Rethinking the Politics of Immigration:
Colonial Modes of Immigration Management and the
Ambivalent Resilience of the Empire State

A Dissertation
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
BY

Mark N. Hoffman

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Raymond Duvall, Lisa J. Disch

July, 2013
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my esteemed advisors, Lisa Disch and Raymond Duvall, for their extraordinary guidance, encouragement, and patience throughout my graduate school career and during each and every phase of my research and writing. They are the best teachers and mentors a graduate student could hope for, and it has been a great privilege to work with them. I am also deeply indebted to my committee members, Antonio Vazquez-Arroyo and Patricia Lorcin. Their inspiration and advice over the past four years has been invaluable. This project would not have been possible without the encouragement and tireless help of my longtime advisor, colleague, and close friend, the indispensable Andrew Davison. My parents, Drs. Ann and Irwin Hoffman, and my brother, Daniel, are phenomenal teachers to whom I’ve turned repeatedly for support and who have more than once rescued me from doctoral despair. I must also thank my intellectual interlocutor, my other brother, Anthony Pahnke, and his family, Marlene Rojas, Mary-Ann Pahnke, and Armond Pahnke, for all their support and guidance. For reading and commenting on various chapters and parts of this dissertation, and for all the inspiring conversations in classrooms, conferences, coffee shops, and bars, I would like to thank Arjun Chowdhury, a brilliant colleague, friend, and co-author to whose coattails I still cling, and also Himadeep Muppidi, Charmaine Chua, Quynh Pham, Brendan Cooper, Jackie Burns, Chiana Loreti, Christine Wegner, Luke Harris, and Kimberlé Crenshaw, Carlos Marentes, Mariano Espinoza, Victor Contreras, and Ruth Snyder. My copyeditor, muse, and partner, the incomparable Jenna G. Laffin, offered invaluable critical commentary on each and every page of this dissertation. During the last phases of solitary writing, when the rigors of revision were throwing the more frightening implications of contemporary bordering practices into sharper relief, Jenna’s intellectual and emotional presence proved an uplifting source of encouragement, inspiration, and hope.
Introduction

Chapter 1
Colonial Borders, New World Orders: Servants, Slaves, and the Founding Divisions of Labor in Nations of Immigrants

Chapter 2
Policing the West: Migration, National-Societal Insecurity, and the Empire State

Chapter 3
Worksites, Schools, and Welcome Centers: The Colonial Incorporation of Immigrants as Aliens

Chapter 4
Imperial Economies, Western Workforces, and Colonial Subjects: A Postcolonial Reconsideration Labor and Migration

Chapter 5
Ambivalence, Breakdowns, and Transpolitical Resistance: Emergenc(i)es of Colonial Immigration Management

Conclusion
Beyond Biopolitics: Immigration Management and the Postcolonial Imperative

Bibliography
Introduction

Racism is constantly emerging out of nationalism, not only towards the exterior, [but also] towards the interior. In the United States, systematic institutional segregation, which put a halt to the first civil rights movement, coincided with America’s entry into world imperialist competition with it subscribing to the idea that the Nordic races had a hegemonic mission. In France, elaboration of an ideology of the French race, rooted in the past of ‘the soil and the dead,’ coincided with the beginning of mass immigration, the preparation for revenge against Germany, and the founding of the colonial empire.1

Étienne Balibar

On September, 22, 2009, hundreds of French riot police from the Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité (CRS) descended upon the Calais “Jungle,” a camp of makeshift tents near the French port sheltering more than 800 Afghan, Iraqi, and Iranian migrants seeking work and asylum in the United Kingdom. Most, if not all, of the English-speaking migrants were escaping violence in Afghanistan and Iraq and seeking low-skilled jobs in the homeland of their regions’ former colonizer, the empire-state for whom their ancestors toiled as colonial subjects. Many of these migrants had helped British and American forces in their campaigns against Saddam Hussein and the Taliban, and were suffering the consequences of their collaboration with Western forces.2 The agency in charge of the Jungle mission, the notorious CRS, was first deployed as riot police tasked with restoring order in France after the liberation from Nazi forces, and subsequently in Algeria to re-establish French dominion in the colony after World War II.3 CRS officers played an integral role in Charles de Gaulle’s counterinsurgency campaign in Algeria. The campaign itself was dramatized in Gillo Pontecorvo’s Battle of Algiers, the anti-colonial masterpiece now used by American security officials (with little sense of irony) to train American troops in the art of counterinsurgency.4

---

2 Field notes: Calais, 2009. My accounts of contemporary policing activity in Calais, Paris, and Marseilles are based on 5 months of field research in France in Fall of 2009 and Summer of 2010.
4 See extra features interviews with counterterrorism officials in Pontecorvo’s Battle of Algiers, extended anniversary edition.
Back in the French metropole, the CRS had been empowered by the government of Nicolas Sarkozy to suppress political dissent, break strikes, and to police communities of immigrants in metropolitan centers, port cities like Marseilles and Calais, and the impoverished *banlieues* outside of Paris. In particular, they were deployed to monitor, control, and harass impoverished communities comprised primarily of migrants from former French colonies in Africa. Their latest job was to protect France’s age-old foe, now-turned-European-ally, the United Kingdom, from the brown-skinned descendants of Britain’s own colonial subjects from the Middle East. These English-speaking subjects - everyone from doctors to truck drivers – sought jobs in low-wage, low-status sectors of the British economy.

In Calais, the CRS used tear gas, dogs, and overwhelming force to subdue both the offending migrant population and its activist supporters. They demolished the tent city and arrested 278 people, including over 150 minors. The operation was not merely a conventional defense of law and order and of French and British national security. More than this, the mission was designed, as one British official put it, “not only to strengthen [the] shared border, but that of Europe as a whole.”

A year earlier, on May 12, 2008, over 900 heavily armed officers drove a caravan of black trucks through the back roads of southern Iowa to Postville, site of Agriprocessors, the largest Kosher meatpacking plant in the United States. The officers were agents of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), an organization established by the Bush administration to “protect America” by “eliminating vulnerabilities that pose a threat to our nation’s borders.” The Postville mission: to detain immigrant workers from Latin America en masse for “Aggravated Identity Theft,” the crime codified by the 2004 Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act. ICE sought to arrest nearly 700 workers that day, one fourth of the town’s population. Of the 390 workers they found and arrested on the shop floor, 383 were Hispanic. Actively recruited by Agriprocessors, these workers had traveled 1800 miles from their native Guatemala to work under harsh factory conditions for minimum wage on the plant’s cut-and-kill

---


assembly line. By the time of the raid, the workers and their families had made Postville one of the most prosperous small towns in the American Heartland. They and other improperly documented Latin American immigrant workers were responsible for revitalizing a meatpacking industry that had been shaken up by the historic labor union strikes of the 1980s. The immigrant workers had settled with their families. They had built relationships and alliances with local residents and workers and, with them, had transformed Postville’s cultural and political landscape. They offered the possibilities of new local and transnational attachments and ways of life. The raids all but destroyed these possibilities.

Contemporary policies and practices of immigration management reveal a paradox at the heart of contemporary global capitalism. On the one hand, individuals in the roles of producers, consumers, and investors seem to move freely across national borders, similar to money and commodities (both human and non-human), in an increasingly borderless or “flat” world. On the other hand, millions of immigrant workers from former European colonies – re-presented in the post-colonial era as “developing countries” – face a proliferating array of legal and coercive restrictions on their movement, from fences and walls to elaborate systems of documentation, systems that exclude them from domains of citizenship and participation in Western political communities. Given the context of globalization and apparently open economies, what explains the emergence of national agencies of immigration enforcement, the proliferation of immigration detention centers, and the mass exploitation, incarceration, and deportation of immigrants across the U.S., Europe, and the new enclaves of capital accumulation in former European colonies and in the former communist bloc? In the context of radical, non-national liberal individualism, what accounts for the explosion of anti-immigrant nationalism in the West and the resurgence of civilian vigilante groups that claim responsibility for policing national borders? What, if anything, reconciles expanded forces of racially discriminatory border controls with enduring policies of economic deregulation and recruitment that facilitate the profitable transnational circulation of exploitable workforces for the sake of economic growth and the relative

---

prosperity of national populations?

The apparent tension between the mass recruitment and the mass exclusion of immigrant workers begs a fundamental question: in the post-slavery, post-apartheid, post-colonial era, on what grounds and in what ways – through what practices, institutions, and mechanisms – are certain categories of workers excluded from domains of citizenship in countries whose economic prosperity and competitiveness depends upon these same workers? Furthermore, how and why are borders separating immigrant, “specialized,” “irregular,” “alien,” and “guest” workers from full members of political communities justified and maintained in a neoliberal world order purportedly defined by post-racial, colorblind individualism?

To understand the imperatives that animate contemporary regimes of border control across Europe and the U.S. in the era of globalization; to understand practices of racial profiling and immigrant-phobic legislation like Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 along with mass immigration raids at profitable centers of production in the era of free trade; to understand the proliferation of practices and centers of detention across the West and the mass incarceration of border crossers from the Global South in an ostensibly “flat world”; in short, to understand how and why a dramatic intensification of immigrant management and border control is occurring when money and commodities are moving across borders with increasing speed and ease, one must consider the social, structural, and historical contexts from which these regimes of immigration management and mass production have emerged.

This study offers a postcolonial analysis of what I call the central constitutive contradiction between the simultaneously operating national discourse of exclusion and the ambivalent colonial discourse of incorporation. My analysis unsettles state-centric accounts of immigration management, including biopolitical and securitization accounts, that fail to satisfactorily account for the dynamics of contemporary colonial power, and it aims to repoliticize the anti-politics essential to that power. I shall describe this latter goal at the end of this Introduction. Here, I elaborate the substantive content of my argument, the meanings of its central concepts, and the contributions it seeks to make to International Relations Theory and Political Theory.

Colonial discourse continually destabilizes the boundaries that separate modern
national populations and order them into hierarchical divisions of labor. As Balibar argues, a tension between nationalist and super-nationalist racisms is always at work in the practices of the national empire state.\(^8\)

At the heart of the colonial ambivalence, therefore, lies the conflict between the European imperial-colonial desire to expand by incorporating foreign lands and peoples and the desire to produce and protect a coherent, cohesive, and relatively homogenous national community by excluding those same foreigners and foreign spaces. The ambivalent solution to this problem has employed colonial practices of bordering that are designed to incorporate colonial subjects partially into national economies and polities, assimilating them to a point at which they resemble Europeans, but are still “not quite” European enough to become full members of the European communities.\(^9\) We see these ambivalent practices, to name just two of countless examples, in the exclusion of former French colonial subjects from North Africa on the grounds that as colonial and as immigrant subjects they refuse to abandon Islamic cultural practices and ways of life, and in the exclusion of Latin Americans from the U.S. on the grounds that they fail to assimilate linguistically and culturally into an imagined American, Anglo-Protestant community tied together by reverence for law and order, despite the efforts of American governmental and non-governmental aid.

I argue that this colonial ambivalence is reproduced within the territory of the nation state in practices designed both to incorporate and to assimilate immigrant subjects, and at the same time to exclude them from the overlapping spheres of the economy and the polity in different ways at different times. This constitutive contradiction of colonial discourse between the imperial desire for expansion, incorporation, and closeness to or intimacy with foreigners and the xenophobic desire for the production and preservation of national identity through exclusion lies at the heart of contemporary modes of immigration management, and takes a number of forms, many of which I will discuss at length in the chapters that follow. For instance, the contradiction often manifests in practices that incorporate immigrants into a national-imperial economy (involving an empire-state’s expansion beyond national borders and transnational modes of production

---


and circulation) as low-status, racialized laborers. At the same time, these same immigrant subjects are excluded from the national polity and domains of citizenship. In the following study I explain the contradictory aspects of immigration management, including how both inclusionary assimilationist organizations, such as humanitarian agencies like the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) and the Bureau of Insular Affairs (BIA), and exclusionary nationalist organizations, such as nationalist labor organizations, call for either conditional (i.e., conditional on proper assimilation and good, civilized behavior) inclusion of immigrant subjects within the national community of rights-bearers or the exclusion of immigrants from the national economy in defense of wages and jobs for national citizens. I shall detail these various dispositions, along with state responses to them, in the study ahead. For example, in the United States, the state has responded to the economic concerns of nationalist unions through various legal mechanisms that ensure that immigrant subjects remain in sectors of the economy that American citizens find undesirable.

My research here supports Balibar’s claim that a “new racism,” in which “sociological” signifiers about “cultural differences” and “lifestyles and traditions” replace biological ones as “the key representation[s] of hatred and fear,” is linked inextricably to processes of decolonization and recolonization during and after the Cold War.10 Balibar’s account of this new racism foregrounds what Jacques Derrida would call a rupture that includes a repetition within colonial discourse.11 Balibar does not suggest that the biological-eugenicist meanings attached to racial classifications have simply been replaced. The representations of racial difference may be changing, but bio-anthropological conventions and understandings, although no longer adequate to describe

---

10 Balibar explains his “neo-racism” hypothesis as follows: “The new racism is a racism of the era of decolonization, of the reversal of population movements between the old colonies and the old metropolises, and the division of humanity within a single political space. Ideologically, current racism, which in France centres upon the immigration complex, fits into a framework of ‘racism without races’ which is already well developed in other countries, particularly the Anglo-Saxon ones. It is a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity as the insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain nuclear peoples relation to others but ‘only’ the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of lifestyles and tradition; in short, it is what P.A. Taguieff has rightly called a differentialist racism.” Étienne Balibar, and Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein. Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities (London; New York: Verso, 1991). 21

the phenomenon and thus “under erasure,” have left a trace that is nonetheless at work in the new official classifications of national and ethnic difference and the bordering practices that both call these differences into being and order them within a global biosocial hierarchy and global division of labor. Although juridical representations of human groups in the “single political space” of the globe now eschew biological categories derived from eugenics and other “official” imperial and colonial sciences, they have recuperated the categorical imperative to maintain borders that segregate what are deemed to be objectively different, superior, and inferior ways of life or, in Samuel Huntington’s famous formulation, “civilizations.” This modification of colonial discourse, legitimated by the Wilsonian ideal of national self-determination and updated by its codification as a human right, maintains, at the same time as it conceals, racial cartographies and racial divisions of labor on a global scale.

This study thus proposes that current modes of immigration management are integral structural manifestations of what Derek Gregory has called the “colonial present”: a global discourse of “cartographic violence,” comprised of colonial practices of bordering that are in turn constituted by new cultural and biopolitical forms of racism. Through historical and theoretical analysis, I aim to situate contemporary practices of racialist immigration management within a history of colonial subject production, namely, the production of racial subjects as occupants or role-players within structures, systems, and practices and of racial identities, namely, relational definitions of homogenous communities with shared heritages and genealogies. Following Balibar, Ann Laura Stoler, Frederick Cooper and others, I argue that immigration discourse “recuperates” aspects of colonial discourse in ways that consistently blur the boundaries separating neo-racist (e.g., nationalist, ethnicist, and culturalist) racisms from older eugenicist, biological racisms that were shaped in European colonies and that culminated

---

in the annihilation of Jews and all other "culture destroyers" in Nazi Germany.\textsuperscript{17}

As Balibar asserts and as Michel Foucault demonstrates at length in his studies of the regulation of national populations, it would be a mistake to reduce current modes of societal group classification to a post-slavery, post-apartheid, post-fascist, post-colonial, and post-racial appreciation of national-cultural difference and diversity.\textsuperscript{18} New immigrants to France and the U.S. from former colonial possessions and imperialist spheres of influence are not merely deemed underdeveloped and potentially assimilable; they are also deemed categorically and eternally different. That is to say, they are represented within official state and public discourses as groups belonging to different cultures which, like bio-racial groupings (and retaining meanings from that still-present mode of classification), are immutable.

As I will show, current hegemonic politics of difference founded upon the myth of distinctive national and civilizational cultures conceals its own embeddedness within that older mode of racism that emerged out of European bio-anthropological science in the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries. Although representations of racial subjects have varied over time and in different geographic and political contexts, the biological core of national and imperial racism remains an underlying force of social reproduction. It is this core that animates the exclusions of colonial subjects and immigrant subjects from the political communities of national states and, through these exclusions, the production of national subjects and national populations as societies that, in Foucault’s famous formulation, “must be defended.”

\textbf{Potential Significance of the Work}

This work has several implications for International Relations Theory and Political Theory. First, by unsettling assumptions of national identity and state cohesiveness and strength, postcolonial analysis of immigration management unsettles the distinctions between foreign and domestic policy upon which neorealist and


\textsuperscript{18} It would be equally misleading to reduce Nazi anti-semitism to bio-racial hatred and a desire for annihilation. The purported cultural distinctiveness of Jews was a central feature of Third Reich anti-semitism, and Jews were not merely annihilated, they were also put to work in concentration camps.
neoliberal theories of international relations are founded. Postcolonial analysis foregrounds the ways in which European-style nation-states today are also *empire-states*: states that expand through colonial modes of governance at the peripheries of colonial and neo-colonial empires. In other words, they are states that incorporate initially foreign resources, e.g., by supporting multinational corporations based within their territories and whose profits flow to a powerful class of their citizens, while at the same time attempting to secure relatively cohesive national populations. Thus, these national empire-states are plagued by an irreconcilable internal conflict between the desire to expand and incorporate foreigners through colonial practices and the desire to secure national populations and state power over these populations: to build walls, to violently exclude or destroy everyone and everything deemed foreign and potentially threatening. In both seemingly benevolent and in brutally violent practices, this internal conflict begs a rhetorical question that Homi Bhabha suggests we’re “bound to ask,” namely, “what does colonial power want”?

To rationalist – neorealist and neoliberal – theorists of International Relations, the question of what states want is an empirical question whose answer can be determined through observable patterns of consistently rational state behavior. Given the ambivalent character of what I will call national empire-states (or, depending on context and emphasis, either the national state or the empire-state), this study necessarily takes a different view. The national empire-state displays incoherent, erratic, and contradictory behavior, especially with respect to immigration management. *The national empire-state does not know what it wants.*

This character stems from its unfixed, heterogeneous foundations. “The people” on which this modern state depends for recognition is not a unified monolith, but rather a “confuctual” “multiplicity.” To earn recognition as a modern democratic state, the national state must respond to multiple conflicting political demands and dynamic interests expressed in a field of contestation wherein the borders of the community are always in question. To the extent that these contestations undermine state authority, however, the national empire-state suppresses or subsumes them within a nationalist discourse that demands state authority and state *sovereignty*,

---

21 See my treatment of debates on national identity in the U.S. and France in Chapter 5.
namely, the right of state authorities to suspend and change its laws for the sake of the life of the population, but without having to consult its members as political agents.

Thus, the national state must suppress the démos and must actively work to produce the population as an imagined community, an ethnos, unified by common heritage, culture, language, tradition and, in the modern context, by race. It attempts (and fails, and attempts again) to produce this ethnos through various anti-political mechanisms of structural and symbolic violence that evacuate “the people” of any allegiance to identities that might undermine state authority or its efforts to protect the life of the population as a biopolitical body. Following Balibar, this study proposes that, from the standpoint of the national state, the ideal population is a population of police. 22

The national empire-state’s “interests” are complicated further by its status as a competitor in the world of imperial powers. Whereas this state seeks to produce and protect the national population by securing territorial boundaries, it also seeks to expand beyond national boundaries into foreign territories in order to accumulate wealth through the exploitation of foreign people and resources, i.e., through colonization. Through colonial adventures, Western European countries and the United States have accumulated surpluses that they have appropriated within national contexts, e.g., by guaranteeing French and American populations a privileged position in the global division of labor as a right of citizenship.

In the world of empire-states, global market pressures and the imperatives of imperial expansion largely determine domestic policy. These pressures and imperatives transcend the domestic-foreign policy divide in ways that are too often unreflectively posited within conventional IR Theory. 23 As an empire-state, the state’s “interests” often seem to coincide more with the interests of capital in the form of multinational corporations and military regimes established to protect private property (e.g., oil in the

22 In Foucault’s broad sense of the term, police signifies the “biopolitical” force of the state that regulates the health of the population by eradicating endemic threats (e.g., disease, cultural threats to national identity and cohesion, home-grown terrorists, etc.), producing and protecting borders, and regulating production and the circulation of goods and people. This concept is discussed at length below and in various contexts in Chapters 2-5.

Gulf) than with the national population under its jurisdiction. There is undoubtedly a
great deal of truth in this Marxian theory of the state. However, it would be a mistake to
assume from this appearance a simple Marxist structural dynamic in which the state is
merely an administrator of capital that merely serves the interests of a ruling class of
capitalists at the expense of all others, including the national population. In order to
expand and survive, the empire-state relies on the active recognition and support of its
national population. And state officials must work to produce that support, e.g., through
the production of coherent national narratives, through negotiations that ensure profit
sharing with American workers and through the maintenance of a robust system of social
welfare.

A postcolonial approach to immigration studies makes these tensions and
paradoxes more apparent. By definition, colonial and migration policies and practices
blur lines that separate foreign and domestic policy. Also by definition, colonial and
immigrant subjects blur lines that separate national populations from foreigners. Like
colonial practices, and through a recuperation and adaptation of their technologies of
power, immigration policies recognize non-citizens who have been incorporated into
national economies as workers for multinational firms as potentially part of the national
polity and, thus, part of the body politic that legitimates state power and gives the state
the strength to achieve its double objective of expansion and security.

By focusing primarily on state actors in general and “great powers” in particular,
conventional IR Theory obscures the production of colonial subjects whose racial
subordination within imperial economies and the global division of labor excludes them
from political negotiations among the friends, enemies, and competitors of great power
politics. This study reconceives these peripheral practices and modes of subjection as
central features of international politics and international political economy.

This postcolonial framework also complicates, at the same time as it builds upon,
Foucauldian analyses of the biopolitical discourse of the modern nation-state. As I
discuss below, the analyses of biopolitics typically proceed by usefully analyzing how
post-Westphalian states regulate the life and health of national populations, e.g., through
practices of surveillance and control of the populations’ vital (life-sustaining and life-
enhancing) state-istics, e.g., birth and death rates, rates of disease, rates of production and
consumption, and all factors relevant to national security, including the opening or
closing of borders to potentially threatening foreign bodies. One of the revolutionary
insights offered by this mode of analysis is its genealogical account of the ways in which
practices of regulation developed in peripheral spaces (science labs, asylums, prison, etc.)
are appropriated by state actors in ways that actually produce the populations that social
scientists, as state actors, seem merely to regulate and protect. Indeed, one of the reasons
the regulation and securitization of the population must be so relentless is the fact that it
is a productive power.24 It must relentlessly produce and reproduce a thing – a social-
biological body called the population – that is always in the process of dissolving or
morphing into something else, often as a result of its own practices of expansion and
“circulation” enacted by the state in part to increase the health and prosperity of the
national population. State power is contingent upon the effectiveness of biopolitical
regulation as a productive power.25

However, Foucault’s mode of discourse analysis also lends itself to ironically
conservative readings and applications.26 It does so by occasionally over-emphasizing
the sheer effectiveness of biopolitical regulation in producing and reproducing national
populations through a plethora of material practices including, as Edward Said
demonstrates more than Foucault, national narratives articulated in everything from
novels to colonial manuals. In light of this apparent effectiveness, it is difficult to
imagine how one might rehabilitate the “knowledges” that are “subjugated” and
“disqualified” by the discursive practices of the nation-state, including colonial practices.
In calling for the rebellion and liberation of these subjugated knowledges, and by de-
naturalizing the national population as an object of scientific analysis and regulation
through analysis of its parochial, peripheral origins, Foucault also seems to contradict the
implications of his own emphasis on the power of regulation, as, for example, in his
representation of the Nazi state as the condition of modern biopolitical regulation par

International Relations (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
25 As Edward Said’s Orientalism among other seminal postcolonial works attests, this insight has enabled a
number of deconstructive gestures as well as calls for resistance within postcolonial theory and postcolonial
social movements.
excellence, as the model of effective biopolitical regulation as opposed to an aberration. My project attempts to highlight these internal tensions within Foucault’s account of his objectives and his mode of analysis, a tension that I argue begs for postcolonial reconsiderations.

**Imperialism, Colonialism, Post-Colonialism, Postcolonialism, and Imported Colonialism**

I define European imperialism, following Robert Young, as the strategy and practice of political-economic domination on the part of European nation-states of foreign spaces and peoples, achieved and legitimated through processes of racialization and hierarchization. “Typically,” Young argues, imperialism “is the deliberate product of a political machine that rules from the centre, and extends its control to the furthest reaches of the peripheries.” By contrast, colonialism functions “as an activity on the periphery” and “needs to be analyzed primarily as a practice,” or set of practices. Postcolonial theorists and historians have identified several patterns of colonial practices, at least six of which are important for the purposes of this study: 1) the conflicting attitudes of love and fear that constitute the ambivalent disposition of the colonizer to the colonized; 2) the mysterious alterity of the colonized other from the point of view of the colonizer; 3) the racial subjection or interpellation of colonizing and subject populations through the projection of “pre-civilized/pre-modern” colonial identities/subjectivities onto colonized spaces and peoples, 4) the systematic

---


29 Young, 2001. 17.


32 Throughout this project, I use the terms subjection and interpellation in the sense provided by Louis Althusser in his Marxian theorization of “ideological state apparatuses.” Althusser argues that all individuals are produced as subjects who occupy structural positions in a global division of labor through practices of interpellation or “hailing,” that is, practices that call them into being as subjects who are bound to play a specific role in a division of labor. Louis Althusser. *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays.* (Monthly Review Press, 2001).

incorporation of colonized populations into imperial economies, often partially into local communities, and the simultaneous exclusion of these populations from national political communities national economies, 5) the “double consciousness” of the colonized population as fully human social agents and political actors and as racialized and commodified objects-in-nature, and 6) the perpetual vulnerability of colonial orders to the formation of subjects that transgress the colonizer/colonized divide.

Post-colonial, as an historical-analytical category, refers to the conventional way historians demarcate the historical period, institutional forms, and modes of governance that emerged chronologically after the formal decolonization of, and the granting of formal independent statehood to, former European colonies. The hyphen emphasizes the “post” as a periodization. Although post-colonial eras began at different times in different former colonies, my historical analysis privileges the period of rapid decolonization after World War II. By contrast, and as Young describes it in his magisterial study of the field, I define postcolonialism as an orientation and mode of critical historical analysis that seeks to identify and challenge colonial trajectories and enduring modes of colonial domination – the traces and legacies of colonialism – in the colonial present. Cultivating a postcolonial orientation means cultivating an awareness of the traces of colonialism that have endured and attention to the ways in which new forms of racialization and exploitation (what Balibar calls the “recolonization of immigration” and what Ngai calls “imported colonialism”) transform colonial discourse at the same time as they reproduce certain aspects of this discourse.

This project also deepens and further theorizes Mae Ngai’s concept of “imported colonialism.” Ngai identifies the recruitment of Mexican labor as perhaps the most instructive example of imported colonialism. In her groundbreaking study of the recruitment and re-subordination of racialized “impossible subjects” in the United States, she describes imported colonialism as "a defacto social-legal condition embedded in formally non-colonial relationships and spaces, in which free citizens of Mexico, an independent nation-state, voluntarily contracted to putatively free, waged labor, within the United States proper.”34 Ngai’s contribution to the literature is significant not only

---

because it identifies coloniality as a *constitutive* dimension of immigration management in the U.S., but also because it hints at a history— the history of US coloniality in Latin America— that is under erasure. Her use of the concept “imported colonialism” calls for further historical and theoretical elaboration of its relevance beyond the geographic and temporal scope of her analysis.\(^{35}\)

In the words of Alicia Camacho, Ngai demonstrates how contemporary modes of immigration management in the United States “mimic” older, distinctively European colonial modes of governance. My study goes further in arguing that immigration management in the U.S. developed *within* a European colonial milieu, adopting and adapting practices from colonial agents in the peripheries of European empires. For instance, the U.S. developed colonial modes of immigration management in the Philippines when it was a U.S. colony, differentiated these practices from the colonial practices of the Spanish, connected them to the colonial practices of the French, and experimented with modifications of these practices in the U.S. metropole when Filipino and other Asian and Latin American groups immigrated to the U.S. in the 20th century. These modifications in turn influenced post-colonial European practices of immigration management. Contemporary practices of immigration management in the U.S. thus can be linked *directly* to these European colonial origins.

In the post-World War II ideological environment defined by self-determination, national independence, anti-imperialism, and anti-colonialism, one might expect to find a fundamental break with Europe’s colonial practices and technologies of power, at least in the sense that national independence would mean the end of formal colonial rule over

---

\(^{35}\) One could argue that the limits of Ngai’s geographic frame, and the consequences of these limits, are analogous to the limits of Foucault’s frame in *Society Must be Defended, the Birth of Biopolitics, and Security, Territory, Population*, as they are identified, for example, by Ann Laura Stoler in *Race and the Education of Desire*. Like Foucault, Ngai calls for an analysis that links a contemporary practice, “imported colonialism,” to points of rupture and repetition in the colonial past. Also like Foucault, however, she limits her analysis to a Western geographic context, which begs the question of *how* and *when* colonial technologies were imported and adapted from the era and peripheral regions of formal colonialism in the post-colonial age. Answers to these questions are largely beyond the scope of this study, although I do suggest ways in which colonial theories and technologies of power travelled with officers and agents of colonialism in the Philippines and North Africa to the U.S. and France, where they were adapted to control both colonials-cum-immigrants and national populations (e.g., see my discussions of the CRS in Algeria and France); Also see Alicia R. Schmidt Camacho. *Migrant Imaginaries: Latino Cultural Politics in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands, Nation of Newcomers* (New York: New York University Press, 2008). pp. xiii, 375.
ostensibly pre-modern subjects in imperial domains. Post-colonialism, that is, might be seen as a moment of apparent rupture within which one can identify precisely what aspects of colonial discourse are preserved and how they are transformed, as well as what precisely is abandoned, eschewed, and replaced. I offer a different and more complicated perspective, one in which one sees both ruptures and repetitions of colonial modes of governance. Focusing on two Western nation-states who developed exclusionary and often brutal practices of immigration management in conversation with one another, I demonstrate how contemporary practices of immigration management in the modern nation-state reproduce colonial practices of inclusive exclusion. These practices incorporate immigrants like and/or as colonial subjects into imperial economies within the territories of Western states while at the same time “building a wall around the West,” i.e., around the privileges of citizenship within Western political communities in particular and the modern Westphalian nation-state in general.

By highlighting the racial dimension of imported colonialism, my study also challenges dominant theoretical paradigms on the global power of the United States in the field of International Relations that either ignore the racialist cartographies that have shaped American expansionist foreign policy or treat them as epiphenomenal to calculations based on the state imperatives of security and economic growth. In classical and neorealist accounts, the expansionist military concerns are inextricably connected to the economic concerns because military strength requires “fungible” economic growth, i.e., growth that could be converted into military security. In these accounts, racialist justifications of the exploitation of foreign peoples as low-wage laborers and of their subjection as potentially bourgeois consumers of American products come after the fact, to legitimize the predetermined, predictable behavior of strong-but-always-already-insecure states within a context of international anarchy. More generally, the guiding principle of Realist IR Theory, that the “strong do what they can,” brackets off the complex ethno-racial frameworks through which strength and weakness have been conceived by both state and non-state actors.

---

37 Zakaria, 1999.
Postcolonial analysis reveals the intrinsic weakness of strong states: the ephemerality and heterogeneity – in short, the non-existence – of the national populations in whose name these states act and speak. As Roxanne Doty has argued, positivist accounts of cause and effect in IR Theory tend to downplay the discursive parameters that produce and empower the subjects of imperialist projects and that shape their choices. Like Doty, I am interested here not in the immediate causes of U.S. expansion, but rather in the discursive terrain and the structural constraints that made these specific expansionary projects possible in the first place and that shaped immigration policy and practice. I am interested not so much in why the U.S. engaged in imperialist practices at particular historical moments, but in how these practices became thinkable, particularly in the context of U.S. exceptionalism and liberal individualism. Grappling with such “how” questions requires that we treat as constitutive those aspects of expansionist practices that more traditional, positivist scholars of International Relations bracket off as epiphenomenal. Included among these aspects are the meanings and values that constitute imperialist practices as such, the background criteria used to evaluate the validity, success, and failure of these practices, and the criteria used to determine what type of political speech is valid and what actors are authorized as political subjects to speak. To accomplish this, one must situate expansionist practices within broader social and historical contexts. These broader contexts complicate theories of state behavior that posit the modern nation-state as a unified, sovereign actor. Focusing on constitutive “how” questions allows us to see the negotiations, aporias, and ambivalence at the heart of contemporary immigration discourse in Western (and Westernized) nation-states. From this vantage point, race is a central element of, and has a central role in shaping, the foreign and domestic policy discourses of so-called “strong states,” and these states are less coherent and “strong” than International Relations Theory might make them seem.

Colonial Ambivalence

The concept of colonial ambivalence provides the key to explaining aspects of population management and border control that the extant literature in International Relations and Comparative Politics, which has gone a long way towards explaining the

---

structural-economic forces animating recent mass migration and its containment, has not satisfactorily accounted for. The concept also points to additional dimensions of my analysis informed by postcolonial and feminist understandings of race and gender.

As I note above, my understanding of the ambivalence of “colonial discourse” draws on Homi Bhabha's work. Bhabha associates colonial ambivalence with the compromises that must be made to settle conflicts between the demand for assimilation, identity, and stasis (which, I have suggested, is a constitutive demand of the modern nation-state and modern nationalism) and the demand for expansion, circulation, change, and difference (which, I have suggested, is a constitutive demand of what I and others have called the “empire-state”). Drawing on Edward Said and Franz Fanon, Bhabha associates ambivalence with the “mimicry” that’s required of both colonizer and colonized to balance the imperatives of assimilation and exclusion:

Within that conflictual economy of colonial discourse which Edward Said describes as the tension between the synchronic panoptical vision of domination—the demand for identity, stasis—and the counter-pressure of the diachrony of history—change, difference—mimicry represents an ironic compromise …[C]olonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite. Which is to say that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference.

Within the European colony, the mimicry required by colonial rule requires the colonized subject to become like the European colonizer, but also to remain perpetually different and inferior both to the colonizer and to the European national population as a whole. This double-bind justifies the subordination of colonials in two ways: by suggesting that colonial subjects are in need of European parental tutelage, training, and regulatory discipline, and by suggesting that they will never become fully European regardless of the effectiveness of this tutelage, which may or may not raise them out of a state of sub-human bestiality and into various conditions of human underdevelopment. Colonial discourse is ambivalent to the extent that it calls for the assimilation – the becoming European – of the colonized at the same time as its regulatory control, abuse, and surveillance practices (material and linguistic) ensures that they will remain a pale imitation of the modern European citizen-subject. In this way, ambivalent colonial
discourse ensures a relatively enduring if also shifting and always unstable boundary between the European citizen-subject and the colonial, between the West and its Others. However, as Bhabha notes, this boundary is perpetually threatened by the mimicry engendered by ambivalent colonial practices:

Mimicry is, thus, the sign of a double articulation; a complex strategy of reform, regulation and discipline, which “appropriates” the other...Mimicry is also the sign of the inappropriate...a difference or recalcitrance which coheres the dominant strategic function of colonial power, intensifies surveillance, and poses an imminent threat to both normalized knowledges and disciplinary powers.40

In both colony and Metropole, this recalcitrant difference takes the form both of a refusal to assimilate and an “inappropriate” willingness to assimilate, or at least to abide by certain core cultural mores and creedal rules and regulations, in exchange for full inclusion within the European imperial-cum-national polity. The latter is deemed inappropriate by a colonizer whose conception of appropriateness is founded upon what Michael Shapiro has called a racial “optic”41 or “violent cartography.” This racial map was developed over centuries by official modes of knowledge production in Europe and Euro-America, namely, those “pseudo–scientific, typological, legal–administrative, [and] eugenicist”42 practices that, as Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney put it, “deal with difference” by projecting onto the colony all that is deemed threatening or dangerous within the European “self,” thereby producing the racial borders and boundaries of Europe.43

Working, therefore, within this conceptual matrix of ambivalence, this study proposes that European coloniality and colonial histories shape the fundamental ambivalence of immigration discourse today. I argue that the conflicts and contradictions within regimes of immigration management and border control replicate with difference the internal conflicts of distinctively European forms of imperial expansion. Most importantly, they reproduce, at the same time as they reconfigure, the conflict between the desire for the assimilation of foreign subjects into Western economies, even into local communities, and the desire for the exclusion of these foreigners from both the

40 Homi K. Bhabha. The Location of Culture. (New York: Routledge, 1994).
41 Shapiro, 2004.
42 Bhabha, 2004. 81.
43 See Inayatullah and Blaney, 2005 on the concept of “splitting.” P. 19
biologically defined body of the national population and from the racially constituted national political community. The internal conflict between the desire for assimilation and intimacy (including love) and the desire for exclusion and annihilation of foreigners and foreign-ness is a constitutive contradiction of colonial rule. Like formal colonial rule, immigration management in the modern nation-state can and ought to be understood and explained in terms of how various state and non-state actors negotiate, compromise on, and otherwise deal with this constitutive contradiction. Guest and contract worker programs, such as the Bracero Program in the U.S., can be fruitfully analyzed as efforts to find a relatively enduring postcolonial equilibrium that satisfies both conflicting desires adequately enough to avert a fatal crisis. Like all colonial practices, these practices of incorporation and bordering in the peripheries of the metropole involve a complex and constantly changing combination of legal regulations, alongside practices of exploitation, segregation, and intimidation that both adhere to and violate these regulations (as shown in Chapter 2), extra-legal recruitment and contracting practices, and “civilizing” or “development” practices that profess to modernize immigrant subjects in precisely the same way that colonial practices were designed to modernize colonial subjects (as shown in Chapter 3).

In the chapters that follow, I thus attempt to show how racial categories and boundaries have been imported from European colonies to Western-style nation-states and reconfigured to maintain increasingly complex internal borders separating citizen-subjects from recolonized immigrant subjects. That these practices produce violent cartographies within the territorial boundaries of nation-states must be emphasized. These maps group people according to racial status determined by imperial modes of knowledge production and draw juridical, ideological, and physical boundaries around these groups. Prior studies on the French colonial context emphasize this as well: Patricia Lorcin details the way in which French colonial officials trained at the French colonial and polytechnical schools believed they had identified two major racially distinct groups in Algeria, namely, relatively nomadic Arabs whose heritage could be traced back to the Ottoman invasions, and thus to a non-white-European past, and relatively sedentary

---

Berbers from the Kabylia region who French officials believed to have Roman, and thus relatively more white-European, ancestral roots. Initial evaluations of the character, manners, and mores of these two groups proliferated in French centers of knowledge production, ultimately producing a discourse: a set of material practices that together provide the criteria through which truth claims can be validated and acted upon.

In this way, colonial modes of knowledge production created an incomplete and unstable version of what it claimed to know beforehand. The physical segregation of the Algerian population and the physical ordering of the space of Algeria into a hierarchy with French metropolitans at the top, followed by French settlers, Berbers, and finally Arabs, who stood just above “black Africans” in the French colonial-racial cartography, was one part of an ongoing process of imperial subjection that required colonial subjects to perform various roles in a colonial hierarchy, e.g., that of manual laborer in factories, domestic workers in households, colonial overseers and colonial police. Repetition of these performances produces conventions that have lasting “subject effects” in both the former colony and the former metropole. They have re-emerged in subtle but important ways in the context of European immigration discourse, in what Balibar calls the “recolonization” of immigrant subjects that I discuss in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 and in the political actions and practices of these subjects discussed in Chapter 5.

Although the racial boundaries of colonial cartographies are easily visible when they take the form of physical walls or fences, e.g., around factories, agribusiness fields, work and concentration camps, or entire countries, these physical boundaries represent one among other dramatic culminations of complex and varied prior (in both the logical and the chronological sense of the term) practices of racial bordering. These violent racial maps are also typically gendered in the sense that hierarchies of racial superiority and inferiority are typically framed in terms of masculine and feminine traits within a patriarchal discourse. Indeed, as Balibar, Stoler, Said, and Gayatri Spivak among others have demonstrated, colonial discourse derives its central tropes and criteria for valid truth claims about the identities and behaviors of social groups from patriarchal

---

Colonial and immigrant subjects are typically represented within colonial discourse much like women are typically represented in patriarchal discourse, namely, as underdeveloped, irrational, hysterical, sexually immature and undisciplined, and therefore as necessarily dependent upon a ruling class of rational, independent, modern white men whose burden it is to discipline all human groups who are deemed not to meet these patriarchal standards – women and the inferior races – and to suppress their baser, animalistic instincts. As Balibar has emphasized, training for the colonial practices entailed by the “white man’s burden” took place in the domestic space of the home as much as it did in the peripheral space of the colony.47 Indeed, as feminist postcolonial theorists have argued, colonization is itself a process of *domestication*.48

My research participates in this arena of thinking by showing how these kinds of patriarchal and paternalist racial cartographies, produced through colonial practices in the peripheries of European empires, were recoded and rehabilitated during and after the postwar ruptures of decolonization within European metropolitan centers (e.g., agribusiness factory fields and plants reserved for specialized immigrant labor and in “domestic” spaces like hospitals and private homes) and within the capitalist world system more broadly. In short, what follows is a study of the reproduction within discourses of immigration, population, and workforce management of patriarchal and paternalist colonial modes of governance and gendered, colonial-racial divisions of labor in an ostensibly post-colonial world.

**Further Dimensions of Significance in IR: “Security,” Conflicts, Contradictions, and Crises of Immigration Management in the Post-Colonial Era**

The phenomena that most concern me – recent developments in Western immigration management and border control in the post-colonial era – are typically conceptualized and analyzed in the field of IR as modes of national-societal “securitization.”49 In fixating on problems associated with national security, conceived as

49 Didier Bigo. “When two Become One: Internal and External Securitizations in Europe” in Michael Williams (Ed.); Kelstrup, Morten; Williams, Michael (2002-12-07). *International Relations Theory and the*
the protection of the integrity and health of the national population, these studies tend to
neglect the imperial-colonial history of population management in general and
immigration management in particular. Thus, they often under-appreciate what
postcolonial historians and theorists regard as crucially important colonial modes of
subjection, including the ways in which conventions and performances of sexual and
racial difference function to present as natural both the division between Western subjects
and non-Western others and the subordination of the latter to the former. In discourses of
national security and securitization developed in the U.S. and Europe, immigrants are
represented and treated as potential threats to Western standards of living, ways of life, as
well as, qua "terrorists" or unassimilable masses, existential threats to the lives of
members of the population and the population as a whole. As I discuss in Chapter 5, these
representations always fail to capture immigrant subjects completely, both in the sense of
representing them accurately and in Louis Althusser’s sense of “interpellating” them or
transforming them into subjects within ideological structures and material divisions of
labor. Interpellation, or the transformation of individuals into subjects within a discourse,
always involves a misrecognition of internally conflicted and multiple subjects-in
formation as unitary and static subjects who are bound to occupy their appropriate subject
position within a given socioeconomic structure.

Alongside the securitization studies, there exists a body of IR scholarship that has
tried to bring Foucauldian discourse analysis to bear on the politics of immigration.
These critical interventions into the discourses of security focus have argued that
agencies of border control tend to produce the very threats they are designed to curb, e.g.,
by empowering criminal border crossers such as drug cartels and human smugglers.50
Some Foucauldian Critical Security scholars further examine how border control and
immigration management regimes actually serve to produce the populations they are
designed to protect, i.e., by constructing national identities in relation to others or what

---

Ernesto Laclau and Derrida have called a “constitutive outside.” The present study builds on these interventions, examining the specific ways regimes of border control adapt colonial modes of subjection both to valorize national citizenship and to recolonize former colonial subjects as occupants of subordinate position within reconfigured imperial economies.

Other dominant strains in the field of immigration studies focus on the structural economic pressures and rational responses to these pressures on the part of individuals and states that cause migration from poorer countries and regions to countries and places with more and better economic opportunities for workers. Drawing on economic models of market-driven behavior, these studies treat immigration policies and practices as rational efforts to realize the well-defined, “objective” interests of unified nation-states. These structural and rational actor theories of migration foreground important international and global inequalities that help to explain patterns of migration. However, mass migration from the Global South to Europe and the U.S. as well as from the U.S. and Europe to new centers of capital accumulation in the “developing world” (e.g., China and India) reveals much more than calculations based on economic opportunities for migrant workers and the “needs” of particular countries. It reveals more than the “opening” and “closing” of “doors” to different groups of immigrants. It reveals more even than the analysis of immigration and emigration, as such, can explain. More than all of this, it exposes the virtuality of “the West” in the context of imperial expansion; the

53 According to the passive economistic vocabulary of immigration studies, migrants from the “developing world” are “pushed” and “pulled” by market forces unleashed by neoliberal deregulation and demands for labor. They are “let in” or “excluded” according to the interests and needs of unified nation-states. This framework largely disregards the transnational spaces produced both by empire-states and by border-crossing migrants, the active incorporation of immigrant and colonial workers, as well as divisions and conflicting interests within and between different state apparatuses. This theme is introduced here and discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 4.
54 “The United States is unique as a nation in the degree to which it has absorbed immigrants from other nation-states. No other nation in the world has experienced as many and as varied an influx of various ethnic groups. Our initial policy was to keep an open door, welcoming all. Indeed, as a nation comprised of a group of states, we positively reached out and sought to draw to our shores immigrants from Europe.” Michael C. LeMay. From Open Door to Dutch Door: An Analysis of U.S. Immigration Policy Since 1820 (Westport, Praeger, 1987). 20.
ephemerality of Western political communities, economies, and workforces in the context of colonial incorporation of foreign lands and peoples; and the perpetual incompleteness of the modern Western nation-state in the context of profitable border crossings that perpetually reconfigure national political communities. In so doing, it reveals the continuation of strategies and practices of European imperial expansion, incorporation, and exclusion that transgress national borders, produce transnational spaces and imperial-global systems, and thus animate colonial practices of policing that reproduce colonial hierarchies. My argument here is that Europe and the West are contested concepts, both in terms of territory and in terms of political community, and that practices of policing and security – and specifically immigration management and border control – strive to produce Western subjects and spaces rather than securing an already constituted West. The subject effects of these practices are performances of identities rather than static subjects. As such, they are more vulnerable to political contestation, to subversive mimicry or to what Judith Butler has termed the “resignification” of social conventions, than dominant narratives of identity and difference would make them seem.55

This dissertation thus contributes to a growing literature that addresses how the crises of immigration management, border control, and policing reflect “tensions of empire.”56 My goal is to understand and explain the contradictions, crises, and ambivalence of contemporary immigration management by examining how it reproduces and reconfigures the contradictions and crises of European imperial expansion and colonial modes of population management and governance. I demonstrate how “imperial economies,”57 masquerading as national economies within domestic and foreign policy debates, expand through the recruitment, incorporation, policing, and exclusion of immigrants, and how this continued expansion recapitulates European projects of expansion into Africa, Asia, and Latin America during the era of formal colonialism, blurring national boundaries and necessitating productive practices of rebordering in the form of policing and border control.

55 Judith Butler. Excitable Speech; Also see Franz Fanon. Black Skin White Masks.
57 Frederick Cooper, 1997.
Politics, Biopolitics, and Anti-Politics

Throughout the work, I examine how immigration and border practices break down as political projects and how anti-political regimes compensate for political conflicts and failures. This dimension of my analysis is premised upon a broadly Arendtian conception of politics and the political at work here denoting insurrectional reconceptualizations and contestations of exclusive and violent procedures and institutions that have, in Arendt’s words, become banal, that is to say, that have become ordinary bureaucratic and technocratic discourses that are taken as givens by agents of law and order and, to the extent that they participate in and reproduce these discourses unreflectively, by all members of national populations. Practices that normalize, naturalize, and/or reify these discourses are anti-political in the sense that they insulate technocratic and bureaucratic institutions and practices from the political fray. As Balibar and others have demonstrated, the borders of the national state function not only to keep foreigners out, transforming them into threatening aliens, but also to control political challenges to state authority and to purge the national territory of political conflicts and insurrections.

To be political, the means and ends of these processes and practices must not be fixed in advance, as in an Aristotelian techné, e.g., the building of a house that already has a blueprint or the building of a wall to protect a national population. Nor can the identities and interests of their participants be fixed, as in the case of already constituted national political communities, ethnic groups, classes, etc. Rather, “outcomes,” whether in the form of a distribution and mode of consumption of a surplus of goods and resources, the production of new customs, practices, or ways of life, or the composition and constitution of a political community, must always be the products of contestation and open to further contestation. The political is this opening up of reified conventions to new ways of thinking and acting and to new political actors formerly excluded from domains of political conflict and contestation. Political activity subversively challenges the taken-for-granted banality of everyday practices, especially those practices that
function to exclude certain political subjects from participation in political conflicts, including the shaping of the terms of those conflicts.  

Like older forms of eugenicist social engineering, contemporary biopolitics is anti-political to the extent that 1) it transforms political contestation into a technocratic project that must be undertaken by a state bureaucracy whose objective is given in advance – the life/health of a particular kind of racialized social body called the nation – and measured by already-specified metrics called statistics; 2) its means are practices of policing (including practices of bordering and subjection), in Foucault’s broad sense of the term; and 3) its participants are transformed and transform themselves into subjects of the nation and instruments of the state, namely, into police. To take an instructive example that I explore in this study, the immigrant-phobic demands of the “Minutemen” in the U.S. for the right to establish local, non-state sites of autonomous authority to “police the border” are immediately transformed into demands for the Federal Government to pass “comprehensive immigration reform” and to “fix our broken borders” in such a way that the Minutemen themselves would become agents of the big state they purportedly despise. Likewise, the demands of immigrant rights advocates for amnesty programs, guest-worker programs, paths to citizenship, and for bilingual and multicultural education morph into demands for a different kind of “comprehensive immigration reform” that will “fix our broken immigration system.” In short, parties to the conflict over immigration as such, to the extent that they frame their demands in terms of the problem of immigration, fight on the same biopolitical, and thus, as I argue, anti-political, terrain. They pose questions and make demands that reify the national population as the beneficiary and/or the victim of immigration, and that more or less exclude immigrants along with transnational subjects like workers as full participants in

As Lisa Disch has noted, Hannah Arendt usefully theorized the political as that which draws attention to or “raises awareness” of the “banality of evil”: of the injustices produced by what seem initially to be mechanical and thus banal institutions and procedures through which inequalities are perpetuated and violent exclusions and annihilations of large human groupings are achieved. Biopolitical discourse and colonial discourse, like fascist discourse (and sharing some of its origins in the founding of the European nation-state) is a set of apparently banal practices of border enforcement that in fact violently exploit, exclude, assimilate, and annihilate large groups of people as subordinate, threatening, and expendable subjects who both exist within biopolitical discourse and who are produced by that discourse. See Craig J. Calhoun and John McGowan. *Hannah Arendt and the Meaning of Politics, Contradictions of Modernity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).
political debates. They all regard immigration as a problem that must be solved by the state on behalf of the national population.

Thus, national borders, and now the borders of Europe and the West, along with the practices that produce and maintain these borders, are fundamentally anti-political and “profoundly antidemocratic.” National borders and statist bordering practices mark the lines where democratic deliberation among “the people” as a political community, as a dēmos, ends and where technocratic calculations among biopolitical technocrats about how best to protect “the people” as “an imagined community of membership and filiation,” an ethnos, begins. On one side of the border lies the domain of politics and of democratic contestation over “the good life,” the political community’s self-definitions, its borders, its modes of production and consumption, and its future. On the other side lies the domain of the police, of national security, of regulation and surveillance, and of border control as a techné. A central, curious consequence of this techné is that it evacuates the biopolitical sphere both of the dēmos and of the cultural content that constitutes the imagined community of “the people” as an ethnos.

This point is crucial. Biopolitical regimes blur the line between politics and police by deputizing citizens as agents of the national state, i.e., as national police. What I have called the becoming police of the people has at least two major consequences. First, the people’s responsibilities as members of a dēmos are subordinated to their duties as protectors of the fictive national ethnos. Among other political conflicts, this transformation suppresses conflict over modes of ownership, production, consumption, and distribution of commodities and useful goods or use-values; over cultural formations and ways of life; and, most importantly for my purposes, over the definitions of political communities and the bordering criteria that separate and reproduce those communities. Second, whatever substantive ethno-cultural content might have defined “the people” as an ethnos is erased and replaced by the non-culture of technocratic policing, of technocratic calculations, of law and order. If we understand culture in broadly Marxian terms as the appropriation of surplus, as that which exceeds the boundaries of what it would take to reproduce the bare subsistence of individuals and of the species, the

---

national empire-state constantly strives to suppress cultural formations in order to transform the people into police. I take this to be the dystopia described by Foucault at the end of *Society Must be Defended*. In the extreme case of the fascist state, the dēmos has been destroyed, and the only remnant of the culture of the *ethnos* is “state racism.” The more the nation as a political community and a dynamic cultural formation and imagined ethno-cultural community is destroyed, the more the state is left by its own devices to defend an *absent nation* composed of police and bare life.

**Case Selection, Methodology, and Organization**

My choice of the U.S. and France as “cases” may seem strange to some political analysts, given that the era of formal French colonial rule was officially brought to end by the Evian accords in 1962 and that the U.S. has never been widely considered a formal colonial power in the European sense. In addition, some theorists of Comparative Politics and postcolonial theorists may, for different reasons, see my case selection as altogether too easy: two imperial-colonial nation-state powers re-enacting similar colonial practices in their treatment of immigrants from former colonies proves nothing or nothing particularly special. One could argue that I am simply stating what is obviously true (for instance, to those who experience the coloniality of border control and workforce management in their daily lives) or selecting cases based on a common colonial dependent-variable-effect, namely, colonial modes of immigration management. These potential criticisms must be addressed from the outset.

While I acknowledge that the coloniality of labor migration management in the U.S. and France will be obvious to certain postcolonial subjects and intellectuals, I re-assert the importance of analyses that foreground this coloniality in the context of both the conventional reputation of these states as inclusive nations of immigrants and dominant scholarly and popular narratives about U.S. and French exceptionalism. For many scholars, the American “Turner Thesis” and French support for “the universal rights of man,” are “least likely cases” of colonial modes of governance, not obvious ones.⁶¹ However, by foregrounding the traces of profoundly illiberal and culturally

---

⁶¹ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.*
parochial practices of cultural imposition within both the French and American discourses of immigration management, this study cuts against the grain of dominant narratives.

Moreover, the historical analysis offered here demonstrates that colonial modes of immigration management were developed in an international context in ways that cannot be captured by standard comparative analyses of immigration and labor management within independent nation-states. Focusing on the U.S. and France enables an analysis that clearly shows how colonial technologies were transferred back and forth across the Atlantic in addition to being imported from colony to metropole. Although I do not attempt a full analysis of inter-Atlantic conversations and negotiations of the effectiveness of different modes of colonial governance in the metropole, I do provide glimpses into the ways in which interaction between France and the U.S., from the early New World imperial adventures to the present, were integral to the production of a European and a Western population and of Western discourses of societal and civilizational security. Chapter 4, for example, offers an historical account of how the coloniality of labor immigration and workforce management were exported through the Marshall Plan from the U.S. to Western Europe during periods of waning formal colonial rule and of decolonization. I propose that just as U.S. officials used knowledge garnered from French colonial experience in North Africa and Vietnam in the U.S. colonialism of the Philippines, Hawai`i, and Northern Mexico (and more recently in Iraq and as successors of the French Vietnam), France has learned from U.S. officials about how to adapt colonial practices to control and maintain borders among colonial-immigrant and citizen workforces.

Situating the practices of immigration management within an ongoing history of colonial governance requires a multi-method, inter-disciplinary approach. My research employs three modes of inquiry to study the colonial history of immigration discourse: archival historical research, non-participant observation and interviews, and interpretive, textual analysis. This methodology has allowed me to develop interpretive, historical modes of analysis that bring established modes of postcolonial theory that are normally applied only to “classic” cases of European colonialism and its legacies in Europe and the

---

formerly colonized world to bear on contemporary immigration policies and practices in the U.S. and France.

Guided by my reading of contemporary theories of immigration policy and practice in Political Science and by historical accounts of the development of immigration discourse in the U.S. and France, I have through my fieldwork in those respective nations sought to identify constitutive features of contemporary immigration discourse in the West that have been neglected or under-theorized in this literature. My approach here is genealogical in the sense that my goal is to demonstrate how contemporary modes of immigration management came into being at particular historical moments of crisis, adapting some features of prior paradigms and eschewing others. By contextualizing immigration practices, I hope both to contribute to an understanding of present practices and to de-naturalize and politicize these practices: to open anti-political practices to political contestation.

The following chapters seek to highlight continuities that link discourses of immigration management to a colonial past by examining moments and periods of rupture in which one might expect a radical departure from that past. More importantly, I seek to explain the ambivalence of contemporary immigration management, with reference both to contemporary representations of borders, citizens, and immigrants, and to historical representations of full members of national political communities and Others.

The opening chapter provides a broad historical analysis of ruptures and repetitions within European colonial discourse in North America. Here, I attempt in broad historical outline to identify some of the precedents for the racial subjection of immigrants in the U.S. and France and for contemporary modes of imported colonialism generally. Although I focus primarily on the U.S. “case” in this chapter, I also seek to narrow the gap between, on the one hand, studies of European colonialism in general and French colonialism in particular and, on the other hand, studies of ostensibly exceptional American Westward expansion both across the continent and finally into the Pacific Islands and other overseas territories. This chapter begins an effort to participate in a growing body of literature that challenges narratives of U.S. exceptionalism, especially in the context of racial subject production. I argue with others that the subjection of indentured servants, slaves, and indigenous communities share more with European
practices of imperial expansion and colonial subjection than conventional accounts founded on the exceptionalism of Frederick Jackson Turner’s “frontier thesis” would make it seem. In fact, agents of American expansion learned from French and Spanish colonial officers and *vice versa*.

Chapters 2 through 4 explore the ways in which colonial discourse was recuperated by practices of immigration and population management, workforce management, ambivalent labor union agitation, and the recruitment and developmental assimilation of immigrant workers. Chapter 2 begins with a review of state-centric theories of immigration policy based on narratives of national security, including the security of national economies. It then proceeds to critique these theories through a Foucauldian analysis of the ways in which discourses of immigration management and border control in the U.S. and France *produce* the borders and the populations, as biologically defined bodies, that they claim merely to regulate and protect. I conclude the chapter with reflections on the limitations of Foucauldian discourse-analytics for understanding the complex processes of subjection in colonial peripheries, and particularly the *ambivalence* of colonial policing in both colony and metropole.

Chapter 3 initially undertakes an analysis of this ambivalence as it is manifested in the active recruitment, incorporation, development, modernization, and civilization of immigrant subjects. I argue that these practices of incorporation reproduce various constitutive aspects of civilizing missions that were modeled on the first French *missions civilisatrices* in its African and Asian colonies and that were modified by American colonial officials in the “insular cases” of the Philippines, Guam, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Hawai’i, and Northern Mexico. I argue that by closing the geographic distance between citizen-colonizer and non-citizen-colonized populations, and thereby opening new avenues for transnational solidarity and effective demands for equality with citizens of the colonizing “host country,” these fundamentally ambivalent practices of incorporation brought the contradictions of American and French imperialism and colonialism to a head.

Chapter 4 explores manifestations of this colonial ambivalence within American and French labor movements and in their negotiation with state agencies and employers. I attempt to demonstrate how the internal conflicts within labor movements over colonialism and immigration reflect the fundamental conflict, foregrounded by the active
recruitment of colonial subjects as low-cost workers, between the national workforce and the political subject “worker.” I examine how openings for the articulation of the latter subject were closed after the Second World War and paradoxically undermined by successful movements for the national liberation and independence of former colonies.

The fifth and final chapter examines what I term the politics of biopolitics, namely, the complex, diverse, intra- and transnational political demands, contestations, and movements that biopolitical state forces channel in nationalist and Europeanist directions. With postcolonial theorists such as Homi Bhabha and historians such as Frederick Cooper, I argue that, although these nationalist channelings have intensified in recent years, they have done so in response to a proliferation of non-national, transnational, and otherwise transnational political or “transpolitical”62 alternatives to the European nation-state. These forces include both the adoption of imperial and colonial modes of capital accumulation by state forces in the so-called “developing world” and trans- and intra-national social movements that are mobilizing to resist these forces.

The concluding chapter returns to the examples and questions posed in the preceding pages and calls for a reconsideration of the terms of popular debates about immigration policies and practices in light of their colonial history and its enduring productive power in the colonial present. I offer reflections on 1) the prospects for latent political subjects produced by contemporary modes of capitalist accumulation and exploitation to challenge the hegemony of the empire-state, as well as 2) practices of resistance to colonial modes of immigration management and border control in which transnational movements are currently engaged.

My overall objective has been to understand and, in Arendt’s terms, to “raise awareness” of the traces of coloniality that haunt contemporary immigration discourse. The importance of this research is, in my view, demonstrated by the politically and historically impoverished, apolitical and anti-political debates on “immigration reform” in the U.S. and France. Debates over how best to “fix” the “problem” of immigration effectively de-politicize national borders and “the wall around the West,” erasing the colonial history that produced the investment in those borders, in the privileges of

---

Western citizenship and European whiteness, and in the subordination and exploitation of non-citizen subjects. I propose here that by pursuing a line of inquiry that asks if and in what ways colonial modes of thinking and governance are still at work in immigration law and border control as well as in the recruitment and exploitation of immigrants, we can begin to think politically and critically about national borders and bordering practices, about the borders of Europe and the West, about the historical function these borders have served and the roles that they serve today.
Chapter 1

Colonial Borders, New World Orders: Servants, Slaves, and the Founding Divisions of Labor in Nations of Immigrants

[Anti-Semitism functioned on a European scale: each nationalism saw in the Jew (who was himself contradictorily conceived as both irreducibly inassimilable to others and as cosmopolitan, as a member of an original people and as rootless) its own specific enemy and the representative of all other hereditary enemies; this meant, then, that all nationalisms were defined against the same foil, the same ‘stateless other,’ and this has been a component of the very idea of Europe as the land of the ‘modern’ nation states or, in other words, of civilization. At the same time, the European or Euro-American nations, locked in a bitter struggle to divide up the world into colonial empires, recognize that they formed a community and shared an ‘equality’ through that very competition, a community and inequality to which they gave the name ‘white’.

Étienne Balibar63

Introduction

Contemporary debates about U.S. immigration policy tend to reflect investments either in pluralist narratives of nation-building immigrant labor and “melting-pot” assimilation or in nativist narratives of enduring ethno-racial American identity and justified exclusion. Parallel debates in France revolve around the traditional commitment to universal human rights founded on the French Declaration of Rights and of the Citizen and insular, xenophobic French republicanism articulated most explicitly by leaders of the Front Nationale but evident in the massive support of center-right parties and in French socialist and labor union opposition to immigration (discussed in Chapter 4). These apparently opposing narratives function to obscure the enduring imperial and colonial dimensions of immigration discourse in the United States and France. In so doing, they obscure the enduring practices of social control through which European and Euro-American discourses both 1) incorporate migrant groups as laborers into their expansionist projects by organizing them into ethno-racial hierarchies and 2) exclude immigrants from domains of full citizenship.

Drawing on prominent theories and histories of racial identity formation, this chapter foregrounds continuities that link contemporary practices of immigration management to the bordering practices and racial conceptions of national identity that emerged during the period of European and Euro-American expansion in the 17th and 18th centuries, prior to the recording of official immigration statistics. Focusing on the institutions of slavery and servitude, it identifies the colonial origins of some aspects of modern immigration discourse. Whereas many prominent theories of immigration to the United States treat these institutions as aberrant or relegate them to a distant past, I argue that the forced migration and super-exploitation of European and African bonded labor should be regarded as foundational practices in the history of Euro-American immigration management.

Underlying this genealogical “history of the present,” and my sense of its importance, are several theoretical convictions and precautions that I will attempt to articulate explicitly before beginning. First and foremost, in attempting to identify certain historical origins and trajectories of contemporary immigration discourse, I am not seeking to identify historical causes of contemporary practices. On the contrary, taking my lead from Foucault and Derrida, my goal is to identify the emergence of at least some of the conditions that make contemporary immigration practices possible, but not necessary, that is, not historically predetermined. For example, by examining the emergence of the “immigration problem” during the historical ruptures of colonization and decolonization, we enable critical thinking about the conditions of possibility that make the utterance “what should we do about the immigration problem?” possible, and that shape the terms of popular and scientific debate about that problem. Forced to notice that the immigration problem was produced at a particular moment at which a number of different kinds of problematics could have taken center stage, one can begin to think the limits – the cracks, aporias, exclusions, repressions – of what Foucault would call an episteme: the regime of knowledge and truth in which this problem is embedded.

Likewise, examining how the post-colonial immigrant subject, a national body politic comprised of citizens who are defined in relation to that immigrant subject, and a whole range of mechanisms of social control designed to deal with immigrants and citizen populations have been produced alongside the “immigration problem” and in the
same overlapping discourses of the nation state, the empire state, and immigration management, enables consideration of the political subjects that have been and continue to be 

*excluded* by the discourse of immigration management, e.g., the political subject “worker” discussed in Chapter 4 and other transnational political subjects that might challenge the given-ness of national, Western, and European borders. The rehabilitation of alternative political subjects and projects that are repressed by the national state and the current regime of immigration management is a central political goal of this project.

In exploring this history, then, I seek to * politicize* the underlying assumptions, conceptual frameworks, and criteria for evaluating truth claims in present debates about immigration (what Foucault calls *epistemes* in *The Order of Things*) by identifying ruptures in which those criteria *and their predecessors* have been called into question or have been vulnerable to contestation. Historical analysis functions here as a means to make contemporary immigration management and bordering practices that are widely taken for granted as *normal* or even *natural* seem strange and even improbable in light of alternative, “subjugated” possibilities and subversive struggles that have emerged at various moments of historical transformation and crisis. Like Marx’s political subjects in Derrida’s *Specters of Marx*, these subjects and possibilities always *haunt* the present moment, threatening to unsettle its *a priori*, to allow us to think differently about them and, perhaps, to replace them with something new.

What follows is first and foremost a history of the ongoing formation of gendered racial subjects, subjectivities, subject positions, identities, and rules. Specifically, I’m interested in the discursive production – through performance and through performative representation – of racialized imperial, colonial, immigrant, and national subjects, and the ways in which these subjects have endured and changed during periods of apparent crisis. These subjects do not exist in an enduring way, and they cannot continue to exist without repeated performances of racial scripts. In line with Derrida’s theory of representation and Butler’s theory of performativity, I understand subjects as relatively enduring, but nonetheless perpetually unstable effects of repeated performances of identity, e.g., racial, national, and immigrant identities, and repeated representations of difference. I agree with Derrida that the survival of political subjects, conventions, and ideas depends upon acts of repetition. These repetitions depend, in turn, on memory of a history of prior
representations (what Derrida calls “writing”64). Because we rely on these prior representations, we can always find traces of them in our performances of identity at any given moment. My historical account here forms part of an effort to deconstruct the “colorblind” juridical terms of contemporary immigration discourse by identifying the “trace” of colonial representations of racial identity and difference in the current, supposedly post-racial United States and France.

The desire to reproduce stable identities, such as national identities, is perpetually frustrated by the fact that these identities must be performed again and again and that each new performance introduces the possibility of alteration, subversive mimicry, or radical transformation. I will argue that it is precisely this frustration and anxiety in the face of the perpetual absence of identity that animates the bordering practices of the modern national state in ways that reproduce “with difference” older, but still familiar, practices of colonial bordering. These bordering practices are themselves performances of national identity in the sense that they identify members of political communities in relation to foreigners. The inability of the state to produce an enduring national identity fuels more anxiety, especially in the context of diverse imperial spaces with multiple subjects competing for political power. The illusion of identity is a subject-effect of what Althusser calls “misrecognition,” i.e., the misrecognition of something that is multiple and dynamic as something that is unitary and static. The productions of racial categories discussed below are instructive examples of this phenomenon. At no point are any of the subjects discussed below fixed. However, it is their very instability and the anxiety this instability produces that reanimates the practices of bordering that reproduce racial subjects.

