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In Memoriam

Barrows Dunham (1905–1995)

Barrows Dunham was born on October 20, 1905, in Mount Holly, New Jersey, and died in Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania, on Nov. 19, 1995. By age twelve Barrows had read “the great death scene” in the *Phaedo* and told his father he thought Socrates “greater” than Jesus. As a junior at Princeton University he absorbed Anatole France’s *Penguin Island* and “bade religion farewell.” But the Judaic-Christian imperative of love and justice for all, not least for the poor and oppressed, remained as a permanent propulsion, grounded in faith and projected in hope. In his philosophizing he aimed at a synoptic view uniting this ethical heritage with the reason of the Greeks, the empirical realism of modern philosophy, the optimism of the Enlightenment, and the theory and practice of socialism.

Barrows earned his A.B. (1926) and A.M. (1929) at Princeton. As an undergraduate, he found a model in Warner Fite, a prophet defiant of all tyrannies. Lesser influences were the prominent figures and schools of his time: Bergson, Santayana, Bosanquet (via George Tapley Whitney), Russell, Paul Elmer More, realists like E. G. Spaulding, and pragmatists. Kant—whose aesthetics was the subject of his Princeton doctoral dissertation (1933)—left a lasting impress on his ethical thought. In the worldview of Whitehead, under whom he took a seminar in 1929, he welcomed a dialectical synthesis of the permanence affirmed in idealism and the novelty in James’s world of processes “with the lid off.”

But the most deeply formative events for him were the Great Depression of the 1930s and his discovery of the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels, which addressed and diagnosed the crisis in the world economy and prescribed a social solution.

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The war of the Allies against the fascist Axis strengthened his belief in a people's democratic socialism. He joined the Communist Party in 1938 and left it in 1945.

Dunham worked out his worldview as a system both "concrete and comprehensive." He swept from the board G. E. Moore's niggling analysis, A. J. Ayer's sterile positivism, the linguistic philosophers who "dwindled into grammarians," and the existentialism of anguish. For Dunham philosophical reflection begins where everybody begins reflection: in a real world independent of our consciousness, driven by needs for survival and for a higher prosperity, and hence required to know and interact with that world and its people, to make judgments, to choose, and to realize value. Seeking answers to these "ultimate" questions, everybody philosophizes, and philosophy is thus "the theory of human deliverance . . . for mankind as a whole."

Man Against Myth (1947) was a detailed unveiling of the covert philosophical positions in the ruling ideology of twentieth-century capitalism—the unchangeability of human nature, the unfitness of the poor, the inferiority of certain races, and the necessity to look out for yourself. In *Giants in Chains* (1953) Dunham moved to the analysis of the causes and cures of social problems such as the murder of an African American in Georgia who had dared to vote. *The Artist in Society* (1960) and *Ethics Dead and Alive* (1971) were essays intended to surmount the dualism infecting modern thought and to demonstrate the unity of the true, the good, and the beautiful. The theme of *Thinkers and Treasurers* (1955) was the long-standing clash between those who manage and collect revenues for social institutions and the thinkers charged with a true description of things and their corrective. Besides his professional and political activities, Dunham was a poet and pianist, sharing the world of art with his wife, Alice Clarke, a painter and art historian, and his son, Clarke, a set designer for musicals and operas.

He began his teaching at Franklin and Marshall College in 1926, and in 1937 moved to Temple University, where in 1948 he became professor and chair. In 1952 the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) served him with a subpoena to testify and to name the names of his associates suspected of "subversion." He refused, on grounds of the Constitution's Fifth

Amendment protection against self-incrimination. Temple fired him, saying he had “misused” the amendment and was “intellectually arrogant.” In 1954 the House cited him for contempt of congress. Indicted and brought to trial later that year, he was cleared by a federal district court. The American Philosophical Association appealed to the university to restore him to his post. Temple—censured, after unconscionable delay, by the American Association of University Professors—did not reinstate him until 1981. During this long lockout, he had occasional work—part-time teaching at Beaver College (1968) and at Montgomery County Community College and one year of full-time teaching (1970) at the School of Social Research of the University of Pennsylvania. In 1959 he lectured at the Institute of Philosophy of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

To answer HUAC, Dunham took Socrates as the prototype of “intellectual arrogance” and composed *Heroes and Heretics: A Political History of Western Thought* (1964). Graceful in style, rich in content, it was a philosophical narrative of the antagonism between personalities defending orthodox institutions and doctrines, both political and religious, and the heretics of dissent—from Akhnaton to Socrates, from the Hebrew prophets and Jesus to Joan of Arc, from Spinoza to Marx and Debs.