**Histories of Racial Subject Formation in Euro-America**

Popular historical literature on post-abolition immigration to the United States tends to reinforce narratives of American exceptionalism by focusing on the relatively successful struggles of voluntary immigrants from Western Europe and on the temporary, race-based restriction of immigration from Asia and Latin America between the late 19th

---

century and the Kennedy-era reforms of the mid-1960s. With some notable exceptions, this literature relies on a progressive narrative of American inclusiveness and tolerance. Scholars of race, class, and gender have made substantial contributions to a growing body of critical literature attending to the oft-neglected racial and colonial dimensions of immigration policies and practices that existed in various forms throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. Drawing on the seminal works of W.E.B. DuBois and others, theorists of racial identity formation have studied the bordering practices that secure what David R. Roediger calls the “wages of whiteness”: privileges distributed through political and legal mechanisms on the basis of socially legitimated racial hierarchies and divisions of labor. This literature helps to explain enduring patterns of socioeconomic inequality and racial subordination in the ostensibly “colorblind” era of universal rights. Other authors have deepened our understanding of these patterns by identifying their origins in practices of European imperial expansion and colonialism in the Americas.65

What follows seeks to contribute to this conversation by offering an expressly postcolonial analysis of the racialization and exploitation of social groups, including African American slaves, before and after the American Declaration of Independence. Again, by colonial, I mean administrative practices developed to advance imperialist projects of domination and expansion in peripheral spaces located both in foreign lands and within established national territories.66 Clearly, there is a difference between this early colonial period, which developed models primarily of labor export, and the current U.S. and French models of labor recruitment and importation. The historical account presented here complicates this distinction, however, as it focuses on a period in which colonists of the ownership class occupied a liminal position between the colony and the metropole, a position from which it often demanded the importation of laborers from Britain, from Africa, and from among the indigenous populations in North America. Following the historian Mai Ngai, I call the latter form of domination “imported colonialism.”67 Again, by postcolonial, I mean a critical orientation that draws attention to the enduring practices through which colonial relationships of domination are

produced and maintained among would-be rulers and those they seek to rule, notably the social construction of racial subjects and the policing of boundaries between dominant and subordinate social groups.\(^{68}\)

I proceed both chronologically and thematically, focusing on events and developments that demand postcolonial analysis. I concentrate primarily on the American “case,” both because nearly all major European imperial powers developed colonial technologies in the New World and because there already exists an abundance of literature on French colonialism in North Africa and Asia. A central goal of this chapter is to unsettle narratives of American exceptionalism that conceive the U.S. as a non-colonial power, unlike its European predecessors. The chapter begins by situating forced migration to the American territories within a European imperial context. The first section discusses negotiations and settlements of early British, French, and Spanish colonialists in their encounters with indigenous peoples in Ireland and the Americas. The second section discusses the production of colonial subjects that preceded the profitable forced migration and exploitation of the English, Scottish, and Irish poor. I focus on the colonization of Virginia because of the important social and economic role it played in founding the American republic. Continuing to analyze the Virginia case, the third section addresses the origins of institutionalized African slavery, plantation slavery, and chattel slavery and the construction in America of what W.E.B. Du Bois has termed the “color line” and “double consciousness,” and what Franz Fanon later reconceptualized as the “dual consciousness” of the colonized in the Manichean world of the French empire. Here, I examine the ruptures that produced American colonial subjects, racialized them as white and black subjects, and foreclosed opportunities for inter-racial solidarity among bonded laborers. The fourth and final section discusses the legacies of these foreclosures in the post-independence development of race-based immigration policies and practices. I conclude by reflecting briefly on the possible significance of these observations for the study of contemporary immigration discourse in the United States and France.

\textit{I) Rupture and Repetition 1: Imperial Expansion, Colonial Encounters, and Unsettling Settlements}

Although their objectives differed significantly, European powers shared many of the same imperial imperatives. Among these were the need to secure newly established territories in foreign spaces inhabited by indigenous peoples with strong attachments to the land; the need to increase the profitability of trade by lowering costs of production and distribution; and the need to sustain the allegiance of a critical mass of subjects in far-flung regions of the New World. As historians and postcolonial theorists have shown, careful attention to the first of these imperatives reveals the extent to which European colonial practices, including the forcing and restricting of migration, were shaped by encounters, conflicts, and alliances with various Native American peoples. When considered in the context of European colonial adventures in Africa, the transatlantic slave trade, and the forced migration and forced labor of the European poor, this fact demands postcolonial reflection and analysis.

In order to outcompete their European rivals in a new global domain, colonial producers and traders experimented with a range of exploitative practices and institutions, from the coercive expropriation of Native American land and resources and the enslavement of indigenous people, to exploitative planter-tenant farming, to indentured servitude and other term-limited bond labor, to lifelong, hereditary chattel slavery and racial domination. Novel forms of migration and social control accompanied new modes of fur trading in French Louisiana, sugar production and mineral extraction in the Spanish west coast and Florida, and monoculture tobacco, sugar, rice, and cotton production in the American South and the British West Indies. In part to advance the interests of the European and Euro-American bourgeoisie, and in part to ensure the allegiance of Euro-American property owners to capital and the Crown, colonial officials adapted old-world ethno-racial justifications for use in New World contexts.

In order to exploit subordinated colonial subjects as low-wage laborers in the New World, those subjects had first to be produced through ideologies and technologies of domination. When European colonial officials arrived in North America, they had already developed, independently in close conversation, a complex lexicon to describe peoples they deemed inferior both to the old European aristocracy and to the emerging

---

capitalist class. Indeed, the language used by British, Dutch, French, and Spanish officials to justify the conquest and exploitation of American Indians strikingly resembles descriptions of poor people in their home countries as well as to some British descriptions of French Catholic “papists” and French descriptions of British Protestant “heretics.”

Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney have shown how state-centric ways of “dealing with difference” by drawing and policing ethno-racial borders developed in conjunction with the emergence of the modern nation-state in late-Medieval Europe. Imperialists developed ethnic and racial conceptions of national identity both to justify war between European powers and to justify the conquest, incorporation, subordination, forced labor and migration, and annihilation of supposedly inferior populations within European nations and empires. While practices of war-making involved the mutual recognition of European powers as relatively worthy competitor-enemies, colonial regimes recognized indigenous and indigent populations primarily as useful instruments in the production of surplus wealth and as dangerous threats to the emerging capitalist order.

Historians of imperialism and the transatlantic slave trade have examined the connections between the emergence of the nation-state and capitalism and the corresponding mass migration of indigent and indigenous workers. Transformations in agricultural and industrial technologies combined with laws of private enclosure in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries displaced peasant farmers and produced a “floating population” of nomadic unemployed and underemployed paupers and vagabonds. These so-called “vagrants” roamed the countryside and moved, or were forcibly moved, to European cities and towns and to settlements and plantations in the new world. Containing, controlling, and exploiting Europe’s volatile indigent population became a central concern of power- and profit-seeking sovereigns, large landholders, and state-endorsed companies.

---

The intensifying demand and supply of cheap convict labor empowered actors from sovereigns, who could order increased surveillance, sweeps of city streets, and the enforcement of draconian Poor Laws, to corrupt judges who frequently took bribes both from merchants seeking slaves and from brothels seeking protection, to criminal bounty hunters and kidnappers. Merchants and planters encouraged the tactic of emptying overcrowded British prisons and brothels by transplanting undesirables to the Virginia colony. Snatching and selling street urchins and vulnerable beggars, kidnappers or “spirits” emerged as important agents of forced colonial migration during the 17th and 18th centuries. (In some ways, their work resembles the work of illegal human traffickers today.) Although officially illegal, kidnapping was lucrative because it provided planters with a cheap source of labor. Peter Wilson Coldham notes that one was punished more harshly for stealing a horse than stealing a person.

English officials justified the draconian treatment and mass deportation of the English poor using many of the same disparaging stereotypes that were used to define the people colonized by the British in Ireland, the Americas, India, and the Middle East. The poor, who were produced as a social category in urban spaces partly by the administrative practice of land enclosure, were represented by British officials as idle, dirty, uncivilized, lazy, promiscuous, and barbarous. They were deemed a threat to public order and thus had to be executed or banished and put to work for the greater good of the empire. Like the fear of African slaves and the fear of subsequent waves of new immigrants to the Americans, it was a combination of the constructed threat these forced migrants posed and their forced migration (first from their land to cities by enclosure, then to the New World by order of the sovereign) that transformed them from people with rights into racialized and docile exploitable field hands. Later generations of Anglo-Americans would draw on these tropes to express concern over the importation of undesirables from Europe just as those same undesirables transformed the American south into an economic powerhouse.

In the case of convicts, the transportation and borderline enslavement of the English could be achieved through near total martial law, which was indeed the mode of

74 Coldham, 1992.
75 Coldham, 1992. 47.
76 Coldham, 1992.
governance in the early 17th century British colonies. For convict subjects, colonial Virginia was a virtual prison. The work the subjects were forced to perform degraded their status further. Like Algerians in France and Latin Americans in the U.S. in the 20th century, the abject state of these laborers was attributed to their nature as opposed to their working conditions. Resistance to colonial administrators was used as evidence of their dangerously aggressive tendencies. Those who resorted to theft or other criminal activity to improve their lot were likewise deemed innately prone to defy authority and colonial regulations.

However, as Coldham suggests and Edmund Morgan explains more fully, even the poorest of Englishmen had some sense of their rights as English subjects. While the state of martial law might work to suppress a small group of convicts in a work camp, such camps would not support the long-term, sustainable productivity of the colonies. A critical mass of colonial settlers had to develop a stake in the future of the colony in order for it to thrive as a productive, self-sustaining power. Over the course of the 17th century, English and Anglo-American colonists established a complex, multi-class system of colonial rule that would allow Virginia to become the economic engine of the early American republic. This system was founded on colonial racism, and had its roots in earlier British colonial adventures and, more to the point, in encounters and competition with French and Spanish colonial agents on the continent and in the hemisphere.

Producing Colonial Migrant-Subjects in the Old and New Worlds: The Irish and the Native Americans

The British presence in Ireland and Scotland provides instructive illustrations of distinctively colonial population and migration control, and of early performances of national identity and difference, in the era of early capitalism. Indeed, out of the colonial experiments in Ireland, Scotland, and the British countryside emerged ideologies and practices that were later deployed to racialize and control social groups in the American colonies, including migrants from Ireland, bound and free. As early as the 13th century,

English rulers, in true colonial fashion, sought to incorporate England’s neighboring island into its sphere of economic and political influence while at the same time denying Ireland’s inhabitants the privileges afforded to full English subjects. Through “surrender and re-grant” policies, Henry VIII expropriated the land used by subsistence farmers in Ireland and redistributed it to Protestant Englishmen as a privilege of racial superiority. Producing basic foodstuffs and raw materials for absentee English landlords and ruled by discriminatory laws, Irish herders and farmers had neither legal standing in English courts nor political representation in English assemblies. Backed by the crown, English legislators, landholders, and soldiers delegitimized Irish social and economic structures, including tribal relations and customs, subsistence agriculture, the communal use of land for grazing, and Irish laws of primogeniture (patrilineal inheritance). By the 17th century, the Irish were, like many Africans and Native North Americans would become, a subordinated class within the British political economy.

Also like Africans and Native Americans, the Irish were racialized as “natives” within British colonial discourse, a category that would carry over to the New World. Theodore Allen’s definition and analysis of racial oppression shapes my account here. Allen argues that the:

> essential elements of discrimination against the Irish in Ireland and against the African Americans, which gave these respective regimes the character of racial oppression, were those that destroyed the original forms of social identity, and then excluded the oppressed groups from admittance into the forms of social identity normal to the colonizing power.

The practices deployed to achieve this demarcation and racial subordination bear a striking resemblance to practices that that effectively produced Anglos in relation to “Native” Americans and to produce the “French race” in relation to Arabs, Berbers, Asians, and Black Africans, all categories French colonial officials shared with their British and Euro-American counterparts. First and foremost, the practice of dispossession of land in Ireland, North Africa, and the Americas uprooted familial

---

80 Henderson and Olasiji, 1995.
communities, religious practices, and ways of life. Subsequent representations and performances of racial difference cited Arab and Native American nomadism and their inability to farm or support self-sufficient families as indications of racial inferiority and, in the French case, the need for a benevolent colonizer willing to take up the “white man’s burden.” Importantly for my purposes, these racial hierarchies were subject-effects both of developing systems of representation and scientific epistemes and material administrative practices of dispossession that were disavowed as such.

The racialization and subordination of the Irish as inferior “natives” enabled British officials to define the British population in terms of Anglo-Protestant superiority as opposed to Irish Catholic inferiority, not merely on the basis of religious affiliation or economic inequality, both of which could be overcome. As early as the 12th century Norman invasion, English conquerors began to develop elaborate justifications for the oppression of the native Irish. The 13th-century History and Topography of Ireland, which would serve as a manual for subsequent generations of colonialists, summarizes the representations of these “barbarous” natives. To British empire-builders, the Irish were a backward people, unfit for full membership in “civilized” society.

Of course, these racial representations reflected little about Irish culture or ways of life, which was rich and complex. Like most colonial representations, they were impositions, projections of danger and evil, of laziness, aggressiveness, and deviant sexuality – all qualities threatened the British population from within – onto a foreign space and people as if onto a blank screen. The racial status of the “native” Irish from the standpoint of the British colonial official is apparent in the fact that the Irish were prevented from integrating themselves into British Protestant society even when they aspired to assimilate. Social restrictions and laws prevented the conversion of Irish Catholics to the Anglican faith and from marrying Protestants. Nativized Irish Catholics were prohibited from owning land in their home country. Moreover, English laws systematically denied them access to the British education system and barred them from

---
85 The prominent theorist and conservative anti-colonialist Edmund Burke wrote in a letter against the 18th century Penal Laws that colonial supremacists viewed the Irish natives as “a race of bigoted savages who were a disgrace to human nature.”
earning positions within the British ruling class. These restrictions, combined with a series of draconian legal measures, culminating in the infamous 17th and 18th-century Penal Laws, at once stripped the Irish of their cultural and social identities and barred them from entering British society through assimilation. Their coercive incorporation into the British economy and systematic exclusion from British body politic was rooted in many of the same disparaging stereotypes through which British, French, Spanish, and Portuguese colonialists later classified Native Americans and Africans as inferior races.

As in most cases of colonial domination, constructing racial hierarchies meant producing and strictly policing (which is also a form of social production and reproduction) the borders of sexual, social, and political intercourse. Anti-miscegenation laws functioned to harden racial divisions and hierarchies that conquest, dispossession, and exploitation had already begun to produce. Indeed, many of the efforts to separate colonial subjects emerged as responses both to unanticipated mixing of cultures and people and unexpected collective campaigns on the part of Irish Catholic and Irish Protestant rebels. Cromwell’s efforts to exterminate the Irish, and Sir Humphrey Gilbert’s dream of starving them out of the country were in many ways reactions to Irish resistance. The Poor Laws and Penal Laws, in turn, served further to segregate and subordinate native Irish from the Protestant ruling class. These juridical and coercive mechanisms foreshadowed the separation of poor white bond laborers and tenants from African Americans, slave and free. Indeed, they represent a familiar colonial pattern that one can identify in the segregation of immigrant workforces today in both Europe and the United States.

English constructions of Irish backwardness and barbarity provided a framework through which English colonialists could interpret the foreign behavior of Native Americans. Practices of dispossession, bordering, and representation that were developed in Ireland, moreover, were transferred to the New World, despite the fact that the indigenous inhabitants of Americas had vastly different belief systems and ways of life. It was in the English colonial adventure in Ireland, then, that the conditions of

---
possibility of the subordination of Native Americans took shape. Colonial tropes justified the forced labor and migration of Native American and of Irish populations and later of inhabitants of the African continent. Sir Humphrey Gilbert and Sir Walter Raleigh, the half-brothers who earned colonial credentials in their role as settlers of Ireland, and, in Gilbert’s case, the brutal slaughter of French Catholics in the mid-16th century, sought to apply what they learned in their Irish experiments to their North American colonial expeditions. Sponsored by Queen Elizabeth, they sought to civilize and cultivate the wild lands north of Spanish Florida in the late 16th century. Consulting the Spanish colonial model, Raleigh identified two types of Indians before his arrival in Roanoke. The Spanish classified the “good Indians” as noble savages who could be civilized through submission to European colonial forces and disciplined through European modes of profitable production. “Bad Indians” were voracious cannibals who had either to be expelled from colonial holdings or annihilated. The English colonialists expected to find indigenous peoples who would welcome the benevolent rule of planters in return for the benefits of civilized life beyond bare subsistence and for protection both from raiding tribes of cannibals and from tyrannical Spanish and French colonists to the South and West. 90

What Raleigh and his successors found did not meet these expectations. Native Americans in what was to become Virginia and the outlying areas had already developed advanced agricultural and hunting practices. They desired neither to work for the English nor to eat them. In fact, the earliest English colonial tenant farmers and indentured servants found themselves dependent on Indians for their survival. 91 Specifically, they needed Indian-produced corn, which they acquired both through trade and through pillage. In their efforts to extract raw materials for profitable English commodities, early colonialists had neglected to ensure the basic subsistence needs of their settlers. In what became a dire condition of desperation and dependence, it would have been impossible to recruit or to enslave en masse the ostensibly savage people that surrounded them, as some merchants and governors such as the famous John Smith would have liked. 92 Although many Native Americans were captured and bound to work for English interests for set

91 Morgan, 2003. 90.
92 Morgan, 2003. 77.
periods in the 17th century, the vast majority remained independent. Managing to maintain their ways of life through adaptation and strategic alliance, they engaged with the English primarily as hospitable allies or hostile enemies in the European scramble for American territory and resources.

Despite the failures of efforts to employ or enslave Native Americans *en masse*, the subordination of Indians as a racially distinct and inferior group foreshadowed the forced migration and enslavement of Africans by the British in North America and by the French on the islands of the Caribbean as well as the forced migration of Native Americans to newly established reservations (the Trail of Tears, etc.). Like the subjection of the Irish and Africans, the subjection of Indians as “natives” who lacked what the English had – modern culture, written history, modern production techniques, etc. – paralleled French colonial modes of subjection of inhabitants of Northern Africa and the Caribbean and in North America as inferior *indigènes*. All of these colonial modes of subjection were ironic and ambivalent in the extreme, as French and English colonial officials benefited from their colonial encounters in myriad ways, including learning how to survive in the new world and learning new farming practices from Africans. In addition, both the French and the British clashed amongst themselves over whether and to what extent they should attempt to civilize and Christianize their new colonial subjects.

Despite this ambivalence, the indigenous inhabitants of North America were racialized by European colonial administrators in such a way that their enslavement could be justified, even in the face of protests from Anti-Slavery missionaries. As C.S. Everett points out, Indian captives from campaigns of westward expansion were bought and sold by colonists both within Virginia and to the British West Indies. As opposed to the *de jure* term-limited servitude of European immigrants, Native Americans were often subjected to lifetime, hereditary servitude. As Alan Gallay argues, armed conflict between colonists and Indians served as proof of Indian savagery and therefore rationalized their capture, forced migration, and forced labor.

---

**New Means of Production, “New” Colonial Relations**

Unable to secure a stable labor force among native populations before the flourishing of the transatlantic trade in African slaves, English colonial officials and company men had to rely on colonial subjects from their homeland, namely, the Irish, Scottish, and indigent English. Short- and long-term royal investors in the early American colonies, along with those of the emerging European Planters (who ventured to the New World) and Adventurers (who funded the project but stayed home), expected high rates of return in short order.  

Early failures to find precious minerals, such as in Raleigh’s lost Roanoke colony, intensified demand for low-cost labor to aid in the production of cash crops. As mentioned above, the demand for labor in the new colonies dovetailed with new imperatives of population control in Europe. In England, the privatization and enclosure of land and replacement of tenant farmers with grazing sheep produced a massive army of idle, poor people, many of whom became wards of the state. Successive sovereigns beginning with Queen Elizabeth agreed with the ruling classes that the threat posed by these indigents to public order and private property called for a radical response. Taking their lead from the merchant vanguard including Gilbert and Humphrey, Queens and Kings promoted supposedly humanitarian efforts to clear the English streets of vagabonds, thereby saving them from idleness, poverty, thievery, and the gallows.

As Allen and Morgan point out, in the early years of the Virginia colony, the demand for cheap labor was not so great that it trumped English tenant farming customs. Before the full conversion from failed efforts at mineral extraction to tobacco cash crop production, over half of the original bands of laborers in Virginia were officially tenant farmers who worked for wages, farmed for themselves, and produced tobacco for the Virginia Company. By the mid-17th century, beginning a pattern that would be repeated in different forms to the present day, the overproduction of tobacco in Virginia had the effect of lowering its value. Much like today’s multinational corporation seeks out vulnerable, low-cost labor with the help of the modern state, the Virginia Company resolved the problem of falling prices by transforming tenant farmers into bond laborers,

---

95 Allen, 1997.
by recruiting indentured servants, and by importing British criminals and colonial subjects from abroad.

This servant industry was simultaneously colonial, in the sense that it imposed European rule on supposedly backward people and under-cultivated land, and capitalist, in the sense that it was driven by stakeholders in private companies seeking profits. Indeed, it was in many ways these companies themselves that ruled large sections of English colonies around the world. In the early 16th century, English merchants and planters worked with jurists, Kings, and Queens to produce joint stock companies that could weather the storms of colonial experiments and recruit masses of exploitable workers from around the empire. As Don Jordan and Michael Walsh explain, it was an English Judge, Lord Chief Justice Popham, who spearheaded efforts to arrest masses of English vagrants and send them to America. The express purpose of this initiative was both to rid England of its undesirables and to profit off of their labor.

In 1618, the Virginia Company introduced a “headright” system that would grant land to every non-indentured settler. Headright encouraged investment by granting fifty acres of land per servant to those who paid for the servants’ passage. From the standpoint of English rulers, these incentives increased the power of the state by promoting the exile of threatening undesirables and by increasing state revenue through the taxation of tobacco. From the standpoint of profit-seeking merchants, the incentives to buy and sell bonded laborers had the effect of transforming people into commodities. Thus, transportation to the American colonies opened up new opportunities for administrators to create new divisions of labor before the bonded laborers even crossed the ocean. A new set of administrators and administrative practices formed around the headright system, as did a new set of colonial subjects.

The first bonded laborers sent to the American colonies were placed into several categories indicating the social status ascribed to them: “free willers,” convicts (usually petty thieves who stole to survive after the enclosures), indigent children, women, and Catholics. Merchants seduced dislocated and impoverished workers in the first category with promises of a better life across the sea. In the case of landless Irish Catholics, indentures were essentially forced into servitude, as they had no other means of survival in Ireland. In exchange for their Atlantic passage, hopefuls were asked to sell their labor
power for anywhere from 3 to 7 years. As Jordan and Walsh have written, it is in many ways more accurate to say that these voluntary emigrants sold themselves. Colonial laws provided indentures with few rights or protections against masters who commonly abused, beat, and killed them or worked them to death in the service of a capitalist enterprise. Planters could and frequently did extend the terms bondage of indentured servants for alleged violations of strict colonial laws or simply to increase productivity. Those who survived their bond period were often denied their promised “freedom dues,” which may have included land and livestock, and were thus thrust into debt peonage or forced to sell themselves to another master.96

Against the odds, many indentured servants from England did manage to survive their terms of servitude and realize the dream of owning and cultivating land in British colonies. If they were lucky enough to be bought by a generous master, they would collect freedom dues and go to work planting and harvesting their own plots once they had completed their term. As the colonial justice system developed independently from England, a small but growing percentage of English servants who had served their original terms won their freedom through court battles.97

By contrast, convicts offered the chance to work in Virginia to escape incarceration or execution in England had less of a chance of independence than their “free-willing” counterparts. On the servant ships and upon their arrival in the colonies they were chained and packed in rows and treated much like African slaves would be treated in the years to come. They were advertised as commodities in colonial newsletters alongside cattle and trade goods and sold at markets and off the backs of merchant trailers in practices that resembled the auctioning of African slaves.98 Like African slaves, they were deemed threatening enough to public order to be frequently whipped by plantation overseers. While they were more expensive than regular indentured servants, they were cheaper than African slaves and could be forced to work longer than “free willers.”

97 Jordan and Walsh, 2008.
Adding to the ranks of bond laborers were masses of young children and, more and more, women sent to serve as maids and wives of servants. Merchants seeking quick profits made a business of kidnapping poor “urchins” from the streets of English towns and cities and of convincing parents to give up their children to allow them to escape a life of poverty. The bond period of children ranged from 12 to 18 years depending on the age at which they were captured and transported. Like convicts and free willers, children bond laborers were often sold to the highest bidder and worked without adequate rest, food, or medicine. Working in harsh conditions in a foreign climate, many of these children did not survive their childhood, much less their term of bondage.

The systematic dislocation and transportation of Irish Catholics to the new colonies testifies to this exportation of colonial systems of rule along with ready-made colonial rulers and subjects. Cromwell’s invasion of Ireland in the mid-17th century and the draconian anti-Catholic policies that followed in its wake inflicted such devastation on the Catholic population that transportation seemed a welcome escape from debilitating repression and poverty. Many of those who were not forcibly removed to the slave colony of Barbados voluntarily bound themselves to a merchant master as a means of escape. Colonial rulers moved with them, adapting methods of control. Prior to the influx of African slaves, Catholics were marked for especially harsh treatment. Until 1660, the Irish natives were often forced to serve longer terms than their English and Scottish counterparts. In Maryland, they were forced to conform to Anglo-Protestant cultural and religious norms, but denied full inclusion in the political community.

The different treatment of different bond laborers and tenant farmers, colonial administrative practices that produced and maintained divisions of labor between these two categories of workers and prevented labor solidarity, may have served as a mechanism for social control in the years before the massive influx of African slaves. However, given the oppressive conditions faced by all immigrants to the new colonies, one might have expected massive uprisings against colonial masters who did relatively little work and reaped the bulk of the rewards of tobacco sales. Evidence suggests that the threat of rebellion was a near-constant concern of the ruling class planters and merchants in the colonies.99 As the tobacco industry grew exponentially, so did the

---

demand and supply of exploitable workers. As more workers survived their bondage and began farming their own land, planters began to seek a new source of super-exploitable labor. As we shall see, the incorporation of African slaves into the colonial economy did not initially diminish the danger of rebellion. A new system of colonial control was necessary to secure a new colonial hierarchy.

II) Rupture and Repetition 2: Resistance, Rebellion, and Racial Domination

What happened in the peripheral spaces of the colony always complicated imperial ambitions and designs generated in European power centers. As in Ireland, unanticipated alliances, rebellions, and migrations in the Euro-American colonies disrupted the smooth extraction of wealth by merchants and rulers. The unforeseen economic effects of monocrop production exacerbated the obstacles posed by resistance and by alliances among different racialized classes of immigrant workers. Bond laborers defied their masters, and planters and merchants defied revenue-generating European legislation and royal decrees. The reduction of tenant farmers to bond labor status produced a system in which a super-exploited working class vastly outnumbered their colonial masters. Without what Allen calls a secure “buffer zone” or “intermediate stratum” of social control, i.e., a social class of workers who share with their rulers a stake in the colonial political economy, the center would not hold. As Mark Rupert’s analysis of the production of American hegemony demonstrates, precisely the same problem of overwhelming class antagonism recurred in a different form under the Fordist and Taylorist regimes in the U.S. and Europe in the 20th century. The sticks of colonial oppression and the carrots of liberty held just out of reach created a structure that ultimately proved untenable. The problem of labor solidarity and immanent rebellion had to be resolved in order for the colonial appropriation of surplus to endure. Fordist employers worked with the U.S. government to resolve this problem through profit sharing and the imposition of mass production technologies in Europe through the Marshall Plan. In part to discipline and disempower western workforces, they also recruited workers from former European colonies and assured European governments and companies that they could retain control over workforces in Africa and Asia even after

100 Allen, 1997; 2002.
granting African and Asian countries formal independence. These strategies of division and exploitation can be traced back to a period in which Anglo-American and French colonialists resolved the problem of labor unrest through a system of subjection through the racialization of group difference.

*Roads to Rebellion and Racial Slavery*

As prominent historians have noted, the early years of colonial bond servitude in British America were governed primarily by mechanisms of violent coercion and “open military dictatorship.”101 Once plantations were firmly established in Virginia, a new generation of Euro-Americans elites asserted their authority by creating relatively autonomous local governments to replace the system of English direct rule. Acting through the newly established General Assembly, Colonial Council, and General Court, Virginian elites secured and expanded the powers they and their predecessors had been granted by royal charters and the Virginia Company. To increase profits by lowering labor costs and to block competition with tenant farmers and freed former servants, these elites systematically dismantled the ladders of socioeconomic mobility.

As Allen notes, the first immigrants to Virginia were officially divided into 5 classes: gentlemen (who reaped profits but were exempted by law from any physical labor), freemen (a “petty bourgeoisie” of “independent farmers and self-employed artisans”), tenants-at-halves (who enjoyed half the fruits of their agricultural labor), hired indentured servants, and apprentices. Allen subdivides these classes further into owners (the first 2 classes) and non-owners of property.102 Yet another distinction that ought to be made here is that between those who depend on the physical labor of others and those who work. The latter were subdivided and segregated via colonial administrative practices into categories based on social status, a strategy which discouraged their joining forces against the gentlemen. One of the most notable accomplishments of the property owners was their temporary reduction of the laboring classes to the state of bond servility and the corresponding reduction of labor costs, e.g., through the extension of the working day and the reduction of wages.

101 Allen, 1997. 75.
102 Allen, 1997. 93.
A series of attacks by Native American tribes provided justification for austere measures to restrict tenants’ production of corn. Colonial officials argued that corn production served as an enticement to marauding bands of Indians. That colonists had for many years depended on Indians for corn was omitted from the official justification of restrictions. Partly in order to prevent further mixing among immigrant servants, freedmen, and Indians on the frontier, legal restrictions and armed frontiersmen prevented Indian tribes from entering colonial territory. In 1646, Governor Berkeley played a crucial role in establishing what in became one of the first border control regimes on Virginia’s eastern frontier. Under the terms of their submission to the colonial order, members of the former Powhatan Confederacy agreed to ask the Governor for permission before selecting their own rulers.

These restrictions combined with the collection of fixed rents and the reduction of tobacco production (to raise its price) forced immigrant tenants into debt and effectively blocked freed servants from entering the class of independent farmers. Thus, arbitrary status distinctions were maintained as barriers separating members of the laboring class and dissuading otherwise similarly positioned subjects within the colonial system. Forbidden from producing anything but tobacco for English merchants, tenants and aspiring independent farmers had to buy corn from English profiteers who sold the staple at exorbitant prices. In lieu of money or trade goods, property owners accepted years of bonded service in exchange for room and board. To survive in this economy of downward mobility, first generation tenants and farmers from England, Scotland, and Ireland often had “voluntarily” to sell themselves into bondage.

The decline of tobacco prices, manufactured shortages of corn, and Indian raids served to increase the leverage of the property-owning class. Through local government and appeals to the crown, planters managed to convert these crises into advantages. The transformation of tenants and freeman into bonded laborers effectively increased the concentration of land in the hands of large plantation owners. In addition to the acquisition of land through the headright system, the acquisition of laborers became an important source of wealth. The trade in, or “renting out,” of immigrant servants became standard practice towards the end of the 1620s. Colonial officials appropriated

destitute tenants, apprentices and shipments of new farmers as commodity-servants. New shipments of immigrants, it was argued, lacked the capital and the skills to sustain themselves in the colonies, and therefore had to be attached to wealthy planters for their own sake and in order to avoid becoming a public charge or nuisance. Bonded or free, their survival depended upon owners of the means of tobacco production. Advocating the need to increase productivity and sustain population growth, planters secured legislation that extended the terms of bondage of already indentured servants. In addition, the House of Burgesses enacted harsher penalties for those who resisted longer workdays for little or no wages or sought to flee bondage to live with hospitable neighboring Indian tribes. Dependent laborers in this early period were rarely defended by the courts in cases of abuse.\textsuperscript{104} Penalties for minor infractions of decidedly “un-English” colonial regulations increased workers dependence on the local bourgeoisie.

Still, many indentured servants finally won some degree of freedom, and, as the numbers of freedman rose, so did the demand for more land. Planters anticipated this development and pre-emptively bought large tracts to rent out to freedmen at high prices. In this way, they were able to sustain profits by continuing to exploit their former bonded laborers. New poor immigrants in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century were locked into this vicious cycle. How they would fare was determined in part by the luck of the draw. If their masters made good on their promise to free them after their term of service and granted their freedom dues, and if they were able to find a decent plot of land, they could begin the hard life of independent farming. The rarity of this level of success is evidenced by the fact that very few tenant farmers or indentured servants went on to play any role as elites in the planter class or in colonial governing bodies.\textsuperscript{105}

The obstacles to independence faced by a growing number of tenant farmers and freedmen led to rising discontent among first and second-generation immigrant workers from Britain. Like anti-immigrant politicians in the U.S. and France today, colonial officials deployed familiar racial stereotypes of Native Americans as aggressive nomads who did not deserve land, effectively directing anger and frustration over restrictions on land acquisition and corn and tobacco production at Indians as opposed to colonial

\textsuperscript{104} Allen, 1997; Morgan, 2003.  
\textsuperscript{105} Allen, 1997. These facts challenge the myth of early America as a land of opportunity. See Alexis de Tocqueville and J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur. \textit{Letters from an American Farmer}, IV-VIII.
governments. Because freedman could not acquire land already bought by large plantation owners, they were forced to find what they could on the border that separated them from the former Powhatan Confederation of Native American nations. The Virginia colonial government frequently intervened on the side of Euro-American immigrants against the so-called savage natives and endorsed their efforts to expand westward. The recognition of Euro-Americans of whatever class as fundamentally superior to the natives established a racial barrier similar to the one that separated British settlers in Ireland from Irish Catholic natives. Much like the redirection of anger away from businesses and the state and towards immigrant workers today, the redirection of anger and frustration towards Native American and French competitors undermined the cultivation of solidarity among the immigrant poor, not to mention between Euro-American workers and Native Americans.

Nevertheless, as in Ireland, frustration over oppressive working conditions and discriminatory laws eventually boiled over into violence. Although Bacon’s Rebellion of 1676 was directed at securing land from the Powhatan Indians, it defied Berkeley’s oppressive colonial government’s orders on behalf of those suffering most under his rule. Moreover, it represented the colonial government’s worst fears of inter-class alliance. Bacon’s supporters included not only indentured servants, tenants, and freedmen, but also scores of African slaves. In other words, it defied the colonial division of labor and system of ordered differences that colonial government officials had been attempting to establish once and for all. (As I will demonstrate, colonial efforts to establish neat systems of differentiation are always met by social forces that contest the borders of those systems). As Allen notes, despite its apparent racial animus, it raised the specter of working-class racial solidarity against the colonial elite. Even after its brutal suppression, the rebellion left a chilling effect. This was apparent in royal concessions to Virginia colonial subjects that bypassed the local legislature and in renewed local efforts to establish a new colonial system of social control.

The enduring Anglo-Irish and Euro-Indian antagonisms had demonstrated the advantages of systems of racial oppression over the super-exploitation of an increasingly unified class of servile colonial subjects. However, the rebellions in Ireland and then in Virginia also displayed the threat posed collectively by the “losers” in colonial systems of
social control. The more conspicuous the gap that separated the promise of freedom from the reality of seemingly unending servitude and debt peonage, the greater the danger to the colonial hierarchy and the system of accumulation and appropriation of wealth. As the ranks of freedmen and would-be freedmen rose, their demands for relative rewards and freedoms had to be acknowledged. The challenge for the ruling elite became how to satisfy these demands while at the same time preserving a system in which profits could be secured through the exploitation of docile, non-waged workers. Racial, hereditary chattel slavery began to serve this function in the 18th century.

**III) Rupture and Repetition 3: Slavery and Revolution**

A great deal has been written on the radical transformation of the status of Africans in the American colonies in the 17th and 18th centuries. I offer a brief account here for the purpose of illustrating both the continuities and the profound changes represented by the turn to racial slavery. In the wake of Bacon’s Rebellion and subsequent expressions of freedmen’s discontent in Virginia, creating “a society that would nourish the freeman’s freedom and at the same time make possible the unlimited exploitation of labor” became a paramount goal of colonial governance. Resistance and rebellion had demonstrated that the enslavement of Euro-Americans would be impractical if not impossible, especially given the promises of land and freedom dues that motivated many of them to make the treacherous Atlantic voyage and to work under life-threatening conditions for little or nothing. As Morgan notes, while the ruling class in Virginia may not have had moral qualms about enslaving the entire propertyless population of the colony, to do so would require a series of conspicuously deliberate legislative and policing initiatives designed to reduce aspiring independent farmers to the status of inferior colonial subjects. Although this had been achieved in Ireland and in a limited way in the case of indigenous populations in the Americas, to enslave a population of Euro-Americans convinced of their superiority and of their corresponding right to freedom would have required an untenable, brutal system of martial law. Rising life expectancies and expectations of indentured servants erected limits to capital accumulation that racial slavery could break down.

---

Of course, as Native American resistance and the participation of African Americans in Bacon’s Rebellion demonstrated, it would not be an easy task to enslave non-Euro-Americans either. 16th-century Native Americans and African Americans had, in different ways, asserted their own rights to freedom from oppressive colonial laws. Many of the first Africans transported to Anglo-American Virginia were considered servants and shared hopes of freedom with Euro-American indentures and poor farmers. Although many served longer terms than their Euro-American counterparts, a significant number bought their freedom or became free after their terms of bondage expired.

The relatively higher prospects for the successful mass enslavement of people Africa was initially revealed not in a deliberate campaign, but in a series of successful, local legal decisions that defined people with dark skin from across the Atlantic as an undeserving racial group. The significance of the case of John Punch as a turning point is well known, but worth mentioning here. Punch was an African-American servant convicted of running away from his master with two European indentured servants in 1640. The General Court extended the terms of bondage of the two Euro-American servants by four years. By contrast, they sentenced Punch to a lifetime of servitude, arguing only that he was a “non-Christian” and “a negro” to justify his enslavement.

As in Ireland, the designation “non-Christian” would not be a decisive mark of inferior status, as it defeated the purpose of Britain’s ideological civilizing mission to Christianize both Africans and Indians and opened the possibility, attempted by many new slaves, of self-liberation through conversion. To appease missionaries and reconcile the English civilizing mission with the enslavement of Africans, courts subsequently ruled that baptism could not change the status of a slave, and that the legal status of slaves was different than Christian white servants.

In a series of decisions from the 1660s to the turn of the century, the Virginia courts institutionalized the differential treatment of white servants and black slaves. Extreme forms of punishment were legally reserved for blacks, as were prohibitions

against taking abusive white masters to court. By the turn of the 17th century, the property of bonded African Americans was systematically expropriated whereas white servants were allowed to keep their meager belongings, such as livestock. Over time, these laws both produced white contempt for blacks among poor whites and more demand for African slaves as a super-exploitable labor force.\footnote{Morgan, 2003. 332-333.} Slaves were officially recognized as a category of worker in 1661. From that time on, whites increasingly played a police function in suppressing black resistance. Although ownership of black slaves was concentrated in the hands of rich landowners, the structural position of servitude they occupied ensured a position of privilege for poor whites. For their part, wealthy planters, concerned about black insurrection as the numbers of black slaves rose, began to invest more in whites as privileged protectors of private property.\footnote{Morgan, 2003. 379.}

As in Ireland, several laws and practices racialized the differences between whites and blacks and constituted it as a hierarchy by controlling sexual relations. Perhaps the most important was the 1662 act that legislated matrilineal hereditary servitude. By enacting that “all children…should be held bond or free according to the condition of the mother,” Virginian legislators allowed masters who raped their slaves to remain the masters of their own children. A series of anti-miscegenation laws followed, targeting unions between black or mulatto men and white women, and re-establishing distinctions between black slave and white servant that were blurred by these unions.

Even with the development of a legal system of racialized difference and subordination, poor whites and enslaved blacks still joined together in rebellion in the 17th and 18th centuries.\footnote{Henderson and Olasiji. 244.} By this time, however, the white investment in and commitment to a system of racial, hereditary chattel slavery had reached a critical level. Royal charters increased this investment by subsidizing the emerging British slave trade. At war with the Dutch and determined to curb Dutch profiteers who would sell slaves in exchange for goods produced in the English colonies, the Crown sought to replace the Dutch slave trade with its own.\footnote{See Kenneth Morgan.} As Kings, Queens, and colonists like Raleigh and Gilbert had done in Ireland, the Royal African Company established an elaborate set of...
practices for the acquisition, commodification, and transportation of African bond laborers to the English colonies. This initiative combined with the increasingly productive employment of slaves in Virginia and then in South Carolina effectively produced both slave societies and the slave “market.”

As Stephanie E. Smallwood has shown, the deliberate institutionalization of the slave trade relieved American Planters of the burden of subduing and commodifying diverse cultural groups of Africans. The physical and social technologies of violence necessary to ensure the relatively “smooth” transportation of Africans were founded on scientific calculations of the maximum degree of pain and poverty their human bodies could withstand. To avoid collective rebellions and the death of African “cargo,” traders in the Royal African Company along with independent English “interlopers” had to isolate Africans from their cultural frames of reference, e.g., by loading ships with people from different language-speaking groups, and to reduce them to a state of abjection, e.g., by chaining them and depriving them of all but bare-subsistence provisions with no cultural significance. As Smallwood explains, the process of commodification could not be achieved all at once. Rather, the transformation of cultural agents into colonial subject-commodities was achieved through a series of violent incarcerations and forced migrations from capture (usually by Africans at war or working for European colonial agents) in the African interior, to incarceration centers and auction blocks at the coast, to the well-documented horrific death traps that were the slave ships, again to auction blocks in Anglo-America, and finally to plantation servitude. As scholars of the slave trade have noted, African slaves were often bought or sold several times before arriving at their final destination.

Despite disorienting dislocation, violent abuse, and dehumanizing confinement, Africans frequently acted in concert and rebelled against captors, traders, colonial agents, overseers, and planters. As in Ireland, efforts to reduce African people into instruments always failed to remove the threats of African solidarity and insurrection. Colonial officials and slave traders tried to represent these rebellions as indications of

---

117 Henderson and Olasiji. 244.
African barbarity, thereby reinforcing colonial justifications for their subordination and enslavement. As their numbers increased in the American colonies relative to white planters and servants, and as laws and practices of subordination established a new racial hierarchy in the 18th and 19th centuries, fears of black-white servant solidarity dissipated. Confronting the specter of black insurrection, relatively privileged whites joined with Planters to secure their position of superiority in the new colonial order.

As both Morgan and Allen point out, many of the colonial tropes used to justify the subordination of the Irish and Scottish were transported along with Irish and Scottish indentured servants to justify their subordination in the colonies. These tropes often took the form a proto-nativism expressed as fear of the criminal, idle and undisciplined, violent, thieving, dishonest, promiscuous and sexually deviant, murderous, disobedient, and otherwise “barbarous” element that these immigrants introduced. Many of these terms are precisely those used to describe French colonial subjects in Africa and Asia, American colonial subjects in the Pacific Islands, and more recently immigrants from former U.S. and European colonies to Western countries. Of course, the unrelenting demand for low-cost, super-exploitable labor outweighed these fears, which were transformed into brutal practices of subordination to suppress the threat of disorder and rebellion. While African Slavery introduced a racial “ingredient” based on phenotypical associations with the above-mentioned colonial stereotypes, it is important to note that representations and fears of Africans resembled those of Irish, Scottish, and English poor servants. Indeed, the transfer of these colonial representations from the Irish to the Africans required a reconfigured investment in the racial category of whiteness, if not, as Allen’s polemic suggests, the “invention” of this category. As is evidenced by the English and French consultation of the Iberian models, whiteness and blackness were already available as colonial categories when the English entered the transatlantic slave trade. As Bacon’s Rebellion demonstrated, however, the category had not yet been effectively reconfigured to recruit impoverished Euro-Americans and to exclude Africans. To ensure a super-exploitable labor force, the beneficiaries of super-exploitation mobilized Irish and Scottish servants and would-be independent farmers as white subjects worthy of the rights and benefits of citizenship.
White Republican “Revolution”: Equality, Liberty, Racial Slavery, and the Colonial Ordering of Immigrant Workers

As Allen argues, the recruitment of oppressed “whites” required a veritable “sea change” of colonial sensibilities and allegiances. The first volume of Allen’s *Invention of the White Race* details the transformation of Irish servants’ anti-colonial sentiment from rebellious resistance to British colonial oppression to active acceptance and even encouragement of white supremacy and the institution of racial slavery. As a testament to the successful recruitment of Irish servants and settlers as “whites,” leaders of Irish immigrants adamantly defended slavery against charges of hypocritical collusion advanced by the Irish anti-colonial leader, Daniel O’Connell. Having won a degree of freedom and independence in the American colonies by the mid-19th century, especially once the trade in African slaves was in full swing, first and second generation Irish immigrants appeared unwilling to risk sacrificing their superior status by allying with O’Connell and Africans as fellow oppressed colonial subjects. Although meager relative to early American dreams of land, freedom, and independence and to the exorbitant profits of the ruling bourgeoisie, the benefits of whiteness and the stigmas associated with blackness, it seems, were enough to dissuade most poor Irishmen from making common cause with Africans.

Perhaps the most important of the benefits associated with whiteness was the status of not being slaves. As Morgan notes, poor whites in the American south lived in dangerously close proximity to brutal forms of lifetime chattel slavery. Many of them escaped from a condition similar to that of African slaves on the Barbados sugar plantations. In Virginia, the institution of slavery opened enough of a gap in socioeconomic status between Africans and an increasing number of small, poor, quasi-independent white freeholders to create a decisive impression of shared interests with southern white patricians and a shared stake in the “peculiar institution.” Republican ideologues encouraged this identification by valorizing the figure of the landowning yeoman farmer and encouraging his acquisition of small (50-100 acre) plots. The ostensibly independent, armed yeoman was of course the central character in Thomas Jefferson’s republican vision. The patrician’s manifestos ironically, but understandably, de-centered the interests of his own class, which were reflected in the concentration of
wealth conspicuously on display at Monticello and Mount Vernon. The bedrock of the new republic would be the self-made immigrant man of honest means, not a decadent gentleman and not a slave.

Lingering frustration and anger over enduring obstacles to independence directed at local colonial government were thus redirected towards the meddling English crown. Without the taxes and restrictions imposed by this increasingly distant, oppressive power, republicans began to argue, yeomans would be able to realize their birthright as Euro-American freeholders, namely, the right to own property including slaves. The fact that colonial officials and settlers defied the crown did not mean that they defied the colonial order. In many ways the revolution was an effort to preserve this order for the sake of a reconstituted set of “white” beneficiaries. As Morgan points out, Anglo-American patricians and many middling settlers clung to their British identity, which they opposed to the backwardness and barbarity first of the poor immigrants from “beyond the pale” and then to African immigrants and their descendants. As Morgan points out, the fact that Revolutionary soldiers were granted 50 acres and a slave for their service is not an aberration. It was, in fact, a realization of an original American dream.

Histories of the American Revolution that represent the transition from British to American identity as an absolute rupture obscure the continuity represented by the transition from civilized English identity, defined by its negation of an imagined barbarity, to civilized Anglo-American white identity, as opposed to purportedly barbaric African slaves. This erases the continuities that link pre-revolutionary forced migration and servitude to post-revolutionary racial and socioeconomic oppression, both of slaves and, in different but consequentially significant ways, of “new immigrants.” It leads, in short, to major blind spots in most arguments and debates about contemporary immigration policy and practice. One could reasonably argue that immigration management in the United States was and remains a distinctively European colonial project.

IV) New Frontiers: Post-Abolition Internal Colonialism and Contemporary Continuities
Just as it would be a mistake to assume that the American Revolution produced an absolute rupture in Anglo-American colonial discourses of immigration management, it would be equally misleading to assume that the abolition of the slave trade, and then of slavery, ended the colonial ordering of immigrant workforces. As W.E.B Dubois, among others, has proven, the problem of the “color line” survived abolition, as did many the mechanisms of racial oppression, although in different forms. Following Dubois’s lead, historians have shown how the practices of Reconstruction rehabilitated and entrenched colonial hierarchies without the benefit of constitutional sanction.118 Sharecropping and convict labor was throughout the late 19th century at least another form of racial oppression and in many ways “slavery by another name.”119 As in 17th-century Virginia, local courts produced and protected the superior social and legal status of all residents deemed white, including recent immigrants, over all residents deemed black.120 To reinforce their sense of superiority, whites were employed as policemen and protected as supremacist vigilantes. The Ku Klux Klan emerged to protect white racial superiority against the threats of black integration. The Klan endured through ages of mass immigration and nativist restriction as the self-identified guarantors of racial hierarchy and purity.

Meanwhile, the pattern of inclusive exclusion of racialized groups of “new immigrants” – of their incorporation into the American economy and exclusion from the American polity – has continued in a variety of forms. Large corporations continue to recruit massive numbers of immigrant workers who are denied full legal status as members of the American political community. Waves of German, Scandinavian, Irish, Italian, Eastern European, and Latin American immigrants have all occupied forms of this racialized position in the Euro-American political economy. Corporate profits have depended upon the social and political marginalization of these groups. Just as American republicanism reinforced both the demand for super-exploitable labor and the demand for the exclusion of threatening African immigrants from the polity, post-revolutionary

120 Blackmon, 2008.
American patriotism reinforced the demand for cheap labor from Asia, South America, and Eastern Europe and the exclusion of those groups from domains of citizenship.

It is a mark of colonial immigration management that xenophobic (now “nativist”) investment in racial superiority empowers the exploiters of labor by further marginalizing subordinated groups of new immigrants. Fear of and contempt for new immigrants, like the fear of and contempt for Africans displayed by whites in the 17th century, produces a hostile environment in which employers can play the role of a benevolent protector. The fact that both nativist ideology and legal discourse now refers to “countries of origin” as opposed to class or race in its articulation of criteria for inclusion and exclusion may reconfigure the boundaries that organize different groups of immigrants into hierarchies does not fundamentally alter the Euro-American colonial pattern. Students of U.S. immigration policy and practice would benefit from studies that foreground the continuities that link practices of immigration management today to their not-so-distant colonial origins.

U.S. Imperialism and National Self-Determination

In the American colonial imaginary, the popular sovereignty of nation-states was a hard-won privilege of European peoples, not a right of all peoples, as President Wilson’s Fourteen Points would later suggest. Wilson himself believed and acknowledged that the backward peoples inhabiting European colonies had both to be civilized and to earn the right to self-determination before they could enter the international system of states as national peoples. In other words, a European determination of their worthiness and the boundaries of their nationality was a prerequisite to their self-determination and self-government and their entry into the community of nation-states. Ngai summarizes the American colonial policy framework with respect to newly won territories as follows:

Central to the colonial project was the belief that the new territories were inhabited by backward races incapable of self-rule. Americans saw Filipinos as a motley colored race comprising innumerable uncivilized tribes. While it was common to view all non-European peoples as backward, casting Filipinos as “tribal” was essential because it denied them the status of nationhood.121

Like the American West, Hawai’i, Guam, Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Alaska, the Philippines were conceived as a politically empty space, devoid of political community, law, and order. As a political void, the inhabitants of this space were susceptible first to the political designs of more belligerent, less benevolent European powers and subsequently to the Bolsheviks and the expanding communist block. American officials produced knowledge about these spaces in ways that replicated French modes of colonial knowledge production in Asia and North and West Africa (as well as in the American West prior to the Louisiana Purchase). For both French and American imperialists, colonization was justified on the basis both of necessary geostrategic expansion into under- and improperly-colonized spaces and of the relative benevolence of France and the United States as modernizing forces in an emerging global order.

As one of the clearest articulations of American overseas colonial policy, and as an elaboration of the Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny, McKinley’s “Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation” warrants quotation:

In performing [the extension of American sovereignty throughout the Philippines by means of force], the military commander of the United States is enjoined to make known to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands that in succeeding to the sovereignty of Spain, in severing the former political relations, and in establishing a new political power, the authority of the United States is to be exerted for the securing of the persons and property of the people of the Islands and for the confirmation of all private rights and relations. It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, in their employment, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or by honest submission, cooperate with the Government of the United States to give effect to these beneficent purposes will receive the reward of its support and protection. All others will be brought within the lawful rule we have assumed, with firmness if need be… Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of a free people…[and] by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of the benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfillment of this high mission, supporting the temperate administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority, to repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles.
to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands under the flag of the United States.\textsuperscript{122}

In this statement and others, McKinley explicitly links the apparently conflicting colonial objectives of active incorporation (benevolent assimilation) and exclusion (of “all others,” of resistance, of “arbitrary rule,” etc.). Left out of the official reasoning for incorporation were the economic benefits of securing exploitable land, resources, and people. The exclusion objective was pursued both through identification of undesirables and through outright annihilation of “all others” who defied colonial objectives. The American-Filipino colonial hierarchy was secured by a war of conquest in which over 20,000 Filipinos were killed and over 100,000 more died of famine or disease.\textsuperscript{123}

\textit{Imperial Cartographies: Westward Expansion and Benevolent Assimilation in “Injun Country”}

Historians of American Empire such as Walter LaFeber, Neil Smith, Howard Zinn, and Andrew Bacevich, and public intellectuals such as Noam Chomsky, have explored in great detail the new geostrategic imperatives, pitfalls, and tragedies of U.S. global hegemony. Marxian thinkers such as David Harvey, Michael Hardt, and Antonio Negri have drawn attention to the structural features of uneven development and global divisions of labor in the U.S.-dominated global economic order while at the same time foregrounding indications of the dissolution of national borders wrought by transnational flows of goods and people. Postcolonial theorists and critical analysts of international political economy have focused on neocolonial practices that maintain colonial inequalities and modes of exploitation while disguising colonial modes of governance, e.g., through privatization and the administration of capital accumulation by sponsored elites and proxy governments in underdeveloped countries of the Global South. More mainstream economists such as Joseph Stiglitz have highlighted the disastrous effects of


\textsuperscript{123} Estimates range from 60,000 (Max Boot) to 1.4 million (Francisco) dead as a result of the war. Ngai, 2004. 109.
economic underdevelopment on the supposed beneficiaries of neoliberal structural adjustment programs and conditional aid granted to poor countries by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Apologists for global capitalism such as Jagdish Bhagwati and unapologetic promoters of U.S. imperialism such as Robert Kaplan have reinforced at least one dominant strain in the historical literature on “globalization”: the United States has emerged as the guiding light and supreme authority in the post-national era of “globalization.”

Historical discussions of American imperialism in the post-Cold War era tend to focus on the conquest, policing, and economic domination of foreign spaces and peoples rather than the continuation of colonial governance within the territorial boundaries of the United States. Despite a wealth of often devastating critical commentary on the work of Frederick Jackson Turner, many scholars remain invested in updated versions of Turner’s thesis on the centrality of the “frontier” in American history and political culture. Turner predicted that pioneer ideals would survive the closing of the Western frontier and continue to animate U.S. hemispheric and overseas expansion. Turner himself identified the U.S. takeover of former Spanish possessions at the turn of the century as a transformative yet predictable expression of the American pioneer’s expansionist impulse and a natural extension of a distinctively American “sequence.”

Yet it is here, towards the end of his most famous essay, that Turner’s articulation of American exceptionalism slips most dramatically into a European imperialist vision of civilizing conquest and inclusive exclusion. Turner regarded the American presence in the “Far East” both as a new chapter in a distinctively American frontier story – a “logical outcome of the nation’s march to the Pacific” – and as the young country’s entrée into what he calls the “sisterhood of world states.”

Acknowledging the “grave responsibilities” of the American colonial presence in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Hawai’i, Turner shifts his focus from the wild, wide-open terra nullius of the American West, now a constituted “sisterhood of states,” to the improperly mastered European territories of the Far East, the colonial possessions of America’s new, European “world-

125 Turner, 1921.
126 Turner, 1921.
state” siblings. Rehearsing justifications for American imperialism that were reiterated both by his students and by foreign policy officials from Presidents to Generals, Turner calls on U.S. officials as representatives of Europe’s youngest sister to shoulder their fair share of the “white man’s burden.” Foreshadowing his most politically influential students, Turner suggests that, as a zealously liberal-democratic upstart, the U.S. was better suited than its European siblings to undertake the “task of government of other races politically inexperienced and undeveloped.”

Turner’s discussion of the closing of the frontier and the subsequent imperialist expansion of the U.S. “world-state” provided a background framework for dominant strains of American exceptionalism in subsequent decades, both in academic International Relations scholarship and in foreign policy circles. This framework shaped the vision of, among many others, Turner’s most politically influential student, the geographer Isaiah Bowman. A founding father of the modern discipline of academic geography and a close advisor to Presidents from Theodore Roosevelt to Harry Truman, Bowman played a major role in carving up the spaces of a new 20th-century American world order. Like Turner, Bowman envisioned a distinctively American global order through an ethno-racial optic that separated civilized white Europeans from the backward inhabitants of European colonies, including newly-won American territories in the so-called Far East. Also like Turner, Bowman’s racialism seemed to conflict with his commitment to the purportedly exceptional American ideals of liberal equality espoused by the Presidents he served from Wilson to FDR. In his brilliant account of Bowman’s role in the production of the 20th century American Empire, Neil Smith explains the constitutive contradiction of the Euro-American colonial imaginary. Developed throughout his career as a geographer and highly influential political official, Bowman’s efforts came to fruition in the early years of American involvement in World War II. Pre-emptively defending the State Department’s proposals for taking over European colonies against charges of “hypocrisy,” Bowman attempted to reconcile American anti-imperialist exceptionalism with its imperial interests and ambitions. Smith recounts Bowman’s statement at the 1942 State Department meetings on dependent territories as follows:

---

127 Turner, 1921.
The “colonies are backward and we must do something about them.” [Bowman] began, but we should also assume “that they are ‘coming up to something such as we are.’” The “people of backward areas” may not complete the journey but will “arrive at some stage of development to the limit of their competence.” It would doubtless be a messy process, makeshift and military as much as market driven, yet the most powerful nations had no choice but to take control of development if “the hope of a brighter future” was to be realized in dependent territories. Change would be slow rather than dramatic, he counseled, there would be objections, and charges of hypocrisy could be expected. Yet “it is no service to dependent areas to let our desire to improve their condition override” U.S. interests themselves. “Small peoples are onlookers in a world struggle like that of the present.... Their place in the world will be secondary....” Development could be secured only through “international economic agreements” for the purpose of advancing world trade in such a way that the dependent countries would become efficient and “produce wanted products instead of an excess of some products and a deficiency of others.”

Although reconfigured in ways that reflect the conflicting economic and security interests of United States in the new global capitalist order, Bowman’s apologetics reflect a distinctively colonial ambivalence inherited by Europe’s “youngest sister” from her Old World siblings. The goal of U.S. imperialist expansion, like the goal of her European predecessors, was to incorporate backward peoples into the imperial domain in a manner befitting their inferior capacities. Expansion and global governance would advance the interests of the imperialist world states for stability and economic growth and promote the relatively more modest needs of backward peoples first for freedom from barbarism and older modes of European domination and secondly for the basic commodities required to reproduce their ability to work in low-wage, low-skilled sectors of the new global-imperial economy. Accomplishing the latter goal would propel the United States into its rightful place as the leader of the new global order of European World States by securing markets for American goods and by promoting global commerce, economic growth, and stability.

Smith’s account of Bowman’s influence on foreign policymaking throws the conceits of American exceptionalism into sharp relief. Borrowing from Mary Louise Pratt’s excellent analysis of European colonial narratives, Smith situates justifications for American Imperialism within a “strategy of representation whereby European bourgeois

subjects seek to secure their innocence in the same moment as they assert European hegemony."\textsuperscript{129} Influenced by prominent historians and social scientists like Turner and Bowman, American policymakers justified their imperial designs by appealing on the one hand to the civilizing virtues of scientific development and rule of experts and on the other hand to the purportedly American ideals of Lockean liberty and equality, civilizing law and order, and self-determination through a heavily regulated democracy. The latter was a privilege to be earned through gradual, painstaking development towards nation-statehood, not a right to be granted to the inhabitants of colonized spaces as Wilsonian idealism and calls for the national self-determination of peoples might suggest. Under the watchful eye of well-trained experts from the land of pioneers and their “world-state” parents, colonized peoples would learn to play their proper role as extractors of raw materials and administrators of capital in the new American-led global economy and would thereby earn a provisional right to govern their expertly bordered national populations.

A great deal of scholarly attention has recently been paid to the distinctive features of the American-style “neo-colonial” exploitation of former European colonies that began most dramatically with the Spanish-American détente of 1898.\textsuperscript{130} Neil Smith masterfully links neo-colonial discourse to its origins in the emergence of American scientific geography, a discipline that appropriated the Turner thesis for the purposes of planning and justifying American overseas expansion. World Systems Theory and its offshoots have demonstrated how practices of underdevelopment protect colonial divisions of labor, separating European manufacturing “cores” from colonial “peripheries” of raw material extraction in the supposedly post-colonial, neoliberal age. More nuanced applications of Immanuel Wallerstein’s general theory, such as can be found in the work of David Harvey, Étienne Balibar, and Mike Davis have examined the ways in which uneven development produces spaces of primitive accumulation within what are traditionally considered the territorial “core” of the world system, namely, European


\textsuperscript{130} Stuart Creighton Miller. \textit{"Benevolent Assimilation": The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903}. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).
countries and the United States and metropolitan “world cities” of the Global South.\textsuperscript{131} This body of work further substantiates the postcolonial historian Frederick Cooper’s arguments about the staying power of imperialist logic. As Cooper puts it, arguing against James Scott’s Foucauldian analysis of statist cartographies and practices, modern nation-states “see like empires” as much as they “see like states.”

The analysis I offer here participates in these critical conversations by focusing on one, crucially important discursive domain of Euro-American colonial governance. Postcolonial analysis of the “crises” of immigration management in the United States reveals the constitutive ambivalence of “world-states,” conceived as empires, in a global context dominated by the ideals and practices that take place under the banner of American exceptionalism. From a postcolonial standpoint, the U.S. is not exceptional as a post-imperial, post-colonial nation-state superpower. It is exceptional insofar as its imperialist regimes have invented new, purportedly “liberal” ways to reconcile the conflicting goals of expansion and exclusion, incorporation and segregation.

As historians of American Empire have demonstrated, the ongoing colonial practices and ambitions of the United States are well-concealed by the new American internationalism and by the nation-state system through which these practices are administered. Bowman’s defense against charges of hypocrisy rested on the notion that, unlike previous colonizers whose main goal was to extract profits by subjugating and exploiting foreign peoples, the U.S. would aim to secure the entire world for the sake of free enterprise and trade, and would eventually incorporate all the world’s peoples as individuals into a global economic order. This vision was in keeping with the narrative of the U.S. as a nation of entrepreneurial immigrants and with assumptions of the young country’s global Manifest Destiny. In its most abstract, moral-philosophical form, the vision granted that all individuals ought to be liberated as bourgeois subjects, each with an equal opportunity to compete. More concretely, the vision assumed that American citizens would outcompete all other groups of individuals because of their racially determined capacities and hard-earned entrepreneurial skills.

The emphasis placed by Bowman and his contemporaries on expansive incorporation carried with it an American responsibility towards those who would become new participants in the new Americanized world order. In order for new members to become fully integrated as capitalist subjects, such that they could compete as individual entrepreneurs with citizens of European countries, they would have to be trained by American officials and experts. In fact, Wilsonian idealism conflicted not just with the self-interested ambitions and behavior of “world-states,” but also with the colonial bordering practices of ongoing European imperialism.

Contemporary literature on American imperialism (often un-self-consciously) rehabilitates the frontier thesis tradition by shifting scholarly attention from an already “mastered” domestic space to a clearly demarcated foreign policy arena. There is an unfortunate disconnect between studies of American overseas imperialist expansion and domination and studies of race, gender, and immigration in the “domestic sphere” of American policy and practice. This gap reflects a broader disciplinary fissure between the study of “foreign” and “domestic” policy arenas that obscures the expansionist, colonial dimensions of U.S. immigration policy and practice.

By the turn of the 20th century, the United States had established itself as a formidable competitor among European colonial powers. Its victories in the Mexican American and Spanish American Wars had paved the way for its colonization of northern Mexico, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Guam, and Hawai’i. Notwithstanding the disavowals of American Presidents and policymakers, the justifications for the colonization of these spaces and their inhabitants replicated the justifications employed by “Old World” colonial powers like France, Spain, and Britain as well as by American proponents of slavery, servitude, and Manifest Destiny. At the same time as they rejected the “imperialist” label, American officials identified the U.S. mission as one of “benevolent assimilation.”

The Adoption of European Technologies of Colonial Subjugation

---

132 Turner, 1921.
133 For a systematic analysis of the American colonial lexicon, see Matthew Frye Jacobson. *Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876-1917.* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000).
Sure enough, American officials looked to Britain and France for models of colonial subjugation throughout the Philippine campaign and tried to learn both from their successes and their failures. Self-identified “Anglophiles,” American imperialists learned divide-and-conquer tactics both from their “Injun Country” adventures, discussed in Chapter 1, and from British experiments in India and Africa. From Britain, they learned to recruit Filipino scouts, soldiers, and elites to work in both military and non-military capacities as agents of the American empire. From France, American officials learned both the general art of the mission civilisatrice and the “European methods” developed by French officials to subjugate “rebellious Asiatics” in Indochina and Arabs and Berbers in Algeria. General Robert Young, working under the military command of Arthur MacArthur, recommended that French manuals of colonial warfare become required reading at West Point. When MacArthur resisted Young’s promotion of harsher colonial tactics in the Philippines, the General justified these measures by appealing to the Anglo Saxon models of subjugation developed by the British in South Africa. Equating the objectives and challenges of American and British colonialism, Young asserted that “[t]he Anglo Saxon has been gaining wide experience simultaneously fighting enemies full of wile and cunning.”

Among other techniques of counter-insurgency, Young and Macarthur defended the use of the infamous “water cure”: a technique wherein prisoners were subjected to simulated drowning. The practice was used both to gather information and to terrorize and thereby to pacify colonial subjects. In debates that have resurfaced frequently among Western military experts and publics in the 20th and 21st century, peaking during the Algerian war for independence and more recently in the context of the “war on terror,” the merits of this and other brutal methods of gathering intelligence were weighed against their costs in terms primarily of military effectiveness in a distinctively colonial context.

135 Creighton Miller, 1992.
137 Ironically, whereas this technique was borrowed from the British and French by U.S. colonial agents at the turn of the century as an effective means of subjugating “Asiatics,” it has recently been criticized by U.S. counterterrorism officials as a French counterinsurgency method that did not work in the Algerian War. These officials have used Pontecorvo’s film The Battle of Algiers to improve American counterinsurgency strategies and technologies of power. Then as now, the question for colonial officials was a techno-strategic one: how most effectively to pacify non-speaking, apolitical subjects of empire.
As Doty suggests, debates about water torture and other brutal forms of oppression in the Philippines threw the romantic conception of American identity as civilized relative both to other white European powers and to backward non-white peoples into question.\(^{138}\) To re-affirm this identity, American politicians and military officials attempted once again to fix the binary distinction between civilized and uncivilized races. Within the colonial project of civilizing savages, otherwise civilized American soldiers and officers had to act against their nature, i.e., they had to use barbaric measures to pacify a barbaric people who understood no other language than the language of brutal violence.\(^{139}\) The torture, massacre, and systematic dehumanization of Filipinos, e.g., through the systematic use of inhumane tactics and racial epithets, conflicted with the sanitizing ideology of the civilizing mission. The cognitive dissonance produced by these apparent contradictions could only be overcome in a context wherein the identities of colonizer and colonized were relatively fixed, such that no behavior on the part of either party could alter their underlying, fundamental (and fundamentally racial) identity. Brutality and benevolence both proved the superiority and right-to-rule of the Anglo-Saxon colonizer. All forms of resistance and submission proved the relative inferiority of Filipinos and their status as a pre-modern, backward race that lacked the capacity for self-government. In this colonial relation, all political demands were foreclosed. The only remaining possibilities were conquest of the inferior by the superior race and the administration or annihilation of the former by the latter.

The notion that violent technologies were developed in the discursive context of European colonialism rather than the International Relations context of sovereign nation-states is important because of the difference it highlights between colonial relations and relations among recognized European powers. In this case, it highlights the binary logic that separates relations between the U.S. and American “territories” and those among Turner’s “sisterhood” of European “world-states.” This difference is apparent in the frequent declarations of American imperialists that the U.S. was not “at war” in the Philippines, but rather attempting to suppress an insurrection on behalf of the Filipino people and for the greater good both of American citizens and of the American empire.


\(^{139}\) Doty, 1996.
As in conflicts with Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Mexicans, Hawai’ians, Sioux and Apache, the “enemies” in the Philippines were not worthy of the title “enemies in war.” They were racially inferior “insurrectos,” an obstacle to the American civilizing mission in the region and to the realization of the sovereign will of the American people. In short, as non-Europeans, they were apolitical savages whose capacity for political speech was open to question and whose membership in the new world order would depend on the success or failure of an American civilizing mission.140 Although “benevolent assimilation” might require years of “tutoring” and although its potential for success was debatable given Filipinos’ innate inferiority, it was self-evident to Young, Taft, MacArthur, and their imperialist supporters that if any European power could make the best of Filipinos it would be the “sovereign power of the American people.”141

140 Even staunch anti-imperialists shared this ethno-racial cartographic vision. The voracious imperialist/anti-imperialist debates were not so much over the question of distinct racially determined mental faculties, which were largely assumed by imperialist and anti-imperialists alike, but whether or not the U.S. had the right to impose a Euro-American government on a foreign people without giving those people full rights as American citizens.

Chapter 2
Policing the West: Migration, National-Societal Insecurity, and the Empire-State

The law-and-order discourse that states spontaneously oppose to such [immigrant and anti-immigrant] violence, highlighting some forms and minimizing or camouflaging others, creating a priori categories of suspects and scapegoats, is even more difficult to legitimize on the European level than in the national framework, since it would put at the heart of the construction of the community a police order that is synonymous with a perpetual attempt of national repressive apparatuses to outdo one another (as well, no doubt, as mutual suspicion between them).

Étienne Balibar

Conservatory of the passive revolution, the national state now proceeds to find for “the nation” a place in the global order of capital, while striving to keep the contradictions between capital and the people in perpetual suspension. All the politics is now sought to be subsumed under the overwhelming requirements of the state-representing-the-nation.

Partha Chatterjee

In this chapter, I attempt to articulate the significance and limitations of recent interventions in IR Theory, notably those of Peter Andreas and of Critical Security scholars, that identify and analyze contemporary policing practices of population and immigration management and the “rebordering” of the West. I focus in particular on popular accounts that challenge the state-centric, “neo-neo consensus” in IR: a consensus that takes as given unified, rationally-acting nation-states who fight or cooperate depending on balances of power within an international system “structured” by Hobbesian anarchy (in the case of neorealists) or anarchy mitigated by supranational regimes of regulation and cooperation and interdependence built through iterated transactions (in the case of neoliberalism). I argue that appropriations of Foucault go a long way towards diagnosing new regimes of immigration management by identifying

---

142 In Chapter 5, I complicate the notion that states “spontaneously” oppose immigrant and anti-immigrant violence with biopolitical, law-and-order discourse. I argue that political demands for local autonomy (States rights) in the U.S. case and for sovereignty as a model of popular, democratic decision-making that pits society against the state is somehow channeled into statist discourse, such that the demands themselves are always eventually articulated as demands for states to intervene on behalf of the body of the national population.

143 Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
their origins in the emergence of technocratic regimes of individual discipline – the production of bourgeois citizen-subjects – and biopolitical regulation of the health of Western national populations. Like Foucault, however, these appropriations often overestimate the coherence of the new “reason of state” within a global neoliberal order.

To understand the contradictions, crises, and ambivalence of new policing practices, I argue, one must think with and beyond Foucault by situating immigration policing discourse more thoroughly within European imperial histories of expansion and incorporation and in colonial practices of policing and bordering. I argue that the “rebordering” of Western spaces and communities repeats “with difference” the rebordering of European empires during the heyday of European and Euro-American imperial expansion and colonial incorporation and in European metropoles during the pre- and post-World-War II period of rapid decolonization and mass migration. Reconsidering practices of immigration management and policing in this context can enrich our understanding of, among other phenomena, trans- and intra-national subject formation, the ambivalence and incoherence of national and societal security discourse, and the significance of racial identity formation in contemporary practices of bordering and population regulation.

Government efforts to grow economies through the importation and exportation of migrant workers and jobs end up producing liminal, hybrid subjects and spaces that exist simultaneously within and outside of Western polities. Since these are the very polities that national militaries and police forces are expected to protect, economic-political expansion necessitates the expansion of internal policing practices, what IR theorist Peter Andreas calls practices of “rebordering,” and of international networks of surveillance and control, what Andreas calls “policing the globe.” While I am indebted to Andreas for his identification of novel policing practices, my analysis takes a

---

144 Huysman in Michael Williams (Ed.); Kelstrup, Morten; International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration. (New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis, 2000).
145 In Bhabha’s complex sense of the term. See Homi K. Bhabha. The Location of Culture. (New York: Routledge, 1994).
146 Huysman in Williams et. al., 2000; Bigo in Williams et. al., 2000.
148 They also create conditions under which neither militaries nor police forces are certain of their missions or their jurisdictions. As Bigo notes, this has resulted in a “merging” of military and policing functions and forces. See Bigo in Williams et. al., eds., 2000.
different path in showing how mass migration exposes the non-presence both of self-contained national-societal populations and economies, and of unified, rationally-acting nation-states.

I argue here that, like imperial expansion and colonial incorporation, the production of liminal subjects and spaces engendered by cross border flows of goods and people interrupts narratives and performances of national identity and difference. These national narratives promulgate fantasies of popular sovereignty, bind populations to their guardian states, and legitimate violent state practices of national security both within and outside of Western territories. The blurring of jurisdictions caused by mass migration, like that caused by imperial expansion, engenders a crisis of political legitimacy for states in their roles as defenders of Western nations (e.g., because it is never clear what and who their often brutally violent practices secure). In a wider context, mass migration arouses anxieties about the permeability and malleability of territorial and juridical boundaries separating Western citizen-subjects and non-Western others. This anxiety about a lack of substantial borders protecting imagined Western national communities animates frantic and relentless state and non-state efforts to produce these borders: to constitute Western national communities by defining their identities in contradistinction to Others, to that which they are not. This essentially performative task of identification, including legislation, documentation and various forms of juridical marking, is both impossible and necessary in the postcolonial context of the new security environment. Contemporary practices of social production, when they are effective, can legitimate practices of internal security and border control in the name of national defense, but they do not resolve the tensions of postcolonial transnationality and the constant transformations of national populations. In other words, national society-subjects that “must be defended,” to use Foucault’s famous formulation,

---

149 I will discuss the various meanings and deployments of the concept of sovereignty in immigration and security discourse in this and subsequent chapters. Here, I mean something close to the liberal-democratic concept of sovereignty as a unified people with a singular will capable of making decisions and policies without consideration of the wills or interests of others.


151 Bigo in Williams et. al, eds. 2000.

152 Campbell, 1998.
must first be adequately defined and produced through the discipline of citizens, the production of bourgeois subjects, and the regulation of populations.\footnote{Michel Foucault. \textit{Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975-1976}. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2003).}

Foucault both conducts and calls for research that uncovers the history of these modes of national subject production. However, as Robert Young, Edward Said, and Ann Laura Stoler have noted, he largely neglects how these forms of subject production were developed as modes of colonial governance both in the foreign spaces of colonies and in metropolitan spaces to regulate the health of the national body politic, e.g., by gendering and racializing colonial and citizen-subjects and by excluding colonials from full membership in the national population. This chapter draws on the “histories of the present” developed by Foucault during the burgeoning era of global neoliberalism in the late 1970s and early 1980s – his genealogy of the “art of government” and “reason of state” in the liberal-bourgeois context of bounded European nations – to analyze the internal and transnational policing of populations in general and of migrants in particular in the context of the current global neoliberal order. Following Roxanne Doty, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, and scholars of Critical Security Studies, I call for a broadening of Foucault’s analysis of the “art of government” to account for the internalization of militant policing and the internationalization of crime-oriented policing in the new, \textit{global} security environment.\footnote{As Doty notes, although he emphasizes the naturalization and regulation of economies and of cross-border circulation, Foucault’s account lends itself to appropriations that assume clearly demarcated territories and populations. In other words, his history of the present cannot account for the recent deterritorializations within a global Empire. “Foucault’s writings on governmentality and Polanyi’s writings on social protection both presumed unproblematic boundaries between the inside and outside of societies, the domestic and the international. Both implicitly conceived of domestic society as unambiguously bounded and differentiated from the international. The issue of governmentality does not go away though when unproblematic boundaries can no longer be presumed. Arguably it becomes even more complicated when such a presumption cannot be easily made.” Roxanne Lynn Doty. \textit{Anti-Im migrantism in Western Democracies}. (New York: Routledge/RIPE Studies in Global Political Economy, 2007). 37.} Broad appropriations of Foucault’s concepts of biopolitics and governmentality, as well as popular multidisciplinary interventions in IR such as those of Peter Andreas, offer fruitful correctives to the state-centric accounts of neorealism and neoliberalism and of the ironic state-centrism of orthodox Foucauldian theory.\footnote{As I argue in the pages that follow, some Foucauldian scholars tend to lead their readers into an iron cage of statist reason wherein regulation and discipline coherently produce un-ambivalent bourgeois national subjects.} However, these accounts under-appreciate (or omit entirely) constitutive
dimensions of immigration and policing discourse in the “new security environment.” I argue that they miss important colonial aspects of immigration and policing discourse. More specifically, they tend to neglect the colonial ambivalence of state and of non-state actors in their efforts to produce, regulate, and separate populations of citizens and various categories of non-citizens.

In the pages that follow, I will attempt to demonstrate that contemporary modes of policing immigrant groups have deep roots in colonial modes of biopolitical policing and governmentality. My account here challenges widely read interventions in IR, particularly that of Peter Andreas, and appropriations of Foucault that seek to identify the fundamentally new character of (re)bordering and policing of the West in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 neoliberal security environment. I agree that these new practices have developed innovative mechanisms of deterritorializing regulation, but I argue that many of the same practices have deep roots in a prior, imperial-colonial moment. Following prominent postcolonial theorists and historians such as Edward Said, Frederick Cooper, and Alfred McCoy, I suggest that Foucault’s genealogy of raison d’état neglects the development of policing practices in European and U.S. colonies and the importation of colonial techniques to Western metropoles during the period of rapid decolonization before and after the Second World War.156

Although helpful and incisive, many appropriations of Foucault’s later work on security, territory, population, governmentality, and biopolitics make the same omission. By focusing on the distinction between 17th- to 19th-century modes of policing European populations to the post-Cold War neoliberal security context, these appropriations skip over crucial colonial periods, including European civilizing missions in Africa and the American entrée into the world of colonial powers with its colonization of northern Mexico and former Spanish colonies such as the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico. As Stoler, McCoy, Cooper, Said, Spivak, Bhabha, Mitchell and many others have demonstrated, the contradictions and “crises” of colonialism involved the rebordering of people and spaces who had been actively incorporated through economic and political expansion. These were crises engendered, in Deleuzian terms, by deterritorializations

that accompanied imperial expansion beyond the bounds of the national territory and colonial incorporation of foreign subjects partly or fully into Western national populations. This chapter demonstrates how the crises and contradictions of immigration management and policing today are in many ways extensions of the crises and contradictions of colonialism that came to a head during the period of anti-colonial resistance, mass migration of colonial subjects to Western metropoles, and political demands of those subjects ranging from national self-determination, to full citizenship rights in Western polities, to the institutionalization of transnational political communities and spaces already formed by colonial projects and transnational resistance.\footnote{Rebordering the West, Policing the Globe: Immigration Management and Border Control in Europe’s “New Security Environment.”}
The examples of mass recruitment of improperly documented immigrant workers and mass raids at worksites where undocumented immigrants are employed illustrate the central contradictions of national security in the neoliberal era (see Introduction). Western nation-states have apparently prospered and strengthened by incorporating foreign peoples into national war machines, economies, and territories. As increasing numbers of non-Westerners have moved across Western borders and into Western economies and national territories, the incorporation and integration of these people, and their transformation of national and transnational communities, has generated anxieties about the security, integrity, and sovereignty of Western populations. Intensifying demands for low-wage workers and corresponding patterns of migration and settlement have posed intractable problems for Western regimes of border control. Guardians of the Western nation-state articulate the central problem in terms of national security and prosperity: “how do we defend our Western populations from potentially dangerous, non-Western foreigners when the relative economic prosperity and global supremacy of the West depends upon the profitable employment of foreign workers at home and abroad?”

Partly in response to these anxieties and partly productive of them, Western states have developed increasingly sophisticated modes of border control to secure their populations from perceived economic and existential threats posed by non-Western people. The attacks of September 11, 2001 amplified xenophobic anxieties that the border-blurring effects of neoliberal deregulation had already engendered. Western governments have expressed their resolve to protect the privileges of their citizens by constructing fences, walls, detention centers, juridical mechanisms of socioeconomic exclusion and deportation, and elaborate networks of surveillance, containment, and control, as well as through spectacular performances of border “enforcement” exemplified by mass raids in peripheral spaces like Postville, Arizona, and Calais. As scholars of immigration policy have noticed, these structures and missions of security now operate primarily within an increasingly global system developed under the banners of the American-led “wars” on terror and drugs.

159 As Rens van Munster, Peter Andreas, and Didier Bigo among others have argued, Europe-wide policing networks have been constructed under mounting U.S. pressure in the context of the wars on terror and...
These developments trouble the dominant orthodoxies and conceptual frameworks of International Relations Theory. The threats posed by non-state actors, by open markets and flows of goods and people across Western borders, have displaced Cold War military threats posed by insecure states fighting for survival and regional hegemony. The recent blurring of economic and political-territorial boundaries has exposed the pores in the cherished “black boxes” of IR Theory: those unified, rationally-acting, sovereign states all seeking to survive within the tooth-and-claw world of international anarchy. Military mechanisms of national defense and deterrence are poorly suited and ill equipped to defend Western nations from the forces of global capitalism, e.g., the seemingly inexorable, wage-depressing exportation of economic opportunities formerly reserved for members of Western populations and the crisis-inducing importation of non-Western workers into Western territories. The central imperatives of what Roxanne Doty has called Western “statecraft”\(^{160}\) have shifted from the strategic alliance and deterrence of great powers to the management of the structural contradiction between the border-blurring imperatives of \textit{expansion}, of “economic growth” and the expansion of spheres of influence, and the Sisyphean task of defending the privileges of Western citizen-subjects in the so-called “flat” world.

A growing number of International Relations scholars are beginning to acknowledge a profound transformation in Western discourses of national security.\(^{161}\) Peter Andreas has staked a position at the vanguard of this scholarly movement by demarcating a space for a paradigm shift in theories of national security and defense. In his incisive studies of the features that distinguish Western national security discourse in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 eras, Andreas traces the decline of Cold War modes of military defense and the rapid emergence of an American-led law-enforcement regime


whose purpose is to “reborder” the West and to police the globe without blocking profitable flows of goods and people across borders. Andreas provides a thoroughgoing analysis of the innovations and startling implications of what he, following technocratic policymakers in Washington and the EU, calls the West’s new “security environment,” notably: elaborate European and inter-Atlantic networks of “intelligence” constitutive of the “internationalization of border control,” (e.g., extraordinary rendition), the use of military technology to police domestic spaces, the development of new technologies of surveillance (e.g., facial recognition software for use at ports of exit and entry), the cooperation and coordination of agencies of domestic law enforcement and foreign intelligence, the proliferation of internal border checkpoints and detention centers, the deputization of non-state actors as agents of law enforcement, and so on. As Andreas argues, these intra- and supra-national innovations blur the line that divides foreign and domestic policy and practice. His accounts of the diffusion of policing responsibilities and the unifying logic of the new global police calls for inter- and multidisciplinary modes of analysis that can explain how foreign and domestic technologies of border control operate within a complex global system.

Andreas provides an indispensible historical analysis of the emergence of this global system. His overarching objective is to explain the expansion of state power and technologies of surveillance and capture to exclude “bad actors” in the context of open markets and economic deregulation and the symbolic effects of new practices of border control. In so doing, he offers useful correctives first to neorealist accounts that reduce economic interdependence and global networks to their functions as expressions of state interests and second to vulgar liberal analyses of globalization that fixate on the “flattening” of the world through market deregulation. According to Andreas, the modern Western nation-state has neither re-asserted Cold War forms of military security through alliance and economic regulation nor succumbed to the deterritorializing pressures of globalization. Instead, Western states have expanded by developing real, material, and often violent practices of “reregulation…criminalization, and crime

---

control”¹⁶³ that cut across the jurisdictions of individual nation-states. Although these practices have proven to be highly ineffective at stemming the tide of profitable border crossings and illicit activity, Andreas argues, they have symbolic effects in the political discourse of popular sovereignty and national security (what Andreas calls “border games”). Specifically, they reassert the Western state’s sovereign authority over a spatially-defined jurisdiction. In Judith Butler’s language, they perform sovereign authority over national territories and populations.¹⁶⁴

In *Policing the Globe*, Andreas argues compellingly that the United States has enlisted foreign law enforcement officers to prosecute its global policing operations. This American “internationalization” of policing has dovetailed with European Union efforts to coordinate border control initiatives across Europe. These efforts culminated in the 1995 Schengen agreement and the Maastricht treaty, and in the subsequent incorporation of aspiring EU member states into so-called “Fortress Europe” or “Schengenland.” Like the North American Free Trade Agreement, Schengen opened internal and some external borders to economic flows, while simultaneously expanding the “wall around the West” ostensibly in order to exclude potentially threatening non-European peoples from European populations and political communities. Within the discourse of European integration, these “compensatory” measures were necessary to standardize and coordinate security operations in order to protect the community as a whole. Opposition to Schengen and European integration more generally often cited how new transnational practices of policing and regulation were far removed from the democratic processes of nation-states. For many critics, the community represented by the EU and secured by Europol and networks of European police agencies did not exist as

¹⁶³ “Thus, rather than simply eroding,” Andreas contends, “the importance of territoriality is persisting, but with a shift in emphasis.” Andreas sums up his intervention as follows: “the sizable literatures on globalization and transnational relations largely overlook the criminalized side of the transnational world and state efforts to police it. Much is written about the shrinking of the regulatory state through market liberalization and deregulation, but much less noticed and studied is reregulation and state expansion through criminalization and crime control... Similarly, the loosening of state controls through trade liberalization has been accompanied by efforts to tighten controls on illegal trade. In short, even as economic barriers have fallen, police barriers have risen, and increasingly extend outward through regional and global law enforcement.” Peter Andreas and Thomas J. Biersteker. *The Rebordering of North America: Integration and Exclusion in a New Security Context*. (New York: Routledge, 2003). 6.

a democratic political community. The discourse of European integration had therefore to produce this community, in part through representational practices that identified non-Europeans as outsiders and as threats and insiders as European citizens in whose rights had to be protected by Europe as a whole.

Schengen standardized visa requirements, political asylum criteria for refugees, criminal penalties for smugglers, detention and deportation requirements, and standard methods for collecting and mining intelligence data on all non-Westerners. It also imposed various, often distinctive border control responsibilities on all EU members, including special “buffer zone” responsibilities on “countries of first entry” some of which continue to petition for EU membership (e.g., Turkey). As Critical Security scholars such as van Munster, Bigo, and Huysman have shown, the Schengen and Maastricht treaties effectively empowered security professionals to define external and internal threats and to operate relatively independently of political actors such as national government representatives in the European Union. In fact, at each stage of the development of the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ), the European Commission delegated a larger set of agenda-setting and policymaking responsibilities to security professionals and policing networks. Perhaps more importantly, it laid the groundwork for the formation of relatively autonomous, transnational security networks that blurred the boundaries between militaries and domestic law enforcement.

The CRS in Calais and Paris now operate within overlapping French and European jurisdictions under the auspices not only of the French government, but of also of international policing organizations such as Europol and Interpol. Like the Gendarmerie, they see themselves as part of a global campaign to police the West and thereby to secure civilization. By stopping migrants from entering the U.K. through

---

165 Huysman, 2000; Bigo, 2000; van Munster, 2009.
166 van Munster, 2009.
167 As Bigo notes: “...the French gendarmerie considers that it has been prepared for centuries for these missions of internal security, pretending that it possesses an advantage over all other corps due to its role as soldiers of the law, to its power to use military means which it masters in a civilian context, while knowing not to transform its opponent into an enemy to be eradicated. The gendarmerie favours, they say 'the unbroken passage from the normal period to the crisis period, or even war. Well adapted to low intensity conflicts, whose extent exceeds the regular bounds of national police actions, but which do not justify the intervention of other armed forces, it is essential.'... Exploiting the fact that it is both 'civilian due to its missions, but military due to its statutes and missions in times of crisis', the gendarmerie considers itself ready to be the kingpin of internal security missions, in France or abroad.” Didier Bigo. “When Two
the port of Calais, and by rounding up African and Roma migrants in Paris and Marseilles, the CRS carry out duties imposed on them by “Europe as a whole” (articulated, in this case, by their British neighbors). Their deployment in Calais by French President Nicolas Sarkozy was in many ways a response to British demands articulated through EU security channels for the French to stop migrants from entering the U.K. via ferries and the “Chunnel” connecting Calais to London. In coordination with the French Police Nationale and mobile military police, the Gendarmerie, and the French military and foreign agencies of law enforcement, the CRS patrol the streets of Calais looking for anyone fitting the profile of a non-Westerner. As riot police, the CRS like the Gendarmerie fall in between the categories of military soldier, trained to subdue and kill external enemies, and police officer, trained to arrest, control, and monitor internal threats to the national population. As agents of the new EU apparatus of security, which has fallen under increasing pressure from the U.S. to intensify and expand its counterterrorism operations, the CRS are in many ways the agents of global Empire par excellence.

As Andreas notes and scholars of Critical Security Studies have demonstrated compellingly, this kind of quasi-legal profiling is common practice in Europe’s “new security environment.” As Rens van Munster has shown, the process of securitizing immigration in the European Community has legitimated policing practices that break with the liberal conventions of domestic law enforcement. Once immigration is constructed effectively as a “security” problem, as opposed to a humanitarian or merely economic problem, the stakes of enforcement increase dramatically. Security threats are constructed as existential threats to the body of the nation, and responses to these threats can therefore disregard liberal rights afforded to citizens deemed unthreatening (in this case, French-looking or white-skinned citizens). CRS policing activities in Calais are an effect of this process of securitization. More than the Police Nationale and even the quasi-military Gendarmerie, CRS agents actively profile, arrest, detain, harass, interrogate, and release or deport brown-skinned pedestrians on the streets of port cities like Calais and Marseilles and metropolitan centers like Paris and Lyon. The Police


*Nationale* and *Gendarmerie* play a supporting, surveillance role in the cat and mouse game of border control in Calais, Paris, and Marseilles. Encountering suspicious individuals, shelters, or squats, they relay information to intelligence coordination centers, which contact CRS agents who proceed to conduct mass raids or to make individual arrests.\(^{169}\)

As in the U.S. case, and particularly in districts that adopted the 287(g) clause of the Immigration and Nationality Act that encourages cooperation between federal agents and local police (see below), CRS tactics serve a “symbolic” bordering function as well as an exclusionary and deterrence function. As Andreas suggests, border patrol on the U.S.-Mexico border has not stopped or even slowed the flow of improperly documented Latin American migrants crossing into U.S. territory. It *has* empowered smugglers (coyotes) and diverted migrant paths into treacherous desert regions where many failed efforts to cross end in death from exposure and dehydration (discussed below).\(^{170}\) It has also destroyed local economies, depriving them of vital, low-cost laborers, as was the case in Postville, Iowa and Phoenix, Arizona and countless other cities, small towns, and rural areas. Most importantly, it has further marginalized documented and undocumented workers who fit the phenotypical profile of an “illegal.” Likewise in Calais, CRS tactics have little impact on the number of migrants entering migrant camps and attempting to cross the channel to their destination. Rather, they demonstrate France’s resolve to play its proper symbolic role in securing the European population from internal threats. CRS agents regularly stop brown-skinned men who display what they deem to be a Middle-Eastern or Afghan phenotype. They arrive in large white trucks and surround the suspect in groups of six heavily armed men and demand the suspect’s papers. If he (most of the migrants in Calais are young men) cannot produce proper documentation (passport or other valid ID) they handcuff him and take him to local headquarters for questioning and to check his name against the Europol and European immigration databases. If intelligence officers determine that the migrant has any criminal record and that his country of origin or country of first entry will receive him, he is often summarily deported. If the individual’s country of origin or country of first entry refuses to take him

---


back, the suspect is often released or held for no longer than two weeks and then released.\textsuperscript{171}

Most accounts suggest that this catch-and-release tactic is the norm rather than the exception. This is especially true in the case of children, who comprise a large percentage of migrants in the Calais camps. EU regulations require children under the age of 16 to be released within 24 hours of arrest. The CRS commonly arrests children and adults on their way to and from food distribution centers run by French aid organizations (discussed in the following chapter), interrogate them, and release them onto Calais streets where they return to their compatriots in makeshift squats and shelters on the outskirts of the city. Reports of abuse of children and adults in detention centers are common. Most children and adults who are released multiple times attempt to cross the channel in abandoned cars or refrigerated lorries, and most eventually succeed, but the abuse they endure in their efforts has a chilling effect that occludes their emergence as political actors. CRS tactics, like border control tactics across Europe and the U.S., function to marginalize immigrants as threats and to distance them from domains of political speech and action.\textsuperscript{172} In other words, they help to produce vulnerable, docile subjects who function as the Others against which “native” French can define their identity. More broadly, they function to depoliticize the discourse of immigration management, transforming difficult political questions of postcolonial belonging into apparently black and white questions of law and order.

As subjects who are legally prohibited from making demands on Western states, African migrants in Calais, Paris, and Marseilles among other cities and rural areas become exploitable workforces and often desperately impoverished communities living precarious lives in makeshift peripheral ghettos. As such, they appear to pose additional threats as competition for unionized domestic workforces, as parasites that could jeopardize European welfare systems, and as criminal and potentially terrorist elements. Thus, as scholars of Critical Security Studies argue, practices of security and internal bordering interpellate immigrants as threats (and citizens as threatened members of the national population) and produce new threats that spur efforts to create new technologies.

\textsuperscript{171} Interviews with CRS agents in Calais and leaders of the immigrant rights groups \textit{La Belle Etoile} and \textit{No Borders}. August, 2010.
\textsuperscript{172} van Munster, 2009.
of policing. Again, these threats should not be confused with the external military threats posed by foreign states that are the objects of neorealist and neoliberal analysis in IR. Rather, they are constructed as biopolitical threats to the health of the national population. As such, the biopolitical security doctrine dictates that they must be quarantined in camps, marginalized and rendered innocuous/docile, legitimized and assimilated through various legal and sociocultural mechanisms of discipline (see Chapter 3), or purged through coercive deportation.

The only political option open to clandestine or improperly documented migrants who are arrested by the CRS or Gendarmerie, or who wish to apply for asylum in Europe, is to declare themselves persecuted refugees and report to a refugee “camp” or “reception center.”173 Schengen rules require that migrants can only apply for asylum in their country of first entry, where their fingerprints would have been taken upon entering the Schengen zone. This provision put an end to the practice of “asylum shopping” wherein migrants moved from country to country in order to increase their chances of being granted asylum by finding countries with the most generous asylum policies and judicial systems. For most of the asylum seekers in Calais, the country of first origin was Italy or Greece (or Turkey, which continues to play a buffer zone role despite its failed efforts to become and EU member state). The rate of successful asylum applications in these countries ranges from 2 to 30%. France, Europe’s “immigration state,” rejects approximately 85% of all asylum claims. Playing its buffer zone role, Greece rejects 97% of claims.174

As in the U.S., asylum applicants are required to provide specific documentary proof that their lives would be in imminent danger if they would return to their home country. Generalized violence in the country of origin or particular threats that are not substantially documented do not qualify as legitimate claims for asylum. All rejected candidates are immediately deported to their country of origin or to their country of first entry. Any rejected applicant is barred from entering Europe for five to ten years. Facing these dismal odds and often the threat of deportation to conflict zones or poverty-stricken

---

173 These centers are often filled, and overflow candidates have to find their own beds. All applicants receive a small stipend while their application is considered over the course of 1-2 months. Field Notes, July, 2010.
regions of the Global South, migrants often attempt to elude police instead of pursuing legal channels for entry. As clandestine migrants sans papiers, these people are rendered politically abject.\textsuperscript{175} From the perspective of state technocrats and security professionals, they become highly exploitable army of workers as well as symbols of Europe’s “constitutive outside.” In Arendt’s terms, the undocumented people in Calais are stateless, that is, they lack rights that can only be guaranteed by a state power within the international system of states.\textsuperscript{176} Thus, they are dependent on the goodwill of charitable organizations and individuals for the protection of their basic, apolitical rights to biological life.\textsuperscript{177} As I discuss in the next chapter, these organizations often serve a colonial development function as well as a surveillance function for the state.

More recently, Turkey and Eastern Bloc states have been incorporated into “Shengenland” as non-member “buffer zones,” joining forces with Italy and Spain as popular countries of entry into Europe proper. As gatekeepers, these states have been called upon to play an especially strict and brutal exclusion role for the European community (even as they are criticized by European officials for human rights violations). Reports of frequent human rights violations by border police and testimonies of migrants who enter Europe through these countries attest to the delegation of certain brutal exclusion responsibilities to the external boundaries of the West.\textsuperscript{178} Migrants in Calais invariably claim that the most violent border control officials are stationed in these countries, and express relief at having made it through to Western Europe.\textsuperscript{179} The proliferation of detention centers and checkpoints on land and at sea in Spanish territory and the brutal interrogation techniques used by Spanish officials attests to their role as a guardian state acting on behalf of the European community. Reports of migrants dying at sea and on land attempting to cross the Mediterranean into Spain and France while avoiding capture are widespread.\textsuperscript{180} As I suggest below, Arizona has now taken on a

\textsuperscript{176} Hannah Arendt. The Origins of Totalitarianism.
\textsuperscript{177} Duvall et al. in Davison and Muppidi, 2010.
similar role in the North American context.\textsuperscript{181} The intensification of border control on the southern Arizona and California borders has caused similar tragedies in the deserts of northern Mexico, as migrants and smugglers try new more treacherous paths of entry into the United States.

For Andreas, the reregulation of Western borders reflects a shift in Western states’ attention from “external” military enemy-threats to insidious, internal threats posed by “clandestine transnational actors” (CTAs). The overlapping global wars on drugs and “terror” are the defining missions of the new global security regime. As Andreas points out, calling these missions “wars” is misleading insofar as the concept of war invokes struggles for supremacy between rival powers, whereas the new campaigns of national security are \textit{policing} campaigns developed to combat internal, endemic threats to global law and order. Moreover, and perhaps even more importantly, the policing of this order does not aim primarily to vanquish a group of enemies, but rather to reassert a certain kind of symbolic authority over Western territories. Andreas is intrigued by the performative, “audience-directed” nature of novel bordering practices, what he terms “border games,” and technologies of control. Highlighting the obvious inability of new border control strategies to stem the cross-border tide of CTAs, Andreas argues that “the escalation of border policing has ultimately been less about deterring the flow of drugs and migrants than about…symbolically reaffirming the state’s territorial authority.”\textsuperscript{182}

Although he uses different terms, Andreas astutely identifies what Butler and others have theorized as the “performativity” of bordering practices, the way in which the enactment of these practices perform an always already “lost” sovereignty and security along with a coherent narrative of national identity and difference.\textsuperscript{183}

By focusing on the new discourse of national security as law enforcement, Andreas foregrounds important transformations in the rationalities that shape post-Cold

\textsuperscript{181} Interviews and Observations in Calais, France. July, 2009.
\textsuperscript{183} As Judith Butler and Jacques Derrida have suggested, and as I hope the empirical examples in this chapter demonstrate, these performances function to mobilize individuals as members of populations. They are necessary not only to keep out threatening, “bad actors,” but to reproduce populations that could not otherwise endure as bordered, coherent, unified entities. Andreas seems to gesture towards this mobilizing effect in his analysis of the expansion of border control practices to include manifold non-state actors within populations. Judith Butler. \textit{Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative}. (New York: Routledge, 1997).
War Western statecraft. On the one hand, Andreas is right to suggest that the value of his work lies in the way it bridges the gap between IR Theory and “what states are actually doing in the realm of security and border defenses.” Similarly, by drawing attention to underground, illicit and informal economic activities (what Andreas and others call Illicit International Political Economy) and new efforts to contain and control these activities, Andreas has gone a long way towards identifying the interconnections between national security and international political economy. On the other hand, Andreas’ rigorously immanent analysis of the intricacies of “what states are actually doing” often seems to circumscribe the critical potential of his interventions. Andreas frequently identifies his concerns with those of the global police state he is analyzing. His critical gestures are confined by the problem-solving logic of the global police. His questions shift attention away from crucial questions about the productive power of the new security environment – about the subjects and objects produced by its constitutive practices – to sterile questions about the relative “effectiveness” of different strategies and practices of security with respect to the project of excluding dangerous, bad actors from the West. In short, his fascination with the criminological rationalities that constitute the “new security environment” seem to blind him and other scholars of the “securitization of immigration” to important conceptual and critical-historical implications of their work.

In the pages that follow, I seek to draw out some of these implications by situating bordering practices constitutive of the new security environment in national, imperial, and colonial contexts. Drawing on Michel Foucault’s genealogies of raison d’état, the police, governmentality, and biopolitics, I argue that the policing practices identified by Andreas and other theorists of “rebordering” and securitization have roots in 16th- and 17th-century European thought and practice. As I suggest in the opening of the chapter, I go on to suggest that Foucault’s analysis lends itself to appropriations that share many

---

187 By governmentality, I mean the production of bourgeois subjects through micropractices of policing and discipline in the “capillaries” of Western societies, including European and American colonies. By biopolitics, I mean roughly the regulation of the life of populations as if they were biological bodies. This substantiates suggestions Andreas makes in various places.
of the limitations evident in the scholarship in International Relations and immigration studies. In particular, I argue that Foucauldian analyses tend to overemphasize the internal coherence of *raison d’état* and of the state’s rational-biopolitical regulation of national populations. By further situating “rebordering” practices in colonial contexts, I seek to explore the internal contradictions and ambivalence of these practices and the crises they engender.

Specifically, I seek to broaden the concept of Western economic and state *expansion* to include both the internal incorporation of immigrants and the neocolonial opening and securing of markets and sites of production abroad. I argue that economic and state expansion, broadly conceived as both internal and external, throws the figure of the unified national population into radical question. In this context of expansion, “rebordering” must be reconceived as a Sisyphus-like effort to *reproduce western populations and self-contained national economies* rather than merely a symbolic effort to exclude “bad” actors (like Andreas’ CTAs) from national territories. My hope is that this analysis will expand and enrich the explanations offered by recent scholarship on the policing of immigration and borders in the West.

By tracing the continuities that link contemporary “rebordering” practices to older, imperial and colonial bordering practices, this chapter will help articulate the links between theories of securitization in International Relations and theories of global Empire. Anyone familiar with the work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri will notice an affinity linking Andreas’ suggestion that national security has become the objective of a new global police force and Hardt and Negri’s argument that military campaigns within Empire are increasingly taking the form of policing actions within a global, biopolitical

---

188 Here, I agree with Roxanne Doty that: “Foucault's writings on governmentality and Polanyi's writings on social protection both presumed unproblematic boundaries between the inside and outside of societies, the domestic and the international. Both implicitly conceived of domestic society as unambiguously bounded and differentiated from the international.” Roxanne Lynn Doty. *Anti-Immigrantism in Western Democracies*. (Routledge/RIPE Studies in Global Political Economy). 37.

189 I am of course not by any stretch the first to make this point. Ann Laura Stoler’s *Race and the Education of Desire* extends Foucault’s analysis of subject production and explores the Euro-centric limits of his framework by examining the gendered racialization of European colonizers and colonized subjects in the intimate spaces of “domestic” life. Stoler’s brilliant analysis of colonial domesticity bears an important relation to the rendering domestic of military practices, the policing and disciplining of subjects rather than war making against external enemies.
One significant upshot of this transformation is that the objective of policing operations is the capture and containment or killing of apolitical criminals rather than political enemies in war. The shift from international war to global policing thus further depoliticizes the operations and performances of national security.

I seek to articulate these connections more explicitly and to locate their origins in the structures and rationalities of European colonialisms. Drawing on colonial histories, I argue that many policing strategies and tactics of Empire were developed in colonial spaces such as Algeria and the Philippines and subsequently in France and the U.S. when these subjects migrated to the metropole. As I will demonstrate, the anti-politics of the global police regime bears a close-enough resemblance to the anti-politics of colonial policing in an earlier era to warrant genealogical investigation. Like threatening non-Western “illegal immigrants” today, colonials were treated not as enemies but as subordinate subjects. For reasons given in my introduction, I concentrate on U.S. and French colonialism in the 20th century. I seek to demonstrate how the crises, contradictions, and ambivalent practices of European colonialism continue to haunt the new global police in its efforts to reborder the West.

This section also continues my discussion of the reproduction of imperial and colonial hierarchies and racialized and gendered subjects through practices of (re)bordering. In Chapters 3 and 4, I will discuss the complex, gendered racialization of immigrant and Western citizen subjects in the U.S. and France through practices of incorporation and “benevolent assimilation.” Here, I use Foucault’s concept of “state racism” and Balibar’s concept of “class racism” and “neo-racism” in an attempt to explain new juridical justifications for the redefinition and exclusion of non-Westerners from Western spaces. Foucault’s concept of state racism enables an analysis of the juridical mechanisms through which a non-substantive conception of national populations are produced and reproduces through practices of bordering and subordination. With Balibar, I argue that neo-racism is neither new nor captured by categories of “cultural” or “biological” racism. Focusing on the policing of migrant communities, I seek to draw

---

191 I have found Doty’s working definition useful in my efforts to construct my own: “While neo-racism draws its power from the notion of culture rather than science its effect is no less naturalizing. According to the logic of neo-racism the creation of bounded communities founded on cultural differences are a natural
attention both to the usefulness and to the limitations of these concepts for understanding the production of racialized subjects in European imperial spaces and within the still emerging global Empire. In doing so, I seek to shift attention from the question of how most effectively to keep out threatening actors to the question of how the Western societies that apparently “must be defended” are constituted in and through practices of “rebordering” the West and “policing the globe.” I argue that practices of rebordering are animated as much by anxiety about the non-presence of Western national populations, or rather the sense that these populations are defined merely by juridical categories, than about already existing external and internal threats to these populations.  

Rebordering the West: Internal Security in the United States and its Global Implications

On the morning of December 12, 2006, federal officials from the recently established U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency raided a Swift and Co. meatpacking plant in southern town of Worthington, Minnesota. They hastily

result of human nature. The abolition of those boundaries or the coexistence of different cultural traditions within boundaries will naturally give rise to aggression and conflict. Therefore, in order to avoid such conflict, boundaries must be reinforced. One simply must accept the laws of human nature, the tolerance thresholds that are inherent in bounded communities.” Roxanne Lynn Doty. Anti-Immigrantism in Western Democracies. (New York: Routledge/RIPE Studies in Global Political Economy, 2007). 20.

192 In addition to Foucault, I owe great debts to David Campbell, Michael Shapiro, Roxanne Doty, and the authors of Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger for this line of argument. Focusing on the anxious ambivalence of practices of border control and the roots of this anxiety in colonial history, I hope to contribute in some small way to the conversation they’ve initiated on the discursive production of subjects, objects, and threats. A guiding thread in these chapters is an effort demonstrate the ways in which IR theories and practices of bordering are haunted less by fears of clandestine bad actors (Andreas’s CTAs) and “evil doers” and more by fears of potentially “good” actors who might outcompete self-identified Westerners at their own capitalist game, who integrate themselves into local communities, or who unite with self-identified Westerners to create transnational communities that trouble the boundaries and the identity of the West. Through new cultural practices and modes of cultural production and through collective political action, these subjects unsettle the boundaries of the west and the privileges historically considered to be the birthright of bourgeois Western subjects whose archetype is the white male entrepreneur. From this standpoint, the anxieties animating bordering practices stem less from fears of drugs and terror and more from anxieties about national identity expressed most clearly and explicitly by the extreme right, e.g., by Jen Marie Le Pen and the National Front in France and by Patrick Buchanan in the United States. Perhaps the most scholarly articulation of these anxieties is contained within Samuel Huntington’s recent phobic lament on the loss of an imagined Western community and identity. Underlying the technocratic and bureaucratic instrumentalism of immigration management, I argue, is Huntington’s pregnant question, posed at once to the United States and to the West, namely: “Who are we?”

193 “U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) was established in March 2003 as the largest investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Security. ICE is comprised of five integrated divisions
arrested over 230 workers, bussed them to remote facilities in North Dakota and Iowa, and detained them without charge or due process.\textsuperscript{194} ICE did not inform the workers’ relatives of their whereabouts until days later, and some were deported without notice. School officials and parishioners went into “crisis mode” in their efforts to find homes and caregivers for children whose parents had been incarcerated or deported. (Nearly 40% of the Worthington school population belongs to immigrant families.) After the raids, reports of racial discrimination, maltreatment, and abuse were widespread. Some fully “documented” immigrants were arrested and interrogated for what can only be assumed to be their accents and/or skin color. Other lighter-skinned workers with inadequate or false documentation were released. One worker, Veronica Maravilla, forgot to bring her green card to the plant that day. She was handcuffed and interrogated by ICE officials until her teenage daughter arrived with the necessary documentation.\textsuperscript{195}

The Worthington Raids were part of Operation Wagon Train,\textsuperscript{196} a one-day, nationwide “sweep” of Swift plants that resulted in the arrest and detention of over 1,250 people from six states. Prior to the Governor Pawlenty’s executive orders in 2006, “sanctuary” policies in small towns like Worthington – policies that have served to maintain a sharp distinction between federal agencies and domestic agencies of local law enforcement, designed to defend and protect local communities – precluded effective coordination between ICE and local police. ICE did not act alone. Adhering to Department of Homeland Security guidelines and taking advantage of already existing networks of anti-immigrant security, ICE worked with local officials from “numerous federal agencies,” including the Departments of Agriculture and Labor, to coordinate the raids. Prior to the operation, they obtained court-authorized warrants from District Attorneys in all of the affected regions, and laid plans to prosecute offenders. On the day

\textsuperscript{194} http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/061212wagontrainfs.htm
\textsuperscript{196} Wagon Train was a popular 1950s television show about post-civil war, old-west pioneers. The reference is instructively ironic in that it highlights both the centrality of Old-West tropes in the American imaginary and the way in which these tropes recall spaces and social orders that have yet to be colonized by the nation-state. See Michael Shapiro, \textit{Methods and Nations}, for extended discussions of the profound ambivalence reflected in Old-West scripts and performances and the creative subversion of these ostensibly nationalist tropes.
of the operation, ICE contacted the officers of the Governors, State Homeland Security advisors, U.S. senators from all six states affected by the raids, and U.S. congressional representatives from all of the districts in which raids were conducted. According to ICE spokesmen, the coordinated effort was “the largest workplace enforcement action in history.”

The official rationale for the operation was the perceived need to curb a nationwide rise in cases of “identity fraud”: the unlawful assumption of the name, date of birth, and/or social security number of a United States citizen, in this case, by an otherwise inadequately or “undocumented” non-citizen. More broadly, the raids enacted a central tenant of ICE’s core mission, namely, to “protect America” by “identifying criminal activities and eliminating vulnerabilities that pose a threat to our nation’s borders, as well as enforcing economic, transportation and infrastructure security.” The mission was part of a broader transformation of national security that took concrete shape in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001. At the time of its founding, ICE’s parent organization, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), itself a product of the desire for order that followed the 9/11 trauma, was orchestrating a dramatic shift in the country’s technologies of security and power. As part of its effort to convert bureaucratic conflict, jurisdictional gridlock, and legal paralysis into pro-active and pre-emptive mechanisms of enforcement, the DHS supplemented the more defensive, bureaucratic Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) with ICE, which immediately took on an aggressive role in the “domestic” theater of border control.

197 ICE had developed the practice of “workplace enforcement actions” over three years, since the Department of Homeland Security established the agency in March of 2003. The timeframe to which this boastful statement refers is therefore ambiguous. That said, the shear scope and scale of the operation, and the openness with which it was carried out, points to the significance of changing security policies. See the agency’s website: http://www.ice.gov/about/index.htm, and it’s report on Operation Wagon Train: http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/061212wagontrainfs.htm. (Accessed, September 11, 2007).

198 To the extent that the “crisis” of immigration is conceptualized and constituted as “identity theft,” it complicates the commonly held belief that the dangers posed by immigrants stem from their inability to assimilate. In this case, it is precisely immigrants’ knack for assimilation – their ability to masquerade, undetected, as real Americans – that brings the nation as a neo-racial concept into crisis. In this case, the only marker of difference and danger, besides skin color and language, was “illegality,” conceived as improper documentation. I will return to the themes of identity theft, assimilation, integration, and visibility. Suffice for the moment to say that the state’s obsession with identity fraud/theft is a symptom of a broader crisis of American identity.


200 Incidentally, this move also served to insulate the highly consequential legal practices of the INS (now USCIS for U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services) from political contestation. As critical focus has
Two years after the Worthington raids, on January 7th, 2008, Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty bypassed the Minnesota legislature and issued two executive orders. The first directed local law enforcement officers to cooperate with federal security agencies to address the “serious problems” posed by “illegal immigration” across the state. The second required businesses to participate in federal electronic identification and surveillance initiatives, and threatened penalties for employers who refused to cooperate with federal immigration agents and/or failed to comply with immigration laws. By formally assembling pervasive networks of surveillance and enforcement, networks that permeate local communities and economies, these directives expanded the powers of federal authorities to code, contain, and control both the bodies of immigrants and the Minnesota population as a whole.

While these assemblages mark a significant intensification of xenophobic security discourses in Minnesota and a shift in the state government’s official approach to the “problems” of immigration, they were not created in a discursive vacuum. Lauded as a necessary response to an emerging “crisis” by “immigration reduction” groups, vigilante justice organizations, federal agencies and local police officers, presidential candidates and local politicians, and vocal segments of the Minnesota electorate, Pawlenty’s decrees endowed formerly extra- and quasi-legal security practices with the “force of law.”

shifted to the violent and legally questionable ICE initiatives, it has shifted away from the structural violence of legal coding and exclusion performed through the bureaucratic functions of the INS.  

203 While these practices certainly have far more pronounced and devastating effects on the lives of undocumented immigrants and their families, they serve to demarcate the spaces and lifeworlds of all Minnesota residents.  
204 I refer here primarily to the Minnesota Coalition for Immigration Reduction (MCIR) and the Minutemen organization, whose members the MCIR have recruited to support their efforts in the state. See http://www.mnforsustain.org/immg_minnesota_coalition_for_immig_reduction.htm. (Accessed December 12, 2009). I also have in mind the mouthpieces of national anti-immigrantism, whom I discuss at length below.  
These events and countless others across the United States exemplify what Andreas has theorized as the “rebordering of North America” in the context of efforts to “build a wall around the West” and to “police the globe.” As Andreas and others have demonstrated, the rebordering of the United States, like the rebordering of Europe in general and France in particular, has involved more than military and border patrol operations at the geographic-political (U.S.-Mexico) border. It has involved the surveillance of immigrant groups in the “Heartland” and the merging of foreign and domestic policing networks through the enlistment of federal and local agencies as well as non-state actors. Bringing “the border” to Minnesota, Calais, and Paris has involved elaborate bureaucratic maneuvers, techniques of internal mapping, reeducation, and, perhaps most visibly, the sensitive process of redeploying coercive, extra-legal forces traditionally operating in foreign theaters of war in the arena of “domestic” regulation. A plethora of abstract categories for immigrant bodies have emerged over the past several decades, from “illegals,” to various categories of “guest workers,” to resident aliens, to “anchor babies,” to the especially dangerous OTMs (Other Than Mexican), to refugees seeking asylum, each coded in terms of the specific set of dangers and/or “costs” they pose to the American population. Once established, these dangers and costs are weighed against the benefits and advantages accrued by the inclusion of immigrant groups, e.g., their usefulness as labor and as cultural novelties and symbols of American melting-pot diversity.

---

206 The invisibility of the 9/11 hijackers – their integration into American social life – further provoked the desire to “process” the immigrant body in bureaucratic machines of knowledge production, i.e., to contain and control the immigrant threat by documenting it, marking it, and otherwise making it known.

207 As I discuss below, the final categories listed here, refugees, poses significant problems for writers of the immigration crisis.

208 Doty theorizes Huntington’s new manifesto as an example of neo-racism: “Huntington draws a sharp line between Western culture and Western ideas of individualism, liberty, equality, rule of law, democracy, and non-Western ideas that are incompatible with these and pose the potential for conflict. More recently, Huntington has suggested that ‘migration is the central issue of our time’ posing a threat to ‘the cultural integrity’ of European countries. He suggests that the United States faces the same challenge as Europe, the same potential for conflict within its domestic borders if immigration continues. According to Huntington, the assimilation of immigrants in the 19th century and prior to the First World War, was aided when the ‘waves of immigration ended’ and ‘no more of the same kind of people came.’ It goes without saying, for Huntington, that the meaning of the phrase ‘the same kind of people’ is unproblematic and in no need of elaboration. His slippage from place of origin to ‘kinds of people’ is perhaps some kind of Freudian slip, but is illustrative of neo-racism.” Roxanne Lynn Doty. Anti-Immigrantism in Western Democracies: Statecraft, Desire and the Politics of Exclusion. (London; New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2003). 23.
The geographer Mathew Coleman has offered compelling accounts of the innovative mechanisms through which boundaries have been reproduced between American citizens and various classes of legal and illegal aliens and residents. According to Coleman, 287(g) and its local codifications in places like Minnesota and Arizona reflect a broader “devolution” strategy that makes “immigration enforcement a localized as well as inward looking national security practice…”209 Between 2003 and 2010, over 100 localities signed 287(g) agreements, effectively deputizing thousands of local police as federal agents of border control. The most famous of these mass deputizations, Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070, requires local police to enforce federal immigration law by arresting anyone who arouses “reasonable suspicion” that they have entered or stayed in the country illegally. Coleman goes on to show how the policies and practices of “inherent authority,” which gives local actors free reign to enforce national immigration policies without federal oversight, has deepened and proliferated networks of surveillance, transforming local communities into mini police states.210

Most of these innovative strategies of internal surveillance and exclusion can be conceived in terms of calculations rooted in reason of state and the broad conception of policing discussed by Coleman and Andreas. Foucault historicizes the conceptions of the police and the population implicit in Andreas’ work in Security, Territory, Population and Society Must be Defended. Here and elsewhere, Foucault examines how the modern nation-state was constituted through biopolitical practices of mapping, administration, war-making, and a new form of racism, namely, “state racism” in 16th- and 17th-century Europe. Several themes are relevant to the cases described above. First, Foucault’s genealogy demonstrates how biopower, the power to “make live and let die” (as opposed the sovereign power to kill: to let live and make die) co-emerges with the “new body” of the population and the domestication of technologies of power.211 Biopower’s “field of application” is the body of the population. Its raison d’etre is the life and well-being of this body. To function properly, its technologies of power rely on the disciplining of

individual bodies (and on “disciplinarity” broadly speaking), but the overriding purpose of these technologies is to “regulate” all of the flows and exchanges that affect the health, general well-being, and longevity of the population as a whole.\textsuperscript{212} The mechanisms of biopower, then, are essentially mechanisms of regulation, regularization (as in that which achieves “overall states of equilibrium or regularity”) and security.

Like a biological body, there is of course an element of unpredictability as to what will happen to, and within, the population. “In a word,” Foucault explains, “security mechanisms have to be installed around the random element inherent in a population of living beings so as to optimize a state of life.”\textsuperscript{213} Although this “random” or “aleatory” element may take the form of external threats, like expanding foreign forces, biopower is nonetheless always concerned primarily with what happens inside the population.

According to Foucault’s genealogical account, the “functions” introduced by biopolitics in the 18\textsuperscript{th} century – including “forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures” – shift the focus of statecraft from the epidemic, which “swoop[s] down on life” to something much more insidious, internal, and permanent.\textsuperscript{214} This Foucault aptly labels the “endemic,” a state of dis-ease that “slips into life, perpetually gnaws at it, diminishes it and weakens it.”\textsuperscript{215} The shift in focus from the epidemic to the endemic corresponds in many respects to what Andreas conceptualizes as the domestication and the internationalization of “rebordering” and border control. When bad agents threaten the life of the population, the killing functions of the naturally expansionist war machine are recalled to eradicate the domestic threat.

One can analyze contemporary security discourses in the West as manifestations of this significant discursive shift. For instance, anti-immigrant populism demands the immediate recall of military personnel from Iraq and permanent redeployment to the

\textsuperscript{212} Foucault’s analysis here extends his genealogical investigation of the biologically defined human body in \textit{The History of Sexuality} and \textit{The Order of Things}. It is only after the human body emerges as an object of knowledge that the population can be thought and acted upon. Roughly speaking, the population is an aggregation and distribution of biological bodies, such that optimization of life requires close monitoring of patterns of disease, morbidity, etc.


\textsuperscript{214} Foucault, 2003. 244-45.

\textsuperscript{215} Foucault, 2003. 244.
borders, internal and external, of American society.\footnote{For an explicit and elaborate troop redeployment proposal, see J. D. Hayworth and Joe Eule. \textit{Whatever It Takes: Illegal Immigration, Border Security, and the War on Terror}. (Washington, DC: Regnery Pub.; Distributed to the trade by National Book Network, 2006).} The establishment of permanent, professional “enforcement” mechanisms such as ICE in the U.S. and the CRS and \textit{Gendarmerie} in France functions to deepen the domestic military-police apparatus, penetrating society, isolating, containing, and eradicating potentially malignant bodies within the population. Furthermore, the proliferation of private security organizations and community groups supplements these “public” enforcement mechanisms, laying the foundations for a hyperactive immune system that permeates the bio-social order.

For all its sophisticated mechanisms and functions, this system does not in itself provide the criteria by which endemics can be identified and diagnosed. Nor does it justify its practices of killing or exclusion. As Foucault points out, the war-making function of “bioregulation” raises the paradox of how a biopolitical order whose \textit{raison d’etre} is the optimization of life can justify murder.\footnote{Foucault is quick to point out that this intervention does not mark the emergence of racism as a social phenomenon, but rather its “inscription” as a mechanism of State power. What is new is its function as a fundamentally biopolitically mechanism of state and statecraft. Foucault, 2003. 254.} In this present case, the question of how to diagnose immigrant bodies as threatening bodies remains open, even after all the mechanisms of statecraft are brought to bear on the population as a whole. “It is here,” Foucault suggests, “that racism intervenes.”\footnote{Foucault, 2003. 254-55.} Foucault distinguishes this new form of racism as a “basic mechanism” of the “modern State.” His definition warrants quoting at length, as it sheds light on the discursive foundations for anti-immigrant populism in the U.S. and elsewhere:

\begin{quote}
What in fact is racism? It is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die. The appearance within the biological continuum of the human race of races, the distinction among races, the hierarchy of races, the fact that certain races are described as good and that others, in contrast, are described as inferior: all this is a way of fragmenting the field of the biological that power controls. It is a way of separating out the groups that exist within a population. It is, in short, a way of establishing a biological type caesura within the population that appears to be a biological domain.
\end{quote}
Put another way, the biopolitical, “popular” sovereign kills in order to make live. It isolates threats through processes of racialization (in this case, through statistical analysis, professional diagnosis, documentation, and policing), and purges those threats through techniques of containment, extrication, forcible assimilation, and killing. Foucault’s genealogy of state racism indicates how the myth of a culturally distinct nation obscures the underlying structural imperative of biopolitical orders: the need to identify and externalize threatening bodies in order to save the population. If there is anything like a nation within this statist discourse, it is, as in Europe, a racial nation, biopolitically defined.  

State racism is the nihilistic underbelly of American and French immigration crises. It is also a common, disavowed thread running through security practices of all nation-states as such, most notably those of imperial and “post-”imperial Europe. Comparative analyses that reinforce the founding myths of the U.S. and France as exceptional “immigration states” tend to ignore this biopolitical register: the founding and preserving violence carried out by the state to save the biopolitical life of the national population. Foucault thus identifies the way in which external enemies are transformed by biopolitical discourse into racial contaminants that threaten the life of the population from within. As I will attempt to show, this racial discourse took shape in the peripheral spaces of the French and American empires in ways that are more complicated

220 Foucault takes pains to explain the difference between the "relationship of war" and the bi-racial/biopolitical relationship. The relation "In order to live, you must take lives..." emerges out of the relationship of war, but takes a new, Darwinian form in the biopolitical order. "On the one hand, racism makes it possible to establish a relationship between my life and the death of the other that is not a military or warlike relationship of confrontation, but a biological-type relationship: 'the more inferior species die out...the more abnormal individuals are eliminated...the more I – as a species rather than [an] individual – can live, the stronger I will be, the more vigorous I will be..." Foucault, 2003. 255. This formulation bears on arguments about the difference between abstract and concrete enmity, and between definite and absolute enemies. See the work of Carl Schmitt.

221 This myth was reinforced by John F. Kennedy’s A Nation of Immigrants. Buchanan rightly points out the Kennedy never intended to throw the door open to immigration from the “Third World.” Patrick J. Buchanan. State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America. 1st edn. (New York: Thomas Dunne Books/St. Martin's Press, 2006). pps. 220-244.

222 Hannah Arendt's classic studies Origins of Totalitarianism and Eichman in Jerusalem illustrate how practices of what she calls "bureaucratic racism" take shape in European contexts. One can see a parallel in the recalling of troops from Iraq and from the overseas "war on terror" to secure the border and defend the population from the "invasion" of browner-skinned foreign bodies, many of which are already "in our midst." The recall, then, is aimed at producing a healthy (if not completely pure) body out of an already contaminated population. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism. 1st edn. (New York: Schocken Books, 2004).
that Foucault’s concept of “state racism” suggests. The importation of this discourse to the metropole has had anti-political consequences not only for immigrants but, as Foucault suggests, for European populations as well.

Of course, the contamination of the population is not merely a product of porous borders and dangerous moving agents, as Andreas sometimes suggests. Rather, it is the product of a necessary circulation for prosperity and security in a liberal state and the expansion of markets and thus of state power. As van Munster notes, drawing on Foucault and Agamben, “Security, wealth and productivity are not guaranteed through constant interventions but through ensuring the circulation already found in [liberal] society.”223 The dilemmas of “rebordering” are a product not only of the unintentional production of illicit trade and informal economies, but of the active promotion of circulation in the name of expansion. As I discuss below, this has included the active incorporation of immigrant workers, their legalization and subsequent repatriation, by the very same policing organizations now responsible for excluding CTAs. To suggest, as Andreas does, that European border security agents and the American INS were “hands off” prior to the Cold War and the subsequent “crime wars” misses this crucial point. The INS was in fact an active agent in the facilitation and regulation of profitable cross-border flows of immigrant workers throughout the first half of the 20th century. For instance, they were tasked with monitoring the recruitment, transportation, and employment of Mexican workers in low-status agricultural jobs both in the 1930s prior to the Great Depression and in the years following the Second World War (see below and Chapter 3). That is to say, they operated within the broad framework of biopolitical policing as regulation analyzed by Foucault. As such, they participated in expansionist practices that altered local and national demographics and that unsettled narratives of national belonging.

From Colony to Metropole: Policing French Colonial Hierarchies During the Era of Decolonization and Mass Migration

The same Compagnie Républicain de Sécurité that patrols the streets of Calais and Paris today was established by General de Gaulle at the end of the Second World

War to “maintain and to re-establish public order…throughout the national territory.”

Many historians have characterized postwar France as a police state. The CRS and Gendarmerie functioned within an extra-legal context of emergency and martial law. Their role in this context, which in many ways foreshadowed the contemporary “security environment,” was to root out any and all challenges to the authority of the French state. As Mathieu Rigouste and Matthew Connelly among others have thoroughly documented, of particular concern to the French authorities, partly due to pressure from their American counterparts, were the insidious powers of a Soviet “fifth column” that threatened the French nation from within. As Rigouste observes, the French state’s campaign to re-establish dominion over its colonial subjects, both in the colony and in the French Metropole, was tied to its anti-communist mission. Like American officials viewed colonial subjects in Cuba and the Philippines and migrant workers from Mexico, the French regarded Algerians as always potentially corruptible by their new political rival to the east.

This perception was consistent with the French colonial imaginary, including narratives about the racial inferiority of its African and Asian subjects. Unlike the Soviets, Algerians were not deemed a political enemy. As colonial subjects, they had since 1830 been under the benevolent protection of the French state and the tutelage of French colonial officials. According to official French mission civilisatrice, Algerians remained politically immature and undeveloped and therefore dangerously unruly and impressionable. Counterinsurgency in Algeria was therefore carefully constructed within official state discourse as a policing operation, not a war. Its goal was to re-establish order within a French colony that was technically part of France (that is, three departments within the French bureaucracy). In the colonial context, however, policing meant establishing dominion over a population coded in biological and cultural terms as racially and ethnically inferior, but potentially modern. It meant re-affirming French domination in the peripheries of the Empire, both in its colonies and in the banlieues of its urban centers, where colonials recruited by French industries and the French state.

were known to settle (see Chapter 3). In the metropole, as in the colony, it also meant maintaining boundaries that “secured” the “European” population from Arab and Muslim Others.

It made sense, then, that the CRS would be deployed to police colonial subjects in both the colony and the metropole during the period of rapid decolonization from 1945 to 1962. The agency distanced themselves from French military units stationed in Algeria, taking on the double role of an intelligence service and a police force. As in the French hexagon today, the CRS interrogated Algerians suspected of participating in subversive activity, whether nationalist or socialist. Like a domestic police force, the CRS treated all potentially anti-colonial activity as criminal activity that threatened colonial law and order. Of course, within the colonial order there was a Manichean separation between “Europeans” and Muslims, and one of the CRS’s primary tasks was to protect the European quarter in Algiers from the Arab residents of the Casbah, especially in the violent years leading up to Algerian independence.

The CRS was responsible for producing reports on threatening individuals and groups both to the colonial administration in Algeria and to the Ministries of the Interior, Muslim Affairs, and North African Affairs in Paris. CRS agents developed special techniques of interrogation and intimidation in Algeria that were later used to infiltrate migrant groups and political subversives in the metropole. Like other colonial officials, CRS agents were encouraged to earn the trust of local “Beni oui oui” or Algerian informants and quislings to crack cells of insurgents. Also like other colonial agents, some officers attempted to integrate themselves into local communities in order to gain enough trust to gather information about insurgent locations, strategies, and tactics. Although their activities participated fully within the counterinsurgency campaign, their presence as riot police and crowd control functioned to further depoliticize the suppression of Algerian resistance within a discourse of governmentality and biopolitics.

The CRS made use of meticulous identification systems and introduced surveillance technologies to the Algerian countryside. Courtois and LeJeune’s laudatory account of the CRS in Algeria emphasizes the quotidian nature of their role as guardians of the colonial order. They patrolled streets and stopped suspects exiting or entering busses or trains, patted them down and asked for their identification. Any resistance was
grounds for arrest or entry into a growing database of subversives whose movements
would be monitored for years to come, especially to and from the French metropole.
Thus, the CRS actively worked to reproduce borders that had been blurred by the
inclusion of Algeria within the French Empire and bureaucratically within the French
state.

It was in Algeria that the CRS developed practices of what Bigo and Huysman
now describe, without reference to European colonies, as the characteristics of police
within global neoliberal Empire. As Courtois and LeJeune describe their emerging role,
the CRS carved out a niche in between the civil and the military forces in Algeria. Thus,
they cultivated their role as biopolitical agents concerned with the health primarily of the
European population, but also of the Arab-Muslim population in Algeria. Their symbolic
function was partly to transform an increasingly political war between enemies into a
matter merely of law and order. Of course, law and order in the colony was designed to
maintain boundaries and patriarchal relations between Europeans and non-Europeans and
to “civilize” the latter without allowing them entry into the French polity. Thus, the CRS
agents played a profoundly ambivalent role in Algeria, like the French government more
generally but in a more acute way.

If the role of the CRS was merely to maintain the status quo order, it had to adapt
when that order changed radically during and after the Algerian war for independence.
Upon returning to the metropole, the CRS developed these technologies of power even
further in order produce new boundaries between the French population and threatening
others. As Courtois and LeJeune suggest, CRS agents often policed the same racialized
colonial bodies in the metropole as they did in the colony, albeit in a different way. They
also took on a more prominent role as general riot police, suppressing all political activity
in ways that resembled tactics they used in the colony. CRS extra-legal brutality against
“Europeans” has over the past several decades earned them a reputation as a brutal force
that defies French republican values of liberty, equality, and fraternity. On the other hand,
their sweeps and surveillance of darker-skinned communities is often lauded both by the
mainstream and the right-wing press as well as by the politicians who deploy them to
deal with France’s “immigration crises” in a way that erases their political history and
meaning.
By drawing out similarities between the policing of immigrant communities in the West and the policing of colonized peoples in European empires, I do not mean to equate internal colonialism with more traditional modes of colonial rule and administration. Clearly, the ruptures of decolonization in the 20th century introduced a profoundly different set of conditions and relations of rule. It would be a mistake, however, to revert to a comparative approach that takes post-colonial nation-states for granted as self-contained, semi-sovereign rational actors that can calculate the relative costs and benefits of “open” and “closed-door” policies and act accordingly. The internalization of imperial frontiers did not spell the end of European and Euro-American colonial expansion. In fact, as World Systems Theorists and others have demonstrated, the empowerment of elites in former colonies often strengthened networks of colonial control, allowing U.S. and European businesses and government officials to manage workforces in foreign countries remotely via administrative proxies. In addition, it legitimated the exploitation of immigrant workforces in European metropoles by recasting the terms of their subordination as negotiated settlements between sovereign states.

To understand the recolonization of immigrant workforces, it is instructive to examine documents related to the recruitment, surveillance, and policing of people moving to the French hexagon from former French colonies during and immediately after the struggles for independence in North and West Africa. If we regard national liberation as an event that ought to have ended colonial practices of exploitation and subjection, the continuation of these practices in Europe calls for an examination of processes through which colonial practices transformed and endured. As French officials sought to redefine social and legal relationships with their former and, in the case of Algerians, soon-to-be former colonial subjects in the 1950s, technologies and agents of colonial control were transferred from colony to metropole and gradually appropriated to function within the new framework of independent, post-colonial states. As in the colony, business leaders, state officials, and academics worked separately and together to define foreign workers in relation to each other, to white Europeans, and to native French.

---

227 Most of the documents that inform my analysis here are located in the F series at the *Archives Nationale* in Paris and in the files on postwar police surveillance in the Archives of the *Prefecture de Police.* (Cite cartons)
citizen-subjects. As in the colonies, these classificatory schemes were orientalist insofar as they functioned to define White-European-French culture and ethnicity in opposition to a mythologized conception of exotic blacks and Arabs.