Although in his later years Dunham’s optimism was tempered by the ordeal of his own inquisition and academic exile, the horror of fascism, and the shortcomings of “real socialism,” he never faltered in the faith he expressed in his first book:

Now, therefore, since the struggle deepens, since evil abides and good does not yet prosper, let us gather what strength we have, what confidence and valor, that our small victories may end in triumph, and the world awaited be a world attained.

[Abridged from *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 69, no. 5 (1996): 122–23 with permission of the Association.

An interview with Barrows Dunham by Fred Whitehead appeared in *Nature, Society, and Thought* 6, no. 3 (1993): 311–34.]

Howard L. Parsons
Department of Philosophy, Emeritus
University of Bridgeport

The Limits of Postmodern Feminism: A Critique from the Periphery

Delia D. Aguilar

Introduction

This paper will describe transactions in a nontraditional classroom in Manila, Philippines, where a group of Asian/Pacific women were enrolled in an intensive intercultural women's studies course. It will examine and discuss the dilemmas that arose in the process of deploying "feminism" as a way of viewing women's condition in societies where traditional cultures, while often oppressive to women, are also seen as instruments for resisting Western hegemony. Bound in a web of feudal ties that simultaneously constrains and secures their well-being, the women evince responses projecting gender not as an autonomous category, but as one that is always articulated with other social relations. The entire narration will be located squarely within the framework of feminist thinking as it has developed over the past three decades, in particular underscoring the uses and limitations of contemporary postmodern formulations.

Debates in Western feminism

The theoretical tendencies in feminism today can best be comprehended as evolving from a history of argumentation and debate that has spanned more than thirty years. Since the inception of second-wave feminism, African American, Latina, and other women of color have repeatedly challenged its exclusivity and narrowness of focus. One of the earliest critiques delineated the qualitative difference marking Black women's position (Beale 1970), with subsequent ones directly citing racism as the blinder that rendered women of color and their own specific

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issues invisible (hooks 1981; Moraga and Anzaldúa 1981; Smith 1982). Some challenged the applicability of feminist theory for those outside the mainstream (Carby 1982) and questioned the issues labeled as “feminist”—for example, the targeting of the family as the major site of female subordination, when for marginalized women and those in nations waging liberation struggles, families constituted cultures of resistance (Caulfield 1974; Stack 1974; Mullings 1986). Others complained that when their existence was recognized, women of color were homogenized and seen as passive victims (Mohanty 1991). Eventually, the unmasking of the “universal female” as white and middle class exploded the myth of women as a unified group and led to the acknowledgment that a more accurate understanding of gender necessitated contextualization in racial, ethnic, and class divisions (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1983).

In contemporary approaches, the essentialism that underpins now archaic conceptions of a universal female experience has become anathema. To insure its displacement, a stress on the proliferation of “difference” based on postmodernist theory has gained acceptance by academic feminists. On the one hand, this new trend heralds a wholesome turn, given the racism implicit in earlier feminist stances; on the other, it betrays clearly demarcated limitations, as the following case study should unfold.

From metropolis to periphery

In 1992 in Manila, Philippines, I had the opportunity to teach a module in a three-month intensive program titled “Intercultural Course on Women and Society” offered to Asian/Pacific women by the Institute of Women’s Studies in St. Scholastica’s College. Seventeen women attended; they represented thirteen countries, with two of these nations being outside the Asia/Pacific region. One woman came from Zambia, and two from the United States. Each year the Institute designates a few slots to women from the “First World” who must pay their own way. The rest are on full scholarships, including travel and living expenses. While a requirement for admission calls for work experience with women, only two (the ones from the United States) had taken classes in women’s studies.

The objectives of the program can best be described as practical in thrust, with the enhancement of existing social movements as a major goal. Learning was not to be conducted solely for learning's sake. The women themselves, at the outset, declared their status as community workers in search of knowledge, skills, and strategies that they could utilize upon return to their home countries. By providing a place where women could live and study together, the Institute sought to develop a critical understanding of gender and to forge a sense of solidarity among Asian/Pacific women, with the hope of "exploring cooperative actions" in the context of "working toward a more just and egalitarian society."