Although the categories developed to monitor immigrants in France shifted and slipped from agency to agency over time, the classifications developed by French officials in the aftermath of World War II bore a striking resemblance to those developed by colonial officials in Africa and in the Metropolitain école coloniale and école polytechnique.228 A cursory examination of official documents and studies of immigrant communities from former French colonies reveals efforts to recuperate colonial designations and tropes for use in metropolitan contexts. As in the colonies, these studies produced knowledge about foreign subjects that enabled various forms of cartographic surveillance and control. They recognized their former colonial subjects as racially and ethnically distinct social groups, as threats to public order and public hygiene, as wards in need of protection and aid from the French state, and as highly exploitable laborers.

Just as the departmental structure of the French state was transferred to its African colonies, the cartographies and corresponding institutional structures developed in the colonies were transferred to the metropole. Immigrants coming from former colonies were variously recognized and documented as North Africans, Muslims, Arabs, blacks, and less frequently as subjects of inadequately developed African nation-states. Colonial ministries of Muslim, Arab, Black, and North African “Affairs” had counterparts in Paris who coordinated surveillance initiatives with colonial officials. As struggles for national independence in North Africa intensified, correspondence between colonial and metropolitan agencies became all the more frequent and urgent. After the war, French officials led by de Gaulle were eager to re-establish control over African territories and people and a regional influence as a European power. The most pressing concern of ministry officials during and after the War was the surveillance and repression of anti-colonial resistance.

A great deal has been written on the surveillance of Algerians in the Metropole, particularly during the Algerian Liberation Front’s (FLN) armed struggle for

These statist efforts were undermined by the fact that Algeria was de jure part of France. Despite their “special” status as French colonial subjects, most Algerians spoke fluent French, understood French customs and, were it not for the French state’s obsessive surveillance and control of brown- and black-skinned Muslims and immigrants, would have been able to move more or less easily back-and-forth from Africa to Europe. In her study of Algerian immigration, Linda Amiri documents the administrative acrobatics that were required to recognize both the French citizenship of Algerians and their status as threatening, fundamentally non-European foreigners. Amiri demonstrates how efforts to reestablish French dominion in Algeria after the World War II led to a crisis of French identity that doubled as a crisis of documentation. Algerians were alternatively labeled North African, Muslim, French Algerian, French Algerian Muslim, Muslim workers from North Africa, Arab, and occasionally Black. Top officials expressed frustration with the proliferation of categories and the resulting confusions and miscommunications among police offers and bureaucrats, but because of the conflicting colonial objectives of republican incorporation and exclusion could not establish a standard legal lexicon. Officials also recuperated anthropological distinctions between Arabs and Berbers, rehabilitating the colonial myth of the racial and cultural superiority of Algerians from the Kabylie region of northern Algeria.

One of the overarching effects of these classifications was to marginalize Algerians alongside other Africans as not-quite-French and not-quite-white. Like Moroccans, Tunisians, Senegalese, Mauritanians and others, Algerians were monitored by agencies ranging from the Ministry of Colonial Affairs to the Ministry of North African Affairs to the Ministry of Muslim Affairs in addition to regional departments in both France and Algeria. French officials tracked their movements on both sides of the

232 Arab workforces were often compared and contrasted with black African workforces, but were also occasionally lumped into “the black problem” (Le Probleme Noire). AN F/1A/5136
Mediterranean. As was the case with Moroccan and Tunisian migrants, colonial and metropolitan officials alerted each other every time Algerians suspected of participating in the FLN resistance moved from colony to Metropole or Metropole to colony. Compatriots and family members were monitored as well, laying the groundwork for a system of racial surveillance justified on the basis of national security, French dominion, and guilt by African and Muslim association. Copious records of entries and exits were recorded in port cities like Algiers and Marseilles and sent to the central government and police prefectures in Paris to be included in an immense archive that, as Clifford Rosenberg has shown, was developed to monitor and control the Arab, black, and Jewish populations in the inter-War years and subsequently during the reign of the fascist Vichy regime.

As Rosenberg demonstrates, Algerian Muslims in France, like Jews prior to World War II, “endured the burdens of French nationality without any of the benefits of citizenship” from the time of the conquest of Algeria in 1830 until decolonization in the 1960s. Algerians were required to renounce Islam and prove compliance with the French civil code in order to be considered, on a case-by-case basis, as candidates for naturalization. In practices that have been revived by French President Nicholas Sarkozy, local administrations would rigorously investigate the “morality” and family background of Algerian immigrants, focusing in particular on their sexual behavior. After 1899, French officials denied between one-half and three-fourths of Algerian applications on the grounds that applicants demonstrated inadequate assimilation to French culture and society.

Throughout the first half of the 20th century, Muslims could not vote or run for office. Confirming the ethno-racial dimension of colonial immigration discourse, even Muslim converts to Christianity were frequently denied full citizenship rights.

---

235 Archives de Préfecture de Police. Paris, France.
236 Rosenberg, 2006. 120.
The methods of surveillance, policing, and exclusion developed before and during the German occupation of France were elaborated by the policing agencies of the Fifth Republic. The police archives in Paris are replete with surveillance reports that document the movements of formerly colonized African immigrants in metropolitan centers like Paris, Marseille, and Lyon. Colonial cartographies were literally remapped onto French cities and towns, providing house-by-house street-level locations of different groups of formerly colonized subjects.\(^{239}\) Mass raids and arrests in Paris mirrored those in the Algerian Casbah, with the notable difference that police brutality in Paris was more visible to a European audience and thus more vulnerable to political opposition.\(^{240}\) Despite the contradiction between ideals of French Republicanism and the reality of colonial discrimination and repression, police raids and surveillance functioned to depoliticize immigrants from former colonies who sought rights as French citizens and/or who were fighting for the independence of African countries. And, as I discuss below, the liberation of North African countries did not end the depoliticizing colonial control of immigrant populations in France.

Throughout the first half of the 20\(^{th}\) century, Filipinos’ legal status vis-a-vis the U.S. was similar to that of Algerians insofar as they were deemed “national” subjects to whom full citizenship was nevertheless categorically denied on the basis of ethno-racial inferiority. This similarity is understandable given the fact that American colonial officials looked to the French Empire for effective models of colonial control throughout the Filipino counterinsurgency (see Chapter 1). Like Algerian French nationals, Filipino nationals occupied “a liminal status that was neither citizen nor alien.”\(^{241}\) Also like Algerians, Filipino immigrants were denied rights to full political and legal representation at the same time as their allegiance to the United States was demanded and ensured by the force of law.\(^{242}\) Despite their formal exclusion from political arenas, the legal status of Filipinos as American nationals allowed them to move more freely to and from the United States than immigrant groups who were not under U.S. colonial supervision and

\(^{239}\) AN F1a/5342
\(^{240}\) AN F1a/3294
\(^{242}\) Filipinos were granted non-voting seats in Congress, but had little political influence on legislation. The role of these representatives was both symbolic and an effort to train Filipino elites in the practices of democratic government.
who were not formally subjects of American colonial tutelage. As nationals, Filipinos were not subject to the exclusion acts that barred other “Asiatics” for much of the late 19th and early 20th centuries from entering the United States. However, like other people from the “Asiatic barred zone,” their migration was heavily regulated and was eventually restricted by the same quotas on “nonwhites ineligible for citizenship.”\textsuperscript{243} Just as the social-juridical categories “North African” and even “Black” were often deployed to justify the surveillance and exclusion of Algerian “nationals” in France, the category “Asiatic” haunted Filipino nationals and was ultimately deployed to justify their mass repatriation in the 1930s.

As discussed in the previous chapter, unlike other immigrants deemed nonwhite by the American government, Filipinos were subject to regulations imposed by the Bureau of Insular Affairs, the metropolitan arm of the colonial administration in the Philippines. Like the Ministries of Muslim, Algerian, and French African Affairs, the Bureau of Insular Affairs monitored the migrations of Filipino subjects, responded to grievances regarding Filipino migrant workers and students, helped to connect migrants with employers, and acted as a liaison connecting the national government, local and state governments, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, local agencies and organizations, and individual Filipinos. Also like the French colonial ministries, the Bureau worked closely with aid organizations both to monitor colonial subjects in the metropole and to perform the development functions that were created by the imperial center, the Federal Government, in consultation with administrative agencies in the colonies.

Like Algerians in France, “undocumented” Filipino immigrants were granted freedom of movement to, from, and within the U.S. metropole. Their special status

\textsuperscript{243} As discussed in the following pages, this “privileged” national status, like the status of Algerians in France, was contingent upon a formal colonial relation that barred Filipino citizenship and full entry into the political community. Like Algerians after the Second World War, Filipinos re-entered the broader category of “non-white,” and in this case “Asiatic,” the moment that their national independence appeared immanent with the passing of the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934. Even before the act was passed, Filipinos were barred from citizenship on the grounds that they were nonwhite and therefore unassimilable. As resident nationals and colonial subjects, they occupied several legal and social categories simultaneously. Like Asians, Latin Americans, and Africans, Filipinos were subject to overtly racialist annual quotas ranging from 50 to 100 persons. With the passing of Tydings-McDuffie, Filipinos national status was removed, thousands of Filipinos were repatriated, and immigration from the Philippines was closed.
enabled them to work in sectors of the American economy that were suffering labor shortages, and thus enabled sugar and salmon producers to recruit Filipinos *en masse* to work for low wages both within the space of the colony and within the territorial United States. Filipino subjects were intensively recruited to work on Hawai’i’s sugar plantations beginning in 1910. As a liminal space between colony and metropole, Hawai’i remained an ideal site for exploitation and the ongoing primitive accumulation of capital after the closing of the American frontier at the end of the 19th century. Even after nativist and racist campaigns for Asian exclusion succeeded in passing the Chinese exclusion laws, the Hawai’i Sugar Plantation Association continued to recruit Filipinos workers. Isolating these workers both from their home communities and from American citizens, the H.S.P.A. was able to train them as members of a growing agro-industrial proletariat. During the Great Depression, when nativist calls for Filipino exclusion reached a fever pitch and voluntary and forced repatriation became standard practice, Filipinos still comprised almost 70% of the workforce in the Hawaiian sugar industry. When they began to migrate to the U.S. mainland, Filipino migrants sparked xenophobic anxieties and a nativist backlash, animating a range of bordering practices to maintain colonial hierarchies in the metropole. Paths to citizenship were categorically denied to Filipino colonial subjects. Workers were hired to 3-year contracts and were monitored intensively by special Filipino and American commissioners.244

The anti-colonial zeal with which the U.S. entered and emerged from World War II brought the cognitive dissonance of formal American colonialism to a head. Anti-colonial uprisings in North Africa and the apparent ineffectiveness of violent French efforts to crack down on their colonial subjects served as a warning to the architects of American foreign policy. In the terms of the Western colonial imaginary, rebellious colonial subjects posed a double threat. They were undeveloped and unruly threats to the sovereignty of European allies in the fight against communism and politically immature children susceptible to the influential forces of the expanding communist block. Losing these subjects completely would mean handing a great victory to a global-political rival and sacrificing essential markets and sites for the production of raw materials for Western manufacture. In part to keep these markets open and to produce a stable, U.S.-dominated

---

244 The largest employers of Filipinos at the turn of the century paid on average $1 for a 10-hour day.
sphere of influence, U.S. government officials pressured the French government as well as other Western European allies to grant independence to their colonial possessions.\textsuperscript{245} As Matthew Connelly has demonstrated, U.S. pressure solicited by the FLN emboldened anti-colonial movements and was a major factor in the eventual French acceptance of Algerian independence. In its effort to rehabilitate its reputation as an exceptional “empire of liberty” and properly anti-colonial power, ideologues for a U.S.-dominated postwar order swept its own colonial history under the proverbial rug.

At the same time, the U.S. spearheaded efforts to maintain colonial relations with non-Western countries through the empowerment and control of Non-Western elites as state actors who would protect American interests.\textsuperscript{246} The economic and geostrategic motivations for transforming direct rule over colonies, territories, and commonwealths into indirect control via native proxies and elite administrators who benefited from the terms of the American neoliberal order are well known. What is often neglected, however, are the ways in which the empowerment of state elites facilitated the recolonization of immigrants from former European and U.S. possessions. Partly as a response to U.S. pressure, France trained elites in North African countries to take over colonial functions on behalf of French interests, including the surveillance and control of migrants. American agencies developed similar strategies of cooperation and coordination with foreign elites to recruit and regulate the flow of large numbers of migrant workers from Latin America. Both governments used the dual emergencies of war and decolonization as an opportunity to develop new legal and extra-legal practices of surveillance and control.

The pattern of mass recruitment, incorporation, and exclusion of Mexican workers began long before the Emergency temporary worker program was established in 1942. Because of their proximity and perceived docility, and because of the history of colonial and neocolonial relations between the U.S. and Mexico, Mexicans provided an ideal substitute for domestic workers during periods of economic expansion and crisis.

\textsuperscript{245} Matthew Connelly. \textit{A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era}. (New York, Oxford University Press, 2002).
\textsuperscript{246} It was precisely this strategy of proxy rule, described in the preceding section, that France developed by training African elites to facilitate, monitor, and restrict the flow of former colonial subjects to and from France.
Mexicans were exempt from many of the restrictions imposed by the quota laws and other legislation at the peak of the “restrictionist” period, including literacy tests designed to exclude non-western-Europeans from the polity.

The mass repatriation of itinerant Mexican workers during the Great Depression demonstrated both the vulnerability of this community to surveillance, control, and exclusion, and the profound ambivalence of recolonization. The pattern of mass recruitment and mass exclusion of Mexicans was repeated during and after World War II. As the largest “guest-worker” program in U.S. history, the Bracero Program contracted over five million Mexican workers from 1942 until 1964 to work primarily in low-status agricultural sectors of the U.S. economy. Having lost workers to the war and to higher-wage occupations in cities, employers in the expanding agribusiness industry joined forces with state agencies to seek an exploitable, racially identifiable workforce of “stoop” laborers who could increase agricultural productivity and profits without threatening narratives of national identity and difference. As Kitty Calavita notes in her classic study of the program, this regulation was designed to ensure employers steady access to cheap labor while calming nativist anxieties provoked by the unregulated influx of threatening foreign bodies into the national territory. The hope was that employers would be willing to trade their unregulated super-exploitation of undocumented aliens for government assistance both in securing a cheap workforce and in justifying the employment and production practices of growers. The end result, it was hoped, would be a prosperous, expansive agricultural industry and a reinforced national boundary that separated migrant subjects from the U.S. population.

At one level, this massive project of recruitment and control can be analyzed as a quintessentially biopolitical project of regulation on behalf of the American national population. Mexican bodies were needed to protect the American national body politic from underproduction and rising food prices and to protect the health and prosperity of American businesses. The Bracero Program aimed to resolve the conflict between the equally biopolitical imperatives of securing cheap labor and securing the national population. As Calavita argues, the literal meaning of “bracero,” “arm man,” indicates

---

247 Granted significant historical differences, the practices of incorporation and hierarchization of Mexican workers that structured American immigration discourse mirrored postwar French immigration discourse in the years following both world wars.
the biopolitical function these workers “were to play in the agricultural economy, supplying a cheap pair of arms and imposing few obligations on the host society as human beings.” Calavita’s outstanding analysis of the program shows how multiple U.S. and Mexican agencies strove in vain to resolve the structural contradictions of imperialist capitalism in the context of the nation-state system. Although their agendas and priorities often conflicted in highly consequential ways, for reasons that I think become clearer when one considers American colonial history, the overarching biopolitical strategy of their mission was relatively coherent: incorporate Mexican bodies while defending the national society from the threats those bodies might pose.

At another level, though, these workers were represented as much more than mere “farmhands.” Rather, they were viewed as subjects of the same kind of civilizing-modernizing mission that had been developed to uplift colonial subjects in the Philippines. The case of Mexican contract workers, called braceros, is instructive because it clearly illustrates how the mechanisms of colonial subjection could be reconfigured to maintain ethno-racial hierarchies when the subjects in question were citizens of foreign countries. Indeed, nowhere is the endurance of Euro-American coloniality more apparent than in the wartime and postwar mass recruitment of Mexican contract workers. As noted in the introduction, Ngai identifies the recruitment of Mexican labor as perhaps the most instructive example of “imported colonialism”: the production of “new social relations based on the subordination of racialized foreign bodies who worked in the United States, but who remained excluded from the polity by…law and social custom.”248 One could argue that the case of the braceros provides a proverbial missing link in scholarship on immigration discourse: a link that connects formal colonialism in the history of U.S. empire to contemporary forms of “imported colonialism” on the U.S. mainland. The state-to-state negotiation of bracero contracts legitimated the paternalist subjection of Mexican workers in a way that the postwar benevolent assimilation ideology on its own no longer could.

As Calavita demonstrates, the structural contradiction that pitted growers’ desire for cheap, docile workers against demands for border control produced a number of

---

dilemmas for government agencies and especially for the INS. As the agency responsible for overseeing all of the program’s phases, from recruitment to employment to return, the INS had to accommodate several conflicting interests. Perhaps the strongest of these was growers’ interest in obtaining a constant supply of reliable workers for low wages who would be bound to agricultural stoop labor and could be held “captive” by contracts on specific farms. The mission of the INS was to enforce these contracts on behalf of the state department, growers, and the Mexican government (as representatives of braceros). In administrative practice (in the peripheral spaces of worksites and deserts) the INS frequently penalized, deported, and blacklisted braceros for even the most minor breaches, but generally turned a blind eye when growers violated terms such as “prevailing wage” minimums or adequate, sanitary housing provisions or when they openly abused workers in the fields. INS agents were also lenient when growers hired “illegal” workers. Employers justified the hiring of “illegals” on the grounds that they did not receive a sufficient number of braceros from the INS recruiting centers. Instead of punishing these employers, the INS attempted to persuade them to replace illegal works with contracted workers under the supervision of the INS. Under the auspices of a campaign to “dry out the wetbacks,” thousands of other illegal workers were captured by INS agents, “legalized” and distributed to agribusiness employers. Others were arrested and “paroled” as convict laborers who would be supervised by armed guards in cotton and sugar beet fields.

Of course, these “protections” also functioned to produce colonial relationships of debt and dependence. The screening process of would-be braceros marked them as a racially distinct social group who posed a range of threats to the American population. Medical exams in Mexico and the United States reflected fears of biological contamination. Health exams determined their “strength” and ability to work long hours as stoop laborers. Background checks sought to siphon out a Mexican criminal element. All of these measures were justified both as exceptional wartime imperatives and as necessary for the modernization of Mexican peasants. Finally, as in France, a range of measures was implemented on both sides of the border to ensure that braceros would not engage in any political activity. Mexican officials demanded that braceros act as diligent, obedient, docile workers, that they do what they were told and refuse any efforts to
organize them as political actors. Official legal measures and penalties reinforced these demands. Provisions in bracero contracts explicitly prohibited any participation in labor organizing or union activity. Any violation of these terms could lead to immediate arrest or deportation.

**Conclusion**

Since World War II, France, the U.S., and other Western governments have imported colonial technologies of surveillance and control developed in colonial spaces in efforts to maintain colonial divisions of labor between citizens and immigrant subjects. These technologies have enabled the mass recruitment of laborers from former European colonies without allowing these migrants to establish bonds of solidarity with citizen workers. Working with state officials from newly independent nations to monitor cross-border flows even more effectively than the could before decolonization, the U.S. and France, as empire states, have continued to expand by continuing to circulate goods and people across borders by ensuring employers’ access to a steady stream of low cost, low status, vulnerable and thus exploitable laborers.

At the same time, by stepping up enforcement operations and practices of internal bordering, Western national states have thus far been able to maintain privileges of national citizenship for their populations. Popular representations of immigrants from Africa and Latin America as primitive, dangerous, and suited for low-status work rehabilitate colonial tropes and serve to justify surveillance, raids, and extreme forms of exploitation. Like formal colonial practices, U.S. and French employers and state officials have *experimented* with a variety of juridical mechanisms and production practices designed to segregate workforces and to attempt to ensure that immigrant subjects do not engage in “political activity.” Experiments with contract work in the United States achieved a quasi-colonial equilibrium between the demands of the empire-state and employers for low cost labor and the demands on the national state for protection from the potentially wage-depressing and otherwise threatening immigrants. Like Algerians in France and Filipinos in the U.S., braceros were interpellated simultaneously as peasants, as beneficiaries of American modes of modernization and development, as heroes of the war effort, and as racially inferior stoop laborers. These
contradictions and conflicts worked in favor of employers, who benefitted from the social and juridical marginalization of immigrants, until braceros began to organize and agitate for fair wages and fuller inclusion in the polity. The problem with more complete incorporation and regulation of immigrant laborers, it turns out, was that these laborers ended up in a better legal and social position (they were heroes of war with contracts) to protest their subordinate status alongside full members of the polity. The next chapter analyses the pitfalls of the colonial incorporation of immigrants in greater depth.
Chapter 3

Worksites, Schools, and Welcome Centers: The Colonial Incorporation of Immigrants as Aliens

In Chapter 2, I focused on practices of colonial exclusion in both the colony and the metropole. Here, I shift attention to the “humanitarian” dimensions of colonial policing: the ostensibly benevolent, controlled recruitment and incorporation of immigrants as aliens, purportedly for the sake both of the national economy and the immigrants themselves. I attempt to show how the active incorporation of immigrants, like imperial projects of expansion, undermines narratives of national identity and difference. Elaborating a theme from Chapter 2, I argue that the anti-political, “statist” regimes of immigration management, border control, law, and order, seek to resolve these crises by producing artificial legal and structural distinctions that respond to social anxieties based on ethno-racial conceptions of national belonging.

Colonial subjection is a constitutive part of contemporary immigration management. Understanding these practices therefore requires postcolonial analysis. As I discussed in Chapter 2, recent mass raids and deportations across Europe and the United States mark a significant intensification of border control in the West. In conjunction with expanding surveillance networks and proliferating detention centers, practices of spectacular policing are reconfiguring and fortifying boundaries that separate Western citizen-subjects from non-Western Others. This chapter aims to situate contemporary immigration discourse in Europe and the United States within a context of colonial practices that incorporate immigrants as aliens and that maintain positions of privilege for European and Euro-American subjects. Specifically, I attempt to establish discursive connections between contemporary practices of immigration management and border control and the recolonizing practices of immigrant incorporation and exclusion in

---

250 Over the last several years, scholars of comparative immigration policy have turned their attention both to the “militarization” of European and American borders and to the emergence of new forms of everyday policing and surveillance. Much of this literature concentrates on statist imperatives of securitization in the post-9/11 environment and the so-called “global war on terror.” Although useful for understanding new practices of surveillance and exclusion, these accounts tend to downplay the profound ambivalence of European and Euro-American border control. To explain some of the internal conflicts and contradictions of U.S. immigration discourse along with its failures and the impact of resistance, it is helpful to examine the policing and exclusion of immigrants within a broader historical context of recruitment, incorporation, and subjection.
France and the United States. To understand the postcolonial recuperation of colonial tropes, I focus on the “recolonization” of immigrants during periods of formal decolonization.

Bordering practices in European metropoles draw attention to the internal expansion of the nation. The practices of incorporation and apartheid required by internal expansion blurs the conceptual boundary separating colonial adventures in foreign lands from what the historian Mae Ngai has called “imported colonialism.” As Robert Young and others have noted, colonial practices are distinctive precisely insofar as they produce colonial subjects (including national subjects) through practices of bordering in the peripheral spaces of the colony. This framework for thinking about colonial practice can be elaborated and applied to the peripheral spaces of the American small town and shop floor. As Balibar has argued about the European context, the peripheral spaces of the modern nation-state are not marginal to the constitution of the people of Europe. Rather, they are central to it. The frameworks that oppose the colony to the metropole tend to obscure the latter’s “differentiations and internal conflicts in order to represent its unity by opposition.”

In order to maintain a colonial relationship with the Others of the nation, the metropole must be continually produced as a unitary, sovereign actor. As a form of “imported colonialism,” immigration management, like colonial adventures in foreign lands, participates in a discourse of nation-making that treats all spaces and peoples as inadequately (but always also potentially) European and in need of European development and civilization. Colonial modes of governance do not merely incorporate or...

---

253 Ngai argues that “Modern, imported colonialism produced new social relations based on the subordination of racialized foreign bodies who worked in the United States but who remained excluded from the polity by both law and by social custom…[I]mported colonialism is better described as a de facto social-legal condition embedded in formally noncolonial relationships and spaces, in which free citizens of Mexico, an independent nation-state, voluntarily contracted to putatively free, waged labor, within the United States proper.” Mae M. Ngai. *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 129.
exclude colonial subjects into an already well-established and homogenous European milieu. On the contrary, they strive relentlessly and always *in vain* to establish a ground upon which to build a European imperial edifice. Colonial modes of governance, including immigration management, strive to produce the metropole as the center of Europe through nation-making practices in the periphery. As bordering practices in the metropole indicate, colonial regimes treat all spaces as imperfectly metropolitan and perpetually in need of Europeanization.

*Know Your Workforce: “Internal” Expansion and the Contemporary Recolonization of Immigrants as Aliens*

Arizona state senator and SB 1070 co-author Russell Pearce’s recent proposals for guest-worker programs, discussed in Chapter 2, exemplify the ways in which the conflicts and crises of colonial governance have been transported to territories of European and Euro-American nation-states. The threat of arrest and detention that SB 1070 posed triggered a mass exodus of Latin American workers from Arizona. With few Arizonans available or willing to fill the positions left vacant, local business demanded a state solution. The economic repercussions of the bill’s exclusions prompted Pearce and other senators, democrats and republicans (this was a fundamentally bipartisan effort), to propose new guest-worker programs that would allow immigrant recruits to work and pay taxes without receiving any benefits or citizenship rights. In 2010, Pearce promoted a bill that would recruit low-wage agricultural workers via the Mexican Consulate while at the same time legally branding those workers permanently as non-rights-bearing aliens and as potential threats to local communities of U.S. citizen-subjects.256 A democratic co-author described the more immigrant-friendly version of the program as follows:

Businesses have to certify that they can't find American workers. Then they send a recruiter to Mexico to find the kind of workers they need, and those people are fingerprinted, photographed, they're background checked in both the United States and the country of Mexico before they're issued their legal card.257

---


257 Pearce rejected this proposal because he wanted to restrict the program to agricultural workers and provide stiffer surveillance and policing measures. As I will discuss, he’s now calling for an end to birthright citizenship for children born on U.S. soil to immigrant parents. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89266085
These recruitment and surveillance initiatives repeat efforts to control colonial subjects both in European colonies and in metropolitan centers. Replicated in various forms all over Europe and the United States, practices of economic incorporation and political exclusion recuperate colonial relationships of domination in the context of independent nation states.

Immigration management produces the metropole by reproducing ethno-racial hierarchies. Like French colonial subjects in North Africa, and U.S. colonial subjects in the Philippines and the Caribbean, immigrants are treated as potentially threatening wards or burdens under the tutelage of a benevolent state. U.S. officials transposed the narrative of the white man’s burden to justify colonial adventures abroad (e.g., in the Philippines and Hawai‘i) and the treatment of immigrant subjects at home. In theory, those immigrants who were deemed assimilable would be appropriately educated and prepared for membership in the Euro-American community. In practice, most non-European immigrants were marked as essentially foreign to Euro-America and incorporated only when their labor profited or otherwise empowered U.S. corporations (e.g., in negotiations with organized labor), the U.S. “national economy,” and the state.

Today, these apparent contradictions are reflected in debates over criteria determining quota restrictions, so-called amnesty for undocumented workers, paths to citizenship, and comprehensive immigration reform. In all of these debates, U.S. immigration policy is represented both as a benevolent giver-of-rights to deserving would-be citizens and a protector of national identity and national security. In every era of immigration reform, from Kennedy and Johnson to Reagan, the Bushes, and Obama, paths to citizenship have produced new categories of liminal subject-aliens and new avenues for colonial exploitation, surveillance, and control. Indeed, amnesty, paths to citizenship, and comprehensive immigration reform can all be read as iterations of

258 Exactly the same can be said about France. See Balibar, 2004. 41.
colonial tutelage that demarcate a space for a native-national *people* in relation to foreigners. Like the racial categorization of colonial subjects, the state’s differential distribution of rights must strive to *produce* the very nation that it is thought to protect.

Critics of Russell Pearce’s proposals for the recruitment, permanent subordination, and surveillance of immigrant workers from Latin America, like critics of the Sarkozy government’s crackdown on undocumented workers in France, have condemned these measures as racist and extremist. The highly compelling charges of immigrant rights activists foreground practices of documentation and racial profiling that function to intimidate and marginalize large social groups, including but not limited to improperly documented immigrants.261 These racializing practices are far more widespread than representations of Arizona and France as outliers would make them seem.

French raids are part of broader European efforts to exclude migrants from European political communities while at the same time encouraging their incorporation into low wage sectors of European economies as guest workers and undocumented caregivers. SB 1070 was written in the context of rising demands for local and national “immigration enforcement” and has since inspired at least 15 “copycat” bills in states ranging from Florida to Illinois. These bills are accompanied by highly restrictive temporary worker programs that would guarantee the subordinate and apolitical status of immigrant workforces. In the U.S. as in Europe, resurgent nativism and xenophobic anxiety is always accompanied by political, economic, cultural, and familial attachments engendered by the recruitment of foreigners and by the resistance of transnational communities to nationalist narratives of law and order. These attachments and corresponding transnational political communities make national bordering projects all the more impossible and, at the same time, all the more urgent from the perspective of those who wish to preserve the privileges of European identity.

Although SB 1070 combined with Pearce’s guest-worker proposals caricature some aspects of U.S. immigration management discourse, they also express a constitutive, colonial feature of that discourse. The proliferation of internal borders in the United States

---

261 The racial effects of SB 1070 and other bills and executive orders calling for local police to aid federal agents in enforcing immigration laws are well documented. See websites of leading immigrant rights organizations in Arizona and Minnesota, including The Coalition for Human Rights at http://www.derechoshumanosaz.net/ and Centro Campesino at http://www.centrocampesino.net/.
States and Europe corresponds to a proliferation of internal colonial relations that are produced by internal expansion. The seemingly apolitical language of law, order, and national origins obscures more than systemic racism. It obscures the ways in which the exploitation and subjection of immigrant workers in the U.S. and Europe reproduces raced and gendered colonial relations between subjects deemed European-white and dangerous outsiders.

The case of Austin, Minnesota is instructive. As evidenced by recent mass Immigration and Customs Enforcement raids in the American Midwest, the “Heartland” has not been immune from the nationwide intensification of border control. The horrific scenes of Guatemalan workers herded into cattle pens by the hundreds in the ICE raid of a Postville, Iowa meatpacking plant, and reports of widespread racial profiling in the surveillance and policing of immigrant communities attests to the racial effects of purportedly colorblind laws and practices. The Postville raid and subsequent prison terms and mass deportations of detainees had a chilling effect on a region already transformed by the coordinated efforts of the Federal Government and local agencies, including local police, to crack down on illegal immigration. As in the past, these efforts were guided by a racial optic. Suspicion based on phenotype made anyone with an apparently non-white complexion vulnerable to arrest and detention.

Workers in Austin’s Quality Pork plant had good reason to be worried. A subsidiary of Hormel Foods, Quality Pork was established to house its parent company’s cut-and-kill assembly line after the historic strikes of the early 1980s. The company now employs mostly Latin American workers, paying them significantly less than their parent company pays the mostly white citizen workforce at Hormel. Along with its segregation-effect, this strategy gives Hormel political leverage in negotiations with the local labor union by securing a politically vulnerable, relatively isolated, racially stigmatized workforce. The atmosphere of mistrust and racial animus engendered by raids and by the cooperation of local officials with ICE has effectively deterred immigrant political activism and inhibited the formation of potentially border-blurring alliances.

On the one hand, Hormel contributes to this atmosphere of mistrust by deliberately dividing its workforce and by participating in federal programs of electronic surveillance. Hormel’s participation in the E-Verify system and its stated commitment to
work with local and federal agencies of immigration law enforcement increase its power over its foreign workers, whose livelihoods depend on its decisions, and their families. On the other hand, this atmosphere allows Hormel to establish itself as a paternalistic protector of immigrants. When Latin American immigrants began to arrive in large numbers to work at Quality Pork, Hormel established a “Welcome Center” both to document and monitor new workers and to help them adapt to new circumstances. Among other forms of identification, Austin’s Welcome Center provides each new immigrant worker with an Individual Taxpayer Identification Number (ITIN) that situates them in a legal limbo, requires them to pay taxes, and identifies them as foreign subjects.²⁶² For reasons whose significance will become more apparent in the subsequent section, the Welcome Center worked closely with the Mexican consulate to ensure that immigrants understood the risks of remaining in the country without the requisite documentation. By involving the Mexican government, Hormel recasts racial distinctions as merely legal distinctions based on national origins.

In these ways and others, Hormel helps immigrants negotiate the legal terrain of U.S. immigration policy and practice. Perhaps more importantly, it helps immigrants integrate themselves into local communities by learning English and enrolling their children in local schools. Involving teachers, employers, local residents, and families, the Welcome Center is in many ways the benevolent, assimilationist colonial institution par excellence. It facilitates and legitimizes the exploitation and surveillance of foreign workers while at the same time performing a humanitarian and development function. As I discuss below, French Welcome Centers during and after the colonial period ending in 1962 performed strikingly similar humanitarian and surveillance functions.

Welcome Centers in Austin, Albert Lea, and elsewhere have come under fire from immigrant-phobic organizations, like the local Minnesota Coalition for Immigration Reduction and the national Federation for American Immigration Reform, who assert that the centers facilitate illegal border crossings. These organizations have called on the state and the people as forces of border control to intervene on behalf of the native workforce and in the name of protecting national identity. The threats (of incarceration, deportation, etc.) posed by networks of state-civilian border guards occlude political alliances within

---
local communities and force immigrants to seek the protection of their corporate patrons. In this way, the colonial forces of incorporation and apartheid work together to reproduce the opposition between native citizen-subjects and various categories of marginalized immigrants.

As in the case of traditional colonization of foreign lands and peoples, the drawing and policing of boundaries that separate different categories of workers occurs in peripheral spaces, producing complex and dynamic communities, and relations of rule. Like all European colonial projects, the segregation and policing of immigrants never fully achieves the Manichean divisions called for by nationalists and nativists. In addition to their policing function, Welcome Centers and other initiatives designed to integrate immigrants into local communities produce more than docile immigrant bodies: they help to produce hybrid subjects and sites of resistance. At the very least, they produce conditions under which new “transpolitical” forms of belonging and ways of life can take shape and challenge dominant narratives of national identity and difference.

De L’Indigène à L’Immigré: Incorporating Colonial Subjects as Immigrant Aliens in the French Metropole

As in all cases of colonial administration, however, the policing of immigrant communities was not restricted to practices of repression and exclusion. The National and Police archives provide ample evidence of a massive postwar transfer of colonial bordering technologies to the metropole. They provide as much if not more evidence of state and non-state French aid to immigrant groups and massive efforts to incorporate immigrants from former colonies into the national economy as low-wage workers while excluding them from the national political community.

As in the United States and across Europe, the recruitment of immigrant labor by French companies and the French government repeated practices of active incorporation that have intensified and waned according to the availability of European workers and their relative willingness to work in low-wage sectors of the French economy. As Rosenberg and others have argued, the intensification of French colonial bordering

---

264 Archives Nationale. F/1a
practices in the metropole were animated by the recruitment of North African workers during World War I. Hired to replace French, Italian, Spanish, and Polish workers during the war, Algerians were designated as non-white “colonial workers” and physically and juridically separated from “foreign workers of the white race.”\(^{265}\) During the war, their recruitment and labor was overseen by the French military’s Service de la Main-d’Oeuvre étrangère (Service of Foreign Labor). The Service was divided into sections, each with its own director, and each “corresponding to a race of workers.”\(^{266}\) Racial distinctions were based on the work of the same eugenicist anthropology that guided colonial immigration policies of other European powers and the Quota Laws of the United States. As I discuss below, the latter became a model for French colonial and immigration officials in the Inter-War Years, reinforcing the mutual influence of French and American colonial immigration discourse. Concerned about the political and biopolitical repercussions of incorporating foreign workers into the metropolitan labor force, the Service reassured white French citizens by using special wartime powers to segregate colonial recruits as ethnically distinct and deportable bodies.

After World War I, French immigration officials made good on their word by “repatriating” Algerians and other North Africans in order to ensure that white Europeans would rebuild France as a white-European nation. The mass deportation of Algerians did not make sense from strictly juridical or economic standpoints; as French subjects Algerians could not be involuntarily deported and their labor was still of great economic value given the massive depopulation of the white European workforce during the war. Bertrand Nogaro, the economist and law professor who managed labor relations during the war justified the call for repatriation in no uncertain terms: colonial workers from African and Indochina were “too ethnographically distinct” from the French and white European population to participate in the rebuilding of France. Their participation, he argued, would cause ethnic conflict and would dilute French-European national culture. In late 1919, the Minister of the Interior ordered that all North Africans without steady employment be sent back to the colonies. Police combed the streets under orders to find and arrest “every individual you consider undesirable” without concern about protocols.

\(^{265}\) Rosenberg, Policing Paris. 122. Nogaro and Weil. La Main D’oeuvre étrangère et coloniale pendant la guerre. p.43

\(^{266}\) Rosenberg, 2004. 122.
for arrest and detention. When police failed to expel more integrated segments of the colonial population, they began arresting everyone who looked out of place. The profiling practices and police discretion encouraged by authorities in the aftermath of World War I repeat a pattern that survived World War II and decolonization, and that resembles practices of racial profiling encouraged in France today.

Once again, though, these brutal practices of exclusion were challenged and complicated by French efforts to incorporate Algerians, commend them for their labor as workers in French industries and as soldiers in the French Military, and even to defend and protect their rights. French educated elites from North Africa joined with French progressives to promote Algerian assimilation and their rights as French citizens. Government officials and companies joined forces to respond to these demands by providing social services that would double as mechanisms of surveillance and control. In his brilliant analysis of The Franco-Muslim hospital, Rosenberg discusses the “curious” fact that the Inter-War French government was willing to “invest massive sums in social programs” for North Africans. According to Rosenberg, by building boarding houses, hospitals, subsidized housing, work training facilities, training in hygienic practices, education in French language and culture, the French “North African Services” hoped to “govern more effectively overseas by winning over colonial populations and persuading them of the superiority of Western civilization.” Of course, in order to invest in these services, colonial progressives had to convince a broad coalition of political actors that it was worth state resources that equaled or exceeded those devoted to French citizens. Rosenberg summarizes the careful balancing of metropolitan colonial objectives as follows:

Combining strategic considerations, well-founded reform arguments, and a traditional paternalism, as well as a healthy dose of racial fear, [the local government in Paris] took advantage of the financial and administrative wherewithal the capital afforded. Investing in social services in building a hospital enabled them to hold together a broad political coalition. With the hope of living up to their promises to make the empire more humane… moderates and Socialists agreed to a unique blend of surveillance and assistance to “civilize” their North African subjects and protégés and to ensure their loyalty. The effort both discipline and morally to justify the exploitation of colonial workers in France led to unprecedented forms of social control and exceptional forms of assistance.

---

Nothing distinguished North Africans from other first-generation immigrants more than the assistance they received.\textsuperscript{268}

Rosenberg goes on to illustrate how hospitals functioned at once to provide medical services to North Africans to which even the Euro-French population did not have access, segregated and quarantined North Africans thought to be carriers of dangerous diseases such as syphilis and tuberculosis, and enabled the monitoring and suppression of any and all North African political activity. Muslim hospital directors interrogated patients and reported consistently to police. Municipal councilors were explicit about the effectiveness of using social services as institutions of surveillance. One commented that, “at present, the natives are under the impression that this organization was created not so much to discipline them as to assist and protect them, which has contributed to its success much more than outright force would have done,” and that his city’s approach “consists in protecting and assisting in order to discipline [colonial workers in the metropole] more effectively.”\textsuperscript{269} As Rosenberg suggests:

To find a job or place to sleep, to receive food or medical assistance, to contact relatives back home or resolve a dispute in the Metropole, even to take a language class, North Africans had to provide a range of personal information. Local authorities collected information from all of the assistance programs and forwarded it to the police. The entire surveillance system sought constantly to control North African workers and to centralize all their vital information, records of political activity employment, and medical histories were all kept together. [The Municipal Councilor, Emile] Massard claimed that: “nothing concerning the natives remains unknown to us.”\textsuperscript{270}

These practices of colonial knowledge production were in many respects more effective in the metropole than in the colony, partly because of the familiar geographic and social terrain and partly because of extensive metropolitan resources. Although they were privileged in some ways as favored colonial subjects, North Africans and Algerians were also subject to more effective and intensive surveillance and control precisely because they were relatively more well known and well-documented by colonial officials on both sides of the sea.

\textsuperscript{268} Rosenberg, 2004. 169.
\textsuperscript{269} Rosenberg, 2004. 173.
\textsuperscript{270} Rosenberg, 2004. 193.
Practices designed by businesses to monitor and discipline immigrant workforces were developed in conjunction with social services and policing practices. All of these mirrored similar practices in French colonies and all were often developed alongside these practices.\textsuperscript{271} State officials, business owners, and aid agencies, learned about how to manage different immigrant groups by consulting colonial officials and colonial models of social control.\textsuperscript{272} Colonial solutions were developed to deal with “The Black Problem” (\textit{Le Problème Noir}) in the French hexagon as much as they were to the problems posed by Arab and Berber North Africans. In fact, initiatives to monitor and incorporate blacks were often deliberately and explicitly modeled on those designed to recolonize Algerian Muslims. Rather than fading away, these models of colonial control became even more widely and systematically used in the years after World War II.

Documents related to the management, partial integration, and paternalistic aid of African workers in the 1950s and 1960s provide instructive historical evidence of metropolitan recolonization and the recuperation of colonial categories in the wake of North African movements for national independence. At a series of inter-agency conferences in France to which interior ministers of “francophone” African countries were often invited, solutions were sought to the “grave problems” of mass migration from independent black Africa to the French metropole. The goal of these conferences was to train African government officials and to enlist their support in the surveillance and control of migrant workers to and from France. The most immediate concern of conference directors was how to construct adequate “\textit{Centres d’Accueil}” (Reception or Welcome Centers) that would at once acclimate new immigrants to the metropole and to French ways of life, integrate them into the national economy, gather information about them to provide to police and government officials, and mark them as ethno-racial others. These Welcome Centers and the services provided to African workers were represented as charitable, humanitarian gifts of a modern democratic republic to the unfortunate.

\textsuperscript{271} Weil, 2002; Lorcin, 1995; Silverstein, 2004.
\textsuperscript{272} This is evident in the language used to describe immigrants and colonial subjects. It is no wonder that colonial categories travelled back and forth across the Mediterranean, as many colonial officials from North Africa were reassigned to ministries in the Metropole during and after struggles for national independence. In letters of recommendation from colonial authorities, these officials were praised for their work as recruitment officers, officers of assimilation, multilingual (Arabic-speaking) administrators, and knowers of North African culture. In short, their training as colonial agents qualified them for jobs in the metropole.
subjects of backward nations whose only redeeming qualities are products of French influence and tutelage.

By working with African government ministers to develop these purportedly humanitarian policies, these conferences and the initiatives they developed and endorsed simultaneously recuperated colonial modes of control and erased the historical practices of imperial and colonial expansion that produced transnational migrations and communities in the first place. Indeed, surveillance during and after periods of decolonization became easier and more easily legitimized in certain respects. Schemes were devised to maintain at least two records of the movement of Africans back and forth across the French border. African ministers from Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, Mauritania, Niger, the Ivory Coast, and Mali were asked to develop exit visa strategies that would correspond to French protocols and labor needs.

Some African migrants negotiated this new system by developing false identity cards. For instance, when the French interior ministry was favoring immigration from Senegal in the early 1960s, Malians found ways to present themselves as Senegalese, provoking new French initiatives designed to root out cases of misrepresentation and identity theft. The ensuing crisis of identity and documentation provoked wide-ranging efforts to re-impose racialized colonial identities on migrants. While the responsibility for deportation fell upon the ministers of the interior and national security, a wide range of actors participated in surveillance, from supervisors at industrial plants to aid workers.

At the inter-ministerial conference of 10 June, 1964, the primary actionable objectives of the incorporation and surveillance of immigrants was spelled out as follows:

1. All translations and interpretations are the author’s. Original relevant text reads as follows: Certes, la réglementation du séjour de ces immigrants s’avère délicate. Elle est liée, sans doute, aux accords de reciprocité concernant le séjour de nos propres nationaux dans les républiques africaines. Il apparaît néanmoins nécessaire de rechercher une solution, plus souple sans doute que la législation sur le séjour des “étrangers”, mais qui permette d’imposer aux travailleurs originaires d’Afrique un titre comportant une rubrique où seraient mentionnées les déclarations rendues obligatoires de changement de résidence, à l’arrivée et au départ. AN. Nationale F/1A/274. There were enough cases of identity theft like the following to provoke a rigorous response. Le 27 avril 1964, 9 Sénégalais venus chercher du travail en France débarquent à Bordeaux, en provenance d’Abidjan. Cinq d’entre eux, démunis, disent-ils, de pièces d’identité, présentent un simple certificat de perte de carte d’identité livré par les autorités ivoiriennes. Après avis du parquet, les intéressés ont été reembarques pour l’Afrique le 2 mai. AN F/1A
1. Creation or extension of Welcome Centers and bureaus of intervention offices intended to advise migrants… and to facilitate their insertion into the social milieux.
3. Construction of housing: homes for individuals or housing for families of migrants.
4. Surveillance and control of the sexual activities of immigrants, with an emphasis on curbing prostitution and polygamy.
5. Repatriation for those who are unassimilable (Inadapté)\textsuperscript{275}

The report goes on to suggest that housing and financing of social services should be modeled on the example of the French Algerian Welcome Centers and social services. The provision of housing was both a means of helping migrants avoid homelessness and vagrancy and a means of ensuring knowledge of their whereabouts. French officials reserved their sovereign right to repatriate foreign workers in several listings of official objectives of immigrant reception and incorporation.

French officials articulated a number of biopolitical dangers posed by African workers. First and foremost was the danger of public disorder and disease. The conditions in French housing projects had to be improved and medical services provided to their inhabitants, it was argued, because as natural carriers of infectious diseases, black Africans, like North Africans, posed a biological threat to the general French population. The prevention of disease was a primary justification for the regulation of sexual relations among immigrant workers. Like Arabs, immigrants from “black Africa” were deemed promiscuous and oversexed and, lacking female companionship among a largely male immigrant population, prone to visit French and African prostitutes who were suspected carriers of sexually transmitted diseases. Several studies and conferences on immigration from African countries concluded that Africans should be forced to submit to medical tests before entering the country. Boarding houses established by aid agencies and the French government were often closed due to “poor hygiene” and threats to “public order.” Their inhabitants were relocated in order to “preserve the tranquility of the African quarters.”\textsuperscript{276}

\textsuperscript{275} AN F1A/5136
\textsuperscript{276} AN F1A/5136
Among the many circumstances under which French officials could legitimately repatriate foreign workers was any indication of political activity outside of the aid organizations endorsed by the French state. For instance, aid organizations were forced to renounce all association with communist or socialist parties in France and to monitor their members’ political affiliation. All known African socialist agitators and associates were to be reported to the police, monitored, and, if deemed threatening or undesirable in any way, deported to their home countries. Like American officials throughout the Cold War, French ministers expressed concern not only about known, outspoken communists, but also about Africans who might be susceptible to the influence of the “extreme left.”

Aid organizations and Welcome Centers were established in part to depoliticize services that would otherwise be provided by political and cultural associations and that might produce transnational political communities, thereby undermining state authority. Interior ministry documents express persistent concern about independent networks of African workers, informal economic activity like remittances and funding for new immigrants by African cooperatives, and the housing of irregulars or “clandestines.” African workers supported each other by pooling resources, opening boarding houses to new immigrants and family members, maintaining national and transnational community bonds and cultural practices, and defending community members from encroachment by other communities and by the French state. Any activity not managed and monitored by state authorities was suspect by reason of its political potential. All aid had to be connected in some way to the paternalistic and surveillance role of the French colonial ministries in the metropole in order to be deemed legitimate by state authorities. Thus, while helping immigrants find housing, jobs, and ways to meet basic subsistence needs, aid organizations participated in the stifling of transnational solidarity among French and African workers. By segregating African workforces by ethnicity and country or region of origin, aid agencies in cooperation with the French government also inhibited, but by no means eliminated, pan-African, pan-Arab, and Islamic political activity.

Major French manufacturers worked closely with Welcome Centers such as the Office of Intervention, Welcome, and Promotion and AFTAM to promote the training and discipline of African workers and to classify and segregate these workers on the basis of what were deemed to be their strengths and weaknesses. AFTAM’s overarching goal
was, and remains, to give immigrants the chance to “live simply but with dignity” by providing basic language and vocational training and by connecting them with employers who were searching for lower-wage workers. Apart from the workers themselves, car manufacturers like Citroen and Renault benefitted from AFTAM’s recruitment efforts. AFTAM and other aid centers were entrusted with the task of assigning workers with different perceived skill sets to various companies. Manufacturers would frequently comment on the relative desirability of different African workforces, often expressing a preference for blacks over Arabs or Arabs over blacks.

Blacks, who were less inclined to agitate for the kinds of citizenship rights demanded by Algerians, were often employed in low skilled sectors where few Algerians or full French citizens desired to work. In representations that reproduced colonial antagonisms and often sparked feuds among different groups of workers, employers often designated certain groups of black Africans as relatively more disciplined and better workers than their Algerian or even their white counterparts. When tensions between designated workforces erupted into violence, the conflicts were blamed on the aggressive tendencies of poorly educated and undeveloped non-Europeans. The skill sets and failings of various immigrant groups, along with their poor “conditions of life” (conditions de vie) were recorded and routinely analyzed by government officials seeking to know and control former colonial subjects in the metropole.

“Benevolent Assimilation”: Internal Expansion and “Imported Colonialism” in the American Empire

The last section analyzed the recuperation of colonial categories and technologies of development by French officials seeking to incorporate immigrants from former French colonies. The postwar period was chosen as a moment of rupture when French officials were reconfiguring relations with their former colonial subjects. My goal was to identify colonial continuities while taking seriously the distinctiveness of immigration management during the period of decolonization and the postwar state of emergency in France. The following section analyzes internal colonialism in the U.S. during the same

---

277 AFTAM’s objectives have shifted since it was created in 1962, but it’s overarching anti-political, humanitarian mission remains the same. <http://www.aftam.fr/25-pour-l-action-sociale-et-medico-sociale-historique-de-l-aftam.htm>
postwar period, as well as preceding moments of crisis and transition, notably after the Spanish-American War and during the Great Depression. Analyzing these earlier periods situates the U.S. more fully within a context of European imperialism.

As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, many scholars have treated American colonial adventures abroad as aberrations in American history. These scholars have examined American foreign and domestic politics as if the U.S. were a non-European and non- and even anti-colonial inter-war and postwar power. Developing themes examined in previous chapters, this section relocates the U.S. within a European colonial milieu by drawing attention to the legacies of overtly colonial projects in the Philippines, Hawai‘i, Puerto Rico, and Northern Mexico as well as to the recolonization of colonial subjects, including Mexican workers, in the American metropole. As in the previous section, I focus here on practices of recruitment, incorporation, and purportedly humanitarian development and how these practices both conflict with and reinforce the colonial practices of surveillance, control, and exclusion discussed in Chapter 2. Drawing on themes from Chapter 1, I argue that colonial subjects were incorporated into the national economy in ways that produced transnational spaces and communities and that unsettled, reproduced, and reconfigured the racial hierarchies established in earlier periods of imperial expansion (e.g., westward expansion after independence and the incorporation of forced labor and indentured servants). As in previous chapters, I argue that the production of imperial spaces and hierarchies unsettles nation-state logics and boundaries. In so doing, they challenge the core assumptions of dominant paradigms in International Relations Theory.

“Our Little Brown Brothers”: The Case of Filipino Immigrants

Nowhere were the contradictions of American empire more evident than in its newly won territories at the turn of the century. It would be a mistake, however, to regard American conquest and colonial administration of these territories as somehow out of character for the American empire-state. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the subjugation of the Philippines was justified and carried out through many of the same brutal practices developed to subjugate indigenous groups on the American frontier in the preceding century, and by many of the same colonial officials and soldiers. As
mentioned in Chapter 1, the leaders of military re-conquest in the Philippines cut their teeth fighting Apache warriors in so-called “Injun Country,” and the cartographies imposed on the spaces of the Philippines, Hawai‘i and Latin American territories replicated the representations of Africans imported as slave labor and the indigenous peoples of the American West. The epithets American officers and their soldiers used to dehumanize Filipinos combined racial and cultural signifiers that already functioned to distance African and Native Americans from American citizens of “Anglo Saxon stock.”

Just as British and French colonial officials referred to older cultural and racial cartographies in their respective “civilizing” campaigns, American officers and soldiers employed an ethno-racial cartography developed in the context of Euro-American westward expansion to justify the coercive subjugation and “benevolent assimilation” of the Filipino “natives.” As in all European imperial contexts, these racial cartographies functioned more to articulate a Euro-American identity and to demarcate a privileged space for a purportedly superior European subject than to foster understanding of foreign peoples, practices, and worldviews.

Like the previous section, this chapter seeks to place “domestic” immigration policies and practices of incorporation within an imperial context of American expansion. By doing so, I am participating in an effort to treat the American metropole as an imperial space. In this context, the management of the immigration of colonial “nationals” from the Philippines is exemplary of – and from the perspectives of employers and agents of the empire-state, the ideal mode of – the treatment of other racialized immigrant groups. The importation of Filipinos as colonial nationals is not, from this standpoint, exceptional or aberrant as many scholars have suggested. As I have argued and will discuss in the next chapter, Chinese exclusion at the turn of the century and the establishment of the Asiatic barred zone had appeased nativist American workers who

---

278 “At a time when the term was appropriate, John Hope Franklin called the annexations of 1898 “America's Negro Empire.” It was a profound insight at the time it was written and remains so, I think, because of, not despite, the dated racial reference. Franklin accomplished two things here: he captured the “mentality” of the majority of Americans who, to comprehend the awesome consequences of the war and its aftermath, lumped the inhabitants of the new possessions living in two oceans and set thousands of miles apart into categories of “Negro” and "black;' a species of humanity they believed they knew well and understood thoroughly. Franklin also anticipated a narrative strategy, embraced by many historians, in which African Americans act as the conceptual bridge connecting domestic racial oppression and the domination of millions of people of color abroad.” Eric T. L. Love. *Race over Empire: Racism and U.S. Imperialism, 1865-1900.* 8.
perceived a threat to their wages and standards of living posed by Chinese and Japanese immigrants. However, as Erika Lee and Mae Ngai suggest, the exclusion of Asians also laid bare the imperial and colonial dimensions of the employment of Asian immigrant labor. As major canning and agricultural industries expanded inland and intensified production, and as Americans entering professional classes created new markets for domestic labor, the demand for racialized, low-cost workers increased. For some employers, particularly in the sugar industry, this “labor problem” could be solved through direct colonization and the employment of “colonials” in the “Far East” and Latin America as part of a project of expansion and benevolent assimilation. For others, e.g., the canning industry on the West coast and families who employed domestic workers, expansion meant the employment of racialized immigrants in the metropole. As discussed earlier, notwithstanding the disciplinary assumptions of “foreign” and “domestic” policy analysts, these two forms of expansion belong to the same imperial logic and are carried out through similar colonial practices of incorporation and bordering. Appreciating the significance of this unifying logic requires treating the territorial space of the nation as an imperial space and the nation-state’s domestic policies as imperial policies.

Although American officials took great pains to distinguish themselves from Old World colonial powers, their physical and rhetorical practices consistently reinforced a reliance on the practices that defined colonial regimes of the past. In the dominant ideology of American imperialism, the American campaign in the Philippines was designed to “liberate” Filipinos from Spanish tyranny and to protect minority ethnic groups from the dominant and supposedly barbarous Tagalogs. The continued presence of Americans was deemed necessary, as historian Stuart Creighton Miller puts it, “to protect Filipinos from European predators waiting in the wings for an American withdrawal and to tutor them in American democracy.”

Whereas the colonial policies and practices of the Spanish emphasized subordination, exploitation, and domination, the policies and practices of U.S. imperialism would focus on bureaucratic administration, health and sanitation, aid, and education. Violent conquest and pacification might be

---

necessary at the outset, but only as a means of establishing the conditions for civilizing administration and aid, which would be evident in the generous appropriations for colonial education, healthcare, sanitation, infrastructure, training, and the recruitment of Filipino workers. Creighton Miller summarizes the era’s “Yankee” apologetics:

If the Yankee presence was bloody initially, it was, in the end, ephemeral and supposedly most beneficial to the Filipinos leaving behind better transportation, mosquito control, the work ethic, the seed of Protestantism, and that perfect symbol of American beneficence, the ubiquitous schoolhouse.  

In short, according to its leading proponents, the bloody re-conquest of the Philippines at the turn of the century was different from prior European colonial conquests in that the end result was not the tyrannical exploitation of a subordinated people but rather the benevolent civilization of those people and their gradual incorporation into the American empire, and eventually the American world system. The military operation was represented as a part of a broader, massive development project that would ultimately raise Filipinos’ standards of living and transform the Filipino people into efficient workers, producers, and bourgeois consumers of American commodities. The soldier, the administrator, and the teacher had equally important roles to play in this broader project. Together and separately, these imperial subjects engaged in the impossible but necessary task of balancing the conflicting goals of incorporation and exclusion.

As the well-known Filipino historian Renato Constantino makes clear, the central institution of American colonialism in the Philippines was not ultimately the military or even the administrative bureaucracy. It was, rather, the system of colonial education. Officially justified as a distinctly American project of development, the education of Filipinos was, as Constantino suggests, also a project of coercive pacification and subjection. Having just successfully resisted another white European power, Filipinos had proved their desire for independence and their impressive capacity for rebellion. Not wanting to repeat Spanish mistakes, American officials were determined to make good American “colonials” out of this defiant and unruly race. To this end, the military

---

281 Of course, this version of the American exceptionalist narrative bears a striking resemblance to European definitions of the white man’s burden, and perhaps particularly to France’s ongoing civilizing missions in Asia and North Africa. American officials and proponents of American exceptionalism were intent not on eschewing European colonial techniques, but rather in perfecting them.
leadership in the colony requested a large appropriation for the establishment of schools and the stationing of “a small army of teachers” on the islands, subject to the command and control of the military brass. Highlighting the role of schools in the American military-colonial project of conquest and subjugation, Constantino cites the military commander of the American mission in the Philippines at the turn of the century, General Arthur MacArthur:

This appropriation [for education] is recommended primarily and exclusively as an adjunct to military operations calculated to pacify the people and to precure and expedite (sic) the restoration of tranquility throughout the archipelago.

From the standpoint of the colonial military regime, then, the school system functioned primarily as a mechanism of capture. As “the most effective means of subjugating a people,” Constantino observes, “capturing minds” through education “serves as a weapon in wars of colonial conquest.” As a weapon, the goal of education was subordination, not “benevolent assimilation.” The project was fundamentally paternalistic, designed to turn unruly, animalistic natives into “little brown brothers,” not to make Americans out of Filipinos or even to make modern adults out of pre-modern children.

The teachers and contractors who were recruited to perform this function of capture, many of whom were former soldiers in the American military, often viewed their roles differently than their military supervisors. Colonial education in the Philippines was certainly an extension of the military campaign there, as Constantino and Dorothy B. Fujita-Rony suggest, but it was more than this. It was also a genuine effort to improve the living standards of Filipinos and to help them realize their intellectual and economic potential within an American system and according to American standards of merit and progress-towards-modernity. As Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler have argued, the conflicts and tensions within empire make it difficult to identify imperial “agents” and to distinguish them from colonial subjects. Viewing empire as a discourse with a structure allows one to de-center the agents of empire and to examine the discursive production of imperial rules, roles, imperatives, tensions, enabling constraints, and subjectivities. From this point of view, the different perspectives articulated by military

---

283 MacArthur quoted in Constantino
284 Constantino
officers, teachers, administrators, politicians, academic researchers (who produced reports for the government and the public), and business leaders provide insights into the constitutive contradictions and the underlying ambivalence of the American civilizing mission within the broader project of imperial expansion.

In her outstanding study of colonial subject production in the transnational space of the American empire, Kimberly Alidio offers an incisive analysis of these constitutive internal conflicts as experienced by colonial teachers and their students. As Alidio suggests, the army of teachers sent to the colonies at the turn of the century were tasked with an impossible project: to transform Filipinos both into “good Americans” and into “good colonials.” Unlike military officers, whose mission of pacification and “capture” had goals that were relatively clear and aligned with the unexceptional European objective of imperial domination, the subjection and assimilation of Filipino students through education introduced the exceptional possibility of development, equality, and independence. These apparently conflicting goals – of making-subordinate and making-equal – had to be reconciled by colonial soldier-teachers in a way that would fulfill the promise of benevolent assimilation without collapsing ethno-racial hierarchies. On the one hand, the constitutive contradiction between domination/exclusion/hierarchy and assimilation/inclusion/equality was a structural component of all European colonial regimes. On the other hand, it took on a particularly acute, crisis-inducing form in those regimes, like the American and the French, whose animating narratives defined them as exceptional by virtue of their superior technologies and strategies of incorporation, integration, and assimilation as opposed to domination and hierarchization.

As I have argued, this constitutive contradiction emerges partly as tensions and conflicts between and within different subjects occupying different positions and playing different roles within an imperial structure. They take the form of debates between apparently independent actors and internal conflicts within those actors, e.g., the debate between imperialists and anti-imperialists or conflicts between colonial teachers and colonial soldiers or between immigrant aid organizations and American employers. They reflect both the constitutive tensions of inclusive exclusion in colonial contexts and the


286 Alidio
fundamental *incoherence* of the colonial narrative, embodied in colonial practices. They defy the calculations of “raison d’état” analyzed by Foucault in *Security, Territory, Population* and the hyper-rational linear statism analyzed by James Scott in *Seeing Like a State*. They confirm a complex web of ambivalent, contradictory meanings and values at the core of imperial strategies and experiences of colonial practice. They validate Frederick Cooper’s thesis that the agents of colonialism saw and acted simultaneously “like empires” and like states.

As Alidio observes, many colonial schoolteachers in the Philippines saw themselves both as agents in an imperial apparatus of domination and as producers of a transpacific American community of equals. In other words, they viewed the world through the kaleidoscopic lenses of empire as much as through the relatively more myopic lenses of the rational state. Documentary evidence suggests that most teachers were vehemently opposed to the brutal tactics of the American military campaign, arguing that it undermined their work as professional assimilators. As opponents of imperial brutality, these teachers represented themselves as humanitarian advocates of the rights and interests of Filipino children and families and as proponents of the American dream, or at least some version of that dream.

However, the pacifism of these teachers did not often correspond to anti-colonial sentiments, or even to a belief in the assimilability of Filipinos. For many teachers, reconciling their conflicting roles as imperial soldiers and benevolent educators meant appealing to a well-established logic of difference wherein ethno-racial capacities would ensure hierarchical relations regardless of their pedagogic effectiveness. From this perspective, the specter of equality was held at bay eternally by innate, ethno-racial difference. The Filipino mind could be advanced through education to some undetermined point below the threshold of white intelligence, but no farther. The colonial teacher could therefore throw themselves into their benevolent work without worrying about the collapse of ontological hierarchies or the crossing of racial borders. The major concern from this colonial standpoint was not the accidental production of equality, but rather the unwitting production of the desire for equality in those who could never achieve it. In an exemplary rhetorical question to his relatives in the United States, one Anglo-American teacher, who was a particularly harsh critic of the American
military campaign, expressed his skepticism regarding the prospects of the civilizing mission:

How can we expect a colored race, with the baser natures and the natural tendencies to evil...to attain without years and years, or even generations, of training, even to a crude imitation of a good form of government?

The same teacher, Mr. Harry Cole, offered elaborate accounts of the racially degenerate behavior of his students and their families. Given their innate inferiority, it was in no one’s interest to inspire in Filipino children the desire to cultivate an intellect on par with that of the Anglo-Saxon race. To do so would be to give them false hope and to undermine the civilizing mission by fostering unrealizable ambitions and conflict-inducing frustration rooted in fantasies of assimilation that could never be realized. On the grounds that pedagogical strategies must acknowledge innate racial differences, therefore, Cole refused to “take any pains to give the Filipinos the idea that they are as good as we [Anglos] are.”

As in France and in other European empires (although in different ways in England and Spain), the official ideology of the American civilizing mission attempted to incorporate both the pessimistic racialism illustrated by the accounts of colonial teachers like Mr. Cole and the hopefulness of the civilizing mission as expressed by other agents of colonialism and sermonized in President McKinley’s Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation. The result was an apparently coherent, but actually deeply contradictory narrative; one that posited essential differences between races and yet held out a sober but apparently genuine hope for a future equality. Agnostic about the assimilability of Filipinos, this narrative prescribed an indefinite period of development (at least 100 years in Taft’s account or several generations in Cole’s) during which American administrators would, like responsible parents, have to rule over Filipinos, administer their development, train them, educate them, discipline them, and provide them with all necessary assistance, and after which Filipinos might be granted some form of independence to be determined at some future moment which may or may not come. This underlying uncertainty allowed politicians to tout the exceptionality of their civilizing mission while

---

simultaneously assuring the American population that the chances of any significant number of Filipinos progressing to the point where they could legitimately encroach upon domains of American privilege were negligible.\textsuperscript{288}

If Filipino colonials remained in the non-U.S. territory of the Philippines, their physical distance might have enabled imperialists to maintain the promise of deferred assimilation without arousing politically destructive nativist anxieties in American citizens, or worse, encouraging demands for full inclusion, equality, and citizenship from Filipinos. Without breaching the territory reserved for the Anglo-American and broader Western-Euro-American population, even highly educated Filipino colonials could not threaten the security and the privileges reserved for this nation-on-a-hill.\textsuperscript{289} As the previous chapter suggests, the importance of territory in the colonial imaginary is apparent in the statist and nativist opposition to the full incorporation of the Philippines in the union as a state. The decisions in the insular cases were crucial in this regard, as were restrictions on immigration from the colonies. If the constitution followed the flag and expanded the territory of the nation by transforming colonies into states of the republic, or if colonial subjects were allowed to enter the Constitution’s territorial jurisdiction, the racial integrity of the population would be irrevocably and fatally compromised.\textsuperscript{290}

Of course, the Manichean racial cartography that seemed to make imperial expansion safe-enough for the national population was undermined by the project of benevolent assimilation itself, especially when that project encouraged or entailed the migration of colonials to the metropole. As Benedict Anderson suggests, colonial education was designed to produce a colonial elite who would remain loyal subjects of

\textsuperscript{288} Even the staunchest supporters of the benevolent assimilation of Filipinos expressed undying faith in their unassimilability.
\textsuperscript{289} Insular cases. Concerns about immigration.
\textsuperscript{290} The fact that this population was already compromised by a motley assortment of lesser peoples — a consequence of, among other things, triangular trade, African forced labor, and territorial expansion under the banners of economic growth and manifest destiny — only exacerbated the present danger. Like the desire for benevolent assimilation, nativist anxiety was a central and ever-present feature of American colonialism. Indeed, it performed an exclusion function that was necessary for the civilizing mission to take place without jeopardizing the privileges of citizenship reserved for the American population. In many ways, the project of colonization depended upon both the rhetoric of benevolent assimilation and the belief that this project was \textit{a priori} doomed to fail, that the best that could be hoped for were modest advances in the intellectual development of racially inferior colonized peoples and the worst case scenario was a resort to older modes of domination or, even more horrific, the “race suicide” of the national population. [move to body]
the empire-state and would carry out the sovereign will of the metropolitan government, and in this case of the “American people,” in the colony.\textsuperscript{291} In fact, what it helped to produce were bi-lingual, mobile subjects who moved in an imperial space, crossing national and racial borders, competing with European workforces, integrating themselves within European societies, creating transnational communities, demanding rights \textit{both} for full inclusion in the metropole \textit{and} for national independence, and throwing the racial boundaries of the nation radically into question. Although the constitution did not end up following the flag to the Philippines, the colonial project there did create an imperial, transnational, transcultural space in which the desires and aspirations of “colonials” threatened the integrity and assumed sovereignty of the Euro-American national population. Given the constitutive contradictions of American and French colonialism in the context of their respective narratives of exceptionalism, embodied as they were in the practices of colonial education and the recruitment of colonial workers, it was never clear even to the agents of the empire-state exactly what territory and what population would be included within the state’s jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{292} As the insular cases and the experience of colonial teachers suggest, these boundaries were always already shifting and transforming in ways that the empire-state could not fully control.

The large-scale migration of Filipino colonials to the American metropole began within a decade of the suppression of the Filipino rebellion at the turn of the century. It was driven at once by the demands of American employers for cheap, racialized workers, the demands of colonial officials for highly educated Filipino elites who could rule the Philippines and establish an American-style democratic government there, and by Filipino demands for the benefits of their “national” status: for the American opportunities that were promoted in their primary and secondary school education in the Philippines, and for inclusion in the American polity. While all of these demands threatened the sanctity of the American national territory and population, they were perfectly consistent with the promise and the ideology of benevolent assimilation. In fact, the American empire-state actively encouraged and participated in Filipinos’

\textsuperscript{291} Anderson. \textit{Imagined Communities}.
\textsuperscript{292} As discussed in earlier sections, unlike the nation-state, which sought to secure the boundaries of the nation and improve the health of the national population, the empire-state produced and operated within a world of shifting borders, of deterritorialization and reterritorialization.
metropolitan incorporation, which was seen by advocates of Filipino migration as a logical domestic extension of the colonial project abroad.

According to advocates of benevolent assimilation, education and training in the colonies could only go so far in producing adequately Americanized colonial subjects. To understand the intricacies of American government, business, and society, Filipino subjects would have to live, learn, and work among their sovereigns, the American people. In order for American businesses whose operations were restricted to the American mainland to reap the benefits of imperial expansion, they would have to employ Filipinos as non-citizen workers.\textsuperscript{293} Within the benevolent assimilation narrative, the exploitation of Filipinos was legitimated as part of the empire-state’s efforts to train Filipinos for entry into the world of modern industry.

In the metropole, government officials, aid agencies, employers, and popular media have reconfigured colonial crises as crises of immigration management. As I have argued, however, they have also adapted colonial practices of bordering, surveillance, and regulation to control immigrant communities. As in France, American regimes of immigration management joined forces with colonial administrative bodies, appropriated colonial bordering practices, and sought to mitigate the boundary-blurring effects of transnational migration through various forms of exclusion and colonial modes of governance. At the same time, they have reproduced transnational, imperial spaces by incorporating immigrants as aliens. Far from an aberration in American history, the control of Filipino immigrants provided models of immigration management that both drew upon older modes of colonial governance and set standards for the colonial regulation of migration into, out of, and within the imperial space of the American metropole. The frameworks constructed to understand and resolve the crises of Filipino immigration merged both with frameworks for understanding and controlling non-white

\textsuperscript{293} In short, the incorporation of Filipino immigrants was a form of internal expansion that operated within the same imperial logic as expansion abroad. As such, it blurred the line separating foreign and domestic policy and re-animated internal bordering practices that maintained boundaries between colonial subjects and citizens. As I have argued, like the colonization of Spain’s possessions at the turn of the century, the recolonization of Filipinos in the American metropole was not an aberration in American history. Rather, it borrowed from older models of foreign and domestic administration and was used as a model for the internal colonization of other immigrant groups.
immigration in general. As I have argued, these contradictory frameworks shaped the imperatives of American global hegemony in the decades that followed.

Like the bracero system discussed in the next section, the Filipino contract system was also touted as a benevolent effort to train Filipino colonial apprentices and send them home as modern subjects. Filipino contracts included provisions for suitable housing for the worker and his family, “water and fuel…free medicine and medical attention and hospitalization,” and training in modern industrial work, sanitation, and hygiene. As in France, the provision of medical care served a dual function. Hospitals were sites of humanitarian aid and sanitation and part of a disciplinary regime that promoted health and hygiene among a migrant population deemed unsanitary and prone to infectious diseases. They were also sites of colonial surveillance and exclusion. As their experience in Hawai‘i and across the West Coast demonstrated, “national” status did not protect Filipinos from threats of discrimination, abuse, and forcible repatriation. If workers were found by on-site doctors to be carrying diseases or in any way unfit for plantation work, general immigration laws required that they would be repatriated to Manila at the expense of the company. The Hawai‘i experience was an early indication that Filipino nationals would not be exempted either from the “medicalized nativism” that threatened other Asian immigrant groups as well as Jews, Italians, and Eastern Europeans, or from the racialized category of immigrant persons “likely to become a public charge.” The medical industries established to aid immigrants and to promote sanitation were situated both within narratives of benevolent assimilation and within a biopolitical discourse that sought to protect the national population from biological (microbial and genetic) contamination.

Politicians articulated racist assurances of the impossibility of Filipino naturalization to assuage the fears of American workforces. The mass migration of Filipinos to the mainland in the subsequent decade may have undercut these assurances by putting Filipino workers into competition with American citizens, but in doing so they

294 Erika Lee
295 See Sparrow. Eric T. Love argues compellingly that imperialists often had to defend their policy prescriptions against staunch racists and racialists, who held imperial expansion in check. This challenges a common misconception that racism per se animated American imperialist expansion. With and against Love, I argue that colonial practices are products of a tension between racist particularism and liberal universalism. It is this tension within empire that makes colonial practices what they are and not something else.
also intensified the bordering practices of government officials and employers in the metropole. Filipinos filled jobs in agriculture, canning, and service industries (hotels, restaurants, etc.) across the West Coast. Most were recruited to do difficult, undesirable manual labor for low wages under conditions that white American citizens would no longer accept. Others found jobs as domestic servants and found themselves in direct competition with black and white American citizen women. As domestic servants and plantation “stoop” laborers who were housed and fed by their paternalist employers, Filipino workers, like African Americans, were prevented from entering the masculine, bourgeois world of independent entrepreneurs. The employment of Filipino men in positions formerly reserved for women and feminized black and brown workers reified gendered divisions of labor along shifting racial lines and maintained a space for the white male patriarch-pioneer. The infantilization of Filipino workers reinforced the Manichean paternalism of the American colonial imaginary. The mission of benevolent assimilation was made safe for the white republic through practices that precluded the movement of colonial apprentices into domains reserved for their white male masters.

Government reports suggest that employers chose Filipino immigrants over American citizens precisely because they were willing to work long hours at a rapid pace under harsh conditions for low wages, and to live in low-cost housing. These are precisely the reasons employers like Citroen and Renault gave for hiring black Africans over both white native French and Algerians. As in France, official reports on labor relations shifted unreflectively from categories of colonial and national origin to broader regional and racial categories and back, reflecting the ways in which racial categories lurked behind legal categories associated with national origins. According to Bruno Lasker’s well-known report on Filipino immigration for the American Council’s Institute of Pacific Relations, it was “the willingness of Oriental workers to put up with rough accommodation of this kind during the few weeks of harvesting the crop [that was] the chief reason for their employment.”²⁹⁶ The advantage of hiring Filipino “Orientals” in

particular was that their “national” status protected employers from the charge of illegal super-exploitation.\textsuperscript{297}

As in the contemporary case of Hormel Foods and the American meatpacking industry, the intensive recruitment of racialized immigrant workers by agricultural producers reflected the structural imperatives of expansion and capitalist competition and the upward mobility of white workers into higher-status occupations on both on farms and in cities. As in Austin today and in France after both World Wars, the dual crises of war and rapid industrial expansion, including the intensification and increased speed of work, resulted in a labor problem that was represented by employers as a labor shortage. In response to nativist complaints and the concerns of white workers, producers argued – in a manner that resembles arguments in contemporary debates on immigration – that Filipinos were occupying positions that American white workers no longer needed and would no longer accept. Furthermore, the relatively stable, privileged position white workers now enjoyed within the national economy was largely a product of the expansion and division of labor enabled by the employment of Filipino workers in temporary seasonal occupations, stop-gap emergency harvesting, stoop labor, and other low-status and low-wage jobs.

So long as workforces remained segregated, these employers argued, Filipinos would pose little threat to white workers’ wages or the integrity of their privileged place in the national economy and the national community. In fact, by occupying the new high-intensity, low-status segment of the new industrial workforce, these workers enabled white workers to take their rightful place among the higher-status supervisor and higher-wage classes. Notwithstanding the gendered goals of development as a project whose aim was the production of modern, independent working men, all necessary measures had to be taken to ensure that Filipinos continued to occupy the position of feminized children in the American developmental scheme. In the context of domestic households, this meant performing domestic chores for white families. In the context of agribusiness, it

\textsuperscript{297} This is similar to the symbolic effect produced by guest-worker programs, including those proposed by Russell Pearce discussed in the opening sections of this chapter. It was the rationale that justified the employment and production practices of employers who participated in the Bracero Program discussed in the next section. My argument here is that the legal and social production of a stratified immigrant class, with sub-classes ranging from legal residents on paths to citizenship, to guest-workers, to illegal aliens is an essential structural component of immigration management. In many ways, this mirrors the divisions of labor in the colony.
meant performing stoop labor work under the paternal supervision of white growers. Any indication that Filipinos might not remain in their assigned socioeconomic space provoked nativist reactions in the form of riots, beatings, and racist campaigns for Filipino exclusion. To minimize the danger of Filipinos’ upward mobility, employers and local government officials (e.g., in public housing) coordinated efforts to ensure that Filipinos’ socioeconomic place corresponded to relatively isolated geographic spaces in the metropole. Nativist forces aided this effort by intimidating Filipinos, forcing them into segregated housing where they could be more easily monitored, and discouraging social interactions with whites. So long as nativist campaigns were held in check and not allowed to boil over into successful campaigns for mass deportations, their activity performed an exclusion function for employers and the nation-state. At the same time, employers and government officials could distance themselves from these activities and maintain their status as legitimate actors whose role was to increase productivity while maintaining law and order and simultaneously modernizing immigrant workers.

As Alidio and Linda España-Maram have shown, apart from their privileged status in the American economy, white male workers were concerned about their social authority within American patriarchy. Of particular concern was the miscegenation threat posed by male Filipino workers. Lasker summarizes the advantages of the new division of labor from the perspective of lettuce growers on the West Coast:

It is contended by some employers that the extension of lettuce growing, made possible by Filipino labor, has greatly increased the employment opportunities in the valley for white labor. For some time it was conceded by public opinion that a packer, when short of labor, might in an emergency employ Filipino gangs in the packing houses at night work. The community, in other words, was not so much concerned in barring the Filipino from this additional source of revenue as it was from preventing his working with American workers – particularly with women and girls…Briefly, then, Filipino workers can be said to be in competition with white workers on a considerable scale only when it is assumed that an offer of higher wages on the part of the growers would attract white labor. In that sense, the Filipinos, as other foreign workers before them and now, are undercutting wages. But it is far more correct to say that the white and other resident foreign groups have been able to raise their standards of wages and, while theoretically available for farm labor, are not willing to do work on the land under the present
conditions of forced speed which continue so long as any source of available “cheap” labor remains.\textsuperscript{298}

Lasker’s account demonstrates how, despite their “national” status, Filipinos were often identified with “other foreign workers” as non-white and therefore undeserving of the privileges of Euro-American citizenship. Framed in these terms, the employment of Filipinos in low-status sectors of the economy ran against the grain of the American colonial imaginary and of American liberal universalism. Filipinos' legal status as “nationals” allowed employers to remain agnostic as to their assimilability and to justify their segregation on the grounds that they were still colonial subjects and, within the civilizing mission’s developmental scheme, not assimilated yet. The exploitation of Filipinos could therefore be justified as an experiment that would test the assimilability of Filipinos on behalf of the American empire-state and under the banner of civilization. At the same time, their segregation could be justified as a means of protecting white workers from the corrupting threats of a still-inferior, yet-to-be-civilized race.

The structural segregation of workforces combined with the legal and social obstacles to assimilation discussed in Chapters 2 and 4 fixed the outcome of this experiment in advance. Internal expansion followed a familiar pattern, evident in the segregation and working conditions of North Africans in France. Poor working conditions and over-crowded, poorly ventilated housing produced conditions for the spread of ailments like tuberculosis which fed suspicions that Filipinos were biologically predisposed to carry infectious disease and thus were a biological threat to the national population.\textsuperscript{299} Poor sanitation in work camps, actually due to employers’ cost-cutting measures and migrant laborers unsettled existence, was blamed on Filipinos’ unsanitary behavior. Seasonal labor required frequent migration from plantation to plantation, a necessarily nomadic lifestyle that made the kind of settlement associated with proper Euro-American settlement impossible. The long hours of work necessary to eke out a living made attendance at school difficult, if not impossible, for the vast majority of Filipino immigrants, although many came to the United States with the hope of earning a

\textsuperscript{298} Lasker, 1931. 49. Also see Hearings before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on H.R. 8708, May 7, 1930. 210-213. 
\textsuperscript{299} Lasker, 1931.
college or professional degree. The intensive recruitment of young male workers aroused fears of sexual threats to white women, and thus to white male virility and authority. As Alidio, España-Maram, and others have illustrated, many Filipino men sought female companionship with white women, for instance, at dance halls and social clubs. As several historians of Filipino migration have noted, this, combined with rumors that Filipinos patronized prostitutes and engaged in homosexual behavior, also fed racist stereotypes of Filipino men as promiscuous sexual deviants.300

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, when oppression and abuse provoked Filipino protests and rebellion, including militant demands both for full inclusion in the U.S. polity and for Filipino independence, these uprisings were attributed to Filipinos’ proclivities for violence and general unruliness. All of these anxieties reflected colonial attitudes towards Filipinos and other non-white immigrant groups in addition to African and Native Americans. They animated both the civilizing mission and efforts to block assimilation, including the anti-miscegenation laws discussed in the previous chapter and the local policing of racial boundaries through beatings, burnings, and riots.

Social scientists and politicians debated the relative extent to which Filipinos’ general failure to assimilate was due to innate inferiority or to legal and environmental factors. Staunch exclusionists argued that Filipinos were members of the same “Mongoloid” race as the Chinese and should be deported for the same reasons that the Chinese were excluded. As Lasker suggests, however, eugenicists who were advocates of Filipino independence had to strike a delicate balance. If they argued too strongly in favor of repatriation on the basis of racial inferiority, they would undermine arguments for Philippine independence, which rested on the notion that Filipinos were advanced enough to govern themselves and to ward off the corrupting influences of foreign European powers, communists, and the Chinese. “Moderate” conclusions to racial questions of assimilability, such as that offered by Lasker, rejected alarmist notions of biological and cultural contamination in favor of an apparently immigrant-friendly view. Lasker’s report, which was commissioned by a government agency to respond to the growing Filipino exclusion movement, downplayed alarmist nativism and emphasized the

contributions of Filipino workers and the impressive progress they had made despite enormous social and economic obstacles. Lasker devotes several chapters to the processes and circuits through which Filipinos were recruited, exploited, segregated from American citizens, and subject to abuse. At the same time, Lasker feels compelled as a serious social scientist to acknowledge innate racial and cultural differences that set Filipinos apart and that justified the maintenance of racial boundaries.

Like other government-sponsored academic accounts of non-white immigration from the 1920s and 1930s, Lasker’s report reflects a constitutive tension of American empire and an underlying source of colonial ambivalence. Like other Asian, African, and Latin American groups, these reports represented Filipinos as both undesirable and highly desirable, over-exploited and well-suited to be included among the exploited classes necessary for the expansion of American industry and empire, at once as unassimilable, impressively assimilable, needing further assimilation, and overly assimilated. Filipino immigrants were a threat because they challenged racial conceptions of national identity and difference and jeopardized the privileged structural position of white men in American society and the national political economy. As Lasker points out, and as his equivocations on the question of assimilability reflect, it was not difference per se that posed a threat, but rather Filipinos’ impressive ability to overcome formidable obstacles and to enter the public sphere as political actors that could make demands on the state as quasi-members of the nation. To the extent that benevolent assimilation encouraged and facilitated their efforts to realize a version of the American dream, its risks outweighed its benefits. This was most apparent in the success of those Filipinos who took advantage of educational opportunities in the United States. Like Filipino soldiers in the American military, these subjects discredited racialist assumptions and de-legitimized the legal and social obstacles that blocked their path to citizenship. Notwithstanding his own racialist framework, Lasker instructively concedes that:

In public resolutions, the Filipino is often described as unassimilable; but what is meant evidently is that his assimilation is considered undesirable. For, speaking the English language, predisposed by his schooling in the Philippine Islands for a love of America and all its traditions and customs, anxious to acquire the skills and knowledge which America has to offer and to mix socially with Americans, the more educated Filipino is, if anything, too assimilable to accept the limitations imposed on him by public opinion; and the problem
which he creates is not that of a stranger who cannot be Americanized, but rather that of a would-be American who refuses to remain a stranger.\textsuperscript{301}

Like reports made by colonial officials, Lasker’s sympathetic analysis de-politicizes Filipinos at the same time as it raises the specter of their assimilability. In Will Kymlicka’s terms, Filipinos are represented here as a national minority who want nothing more than full inclusion within American society, and who may very well be capable of achieving a certain degree of equality despite their racial, cultural, and moral deficiencies. Credit for Filipino progress is attributed to the success of the civilizing mission and the participation of Filipinos in that mission. Political demands and complex, transnational cultural formations are elided or analyzed as symptoms of regression. I will return to these demands and the politics of Filipino resistance in Chapters 4 and 5. Here, I will continue to focus on the ambivalence and de-politicizing effects of colonial practices and narratives in the metropole, particularly as they are manifested in schools, aid agencies, and immigrant Welcome Centers.

If the U.S. recolonization of colonial subjects in the metropole was exceptional, its exceptionality was in the extent to which it delegated both aid and surveillance responsibilities to local agencies, private organizations and companies, and non-profits. In addition to performing its boundary-drawing and exclusion functions, the Bureau of Insular Affairs worked with aid organizations to improve the living and working conditions, health, hygiene, and well-being of colonial subjects. In addition to the BIA, organizations that supported Filipinos included the YMCA, the International Institute, various Filipino clubs and social networks that were supervised both by American citizen officials and Filipino elites, as well as employers and their contracted recruiters. All of these organizations represented themselves as benevolent torchbearers of American empire. Like Citroen, Renault, and agricultural producers in France, businesses legitimated their exploitation of Filipino workers by providing housing in labor camps, adequate board, and wages appropriate for the apprentice status of colonial subjects. The YMCA and International Institute, in consultation with social scientists and government

\textsuperscript{301} Bruno Lasker, and Institute of Pacific Relations. American Council. \textit{Filipino Immigration to Continental United States and to Hawaii}. (Chicago, Ill.: Pub. for the American council, Institute of Pacific relations, 1931), 445.
officials in the BIA and elsewhere, intervened on behalf of Filipino colonials when their living and working conditions proved inadequate or inhumane, when they were cheated out of earned wages, or when they were subjected to racist abuse either by employers or by members of local communities. In addition, these and other organizations functioned as forces of “Americanization,” furthering the development process that began, and according to the official discourse would end, in the colony.

The case of the International Institute is instructive and helps to draw parallels linking practices of recolonization in France and the United States. The first International Institute was established in 1914 as an immigrant welfare department of the national board of YWCAs. Like the French Welcome Centers, the International Institute legitimated itself as a “nonsectarian, nonpolitical chain of community agencies working with all nationalities for their successful integration into American life and loyalties.” Its goal was to “befriend newcomers from foreign countries, guide them while strangers, and help them find the opportunity for maximum personal development which made and keeps America Free and Great.” To do this, the Institute would, in a “non-political” way, “cooperate with governmental and intergovernmental agencies; share international planning with voluntary agencies; assist local communities to draw nationality groups into understanding and cooperation, and to establish needed services.” As one might expect, given the fact that YWCAs and YMCAs operated in similar ways in France and in Europe more generally, as well as in European colonies, the services offered by the Institute mirrored those of the YMCAs and Centres d’Accueil in the French metropole.

The institute’s function in the 1920s and 1930s, within the project of benevolent assimilation, was to Americanize new immigrants, a multifaceted task that entailed, among other programs, English language instruction, job training, basic education in American immigration laws and policies, and intensive acculturation to instill knowledge about American history, law, culture, and values. The various local chapters of the Institute were staffed by trained teachers, administrators, and lawyers, and they made extensive use of professional volunteers to provide wide ranging services to a variety of immigrant communities. In keeping with the Institute’s status as an apolitical organization, supervisors policed the discourse of beneficiaries to ensure that political

---

agendas were left at the proverbial door. As in French Welcome Centers, the main concern of Institute officials and supervisors was the encroachment into these apolitical spaces of labor organizing and anti-colonial influences as well as political opposition to discriminatory immigration policies and practices. International Institute meeting minutes and reports document how Filipino nationalism and unionism was carefully filtered through narratives of development and American-style cosmopolitanism. Youth groups sponsored by the Institute participated in festivals that celebrated cultural diversity and that showcased American openmess and the success of its projects of cosmopolitan Americanization.303

Quasi-religious organizations like the Institute’s founder and parent, the YMCA, also promoted anti-political American cosmopolitanism. In the first decade of the 20th century, the YMCA had chapters throughout the American empire. It established its first branch in the Philippines in 1908 and went on to establish what Alidio aptly calls “an umbrella organization” for Filipino students in the United States. The links between the Filipino YMCAs in the Philippines and the U.S. produced a transnational space in which Filipino students and migrants gathered and formed transnational bonds. Local branches in cities like Chicago and San Francisco held events to celebrate American history and diversity, including the ongoing development of the Philippines. As Alidio notes, these events would have been familiar to Filipino students who were required to attend similar functions at American public schools in the Philippines. One effect of this transpacific network of organizations was the formation of transnational and intra-national communities and of different Filipino political and cultural groups. Like worksites, YMCAs facilitated the production of Filipino national solidarity across regional ethnic and linguistic identity-lines (many learned and spoke Tagalog at the YMCAs and social clubs and at the workplace so they could communicate with fellow immigrants). Filipinos often transformed these networks into political associations where political grievances could be aired and concerted political actions planned.

303 In some respects, these festivals can be read as local versions of the European and Euro-American “world exhibitions” that were designed to showcase exotic peoples and places and the achievements of European and Euro-American imperialism. Need more on this connection from All the World’s a Fair and Zoological relations.
The YMCA took pains to channel political energies in apolitical directions by representing Filipinos as proper American subjects and suppressing their efforts to represent themselves. The dual specters of communism and anti-colonial Filipino nationalism intensified concerns about Filipino’s commitment to self-modernization on American terms. At YMCA festivals and events, “Filipino bodies were to be arranged in the following ways: seated next to students from other nations, adorned with lapel pins of American heroes, or featured as ‘native’ entertainment.” Under no circumstances was this celebration of national identity to be expressed in terms of political nationalism, opposition to American policies, labor activism, or “political” speech of any kind. Alidio’s research illustrates that when “Indian, Korean, and Filipino students…violate[d] the code of apolitical, cosmopolitan exchanges,” they were scolded and told that “only through moral and intellectual development would they truly contribute to the nationalist cause.” According to a supervisor from the YMCA’s Committee on Friendly Relations among Foreign Students, Indians’ and Filipinos’ “‘active propaganda’ for national independence frequently had interfered ‘with their acceptability as guests and speakers.’” Replicating official government and military versions of American Imperialist discourses, Filipino colonials were grouped together with other European colonial subjects as dangerously impressionable political children. Alidio’s interpretation sheds light on the underlying concerns and conflicting objectives of the YMCA mission:

The committee’s censure of Asian nationalist politics suggests the ambivalence of the cosmopolitan vision. Attempting to separate what was political from other modes of pro-nationalist student activity, the CONFRAS revealed its own political agenda to foster U.S. global hegemony and to draw [through] education people all over the world away from the lure of communism.

Of course, to the extent that organizations like the International Institute and the YMCA had to operate within a racially stratified, colonial context, they could not live up to the colorblind principles expressed in their mission statements. They could not, for instance, encourage Filipino and other non-white immigrants to strive for American citizenship as they could Western European immigrants. Among other things, to do so

---

304 Even this level of integration was deemed unacceptable by some members of the women’s auxiliary, as young Filipino men would be seated in close proximity to white women and girls.
305 IHRC. International Institute of Minnesota. Box 2 [check]
would be to defy the government authorities on whom the Institute depended for institutional and financial support and with whom its leaders worked to improve the basic living conditions of colonial nationals and aliens. Moreover, in their efforts to help Filipinos find jobs and housing, the Institute and other similar organizations could not defy the will of employers who sought Filipino workers precisely because of their colonial status and their willingness to work under harsh conditions and poor, low-cost housing without complaint. In fact, like the national and colonial Ministries in France, they facilitated the recruitment efforts of businesses and of individual families looking for domestic workers. The most they could do on behalf of Filipino rights was to publish reports, write letters, and relay grievances on behalf of individuals to the Bureau of Insular Affairs and the Department of Labor when cost-cutting measures led to egregious forms of exploitation and abuse. Regardless of the intentions of their leaders and staff, American aid organizations were forced to participate in colonial practices of segregation at the same time as they attempted to “Americanize” their constituents.

Archival material on the YMCA and International Institute indicates a deep-seated ambivalence with respect to the treatment of Filipinos stemming both from legal and social constraints and from the prejudices and conceptual frameworks of organization staff. Although the YMCA participated in efforts to assimilate Filipinos, many if not most of their events were racially segregated. The International Institute established English language and acculturation classes and youth groups exclusively for Filipinos. Isolating Filipinos, Mexicans, Chinese, and other non-white “new immigrants” was justified as a means of giving them specialized services and protecting them from the racial prejudice of the larger community. It was also designed to further the racial development of these groups as called for in the civilizing mission, to help place them in low-status industrial and agricultural jobs, and to monitor and supervise them on behalf of the government and of local communities.

The surveillance function of these organizations became clearer at moments when the national economy was in crisis and the wages and status of white workers was in serious jeopardy. Like the granting of independence to French colonies, the passing of

---

306 IHRC
307 IHRC
308 Alidio et. al.
the Tydings-McDuffie Act, officially known as the Philippine Independence Act, abruptly changed the status of Filipinos from “nationals” to “aliens,” removing most of the protections they enjoyed as colonial subjects. Exemplifying the contradictions of American colonial policy, the same Act begins with a set of “mandatory provisions” for Philippine subordination to U.S. rule to be included in the Philippine constitution. The first two provisions stated that “1) all citizens of the Philippine Islands shall owe allegiance to the United States and 2) Every officer of the government of the Philippine Islands shall, before entering upon discharge of his duties, take and subscribe an oath of office, declaring…that he accepts the supreme authority of and will maintain true faith and allegiance to the United States.” As in France, then, Filipino government officers were enlisted to support new efforts of the empire-state to monitor Filipino migrants and to “repatriate” them to their subordinate-but-soon-to-be-“independent” nation of origin when times got tough on the mainland.

As the Bureau of Insular Affairs lost its official functions as a colonial agency in the metropole, it transferred its surveillance and exclusion functions to local and federal agencies of immigration management, labor, and national security including the Office of the American High Commission in Manila, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Department Of Labor, and, like in France, the Department of the Interior. As mentioned above, since Philippine independence had not yet been granted, Filipinos found themselves represented in legal discourse as aliens who still owed full allegiance to the United States. In a legal limbo, and within the jurisdiction of multiple agencies at once, Filipinos found they could no longer appeal to their colonial protectors for anything resembling reliable assistance or protection. Individual Filipinos entered a Kafka-esque world of perpetual vulnerability to the state and by extension to employers, American citizens who were government- and self-appointed agents of surveillance, and to their own government-in-training. Launched from a colonial condition of official subordination into a neo-colonial condition of informal subordination and deferred independence without national sovereignty, Filipinos were quite literally stateless.

Uncertain about their status and their fate, many Filipinos recalled the American government’s responsibilities as benevolent colonizers. Some of these colonials had integrated themselves into local communities, earned professional and even government
jobs, and saw themselves both as Americans and as colonial subjects. In the period between the passing of Tydings-McDuffie and the declaration of Philippine independence, called the “Commonwealth” period, the BIA’s colonial roles were transferred to the Office of the American High Commissioner in Manila. Many Filipino immigrants were not informed of this development, and even government officials seemed confused as to its implications for specific individuals and groups. One public sector employee expressed his frustration with the government’s ambivalence and inconsistency as follows:

Since the Filipinos fall under the jurisdiction of this Bureau and since there are many of us not fully inform[ed] as to the status of Filipinos specially in reference to the bill in Congress prohibiting the employment of an alien and the fact that the Philippine government is under the American flag...what is the legal status of the Filipinos? Are the Filipinos aliens to this country?  

The Bureau responded to letters from Filipino immigrants with copies of new legislation and often referred their cases to the federal agency. As Alidio notes, the go-to agency for matters of internal colonialism during and after the Depression was not the Bureau of Insular Affairs, but the federal agency responsible for the surveillance and regulation of all immigrants, namely, the INS. The INS took over and transformed the BIA’s colonial responsibilities and gradually reconfigured its jurisdiction to regulate colonial subjects who had lost their “national status” and thus become aliens (see below). Uncertain about what office, if any, was now responsible for their welfare, Filipinos used to being treated as dependents with certain protections demanded to know their status and whether or not they retained any rights or benefits as subjects after Tydings-McDuffie. Alidio quotes one civil servant who powerfully contrasts the ideology of the civilizing mission with the reality of his concrete experience as a veteran U.S. postal worker from the American Commonwealth of the Philippines:

As a white man’s burden and pending the induction of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, I, as a citizen of the PI and owe allegiance to the sovereignty of the U.S., am resident of the U.S. for the last thirteen years and due to my long absence I am entirely ignorant [of] the economic conditions over there [in the Philippines]. Will you, as supreme ruler of this wonderful Republic, kindly advise me what will be the real status of the Filipinos, who, in the eyes of

---

Quoted in Alidio
immigration and naturalization laws, [are] not citizen[s] of the U.S., [but] are holding federal jobs through civil service examinations? 

It does not take a great interpretive leap to suggest, as Alidio does, that the author of this letter meant to parody the roles assigned by the civilizing mission. It may also be possible that he wanted genuinely and poignantly to call the U.S. President and his government to account for breaches of written and unwritten contracts with colonial subjects. Regardless of his intentions, the author sheds light on the absurdity of the government’s inconsistent treatment of Filipinos from the standpoint of the civilizing mission and American exceptionalism as well as from the perspective of Filipino subjects who had moved into the American middle and professional classes. If Filipinos were excelling against all odds in the Anglo-American world on Anglo-American terms (passing civil service exams, entering the American middle class, etc.), wasn’t this an indication that they were adequately assimilated and, thus, assimilable? Here, the naked force of exclusion is laid bare. In cases where Filipinos could prove assimilability, what was the substantive content of the justification for exclusion based on national origins? This letter and others like it demonstrate an awareness of the empire-state’s ambivalence and uncertainty regarding its colonial missions. It neither calls for Philippine independence nor paths to citizenship for Filipino immigrants, but rather holds up a mirror to show the profound contradictions of American policy and practice. The author seems to ask, in a tone both mocking and deadly serious, “Do you know what you want?” and, “Why can’t you make up your minds about us?”

Although Tydings-McDuffie did not officially ban the hiring of Filipinos to do civil service jobs or sit for civil service examinations, it also did not prohibit public sector officials or employers in any industry from firing Filipinos first when there was a downturn in the economy. As historians of Filipino history have shown, Filipinos were often the first to be fired when the Great Depression hit, leaving them vulnerable as aliens who were “likely to become a public charge.” When Filipinos were fired, they became vulnerable to the INS and other agencies of surveillance and control. Furthermore, out-of-work and itinerant Filipino workers became vulnerable to all the mechanisms of the

---

310 Alidio, 213.
surveillance state, including the aid agencies and forces of incorporation that had been their colonial protectors and tutors in both the metropole and the colony.

During the Great Depression, when the government was actively repatriating Asian and Latin American workers on behalf of the American citizen workforce, Filipinos turned to the International Institute for assistance. Letters to and from the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the Institute’s archival documents indicate that aid organizations were often tasked with the project of monitoring Filipinos who had been placed on repatriation and deportation blacklists and “paroled” to the International Institute. In one 1936 exchange, the San Francisco District Director of the INS at Angel Island, Edward Haff, wrote several letters to the Executive Secretary of the San Francisco branch of the Institute, Annie Clo Watson, demanding information about Filipino subjects. A letter written June of 1937 gives an impression of the expectations these government agencies had of aid organizations:

With reference to the application of Roberto Visitación (Filipino)...paroled to the International Institute, San Francisco on September 13, 1934, you are informed that the excluding decision of the last mentioned date was affirmed on May 28, 1937 by the Secretary of Labor, Washington, D.C. This Office would request the surrender of the alien at the present time in order that he may be deported on the first available sailing of the line which brought him to this country, at the expense of the line.\footnote{IHRC. International Institute Records. Box}

This type of letter is telling in its strong identification of Filipinos as aliens rather than colonials or nationals. Throughout the 1930s and continuing through the Second World War, government agencies worked actively with apprentice Filipino government officials to re-ascribe non-white alien status on Filipino subjects who had formerly been identified as colonial nationals. This collaboration bears affinity to the negotiations with Japanese officials that led to the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” that enlisted the support of Japanese officials in the exclusion of formerly legal Japanese immigrants to the American mainland.\footnote{IHRC. International Institute Records. Box} During this period, like North Africans under the jurisdiction of the French empire-state, Filipinos fell under multiple jurisdictions at the same time and were identified with different legal categories by different agencies and often by the same agencies. Moreover, these categories shifted so often that it was difficult for agencies...
and aid organizations to know how to treat various categories of new immigrants, particularly those that were identified as “non-white.” In letters that resemble French inter-Ministry correspondence as well as contemporary calls for “comprehensive immigration reform” on the part of immigrant rights organizations, the International Institute expressed frustration about the lack of clarity and consistency in federal and local interpretations of new legislation. These letters also conveyed an uneasiness about the surveillance role of what was supposed to be an advocacy organization.\(^\text{313}\)

A 1934 case illustrates this tension within and among government and non-governmental organizations. The case involves a group of 73 young Filipino men who were among the thousands the INS was trying to deport to Manila. The letters indicate a close working relationship among the INS, aid agencies, and the Department of Labor. Watson responded to the initial stern request for information about these Filipinos with characteristic deference:

> The problem of 73 Filipino boys…was brought to our attention today. We are willing to have them paroled to the care of the International Institute until the Department of Labor makes a permanent decision in regard to their status…we are glad to be of service to the immigration officials and will do the best we can… and we shall keep you regularly informed of any changes which we are able to discover.

Internally, the Institute scrambled to find the young men, who had disappeared into the California countryside. Some expressed frustration both regarding the Institute’s lack of sufficient surveillance capacities and regarding the role the government was demanding the Institute play in the surveillance of a community they were established to protect and defend. Nonetheless, the Institute dutifully searched for these subjects on behalf of their government sponsors. In a letter to the founder of the National Institute of Immigrant Welfare, Watson explained that:

> On last Tuesday the entire parole responsibility of the International Institute for the group of [73] boys who arrived in May 1934 was reviewed by the board of directors. As you know, as soon as they were released the boys scattered to all parts of California, particularly to rural districts, and also to other parts of the United States. Each one carried with him an addressed postal card on which he

---

\(^{313}\) At times this ambivalence was expressed as harsh criticism of government departments and agencies for their lack of standard procedures. After the Second World War, the agencies joined immigrant rights coalitions and became more vocally supportive of the immigrants they served.
was to notify us of any change in his address. Complete explanation of the plan, in several dialects, was made by our Filipino worker. Some of the cards were returned indicating considerable mobility, a situation common to seasonal agriculture. As soon as advice was received from your office that permission to enter the United States permanently was denied, we issued immediately a letter to that effect. Instructions were given that voluntary departure would be expected within a time limit, after which they would be liable to deportation. Articles containing this information were published in the principal Filipino newspapers in San Francisco, Stockton and Salinas. Announcements were made in Filipino groups. The response to this effort was, as you know, very limited. Within a period of time, another general letter was sent out emphasizing the necessity of reporting to the immigration authorities at Angel Island. A considerable number of the letters were returned unclaimed and your office was notified in each case. Also, you were advised of inquiries from individuals which offered pertinent information. Altogether three general letters were sent out to the entire group. We have made every effort to bring about compliance with the orders of the Department of Labor and we still stand ready to be of any service within our power. However, we are making this summary report of our activity because there seems to be nothing more we can do at this time and we believe that only the full application of the law by the department of Labor will accomplish the return of the boys to the Philippines. 

This letter is exemplary of communications between aid organizations and the government and is instructive for a number of reasons. First, it indicates a concerted effort to help the government deport large segments of the Institute’s beneficiaries. To the extent that workers cooperated with the Institute, the YMCA, and other similar organizations as well as the Departments of Labor, the INS, and the Bureau of Insular Affairs, they were vulnerable to its mechanisms of surveillance and exclusion. Second, it indicates how the Institute attempted to mobilize a complex surveillance network that included Filipino community groups as well as local newspapers and depended on Filipinos reporting on their compatriots. At moments of perceived crisis, aid organizations, which were always on the verge of recognizing transnational political subjects, were re-oriented to perform their biopolitical role as anti-political protectors of the nation-state. Third, it demonstrates the difficulty of colonial surveillance in the metropole of a mobile population that could blend into local communities and make use of local, national, and transnational networks of support.

314 IHRC. International Institute. Box.
I discuss these networks and transnational and intra-national communities in Chapters 4 and 5. Here, it will suffice to suggest that, like North Africans in France, Filipinos developed transnational and intra-national support networks that were relatively independent from the state and that undermined efforts to monitor their social, sexual, labor, and political activity, segregate them from the general population, and control them as apolitical alien-subjects. These organizations often doubled as political networks promoting Filipino and workers’ rights, as formal and informal labor unions, and as coalitions fighting for Filipino national independence. It is important to recognize that these networks were partly a product of the expansionist policies of the empire-state, including the internal expansion promoted by large and small employers and carried out through the recruitment and employment practices of expanding agricultural industries, families entering the emerging white professional classes, and aid agencies devoted to the well-being of immigrants.

Despite working as seasonal, migrant labor and during the day as domestic labor, a significant minority of Filipino immigrants who had not been handpicked by the American government worked their way through college and joined the ranks of the colonial elite. Refusing inferior, colonial status, many struck for wages equal to those of their white citizen counterparts. White American workers and policymakers expressed fear and anger over potential wage depression caused by employers’ access to cheap Filipino labor by attacking Filipinos themselves. Nativist anxieties were exacerbated both by the mass recruitment of male Filipino workers and by the provision of special social services to these workers. Colonial borders were thus maintained by a combination of official policies of segregation implemented by law enforcement and corporations, by violent working class nativism, and by racial obstacles to social mobility.

Like debates over African immigrants in France, debates in the U.S. focused on the racial and ethnic distinctiveness of immigrants from Asia and Latin America, the specific threats these immigrants posed to the privileges of American citizenship and ways of life, and the relative desirability of various racially distinct groups of Asian and

---

315 I treat these dynamics in more depth in Chapter 4.
Latin American workers. Employers took advantage of the general anti-Asian animus in a variety of ways. In the face of economic and racial anxieties provoked by the mass recruitment of colonial subjects, employers became the immigrants’ protectors. In a pattern that began in the American context with slavery and indentured servitude, and that continues in practices of recruitment and exploitation today, the exploiters of Filipino colonial subjects in the metropole became their benevolent assimilators and protectors as well.

The special rights that had been granted to Filipino workers prior to Tydings-McDuffie gave them advantages over their Japanese and Chinese predecessors. Accepting wages below the average wages paid by agricultural producers to Euro-Americans, Filipinos were granted agricultural jobs formerly occupied by Japanese immigrants and whites. Agribusiness companies actively recruited Filipino workers in order to lower production costs and to undermine labor solidarity. At the same time, racial discrimination in the housing market forced Filipinos into ghettoized, overcrowded, low-cost housing where, like African immigrants in France, they could be easily monitored and controlled. Immigrant-phobic organizations attributed Filipino ghettos, overcrowding, and poor living conditions to Filipinos fundamental racial inferiority and inability to assimilate. Popular and official debates about Filipino immigrants represented them as threats to sanitation and hygiene as well as to wages and Euro-American standards of living. In addition, popular stereotypes represented Filipinos as promiscuous sexual deviants who regularly patronized prostitutes and threatened the virtues and respectability of white women. Policing the boundaries of white privilege, anti-immigrant vigilante groups frequently attacked Filipino worksites and ghettos.

As in France, narratives of benevolent assimilation were constructed within this context of ideological and coercive exclusion. State actors, experts, and corporations intervened ostensibly to help modernize Filipino immigrants and help them adapt to western standards of cleanliness and health. As in the Philippines, where unhygienic

---

316 Many official discussions focused on the extent to which different populations from Asia belonged to the “Mongolian” race. In both France and the United States, Eugenics and cultural conceptions of race provided epistemic frameworks that shaped the terms and parameters of debates over immigration.

317 Ngai, 2004. 100-105
practices were blamed for high infant mortality rates and high rates of disease. American officials sought to discipline Filipino subjects in the metropole. Influenced by French practices of sanitation, American officials associated the teaching of hygienic practices, notably the habitual use of soap, with the white man’s burden. Enlisting the services of doctors and dentists, officials subjected Filipinos to intensive screenings for contagious diseases such as tuberculosis and venereal disease. Like Algerians, surveillance of Filipino immigrants was accomplished through special bureaucratic apparatuses of medical and social services. The policing of these communities was facilitated by their ghettoization in work camps and racially segregated, low-income housing. Nearly all of the mechanisms of benevolent assimilation, then, doubled as mechanisms of social control, surveillance, and exclusion.

As in France, the classification schemes of American politicians and immigration officials conflicted, slipped, and shifted, producing new boundaries between some workforces while simultaneously blurring others. As Ngai suggests, the “perception” of widespread job competition was, in fact, fueled by a “longstanding racial animus towards Asiatics.” As discussed in the preceding chapter, Filipinos were initially recruited in part to replace Chinese and Japanese workers who were restricted by the Chinese Exclusion Act and the Japanese-American Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907 respectively. Both of these policies were in part responses to general anti-Asian nativism in California and the American South. Like other immigrant-phobic policies of exclusion, all of these policies were constructed within the context of the ongoing segregation and subordination of Africa Americans, and all were integrated into a white/non-white racial cartography. Although Filipinos were granted some privileges as officially recognized colonial subjects and wards of the state, they were systematically denied the privileges of whiteness.

The few privileges that Filipino immigrants enjoyed as American nationals were wiped out in the negotiations that led to Philippine independence in 1946. The Philippine Independence Act of 1934 demanded the allegiance of citizens of the new

---

Commonwealth while at the same time defining Filipino immigrants as aliens. During the period of decolonization in the 1930s, U.S. officials engaged in a systematic campaign to repatriate Filipino subjects to their homeland. The annual quota of 50 Filipino immigrants per year was only slightly higher than for other “Asiatics” from China and Japan. The same justifications used to exclude the Chinese in the Exclusion Acts and other non-European-whites in the quota laws were now deployed to exclude these ostensibly American nationals. At the same time, an array of colonial tropes was used to gloss the mass deportation of Filipinos. Farm workers were issued certificates of achievement that, it was argued, would give them a special status as elite, westernized civilizers in their newly independent, but still woefully undeveloped country.

Segregated training courses in the American metropole thus functioned in precisely the same way as training courses in the colony. Combined with ghettoized housing and work camps, schoolhouses maintained boundaries that might otherwise be dismantled by labor organization and the demands of immigrants for equal rights. As in the French empire, formal and informal mechanisms of racial segregation enabled both the surveillance and deportation of colonial subjects in the metropole and the representation of their subjection as an imperative of benevolent assimilation.

If social scientific accounts of immigration policy and practice in the U.S. consider the Filipino case at all, they generally treat it as a peculiar aberration in American history. Postcolonial historians like Ngai and Alfred McCoy have made significant inroads by unearthing the colonial foundations of population management in the United States. As I hope the preceding section begins to demonstrate, many of constitutive features of American immigration discourse today bear a conspicuous resemblance to discourse surrounding Filipino immigrants in the 1930s. Although today’s post-racial legal-economic discourse effectively camouflages ethno-racial hierarchies as apolitical matters of law, order, and economic necessity, the discursive connection to America’s colonial moment are evident in the extensive economic recruitment and incorporation, and equally extensive political exclusion, of Asian and Latin American workers.

The “benevolent assimilation” of Filipino and Mexican immigrants gives an indication both of the productivity and of the impotence of colonial regimes of
immigration management. Ultimately, the borders separating Filipinos from Euro-American citizens could not be adequately maintained without re-establishing a physical distance between the two populations. The alienization and repatriation of Filipinos was an anti-political response to what had become an open political question. Integrating themselves into the Euro-American political community and partway into the Euro-American polity, Filipino immigrants had articulated a transnational subjectivity that challenged both the nation-state as a political unit and the colonial division of European and non-European peoples.

_Emergency, Exception, and Recolonization: The Wartime and Postwar production of Mexican Braceros as Colonial Subjects_

The International Institute also performed the educational and training functions performed by growers in the Southwest. Together with YWCAs, the International Institute promoted the Americanization of Mexican workers by running language, culture, and citizenship training programs. As with Filipino immigrants, the International Institute also celebrated the Mexican presence as a symbol of American multiculturalism. In keeping with the Institute’s “non-political” Americanization and educational objectives, Institute studies identified the education of and care for Mexican youth from families of migrant workers as the greatest challenge facing those responsible for the incorporation of Mexican workers. The International Institute’s Education Director supervised classes in English and Citizenship at a “Neighborhood House” for Mexican youth and adults. The accounts of teachers’ efforts to reform and modernize these students resemble accounts of teachers working in the Philippines during the same period. Institute schools taught nutrition and hygiene. Teachers debated the extent to which Mexican youth could assimilate to Western norms and standards. Some teachers found most Mexican children “respectful, amenable to discipline, and cooperative,” while others expressed concerns about bad parenting manifested in children’s poor hygiene, attitudes, and eating habits.  

Many Institute reports recognized the structural demand for migrant workers and the ways in which these demands impeded Mexicans’ progress towards assimilation and

---

IHRC International Institute Files.
Americanization by preventing the Institute from performing its development functions. Reports complained that students making good progress in schools had to leave every harvest season and thus would fall far behind their classmates. Others highlighted the rampant discrimination faced by Mexicans in employment and housing and the impact this had on Mexican families. Discussing the difficulty Mexican men faced in finding employment during the winter months, several reports offered “apolitical” solutions in full conformity with gendered, racial divisions of labor.

Of the 208 schedules taken, 136 family heads are regularly employed in the beet fields. They would like to find work in industries in the winter but only 16 have found any work in the packing plants this winter. These are in addition to the 30 who consider working in the packing plant as their regular employment and do not go to the beet fields. 9 heads of families who do not migrate are employed by railroads and 13 claim other miscellaneous employment, including 3 who describe their occupation as living off the city dump. Because of race prejudice the question of the employment future of the Mexican young people is a serious one. The international institute has an idea based on the experience of some committee members that the young women would make good domestic servants—the one occupation not overcrowded—and has plans to train a small group of girls for this work as an experiment.  

As part of its development and modernization efforts, the Institute played an integral role in preparing Mexican workers for work in low-status sectors of the economy. In addition to connecting itinerant workers with employers, the International Institute called on the State Employment Service to place Mexican workers with sugar beet, canning, and meatpacking companies, and then monitor these companies in order to ensure their year-round employment and protect them from discrimination and abuse. At the same time, International Institute reports called for the training of Mexican elites in schools, granting special advantages to “talented children”:

The Mexican-American businessman of the future may prove a great asset not only to help his own people but in our contacts with Central and South America. Let us have scholarships so that Mexicans may have doctors, lawyers, teachers as soon as possible from among their own people, and let us help those coming professional men to have such pride in their own race that they will not desert their own kind as so many of other second generation of other racial and nationality groups have done.  

---

321 IHRC International Institute Report.  
322 IHRC International Institute Report.
Underlying this racialized vision of Mexican progress was a genuine belief in Mexican assimilability among Institute leaders. Institute reports lament the extent to which this vision of progress and the making of a Mexican middle class were constantly undermined by racial discrimination in employment and the broader society and legal obstacles to full citizenship. These forces proliferated and intensified during the Great Depression, when unemployed white workers began to accept low-status, low-wage jobs occupied by Mexicans throughout the 1920s and early 1930s.

Notwithstanding their advocacy for Mexican workers’ rights and their belief in Mexican assimilability, the International Institute staff worked closely with the INS and local government agencies to monitor the Mexican workforce. Like aid agencies in France, the Institute conducted surveys that were used by the Immigration Service and other agencies to track down itinerant Mexican workers during the Great Depression’s mass repatriation campaign. Particularly useful were street level maps that identified segregated Mexican housing in cities and rural areas. These surveys were intended to identify the needs of Mexican immigrants and the inadequacy and squalor of their living conditions and to substantiate appeals for government assistance. As an “apolitical” organization, however, the International Institute had to comply with the ostensibly apolitical governmental regimes of law and order. At the time of the Great Depression, the INS requested that all statistics gathered by the International Institute on Mexican immigrants, including residence, marital status, citizenship status, and academic records, be forwarded to INS headquarters.

Like the Bureau of Insular Affairs, the INS served as the principle liaison between the government and vulnerable immigrant communities. When the INS sought to aid in the recruitment efforts of sugar beet growers and to regulate flows of migrant workers, they asked the Institute to help acclimate workers and place them with local employers. When the INS wanted to inform Mexican immigrants of new legislation regarding citizenship and documentation as they did during the Great Depression and at the beginning of World War II, they delegated these responsibilities to the Institute. When the agency sought to detain and deport undocumented Mexican immigrants en masse, as they did during the Great Depression, they used information gathered by the Institute. Despite its stated philosophy and intentions, then, the International Institute served both
as an agent of development and Americanization and as an agent of surveillance and exclusion. Understandably, Mexican immigrants became wary of aid organizations. They also refrained from asking for relief from Depression-era welfare organizations for fear that information gathered by these agencies would be used to deport them.

The production of braceros as colonial subjects was a joint project of U.S. government agencies, the Mexican government, and U.S. employers. The participation of the Mexican government lent legitimacy both to the terms of bracero employment and to the dual narratives of modernization and nationalism used to justify bracero recruitment. In her ethnographic analysis of the program, Deborah Cohen outlines the ways in which both the American and Mexican governments framed the employment of braceros as a project aimed to modernize Mexican agricultural practices by making modern, businessmen-farmers out of Mexican peasants. Mexicans were initially recruited by the government in campaigns that emphasized the role they could play both in the fight against Nazi Germany and in the de-peasantization of Mexican agriculture. Although most of those who applied to join the bracero ranks admitted that their primary goal was to earn higher wages to support their families in Mexico, the Mexican and American governments represented and implemented the program within nationalist and paternalist narratives and practices. This was manifested in the physical and social boundaries that segregated Mexican and American workers in California, Arizona, Texas, and the American North and Midwest and in the paternalist treatment of braceros both by the government and by employers. It was also apparent in the self-identification of braceros as patriarchal Mexican breadwinners on whom Mexican families depended.

The official American rationale for the Bracero Program emphasized the development of Mexican workers and promoted the United States’s role as a benevolent, Civilizing force. Mexicans who played by the rules and served their terms of service would learn valuable techniques of capital-intensive agricultural production and business. Wages, room, and board would be provided in the interest of workers’ well being and growers’ efficiency in putting braceros to use. The express goal was to save American

---

323 The model farmer was the American breadwinner making profits through the use of advanced agricultural techniques on the romanticized American nuclear family farm.
agriculture while at the same time training Mexicans to become independent agricultural businessmen like their grower bosses. Government officials and agricultural employers represented the model American grower as a self-made entrepreneur and Mexican workers as backward peasants who were potentially modern in a distinctively Euro-American sense of the term. Although juridical restrictions and exploitative practices made achieving this modernity on U.S. soil impossible, proponents of the program suggested that Mexican braceros could return home as proud heads of households and employers, and start their own agribusinesses, employing Mexican peasants as needed and eventually liberating them from the backwardness of peasant subsistence farming in their homeland. The Bracero Program could therefore be heralded as an extension of the modernizing projects that “freed” Mexican workers from the land and from feudal landlords.325

As in the case of African colonials and nationals in France, and Filipino nationals in the United States, Mexican workers were systematically recruited in their home country and incorporated into the American economy as subordinate subjects. At first, this massive recruitment effort took the form of a wartime emergency measure to compensate for labor shortages in agriculture. In the years leading up to the bombing of Pearl Harbor, grower requests for contracted Mexican workers were systematically denied on behalf of the domestic workforce and the interests of the national population. This changed in 1942 when the U.S. entered the war and the government perceived an overriding need for massive increases in food production. Responding to grower demands, the Special Committee on the Importation of Mexican Labor, which consisted of officials from a range of agencies including the departments of Agriculture, State, Labor, and the War Manpower Commission, met in the spring of 1942 to formulate a temporary worker program. Negotiations with Mexican officials produced a model for future legislation on temporary workers called the Mexican National Agreement. This bilateral arrangement called for a process wherein the State Department and U.S. Employment Services would forward American employers’ requests for specific numbers

325 The broader project would, of course, continue through the 20th century in a process that included both the displacement of subsistence farming by Mexican and American agribusiness corporations and American corn subsidies and the incorporation and subordination of Mexican workers both in the U.S. and in Mexico.
of Mexican workers to Mexican officials. Mexican recruiters would then select bracero candidates from among the growing ranks of displaced peasant farmers in poor, remote regions and transfer them to “recruitment centers” in the Mexican interior where they would be inspected by officials from both governments. Finally, workers selected as braceros would be transported to worksites in the United States.

As Calavita’s account shows, this elaborate system of recruitment, transportation, and incorporation required a massive investment of American resources and a coordinated inter-agency effort. Recruitment and transportation costs were paid for by the American government with the help of employers who paid a $5 per bracero tax. Growers accepted this tax along with new restrictions of their employment practices in exchange for a steady supply of docile Mexican workers whose work and movements would be monitored and controlled by state agencies. The agency responsible for the surveillance and regulation of Mexican Workers, the INS, performed many of the same functions that the Bureau of Insular Affairs fulfilled for Filipino workers, just as the Ministries of colonial, North African, and Algerian affairs did in France. According to the President’s Commission on Migratory Labor, the goal of the program was to maintain super- and subordinate relations with a flexible workforce who “would be ready to go to work when needed” and “be gone when not needed” and who would “not impose social and economic problems on them or on their community when the work is finished.”

The influx of braceros and “illegals” during and immediately after World War II produced a need for an even more elaborate surveillance network and new, innovative mechanisms of incorporation. Public Law 78, signed by President Truman in 1951, supplemented Mexican “recruitment centers” with “reception centers” on the U.S. side of the border. The law also established the U.S. government as the guarantor of contracts, further aligning the interests of the state in economic expansion and the interests of the growers in increased profits. Recruitment and reception centers served as sites of

---

326 The agreements with Mexico were negotiated largely by the Department of State; the United States Employment Service was responsible for certifying labor shortages and estimating prevailing wages; the Farm Security Administration—and later the War Food Administration—did the actual recruitment and contracting; and the INS authorized and oversaw the admission and return of the workers. Kitty Calavita. (2010). Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration, and the I.N.S. (Classics of Law & Society) (Kindle Locations 472-473). Quid Pro Books. Kindle Edition.

encounter and subjection. As Deborah Cohen has noted, the Mexican centers were sites
where state officials articulated the development function of the program and the
paternalist expectations of migrants. Cohen’s theorization of the screening and reception
of migrants as “practices of border” is in line with what I have been calling colonial
bordering practices:

For Mexicans, this migrant was a national actor, while for U.S. officials he was a
stoop laborer. Screening men's bodies, then, was part and parcel of the
differentiating, ranking, and attendant valuing of particular kinds of bodies, cut
along racial, gender, and class lines with a national valiance. The selection
process entailed practices of border: evaluative rituals that symbolically recreate
the border in quotidian ways as incommensurable difference. In that way, the
work of the border would be reproduced in future exchanges with U.S. growers,
foremen, and community locals, reshaping how braceros understood themselves
and their nation.\(^\text{328}\)

Through paternalistic tropes and demeaning instructions and medical screenings, braceros
were marked as inferior, dirty, potentially threatening others in need of benevolent
advancement through supervised manual labor. Cohen describes the scene at a
recruitment center in Durango city:

This national incorporation was done, in part, through explicit instructions given
to the men as they waited. “You are going to be representatives of Mexico in the
U.S.,” they were told. “Be an example of honesty and show what good workmen
you are.” In this case, the instructions were code for being obedient and docile.
“Don't go on strikes or make trouble for your bosses. Remember, if you make
good, you will be wanted again and again in the future.” Thus, these migrants
were told of the possibilities of future contracts and instructed in their role as
Mexico’s ground-level “ambassadors” in the promotion of binational
understanding.\(^\text{329}\)

Corresponding practices of subjection were developed at reception centers in the U.S.
Growers seeking greater influence over the recruitment process demanded a system
through which they could re-contract braceros who were known to be reliable,
unthreatening, docile workers. The INS responded by implementing an identification
system whereby acceptable braceros would be issued an “I-100 card” upon departing for


Mexico after the expiration of a contract. These workers could bypass recruitment centers in Mexico and proceed directly to reception centers in the United States. This had the dual effect of undermining Mexican state authority and sovereignty and creating “a pool of reliable, competent, security screened workers and will, therefore, materially assist the farmers participating in the program.”

Despite effective mechanisms of social control that recuperated the colonial technologies and structures of racial oppression discussed in Chapter 1, braceros and Filipinos, like their North African counterparts in France, developed innovative networks and strategies of resistance to racial subjection and subordination. In fact, like North Africans working at Renault and Citroen, braceros and Filipinos formed the most active segments of new labor movements in the 1950s and 1960s. Despite lacking union support until their own formation of the United Farm Workers in 1966, braceros, like North Africans, actively agitated for wages and working conditions equal to that of white American citizens, and ultimately for all the benefits and privileges of citizenship. It was due in part to the effectiveness of these campaigns that the American government ended the program in 1964, allowing employers to replace braceros with lower-cost undocumented workers from other Latin American countries.

**Conclusion**

The active recruitment and incorporation of immigrants from former European colonies to the U.S. and France follows a familiar colonial pattern of imperial expansion and internal practices of bordering. These practices go far beyond calculations about whom the state should and should not “let in” at a particular historical moment. Moreover, they go beyond rigid Marxist structural explanations of migration from “periphery to core.” Projects of immigrant incorporation have involved organizations genuinely dedicated to aiding immigrants, helping them negotiate an unfamiliar cultural and legal terrain, and even protecting them from the police (and only unwittingly aiding in state surveillance). They are in many respects repetitions with difference of colonial

---

civilizing missions: their goal has been to transform colonials and immigrants and immigrant colonials into good Americans and good Europeans.

On the one hand, in working with state agencies to achieve this objective, aid organizations have reinforced the anti-political objectives of the national state and the colonial objectives of the empire state. Moreover, they have participated in the state’s monitoring of immigrants, taking up the role once occupied by colonial ministries in France and the Bureau of Insular Affairs in the U.S. On the other hand, in helping to integrate immigrants and by insulating them from the worst excesses of border control, aid organizations have facilitated the formation of transnational and intra-national communities that have resisted the violence of national bordering practices. Although humanitarian immigrant rights advocates and aid agencies are typically bound to remain neutral with respect to political question of borders, labor unions, and who deserves what rights, they help to create conditions under which immigrants can mobilize politically with citizens, and particularly with citizen members of the national workforce. I explore the obstacles and prospects for transnational labor organization under conditions of imported colonialism in the following chapter.
Chapter 4
Imperial Economies, Western Workforces, and Colonial Subjects: A Postcolonial Reconsideration Labor and Migration

Like colonization, which, as Sartre once remarked, formed a system, immigration constitutes a system of ‘determinate relations that are necessary and independent of the will of individuals.’ That system organizes all the representations of the social world in which the individual is obliged to live...The most visible manifestation of the systemic nature of immigration, or the manifestation that has the most implications and that is richest in meaning is, of course, the almost total identification of the immigrant condition with the position of the OS [ouvrier spécialisé “special,” usually unskilled worker].
Abdelmalek Sayad331

Is the indentured alien – an almost perfect model of the economic man, an “input factor” stripped of the political and social attributes that liberal democracy likes to ascribe to all human beings ideally – is this bracero the prototype of the production man of the future? Ernesto Galarza332

This process...creates body men, men whose body is a machine body, that is fragmented and dominated, and used to perform one isolable function or gesture, being both destroyed in its integrity and fetishized, atrophied and hyperphied in its useful organs.
Étienne Balibar333

Introduction

At the core of the ambivalent recruitment, incorporation, and policing of immigrants in Western nation states lie questions of production and gendered divisions of labor. The continuity that links contemporary labor politics and labor migration to the administration of colonial workers is apparent in the West, traditionally conceived as Western Europe and the United States, in the formerly colonized Global South, as well as in China and the former Communist bloc. Governments and companies in China, Singapore, and Algeria today recruit massive numbers of flexible, specialized guest workers, granting them either de jure or socially imposed de facto second-class status

331 Sayad. The Suffering of the Immigrant. The translator of Sayad’s text interprets OS as follows: “Ouvrier spécialisé (literally, ‘specialized worker’) is commonly interpreted as the French equivalent to ‘unskilled worker.’ Such a worker is ‘specialized’ in the Taylorist sense: he ‘specializes’ in doing one task ‘the one best way’ [translator].”
332 Galarza. Merchants of Labor.
333 Étienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein. “Class Racism” in Nation, Race, Class. With apologies to Alicia Schmidt Camacho, whose Migrant Imaginaries inspired the use of these epigraphs from Galarza and Balibar. See her Migrant Imaginaries: Nation of Newcomers: Immigrant History as American History. (NYU Press). Chapter 2.
within their national political communities. Within the biopolitical order of the modern nation-state, the divisions between these “specialized” workers and full citizens is founded upon gendered conceptions of racial difference developed during the colonial era and recoded within neoliberal ideology as differences of legal status based on national origin. The subjection of immigrants as right-less “body-men” – workers whose recruitment and employment gradually devalues the labor power of citizen workforces – threatens the privileges of Western citizenship. Today, all workers face the specter of becoming OS, “the production man of the future,” a stateless “input” within the production process. The new form of precarious life represented by the immigrant OS has both 1) opened opportunities for the transnational and intra-national mobilization of workers against the new imperatives of capitalist super-exploitation and 2) re-animated practices of racial bordering, exclusion, and closure that protect the increasingly precarious rights of citizen workers and full members of national populations as opposed to “specialized” foreign bodies.

On the one hand, the social, political, and administrative mechanisms through which these “specialized” workforces or “indentured aliens” are monitored, managed, and segregated from national workforces, so as to insulate and protect the latter’s relative advantage within the state’s imperial economy, are rooted in colonial practices of bordering, exploitation, and social control. On the other hand, these mechanisms of workforce management deliberately and systematically threaten the standards of living to which Western subjects had become accustomed during the colonial era. They do so by using reserve armies of racialized, border-crossing immigrant workers as leverage in negotiations with Western workforces in general and labor unions in particular. This age-old capitalist strategy effectively narrows the economic gap between citizen-subjects and *immigrés postcoloniale*. As mentioned above, this narrowing has at least two effects. First, it raises the specter of the ubiquitous body-man: a “mere input” as the “prototypical production man of the future” (See Sayad above). Second, it opens the possibility for transpolitical interests (of potential body-men) to be realized through transnational labor solidarities and social movements (i.e.,

---

335 Galarza. *Merchants of Labor.*
solidarities that are transgressive of national political community boundaries, the boundaries of the West and the Global South, and so on). More than colonial divisions of labor, wherein territorial boundaries can insulate national populations (in ways described by Foucault in *Society Must Be Defended*), the divisions of labor produced by immigrant workforce management are continuously vulnerable to the “aleatory” solidarities and movements of the circulation of workers across borders (as Foucault suggests but does not adequately theorize or historicize in *Security, Territory, Population*).

My second chapter addressed statist modes and technologies of policing that reproduce colonial subjects and borders within the France and the United States. The preceding chapter focused on colonial practices of recruitment and incorporation that have both expanded the national economy and have maintained gendered, colonial divisions of labor characteristic of imperial economies. Continuing my analysis of the colonial production of racialized workers as transnational political subjects, this chapter focuses more directly on the contradictions, conflicts, and crises of production, capitalist accumulation, labor, and “labor migration” in French and U.S. imperial economies and more generally in the postcolonial contexts of Western nation-states. It draws attention to the opening of the possibility of transnational and anti-racist labor solidarity during the period of rapid decolonization after World War II through the production of “body-men” (e.g., braceros or hired arms/hands in the United States and the OS *immigrés postcoloniales* from North Africa in France). And it explores the closure of that possibility in ways that have produced new, hybrid national-imperial economies and divisions of labor in the neoliberal era. The coloniality of this closure can be seen most clearly in the case of the changing relationship of U.S. institutions and employers to U.S. colonial subjects from the Pacific Islands and North and West Africans in the French metropole (discussed below), but it was not limited to cases of formal colonialism. The case of Filipino colonials working in the United States is often cited as an *aberration* in the history of American labor relations. By contrast, my analysis below suggests that American experiments in colonial governance provided a *model* for workforce management and the maintenance of (colonial-racial) divisions of labor in the U.S. imperial economy. As such, it helps explain contemporary practices and crises of workforce segregation and control.
The underlying question that guides my analysis here will look familiar to Althusserian Marxists, labor historians, and participants in labor struggles. Given the mass migration of workers across national borders in recent decades, the dramatic increase in inequalities separating rich and poor and the decline in standards of living in both the Global South and the West, and the dramatic increase in economic insecurity among masses of workers in Europe and the United States, what explains the persistent failure to mobilize workers as workers across national boundaries? In the language of recent Marxian political theory, what constraints explain the apparent failure of labor movements to articulate an enduring political subject called “worker” that would destroy the divisions of labor engendered by European and Euro-American imperialism and colonialism? How and why have labor movements, and particularly trade union movements in Europe and the United States, participated in the reproduction of colonial boundaries and hierarchies, working with state agencies to protect their precariously privileged position within the global economy instead of unifying with workers from the Global South against capitalist modes of exploitation and oppression? How and why is working-class frustration and anger consistently channeled in nationalist directions, effectively expanding the power of the national state, rather than into transnational, international, and intra-national social movements?

As a prelude to the penultimate chapter on the ambivalence of colonial representations and transnational resistance to colonial governance, this chapter also foregrounds the ways in which national and transnational labor movements have challenged and unsettled the nation-state system and colonial divisions of labor. As previous chapters have demonstrated, imperial expansion itself produces subjects that challenge the hegemony of nation-states both as administrators of capitalist exploitation and as regulators of labor. Focusing again on the United States and France, I examine the tensions that emerge between the mandate of the empire-state to regulate imperial economies and workforces through colonial practices in peripheral spaces and the mandate of the nation-state to act on the behalf of sovereign national workforces: autonomous and sovereign members of national political communities.

In sum, what follows does not offer a traditional comparative analysis of two nation-state “cases.” Rather, it considers the contemporary control of labor migration as
a mode of workforce management with origins that can be traced to colonial modes of
governance developed in transatlantic conversations and negotiations among American,
French, and other European officials at a particular historical moment. Furthermore, it
analyzes the discourse of labor migration within a structured yet dynamic and relational
totality: a social order composed of empire-states and imperial economies that both
influence and compete with each other in their efforts to expand and simultaneously to
ensure the prosperity and security of a critical mass of citizen workers who can
effectively legitimate state authority and state violence.