Setting the stage for feminism

My assignment was to introduce the women to "Feminist Analyses of the Woman Question" as these applied to Asia/Pacific. Before my section of the course, the group had shared their life stories and presented country reports documenting the position of women as encoded by custom and governmental policies. We had also gone on the first part of a series of "exposure tours," which brought into focus the jarring disjointedness and fragmentation that have become defining characteristics of urban life in developing societies. These day-trips within Manila and its vicinity included visits to an opulent megamall boasting superfluous consumer items (an added attraction featured an exhibit on "the world's 'firsts,'" highlighted by a lecture from U.S. astronaut Eugene Ciernan, who taught his Filipino listeners that the history of U.S. space exploration is "your history"); a slumdweller women's association; San Agustin church, an imposing sixteenth-century cathedral; garment factories producing winter coats for export; a ballpoint factory shut down by striking women workers who had pitched makeshift shelters outside. The glaring disparities of class everywhere on display as we took in the sights were surely familiar scenes to these Asian/Pacific women. Whether motivated by gallows humor or an absurdly competitive streak, someone commented that in her country the slum areas at least benefited from a lot of sunlight. Yet something in the manner in which

juxtaposed symbols of wealth and poverty converged as if solely for our perusal gave us pause and, throughout, served as a backdrop against which to interrogate women's lives. By the time I began, therefore, the ice had been broken and the groundwork laid for exploring feminist thinking.

Naming misogyny

Still, an appreciation of feminism requires, at the very least, the naming of women's oppression. Even though the United Nations Decade for Women opened people's eyes to the subordination of women worldwide, the word "feminism" is still taboo for many in developing countries. Seeing consciousness-raising as my first task, I asked the group to bring up examples showing the ways in which women's experience differed from men's in their respective societies. The response was immediate and animated, and soon the discussion centered on traditional practices that threaten women's existence or constrain their behavior. The list was lengthy: dowry deaths, the taking of temple prostitutes, proof of virginity on the wedding night, female infanticide, multiple wives, eating only after everyone had been fed, submission to the husband's authority as "chief spirit of the household" (translated from *Aing U Nut* in Myanmar language), and so on and so forth. We were surprised to discover in the process of assembling this cross-cultural inventory that "under the *saya* [skirt]," a taunt thrown at "henpecked" husbands, was a sexist phrase of common currency not only in the Philippines but also among Indians, Pakistanis, and Sri Lankans.

Community embeddedness

Prepared to meet some resistance, I was relieved not to encounter any. What I found most unusual was the enthusiasm, the vigorous flow of energy that generated this litany of misogynistic rituals and conventions. But even more intriguing was the relatively unperturbed state of mind maintained by the group as a whole as each one proceeded to reformulate older perspectives by examining this array of familiar data from a new, unfamiliar angle. In my introductory women's studies courses in the United States, female students who first begin to glimpse the

extent of women's oppression typically react with outright anger. If not anger, one usually senses in the newly awakened a palpable tension, an impatience to extricate themselves from what all too suddenly has come to be a burdensome situation.

In contrast, here the response was calm, thoughtful, deliberate. Yasmin, a well-heeled Sri Lankan school principal, appropriately recognized her own victimization less than that of her subordinates: "What do I do with my maid? Should I raise her salary? Maybe I am oppressing teachers in my school, too." A few days after this discussion, Minah from Indonesia confided that she had written her parents telling them how women's consignment to the chores of cooking, washing, cleaning, childcare, etc. constitutes oppression. Pratima, a Nepali lawyer, reported that she had done the same. Ma Paw from Myanmar, who regularly got phone calls from her boyfriend stationed in a traveling commercial vessel, joked that she was not marrying anymore. If I must sum up the overall sentiment of the group, however, I would say that this was best captured by the solemn matter-of-factness of Barbara (from Zambia) as she spoke to me across the lunch table: "I've been married twenty-four years. Now I know that I'm oppressed, and that women in my country are oppressed. In our organization we believe we must change ourselves first and then change others. So I must change my relationship with my husband. But what am I to do? How can I do this without divorcing?" Then she added, distinguishing between outright maltreatment and day-to-day, benign forms that subjugation might take, "Battering is something we all say we don't want. But how about housework?"