This analysis both builds on and complicates Wallerstein’s theory of World
Systems and Foucault’s genealogy of biopolitical population management. Following
Wallerstein, it examines the production of a global division of labor in which
accumulators of capital located in the system’s core exploit workers inhabiting peripheral
sites of production, including but not limited to those of the post-colony. Complicating
both Wallerstein and Foucault, the postcolonial analysis offered here foregrounds the
precariousness of workforce privileges in the core, and specifically the privileged status
of core-nation-state workforces, racially and juridically coded as modern and white, in
the context of mass migration and the movement of sites of production and capital
accumulation to new low-cost enclaves and “export zones.” As Balibar has argued, these
dynamics blur the ethno-racial boundaries separating core and peripheral spaces as well
as the boundaries separating national populations. This blurring-effect, in turn, animates
relentless practices of postcolonial subjection or “recolonization” discussed in previous
chapters.

In Post-Marxian terms, this analysis seeks to provide a postcolonial application of
Althusser’s theory of bourgeois-capitalist interpellation, wherein colonized subjects are
systematically recoded as specialized, racially inferior immigrant workers – as “input”
“body-men” – in relation to native citizen-workforces. Through these practices of
interpellation, citizen workforces are re-subjected as privileged Western subjects within
economies that have incorporated workers deemed racially inferior. As we have seen,
although violent and pervasive, these mechanisms are far less powerful than Althusser
made them seem. Moreover, they have become increasingly vulnerable to transpolitical
attack as the privileges of national citizenship have dwindled.
Specifically, this study explores the historical ruptures and repetitions that have transferred colonial modes of governance to nation-state modes of immigration management. This transference has occurred not only within the metropoles of former colonial powers, but also in former colonies themselves. Quasi-independent governments in places like Algeria, the Philippines, and Singapore have adopted practices of “exported” and “imported” colonialism, and have produced their own colonial divisions of labor. Indeed, producing and maintaining colonial divisions of labor within these countries through the recruitment, incorporation, segregation, and control of immigrant workers has become a crucial indicator of successful development and “growth” according to postcolonial-neoliberal metrics established by Western Europe and the United States during the Cold War.336

**Nation- and Empire-States; National and Imperial Economies**

In his final collection of essays, *La double absence: Des illusions de l’émigré aux souffrances de l’immigré*, Abdelmalek Sayad provides a series of devastating critical interpretations of the intersecting discourses of immigration management, labor relations, and “labor migration.” Cutting against the discursive grain of immigration studies, Sayad demonstrates how statist calculations of the “costs” and “benefits” of immigration erase the experiences, politics, and the society of the *émigrant* as such. In so doing, these calculations obscure the political conditions, the history, and experiences of emigration, including but not limited to practices of dispossession and administration that produce and maintain colonial divisions of labor. More often than not, people who emigrated from North Africa to France and Latin America to the U.S. felt compelled to leave their home communities because coercive land appropriations by colonial agents and settlers had left their families destitute, farming infertile land, and searching for scarce work in towns and cities.337 These practices of dispossession were carried out overtly and coercively during the colonial era in places like Northern Mexico and Algeria. They continue today under the guise of post-Bretton-Woods “free trade” and structural

adjustment, a set of practices that have allowed American and French businesses to collude with proxies in former European colonies in order to acquire large tracts of land and to undersell local subsistence farmers, pushing them towards urban domains of wage labor and ultimately to the higher-wage territories of the United States and Western Europe, and now to new enclaves of accumulation in semi-peripheral countries like Singapore and China. These “push” factors are amplified by European imperial ideology, which, unfortunately for the jealous, xenophobic, self-deputized guardians of national borders, maintains that wealth and modern ways of life can be accrued more effectively in the civilized industries of the metropole than in the backward peasant economies and pre-modern cultures of the colony-cum-developing-nation.

At the same time, efforts to “technicalize” the problem of labor migration in terms of costs and benefits to the national workforce end up reproducing discourses of colonial administration, i.e., of non-European immigrant workers and their families in relation to “native” European workers, etc.). Sayad demonstrates how this reproduction is apparent both in the analogous subjection of the immigrant and the native or indigène (as indicated in the epigraph above) and in the real historical convergence of these two modes of subjection. In other words, it is apparent in the practices that interpellate formerly colonized workers who emigrate as “unskilled” or more broadly as “specialized” immigrant workers who will – or more precisely must – occupy a subordinate position within a hybrid and stratified economy, an economy that is national by definition, but in fact part of a border-crossing imperial economy.

North and West Africans who emigrate to France for work find themselves subject to even more pervasive and everyday suspicion, surveillance, and recolonizing control than they did when they were colonial subjects in Algérie Française. One of the constitutive differences of metropolitan control is that it includes the potential exclusionary and xenophobic impulses of all French citizen-subjects, including French workers in general and union members in particular. As Achille Mbembe among others have argued, and as Joseph Conrad’s classic Heart of Darkness evokes, one of the distinctive features of the European colony was its geographic remoteness from the European subjects of the metropole. Although their surveillance has never been complete

---

338 Sayad.
(in fact, their liminal status as OS requires a degree of juridical and social distance and ignorance that distinguishes them from citizens who were fully known, documented, etc.), the physical proximity of the immigrant colonial OS to European subjects means in practice that every European subject, from police officers, to teachers, to neighbors – i.e., not only colonial officials and settlers – concretely occupied the position of citizen in relation to the recolonized OS subject. As such, the citizen could at any moment become an agent of colonial control, reporting to the notorious CRS on neighbors, students, and, in the post-9/11 security environment, anyone or anything they deem suspicious.

The same can be said for deputized citizen-subjects in the United States. Despite its reputation as a non-colonial power, colonial control of immigrant workers has always been a constitutive feature of U.S. workforce management. Postcolonial immigrant workers in the U.S. are subjects of systematic discrimination and abuse by the state and by deputized citizens. Workers arriving from former American and other European colonies and the descendants of the Mexican contract workers who, as Mae Ngai has shown and as Galarza previously demonstrated in his landmark *Merchants of Labor*, were colonial subjects in all but name have been particularly vulnerable in this context. However, their experience is shared by countless others of African, Asian, and Latin American descent. Local citizens have joined forces with local police and government agencies to “enforce laws” that in practice maintain national borders and birthrights and colonial divisions of labor in the space of the metropole. As Balibar suggests in his essay “Class Racism,” this nationalist-racist discourse militates against the articulation of class interests as such. As in France, even the most progressive and cosmopolitan U.S. labor unions have typically remained on the fence with respect to the question of immigrant labor. Always a potential threat to the lives of immigrants living within U.S. borders, American unions in turn arouse the legitimate suspicions of immigrant workers and undermine mobilizations around transnational class-consciousness.

The political nature of the quotidian juridical imperative to “enforce immigration laws” is obscured by analyses of cost and benefit and simultaneously highlighted by them. Officials and ordinary citizens deem the presence of immigrants legitimate when it is abundantly clear that immigrant workers enrich and empower the national population in general, and the national workforce in particular, *more* than they benefit the immigrant
workforce. Within the colonial discourse of immigration management, for the citizen worker the game is zero-sum. Any benefits immigrant workers might derive from low wages and social services are deemed a wage-depressing force and a drain on an already weak welfare state that ultimately will degrade and devalue the labor of American citizens. Employers and the state must therefore always walk a fine line, incorporating immigrant workers to cut costs while at the same time redirecting class-conscious anger in nationalist directions, towards the foreign bodies of immigrants and away from corporations and the state.

In short, the rupture of decolonization is accompanied by a recolonization of the native as a non-citizen “OS”: an unskilled or low-status input, a “special” immigrant worker whose full inclusion in the polity is deferred indefinitely for the sake of the security of the population-as-workforce and contingent upon the same modernizing imperatives that drove European civilizing missions. Linked to racial and ethnic categories, special status distinguishes these foreign workers from members of the national workforce whose privileges are guaranteed as birthrights by the state.

Of course, the colonization of subjects and recolonization of immigrants destroys neither the ties that bind emigrants to their families, and to the political, ethnic, and religious communities in their homelands, nor the new solidarities with workers in the metropole. And, like colonization, immigration management imposes conflicting demands on subject populations. On the one hand, it demands that these subjects assimilate fully into the national culture, threatening those who resist or who fail to achieve assimilation with exclusion and deportation. On the other hand, it requires that these immigrants maintain ties to a foreign culture and homeland, thereby justifying their subordinate-because-categorically-foreign-and-transient status within the both the national polity and the national economy. The ambivalence of trade unions and workers’ movements and parties in the U.S. and France whose members are primarily comprised of citizens towards immigrant workers and colonized subjects helps to explain the ambivalence of empire states discussed in Chapter 2. Indeed, labor organizations collaborate with the state to negotiate these tensions and contradictions and to find relatively enduring solutions wherein colonial subjects can be recolonized as immigrant
“OS,” thereby threatening, but not completely obliterating, the advantages conferred upon the citizen workforce.

This recolonization – the subjection or interpellation of the colonized subject as an “unskilled” or otherwise “special” immigrant worker – was thinly, but effectively veiled by the prerogatives and imperatives of the nation-state during and after the period of formal decolonization. As in the cases discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, agents of immigration management recover, modify, and apply colonial tropes within the nation-state’s legal and administrative discourse to protect the precarious privileges of the national population and workforce. The “unskilled,” docile immigrant worker, like and/or as the exploitable native, is at once a boon for the national economy and a threat to the national workforce’s wages, standards of living, rules of law and order, national culture, and so on. More importantly for the purposes of this chapter, the national workforce itself, insofar as it supports the state as the guardian of the national population, at once mimics and causes the state’s ambivalent disposition towards the native-cum-immigrant worker.

For instance, the manager of the local United Food and Commercial Workers union in Austin, Minnesota agrees with the former chief of Police and current Mayor, Tom Stiehm, that immigrant workers from Mexico play a vital role in low-status sectors of the local economy. Thus, they demand that the state respect the rights of immigrants to work and of employers like Hormel Foods to employ them. However, both say they would work with local police and federal agents to monitor and deport “illegals,” i.e., those without proper documentation (which, in cases like Austin and Postville, comprised almost half of the cities’ populations.) Moreover, many union members have aligned themselves with anti-immigrant organizations like the Minnesota Coalition for Immigration Reduction (MCFIR) and the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR). The same ambivalence can be seen in the attitudes towards immigrant workers among union leaders and members in France (see below).

The Sarkozy government has not simply imposed a xenophobic system of tiered citizenship that renders formerly colonial subjects easily deportable and thus easily

339 http://www.fairus.org/home
exploitable on a defiant population. Rather, he and his administration have responded to conflicting pressures from the national population, and particularly from union leaders and members. Many current and former members of the French labor movement now support the anti-immigrant policy platforms of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front (FN). Significantly, this rightward shift in attitude towards immigrants ought not to be reduced to its racist and xenophobic dimensions. Rather, it ought to be analyzed as part of a historically colonial trajectory that begins with support for expansion and continued colonial rule in North Africa. Before running on an anti-immigrant, closed border platform, Le Pen was a colonial officer in Algeria and a staunch advocate for the OAS and for the maintenance of Algerie Francaise. His anti-immigrantism, like that of many conservatives in the U.S., is therefore part of an internally conflicted colonial discourse whose contradictions come to a head when the inhabitants of the empire migrate to the metropole. The conflicts within and between state agencies in the U.S. and France are in large part products of the conflicts inherent in imperial economies.

The social phenomenon *l’indigène à l’immigré* (native-cum-immigrant) is both a potentially profitable input within the Taylorist-nationalist regime of corporate mass production and profit sharing and a potential union ally against exploitative or abusive employers. In this way, the native/immigrant is potentially an asset to the national workforce. S/he is also both a foreign threat to biopolitical nationalist-corporatist regimes and a tool of capitalist accumulation that undermines the political power of the national workforce. Thus, s/he is also an insidious pariah from the point of view of the so-called “native” workers.

The double subjection of the immigrant worker – as worker and as specialized foreign threat – parallels the doubling of the colonized subject. Reified by juridical categories (citizen, legal resident, guest worker, illegal alien, identity thief, etc.), social processes of subjection produce an ethno-racial color line with hybrid subjects and subjectivities on one side and an ostensibly homogenous – but actually heterogeneous and internally conflicted – Euro-“civilized” population on the other. The ambivalence of labor immigration management bears a striking resemblance to the ambivalence of Western states and workforces towards formal colonialism in the U.S. and French empires. Like the recruitment of the unskilled “OS” worker, the subjection of native
workers coercively redistributed undesirable jobs to the colony, establishing a division of labor in which the national workforce enjoyed no small degree of privilege. However, the exploitation of the indigène also threatened this privilege by incorporating colonized populations into a European political milieu: a context in which the colonized worker could make claims upon the national state for the rights and privileges associated with membership in the European and Euro-American national-imperial polity and even for rights of citizenship.\(^{341}\) Emigration from the peripheries of imperial economies to metropolitan territories validated the insecurities of European and Euro-American workers at the same time as it provided unprecedented opportunities for mass production and prosperity as well as for class-consciousness and the formation of transnational political communities.

Most comparative studies of labor and immigration in Western nation-states omit the problems and contradictions of imperial economies, colonial divisions of labor, and transnational labor movements.\(^{342}\) These studies take for granted the existence of national economies over which nation-states have jurisdiction as well as the cohesive identities and interests of national citizen-workforces.\(^{343}\) Recent literature on globalization and global capitalism has thrown these types of comparative studies into question by demonstrating the apparent inability of national governments to control the flow of goods, money, and people across national borders.\(^{344}\) Highlighting the border-blurring effects of globalization, this literature has been adapted by everyone from neoliberal triumphalists, who promote further deregulation of international trade,\(^{345}\) to conservative nationalists, who promote nostalgia for a bygone era of authentic, homogenous national identities and who call for the closing of national borders and the re-assertion of national sovereignty.\(^{346}\)


\(^{344}\) Haus, 2002.

\(^{345}\) Thomas Friedman. \textit{The World is Flat}; Francis Fukuyama. \textit{The End of History and the Last Man}.

In overemphasizing the novelty of globalizing flows, most of these appropriations miss a crucial historical-structural dynamic: since at least the 17th century, Western empire-states, including the U.S. and France, have sought to expand and prosper through the recruitment of foreign workers and their incorporation into imperial economies. The sheer presence of these workers within imperial economies and especially as immigrants within national territories has blurred the boundaries that demarcate national workforces and the populations on whose behalf Western states are authorized to act. Add to this the political agency of colonial subjects and the bonds of transnational solidarity they form in both colony and metropole, and the contradictions and crises of the imperial nation-state are thrown into even sharper relief.

The coexistence of overlapping national and imperial economies means that workforce boundaries cannot be fixed through the rules of citizenship and practices of documentation and policing discussed in Chapter 2. The peripheral nature of colonial experiments, including practices of bordering and exploitation, enable colonial agents to act with governmental authorization while simultaneously insulating these experiments from official governmental oversight and regulation. In many crucial respects, this is no less true in experiments in workplace management in the peripheral spaces within the metropole than it is in the peripheral space of the colony. The racialization, exploitation, and political exclusion of Mexican contract workers (discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 and below) both by employers and by labor unions in the South and Pacific Northwest, and the treatment of French Senegalese and Algerian nationals in Marseilles, bears a striking resemblance to the management of colonial workforces in North and West Africa by French colonial officials. The continuities that link these practices across time and space blur boundaries separating colony and metropole as well as epochal boundaries separating the era of formal colonialism from the era of neoliberal states.

The specter of national-citizen and colonial-subject workforces joining forces always threatens the states and corporations who depend on the labor of both and on competition and conflict among the various categories of workers that they create. Subsequent sections examine the structural and strategic obstacles to the unification of Western citizen and colonial subject workers within U.S. and French imperial economies.
The next chapter reflects on the prospects for transnational class solidarity and other intra- and transnational political mobilizations in the future.

As in previous chapters, I focus here on the inter- and post-war periods of rapid decolonization and recolonization and compare these junctures to the contemporary neoliberal and post-9/11 security context. As in the current neoliberal moment, one might expect to see class solidarity emerge across crumbling colonial borders in the postwar context, despite the anti-international ideology of American liberal democracy during the Cold War. Recent historiography has shown that union movements in Africa and Latin America did indeed begin to form bonds with metropolitan citizens in the U.S. and France throughout the 20th century, and especially after World War II. How these bonds emerged and were broken, and what lessons these possibilities and foreclosures have for our own time, are central concerns of the following sections.

The Postwar Reproduction of Imperial Economies: Decolonization and the Question of Labor

As Chapter 3 demonstrated, the policing and exclusion of immigrant workers in Europe and the U.S. discussed in Chapter 2 is more ambivalent and conflicted than state-centric analyses of security and Foucauldian analyses of biopolitical regulation often make it seem. This ambivalence is apparent in the recruitment and conditional incorporation of immigrant workers into national and imperial economies, and it is rooted in the ambivalent relationship of labor to capital and the state and in the forms of resistance to capitalist exploitation. The suspicion of immigrant workers recruited by Hormel Foods in Austin, Minnesota has its historical roots in slavery and indentured servitude. So too does it follow from the suspicion of colonial agricultural and cannery workers from the Philippines and braceros from Mexico in the cotton, chili, and vegetable fields of the American South and Southwest, the canneries of the Pacific Northwest, and the beet fields of the American Heartland. The segregation, control, and suspicion of African workers in Paris and Marseilles re-enacts the mechanisms developed to control formerly colonized workers in French North and West Africa and Indochina.

347 Sentences here on international trade unions and counterparts of the French CGT in North and West Africa.
In each of these cases, real opportunities for transnational labor solidarity emerged and were foreclosed by the combined forces of agribusiness, state agencies working on employers’ behalf, the socio-juridical re-subjection of the national workforce within an expanding imperial economy, and the recolonization of immigrant workers.

20th-century labor movements in Europe and North America were rife with internal tensions and conflicts. Chief among these has been the conflict between nationalist trade unionism and national party politics and internationalist socialism and communism. Nowhere have these tensions been more apparent than in France and the United States. In both countries, practices of imperial expansion, along with both liberal and socialist movements for rights and control of production, have produced conditions for transnational class solidarity and the transcendence of parochial nationalisms and regionalisms, including those founded on notions of European and Euro-American identity and difference. However, even the most radically internationalist French and American labor organizations, including self-identified communist parties in France, have remained at least ambivalent and at most openly xenophobic when confronted with the question of whether or not to welcome immigrant workers from former European colonies into their ranks. American efforts to influence postwar European reconstruction bolstered and transformed nationalist unionism in Western Europe, but anti-internationalism was already a formidable social force on both sides of the Atlantic.

The French Communist Party (PCF), to take a noteworthy example of ambivalence on the French left, is known both for its efforts to mobilize workers from French colonies and for its renunciation of “fierce internationalism” in favor of “republican and nationalist symbolism of the tricolor and the Marseillaise.”348

Following the provisional strategic advice of the Comintern, the PCF joined with center-left socialist and liberal parties to form the anti-Nazi Popular Front in the 1930s, thereby winning legitimacy and mainstream political power. This entry into the nationalist mainstream further curtailed the international ambitions of PCF party leaders and members and entrenched the party with liberals and even right-wing nationalists on the front lines of the defense of the French people and homeland. Historians have

---

demonstrated that racist, anti-immigrant sentiment expressed by PCF leaders laid fertile ground for a strange and powerful fellowship among xenophobic communists and the extreme right-wing National Front under Jean-Marie Le Pen.\(^{349}\) This quasi-corporatist alliance of nationalist and socialist actors was strengthened by the U.S. Marshall Plan for postwar European reconstruction, which demanded that France and other Western European countries develop nationalist-Taylorist modes of mass production, as opposed to the internationalist Soviet communist and imperialist modes, in exchange for American aid (discussed below).

Leading this geostrategic-anti-communist and neo-corporatist/imperialist campaign was none other than the notoriously xenophobic American Federation of Labor under the direction of Jay Lovestone and Irving Brown with the direct support of the CIA who channeled socialist energies away from the Comintern and towards the anti-communist International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.\(^{350}\) Like the AFL and under its influence, the General Confederation of Labor (CGT)’s and PCF’s ironically xenophobic rhetoric was backed by anti-immigrant activism, punctuated in the French case by the infamous communist eviction of Malian migrant workers from a Paris hostel in 1982 and by more recent anti-immigrant campaigns, mass raids, and formal and informal segregation and exclusion under both socialist and center-right parties over the last three decades (discussed in Chapter 2 and below). The resurgence of anti-immigrant nationalism under Interior Minister and then President Sarkozy, discussed below, should be analyzed as a reiteration of French neoliberal corporatism on this fraught postcolonial terrain.

In the U.S. context of anti-internationalist labor relations, central institutional features of which were imposed on Western Europe by the Marshall Plan, Africa, and Asia in the postwar era, the tradition of anti-imperialist and anti-immigrant trade unionism had its roots in narratives of Anglo-American exceptionalism and nativism and in the reformist tradition of nationalist collective bargaining championed by Samuel


Mark Rupert’s now classic study (discussed further in Chapter 2 and below) of the 20th-century alliance among factory workers, major corporations, and American government agencies sheds light both on the apparent triumphs of American trade unions (higher wages, a shortened working day, better working conditions, benefits, etc.) and on the production of formidable ideological and institutional barriers to the internationalization or even the nationalization of the American labor movement. The rationalization and “Americanization” of U.S. industry, spearheaded by Frederick Taylor and Henry Ford, and the correlative mechanization and de-skilling of labor on the new assembly lines of modern factories produced windfall profits and allowed large employers to secure paternalist hierarchies through profit sharing and through conditional distribution of benefits to properly “Americanized” workers.

Rupert demonstrates how a hegemonic pact between large American employers and their workers was brokered and enforced by state agencies. This pact secured a provisional position of privilege for the American workforce within the global economy, but it came at a price. In exchange for higher wages and benefits, unionized workers in the AFL and eventually in the CIO agreed to abstain from radical tactics like general strikes and labor organization across national borders. In addition, they agreed to purge from their ranks all elements deemed radical by employers and by the state. This imperative was codified in various forms during the inter-war period and during and after World War II, and it functioned as a formidable impediment to those who might otherwise seek to strengthen labor’s hand by mobilizing immigrant workers. Two World Wars, the Great Depression, and the Red Scare further galvanized populist nativism on the left and exacerbated immigrant-phobia among American workers. Homegrown anti-communism dovetailed with American realpolitik during the Cold War and set the stage

351 Expand here using Philip Foner’s history of the AFL
352 Mark Rupert. Producing Hegemony. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). See literature on whiteness studies. The complex processes of Americanization are beyond the scope of this chapter, although they are discussed in the subsequent chapter and in my introduction. A large growing literature on the racialization of American identity and the construction of racial barriers to entry in the American polity has shed light on these processes and practices of racial bordering. In particular, this literature has examined the construction of European whiteness as the constitutive feature of American identity and how the borders demarcating whiteness have shifted over time, including some immigrants into the polity (e.g., Italians, Jews, and Eastern and Southern Europeans) and excluding others (e.g., Asians and Latin Americans).
for American labor unions to enter the European imperial theater alongside American businesses and agencies of American military intelligence and strategic planning.

In both the U.S. and France, working-class nativism was continuously undermined not only by the influx of “unwanted” immigration from Asia, Africa and Latin America, but also by the expansionist practices of the empire-state. As discussed in the previous chapters, the latter included both the export of production facilities and low-status jobs to American and French colonies and territories and the systematic recruitment of colonial subjects by American and French employers. The “special” status, or “national” status in the case of Filipino immigrants in the U.S. and Algerians in France, effectively blocked efforts to unionize these workers on a permanent basis in the metropole or to include them in any official capacity as full members of the American and French labor forces. Instead of promoting international labor solidarity, the strategic use of racialized colonial “nationals” to break strikes, undercut wages, and otherwise discipline American and French trade unions reconfigured class antagonisms as racial conflicts between citizens and foreigners. Unlike Southern and Eastern Europeans in the U.S., who Ford sought to “Americanize” through training on the shop floor, and Italians and Poles in France, who French companies like Citroen and Renault sought to integrate as fellow white and potentially French workers under the Marshall Plan’s productivity imperatives, colonial nationals in both countries occupied a permanently subordinate, racialized position within the U.S. and French national economies.

**The Marshall Plan, Neo-Corporatism, and Postwar American Hegemony**

Like the preceding discussions of the colonial policing, recruitment, and subjection of immigrant workers in the neoliberal era, any postcolonial discussion of labor struggles must contend with the received wisdom that a purportedly anti-colonial superpower, the United States, had a profound impact on the restructuring of the Western system of nation-states during the Cold War and maintains a hegemonic presence in that globalized system today. The received wisdom holds that the U.S. influenced the course of economic development and labor movements through, among other mechanisms, the
Marshall Plan, an aid program that promoted nationalist neo- or quasi-corporatism\textsuperscript{353} and trade unions dependent on employers and on state institutions to combat the double threat of communism and fascism. As the story goes, U.S. officials pressured European and African unions to unite with their employers and Western European states in the Fordist-Taylorist struggle for maximum productivity and against the growing Soviet threat.

U.S. state agencies and corporations did indeed have an impact on the course of economic recovery in Europe, but the anti-colonial dimensions of this impact are less than clear. As the preceding chapters demonstrate, the U.S. had itself been a colonial power since the turn of the century and its government experimented with various forms of imported colonialism, including the Bracero Program and the active recruitment of Asian workers, during and after the war. This fact does more than discredit the righteousness with which American officials condemned British and French colonialism in Africa and Asia. It also calls attention to the ways in which, notwithstanding its official anti-colonial ideology, U.S. negotiations with workers and their employers have always taken place within imperial contexts and spaces.

Critical scholarship about the U.S.-led reconstruction of its own national economy and the global economy after the First and Second World Wars have demonstrated the ways in which U.S. officials worked with U.S.-based corporations to establish pacts with U.S. citizen workforces and to encourage similar pacts in Western European countries. In these arrangements, national workforces adhered to Taylorist ideology and disciplinary regimes in exchange for a share of the profits from mass industrial production and a relatively privileged position within the global division of labor.\textsuperscript{354} The U.S. state, in turn, achieved economic and military hegemony within a new world order of formally autonomous nation-states, most of which would be dependent in one form or another on U.S. companies and the U.S. government for economic and military aid and security. The self-imposed U.S. mandate to “feed the world” after the First and Second World Wars justified the mass production practices of industrial agribusiness and the lowering


of production costs through the employment of colonial subjects, foreign contracted labor, and other non-citizen workers within the growing U.S. imperial economy.\textsuperscript{355}

Mark Rupert provides a highly compelling and influential critical analysis of the social processes through which the economic hegemony of the American capitalist class was achieved after WWII. Among the many contributions offered by Rupert’s account of these processes is his Gramscian politicization of the “neoliberal state.” Most famously theorized by the Marxian IR theorist Robert Cox, the neoliberal state was designed to support the growth of the world economy by supporting the efforts of a capitalist regime based in United States to maximize productivity through dramatic increases in the rates of exploitation of the world’s resources, including both natural resources and human labor. Paraphrasing and quoting Cox, Rupert contrasts this postwar invention from its inter-war predecessor, the “welfare-nationalist state”:

Whereas its antecedent, the welfare-nationalist state, had sought national community in international competition and conflict, the neoliberal form of state would seek its security as a member of a stable alliance system and its economic growth as a participant in an open world economy. Its task was to adjust the national economy to the growth of the world economy.\textsuperscript{356}

In the postwar economic recovery, American officials attempted to design this new world order in a way that would allow the U.S. to play a leading role both as the center of industrial mass production and as a global police force: a guardian of private property the world over and a mediator of disputes among neoliberal states. Elaborating on the precedent set by the Hoover administration’s aid programs after WWI, the Marshall Plan attached explicit and implicit political conditions to the aid packages granted to Western European countries.

These conditions divided French and British labor union movements and gave a decisive advantage to moderate nationalist and corporatist unions over communist and internationalist labor movements.\textsuperscript{357} The Marshall Plan effectively blocked the unification of trade unions across the boundary separating European states from their soon-to-be-former colonies in Africa and Asia. At the same time, U.S government


\textsuperscript{356} Rupert, 1995. 43.

\textsuperscript{357} Carew, 1987.
officials called for the immediate decolonization and self-determination of former colonies. Far from simply liberating former colonies from the yoke of colonial oppression and exploitation, the combination of the Marshall plan and American anti-colonialism reconfigured relationships of debt and dependency, effectively reconstituting former colonies as undeveloped nation-states in need of a new kind of paternalism, namely, modernizing, humanitarian, developmental aid, and economic structural adjustment.

The neorealist state envisioned by the Marshall Plan thus retained from its welfare-nationalist antecedents more of the pressure to produce a “national community” distinct from specific others than the Rupert and Cox quotation above suggests. The crucial difference was that, in the postwar case, these others were primarily former colonies deemed racially inferior, dependent, and in need of development as opposed to Western equals – enemies and competitors – with whom “conflict and competition” was the appropriate relational framework. The Marshall Plan called for a restructuring of imperial economies and colonial modes of governance, not their abolition. The indisputable role that American officials played in the FLN’s liberation of Algeria, documented so compellingly by Matthew Connelly in A Diplomatic Revolution, should not be taken as proof of U.S. anti-colonialism, notwithstanding the official anti-colonial rhetoric of government officials. Indeed, Connelly’s own account indicates the extent to which U.S. officials sought ways for European countries to retain the benefits of Western imperial economies and to maintain some measure of colonial control over Africa, especially in the Cold War context, under the new banners of development and modernization. Documents in the French archives from the postwar period support the notion that American officials encouraged French and British efforts to re-brand colonialism as development and to reconstitute colonial divisions of labor within the contexts of commonwealths, dependencies, and partnerships involving aid and trade. As Frederick Cooper and theorists of neo-colonialism have demonstrated, colonial officials

---


in France and Britain achieved this reconfiguration with the authorization and help of favored government officials and elites in newly independent African countries.\textsuperscript{360}

As the previous sections suggested, whether or not African labor unions would have united with their counterparts in France and Britain were it not for the conditions imposed by the Marshall Plan is by no means clear. Leaders of French unions and labor movements, including communist movements, the PCF and the more moderate CGT, have been notoriously ambivalent about mobilizing alongside workers in French colonies. Socialist and communist participation in the resistance during Vichy and the Free French war effort solidified French nationalism among self-identified members of the French left. Indeed, communist resistance to fascism on behalf of Free France temporarily insulated party members and leaders from Cold War persecution. It also undermined the efforts of internationalists to mobilize colonial subjects as workers.

For their part, \textit{les immigrés postcoloniales} (the term Sayad uses to refer to immigrant workers from French colonies) resisted efforts to mobilize them as members of French union and communist unions and movements. Subjected to state racism, social and cultural exclusion, and abuse perpetrated by both the left and the right, North African immigrants in France were naturally wary of French communist and socialist ideologies and practices of recruitment. Although expressly anti-colonial and anti-racist, the French left appealed to North Africans in a familiar patronizing tone that smacked of colonial paternalism. In order to become full participants in the French labor movement, North Africans would have to renounce their cultural heritage and all ties that bound them to their homeland, families, and communities, and their so-called \textit{paysan} mode of agricultural production. The French left offered a civilizing mission that competed with dominant modes of French colonial rule. It shared with its competitors on the Gaullist right a missionary zeal for modernizing and civilizing formerly colonial subjects in the metropole and colony. Frustrated and politically marginalized by the French left, leaders of the North African working-class split from the dominant French Socialist and Communist unions and parties, and mobilized under the banners of Muslim solidarity, antiracist equality, and national liberation. Somewhat ironically, these postcolonial

immigrant movements became the vanguard of militant campaigns for workers’ rights, civil rights, and human rights as French Socialist and Communists membership and power waned (discussed below and in the following chapter).

Leaders of French trade unions and socialist and communist parties participated in anti-colonial campaigns in their efforts to oust the reigning Gaullist regime of the postwar police state, but their anti-colonialism rarely translated into class solidarity with African and Asian workers, regardless of whether those workers resided in the colonies or in the metropole. Like the history of American unions during the same period, and partly due to American influence, the 20th-century history of French labor unions, especially anti-communist unions such as the Workers Force (FO), is marred by exclusionary racism and nationalist gatekeeping, by anti-immigrantism, by xenophobia in general and by Islamophobia in particular.

Conditions in the Marshall Plan promoted the institutionalization of French nationalism within trade unions by linking them inextricably to a state apparatus devoted to maximizing industrial productivity for the benefit first of American and French employers and second of the French citizen population. American mining companies and growing conglomerates like Coca-Cola used the American state apparatus – both diplomatic and military – to open French and African markets to U.S. products and to secure sites of raw material extraction in French colonies. In addition, the U.S. government played French colonial ambitions off of African struggles for independence. If there was anything like an overarching objective of this strategy (like most imperial strategies, its colonial implementation was more or less ad hoc), it was to support African demands for independence in order to maintain colonial control over African workforces and markets. The American “double game,” as American and French officials dubbed seemingly contradictory U.S. practices in the French Empire, emerged from the widespread belief that the continuation of colonial rule in Africa would ironically lead to the loss of colonial control of markets and workforces in the region. In the Cold War security discourse, this loss would effectively grant Soviet Union access to African workforces and strategic bases in Africa. Soviet officials were already attempting to channel anti-colonial energies into communist (ideally internationalist, but nationalism was accepted as a compromise in exchange for loyalty to the Cominform) as opposed to
pro-western, nationalist directions. The American double game competed with the Soviet
Comintern and European Cominform for the allegiance of African nationalists,
promoting national self-determination as a fundamentally non-communist human right,
while at the same time promising French and British officials, as agents of “development,”
continued control of spheres of influence in Africa either as colonies or as protectorates.
Befriending African nationalists without alienating French imperialists enabled American
officials to maintain strategic bases in North Africa and, perhaps most importantly, secure
the economic interests of American businesses in Africa. The deployment of the CIA-
backed AFL both to France and to North Africa was a testament to the American
investment in workforce subjection. The missions in France assured French labor leaders
a privileged position in the global economy alongside American workers if they chose a
nationalist path and rejected Comintern overtures. At the same time, American
officials promised the Gaullist French government the benefits of colonial exploitation in Africa,
reconstituted as American-backed neocolonial economic “development” projects that
would make extensive use of local elites instead of French colonial officers.

The French government resisted American pressures at every turn, but the
outcome of this conflict was precisely the reproduction of colonial divisions of labor that
have endured, practices that both European governments and governments in the
postcolony re-enact to this day. One sees this re-enactment both in the dispossession of
local farmers and by the presence of American and European businesses in Africa,
lowering labor costs. And one sees it in the tacit and deliberate importation of workers
into the territorial boundaries of the hexagon and other European countries, as well as
Southeast Asian and Sub-Saharan African workers into former French colonies. In these
cases of imported colonialism, conflicts have emerged between native and immigrant
workforces. Once again, these conflicts tend to reproduce colonial relations rather than
unsettling them. Just as colonial governments did, national governments appease their
national workforces by producing legal rules and regulations that inhibit or preclude
transnational labor solidarity. Labor unions are subjected by these regulations as
participants in a nationalist workforce and therefore as categorically superior to racialized
OS workers. OS workers are, in turn, interpellated as an inferior species of labor either in
need of development and aid from the state and white-run labor unions or parasitical on
the state and the welfare of the national population, and therefore excludable from the polity (through incarceration, deportation, etc.) or both.

Although French and British officials finally agreed to abandon the terms “native” and *indigene* in the waning years of formal colonialism – terms used to distinguish colonial subjects from European citizens – they were reluctant to apply the term “worker” to what they still believed were essentially backward nomads and peasants (*paysans*) living in their former colonies. According to colonial officials, granting these people the status of workers was dangerous in at least two ways: first, it emboldened leaders of labor unions who demanded rights and benefits equal to those of European citizen workers, an unthinkable equality from the viewpoint both of colonial administrators and of metropolitan government officials, and second, it effectively urbanized and “proletarianized” primitive peoples who *belonged* in rural spaces of the African “bush.” As colonial subjects from French North and West Africa migrated to the French hexagon after World War II, colonial administrators migrated with them (see Chapter 2), transporting racial stereotypes and mechanisms of segregation and control from colony to metropole.

These mechanisms of colonial segregation and control made it difficult if not impossible for French unions to mobilize with colonial subjects residing in the metropole. Paradoxically, decolonization made prospects for working-class solidarity across already well-established colonial borders worse, not better. Citizens of independent former colonies became *foreign immigrants* in France. French unions and the French state therefore had new, apparently non-colonial and colorblind reasons for excluding these immigrants from the political community and thus from full participation in a civil society of which labor unions and movements were an integral, if weakened, part. As Chapter 2 discusses at length, the French government achieved this exclusion through mechanisms of surveillance, segregation, and control developed in the colonies and often carried out by the same colonial officials and police that regulated colonial subjects in the empire.

---

361 Cooper, 1996. 277.
362 AN F1A
While it strove to influence the course of economic recovery in Europe, the U.S. government was working with U.S.-based employers and unions to reconfigure its own imperial economy. In the process, government officials, technocratic experts of Taylorist management science, and U.S. companies experimented with new strategies of workforce segregation, hierarchization, and discipline; modes of governance that adapted colonial technologies from the pre-war era for use in the embryonic order of neoliberal states. As mentioned above, the coloniality of this adaptation is most striking in the case of the often neglected relationship of U.S. institutions and employers to U.S. colonial-subjects-cum-immigrants from the Philippines residing and working in the U.S. from the turn of the century until World War II, subjects who were labeled “nationals,” like Algerians in France. However, this coloniality was not limited to cases of formal colonialism. Indeed, one could argue that the Bracero Program of contract labor and subsequent employment of Chicanos and Asian immigrants by agribusiness applied equally innovative adaptations of colonial practices of workforce management. These practices maintained boundaries between domestic and racialized foreign workers and effectively prevented the latter from joining so-called “domestic” (read: citizen-led) labor unions movements.

Like all imperial and colonial policies and practices, these practices were flexible. As postcolonial historians Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler among others have demonstrated, imperial economies have endured in large part because empire-states and imperial corporations adapt colonial practices to account for changing circumstances. The adaptation of colonial technologies to control postcolonial immigrant workers in the metropole is an instructive example of this imperial flexibility. The following sections continue to trace these adaptations in an effort to explain the imperial and colonial constraints on labor movements and to assess the strengths and limitations of Marxian and Foucauldian analyses of the labor question from a postcolonial perspective.

The Coloniality of Workforce Management and Labor Relations in France and the United States during and after Decolonization

Following Robert Young, I have defined European imperialism broadly as the strategy and practice of political-economic domination on the part of European nation-
states of foreign spaces and peoples. “Typically,” Young argues, imperialism “is the deliberate product of a political machine that rules from the centre, and extends its control to the furthest reaches of the peripheries.” By contrast, colonialism functions “as an activity on the periphery, economically driven; from the home government’s perspective, it was at times hard to control…colonialism needs to be analyzed primarily as a practice: hence the difficulty of generalizations about it.”364 Despite this difficulty, postcolonial theorists and historians have identified several patterns of colonial practices. For the purposes of this chapter, it is important to recall at least these four: the racial subjection of colonizing and subject populations, the mysterious alterity of the colonized other, the systematic incorporation of these populations into imperial economies, and the simultaneous exclusion of these populations from national political communities, including but not limited to domains of citizenship.

Frederick Cooper’s masterful account of the “labor question” in French and British Africa during the period of decolonization after World War II concretizes these patterns and the crucial distinction between imperialism and colonialism in myriad ways. Although both Britain and France sought to rule their colonial possessions by design from the metropole, government officials often found themselves beholden to colonial administrators, private companies, and colonial subjects in the peripheral spaces of the colony. The need to delegate responsibilities to local representatives of the empire emerged out of a wide range of unanticipated conflicts and exigencies that local administrators argued could only be adequately understood by agents in the field. These agents demanded the support of their home governments even when that support would conflict with official imperial policy.

The conflict between imperialism and colonialism came to a head in debates over forced labor in French and British Africa. Although slavery had been abolished for over a century in most British and French colonies, forced labor remained a common colonial practice, especially when large companies faced labor shortages and when large farming operations needed immediate assistance in the midst of a harvest. When France and Britain succumbed to African labor union and international pressure to ban the practice, colonial administrators and private company officials protested, then proceeded to alter

364 Robert Young. Postcolonialism. 17.
their methods, making more extensive use of local chiefs and contracted African labor hunters to secure the needed temporary workers.\textsuperscript{365} Although brutal practices of recruitment and forced labor deviated from official government policy, the use of temporary workers adhered to dominant French and British imperial ideology and modes of governance. Debates continued to rage over whether Africans could be trained as skilled, permanent workers who might supply French and British colonial industries with labor in both colony and metropole. Many prominent officials believed that Africans could not and should not be “proletarianized,” and that their natural habitat was in the African bush where they could tend their own crops when their labor was no longer needed on colonial farms and in factories. By maintaining Africans’ status as a reserve army of unskilled, nomadic laborers, French and British officials effectively depoliticized African workforces, occluding their mobilization in transnational and international unions. By ensuring that African \textit{paysans} could tend their own crops for at least part of the year, the French government lessened the colonial burden of having to ensure their welfare.

When demands for industrial labor rose dramatically during WWII, French and British administrators worked with employers and labor leaders to control class antagonism by channeling worker demands through state-sanctioned labor unions such as the African CGT. The combination of urbanization and the migration of North and West Africans to the French metropole to work in the car production industry among others proved a challenge for colonial administrators and a dilemma for French citizens and union leaders. Joining with international unions, including both the radical communist-affiliated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTO) and the more moderate, anti-communist International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), African labor movements proved stronger and more difficult to control than French officials anticipated.\textsuperscript{366} The latter were stymied when African workers did not conform to their ascribed racial identities and expected patterns of work and behavior. As demands for standards of living equal to those of French citizens began to proliferate and to gain traction in the emerging post-colonial world order, rapid decolonization began to seem

\textsuperscript{365} Cooper, 1996.  
\textsuperscript{366} Cooper, 1996.
like a necessary means to protect the privileges of the French national workforce and to meet the criteria for aid of Marshall Planners.

Of course, decolonization did not simply and immediately put the genie of French liberal-democratic universalisms and commitments to equality back into the bottles of so-called “developing nations.” In addition to the continuing presence and pressure of African labor unions, the French government and French unions had to deal with the problem of the postwar mass migration of former colonial subjects to the metropole. Many of these workers, including Algerian nationals and French citizens, were actively recruited to fill industrial jobs left vacant by French soldiers. Others, the revered Harkis, were famously recruited to participate directly in the Free French War effort as soldiers. Historians agree that this Force Noire combined with the force of industrial workers from North and West Africa played a decisive role in the French liberation and subsequent economic recovery. At the same moment in history, American officials were recruiting dispossessed Mexican farmers en masse to participate in the allied war effort by picking cotton, corn, beets, and other essential agricultural products to feed and clothe a national population at war. In 1953, these bracero workers were each granted a certificate of honor thanking them for “producing the grain and cotton necessary for the force to defend the nation.”

What obligations did the U.S. and France have to these formerly colonial subjects who had become heroes of the French and U.S. republics? What responsibility did French and American unions have to organize alongside African workers and Latin American workers in the metropole?

Although most French unions promoted decolonization, like their U.S. counterparts, they tended to oppose the immigration of former colonial subjects from North and West Africa, at least until the uprisings of May of 1968. Like the AFL through the Depression era, between 1948 and 1961, the CGT passed a series of resolutions calling for an end to all immigration from French colonies. The PCF, FN, and the French Democratic Federation of Labor (CFDC) were more open, calling for immigration from Africa and Asia to be conditional on the ability of the government to

---


368 Some elements of the PCF were exceptions to this rule.
find the immigrants in question full employment in the metropole without displacing French workers.  

By the mid-1960s, the CGT, like the CIO in the U.S., had begun to take a softer stance more in line with the other unions and the PCP. Still, tensions between full French citizen-workers and African Muslims remained, and at times emerged as schisms within unions who had a difficult time organizing Muslim workers. As in the case of Filipino and bracero workers in the U.S., these tensions were exacerbated when North African Muslim immigrant workers began to organize independently of unions to protest racial and religious discrimination at large manufacturing plants, like those of Renault and Citroen. When these and Mexican and Filipino workers struck for fair wages and working conditions, along with recognition of and respect for their religious practices, the failure of unions to mediate the disputes further alienated French and American citizen union members from their Muslim and Latin American co-workers. French and American corporations capitalized on this division by continuing to work with government agencies to segregate their workforces, threatening immigrants who displayed “radical tendencies” (to join union, labor, or Islamist movements) with surveillance and possible repatriation, praising African immigrant workers who toed the company line, often favoring the latter over unionized French workers, and condemning those who organized workers through Islamic community centers and networks.

The extreme right of French party politics, particularly Jean Marie Le Pen’s National Front (FN), also took advantage of the apparent conflict between French citizen and Muslim immigrant workers. By some estimates, the FN had attracted more than 25% of French citizen workers by 1998. One can see the long-term electoral effects of this attraction in the strong showings of the FN in recent elections. In the U.S., the attraction is apparent in the rise of the Tea Party as a nationalist, anti-immigrant organization composed both of hardened capitalists and of disgruntled workers. In both cases, the “racism-nationalism dyad,” as Balibar has called the “excess of nationalism”

370 Archive docs. Check.
371 Schan, 1998; Archive documents.
characteristic of the modern nation-state, effectively neutralizes the conditions for transnational class struggle.\textsuperscript{372}

Strikingly similar dynamics can be seen in the context of the U.S. and its imperial economy during the same wartime and postwar period. Indeed one can draw direct parallels between the recruitment of forced and contracted labor in African colonies during the crises of labor shortages and war and the recruitment of Filipino colonials and Mexican contract workers during the crises of the Depression and WWII. Like African workers, Mexicans and Filipinos were recruited in remote, rural areas and employed, trained, and educated in peripheral spaces, albeit within the boundaries of U.S. territory. In this vein, Dorothy B. Fujita-Rony calls Seattle a metropole in the Pacific Northwest, similar in every respect to every other colonial metropole in Europe.\textsuperscript{373} To the extent that places like Seattle and California’s imperial valley were metropolitan centers that made use of colonized workers, they did not merely “mimic” European colonialism, as Ngai suggests in her analysis of “imported colonialism.” They reproduced colonial structures and practices.

Like African colonial subjects, Filipinos and braceros were segregated from citizen workforces, forced to live and work in precarious conditions, and discouraged with threats of violence and coercive deportation from agitating as workers for higher wages and better conditions. Perhaps most instructively for the purposes of this study, the employers of Filipino nationals and braceros, notably in the canning industry and in agriculture, functioned in almost precisely the same way as colonial officials and private employers in African economies: they invoked governmental authorization to exploit a cheap, racialized labor force and ignored provisions in government contracts that prohibited abuse of these workers.\textsuperscript{374} Like colonial officials and private colonial employers, their location in peripheral spaces enabled major growers and canners to


\textsuperscript{373} From Dorothy B. Fujita-Rony. American Workers, Colonial Power. “As I have stressed, Seattle was a colonial metropole, drawing men and women with the promises of education and the eventual return to a high-status job in the Philippines. The desire for education was a primary motivation for Filipina/os to emigrate to this country, and education provided a measure of status not only within the Filipina/o community but also in terms of how people perceived their own lives and work. Dorothy B. Fujita-Rony. American Workers, Colonial Power: Philippine Seattle and the Transpacific West, 1919-1941. 66.

\textsuperscript{374} Ngai, 2004; Calavita, 1992; Galarza. Merchants of Labor. 1969; Archival documents.
experiment with practices of cost-cutting segregation and super-exploitation. When workers complained, which they did more and more vocally and frequently in the early 1950s, or when government regulators intervened, which they rarely did, growers would invoke their role as local experts of agricultural production and as essential actors in the government’s efforts to avert food shortages and win wars. Vichy and Gaullist French officials and employers under their authority justified the dispossession of North Africans of fertile land and the employment of dispossessed North Africans in both colony and metropole with arguments similar to those deployed by their American counterparts.

The language of crisis is as essential in these peripheral spaces as it was in formal French and British colonies. As in these colonies, every harvest was a crisis during the wartime and postwar boom in agricultural production. Even during the Depression years, there never seemed to be enough arms and hands to pick certain crops (notably beets, cotton, and lettuce in the 1930s), a “stoop labor” occupation that employers deemed more suitable to Mexicans, Filipinos, and Asians (or African or Native Americans, if they were available) than for white American citizens. Of course, these crises were exacerbated by the need to feed both the troops and the world, a cross borne first by the Hoover administration as part of its war relief effort and carried on by Roosevelt and then Truman as part of the Marshall Plan during the early phases of the Cold War. Large growers thus had a great deal of political clout and leverage in their field of expertise, political capital that they readily used to maximize profits by employing politically vulnerable non-citizen workers and dividing workforces along lines of racial identity.

Les immigrés coloniale et Postcoloniale: North and West Africans in France, Filipino and Mexican Workers in the United States

The Marshall Plan’s promotion of neo-corporatism and neo-colonialism in Western Europe complicates narratives of American liberal individualism and government non-interference. It makes more sense in light of American colonial experiments in the Pacific throughout the first half of the 20th century and the quasi-corporatist pact binding the interests of Fordist-Taylorist employers, American citizen workers, and the state in a competition with European powers and the communist block. As in Europe, this pact has always been vulnerable to the transnational forces and
subjects engendered by imperialist practices of dispossession, trade, export, and, most strikingly, by the recruitment and subjection of immigrant workers. In developing these practices, U.S. government, corporate, and labor leaders were both emulating European powers and developing new seemingly post-colonial relationships of dependence, exploitation, and mutually assured economic and military security. U.S. officials, in turn, transferred their modifications of European modes of colonial rule back to Europe, aiding French and British efforts to maintain control over colonial subjects by transforming them into specialized immigrant workers and employees of multinationals seeking low-status, low-cost labor. The current configuration of tiered participation in imperial-national economies, which disguises enduring colonial modes of governance and divisions of labor, including its current crises and breakdowns, is largely a product of inter-Atlantic conversation and competition.

Post-Colonial Reconfigurations of Colonial Labor Hierarchies in the Metropole: The Bracero, the North African OS, and their Successors

At the same time as U.S. officials began explicitly to promote the formal decolonization of Africa and Asia by Western powers, and just as it began the process of granting formal independence to its own colony in the Pacific, officials in the Department of Labor and War Food Administration were working with the Immigration and Naturalization Service and Mexican governmental and consular officials to establish a program that would allow U.S. employers to maintain racial boundaries between hierarchically-organized workforces. In keeping with the Marshall Plan’s philosophy of modernization, the Bracero Program was justified as a wartime and postwar emergency measure that would both support the war effort and the postwar reconstruction by feeding a Western population that had lost workers to war, and would continue the process of modernizing and Americanizing non-Western subjects for full inclusion in the new U.S. dominated liberal-individualist world order (see Chapters 2 and 3). In its everyday practices, however, the program developed illiberal mechanisms of subjection and exclusion in ways that maintained borders and divisions of labor that separated Western citizen-subjects (in this case, U.S. and French citizens) from non-Western, foreign subjects (Mexican, Algerian, and other North and West African citizens, respectively).
As we have seen, the post-colonial importation and subordination of racialized workforces faced, and continues to face, a new array of challenges. First and foremost, segregation became more complicated in an ostensibly post-slavery and post-racial- apartheid era, especially given the physical proximity of racialized workforces in the metropole. We have seen how in these contexts various forms of inter-racial solidarities and intimate relationships develop among Euro-American citizens and supposedly inferior, yet-to-be-modernized immigrant subjects. These relationships undermine the practices that reproduce colonial divisions of labor. In doing so, they produce xenophobic anxieties that animate practices of recolonization.

Like arguments for – and also many arguments against – the incorporation of Filipino immigrants, many arguments for the incorporation of illiterate Mexicans were explicitly grounded in the racialist assumption that they were apolitical beings who were incapable of assimilation in an Anglo-American population. Like Filipinos, Mexican workers challenged these assumptions by integrating themselves into local communities and various sectors of the American economy, by forming transnational and intra-national communities, and by making political demands on the state both as workers and as national and transnational political actors. Insofar as these political and cultural formations undermined the presumed sovereignty of the nation-state, they exacerbated nativist anxieties and provoked spectacular campaigns of mass exclusion. Two of these campaigns, the Great Depression mass repatriation and Operation Wetback after World War II, are discussed below. As in the case of Filipinos, the structural contradictions and tensions between the empire-state’s impulses towards mass incorporation and mass exclusion of Mexicans fragmented both the state and the nation.

In the years following the quota-law restrictions prohibiting immigration from Asia and Eastern Europe, large growers across the United States sought a steady flow of workers from Mexico to support their expanding industry. To justify the exemption of illiterate Mexicans from the literacy test requirement for entry into the United States, growers assured Congress that, as an apolitical and “inferior race of people,” these workers posed no threat to the American population. Like Filipinos, they were needed to do undesirable jobs for low wages. A democratic representative of Texas agricultural employers who claimed “intimate” knowledge of Mexican laborers from a lifetime of
experience on the U.S.-Mexico border (his confederate parents raised him in Mexico after
the fall of the confederacy), Carlos Bee, summed up one among many conflicting
arguments in the growers’ case at the congressional hearings on the Temporary
Admission of Illiterate Mexicans in 1920:

[Y]ou cannot get…the average white man or the average negro to go in the forest
and grub the land with an ax or whatever else…He won’t do it. But the Mexican
is adapted for that special character of labor…the Mexican is specifically fitted
for the burdensome task of grubbing the fields. And our section is absolutely
prostrate…on its back unless this Congress gives some relief by which we can get
this labor – docile, peaceable, inoffensive, that has never interfered with our
institutions, not interfering with the legitimate employment of our own citizens,
but doing a class of work that our own citizens will not do.  

Reception centers on the U.S. side of the border drew explicitly on racialist tropes to
separate “ideal workers” from slackers, agitators, and otherwise unworthy candidates for
incorporation. According to one bracero’s account of a California reception center, the
“ideal worker” is “the right size…built right…a farmworker”:

He hasn’t any big ideas. He’s got the right attitude. He’s humble, not fresh or
Cocky. He’s an Indian type.

As Cohen notes, officials on both sides of the border were looking not for members of
working or middle classes, but specifically for “peasants” of this “Indian type.”
Inspections required agents to inspect the hands of candidates for callused skin that
would indicate years of hard, manual field labor. When they came across a man who did
not fit the profile of a hardened peasant, their response recalls Laskin’s account of
Filipinos who were “too assimilated” for their own good:

“This one is a type I don't care for,” he contended. “He's no peon. He's too well
dressed. Looks too intelligent. Almost white. He could pass for a Frenchman or
anybody. The trouble with those kind [sic] is that they're too ambitious. This is no
place for them. They end up telling off the foreman and there's trouble.”

The danger posed by “ambitious,” “intelligent” candidates was both economic and
geopolitical. In the context of the Cold War, any Mexican worker deemed capable of

375 Temporary admission of illiterate Mexican laborers: Hearings before the Committee on immigration
and naturalization, House of representatives, Sixty-sixth Congress, second session, on H.J. res. 271 relating
to the temporary admission of illiterate Mexican laborers P. 26
376 Deborah Cohen. Braceros: Migrant Citizens and Transnational Subjects in the Postwar United States
political thought and action was blacklisted as a communist threat and possible fifth column agitator. At the very least, these individuals were viewed like colonial subjects as susceptible to communist influence, both foreign and domestic (see subsequent chapter). Combined with the mechanisms for “development,” this underlying suspicion and pervasive surveillance of political action inhibited labor organizing among braceros. Nationalist narratives and the effective segregation of Mexican and domestic workforces inhibited, but did not preclude, transnational organization.377

Although especially important in its instructive expression of a hybrid border experience, Congressman Bee’s testimony is not unique. Indeed it is an exemplary articulation of the tensions of empire in the administrative, colonial spaces of border zones. Nearly every spokesman for growers’ interests at the hearings expressed some version of Bee’s conflicted understanding of the inclusive exclusion of Mexican workers. At this and subsequent hearings before the Committee on Immigration, growers and their advocates in congress promoted the education of Mexican workers, the humane incorporation of their families into local communities, rigorous segregation, surveillance, and control of Mexican groups, and their mandatory repatriation. Like Bee’s account, the contradictory assurances offered by growers expose the non-presence of the American population as a coherent whole. Accounts of Mexican integration, upward mobility, and value within the American economy and polity undermined efforts to rehabilitate a coherent narrative of national identity. Notwithstanding assertions of Mexican racial inferiority, the acknowledged formation of “intimate,” transnational relationships in the United States and the formation of transnational networks and communities exposed the artificiality and superficiality of legal mechanisms of exclusion. Mexicans had to be

377 Perhaps the greatest fear of nativist opponents of the program was not the illegal entry of “peons,” but rather the entry of those who might successfully infiltrate American society and leave the agricultural sector where they were confined. Like fears of Filipino upward mobility, these fears reflect the porous nature of physical and “quotidian” boundaries separated Braceros from their Anglo counterparts. In this vein, the 1953 President’s Commission warned: “The problem now is so much larger.... [Illegal immigrants] are doing great harm to our economic situation and industry.... In the interior of the country there are thousands who came over here as itinerant farmhands. They very soon learn our ways and our customs, and they infiltrate. They go into industry....” The Chief of the Border Patrol, Willard Kelly, was worried not only that undocumented workers were no longer confined to agriculture, but that they might contribute to the industrial labor movement: “Not all wetbacks come to work on farms.... Unknown thousands have entered the trades and industries. And, incidentally, many are members of our labor unions.” Deborah Cohen, *Braceros: Migrant Citizens and Transnational Subjects in the Postwar United States and Mexico*. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011). 41.
monitored, segregated, and controlled precisely because of their proven ability to move, to integrate themselves, to become multicultural, multilingual, hybrid subjects. As Bee and other growers implicitly acknowledged, Mexican workers had become a valuable part of the American workforce even as they did jobs Americans wouldn’t do. Efforts to help them integrate themselves into American society blurred the boundaries of the American political community. The imposition of laws and practices of exclusion were necessary to re-produce boundaries between citizens and these marginal members of the American workforce and society. Bee’s account gives the lie to narratives of national security that justified practices of exclusion, especially during times of economic crisis. Mexican integration had proven that there was nothing of cultural or political substance to secure. Law and the police actively produced boundaries that would not otherwise exist.

The movement of Mexicans out of agricultural work and into industry, and out of rural areas in the Southern and Western United States to urban spaces the Heartland exacerbated anxieties about the integrity, or lack thereof, of American workforces and by extension the American population. As early as the 1920s, Mexicans were working on railroads, on sugar beet fields, and in manufacturing industries, including meatpacking, as far north as St. Paul, Detroit, and Chicago. Archival documents illustrate the wide dispersal of Mexican immigrants and their families and the role of the state and non-profit organizations in their local recruitment and incorporation. The International Institute of Minnesota played a vital role in connecting Mexican workers with employers in the mining and sugar beet industries. Leaders and individual caseworkers advocated for individual Mexican workers’ rights and relayed grievances about exploitation, the frequent practice of withholding wages, and employer abuse to government agencies.

As in the case of Filipinos, the assumption of Mexican inferiority and natural capacity for hard manual labor was reinforced by social and juridical practices of segregation, surveillance, and control. As in the contemporary case of Mexican workers at Quality Pork in Austin, Minnesota, growers actively produced a bounded economic sector for apolitical Mexican subjects and a set of low-status jobs that domestic workers “would not do.” This segregation was achieved through a range of practices from
segregated housing, to selective recruitment by growers, to surveillance by the departments of Agriculture, Labor, and Justice.

The questions posed by critics and opponents of the employment of Mexicans draw attention to the contradictions of recolonization. Some opposition focused on the danger posed by Mexicans who were – or who might become – political “radicals” and subversives, joining labor unions or leading their own. These critics were reassured that the workforce in question was from a “starving” class of “peasants” and “peons,” and only wanted to make enough money to feed their families back in Mexico. This common response sparked another, opposing concern: that growers were advocating an un-American form of peonage that would degrade American labor standards. Some labor rights advocates forcefully condemned the “stoop labor” practices of cotton and sugar beet growers as forms of modern day slavery that undermined the principle of “free labor,” a central tenet of American exceptionalism.\textsuperscript{378} Representatives of growers responded to these criticisms by providing examples of the benefits and opportunities for advancement afforded by temporary work offered to Mexican peasants. In addition to piece wages, growers offered housing, training in modern agricultural production, training in proper sanitation practices, and, most importantly, an opportunity for education and Americanization. Within the space of a few sentences, the same representative quoted above assured congressmen at the hearing first that the only concern of Mexicans was “frijoles and tortillas (beans and corn bread)…[because] they are starving to death” and second that Mexican children were also capable of rapid progress and Americanization in schools provided by growers:

I have seen [Mexican] children, dirty, filthy, lazy little children, enter the first grade in my state and I have seen those same little children under the educational advantages offered them graduate at the head of their class in a short period of time. I say that to answer the question of Americanization.

Echoed by nearly all of the advocates for grower interests at the hearing, this observation openly acknowledged the assimilability of Mexicans, and particularly of Mexican children. The potential of children to compete with white children, and even in this case

\textsuperscript{378} Responding to an exclusion clause in the resolution calling for incorporated aliens to be deported after one year on pain of imprisonment and steep fines, congressman Raker charged that the resolution prevented the Mexican worker “from starting citizenship and makes him a peon.”
to outcompete them, graduating at the heads of mixed-race classes, was cited as evidence of growers’ benevolence and as evidence that Mexicans could be good, non-threatening members of local communities. Finding himself caught in a web of contradictions, the same representative, Carlos Bee, went on to articulate the constitutive tensions of the American empire as manifested in the peripheral practices of incorporation in the U.S. metropole. Realizing the implications of his arguments about Mexican assimilation and their fitness for American citizenship as loyal non-subversives, Bee backtracked to his earlier opposition to Mexican assimilation. His rhetorical acrobatics are worth quoting at some length, as they reflect the deep ambivalence of imperial expansion through imported colonialism. In response to questions from the committee chairman about Mexicans entering schools with white children, Bee expressed enthusiasm about their proven ability to excel and proceeded immediately to reassert his conviction that Mexicans would not and should not remain within U.S. territory:

Mr. Bee: I can take the poll books alone of Mexicans in my state, and we have thousands and thousands of them, and they will show their occupations as merchants, clerks, and salesmen, all occupations of that kind; they take their place right by the side of the native-born American citizens in their different avocations when they are given the advantage of an education.

Mr. Vaile: You are referring now to Americanized Mexicans?

Mr. Bee: To Americanized Mexicans; but it is the same class that would come in under this resolution. I am not pleading for those men to stay here, though I will say in that connection, supplanting what Mr. Hudspeth has said, that the Mexican has never been, gentlemen of this committee, in my country a radical. He cares nothing about the government in his primitive state; government means to him nothing at all except something to eat and a place to sleep. And when he does take advantage of our educational schools, I defy this record to show a Bolshevik, a Mexican radical, or a Mexican in any class who has endangered the institutions of our government – and I have known them intimately.

Bee’s assurances here might address concerns about political threats posed by Mexicans to the body politic, but they undermine his former and subsequent arguments about the impossibility of Mexican integration and correlative economic threats to the American workforce and population. In an instructive elaboration, Mr. Bee describes his “intimate” knowledge of Mexican immigrants, derived from his childhood experience in the peripheral space of mixed-race schools in Mexico and the United States, wherein the very

---

379 U.S. National Archives. College Park. MD
racial borders of national populations that he sought now to re-assert were blurred and crossed.

I went to school, may I say this gentlemen here where, as a small boy, 80 percent of the children in my school were Mexican children; and I have seen them grown into manhood and take their place by the side of your native born and I have never known them yet to be anything other than loyal American citizens.\footnote{U.S. National Archives. College Park, MD.}

The shifting pronouns in Bee’s account reflect both his own hybrid, transnational experience and his conflicting convictions about the Mexicans with whom he spent his formative years. These Mexicans were both worthy of full American citizenship and guaranteed never to attain it, both capable of excelling in American schools and bound to work in low-status, “land grubbing,” stoop labor sectors of the economy, both demonstrably assimilable and bound by chronic poverty and racial inferiority to return to Mexico when their one-year terms of work were over.

As stoop laborers, braceros faced precisely the same racially constituted structural obstacles to upward economic and social mobility within the territory of the metropole/receiving nation as did Filipinos in the U.S. and North Africans in France. Like Filipino and North African immigrant workers, braceros were valued for their role as specialized “arms,” as right-deprived “inputs” within a Western nation in crisis. As Alicia Camacho writes:

> If employers valued Mexicans’ supposedly unique predisposition to stoop labor, this designation worked against their social integration, since their very suitability for degraded work indicated their disqualification from full citizenship in the United States.\footnote{Alicia Camacho. (2008-07-24). \textit{Migrant Imaginaries}. Nation of Newcomers: Immigrant History as American History. (NYU Press short. Kindle Edition). 67.}

Wising to the strategic recruitment of specialized Mexican workers on the part of growers and industrial employers, citizen workers and union members in the meatpacking and canning industries opposed the employment of “un-free” Mexican contract workers. As in Austin today, this opposition to immigrant labor appeared to take the form of a three-pronged attack on employers, the state, and the bracero workers themselves. In fact, union opposition was animated primarily by racist nationalism and nostalgia for a
mythical time when employers were motivated by a patriotic duty to collaborate with state agencies to protect and empower the national workforce at the expense of competitors. Like Jews in Europe and the Soviet Union in the 20th century, and like North Africans working at Citroen and Renault in Paris and Marseilles, braceros were cast in popular debates as embodiments of new multinational modes of production and circulation, practices that undermined the living standards of Western national workforces. As scapegoats, braceros were vulnerable not only to the state and to their employers, but also to ordinary citizens. Like Filipinos, Mexican workers were forced to take refuge in employers’ work camps to avoid incarceration, deportation, and the violence of vigilante citizens, including local union members.

If the racism-nationalism dyad, as Balibar calls the excess of nationalism that undermines class struggle in the modern nation-state, were not enough to interpellate subjects within colonial divisions of labor, artificial physical barriers were erected to recreate conditions of distance between citizens and foreign subjects that characterized the colonial era. This distancing had a double function for large growers. As mentioned, it prevented social movements that crossed the colonial- and citizen-subject divide, thereby disempowering both groups of workers. Second, it inhibited the ability of Mexican workers to move into industrial sectors of the labor market, thereby preventing their having access to higher paying jobs and established industrial unions. As in European colonies and in Seattle, employers in Texas and Imperial Valley had jealously protected their unfettered control over their bracero workers in the peripheral spaces of work camps, complaining when too many contracted workers moved into the canning industries of the Pacific Northwest and into the meatpacking industries of the American Heartland. The legacies of these practices can be seen in the segregation of workforces both in the fields of large agribusinesses and in the factories of multinational industries.

Bracero camps isolated Mexican workers from their U.S. citizen counterparts and, in the name of protecting both workforces, cultivated mutual distrust and inhibited inter-workforce solidarity. The camps were poorly maintained and cramped – many braceros described sleeping eight to ten in a room large enough for a family of four. Access to water and other amenities were scarce, and subsistence food stuffs could only be

---

purchased from the company store, which overcharged their customer-workers, leaving
them with little money left over to send back to families in Mexico or to use for evening
and Sunday recreation.

To allay the fears and redirect the frustrations of citizen workers, a series of
regulations were added to contracts to ensure that braceros would neither be trained in
industrial farming techniques nor aspire to become modern Western agricultural
producers like their white citizen superiors. Explicitly and egregiously contradicting the
program’s civilizing mission, braceros were commonly banned from using tractors and
modern agricultural equipment.\(^{383}\) Manuals and illustrated narratives of “Muchacho”
bracero life gave prospective braceros the impression that they would learn modern
techniques and import them back to their home communities.\(^ {384}\) In reality, the contracts
reserved higher-status and higher-skilled jobs for Anglo-American citizens. Tied as they
were to particular employers, braceros were banned both *de facto* and *de jure* from
entering into more stable, higher-wage professions in the industrial sector. During the
war emergency, the U.S. government was careful to avoid setting precedents that might
encourage braceros to compete for full inclusion in both the national economy and the
national polity. The controversy caused by the importation and super-exploitation of
braceros was mitigated through emergency bordering practices imposed by none other
than the War Food Administration. As Erasmo Gamboa explains:

> [M]indful of the mounting controversy, the WFA expressly banned braceros
from employment in food processing plants after 1945, except when the
imported men were idle and other workers were not available. In order to
determine when Mexican nationals could be employed in canneries, the WFA
gave local workers first priority, followed by transported interstate labor,
prisoners of war, and finally braceros. According to the WFA’s guidelines, all
workers in each category had to be exhausted before hiring from the next group
was permitted. The WFA’s directive seemed to work well to assuage the
farmers concern that too many contracted laborers were going to canneries, but
the competition for braceros did not end here. Frequently food processors were
permitted to hire braceros on the condition that they would release them
immediately to farmers...Finally, in July 1945, secretary of agriculture Clinton
P. Anderson moved to end the strained relations between canners, farmers, and
local workers. Hereafter, he ordered, braceros were prohibited from
employment, under any pretext, outside of fieldwork. Actually the

\(^{383}\) [http://www.farmworkers.org/centreng.html](http://www.farmworkers.org/centreng.html)

\(^{384}\) See Appendix
The overwhelming majority of the workers were employed as stoop labor and similar jobs all along. The USDA's decision inextricably locked the Mexican men into the least desirable types of agricultural employment with little opportunity to improve their skills.

On the one hand, legal sanction for the economic and social segregation of citizen and non-citizen workers reified class boundaries that ran along lines of racial-national identity, reproducing colonial divisions of labor. On the other hand, the necessity of the work done by the subordinated racial class, braceros, like that done by La Force Noire in Europe, was never in question. As the certificates of honorable contributions to the war effort mentioned above suggest, and as Gamboa notes here:

Although the jobs reserved for the Mexicans were generally despised, they were nonetheless essential first links in the robust war food production chain. In this capacity the Mexican workers made a most vital and measurable contribution to the total war effort.  

The urgency with which employers on both sides of the Atlantic expressed a need for permanently “specialized” immigrant workers during the period of decolonization reflected a transformation of colonial discourse in the contexts of overlapping states of emergency, namely, the Second World War, the period of decolonization – including wars of national liberation and struggles for civil rights and greater inclusion in national polities – and the dawn of the neoliberal era of deregulated trade and multinational competition.

The crisis of the Second World War served as a catalyst for the transition from formal colonial to neoliberal imperial economies, regimes of “development,” and new transnational colonial divisions of labor. The wartime and postwar economies of France and other European countries justified the recolonization and super-exploitation of foreign subjects in metropolitan spaces and the disciplining of national workforces on the

---

385 “In Idaho, they thinned 14% and harvested 31% of the sugar beet crop, painted and harvested 22% of the lettuce crop, harvested 60% of the sweet corn acreage, and 15% of the onion production. Oregon workers harvested 40% of the sugar beets, and 60% of all cucumbers. In Washington nonlocal laborers and an average of 13% the sugar beets as well as harvesting 29% of asparagus, 31% of the canning peas, 90% of the sweet corn production, 2% of the apples, and 70% of the grape crop. This category of workers provided substantial inputs of labor with other crops as well. Firsters made up the largest group of workers transported from all areas to the Pacific Northwest by the extension service and labor branch. In 1946 they account for 70% of all local workers.”
grounds that the survival of the national population depended on these practices. As we have seen, the Cold War and the War on Terror have extended the discursive force of these existential crises indefinitely, legitimating neocolonial development regimes (structural adjustment, etc.), new forms of dispossession, and the recolonization of racialized workforces in Western nation states and the modern nation-state more generally. Wartime harvests enabled states and agents of capital to adapt colonial mechanisms of control in the peripheral spaces of work camps and factory floors. After the war, employers refined these mechanisms under the auspices of postwar reconstruction (of “developed” Western countries) and development (of former colonies).

The agribusiness and large grower harvest-as-existential-crisis remains an animating force for the employment and colonial production practices of agribusiness. Through the dispossession of small family farmers in both the West and the Global South, agribusiness has effectively produced a sector of low-status, OS jobs for specialized workers, the so-called “jobs Americans won’t do.” Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, food crises have dovetailed with the intensification of neoliberal competition among multinational corporations and correlative imperatives of transnational production, distribution, and circulation. In this context, sites of capital accumulation have proliferated along with core-periphery systems within nation-states wherein peripheral spaces continue to function as colonial spaces. These camps ought not to be mistaken for “spaces of exception” in Agamben’s sense of the term, although the rule of law is certainly suspended within these peripheries. Rather, migrant camps reproduce colonial worksites wherein employers maintain intimate relations with subordinated, nomadic workers, excluding these workers from the public sphere of political debate and insulating their production practices from all forms of oversight. Workers in the spaces are not fully documented, known, and monitored by the state, and therefore are more like colonial subjects than former citizens stripped of rights and transformed into bare life.

Work camps in the U.S. still isolate improperly documented migrant workers from Latin America and Asia, impeding access of immigrant rights activists and labor union organizers. Moreover, armies of impoverished workers remain in reserve in former European colonies as well as in the suburbs of Paris and in port cities like Marseilles and
Calais. These modern colonial subjects continue to be used by the state and agents of capital to discipline Western workforces. As such, they both undermine narratives of national identity and solidarity and reanimate practices of colonial bordering developed during periods of formal colonialism and decolonization.

From Labor Politics to Border Politics: A Postcolonial Reconsideration of “Immigration Crises” in the Peripheries of the Metropole

The Mower County Chapter of the Minnesota Coalition for Immigration Reduction (MCFIR) holds its monthly meeting in the seminar room of the Austin Public Library. The meetings bring together concerned residents of Austin and the surrounding area to discuss the “immigration crisis” and to coordinate future actions. The MCFIR gained notoriety in September of 2007 when they invited Ron Branstner, a member of the Minutemen Civil Defense Corps, to speak about the importance of enforcing immigration law and tightening border control in rural Minnesota.386 “This group in front of me is part of the greatest generation,” Branstner declared, praising his audience and invoking a shared military history. He called on rural Minnesotans to “educate the younger generation” about the dangers posed by enemies of the nation, foreign and domestic. According to the local reporter who covered the event, the audience was “fired up on the issue.” “This is going to be a third-world country soon,” warned one attendee. “They’re taking our jobs,” declared another. As he left the room, a third man encouraged the group to “buy bullets.” The border had come to Austin.

On January 15th, 2008, the MCFIR gathered for its first meeting of the New Year.387 Enthusiastic members of the “greatest generation,” some of them sporting army paraphernalia, others wearing “P-9” insignias to commemorate the now-defunct local of the United Food and Commercial Workers Union, filled the small room. There was reason for optimism and excitement. Governor Pawlenty had just signed two executive orders requiring local police and businesses to cooperate with federal immigration officials in efforts to identify, incarcerate, and deport illegal aliens. In collaboration with

386 The meeting was covered by the Post-Bulletin’s Karen Colbenson. 9/18/2007. The article is available online here: http://news.postbulletin.com/newsmanager/templates/localnews_story.asp?z=28&a=308246
387 I had the opportunity to attend this and several other public meetings at the Austin Public Library. The account presented here is derived from my own notes, but the event was also covered by the Austen Daily Herald.
national organizations, the MCIR had lobbied long and hard for precisely this kind of executive action. They now had unprecedented power in their role as “whistleblowers”: a self-deputized surveillance appendage to the domestic security apparatus. For some MCIR members, the news seemed too good to be true. “Is this just talk like usual? Or is this binding?” The leaders of the meeting responded emphatically, in unison: “It’s the law!”

Three decades ago, few could have imagined these assemblies of would-be federal deputies joining forces with the state and calling on local corporations to fall in line. In 1985, Austin was in the midst of an historic dispute between the local workforce and its primary employer, Hormel Foods, Inc. In the winter of 1984, tension over decreasing wages and poor working conditions in the Austin plant boiled over into violence. Workers from the formally powerful local P-9 in Austin defied national union recommendations and struck for a fair contract. The strike was ruthlessly broken over the course of several months. Families split under relentless corporate pressure, as some members crossed picket lines in order to support dependents. Thousands of Hormel employees lost their jobs to permanent replacement workers, and many lost their homes. Others were forcibly removed, beaten, or incarcerated by police. In a move that foreshadowed federal techniques of immigration control, National Guard soldiers were called on to break up union blockades. By many accounts, towns like Austin and Worthington were “torn apart” by the strikes.  

A well-known event in the history of U.S. labor struggles, the defeat is widely considered to mark a turning point in the rise of global neoliberalism and the corresponding decline in the power of labor unions and collective bargaining. Significantly, the rifts that emerged in this period were largely among segments of the native-born, predominantly white inhabitants of small towns.

How did a town known for the political strength of its local union and the relative wealth of its workforce adapt to these globalizing transformations? Are there connections between the P-9s broken strike and contemporary political activity related to immigration and “imported colonialism”? What accounts for the recent resurgence of anti-immigrant

---

389 The Hormel strike is chronicled in several important texts, including the award-winning 1991 documentary *American Dream.*
390 Before turning to immigrant recruits, Hormel’s strikebreaking tactics made extensive use of flexible local labor displaced by agribusiness and downsizing.
nationalism and the proliferation of local “border control” organizations in the meatpacking towns of the American Midwest? What is left of union politics in these towns, and how has it accommodated, or excluded, the influx of immigrant labor? What do local residents regard as the stakes in current political debates on immigration policy and practice, and how do these views relate to their views of labor history, of Hormel Foods, and of big business generally? How, precisely, have the lines of political antagonism shifted since the ’85 strike, and what effects has this had on experiences of local, national, and transnational solidarities and movements?

One might expect that, in the long wake of P-9’s devastating defeat, anger and resentment originally directed at Hormel Foods and at strikebreakers would be mobilized by nationalist “populists” to attack immigrants in the same ways that these energies were redirected towards the bodies of Filipino colonials and Mexican braceros. In other words, one might expect that the resurgence of anti-immigrant nationalism might have filled the political void left by the defeat of local labor unions and by the faceless forces of global capitalism. As town, regional, and industry-specific workforce solidarity waned, strategic political actors – self-identified “populists” such as Lou Dobbs and Patrick Buchanan – redirected resentment and fear in ways that would advance a right-wing, nationalist, and explicitly anti-immigrant agenda.391

Although conversations with longtime Austin residents confirm this suspicion in some respects, the reality of Austin’s transformation is far more complex than this simple narrative would suggest. Encounters between local Mower County residents and recent immigrants have produced ambiguous and ambivalent perceptions of immigrant workers and their families. This is apparent in the rhetoric of, among others, staunch advocates of “immigration reduction” and militarized border control, local elected politicians of all parties and stripes, and the leaders of the recently rehabilitated UFCW local union, whose membership includes recent immigrant workers.

The foundations of the current “immigration crisis” in small-town Minnesota were laid long before the influx of immigrant labor. Current debates about the “immigration crisis” deflect attention from the prior fragmentation caused, in part, by

neoliberal economic policies and practices and by conflicts between meatpacking industry workers, on the one side, and big business and the state, on the other. Second, in response to perceived threats posed by immigrant labor, new alliances have been formed between the nation-state (government, federal agents, police, etc.) and local U.S. citizens who are current and former participants in the labor movement. Furthermore, as the relative power of local unions has declined, and as immigrant labor from Africa and Latin America has dramatically transformed local demographics, attachments to relatively autonomous local political communities have come into increasing competition with attachments, on the one hand, to the nation-state and, on the other hand, to transnational communities. The competition between local and national attachments is apparent in tensions between organizations such as the new local UFCW and nationalist anti-immigrant groups like MCFIR, but they are also apparent within organizations and even within the perspectives of individuals, such as local politicians. Resurgent nationalism (or rather, nation-statism) is partly a product of the failure of local communities to sustain autonomy and comparative advantage within the national and global economy, e.g., through labor struggles. However, attachments to local communities endure, albeit in forms that are significantly different than local attachments of the past.

Finally, racial and cultural conceptions of national identity and belonging operate as mobilizing forces in small-town Minnesota, but these conceptions are obscured by juridical discourses of legality, law enforcement, and economic regulation. In general, the juridical and economic discourses surrounding immigration – e.g., debates about what constitutes “illegal” immigration, what rights ought to be granted to illegal or “undocumented” “aliens,” and whether or not immigrants are economically necessary to “do jobs Americans won’t do” – have obscured underlying political problems related to political economy and national identity. In particular, they obscure political questions about who precisely ought to be excluded from national and local polities and what constitutes legitimate political grounds for this exclusion.

392 In other words, whereas the dominant forms of political identification and mobilization in rural counties were local, i.e., city-wide and county-wide (e.g., Austin and Worthington and Mower County) and often industry-specific (e.g., specific to the meatpacking industry), during the 1970s and 1980s, rising nationalist sentiment has increased pressure on federal immigration agencies to intervene on behalf of a national political community.

393 See Rachleff, 1999.
Conclusion

Through an interpretation of several interviews with politicians, labor union officials, and leaders of immigration reduction and immigrant rights organizations, I’ve noticed three significant patterns. First, fear and resentment of immigrants in the U.S. and France today stems from economic anxieties about the loss of a privileged position for white national subjects within local, national, and global economies. Second, although labor union movements have sought to build transnational networks of solidarity in response to neoliberal economic restructuring, in part by incorporating immigrant workers into their ranks, they continue to display a commitment to border control as a means of protecting national, regional, and local workers. As local union and local community solidarity have been torn apart by multinational corporate practices, forms of national labor solidarity have grown in strength. Third, local politicians are compelled by imperatives of economic expediency to do the bidding of powerful corporations like Hormel Foods, but they must also negotiate the tensions among the imperatives of corporate competition, nationalist efforts to block the recruitment of low-wage immigrant labor, and increasing sympathy for increasingly integrated immigrant communities. They do so, in part, by resorting to familiar, legalistic tropes about the necessity both of economic growth and of law enforcement. Finally, transnational mobilization of local immigrant labor complicates dominant conceptions of national borders, revealing the ambivalent attitude of national workforces towards specialized immigrant workers, and opening opportunities for transnational mobilization.

The following chapter seeks to uncover some of the deeper political meanings that anti-political representations obscure. I attempt to illustrate how these meanings bear on questions of political economy and labor, thereby denaturalizing the terms of popular debates about immigration.
Chapter 5:
Ambivalence, Breakdowns, and Transpolitical Resistance: Emergenc(i)es of Colonial Immigration Management

What theoretical racism calls ‘race’ or ‘culture’ (or both together) is therefore a continued origin of the nation, a concentration of the qualities which belong to the nationals ‘as their own’; it is in the race of ‘its children’ that the nation can contemplate its own identity in the pure state. Consequently, it is around race that it must unite, with race – an ‘inheritance’ to be preserved from any kind of degradation – that it must identify both ‘spiritually’ and ‘physically’ or ‘in its bones’ (the same goes for culture as the substitute or inward expression of race).

Étienne Balibar

The destruction of the racist complex presupposes not only the revolt of its victims, but the transformation of the racists themselves and, consequently, the internal decomposition of the community created by racism.

Étienne Balibar

Introduction

As the preceding chapters have indicated, the ambivalence of colonial discourse opens avenues for transnational and intra-national solidarities, especially in the era of global capitalism and in the context of Western nation-states that have recruited and incorporated immigrant workers en masse, narrowing the gap between Western citizen and Southern subject workforces and threatening to wipe out the privileges of citizenship within Western nations. In each postwar context explored here – policing, active recruitment and integration, and labor unionism – these avenues have been repeatedly blocked by overlapping discourses of racist nationalism, capitalist competition, and practices that recuperate colonial subjects and divisions of labor. Given the emergence/emergency of apparently strong transnational “interests” (e.g., the international depression of wages, rising unemployment, lower standards of living, increasingly radical disparities of wealth in both the “cores” and the “peripheries” of the world system, existential imperatives to migrate, etc.), however, one might expect that transnational solidarities and social movements would still be able to mobilize political communities in ways that challenge the hegemony both of the colonial empire-state and of the biopolitical nation-state. As this chapter will demonstrate, these “transpolitical” formations do indeed continue to emerge out of the contradictions and crises of imported

---

Ngai and Balibar both use the term “imported,” but as I’ve attempted to show this doesn’t quite capture the phenomenon in its complexity.
colonialism and capitalism and through the subversive initiatives of transpolitical communities and social movements.\textsuperscript{395}

It is also clear, however, that statist biopolitics and colonial modes of immigration management have proven formidably resilient at a moment when the privileged position of Western citizen-subjects in the global division of labor appears more precarious than ever. This phenomenon cannot be explained adequately simply by reference to the overwhelming hegemony of biopolitical discourse, although it does testify to the flexibility and robustness of that discourse, which is a central concern in this chapter. Biopolitical regimes must always respond to local, transnational, and global political problems, including demands for autonomy and sovereignty, and to the emergence of non-state sites of authority such as those produced by the immigrant-phobic right, by advocates for immigrant workers’ rights, and by immigrant subjects themselves (e.g., the camps in Calais, the Sans Papiers movement, and support networks and informal labor unions of immigrant workers in the U.S.). The discussion below is in large part an effort to identify how political demands are subsumed within the biopolitical discourse of the nation-state in ways that obscure – \textit{but that never erase} – the original political content of the demand.\textsuperscript{396}

In short, this chapter seeks to identify and to theorize both the resilience of biopolitical discourse and its vulnerability to what Paul Silverstein has called resilient transpolitical communities and demands. I return to the themes of biopolitical crises and colonial ambivalence with a new emphasis on political resistance both to biopolitical regulation and to colonial modes of governance. My hope is that this discussion will open avenues for further critical-postcolonial studies of immigration management and bordering practices in the modern nation-state. At the very least, in line with Lisa J.

\textsuperscript{395} Whether or not the intensification of tensions between imperialist expansion and national security, and the correlative ambivalence of colonial discourse, has reached a tipping point that the nation-state, the empire-state, and the West-Global South division of labor cannot survive is an open question, one that calls for predictions that are beyond the scope of the current study.

\textsuperscript{396} To concretize this rather abstract point, take the familiar example of incomplete subsumption discussed in Chapter 2: right-wing demands for local authority to make and enforce immigration laws (e.g., Arizona’s SB 1070 and its copycats), linked to condemnations of “big [federal] government,” consistently morph into demands for an enlarged state apparatus to make and enforce “comprehensive” federal immigration laws by increasing budgets for federal border control programs and by deputizing local police and civilians as federal agents-of-the-state, effectively authorizing them to protect the national population as a biological body. I return to this example and others below.
Disch’s rehabilitation of Arendtian modes of politicization, I hope this effort “raises awareness” of the violent coloniality underlying the apparently “banal,” biopolitical practices of immigration management, law, and order.397

With regard to this second objective, I follow leads established by intellectuals and activists who strive to produce solidarity among disempowered Western citizen workers and the victims of new colonial regimes of immigration management and border control. Included in this latter category are colonial subjects and their descendants, “illegal” and “irregular” migrants, migrants in detention facilities, people vulnerable to incarceration or deportation because of their status as aliens or their skin tone or both, in short, to people living on borders: people who exist both inside and outside the hegemonic order of the national state and who are used by state agencies to develop criteria of exclusion in negotiations with full citizen members of the national population. Transnational solidarities challenge national boundaries and the boundaries of Europe and the West, and can produce new transnational political communities. These communities can and have moved against the grain of the discourse of the nation-state towards a more thoroughly open conception of citizenship. The work performed by immigrant subjects in Europe and the U.S. as well as new “receiving nations” like Singapore and China vitiates the fantasy that national populations are unitary, self-sufficient, and thus potentially sovereign. In fact, national borders are always vulnerable to political contestation and they frequently shift in ways that either foreground or erase the dependence of the national population and the national state, as well as national and multinational corporations, on non-citizen workers (e.g., when new temporary work visas are introduced during labor shortages or when expulsion decrees are declared at moments of high unemployment).

Rethinking The Politics of Biopolitics: Sovereignty and States of Emergency/Exception

One might think that immigration enforcement should be an “easy case” for biopolitical theories of border control. So-called “illegal” immigrants are a right-less population: they lack a political voice and their legal status makes them an easy target for governmental regulation. Further, immigration regulation is a technical field, involving

397 Hannah Arendt and the Meaning of Politics.
surveillance and enforcement through bureaucracies that seem above the political fray. Immigrants should be easily subjected to biopolitical regulation. If they are not, it raises significant questions about the way biopolitics has been theorized and applied.

Recent developments in Arizona surrounding the legislation and implementation of Senate Bill 1070 and Federal Law 287(g), along with the banning of ethnic studies departments in public institutions of higher education, complicate dominant understandings of biopolitical rule. Whereas dominant conceptions of biopolitics would predict relatively uniform demands for, and acceptance of, the rational regulation of immigrant bodies for the sake of the life and well-being of the body politic (i.e., the American population), the politics of immigration and border control display divergent, antagonistic, and often contradictory tendencies. These political tendencies unsettle, at the same time as they animate, biopolitical modes of governance.

The discourse surrounding Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070) provides instructive examples of the current politics of immigration control. Unlike proponents of segregation and exclusion in debates over quota laws in the 1920s, and unlike expressly political exclusions of communists and other potential “enemies of the state,” the recruitment of contracted workers from Latin America in the 1950s (e.g., under the auspices of the Bracero Program), and segregation from Reconstruction through the 1960s, today’s proponents of immigration enforcement eschew racial categories in favor of a juridical conception of national belonging. Notwithstanding evidence that foregrounds the racial effects of SB 1070 and 287(g), current arguments for enforcement promote a colorblind vision of citizenship that interpellates national subjects primarily as legal entities (as opposed to members of racial, ethnic, national, or political groups). While underlying xenophobic racism and racialism continue to shape understandings of nationality in highly consequential ways, colorblind juridical arguments call for statist practices that redefine nationality in terms of documentation and that monitor the population as a legally-bound and bordered body.

Demands for enforcement, then, call for an analysis of the biopolitics of immigration management. The object of immigration enforcement legislation is to

398 Doty, Huysmans.
399 Foucault and Iron Cage of Reason Theorists.
protect the life of the national population by monitoring its members (citizens) and non-members through technologies of documentation, surveillance, and control. The anti-racial, anti-racist, and anti-political rhetoric articulated by advocates of immigration enforcement attests to the biopolitical forces that animate the codification and implementation of border control.

Previous chapters have highlighted manifestations of the resilience of statist biopolitics and colonial modes of governance in the fallback position of xenophobic nationalism taken by labor unions and even socialist and communist movements and parties in moments of economic crisis, e.g., the Communist Party in France; in the truncated humanism and colonial civilizing missions of colonial-agencies-cum-immigrant-aid organizations and of government departments and ministries of labor; and in policing practices designed, in Partha Chatterjee’s words, to fulfill the “overwhelming requirements of the state-representing-the-nation.”

These dynamics appear to validate a common reading of Foucault’s account of the immense productive power of biopolitical discourse. According to this interpretation, the imperative, “society must be defended,” although always enacted through the repetition of everyday micro-practices in peripheral spaces – in the “capillaries” of society, in asylums, in prisons, in work camps, in colonies, in army barracks, etc. – and then centralized and institutionalized within state agencies and organizations, now appears to function “top down,” as the Nazi regime seems to function in Foucault’s account. The biopolitical state reconfigures political demands from across the left-right spectrum as biopolitical demands for national health and security. That is to say, it imposes biopolitical imperatives on an already-disciplined, docile population of subjects who, in turn, willingly open themselves up to the state’s regulatory agencies and regimes. On this account, it seems as though the state now successfully appropriates political demands for local and transnational self-determination into demands for an enlarged state grounded in statistics that measure the health of the national population in terms of macro-bio-econometrics, dollars, and cents (GDP, GNP, etc.) as opposed, for instance, to border-blurring intimacies and solidarities (inter-racial labor struggles, miscegenation and family

---

bonds, etc.), to valuations of the strength of local communities, to levels and modes of
democratic participation among community residents, to cosmopolitan openness to
difference, to “social capital,” to social justice, to cultural and linguistic diversity, to
economic, social, and political equality, to the strength of non-national social movements
and alternatives to state authority, to other potentially non-national, “transpolitical” goals.

Following postcolonial theorists and historians, I have attempted to offer an
alternative perspective, one that is more in line with the Foucault that calls for the
analysis of non-sovereign peripheral practices and the everyday subjugation of political
subjects and of alternative modes of knowledge production (e.g., in *Madness and
Civilization, The History of Sexuality*, and *The Order of Things*) than with the Foucault
that focuses on apparently top down “state racism” at the end of *Society Must be
Defended*. I have argued that the ambivalence of colonial discourse is evident in the
contradictions and crises of biopolitical discourse in the European Metropolis.

Biopolitical discourse presumes that citizen-subjects are *already known* by the state and,
moreover, *desire to be known* and protected by the state. By contrast, immigrant subjects,
like colonial subjects, cannot be fully known by the state (perfect knowledge of them
would be both impossible and undesirable, given the importance of maintaining their
alien status), but must be visible *enough* to monitor and control without making them full,
documented members of the national population. Given this colonial double standard,
biopolitical discourse cannot possibly achieve the kind of *total* surveillance and control
towards which its agents aspire.

In the following sections, I continue to foreground the political precursors to
contemporary biopolitical retrenchments in the context of the enduring system of empire
states. Throughout, I attempt to foreground the corresponding vulnerabilities of
biopolitics to political resistance, including anti-colonial resistance. I seek to identify the
ways in which originally intra-national and transnational *political* demands have been
channeled in statist, *biopolitical* directions, that is, into anti-political demands for the
state, as a bureaucratic, technocratic, and anti-political machine, to intervene on behalf of
the life and health of the national population as such. The central paradox of the
contemporary phenomenon of biopolitical channeling is that state responses to demands
for intervention often originate as demands for sovereignty, democracy, and, especially in
the U.S. case, for local autonomy and local control. In other words, they originate as political demands for new kinds of political community and political authority that fall outside the current bureaucratic and technocratic projects of the state as a regulatory force and defender of the national population conceived as a biological body. In short, this chapter examines the politics before biopolitics or, perhaps more accurately, the paradoxical politics of biopolitics. I argue that this paradox emerges partly out of the ambivalence of colonial discourse described in previous chapters and partly out of the quasi-political demands that emerge in the context of colonial practices in the metropolitan periphery, demands that are always incompletely disqualified, subjugated, or subsumed within the biopolitical discourse of the nation-state.

In the broad context of European and American party politics, we see these biopolitical transformations at work in the way self-identified leftists in Europe and the United States frame arguments for immigrant rights, paths to citizenship, guest-worker visas, and amnesty for immigrants and refugees in terms of the biopolitical benefits bestowed by these immigrants as occupants of subordinate positions within the national economy on the national population, i.e., as people “who do [low wage and low status] jobs Americans won’t do,” who pick crops, clean latrines, take care of the elderly and sick, etc. On the anti-immigrant right, arguments that originate as condemnations of “big government,” e.g., from self-identified members of the Tea Party, and demands for sovereignty and local autonomy are reframed in terms of the costs of immigrants to the biopolitical body of the national population (e.g., as criminals and drains on public welfare programs) and the need for massive government interventions, e.g., massive increases in border control, high-tech walls and fences, and elaborate federal-local networks of surveillance.401

Biopolitical imperatives also split political parties and create strange bedfellows that blur the left-right political binary and that contribute to the enduring ambivalence of immigration discourse as a colonial discourse. For instance, French socialists and communists and American labor union leaders articulate positions on immigration reform that resemble those of the anti-immigrant right, at least insofar as they call for the

401 Wendy Brown.
protection of the hard-won privileges of the French and American citizen *workforces as such* against the potentially wage-depressing and unsustainable influx of low-cost workers from the “Third World.”

By contrast, neoconservatives in the U.S. Republican Party and neo-colonial, center-right parties in France often find themselves in an uncomfortable, partial alliance with internationalist socialists, communists, and anarchists, as fellow advocates of so-called “open borders.” The latter’s efforts to mobilize new transnational political subjects are consistently suppressed not by a monolithic state apparatus in the service of the population or of Capital, but rather *in the conflict* between the neoliberal-neoconservative capitalist “right,” who call on the empire-state to support the recruitment of foreign labor and the exploitation of foreign resources, and the nationalist left (trade unions, etc.) in alliance with the nationalist right (quasi-fascist nationalist organizations such as the *Front Nationale* in France and immigrant-phobic Tea Party and Minutemen followers of Ideologue Patrick Buchanan, Senator Tom Tancredo, Arizona Sheriff Joe Arpaio, etc. in the U.S.), who call on the national state to insulate the privileges of the national population. The empire-state, performing the role of national state, can moderate these social conflicts by reducing them to biopolitical skirmishes about how best to care for the health of the national population (e.g., by suggesting that the recruitment of immigrant labor is vital to the superior health of the national population, who no longer have to participate in menial labor), but it cannot ever adequately suppress the transpolitical communities and demands that are produced by the conflicts between expansive inclusion and nationalist exclusion and from which these conflicts spring. Thus, the apparently partisan political conflicts over immigration in the West are both a manifestation of the ambivalence of the colonial discourse of immigration management and a *source* of that ambivalence. In the face of the conflict between nationalism and neoconservative neoliberalism, agents of the empire state cannot discern what the population, as a coherent political community, wants.

---

402 Of course, as the left wing of this alliance will be quick to point out, neoconservatives, unlike open border advocates on the left, demand an openness to the controlled importation of low-cost labor power and the export of jobs and sites of production for sake of increasing rates of capital accumulation, whereas leftists, at least in principle, would argue for a borderless Fifth International: an anti-state, anti-capitalist mobilization of proletarians as a fundamentally human class of producers that would transcend all parochial nationalisms. It is precisely this type of solidarity that is repeatedly disqualified as a possible alternative to the status quo by the conflict between the nationalist left and the neoconservative right.
I take Balibar’s diagnosis of the Western nation-state’s “immigration complex” as another way of articulating the racialization that constitutes the biopolitical discourse of the nation-state. More than what Foucault does in Society Must be Defended and in his other lectures and writings on biopolitics and biopower, Balibar, like Homi Bhabha and other Postcolonial Theorists, foregrounds the enduring ambivalence and aporias of this process of racial subject formation, an ambivalence that emerges in peripheral spaces and in the process of what Foucault, in Security, Territory, Population, calls the “aleatory” effects of regulated “circulation” across the boundaries of the nation-state and for the sake of the health of the national population. Balibar foregrounds the paradoxical slippages in the discourse of the nation-state as they are manifested in the discourse of immigration management:

The very categories of immigrant and immigration conceal a second paradox. They are categories which are simultaneously unifying and differentiating. They ascribe to a single situation or type ‘populations’ whose geographical origins, specific histories (and consequently cultures and styles of life), conditions of entry into the national space and legal statuses are wholly heterogeneous. Thus, just as many North Americans are incapable of pointing out a Chinese, a Japanese, or Vietnamese, or indeed a Filipino, or telling them apart… many French people are unable to distinguish between an Algerian, a Tunisian, a Moroccan and a Turk (they are all ‘Arabs’, a generic designation which already constitutes a racist stereotype, and which opens the way to full-blown insults…). More generally, the word immigrant is a catch-all category, combining ethnic and class criteria, into which foreigners are dumped indiscriminately, though not all foreigners and not only foreigners. In fact it is a category [that] precisely makes it possible to split up the apparently ‘neutral’ set of foreigners, though not without some ambiguities. A Portuguese, for example, will be more of an ‘immigrant’ than a Spaniard (in Paris), though less than an Arab or a Black; a Briton or a German certainly will not be an ‘immigrant,’ though a Greek may perhaps be; a Spanish worker and, a fortiori, a Moroccan worker will be ‘immigrants,’ but a Spanish capitalist, or even indeed an Algerian capitalist, will not be.

The end product of these differentiations is a confused and confusing, ambivalent discourse that we see reflected in the policing of immigrant communities in Paris, Calais, Postville, and Phoenix (see Chapters 2 and 3). As different categories of immigrant are introduced, the lines of differentiation begin to blur. Hence the extra-legal imprisonment and occasional deportation of dark-skinned American and French citizens. Also, hence
the relative immunity of criminals with lighter skin and of those racialized immigrants who have the means (read: money and capital resources) to buy their way out of the racialized economic category, immigrant OS and into the guarded circles of the capitalist elite (to move on chartered planes across and within borders, remaining within the heavily guarded circles owned and controlled by members of their class and bearing the signs of their class status, building walls around their mansions and villas, etc.)

Of course, even these liminal subjects are vulnerable to racialization as immigrant subjects. After all, the imperative to recruit only the “most useful” immigrants and the “most assimilable” immigrants will always lead the state back to the central internal conflict of colonial rule: the most useful colonial subjects were precisely the ones who would accept exploitation without demanding to be integrated fully and completely into the national political community. In short, they were ones who would not or could not be integrated, much less assimilated, and it was precisely their un-assimilability that made them useful as instruments in colonial projects. Moreover, it was precisely when these immigrants began to integrate themselves into the colonizer’s society, when they began competing for jobs outside of their OS sector and to demand rights in the colonizer’s language (both in the literal-linguistic and the figurative-ideological sense, i.e., rights to fraternity, liberty, and equality in the French case and life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness/property in the American case) that the current “crisis” of immigration in the West began to emerge.

In previous chapters, I have attempted to show how this conflict has emerged in immigration management practices in various contexts. Balibar takes a different tack. While acknowledging that colonial cartographies and technologies of power were imported from colony to metropole to police immigrant and citizen populations, like Arendt in Origins of Totalitarianism, Balibar reminds us that the immigration crises we see today were also prefigured by the illusory “problem” of a fundamentally cosmopolitan, fully integrated (if not fully assimilated), highly successful capitalist interior enemy, namely, the Jew.

As Balibar notes, Jews in Europe were identified as a problem precisely because they purportedly favored capital accumulation and ethnic solidarity over racially defined and territorialized national identity. To exclude them from national polities, national
identity had to be racialized and at least provisionally disconnected from capitalist class status, or connected to it in a different way. Indeed, the cosmopolitanism of capital, personified in 1936-1945 by the figure of the Jew and today, in different ways, by the movements of migrant workers across borders, has always posed a threat the integrity of the body of the nation-state at the same time as it has filled its coffers. To appropriate Foucault’s terms for Balibar’s account of racial subjection, cross-border capitalist “circulation” has “aleatory” effects that jeopardize the production and reproduction of patriotic solidarity founded upon racist nationalism. Capital flows in the form of money lending, modern usury, and trade – all misidentified as distinctively Jewish activities in the 1930s and 1940s – and in the form of the profitable import and export of labor power.

In “Class Racism,” Balibar explains how the Jew was in many respects the second prototype for the racialized immigrant OS (the first being the colonial subject). Once defined in religio-cultural terms in relation to Christendom, 19th- and 20th-century Jews were redefined in relation to white Christian Europeans in ways that reproduced productive cartographies of racial difference that were mapped onto familiar ethnoch- cultural and “theological” representations. These cartographies functioned to produce the racial groups that they purportedly identified, including the white European population. In both cases (that of the Jew and that of the immigrant OS), Europeans defined themselves in opposition to a dangerous “enemy within.” Through various practices of representation and physical and social segregation, the still-emerging category of white Europeans developed attitudes towards Jews and others that, it seemed, might distinguish them as relatively more European in the evolving and relatively new racial sense of that category. Of course, because Jews spoke the languages and knew the customs of the national communities in which they lived, and because they were thought to excel within Europe’s post-feudal, liberal-capitalist economic system, the social boundaries between Jews and Europeans were difficult, if not impossible, to reproduce and maintain.

Given the level of Jewish integration into European ways of life, and given their legal status as nationals, bordering practices had to be relentless and had to incorporate exceptional juridical mechanisms that would legally exclude Jews from European polities.

---

404 Balibar.
This legal exclusion was supplemented by social stigmatization, segregation, ghettoization, and by the production of concentration camps and death camps. In these “zones of exception,” wherein the rule of law is suspended via legal mechanisms, political subjects are, in Agamben’s famous formulation, transformed into *homo sacer*, bare life, in order to be purged like cancerous bodies from the body of the population. Drawing on Foucault and Carl Schmitt, Agamben argues that sovereign power endures in the post-feudal-monarchical era through declarations of states of exception and the production of zones of exception.

In the biopolitical age, Agamben argues, the sovereign exception – that is, the exception that makes the sovereign what it is, a juridical body with the power to suspend the law in order to secure the legal order that protects the body of the population – has become the rule. Because the supposedly unitary body of the population – both national populations and Samuel Huntington’s “civilizational” populations – is a vulnerable body whose “precarious life” is perpetually threatened from within and from without, populations now demand that states suspend the law for the sake of law and order on their behalf, producing spaces of exception where internal biopolitical threats can be transformed into bare life and eliminated. Nazi death camps, Soviet Gulags, Vichy prisons, and U.S. internment camps for Japanese-Americans during the Second World War provide models for contemporary zones of exception in Cuba (Guantanamo Bay), Iraq (Abu Ghraib prison), and unknown prison camps used as proxy sites of interrogation, torture, and killing by U.S. intelligence agencies on behalf of the U.S. population and Western populations generally. As research in Critical Security Studies has shown, the logic of the sovereign exception now shapes military-cum-policing operations, led by the U.S. national empire-state and its civilizational allies around the globe.

A thoroughgoing analysis of Agamben’s Foucauldian reworking of Carl Schmitt’s personifying definition of the sovereign as “he who decides on the state of exception” is beyond the scope of this study. What I wish to emphasize here is the extent to which overly zealous applications of Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty, Agamben’s theory of states and zones of exception and bare life becoming the norm, and Foucault’s genealogy of biopolitical regulation as a history of the present can obscure the ambivalence and the contradictions of colonial discourse as it manifests in the European and Euro-American
Metropolis. This ambivalence complicates prominent theories of state sovereignty and popular sovereignty in the modern era. As Balibar suggests, and as International Relations Theory confirms, the underlying meaning of popular sovereignty in the context of the modern state system is anti-democratic state sovereignty: the sovereign’s prerogative to suspend the law in order to determine the boundaries of the national population and to eliminate threats to the population and the legal order that keeps it safe. It is *not* founded on the deliberations and contestation of any *dēmos* or political community.

What a postcolonial framework enables in this context is a fruitful means by which to examine 1) the *failures* of the modern, anti-political sovereign to produce and protect cohesive populations through the production and containment of bare life, 2) the incompleteness of states and zones of exception, 3) the *excess* of political and cultural life that always escapes and overflows the borders established by sovereign decisions, and 4) the *dependence* of the modern sovereign on the *recognition* both of “the people” as *ethnos* and as *dēmos* and of multinational corporations seeking profits which, unlike Fordist industrial businesses, no longer need to rely heavily on a pact with national populations. A postcolonial reading of the Nazi Holocaust reveals more than the fact that mechanisms of bordering and social control were developed in European colonies and imported to Western European metropoles, although this is a crucially important insight. It also reveals the extent to which the Nazi regime, like European colonial regimes, could not declare or decide on states of exception without an intimate knowledge of the populations under their jurisdiction that was willingly if not eagerly granted by the members of these populations in exchange for privileges and protection.

Postcolonial analysis has the potential to foreground the failures and aporias of statist modes of knowledge production in the metropole. What the state seeks to produce and protect in the metropole is a homogenous population, a people-qua-*ethnos* or race that will recognize its sovereignty to decide on the exception in order to protect the rule of law and its own enforcement mechanisms. What it finds is a culturally, linguistically, and politically *diverse and dynamic* population comprised of manifold differences, internal conflicts, and schisms. As Balibar observes:

---

405 Sven Lindqvist. *Exterminate All the Brutes.*
It must be admitted that, in the concrete existence of a people, the effectiveness of borders really does mark a delimitation of friend and enemy; but Schmitt keeps running up against the fact that while the state can be personified as a subject, the people cannot be. What reason is there for this asymmetry other than the fact that the very notion of the people implies a multiplicity (or even a conflictuality) that resists absolute unification (even, perhaps, by the methods of totalitarianism)?

Given the multiplicity and conflictuality that constitutes “the people,” what I will call the work of exception requires the production of a cohesive population out of a multitude of disparate and constantly changing social formations and communities. In other words, sovereignty is not merely a matter of drawing borders to separate already existing political communities from enemies and from internal, biopolitical threats. Rather, it involves active practices of representation and subjection.

To the extent that the state requires the recognition of a certain critical mass of this diverse population in order to produce a border that separates friend from enemy, it must respond to multiple, often conflicting, demands. However, to the extent that the ultimate goal of this project of social engineering is the sovereign right to ignore the people as a political community, i.e., to act as if they were neither a dēmos nor an ethnos, but rather merely a population of bodies in need of protection, all political formations including nationalist ones become a threat to state sovereignty. The state can only assure this ability to ignore the political will of the population if it succeeds in transforming the people into functionaries of the state, i.e., into police. Thus, the nationalist far right in France and the U.S. are paradoxically just as threatening to the sovereignty of the biopolitical state as are leftist and religio-political anti-nationalist forces, including advocacy of immigrants’ rights as workers’ rights or human rights. On the one hand, then, the biopolitical state must respond to culturally specific, competing demands of those who would define, in different ways, the people as an ethnos, and in doing so it acknowledges the existence of a dēmos. At the same time, however, modern state sovereignty in the biopolitical age requires the rejection of all cultural and political community, including self-defined ultra-nationalist cultural and political community.

---

All this is to say that the national state shares with the empire-state a type of ambivalence that is linked inextricably to the ambivalence of colonial discourse identified by Bhabha. The state both wants to incorporate citizens, to gain their trust and recognition, and to eviscerate “the people” both as a dēmos and as an ethnos. Likewise, the empire-state desires to civilize and assimilate colonial subjects so that they may become part of the national political community at some point in the indefinite future and, in encouraging these subjects to recognize the hybrid national-imperial state, to aggrandize its power and expand its jurisdiction. However, the empire-state also desires to incorporate colonial subjects into the imperial economy and various state apparatuses as instruments without allowing them to form bonds of allegiance with any political community whatsoever (hence the monitoring of communications between colonial immigrants to France and the U.S. and political organizations within the French and American Metropolis).

Of course, in the colony, where subjects were legally excluded from the national citizen population, this ambivalence is easier to see. In European colonies, and in peripheral spaces of the metropole, this knowledge and recognition was ambivalently sought and never adequately sustained in ways that would produce the kinds of state sovereignty theorized by Schmitt and Agamben. Colonized populations were incorporated by states and agents of capital into European imperial economies and incompletely into European polities, i.e., as colonial subjects under the tutelage of colonial officials as opposed to citizens. Since Algerians were not full members of the French polity with equal status under French law and with the benefits of citizenship, they had little reason to recognize the sovereignty of the French state in Algeria and to offer up their bodies for statist bio-regulation. Thus, French and American officials had difficulty monitoring and controlling these populations in ways that would enable the systematic containment (e.g., encampment) and annihilation of one group or another, as they could with Jews in Europe who were at least juridically and biopolitically speaking full members of the national population. Mbembe’s famous formulation, ventriloquizing the colonizer’s exasperation in the face of resurgent resistance to colonial rule, “How
many times to I have to kill you,” sums up this important difference between the colonial and metropolitan contexts (one can think of any number of examples of this phenomenon of incomplete colonial knowledge, from French officials in Algeria to British officials in India to American officials in the Philippines Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia).

Again, the point here is of course not that a fundamental difference exists between modes of knowledge-production in the metropolis as opposed to the colony. On the contrary, the two modes operate on the same discursive plane and the state’s colonial ambivalence is apparent in both. The national empire-state strives at once to incorporate and to exclude both citizens and colonial subjects, albeit in different ways. The policing of immigrant communities reveals the link that connects policing operations in the colony and the metropole. Immigrant subjects are less known than citizen members of the population, but generally more well known than colonized populations and, as we’ve seen, have occupied both juridical-structural positions at once (e.g., Filipinos in the U.S. and Algerians in France during the Second World War). Both in the case of citizens and in the case of colonial subjects, the goal of the national empire-state is at once to produce a cohesive national ethnos with a mandate provided by an ethereal dēmos and to eliminate both the ethnos and the dēmos – the people – from its biopolitical jurisdiction. With respect to each of these three subject positions – citizen, immigrant, and colonial – the work of exception is undermined by the project of incorporation and the production of coherent national identities and interests and vice versa. The state seeks to produce the people and to eliminate the people at the same time.

The political production-through-incorporation of national cultures and interests and of a dēmos, within which contests over national ways of life can take place, undermines the anti-political project of transforming the people into police, on one side, and bare life, on the other. Despite the pseudo-intellectual acrobatics of eugenicists and racists of all stripes, the project of maintaining boundaries between Jews and immigrants from Africa and Latin America and genuine Europeans quickly degenerated into a techné, i.e., an anti-political policing campaign designed to create and maintain racial hierarchies.

---

that were naturalized as givens. The state both appeals to colonial-cultural tropes apparent in representations of different social groups and evacuates biopolitical discourse of all potentially political cultural content. The result is a bizarre combination of ostensibly intimate knowledge of populations – from their ideological and cultural belief systems and practices to their domestic ways of life, their sexuality, etc. – and an ice-cold, impersonal treatment of members of these populations within a discourse of law and order. Balibar describes the “incoherence” of this statist discourse:

Though by definition it generate hierarchies, it endlessly runs up against – and is fueled by – the incoherence of its own criteria (whether ‘religious,’ ‘national,’ ‘cultural,’ ‘psychological’ or biological’), in search of an unattainable scale of superiority or dangerousness in which blacks, Jews, Arabs, Mediterraneans and Asians would have ‘their’ place – that is, the imaginary place which would enable us to know’ what we should do with them,’ ‘how we should treat them,’ ‘how we should behave’ in their presence.”

The racialization of Jews and Slavs in Europe – their identification as foreigners masquerading as Germans, French, etc. and their eventual condemnation and annihilation both as parasites (as Foucault notes, Hitler called them “lice”) and as would-be religio-capitalist rulers (Arendt outlines the well known conspiracy theories circulating around Europe) – shares a logic with the racialization of immigrants, African Americans, and colonial subjects, including the enslavement of Africans in the Americas.

It is a paradoxical logic that lies at the center of my thesis in this study, namely, that it is integration within Western cultural domains, including domains of capitalist accumulation, not the “official” reason, namely, a failure to assimilate, that produced xenophobic anxieties and that animates contemporary modes of postcolonial racialization. Balibar articulates this “second paradox” as follows:

[T]he less the population designated by the category of immigration is effectively ‘immigrant’, that is…not only by its status and social function, but also in its customs and culture, the more it is denounced as a foreign body. In this paradox we find of course a characteristic feature of racism, with or without explicit race theory, namely the application of the genealogical principle. We may also suspect that the obsessive fear of interbreeding, of the pluri-ethnic or multicultural nation, is merely a special case of the resistance of a part of French society to its own

---

transformations, and even a case of the disavowal of the transformations that have already been accomplished – a disavowal of its own history, that is.

Though Balibar neglects to mention it here, the production of immigrants as “objects to be known” through projection and disavowal replicates a mode of knowledge production that Franz Fanon, Said, and Bhabha characterize as a distinctively colonial technology of power. The immigrant body, like the colonial body, becomes a screen upon which the national population projects disavowed traits (sexual, aggressive, animalistic etc.) deemed dangerous, deviant, or threatening in order to purge those traits by excluding immigrants from the polity and the territory, or coercively assimilating immigrants as non-citizen subjects. Balibar continues:

Thus the category of immigration…provides the racist – the individual and the group as racists – with the illusion of a style of thinking…effective thinking upon an illusory object.  

By racism, Balibar does not mean vulgar forms of individual prejudice, although these might be effects of the same underlying discursive causes. Rather, he means something closer to a pathological form of ideological state racism: a general and generative misrecognition of “the people” and its Others, of national populations, immigrants, and colonials and a correlative misrecognition of individuals as subjects with fixed identities, interests, and positions within a national and global social order.

Balibar’s postcolonial turn here pivots on the ambivalence of practices of representation that produce subjects by channeling the desires of individuals in directions that reinforce state power. Political representation of national citizens and foreigners is both necessary for the maintenance and expansion of state power and, to the extent that political representation is conflictual, vulnerable to contestation and prone to alteration in peripheral spaces by non-state actors (e.g., transnational social movements, nationalists, and communists), it is always potentially a threat to state power. Colonial subjects in national liberation movements in Africa and immigrants like the Sans Papiers in France have successfully used representations of national citizenship in the U.S. and France to demand fuller inclusion in the national political communities whose culture they’ve helped create, both as a cultural influence and as exploited producers of a metropolitan

---

surplus, and to form national and transnational political communities of their own. Thus they have undermined the state’s efforts to draw boundaries around national populations and to reserve rights of citizenship for members of these populations in exchange for recognition of the state’s sovereign authority. For their part, U.S. and French citizens draw on the state’s representation of the national *ethnos* (e.g., Sarah Palin’s “real America” and Marine and Jean-Marie Le Pen’s “*les vrais francais*”\(^{410}\)) to demand recognition and protection of ostensibly distinctive national cultures, undermining the state’s efforts to expand the imperial economy and to monopolize appropriation of surplus.\(^{411}\) The battle between the U.S. Federal Government and Arizona’s government and local sheriffs (notably Joe Arpaio) attests to the paradoxical initial conflict between right-wing political nationalism and the state. To the extent that they participate in representational practices that overflow biopolitical channels and take border-making and border-guarding into their own hands, nationalist, anti-immigrant organizations in Europe and the U.S. undermine recognitions of the state as the sovereign protector of the people.

**Interpellating Immigrants, Colonials, and Citizens: Political Representation and Ambivalent Racial Cartographies**

Acknowledging the state’s misrecognition of “the people” as a relatively homogenous social body, and the people’s misrecognition of themselves as members of a singular *ethnos*, Balibar instructively turns from Foucault’s discourse analytics to Althusser’s Marxian theory of ideological subject formation. Specifically, he turns from Foucault’s genealogy of disciplinary modes of subjection to Althusser’s concept of interpellation: the ideological production of subjects out of individuals in hierarchical structures and divisions of labor. Unfortunately, Balibar moves too quickly through this transition and ends up equating Althusser’s conception of “ideological state apparatuses” and Foucault’s concept of discursive “disciplines.”\(^{412}\) In so doing, he misses an opportunity to highlight the ways in which, unlike Foucault, Althusser provides a

---

\(^{410}\) Both Le Pens explicitly articulate a mainstream conventional wisdom in French politics that is misleadingly associated with the extreme right, namely, that rights of citizenship and work ought to be reserved for the “true French.” See [http://www.electionpresidentielle2012.net/content/front-national](http://www.electionpresidentielle2012.net/content/front-national).

\(^{411}\) Balibar on the fiscus.

\(^{412}\) Balibar, 2004. 28 and 83.
Marxian pathway to a postcolonial analysis of the ambivalent ideological production of subjects in the context of immigration management.

Briefly, Althusser theorizes the productive power of liberal ideology by identifying the effective force with which “all individuals” are, from infancy, misrecognized and “hailed” as subjects within hierarchical structures and, as a consequence, misrecognize themselves as such. Drawing on the work of his mentor, the psychoanalytic philosopher Jacques Lacan, Althusser understands ideology as a social mirror in which individuals can recognize themselves and others as subjects with distinctive kinds of identities, interests, and roles within a given social order. That is to say, ideology enables subjects to experience themselves as valued members of a community. The first and primary moment of interpellation is that in which the infant is misidentified as a gendered individual and misrecognizes itself as a male or female “I.” For Althusser, as for Lacan, the reproduction of gendered divisions of labor begins almost at birth, when the infant identifies with their mother or father and begins to feel social pressure to perform appropriate gendered scripts.\textsuperscript{413} This gendered division of labor has been reproduced on a global scale. Workers in the Global South are, from an early age, interpellated as laborers who are fit for domestic and caregiving work, and more generally for work that reproduces the social order and the means of subsistence of national populations (picking crops, cleaning latrines, etc.)\textsuperscript{414} The low-status “women’s work” they do is not only a product of material structural forces. Maintaining the global gendered division of labor requires relentless practices of ideological interpellation, education, and training.

Within their social roles, subjects come to see themselves as unified, self-legislating actors who own the meanings of their identities, thoughts, and actions. Ideology obscures the ways in which individuals “receive” these constitutive meanings from discursive orders of signification, e.g., from patriarchal and racialist colonial ideology. These orders of signification, disavowed as such, are what enable subjects to “speak,” to refer intelligibly to themselves and to others (e.g., as men, woman, workers, citizens, colonials, immigrants, Muslims, Christians, Jihadists, human beings, etc.), and

\textsuperscript{414} Stoler. Manzo. Edkins.
be heard and understood (as well as to hear and understand). It transforms bundles of parts into coherent, intelligible wholes that can make sense of themselves and of others.

Among the various “Ideological State Apparatuses” and discourses that provide the scripts for these formative hailings, Althusser privileges three: education, the church, and law enforcement discourse.\footnote{To be precise, Althusser suggests that the police and military form part of a Repressive Apparatus, but his most famous example of “hailing” is that of the police officer calling to an individual on the street “hey you there.” It is to this practice of hailing that I refer.} In the case of nationalist immigration ideology, it is through the criminalization of the immigrant OS and through nationalist and colonial pedagogy that divisions of labor between the Western citizen and the immigrant subject are maintained. In Arizona and Calais, the local-cum-national (and continental, in the case of the CRS in France) police officer’s hail, “hey you there,” has the effect of calling citizens and aliens into being as different kinds of subjects occupying different positions within the global division of labor. The hail itself is a differentiating performance of a script that has segregating effects. Its force derives from a prior conditioning of citizens and immigrants in schools and churches to perform their assigned role.

Good examples of this phenomenon are plentiful in the U.S. and France. In Arizona and Minnesota, improperly documented Latin American day laborers frequently socialize with their citizen co-workers and with their employers, just as Mexican braceros did during World War II and Filipinos did throughout the first half of the 20th century. Others own shops and businesses with a clientele that includes citizen workers. When rumors spread of an impending ICE raid, or when local police working for known advocates of border enforcement, such as the deputies of Sheriff Joe Arpaio of Arizona’s Maricopa County, are on patrol in the area, immigrants disperse and disappear and citizens are forced to recall their privileged position in the economy and the polity, which many embrace at the expense of transnational communities-in-formation. Leaders and members of American trade unions, such as the local UFCW union in Austin, who express a willingness and even a desire to form bonds of solidarity with immigrant workers are thrown back into their subject positions as privileged citizens during ICE raids. The common refrain “we want them in our union, but we oppose illegal immigration and believe that we need comprehensive immigration reform to fix our
broken borders” is a conditioned response to the question of why union leaders have consistently failed to protect their undocumented members from federal police.

In Paris, port cities like Marseilles, and small towns with changing demographics like Toulon, CRS raids prevent the *Sans Papiers* from mobilizing with French labor unions and non-unionized workers. The CRS’s early training in anti-communist campaigns in the French hexagon and anti-insurgency campaigns in Algeria makes them ideally suited to the task of maintaining borders between citizen and non-citizen workforces. In Calais, the CRS works on behalf of Fortress Europe to maintain divisions between European citizen advocates of immigrant and human rights and the immigrants with whom they seek to form bonds and to protect from the police. Migrants walking to makeshift soup kitchens who are escorted by members of advocacy groups are in extreme danger of arrest and abuse by CRS agents and to eventual deportation. Without the safe haven of a transnational space – a space that was provided by the Sangatte migrant camp and the first Calais Jungle before its destruction by President Sarkozy’s government – the sight of a CRS truck or national police or mobile *Gendarmerie* vehicle has the effect of the police officer’s hail in Althusser’s example: migrant subjects who had formed bonds with local Calais residents scatter and take up residence in squats and tents that make up new “jungles” further from the city center and from local residents.416

416 Biopolitical surveillance tracks immigrant subjects without integrating them fully either into local communities or into the database of statistics used to regulate the citizen population. This incomplete incorporation offers agents of law enforcement a means to reproduce colonial boundaries. Migrants who turn themselves in to state authorities in the U.S. and France and plead for asylum often receive less brutal treatment than those who remain clandestine, but the state’s benevolence comes at a price. In both the U.S. and France, immigrants from Latin America and Africa respectively, depending on the country of origin and the circumstances of their emigration, generally face extremely low odds of succeeding in the visa application process and are subject to radical changes in policy while their applications are processed. In France, approximately 20% of applications for asylum are accepted. While they wait, applicants in France are quite literally kept in “camps.” They are documented and marked and granted the right to consult a lawyer. If only for a moment, they are incorporated more fully into the French and European legal system. Like Jews in the first half of the 20th century, this official recognition puts immigrants both in a position of privileged status in relation to the alien *clandestines* and in a zone of exception, a position of extreme peril in relation to the would-be sovereign state. To be granted asylum, an applicant must prove (in French, despite the fact that many from former British colonies speak only Arabic and English) that he or she in particular faced existential threats in their country of origin and that they have no criminal record and showed no signs that they would become a burden on the state. The stakes are high because rejected applicants are deported with an injunction preventing them from entering any European country for a period of 5 to 10 years. In many cases, e.g., in the cases of refugees from war torn Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan, these deportations amount to a death sentence.416
Schools participate in these bordering practices both by maintaining linguistic and cultural boundaries between students – e.g., through French-only and English-only education and segregated bilingual education – by instilling respect for national borders and border control as part of the nation’s legal order, and by reproducing the founding myths of imagined national communities. The banning of head scarves in France and the current campaign to ban multilingual and multicultural education in Arizona, among other states, function to interpellate citizens as belonging to a unified national culture that is undermined by foreign cultural formations. The educational “ideological apparatus” effectively maintains class divisions that commonly run along lines of racial identity coded as divisions based on national origin. The refrain “we oppose illegal immigration” among labor union workers is a product of education and exposure to a variety of ideological practices of interpellation that promote feelings of national solidarity and supremacy, and that represent immigrants from Latin America either as privileged beneficiaries of American goodwill or as parasites that threaten American standards of living and ways of life.

As we have seen, however, practices of ideological subjection and responses to these practices are ambivalent and varied. To take a notable example, the national systems of education in the U.S. and France interpellate students in multiple ways simultaneously. For instance, they link national belonging to traditions of inclusion and cosmopolitan openness as opposed to fascism, corporatism, and various forms of totalitarian rule. In France, this has even taken the form of calls by top Government officials, including President Sarkozy, for the addition of positive accounts of French colonialism in the French curriculum. Moreover, French and American curricula promote both radical Rousseauian republicanism, which tends to promote the exclusion of foreigners as members of distinct political communities, and radical liberal individualism, which has no criteria for exclusion of immigrants save for colonial and racial criteria that deem these subjects unprepared for or incapable of participation liberal civil society (as primitive, illiberal, etc.).

---

This complicates Althusser’s central argument in “Ideological State Apparatuses,” summed up in the formula: “Ideology interpellates all individuals as subjects.” This may be true, but as Balibar suggests, we can also reverse the formula and argue compellingly that the liberal empire-state interpellates all subjects as individuals, i.e., “to ignore or neutralize the intermediate ‘bodies,’ the ‘belongings’ that confer a particular identity upon individuals, and which could be claimed either against one another or against the law and the sovereign itself.”

After all, by Althusser’s own admission, the state must in some sense interpellate subjects one at a time “in order to make itself recognized by them and gain their obedience.”

This point may at first seem purely “academic,” but, as we have seen, this contradiction is a central feature of the enduring ambivalence of colonial discourse. The civilizing missions of colonialism, and by extension the recruitment and incorporation practices of immigration management, seek to assimilate non-citizen subjects into a nation of individuals whom the state has sought to strip of their allegiance to national and sub-national communities that might oppose state sovereignty and state power. The European national culture into which immigrant and colonial subjects are supposed to assimilate does not exist as a cohesive ethos. Moreover, as in the colony, intra-national identifications among national citizens always resist the hegemony of the national state, its monopolization of violence, its appropriation of surplus, its production of culture, and its construction of the people as police. Balibar grapples with this apparent conflict by mapping it onto the familiar categories of “primary” and “secondary” identifications. Pushing Althusser in postcolonial directions, Balibar emphasizes the extent to which the system of national education conflicts with the interpellative practices of other ideological apparatuses, including the church and the family. These apparatuses function within broader patriarchal and religious discourses, but they nonetheless produce

---

418 Here, Balibar makes an important if subtle point about the way sovereignty endures in non-totalitarian contexts. He writes: “Does this mean that the institution of an absolute sovereignty (a public power enjoying a monopoly of legislation and administration) excludes every mediation and has a totalitarian character? Certainly not, but what needs to be specified is that the mediations involved are its mediations, forming the system of channels through which the sovereign (the state) reaches individuals one by one (omnes et singulatam, the phrase cited by Foucault) in order to make itself recognized by them and gain their obedience. Étienne Balibar. (2003-11-24). We, the People of Europe?: Reflections on Transnational Citizenship. Translation/Transnation. Kindle Edition. (Princeton University Press). 144.

identifications that undermine state sovereignty insofar as they offer non-police, political, and cultural ways of being and acting in the world. Efforts to subsume or suppress these primary identifications and to replace them with secondary identifications reflect the non-community of the nation-state. Balibar summarizes the problem thus:

The educational process as it has been generalized and reorganized by modern nations (Erziehung and Bildung, “instruction” and “formation”) clearly shows that primary identifications of all sorts (class, regional, linguistic, religious, familial, sexual) cannot be immediately transformed into secondary (national, civic) identifications (which would imply, were it possible, that in order to be a boy or girl, an intellectual or a manual laborer, a Catholic or a Jew, one must first recognize oneself as French, American, or German—as for recognizing oneself as European, that is still far off). Primary identities as such have an ability to resist integration, even when individuals accept integration “intellectually,” that is, in the abstract. They can constitute kernels of resistance to integration.  

Although he doesn’t identify it as such, I find this statement useful as an effort to theorize the ambivalence of colonial discourse as a general constitutive condition within the discourse of the nation-state. The ideological practices of colonial civilizing missions, like efforts to produce coherent national cultures, are in many respects efforts to transform the multiplicity of so-called “primary identifications” into identifications with the state via an identification with a national ethnos.

Since “primary” identifications are culturally more robust, and since the national ethnos is culturally thin and always in danger of becoming nothing more than an appendage of the national state, it takes a great deal of work to subsume these identities into a national identity that is compatible with state sovereignty:

Primary identities, in order to be incorporated into national identity, must be worked on for a long time and in some sense “deconstructed”: the “subjects” must

---

421 Balibar here cites the examples I offered earlier to illustrate the power and the pitfalls of the symbolic violence that happens in the classroom: “This can be clearly seen in “symbolic” episodes charged with emotion, such as the conflicts in the schools over the presence of religious or political symbols in the classroom: crosses on the schoolhouse wall in Bavaria or “Islamic veils” on the heads of young women in French schools. Primary identities, in order to be incorporated into national identity, must be worked on for a long time and in some sense “deconstructed”: the “subjects” must spend long hours sitting in the classroom for years in order for things to work well (although they may turn out badly, even disastrously).” Étienne Balibar. (2003-11-24). We, the People of Europe?: Reflections on Transnational Citizenship. Translation/Transnation. Kindle Edition. (Princeton University Press). 28.
spend long hours sitting in the classroom for years in order for things to work well (although they may turn out badly, even disastrously).  

This interpellative work reflects both the difficulty in maintaining colonial boundaries between national citizens and colonial subjects and the difficulty in producing state sovereignty through decisions on the exception and the production of bare life.

Postville, Iowa once again provides an instructive example. When Mexicans and then Guatemalans began arriving *en masse* in Postville in the 1990s, cultural and language barriers combined with racist xenophobia to prevent bonds from forming across the citizen-immigrant divide. Like Filipino and Mexican contract workers, however, these immigrants quickly integrated themselves into local religious communities, established local restaurants and businesses, and participated in the planning of multicultural events and activities. By the time of the 2008 raid, Guatemalans composed more than half of the congregation of the largest Catholic Church in Postville. Clergy at the Church recruited Spanish-speaking pastors and held bilingual, as well as English and Spanish, services. Initially wary of these foreigners in their midst and concerned about job losses for Euro-American, white workers, many Postville residents eventually formed close bonds with Latin American workers and their families. Community leaders and members supported these workers’ opposition to exploitative and abusive working conditions at the Agriprocessor’s plant as well as their efforts to learn local customs. Over the course of a decade, they established lasting friendships across the linguistic, cultural, and, most importantly, legal divides that separated immigrant subjects from citizens. This, combined with the knowledge that these immigrant workers had helped Postville recover from the farm crisis of the 1980s, produced feelings of amity and closeness that undermined “secondary” identifications with the nation as an *ethnos* and as a biopolitical body.

When the raid came, local residents participated with immigrant rights advocates to protect their undocumented neighbors from the police and to provide them with shelter and food. The raid’s hail did not have the intended subject effects because new transnational communities and political subjects were already in formation. In the end,

---

the raid was experienced by many, if not most, residents of Postville as a destructive force rather than as an effort to protect the national political community.\(^{423}\) The encampment of workers in animal pens horrified residents of Postville and the surrounding region. Busloads of supporters of the immigrants and opponents of ICE’s actions arrived from nearby cities in the days following the raid.

ICE’s justification for the raid was couched in the biopolitical discourse of law and order. According to ICE spokespeople, the raid was intended to defend the national population from “aggravated identity theft” (many of the Guatemalan workers were given false social security cards upon arrival) and to protect both the American citizen and the immigrant population from exploitative employers and from the unbridled forces of capitalist greed.\(^{424}\) On the one hand, this interpellative practice draws its force from racist stereotypes of dark-skinned immigrants as criminals and opportunists who deserve to be treated like animals and of Americans as law-abiding citizens. On the other hand, ICE’s law and order justification for the raids also interpellate national and immigrant subjects as individual lawbreakers and law abiders, as individual perpetrators and victims, obscuring their subjection within a racialized division of labor. Of course, on the question of what constitutes American national identity besides law and order, ICE representatives have very little to say. Americans are victims of crimes, their identities are stolen, or they are citizen police.

As it turned out, the raid, like many other ongoing ICE campaigns, including the 2009 raid of a Bellingham, Washington engine plant, did not receive formal approval from the White House, which subsequently prompted investigations launched by Attorneys General under Presidents G.W. Bush and Barack Obama. We see here an instance of the national empire-state’s internal conflict between expansive inclusion and restrictive exclusion, both justified simultaneously in political and biopolitical terms. Border enforcement agents interpellate citizens as national subjects whose identities – as defined by documents like social security cards, finances, and statistical records – are threatened. At the same time, they are interpellated by the Executive branch as individuals who have a stake in the growth of the national and of local economies

\(^{423}\) Field notes.
\(^{424}\) Field notes.
achieved through the incorporation of immigrant subjects. One should not read into these investigations and criticisms a genuine concern for immigrant subjects, whose abuse has been tacitly condoned by government officials throughout the 20th century. On the contrary, the concern of the Executive and other government officials in these cases arises primarily from the fear of a backlash from employers against strict sanctions and surveillance of employment and production practices.

A parallel case can be seen in France prior to the election of Nicolas Sarkozy, when the center-right Chirac government criticized then Interior Minister Sarkozy for his brutal suppression of immigrant revolts and violent protests in the banlieues of Paris, Marseilles, and Calais. His actions as Interior Minister included the infamous razing of Sangatte, which produced a proliferation of Calais jungles and an extremely vulnerable population of highly exploitable workers, useful both to European businesses and to politicians like Sarkozy and the Le Pens who would run on anti-immigrant platforms.425 Sarkozy defended his hardline stance by appealing to the people’s approval of his methods and his devotion to protecting the borders of France and of Europe from African migrants, many of whom were and are descendants of colonial subjects in French North and West Africa, i.e., under the very colonial regimes that Sarkozy himself has lauded as a modernizing force in Africa and something in which French students should take pride.