Without a doubt the experience and age range (21 to 46) of these women separate them from the average U.S. college student. To be sure, these factors alone can account for the difference in response. But I think that another, more salient issue needs to be stressed here, and that is the rootedness felt quite deeply by these Asian/Pacific women, their profound imbrication in an intricate network comprised of family, clan, friends, workmates, acquaintances, and others in the community. Because they are still caught in a web of semifeudal ties, their identities, though inevitably influenced by the market (e.g., as

workers and consumers), are not exclusively or primarily defined by it. Subsequently, the discovery or “naming” of female oppression did not trigger the individualist impulse to escape, as it often does in women in industrialized nations. Perhaps, too, feminism acquires another meaning in societies where traditional discourse confers high value on women’s place and when the impulse to resist colonizing cultures is strong (Narayan 1989, 259).

An example should serve to clarify my point. Bidya from Nepal, twenty-five and single, began to take a new look at arranged marriages as a result of our ongoing dialogue. Yet she continued to insist that despite the freedom to choose allowed by her parents (she was, after all, a lawyer practicing in the city), she preferred not to take this route. “I don’t possess my parents’ wisdom and judgment and wouldn’t know on what basis to select,” she explained. Afterward, she made abundantly clear her belief that families of origin are a solid anchor, implying that marriage is no more than a way of extending kinship connections. I did not get the impression that marriage might signal, as it could for some young people in the United States, a breaking away into adulthood and independence. “A husband is someone who is new to you, but you’ve known your family all your life,” she declared, in a tone hinting that there was something strange in having to distinguish between an untested entity and an established institution whose permanence ought to be taken for granted. As if foreseeing that her inexperience would lead to the wrong choice, she expressed anxiety over requesting her family’s assistance should her marriage not work out: “I would really feel bad about that.”

Belief systems and material life

In addressing U.S. audiences, I have used Bidya’s stance vis-à-vis arranged marriage to illustrate how different reactions evoked by knowledge of female subordination tend to be congruent, in all their manifest variety, with the social realities entailed. Indeed, what audiences here almost invariably communicate back to me precisely proves my point, for it is to powerlessness—power being equated with the individual’s ability to take action, a market-impelled notion—that they attribute

Bidya's perspective. For them, the possibility that arranged marriage may be beneficial (not to romanticize a custom that automatically cancels romance, or to propose cultural relativism) to a kin system the smooth functioning of which in turn ensures its members' survival and well-being, is an alien thought.

Given that individualism is a core Western value that neither class nor race appear amply capable of mitigating, it was hardly surprising that Ann, my student from the United States who enrolled in the course, found the dissonance in her new store of information unsettling. She told me how angry she was coming to feel about the distortion that U.S. policies have foisted on the economies of developing countries via international monetary agencies. She was enraged to see with her own eyes the resulting havoc in people's lives. On the other hand, she also felt that her sympathy was somehow misplaced. In the face of her Asian/Pacific colleagues' seeming resignation to their fates, she "just could not imagine the lives of these women."

The chances are that these women's lives were not as wretched as Ann imagined. What does not readily come into view is that they shared, similarly as a result of their firm inscription in their particular social networks, something of an inkling that although they were surely women, they were simultaneously many other things as well. Gender for them was not an autonomous category unaffected by other social relations, a point rather belabored in feminist writing in the United States and United Kingdom

Deconstructing the category "women," Denise Riley asks, "what does it mean to insist that 'women' are only sometimes 'women'?" (1988, 96). As with feminists of color in the United States and the United Kingdom, it did not seem to take much for these women to be conscious of their multiple, shifting, fluctuating identities, to use postmodernist jargon (ironic in that "peripheral" nations are a long way from having attained the modernity they aspire to). For what else would have led to Yasmin's perceptive comments, her concern about her subordinates? In turning her gaze to her maid and teaching staff instead of to herself, she demonstrated an instinctive understanding of class as a shaping influence of no lesser consequence than

gender. This constituted a radical switch from the gist of her country report in which she claimed gender parity for Sri Lankan women on the basis of laws granting them equal economic rights. Being rooted in a community further means feeling responsible, in your diverse roles and capacities, for those around you. Replying to her own question about what is to be done, Barbara later on stated that altering her marriage to any significant degree was no longer possible, but she assured us all that she would definitely use her newfound knowledge about gender inequality to educate her children, and the families and couples she counsels in her job.