As in the more extreme case of Jean-Marie Le Pen, we see in Sarkozy’s own thinking the double interpellation of the immigrant subject that is apparent in the conflict between Sarkozy and Chirac. Like Le Pen, Sarkozy praises colonial modes of incorporation, lauding the project of Algerie Française, but vehemently opposes the presence of colonials and their descendants in the hexagon. On the one hand, colonials and their immigrant descendants are potentially modern, potentially French, potentially European. Moreover, they have contributed to the French economy in innumerable ways, and with French military training have fought alongside French forces. On the other hand, colonials and immigrants must be swept out and kept out the hexagon (In Sarkozy’s words: “Il faut nettoyer cela”), because they are a source of criminality, of

425 Police Archives. Media. And Le Pen Correspondence.
426 To which a young opponent responded: “On nettoie pas des gens, on nettoie des animaux.”
délinquance, because they are a parasitical drain on state resources, and because letting them all in would overwhelm and destroy the nation.

**Ambivalent Demands for State Intervention: The Politics Behind the Biopolitical Border Police**

The production of national identities, of “secondary identities” in Balibar’s words, is both impossible and necessary for the production of the kind of state sovereignty that the Sarkozy government tried to achieve in his practices of immigrant abuse, exploitation, and mass deportation. It is an integral part of the work of exception: the production of an invincible population of police that will participate in the production and defense of borders intended to defend a fictive “people”-as-ethnos. The politics behind biopolitics is revealed in the unavoidable political representations of this *ethnos* by state agencies and in the contestation of this representation by various social groups. The suppression of these groups cannot be achieved through biopolitical regulation alone. The state must offer *official* definitions of the national *ethnos*, and now of the European *ethnos*, and must make these definitions *seem* to emerge from “the people.”

It was this imperative that motivated President Sarkozy and his newly appointed minister of his newly established Ministry of Immigration, Integration, and National Identity to launch a national debate *sur les valeurs de l’identité nationale*. As renowned French historian Patrick Weil has commented, these debates served primarily as a means to justify coercive policing and bordering practices with reference to the political representations of the “French public.”

In particular, it enabled the French right to voice anger over the government’s inability or unwillingness to protect the “real French” or the “good French” (*les bons français*) from the scourge of clandestine immigrants entering from former European colonies in Africa. Leaders of the National Front predictably highlighted what a critical mass of moderate French leftists probably believed, but would never admit, namely, that France was fundamentally a Christian-Catholic nation of law abiding modern subjects whose identity and ways of life would be threatened by primitive Muslims.

---

427 Police Archives. Print Journalism Box
Somewhat paradoxically, the notoriously patriarchal and socially conservative French right effectively gave the Sarkozy government a feminist argument for excluding Muslims from the polity: Muslim men imprisoned their women behind headscarves and veils and in their homes. Sarkozy’s strong stance on school dress thereby had a mandate to appeal to the age-old colonial narrative of “white men saving brown women from brown men” and also saving white, Christian France and white, Christian Europe from brown-skinned Muslims who mistreat their women. These representations recalled French citizens not only to their status as superior white Europeans, but also to their role as colonial civilizers whose mission was not yet complete. Muslim women had to be saved from Muslim men. All Muslims had to be assimilated, and since this was impossible, they had either to be deported or to remain an interior threat that the state had the right to monitor and, if necessary, purge.

The debates over French national identity also enabled the French right to mobilize French workers around the banner of “la preference nationale” and against competition with low-cost African workers. Aside from erasing Le Pen’s participation in the struggle for Algérie Française, a struggle that would have put French workers in direct if invisible competition with colonial workers in Algeria, these rhetorical moves undercut the arguments of the moderate French left, who had largely abandoned efforts to mobilize with les Sans Papiers, but who often argued for their regularization, granting them the equivalent of paths to permanent or semi-permanent resident status or to citizenship, but reinforcing the imperative of workforce protection and border control at the same time. When combined with the arguments against Muslim patriarchy and threats to French secularism (read: Christian secularism), the French right granted the French socialists (who of course agreed that secularism, the protection of French workers, and women’s rights were all vitally important aspects of the French tradition) very little political space in which to articulate an alternative vision.

The “outcome” of these debates was, from the perspective of state officials, given in advance. Whatever definitions of the French ethnos emerged from the debates could be used to justify the mass criminalization and exclusion of certain groups of foreigners.

---

429 Interview with Daniel Sabbaugh, Sciences Po.
through anti-political practices that might salvage a semblance of state sovereignty. The representations and contestations of the dēmos were effectively channeled into the articulation of an *ethnos* in urgent need of state protection during a time of border-blurring crisis. Again, though, representations of the *ethnos* are efforts to make a singular “people” out of a conflictual multiplicity that took shape in the context of nation-building and of empire. Mass protests undertaken by the *Sans Papiers* in France serve to remind France and indeed all of Europe of its colonial past in the colonial present. Moreover, CRS crackdowns on these protests and on migrant camps along with CRS patrols and racial profiling recall their notorious role as agents of de Gaulle’s police state after World War II and during the Cold War. Like ICE in the U.S., the CRS are widely reviled in France (even among those who call for strict immigration control) for their brutality and their willingness to destroy communities for the sake of the nation.430 The collective memory of this brutality during and after Vichy, of the violent crackdowns on communists and their sympathizers and the surveillance of the population, is still alive and well in France. These memories haunted the Sarkozy government and its biopolitical turn, his declarations of states of emergency, and his calls for social *nettoyage*. One could argue that they played a role in his recent electoral defeat.

Balibar outlines the structural and symbolic violence that this process of interpellative subjection entails as well as the impossibility of its success:

Several types of violence are virtually at work here. A permanent but diffuse violence is an intrinsic part of…any process of identification controlled by national or religious hegemony. A violence that can be more immediately recognized as political refers us to the “multicultural” problem that has arisen in most contemporary nationalities, which stems from the fact that a given linguistic, religious, geographical, or historical identity is not officially considered to be one of the “legitimate mediations” of secondary national identity (or at least as not having the same legitimacy as others). We speak of exclusion in this case because the logic of hegemony ought to be able to use all primary identities in order to integrate them into the national community, or to construct a “fictive ethnicity.” But the point is that this is not always possible; sometimes it is actively rejected, for there exist forces that work to render the primary identities in question mutually incompatible. Thus in the postcolonial states of Western Europe, Islam

---

is not always accepted without conflict as one religious mediation of national identity among others (just as, in the preceding generation, Jewish identity was excluded from the system of national mediations, at the cost of horrifying tragedies). The violence exercised in this way generally stems from the “majority” and takes the “minority” as its target. Often it is the action of minority groups within the “national community” upon other groups that are equally minorities but that are excluded from this community or whose access to it is rejected as part of a reconstruction of imaginary integrity.431

I take Balibar’s central point in this passage to be that the substantive content of the state’s representation of “the people” as an ethnos will always be untenable. Especially in the context of imperial expansion and its legacies, it can never be fixed once and for all.

As Interior Minister and as President, Sarkozy provides a good example of a wannabe soldier and police officer playing the role of a politician. As discussed in Chapter 2, his policing strategies have been influenced by American global counterterrorism and counterinsurgency initiatives, and both bear the marks of French colonial modes of governance. For his participation in U.S. state’s efforts to “police the globe” and in European efforts to police “Fortress Europe” (e.g., by sending his paramilitary forces to Calais at the request of the British government) “Sheriff Sarkozy”432 has been criticized for becoming a pawn in American and European security discourse. There can be no question that Sarkozy adopted a role in this discourse under intense pressure to conform to the so-called “new security environment.” It is also clear that he did so ambivalently, and that he simultaneously attempted to consolidate his power as the leader of a national state.

Although it may seem like a marginal case, Arizona legislators and police have taken on a similar role for the sake of the U.S. population as the French government has for Europe. That is to say, they have called for state sovereignty to act on behalf of the union to protect the national population in lieu of federal support and immigration reform. Like his counterparts in Europe (including President-cum-Sheriff Sarkozy), Maricopa county Sheriff Joe Arpaio, a hero of the U.S. border control enforcement movement, has taken pains to define his controversial policing practices in biopolitical terms, but has

432 http://spectator.org/blog/2011/03/20/sheriff-sarkozy
also intervened in political debates about the essence of American identity. Like Sarkozy, Arpaio credits his electoral success on his hardline, anti-crime, anti-political approach to policing. Asked if he would consider running for governor, Arpaio reiterates that all he ever wants to do is be Sheriff, and that this is why he always gets re-elected. Rejecting charges that his police force and citizen “posse” engage in practices of racial profiling, Arpaio emphasizes the criminal, economic, and biological threats posed by illegal alien bodies that move within the body politic. In his autobiography, Joe’s Law, Arpaio juxtaposes his work to combat the influx of “illegals” with his work to capture and detain drug addicts and chronic criminals. In both cases, he asserts, his goal is to eliminate threats to the general, law-abiding population.

Arpaio’s framework sheds light on the extent to which the border control regime has been incorporated into a broader, biopolitical regime whose accepted function is to produce and protect a healthy national body. He and other spokespersons for border control enforcement have defended the SB 1070 legislation both by citing statistics of rising rates of criminal behavior in border areas, notably drug and human trafficking, violence, murder, threats to local authorities, and general public disorder, and by emphasizing the imperatives of colorblind implementation. SB 1070 requires officers to demand official papers from anyone they “reasonably suspect” might lack documents proving their legal residence within or movement across U.S. national borders. Critics of SB 1070 have understandably expressed concern that the ambiguous definition of “reasonable suspicion” effectively gives license to police officers – indeed that will encourage them – to use racial criteria (notably skin color and language skills) when deciding whether or not to ask individuals for documents. In response, Arpaio and other supporters of the law have had to reiterate the “probable cause” requirement as a colorblind criterion.

Regardless of his sincerity or the ways in which the law is implemented de facto, Arpaio’s frequent assertion that police officers “need probable cause” to make an arrest has the de jure effect of relegating all suspicious signals, from broken tail lights, to nervousness, to apparently evasive behavior like a reluctance to respond to officers’

---

433 Arpaio, Joe’s Law.
434 Interview with Arpaio citizen deputy.
questions, into the same legal category. Whereas the ambiguity of the term “reasonable suspicion” seems compatible with an older, political and racialist legal framework, the invocation of “probable cause” is expressly designed to expand the biopolitical prerogatives of the state.

Confronted with charges of racism, advocates of SB 1070 express confidence in police officers’ abilities to stop and question only violators of laws, satisfying the colorblind “probable cause” requirement, and to predict the legal status of those whom they stop on the basis of something other than political, ethnic, or racial criteria. The authors and sponsors of SB 1070 respond to concerns about racist implementation by appealing to the professionalism and expertise of the police and of technocratic regimes of law enforcement. One effect of this effort has been to suppress both political opposition and political support for the law.

Rallies in support of SB 1070 feature border patrol officers, police authorities, politicians who eschew racially informed political exclusions in favor of purely juridical practices of border control, and Hispanic and African American supporters who reinforce the legalistic notion that SB 1070 benefits properly documented Americans as such rather than a particular political, racial, ethnic, cultural, or socioeconomic group. Attendees are warned to avoid any and all racial justifications for exclusion.\textsuperscript{435} The message of proponents consistently focuses on criminal and economic threats posed by “illegals” as such. That is to say, they focus on apolitical and even anti-political imperatives of law enforcement rather than the objective of articulating the American political subject and differentiating that subject in political, cultural, ethnic, and/or racial terms from alien others. In most public debates, proponents of border enforcement define American identity in terms of the possession of proper documentation and \textit{nothing else}. Very little reassurance is offered to those who would prefer to ground their legal privileges explicitly and openly in substantive political, cultural, and racial criteria. In fact, proponents of border control enforcement who articulate political, racial, or cultural justifications for exclusion are strictly disciplined by the border control activist leaders.\textsuperscript{436}


Despite the strictly anti-political policing of border enforcement political speech, political, cultural, and racial frameworks are clearly at work in border control discourse, i.e., both in the material practices of border control and in the linguistic justification of these practices. This is evident not only in the political activities and manifestos of fringe or “extremist” groups and public figures, notably Patrick Buchanan, Tom Tancredo, J.D. Hayworth, Lou Dobbs, and racist factions of the Minuteman Defense Corps, but also in the tensions and slips within otherwise apparently anti-political statements of enforcement advocates. Even the leaders of definitionally anti-political law enforcement agencies often feel compelled to provide political and cultural, if not explicitly racial justifications for strict enforcement of border control laws.

For instance, Sheriff Arpaio is ambivalent about the question of the politics of border control. Suspicious of politics, he “hesitates” when people ask him if he’s a politician.\textsuperscript{437} Despite his role as non-political agent of law enforcement, Arpaio concedes that he \textit{must} engage in political activity in order to do his job effectively:

\begin{quote}
[T]o honestly and effectively enforce the law and protect the public and the public interest” often means transcending the bounds of any officer’s jurisdiction and transcending the specific definition of law enforcement itself… What I am saying is that some problems cannot be addressed by law enforcement itself, but [only] by law enforcement working with political entities and forces…\textsuperscript{438}
\end{quote}

Here, Arpaio draws attention to the necessary coordination of law enforcement and more “political” entities. In doing so, he opens space to express his own political sensibility regarding national identity and border control and his own political-historical narrative of immigration. He goes on to list six quasi-political criteria for \textit{legitimate} immigration into the United States, drawing on racial tropes that bear a resemblance to colonial reports (e.g., that of Bruno Lasker on Filipinos and of colonial officials in Algeria). His instructive foray into explicitly political speech warrants close attention, as it is

\textsuperscript{437} “Yes, I’m an elected official. Yes I’m a public servant... But no I don’t like to think of myself as a politician.” Joe Arpaio and Len Sherman. \textit{Joe’s Law: America’s Toughest Sheriff Takes on Illegal Immigration, Drugs, and Everything Else That Threatens America}. (New York: AMACOM, 2008).

\textsuperscript{438} Arpaio lists several problems that require political as well as policing solutions. Money Laundering, Weapons Sales, Immigration, Prostitution Rings, Pedophile Groups, Internet Scams, we have to fight on the street and in the halls of government. Joe Arpaio, and Len Sherman, \textit{Joe’s Law: America’s Toughest Sheriff Takes on Illegal Immigration, Drugs, and Everything Else That Threatens America} (New York: AMACOM, 2008)
reproduced by his supporters and followers as well as many of his opponents and echoed by his counterparts across the Atlantic.\footnote{Interview. Minuteman defense corps.}

Arpaio takes pains to distinguish Mexican immigrants from previous immigrant groups, including his own family, indicating the need for special political action to curb the tide of immigration from Mexico. First, he suggests, unlike previous groups, Mexican immigrants have no allegiance to the United States and no intention to assimilate and to become full members of the nation:

My parents came to this country from Italy. But they came legally, just like millions of others who left their homes to find new opportunities, new freedoms, new futures.

There were other differences as well. My parents, like all other immigrants exclusive of those from Mexico, held to certain hopes and truths.

1. My parents left Italy and basically never expected to return, unlike the illegal Mexican immigrants. Because their country is contiguous to the United States, Mexican immigrants not only take their earnings and return home, going back and forth over the border, but they are encouraged to do exactly that by the Mexican government in order to help sustain Mexico’s economy. And they did so, to the tune of more than 20 billion dollars last year.\footnote{Joe Arpaio and Len Sherman. \textit{Joe's Law: America's Toughest Sheriff Takes on Illegal Immigration, Drugs, and Everything Else That Threatens America.} (New York: AMACOM, 2008). 48-49.}

Secondly, he interprets the political framework and expectations of the new Mexican immigrants, as distinct from other immigrant groups, including his own:

2. My parents did not regard any inch of American soil as somehow belonging to Italy, so their arrival here never constituted a “reconquest” of that land. A growing movement among not only Mexican nationals but also some Mexican-Americans contends that the United States stole the territory that is now California, Arizona, and Texas for a start, and that massive immigration over the border will speed and guarantee the \textit{reconquista} of these lands, returning them to Mexico.

Third, he foregrounds the dangerous concentration of Mexican immigrants near the southern border, suggesting that this corresponds both to their unwillingness to assimilate and to their political goal of reconquering the southern United States:

3. Previous immigrant groups, while congregating together, also dispersed throughout the country, accounting for the existence of a little Italy in city after city for example. This is in stark contrast to the exceptional concentration of
Mexicans in the Southwest. This practice has permitted second and third generation of Mexican immigrants to maintain identities, from language to customs to beliefs, separate from the American mainstream, as opposed to so many millions of immigrants from other places who longed for their children to become assimilated into their own homeland instantly and thoroughly.

Fourth, he emphasizes the political import of an investment, or in the Mexican case, lack thereof, in specifically American law and order:

4. My parents came to America legally. That was the norm for our entire history. No other group except the Mexicans, and other Hispanics as well, has broken the immigration laws in such astonishing numbers.

Fifth, he foregrounds the unprecedented scale of Mexican immigration, and the unprecedented uncertainty of the state as to their number and whereabouts:

5. The scale of the immigration is unprecedented. How many Mexicans are already in this country? Ten million? Fifteen million? Twenty million? No one really knows for sure.
6. Usually, specific groups immigrate for only a relatively short amount of time. The potato famine brought the Irish in the 1840s and 1850s, ending during the Civil War. Large-scale Mexican immigration started in the 1960s, continues to this day, and promises to continue indefinitely – unless we do something.

Finally, he positions himself among well-known political theorists of identity and difference, notably Samuel Huntington:

I’m hardly the first to consider these factors. Many others, led by the scholar and author Samuel P. Huntington, have gone into these issues in far greater depth. These issues do not mean that Mexicans are our enemies, or that we have to cut off all Mexican (and other Hispanic) immigration. It does mean that we have to understand what is happening, and what underlying facts are pushing people to act in certain ways, and we have to deal with all of this information intelligently and forcefully.

Arpaio is quick to point out that he receives support from “legal” Hispanics. However, he quickly returns to the specific political dangers posed by these immigrants’ political

441 “I’ve always enjoyed terrific support from the Hispanic community, without which I might not be Sheriff, and I have always worked to protect their homes and businesses and neighborhoods the same way my deputies protect the homes and businesses and neighborhoods of everyone in Maricopa county. I do not expect my support to drop because I am enforcing the laws of Arizona and the United States. My many years in law enforcement…have evidently demonstrated to the majority of Maricopa County citizens, including the sizable number of Hispanic citizens within that population, that I deserve their support. Otherwise…I wouldn’t have an approval rating of over 80 percent, a measure of support that I know no other elected official in Arizona can claim, and I doubt any significant elected official anywhere in the
representatives and countrymen. Interpreting the online literature of the immigrant rights “sanctuary movement,” and specifically their mission to “protect rights of livelihood, family unity, and physical and emotional safety, rights that exist regardless of national origin,” Arpaio admonishes his readers to:

[c]arefully consider those last words – ‘regardless of national origin.’ That’s an amazing statement, because if national origin is not the key determinant in how decide how to deal with immigration, if it is relegated to a secondary position, it is being pushed into instant irrelevance. If that is so, then citizenship has no meaning, and borders have no meaning, and being American (or Mexican, or Italian, or Japanese) has no meaning. Are we prepared to give up our sovereignty? Are we willing to give up our national identity? Are we ready to throw away the American idea?\textsuperscript{442}

Here Arpaio abandons the biopolitical language of law and order in favor of the communitarian language of national identity and the nationalist language of American sovereignty and exceptionalism. His foes here are not threatening criminal bodies, but rather political actors and leaders. He continues:

Consider the words of President Felipe Calderón of Mexico, in his annual formal address to his nation. ‘I have said that Mexico does not stop at its border. That wherever there is a Mexican, there is Mexico.’ Wow. Now that’s a showstopper. What the man was doing was essentially declaring war, presumably of the non-violent variety, on the United States by presuming that the millions of Mexicans who illegally reside north of the border constitute a legitimate and successful invasion, a \textit{de facto} annexation of American territory that the Mexican state has not only the right but the obligation to defend. Did the man really mean it? Time for a rhetorical question: Do you think any politician means anything he’s saying when he’s addressing his angry, unemployed, poor nation? So maybe he meant it literally, or maybe it was just a dramatic flourish for the impressionable audience. Either way, it was a pretty amazing statement for any president of any country to make, especially \textit{that} country, which is so dependent upon this country.\textsuperscript{443}

Finally, Arpaio blames his own country for not taking a political stand against the threats posed by political leaders in Latin America.

country can equal. I’ve enjoyed that measure of support, virtually without interruption, for the fifteen years I’ve been in office because of the work I have done and the stands I have taken. In fact, isn’t it offensive to assume that Hispanics are less interested in enforcing the laws of our country?” Arpaio. 49-50.
\textsuperscript{442} Arpaio. 49.
\textsuperscript{443} Arpaio. (Author’s emphasis).
We’ve allowed that kind of brazen and bizarre talk. We’ve set the stage where such talk is almost inevitable, by not insisting that the sanctity of America’s borders is not open for discussion or debate.\textsuperscript{444}

In these ways, Arpaio and his fellow agents of enforcement articulate the political imperatives of border control. The terms of his political opposition to Latin American immigration are echoed by nearly every prominent advocate of enforcement.

If these tensions and slips within otherwise anti-political discourse provide a glimpse of the political frameworks that inform and shape the biopolitical practices of border control, the immigrant-phobic statements of public figures (e.g., Buchanan) and public intellectuals (e.g., Huntington) help to clarify these frameworks and to lay them bare. Buchanan’s commentaries are among the clearest, most comprehensive, and most instructive statements of anti-immigrantism available in English, and they serve as useful reference points for readings of other texts in the literature on the “crisis.” In his recent bestselling book, aptly titled \textit{State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America}, Buchanan lays out a series of popular arguments, in the strongest and most explicit terms, to support his thesis that the U.S. as a nation, and the West as a civilization, are in “mortal peril” due to the “unresisted” “invasion” of immigrants.\textsuperscript{445} The sincere urgency conveyed in this text derives its force from a groundswell of resentment and fear manifested in small towns and big cities alike.\textsuperscript{446} This urgency, in turn, is performatively reproduced in the collective action of local community groups and national organizations, which function as appendages to federal agencies like ICE, and which pressure governments and governors to participate by declaring local micro-emergencies and issuing executive orders. Important discursive variations notwithstanding, Buchanan’s statement is important in that it foregrounds many of the anxieties that animate the practices of U.S. immigration and national security discourse.

Buchanan begins with a simple premise: “America,” both as a nation and as the last bastion of “Western” culture, is dying. The symptoms of its demise are manifold and

\textsuperscript{444} Arpaio. (My emphasis).
\textsuperscript{446} As in the case of Pawlenty’s executive orders, Buchanan’s impressive conceptualization of the immigration crisis does not make him the author of any dominant script. In emphasizing the importance of his work, we mean only to highlight the useful way in which it amalgamates, condenses, and clarifies the work of others.
diverse, but they share a common feature: they all emerge as direct or indirect results of the unprecedented, massive influx of immigrants from the “Third World” over the past two decades. Buchanan’s diagnoses, and those of the “anti-immigrantist” literature more broadly, can be divided roughly into two categories. The first category is biopolitical. It is concerned fundamentally with the management of the U.S. population as an abstract juridical entity (a bio-juridical order), the regulation of the flows of goods and people across and within the borders of this ordered whole, and more broadly the defense of a unitary social body through technologies of statecraft. 447 Into this category fall Buchanan’s concerns about wage depression and job losses for American workers caused by the exploitation of low-wage labor from abroad 448; the debilitating “cost” that recent waves of immigration have imposed on social services (healthcare, education, etc.) and the welfare state generally 449; the contamination of the otherwise juridically ordered social body by criminal agents and by entire cultures of criminality 450; the insidious contamination of otherwise healthy individual American bodies and the biopolitical body of American society with a “veritable assembly line” of foreign diseases (tuberculosis, Chagas disease, leprosy, etc.) 451; the specter of cellular terrorism and the bomb-strapped Muslim body; and the degradation of U.S. sovereign power over its own body (it cannot even maintain the integrity of it’s borders, etc.). These themes are reiterated and elaborated by public figures from across the political spectrum, but most importantly by self-proclaimed “conservatives” who have lost faith in the Republican Party’s commitment to national security, isolationist protectionism, and cultural distinctiveness.

Into the second diagnostic category fall symptoms of the terminal sickness of an intelligible, unified (if not completely homogenous), and patriotic national culture and political community. Buchanan devotes an entire chapter to the question: “What is a nation?” He provides an instructive account of the disavowals at the heart of the “immigration debate.” Agreeing with North Carolina Senator Sam Ervin about the

448 Like Dobbs, Buchanan also expresses a deep-seated concern about the exportation of American jobs abroad.
449 Buchanan. 31 and 34.
450 Buchanan. 23-27.
451 Buchanan. 29-31.
legitimacy of restricting immigration to people of European origin, something that most immigration legislation prior to the 1965 sought to do, he asks:

What is wrong...with the national origins of the American people? What is wrong with maintaining them? What is wrong with preferring as immigrants one’s own kinsman?¹⁴⁵²

Lamenting the discourse of liberal multiculturalism as “Western suicide,” he continues:

It is not true that all creeds and cultures are equally assimilable in a first world nation born of England, Christianity, and Western civilization. Race, faith, ethnicity, and history leave genetic fingerprints that [nothing] can erase.¹⁴⁵³

I will return to the ways in which Buchanan’s apologetics reflect the failures of the dominant national imaginary to differentiate between the immigrant other and the native subject. Here, I only wish to stress the way in which Buchanan articulates the commonly disavowed political-racial structure of the nation-state’s symbolic order. His words illuminate how the constitutive practices of the immigration crisis – including the articulation of anti-immigrant rhetoric, the codification and documentation of identity and difference, and the policing of geographic and demographic boundaries – are always already practices of political and racial differentiation.

Samuel Huntington’s treatise on the “crisis” of American identity, Who Are We: The Challenges to American National Identity, articulates the politics of immigration enforcement in a more scholarly mode. Acknowledging the historical and contemporary realities of cultural mixing and the founding violence that established Anglo-Protestant culture in native America, Huntington locates the golden age of American identity in the 100 years between the Civil War and the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. During this period, he argues, a distinct Anglo-Protestant culture flourished. According to Huntington, “key elements” of this cultural identity were:

The English language; Christianity; religious commitment; English concepts of the rule of law, the responsibility of rulers, and the rights of individuals; and dissenting Protestant values of individualism, the work ethic, and the belief that

¹⁴⁵² Buchanan, 240.
¹⁴⁵³ Buchanan, 248. Buchanan’s reference to the West here is significant and indicative of a common feature of the immigration crisis literature, which slips between references to the American nation and to the multinational concept of Western civilization. Nationalist invocations of Western culture and international threats to Western culture, like their support of international policing assemblages (e.g., agencies of the War on Terror), miss their patriotic mark in interesting ways.
humans have the ability and the duty to create a heaven on earth, a ‘city on a hill.’

Huntington goes on to suggest that this cohesive national culture has been unsettled and displaced by “a new wave of immigrants from Latin America and Asia,” by “the popularity…of multiculturalism and diversity,” by “Hispanization trends” (including the rise of Spanish-speaking communities and bilingualism), by identity politics, by transnational, diasporic affiliations, and “by the growing commitment of elites to cosmopolitan and transnational identities.”

The latter concern marks Huntington’s book as a “populist” text. Like Dobbs and Buchanan, Huntington positions his restrictionist stance within the time-honored tradition of grassroots, democratic “anti-elitism.” With good reason, historians of 19th- and early-20th-century democratic movements view this new anti-elitist populism as a perversion of the vision of the agrarian People’s Party, to which the label Populism as a proper noun has been applied. Contemporary populist rhetoric nonetheless derives its force from a deeply rooted collective memory of what historians, following Lawrence Goodwyn, call the Populist Moment: the mass democratic movement of American farmers in the 1880s. This Moment has been forcefully recalled and restaged at other historical moments over the past century. Current statements like those of Huntington, Buchanan, and Dobbs draw largely upon the mobilizing force of two antecedent appropriations. The first, associated with the notorious southern segregationist, George Wallace, explicitly tied the interests of the common small-town “working man” (read: white working man) and grievances against moneyed, “liberal” elites to principles of racial segregation and majoritarian rule. Like the anti-immigrant populists of today, Wallace and others

---

454 Already, one can find a slippage between the national identity and a universal humanism. The universalism of Anglo-protestant culture appears to contradict the nationalist exclusions that Huntington, as “a patriot and a scholar,” goes on to advocate. As I argue below, Buchanan seems to articulate the deeper ethno-nationalism at work in Huntington’s apparently truncated humanism, although he too slips back and forth between the nation and the human (as conceived within the Orientalizing discourses of “The West”). See Huntington, 2004, xvi and Buchanan.

455 Huntington, 2004. xvi.

456 I follow the lead of Michael Kazin in respecting the historiographical convention that reserves the proper noun Populism (with a capital P) for this mass democratic movement. Although this agrarian movement was itself a “repetition with difference” of prior uprisings, historians generally agree that it marked a significant discursive shift.

mobilized economic and social uncertainty and xenophobic paranoia\textsuperscript{458} and directed it towards the ungodly alliance of “liberal elites,” particularly those in the legislature and the judiciary,\textsuperscript{459} and African Americans.

The second populist moment, the so-called grassroots “Reagan Revolution,” disavowed the explicit racism of the Wallace regime, but nonetheless “learned to harness the same mass resentments (against federal power, left-wing movements, the counterculture, and the black poor) for which George Wallace had spoken.”\textsuperscript{460} Appealing to “small-town” values of hard work, self-sufficiency, family, and religious conservatism, the Reagan regime reconciled the apparently conflicting interests of globalizing big-business and an increasingly insecure middle class. Despite the downward pressure on real wages, job losses, hostile corporatization, and increasing economic uncertainty, Reagan republicanism managed to interpellate small-town white Americans as successful entrepreneurs in their own right, as opposed to the parasitic, unassimilated (and perhaps unassimilable), usually black underclass of low-wage labor and unemployed miscreants. The appeal of Reagan’s American imaginary was apparent both in the overwhelming support for his laissez-faire economic policies and in the increasing resentment directed at the welfare state (and other New Deal legacies), paternalistic liberal elites, and the purportedly unassimilable people who “did their bidding.”\textsuperscript{461}

Huntington, Buchanan, and Dobbs, themselves products of the Wallace-Reagan legacy, inherit the fantasy of a Euro-American, Christian people united against elitism, idleness, decadence, criminality, and judicial tyranny. They also inherit the trace of what this fantasy has suppressed. Reworking the racial distinctions articulated by Wallace and others, both Huntington and Buchanan strain to emphasize the essential difference between the American people and the new immigrant masses. Whereas Huntington attempts to reconcile the religio-political doctrine of universal humanism with nationalist exclusions, Buchanan asserts the primacy of an exclusive national culture and ethnicity.

\textsuperscript{458} For example, paranoia stemming from the changing demographics of predominantly white, small-town America and the threats posed by African American labor, as well as from Cold War fears previously mobilized by McCarthyism.

\textsuperscript{459} Wallace was well known for his opposition to liberal judges who would “legislate from the bench,” making decisions in civil rights that overruled the democratic will of the majority in small-town America.

\textsuperscript{460} Kazin, 1995.

\textsuperscript{461} Kazin, 1995.
over any universalist “creed.” Buchanan declares, “came the nation.” Quoting Peter Brimelow, Buchanan argues compellingly that the U.S. as a nation “implies a link by blood…like an extended family” and is, in the last analysis, “an ethno-national community…an interlacing of ethnicity and culture’ that ‘speaks one language.’”

A Reagan speechwriter, Buchanan sheds light on the underlying meanings and values that constituted the “Silent Majority” of the Reagan Revolution. Reagan’s apparent ecumenical support of formal equality, civil rights, and diversity obscured the exclusive nature of this revolution. Buchanan now lays these exclusions bare. Unapologetically, he asserts that Americans are one people and one nation because they share a common bond of kinship, the same religious traditions, the same “heroes,” “history,” and “holidays.” They watch the same television programs and they read the same newspapers, magazines, and books. They speak the same language, English, both at work and at home. They express patriotic feeling in a wide array of nationalist rituals and ceremonies. The fact that new immigrant communities conform to few of these conventional ways of being American and seem to have no intention of doing so implies that they are so many “millions and millions of strangers…in our midst.” To say, as liberals do, that we are a “multicultural nation” is tantamount to saying that we are multinational, which implies that the singular American nation is dead.

To his credit, Buchanan’s appeal highlights the contradictions of Reaganite neoliberal nationalism. Arguing that “an economy is not a country,” he attacks the neoliberal “economism cult” – including both Reagan and Bush – for worshipping transnational corporations as if they were sovereign rulers, and for succumbing to the logic of global competition. Blinded by the profit motive and the GDP, he suggests, the economism cult has recruited unassimilable immigrant labor from Latin America, abolishing the attachments that constitute America’s “European core.” As a result, small towns and big cities alike have begun to “look like Mexico.” This dynamic is fatal, in part because, unlike the economists, Mexicans retain a sense of nationalist pride and

---

462 Buchanan, 2006, 151.
463 Buchanan, 2006, 151.
464 Buchanan, 2006, 141-142.
465 Buchanan.
harbor a “grudge against the Gringo” for the founding violence that extended U.S. borders to the south and west. Their commendable allegiance to the Mexican nation partly explains why they, unlike previous immigrants, will never assimilate to the American way of life. In Buchanan’s expressly political narrative of conquest and war, post-national competition does not supplant the mortal combat between nations. Fostering the unresisted “invasion” of immigrants, it merely puts Americans at a disadvantage in that fight.

Dominant Foucauldian analyses of biopolitical governmentality can only go so far in explaining the impetus and effects of Buchanan’s appeal. The desperation expressed by Buchanan and Huntington reflects a productive desire to move beyond biopolitical governmentality, i.e., to re-establish an American “way of life” and a substantive politics of nationality that defies the logic of the market and the imperatives of the police state. Realistic or not, this desire is a crucial aspect of sweeping demands for everyday border security. Indeed, it is precisely the repeated failure to realize the dream of a substantive nationality that amplifies and intensifies demands for exceptional legal and extra-legal measures. Buchanan does not shy away from these failures. His pessimism reflects a deep awareness of the futility of his patriotic project, and helps to explain increasing demands for pervasive, “intimate violence” in the name of national identity and security.

More than other restrictionists, Buchanan questions the existence of American culture and ethnicity in a way that throws prospects for its rehabilitation into doubt. He goes so far as to question demands for “assimilation” in a context where the already assimilated culture is rotten to the core. In a statement that undercuts demands for the “defense” of American society, Buchanan implies that unassimilable immigrants are in many ways more “American” than the native population. In a subsection with the apt heading, “Assimilating to What?” Buchanan provides an instructive glimpse of the proverbial elephant in the room:

Millions of immigrants, but especially their children…are being inculcated with the values of a subculture of gangs, crime, drugs, and violence. The parents may work hard, attend church, and still carry with them the conservative and Catholic values with which they were raised in Latin America or Mexico. But these good people are not changing our culture. Our polluted culture is capturing and changing their children.466

466 Buchanan, 28.
Admissions like this reveal an underlying anxiety about the untenability of ethno-national distinctions. They are echoed by other restrictionists in striking terms. Consider this statement by Ron Paul, calling attention to the “embarrassing” American work ethic of immigrant labor.

A lot of illegals come in here because they are desperate and they know there’s a job, and in their [good] work ethic—you know it’s almost embarrassing—some of them are more American than some of us…So I don’t want us to worry about the borders between North and South Korea, and between Iraq and Syria. I want to worry about [securing] our own borders. ⁴⁶⁷

These examples and others illustrate the deep awareness of how dangerously thin ethno-national distinctions have become. Without these distinctions, political questions of immigration policy become biopolitical calculations. Far from discouraging policies and practices based on these distinctions, however, this awareness invigorates the desire to pry closely interwoven national identities apart. The immigration crisis reflects more than the desire to protect a numerical majority (although, as Appadurai argues, this is certainly part of the objective⁴⁶⁸). Rather, it reflects a desire to become more than a mere numerical majority. Intimate violence thus emerges partly from a desire to create a national culture from the ground up.

---

⁴⁶⁷ Ron Paul campaign speech: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7U4RgUh5G38, 2:00-2:27.
⁴⁶⁸ Appadurai, 2006. 52.
Conclusion
Immigration Management and Bordering in the Colonial Present

To put it in a word, the colonial heritage is the persistence of the empty place of the subject, forming the shadow cast by the citizen in the space of sovereignty.

Étienne Balibar 469

The Resilience of Colonial Racism

In the postcolonial metropole, as in the post-colony, the contradictions and crises of colonialism have survived the ruptures of national independence and decolonization. Challenging prominent state-centric theories of international relations, theorists of neocolonial dependency, underdevelopment, and world systems have analyzed how elites (including elites in the post-colony) have reproduced structural relationships of debt, domination, and exploitation. 470 In the preceding chapters, I have endeavored to bring postcolonial analysis to bear on what Balibar calls “immigration recolonized”: the subordination of immigrants through administrative and representational practices of racial bordering, surveillance, and control within the territorial boundaries of the West.

Whereas Balibar and other postcolonial thinkers have restricted their studies of recolonization to the territories of European countries, I have sought to identify the connections and continuities that link bordering practices in the United States to a European colonial past and present. Animated by an enduring desire to reconstitute racial hierarchies in the post-colonial world order and to recover the privileges of whiteness for a re-imagined Euro-Western population – for the West “as a whole” – these practices strive relentlessly to demarcate Western citizen-subjects from non-Western others. In doing so, they function to maintain divisions of labor rendered precarious by the mass recruitment of non-citizen workers, a market-driven phenomenon over which the state seems to have lost control, and by demands these workers make for rights of citizenship, which the state can still deny. In the service of desperate efforts to secure a monopoly on the rights and privileges of European and Euro-American citizenship for an identifiable population, these practices must continuously produce Europeans as recognizable

470 Manzo; Cordoso; Gunder-Franke.
471 Balibar.
subjects distinct from others. Given that these immigrant others are now exploited _en masse_ not only within Western national and imperial economies but also inside the territories of Western nation-states, and given the extent to which immigrants have both integrated into and reconfigured communities within these territories, efforts to produce Europeans as an exclusive class of rights-bearers have been forced to rely more and more heavily on thin legal categories of national belonging.  

On the one hand, representations of “the immigrant problem” interpellate immigrants as inadequately developed either by benevolent efforts to civilize them as colonial subjects or to assimilate them as immigrants, or both in succession. On the other hand, the moral foundations of civilizing missions could not by themselves support a categorical exclusion of immigrant subjects from domains of Western citizenship or from communities whose members reside within the territorial boundaries of Western countries. It was, after all, a constitutive goal of French and U.S. civilizing missions to transform natives, if not into full-blooded Europeans and Euro-Americans, at least into precisely those kinds of subjects who could move to and reside and work in Euro-Western spaces and among European peoples. Like the Algerian _Harkis_, Filipino colonials who succeeded in U.S. schools and worksites and Mexican braceros were lauded as indications of the success of American projects of colonization and modernization and as national heroes in both their home countries and the metropole. Nevertheless, demands for rights among these Americanized subjects – students and workers – provoked categorical exclusions that reproduced Europeans and Euro-Americans as legal subjects in relation to illegal foreigners.

The repressive practices that comprise the West’s “new security environment” and the “securitization of immigration” (as discussed in Chapter 2) serve this disciplinary, productive function. They interpellate immigrants as chronically deviant and criminal and, in the final analysis, as undeserving of European status. These same practices mobilize European citizen-subjects as guardians of a European community that has never existed. Through their participation in the production of Europe by way of a permanently functioning regulation of non-citizens as non-Europeans, the people of Europe identify with the national state and join its police.

---

472 Balibar aptly describes this thinning as a kind of abstraction of communitarian allegiances (see below).
Europe’s “new security environment” has intensified these practices of identification. The criminalization of undocumented immigration produces juridical categories (the “clandestine” in France and the “illegal alien” in the U.S.) that overcode racial evaluations developed within colonial discourse. The practice of linking domestic criminal penalties to penalties for crossing borders without proper governmental authorization renders immigrant workers vulnerable to exceptional forms of state surveillance and control described in preceding chapters, including the ever-present threat of incarceration and deportation. As Balibar writes, this practice of “double jeopardy” should be “complemented by a full description of the forms of institutional racism on the part of the bureaucracy to which foreigners (or rather certain foreigners, ‘swarthy’ ones from the ‘South’) are exposed to once they try to claim the benefit of a right or are suspected of wanting to attribute it to themselves.”

For citizen subjects, as the cases of immigrant-phobic labor unions in France and the U.S. attest, the tendency toward complete identification with the state emerges from an acute awareness of the inability and/or the unwillingness of the neoliberal state to protect the privileges of Western workforces from the acceleration of flows of capital and labor across borders. To assure the allegiance of workforces who suspect that their sovereign power over borders may be dwindling, state actors have deputized local police, bureaucrats, and ordinary citizens to participate both in spectacular policing operations, like the ones we have seen in Calais, Paris, Marseilles, Worthington, Postville and in the quotidian practices of internal bordering for which the state of Arizona provides among the most instructive examples.

The precariousness of the privileges of Western whiteness is illustrated by the decrease in real wages and standards of living for U.S. and French citizens and in the narrowing of income differentials between citizen and immigrant workers (e.g., in Austin Minnesota where this difference has nearly been eliminated, although differences in working conditions remain.) In this context of economic insecurity, wherein the wages of Western citizenship are no longer ensured, it becomes all the more imperative that the exclusive rights of citizen workers are guaranteed by the state. As Balibar observes, this

---

assurance of rights is achieved, and the Western community preserved, primarily through the increasingly abstract communitarian denouncement, stigmatization, and denigration of immigrants as infiltrating illegals. 474 Even the most generous proposals for “paths to citizenship” reinforce the patronizing narrative that immigrant workers would in the best of circumstances remain a class of fortunate, liminal subjects, the beneficiaries of Western benevolence, tutelage, and tolerance.

Critically reconsidered and radicalized, recent campaigns for immigrant rights have the potential to unsettle the core of this narrative. In the U.S., rights activists have demonstrated the lack of substantive justification for laws that would exclude children and young adults brought to the U.S. by their parents at a young age from the polity. Debates among policymakers about the U.S. Dream Act, legislation that would grant citizenship to young adults on the condition that they complete four years of college or two years of military service, reveal both the ambivalence of Western immigration discourse and the racial conception of national identity that animates practices of inclusion and exclusion. As advocacy groups have documented, most of these young people have been educated exclusively in U.S. elementary and secondary schools, are fluent in both English and Spanish (although some can no longer speak Spanish), and have participated in the production of local communities. Outside of social movements and inside policymaking circles, both sides of this debate share a racial framework that legal and economic reasoning obscure, e.g., the notion that these foreigners will or will not jeopardize the privileged status of authentic American students by flocking to take seats in American colleges or the notion that they will or will not cost taxpayers by paying in-state rates at public institutions. Both choices – granting these young immigrants the gift of a conditional path to citizenship or excluding and deporting them

474 Representing the presence of inadequately documented immigrant workers as a concession or a gift preserves that status of citizenship as a birthright. These representations pervade debates on the “immigrant problem” on both sides of the Atlantic. Whereas anti-immigrant nationalists argue that this concession (the concession of “amnesty” in the U.S. context) ought to be revoked immediately, proponents of immigrant rights argue that it ought to be extended, or at least that its revocation ought to be “deferred.” “We thus see the development of an abstract communitarianism, centered on the state and its exclusive claim to incarnate the universal. This public communitarianism continually affirms itself by denouncing the danger of rival communitarianisms or real or imaginary differentialisms that reflect the irreducibility of contemporary societies to a single model of national assimilation. It allows the permanent stigmatization of any foreigner who does not consider his presence on national soil to be simply a revocable concession.” Balibar, Étienne (2003-11-24). We, the People of Europe?: Reflections on Transnational Citizenship. Translation/Transnation. Kindle Edition. (Princeton University Press). 37
from the polity – interpellate citizens as authentic and unconditionally American citizen-subjects who need prove neither their allegiance to the nation nor their fitness for inclusion in the national political community.

Nonetheless, support for the Dream Act among politicians reveals a desire to incorporate immigrant subjects. Opposition to the Dream Act and other exemptions for the children of immigrants in the U.S. and Europe lays bare the stark racism that animates new bordering practices. Resurgent campaigns for the repeal of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects the *jus soli* rights of all children born in the United States, reveals the underlying bio-genealogical underpinnings of American nationalism and xenophobia. As Balibar has argued, similar campaigns in France to block family unification among citizens and non-citizens in the metropole participate in the same “politics of genealogy”:

The existence of migrant families (and their composition, their way of life) has become a true obsession for migration policies and public opinion. Should the alien families be separated or united (that is, reunited)? If so, on which side of the border, which kind of families (traditional, modern), which kind of relatives (parents, children), with what kind of rights? [T]he interference of family politics…with the definition of the national “community” is a crucial structural mode of production of historical racism.475

The ideology of Le Pen’s National Front in France holds the line on this bio-genealogical racism, allowing politicians in the French mainstream on both the right and the left to distance themselves from right-wing extremism while simultaneously calling for increased border control to protect the French workforce and population. Leaders of the party rehabilitate the principles of *jus sanguinis*, arguing that in order to become French citizens, residents should have to prove maternal or paternal French ancestry. In the U.S., anti-immigrant rhetoric frequently deploys the concept of “anchor babies” – children born for the purpose of legitimizing the status of undocumented parents – to challenge citizenship as a birthright of children born to non-citizens on U.S. territory.

The perception of danger posed by the so-called “anchor baby” and the correlative danger of family unification emerges from at least two conflicting sources of anxiety. The first is racism of the old type: a belief that the offspring of racially inferior

---

groups will not assimilate and will contaminate the European race beyond recognition, finishing what their parents had started. The second is the prospect that the offspring of non-citizen immigrants will cultivate skills, compete with the offspring of citizen-subjects, and make legitimate demands on the state for full citizenship rights. Bilingual and instilled with knowledge of the value of their citizenship, these first generation citizens will have the ability to move across cultural and linguistic borders in a world where transnational mobility has become an increasingly valuable asset. In doing so, they will create transnational communities that undermine dominant narratives of the nation-state.

Together, these anxieties intersect in ways that produce crises of identity and difference within the national population. The potential hybridity represented by the “anchor baby” and the prospect of proliferating transnational, transpolitical families integrated within communities of citizen-subjects and legitimized by Dream Acts and family unification laws, strikes at the core of dominant narratives of racially exclusive national belonging. Immigrant children and families have the potential to undermine the sanctity of national borders, including linguistic and cultural borders. As deputies of national border control, citizen police have recast this crisis of identity – or, more accurately, of non-identity, of the crisis of an absent nation that must be produced in order to be defended – as an immigration crisis and an “immigrant problem.” This problematization obscures the transpolitical promise of immigrant children and their families, the promise of transnational communities that lay bare the poverty of nationalism in the Western nation-state.

The Immigrant Problem Reconsidered

Crises of colonial administration, caused in part by demands for rights on the part of colonized people both to inclusion and to cultural autonomy, have resurfaced as crises of national identity and difference in the era of mass migration. Modes of governance and practices of racial bordering, exploitation, and exclusion developed in colonial spaces have been imported to the metropole, reconstituting the problems of colonial rule as an “immigrant problem.” Constructions of the “immigrant problem” and the “immigration crisis” in Europe and the United States reanimate practices of colonial bordering, colonial
subject production, and colonial divisions of labor at the same time as they erase the
colonial heritage of these practices.

By extension, the recuperation of colonial practices to manage immigrants
reproduces the tensions and contradictions of colonial administration. The conflict
between the incorporation of immigrant subjects into national workforces, including their
subjection through education and training, and their perennial exclusion from domains of
citizenship reproduces tensions characteristic of systems of colonial rule. These tensions
emerge out of the endemic conflicts of imperial nation-states, notably, the conflict
between the imperatives of civilizing missions, imperatives of incorporation and
integration, and the imperatives of exclusive subordination and exploitation.

Postcolonial analysis of this tension’s re-emergence in policies and practices of
immigration management demonstrates how internal expansion through the
“recolonization” of immigrants continues to unsettle the boundaries that demarcate
national populations. As Balibar observes, ostensibly post-racial representations of the
“immigrant problem” in the U.S. and France rely on anti-political arguments for “national
preference” that invoke limited “capacities of reception and integration” to justify
exclusion. Like colonial justifications for the exclusion of the indigène from domains of
European citizenship, these arguments obfuscate the extent to which employers and the
state have already – that is, prior to the formulation of criteria of exclusion and prior to
practices of surveillance, incarceration, and deportation of those deemed legitimately
excludable – profitably recruited and integrated immigrant subjects. In addition, these
arguments obscure the ways in which immigrants have, within transnational spaces
produced via practices of imperial expansion, themselves created intranational and
transnational communities and economies that include American and European citizens
as members and as beneficiaries.

The emergence of multilingual, multicultural communities and workforces
comprised of citizens and immigrant subjects gives the lie to criteria for exclusion from
the nation based on non-racial thresholds of sustainability. No longer can exclusion be
tenably grounded in the imperative to protect a national workforce, because it is no
longer clear, if it ever was, what constitutes that workforce. The endurance of imperial
workforces and transnational communities should force us to consider the following
question: if immigrant subjects like colonial subjects contribute to the production of goods and ways of life in the metropole, if they join national workforces in ways that benefit local and national communities, national and imperial economies, and multinational corporations, if they actively create economies and political communities, what precisely would be “sustained” through the exclusion of these subjects from domains of citizenship? If racial difference is an illegitimate criterion for exclusion, then what is left? The citizenship status of individuals in a given population itself provides no substantive justification for exclusion of resident non-citizens (or anyone for that matter). Even more than in the colony, where administrators could more easily legitimate the policing colonized subjects on the moral foundations of the civilizing mission, justifications for the policing of immigrant communities quickly degenerate into mere legal arguments about who is in juridical fact a documented citizen and who is not. Within this juridical discourse, the identities of citizens and non-citizens amount to nothing other than their legal status, a status devoid of any and all economic, social, political, and cultural content. The policing of the border between citizen and non-citizen in this context would become an utterly apolitical, technocratic affair; one that would require the participation of all citizens as deputies of border control and as documented subjects willing to show their papers – the only remaining proof of their membership in the nation – at every moment of every day.

Legalistic disavowals of racism in the U.S. and France among border guarding politicians from across the political spectrum do indeed have the dystopic, anti-political subject-effects described above. However, they do so by obscuring a more complex colonial system of representation and belief. On the question of where criteria for the exclusion of profitably recruited and integrated immigrants come from, the neo-racist rhetoric of the far right is more instructive than the juridical rhetoric of moderates and the left. As Balibar observes, this rhetoric recodes racial “thresholds of tolerance” in cultural terms, but nonetheless retains a racial conception of national identity and difference:

What “national preference” means today is that immigrants, beginning with foreigners in irregular situations or who can easily be rendered illegal, are deprived of fundamental social rights (such as unemployment insurance, health care, familial allocations, housing, and schooling) and can be expelled as a function of “thresholds of tolerance” that are arbitrarily established according to criteria of “cultural distance”—that is, race in the sense the notion has taken on
today.

Although disavowed by self-identified moderates, the racial ideology of “national preference” articulated explicitly by far right anti-immigrant nationalists in Europe and the United States (e.g., the Le Pens in France and Patrick Buchanan in the U.S.) provides the legitimating principles for all policies and practices of border control, political exclusion, and expulsion. Outside of a colonial order of racial subjects, the concepts of national capacities for integration, thresholds of tolerance, and sustainability lose their meaning. As Patrick Buchanan has suggested, the answer to the question “sustainability for whom” cannot be creedal.

**Rethinking the State of Exception and Border Politics**

In the preceding chapters, I proposed that colonial continuities connect what Balibar has called the “new racism” (nationalist, culturalist, and class-based, as opposed to merely biological and phenotypical) of immigration discourse both to what Foucault calls the “biopolitical” discourse of the nation-state and, furthermore, to a distinctively European colonial past; a past that is marked by internal conflict and ambivalence, in Homi Bhabha’s sense of the term, as much as it is by rational calculations and coherent policies and practices of rationally acting states. Drawing on the work of postcolonial theorists and historians, I have argued that analysis of colonial trajectories complicates state-centric analyses of immigration, including both realist and liberal theories of International Relations and Foucauldian analyses of biopolitics. Furthermore, this study complicates analysis inspired by Giorgio Agamben’s use of Foucault’s biopolitical analysis to understand states of emergency and exception.

Like Francophone African descendants of French colonial workers who continue to work for French companies both in former French colonies and in the French hexagon, like Afghans who were recruited to fight alongside U.S. troops and their allies against the Taliban and who now seek refuge in the metropole of the region’s former colonizer, Guatemalans who have been recruited to bolster the American meatpacking industry are both wanted and not wanted, actively recruited and actively excluded from the national

---

political community and from high-status sectors of the national economy. Across Europe and the United states, colonial boundaries have functioned to maintain the structural privileges of patriarchy and of whiteness during border-blurring emergencies, such as war, and economic crises, such as labor shortages and depressions. The Foucauldian analysis of biopolitics and “states of exception” captures only certain aspects of these bordering practices. Agamben’s theory of sovereignty and states of exception helps explain the systematic denial of rights to fully recognized citizens who are perceived to pose threats to the body of the population, such as Japanese Americans in the United States during World War II and European Jews and French Algerians in France in the 1930s through the 1950s. Neither of these explains the colonial and political production and maintenance of modern European/white bourgeois subjectivity. The political production of Western subjects has always been a necessary condition for the production of European states and spaces of exception. As exemplified by the treatment of Filipino and Algerian immigrants in the United States and France, respectively, biopolitical framings that take the stability of a national subject for granted as that which must be protected cannot adequately capture the colonial work that necessarily precedes modern states of exception. This is because biopolitical framings, ironically much like the state-centric theories of International Relations, tend to overstate the effectiveness of biopolitical regulatory regimes. In doing so, they downplay the importance of political contestations that exceed the bounds of the biopolitical domain.

This work of exception involves more than the sovereign exclusion of formerly recognized speaking subjects from domains of political speech. It involves, first, the misrecognition of foreigners as non-humans or quasi-humans, and, second, practices of civilization or modernization that articulate the boundaries of modern European subjectivity and that partially incorporate foreigners into an incompletely bordered European domain. Analysis of the colonial incorporation and subjection of immigrants in contexts of crisis reveals more than the precariousness of the racial populations that declarations and practices of exception purport to defend. It reveals the fragmentation and non-presence of politically defined national populations and the susceptibility of these populations to transformation.
French aid agencies and employers thus performed policing and surveillance functions for the French state and were highly intimate with humanitarian, development functions. The two functions correspond to the French empire’s exclusion and exploitation of colonial subjects and its ongoing civilizing mission. The tension between the modern European state’s objectives of exclusion and subordination repeats “with difference” the tension between the French empire’s exclusive subordination of colonial subjects and its efforts to prepare colonial subjects for incorporation as full citizens.

In postwar France, even the agencies established exclusively to keep out threatening bodies valued the anthropological and development functions performed by humanitarian organizations. Letters from the ministry of national security to the ministry of the interior frequently directed authorities to report on the political, cultural, and sexual activities of individuals and groups of African migrants to France, as well as their living conditions. Inter-agency communication reveals an important colonial feature of statist border control that the impersonal ideology of border enforcement, law, and order obscures. As in the colony, to know and control the others of Europe, statist organizations had to rely on information accumulated through intimate encounters with these subjects. The French Ministry of National Security did not merely control the external borders of the French hexagon by regulating the flow of alien migrants. Rather, it consulted with the Ministries of the Interior, who, through aid agencies, had access to information about the private, domestic lives of immigrants and about their lives as workers, family members, community members, and perhaps most importantly as political actors. As in the colony, the production of knowledge of non-French, non-white subjects in the metropole involved political and cultural encounters and engagements not only on borders and in prisons, but also in homes, neighborhoods, worksites, places of worship, and political gatherings.

As in French colonies and in the U.S., xenophobic anxieties in France were intensified by the fact that immigrant populations were inadequately known. Official reports from the various ministries frequently express frustration about the lack of adequate census statistics and anthropological information that would enable effective identification and monitoring of immigrants. Like Algerians, other African immigrants
to France occupied a liminal space in between the wild *terra nullius* of the colony and the space of exception in the metropole.\(^{477}\)

Following Agamben, some have argued that, as a veritable police state, Postwar France (between 1945 and 1968) was attempting to re-establish sovereignty by creating spaces of exception to the rule of law. Included among these spaces were the dwellings and worksites of African immigrants, where immigrant bodies were subject to sovereign violence without legal protections afforded to citizen-subjects. However, the preceding discussion further complicates Agamben’s theory of modern sovereignty and his elaboration of Foucault’s theory of biopolitics as applied to African immigrants from former French colonies. Agamben conceives biopolitical sovereignty as that which decides what parts of a given population (national, Western, global, etc.) must be quarantined or killed for the sake of the health of the population as a whole. Decisions to *suspend* the law for particular spaces or groups require mutual juridical recognition of sovereign and the corpus of the nation as a biological body.\(^{478}\) The mass incarceration and killing of Jews in Vichy France and Nazi Germany required that all members of the body politic, including Jews, make themselves known to the state as European subjects. By contrast, colonial subjects both rejected and were systematically denied entry into the national corpus.

The French state recognized its colonial subjects as sub-human bodies in a not-yet-biopolitical terrain. The French civilizing mission aimed to make humans out of humanoid animals and then possibly to incorporate these humans, once adequately developed, into the French population. It was therefore set apart from the project of protecting an already constituted corpus. Knowledge of colonial subjects was by design incomplete and one-sided. The French state demanded the *allegiance* of colonial subjects in Africa, but did not demand the same kind of *recognition* that it required of its citizens. Africans were deemed incapable of entering into “normal” relations with a European nation-state. They were studied, monitored, coerced, and killed, but not recognized as rights-bearers to whom “normal” French law applied. The upshot was that colonial

---


\(^{478}\) Arjun Chowdhury. “The Colony as Exception (Or Why do I Have to Kill you More than Once)” *Borderlands*. (V.6 No.3, 2007).
subjects could not be adequately known and controlled, and therefore could not be exceptions to the rule of law in the technical sense theorized by Agamben. This explains the colonial official’s frustration in the face of anti-colonial resistance, a frustration Achille Mbembe sums up in the expression: “how many times do I have to kill you.”

Of course, as the preceding discussion has suggested, the boundary separating the wild space of the colony and the biopolitical space of the metropole cannot be maintained. On the contrary, the French civilizing mission and the cross-border flows of migrants and colonial officials constantly undermine this boundary. As colonial subjects are “developed,” they enter into the juridical sphere as quasi-political subjects who demand rights, whether or not they are granted those rights. At the same time, they are subjected more and more to biopolitical regulation, e.g., in hospitals, schools, and workplaces. Marginally incorporated into the corpus, they are politically empowered, but also rendered vulnerable to sovereign violence in states of exception. Immigrants to France from former colonies thus pose a dilemma for the French state. On the one hand, anxieties are produced by the fact that, as colonial subjects, these immigrants are relatively unknown and difficult to monitor. On the other hand, knowing these subjects requires acknowledging their place within the body of the population, and thus opening the possibility of their political equality as speaking, European subjects. In many ways, the “immigration problem,” including “the black problem” and the “North African problem,” reflects the quintessential dilemma of colonial governance brought to a head: not how can the state suspend law to kill a segment of the population, but how can the state help to create laws, policies, and practices that will incorporate foreign bodies without recognizing them as speaking subjects.

Juridical efforts to incorporate immigrants without recognizing them as speaking subjects relied heavily on the anthropological and development functions performed by aid agencies as well as other biopolitical sites of subject production like workplaces and hospitals. Like reports on populations in the colonies, nearly all ministry reports about immigrants to France from former colonies in the postwar years systematically ignored the political aspirations and cultural formations of immigrant communities. Instead of recognizing immigrants as speaking subjects, the French state re-imposed colonial

---

categories on immigrants and read their behavior through a colonial optic. When immigrants mobilized politically, e.g., as anti-colonial Pan-Arab or Pan-African associations or as communists, their struggles were reduced by the French state to symptoms of a chronic inability to assimilate and a correlative a propensity to be seduced like impressionable children by radical political parties. Unlike the political speech of French communists, who were included within a European milieu as political rivals, the speech of immigrants from French colonies was treated as symptomatic of racial and cultural separateness and inferiority. As in the colony, the remedy in postwar France was not only strict surveillance, documentation, and coercive exploitation. It was also humanitarian aid, integration, and paternalistic tutelage. To the extent that racialized immigrants were recognized as humanoid animals and children, it was imperative that they remain dependents of the French state. Often with the best of intentions, colonial agencies participated in the reproduction of the debt structure that maintained colonial relations between French citizen-subjects as purveyors and protectors of civilization and African beneficiaries of the French state’s developmental services.

The mass incorporation and exclusion of Latin American workers in places like Arizona, California, and the “Heartland” states recalls the general mechanisms of inclusive exclusion characteristic of American imperial projects. Skeptics of this postcolonial perspective argue that because Mexico was never a formal U.S. colony and because U.S. domestic and foreign policy after World War II is fundamentally post- and even anti-colonial, we have good reason to regard the discriminatory treatment of Latin American immigrants as part of a non-colonial order of liberal nation-states. This argument could be applied to the treatment of all non-Filipino immigrants deemed “non-white” coming from countries that were not formally U.S. colonies. As postcolonial historians have shown, however, the historical record does not bear this argument out. Structures of American colonialism were still clearly at work in producing boundaries and subjectivities of postwar immigration discourse throughout the second half of the 20th century. Ngai implies this in her theorization of the concept of “imported colonialism,” and recent histories of American Empire draw further attention to colonial continuities. These continuities were apparent in the treatment of Filipinos remaining in the country
after the mass repatriation of colonial subjects, but they are also apparent in the subjection of other non-European immigrant groups after the war.

The clearest illustration of the recolonization of Filipinos and other Asian and Latin American immigrant groups was the establishment of colonial policing and surveillance networks in the metropole. As historian Alfred W. McCoy has demonstrated, the officers who developed colonial policies and technologies of power in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Cuba were the very same officers who developed the policies and practices of immigration management designed to monitor and control not only colonial subjects, but also all immigrants from former European colonies in Africa and Latin America. The Bureau of Insular Affairs (BIA) (and subsequently the Office of Insular Affairs) played an integral role in the surveillance and control of colonial subjects on the mainland. Much like the French ministries of Muslim, Algerian, North African, and Black African affairs, the BIA worked closely both with colonial officials in the Philippines and with the U.S. departments of the interior, agriculture, education, and labor to regulate the flow of immigrant workers and students, to monitor their productive and political activities, and to produce and maintain boundaries separating different classes of colonial subjects, other classes of racialized aliens, and citizens.

Also like the French colonial and metropolitan Ministries, the Bureau of Insular Affairs played a crucial role in the “development” of immigrant colonials in the American metropole. For instance, the BIA helped to recruit young Filipinos from what were deemed elite Filipino families to attend institutions of higher education across the United States from Seattle to Chicago to New York. Maintaining class distinctions that were central to the civilizing mission, William Howard Taft, President McKinley’s Governor-General in the Philippines, consulted with the BIA to select group of elite Filipino students to travel to the U.S. as potential future leaders of an Americanized Filipino government. In addition, the BIA facilitated the recruitment of so-called “low-skilled” Filipino laborers to work in the burgeoning railway, fishing, canning, and agribusiness industries concentrated in Hawai‘i and across the West Coast but expanding inland. The BIA also functioned as a liaison between employers and Filipino workers

---

and students, responding both to employers’ demands and to Filipino grievances. As such, it functioned to de-politicize emerging antagonisms between capital and labor which might otherwise have transgressed national and colonial boundaries by reinforcing the primacy of relations between colonial subjects and national citizens. During times of crisis, or more generally when the presence of Filipinos seemed to pose a threat to this boundary, the BIA orchestrated the “repatriation” either of threatening individuals or of large groups or both, as was the case during the mass repatriations of the 1930s.

As discussed in Chapter 1, American Presidents reconciled their liberal commitment to individual freedom with a mission of conquest and coercive assimilation by positing a natural hierarchy and a developmental scheme. The chairman of McKinley’s second colonial commission, William Howard Taft, shared his President’s racialist paternalism. According to Taft, Americans’ “little brown [Filipino] brothers” would need “fifty or one hundred years” of Euro-American supervision and tutelage in order to “develop anything resembling Anglo-Saxon political principles and skills.”

Statements like these reflect a desire to define the American population as a modern European subject by distinguishing American modes of governance from the pre-modern anarchy of non-European peoples and spaces. On the one hand, the fantasy of a relatively homogenous, Anglo-American population and mode of governance was productive of various bordering practices that functioned to define and protect this population. On the other hand, these bordering practices consistently failed to produce the subjects within the fantasy’s racialist narratives. The specters of difference within and commonality across colonial boundaries, combined with the specter of unknowable alterity, haunted the dual projects of colonial incorporation and exclusion both in the colony and in the metropole.

**Specters of Transnationalism**

Although they ultimately proved fatal for formal colonial governance in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the crises of “exceptional” European colonialism could be provisionally managed in the foreign spaces of French and American colonies through

---

481 Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs. National Archives, College Park, MD.

bordering practices that maintained ideological and physical distance between colonizer and colonized. A complex web of representational and physical practices drew on older colonial tropes and techniques to maintain clear-enough boundaries between colonial officials, administrators, governors, and teachers and their colonial subjects. So long as colonial officials could represent themselves as apolitical, benevolent administrators in an apolitical foreign place inhabited by a foreign, apolitically childlike people, they could incorporate the space of the colony into the empire while at the same time securing colonial hierarchies and relations of rule. The movement of colonial subjects back and forth from colony to metropole and their more thorough integration within local and national communities in within the territory of the United States brought the crises of colonialism to a head as crises of imperial transnationality. Like the forced migrations discussed in Chapter 1, the movement of colonial subjects realized the imperialist vision of transnational space and community. In so doing, it disturbed the security of European national territories and populations and, with them, the borders that functioned as the national boundaries of whiteness. The migrations of colonial subjects, many of whom have been actively recruited incorporated by businesses, government officials, and agencies of humanitarian aid brought the crises of imperialism into the territory of the metropole, the national republic.

These practices now extend beyond the boundaries of Europe and the United States. They have been reproduced in modern nation-states around the globe, from new immigrant receiving nations like Singapore and Saudi Arabia to newly independent nation-states, like the Philippines and Mexico, whose primary exports include the labor power of migrant workers. Once the prerogative of colonial administrative offices like the Bureau of Insular Affairs in the U.S. and the colonial ministries in France, the practice of preparing migrant workers to serve in racialized low-wage, low-status sectors of national economies and of the global economy now takes place within the post-colony as well as the receiving nation. In the neoliberal world order shaped by the Marshall Plan and the Washington Consensus, elite state officials in the post-colony interpellate and train what Abdelmalek Sayad has called a low-status, “OS” workforce that is tethered to its home country and thus less likely to form bonds of allegiance and community in the receiving country. Like properly colonized subjects, this atomized proletariat has been
trained to work in foreign countries without demanding rights of citizenship or mobilizing with citizen workers, and to send remittances home, which serve as a source of revenue for the neoliberal, post-colonial state.

However, as the preceding chapters have demonstrated, colonial regimes cannot adequately control the formation of political and cultural communities that cut across colonial divisions of labor. The same can be said about new practices of recolonization in the post-colony and imported colonialism in the West and in former colonies that have transformed into Western-style empire states, states that incorporate immigrants into their national and imperial economies, but exclude them from their national political communities. Although the trade union movement in the West remains reluctant to mobilize immigrant workers, the precariousness of their privileged status has lead many in Western labor movements to form bonds of solidarity with immigrant workers. Meanwhile, people who cross borders have formed transnational communities that challenge the hegemony of the neoliberal state and that raise the specter of transnational social movements. This transpolitical specter continues to haunt the bordering practices of internal colonialism. The proliferation and desperate intensification of these practices in recent years indicates the vulnerability of contemporary modes of colonial governance, of colonial divisions of labor, and of the nation-state.
Bibliography


New York: Manchester University Press ;
Distributed exclusively in the USA and Canada by St. Martin’s Press, 1994.


Copyright Collection (Library of Congress). The Fight in the Fields--Caesar Chavez and the Farm Worker’s Struggle. 1996.