Against late-capitalist hegemony

Paradoxically, the powerlessness to which these women's equanimity is attributed, supposedly deriving from the absence of a viable alternative, is belied by what I saw as a keen awareness on their part of the existence of other worlds and other cultures. (One can rarely say the same for many in the metropolis who, presuming themselves to be situated in the hub of the universe, harbor little curiosity about anything outside.) This is not to say that their ideas about other cultures were always accurate, but the interest was present and it was strong. Let me explain what I mean. At breakfast one morning, Yasmin showed me an essay commending the protection afforded to women by Islamic religion. I assumed the author to be someone else, but on subsequent inquiry found out that she herself had written it as an address to teachers "many years ago." The piece did not simply exhort women to be faithful to their domestic duties because doing so was valuable in itself, or because female piety would guarantee the stability of family life and, by extension, the society at large. Instead, it seized upon the social disruption plaguing the United States (worded in the well-worn conservative assertion that the untrammelled freedom of [Western] women has led to family breakdown which, in turn, is causing juvenile crime, drug addiction, wanton violence, and a pervasive moral collapse), and used that as a warning to keep Sri Lankan women in place.

At this point in the course I was convinced that Yasmin had taken hold of my feminist agenda and was mulling it over very carefully in her mind. So while there were two major points in her article, one antifeminist and the other pro-Islam, it really was not feminism that she was against, nor was she necessarily urging conversion to Islam. The group dynamic occurring at the time, coupled with conversations outside the formal meetings, goaded me to dig a little beneath the surface in search of the real argument. Before long I began to realize that what Yasmin, and others along with her, had undertaken to defend staunchly was cultural pride. Although now punctured by their cognizance of misogyny, this pride served over and above all as a weapon to fight off a more feared specter, moral decadence and degeneration as they saw it manifested in the technologically advanced West.

This message was as explicit as it could be in the speech Yasmin wrote. Echoes of that sentiment resonated with others in the group and, intoned again and again in various ways, this point of view simply could not be missed or misinterpreted. For example, I was shortly to learn from Gail (the other U.S. student) that she and Ann had received a tepid welcome from the start, in spite of the fact that everyone knew that the two of them had not received funding. As Gail was recounting events surrounding her arrival, I recalled a prior exchange during the country reports where her use of the terms "First World" and "Third World" immediately drew sharp criticism from a number of women who questioned the basis for the implied ranking. Now I have no way of telling whether the anti-Western current that emerged in the group would have been equally pronounced if the setting had been another country in Asia/Pacific, say, Malaysia. A need to find out exactly where I stood as a Filipino residing in the United States cannot, of course, be ruled out as a probable contributing element; perhaps I was being tested. Needless to say, these women's impression of the Philippines as not only heavily "Westernized" but worse, suffering from a "lack of their own culture" (observations that are hard to contest), operated to aggravate simmering antagonisms traceable to South/North systemic relations of dominance. Giving voice to these conflicts as

the more outspoken women began to do was, in my opinion, a perfectly healthy sign.

When Vibha of Pakistan announced, “We are proud of our own culture, we do not look up to America as our model,” she unmistakably meant it for Filipino ears. I was glad to hear her say this, because I felt that it was important for my compatriots in the class to hear directly from other Asians how we, as Filipinos, are viewed. I felt that such comments would compel constant alertness to the often confounding ramifications in a neocolonial formation like the Philippines, when feminist issues intersect with questions of national sovereignty at every single juncture. Interestingly enough, no one impugned the vibrancy of feminism in the Philippines as a symptom of acquiescence to Western values. Perhaps it was inevitable after I encouraged this drift (I asked for examples of what someone had referred to as “Western behavior” in Filipinos) that poor Luzviminda, a Filipina organizer of domestic helpers in Hong Kong, was described to her face as a “dominating” person who “talks too much,” conduct in women purportedly antithetical to Asian values. Mentioned privately to me after that, Luzviminda’s keeping company with the two U.S. women was interpreted as a sign that she looked up to them and had taken them for role models, their closeness in age (they were the three youngest members) as an alternative explanation having been discounted altogether.

Also brought up for questioning was the advice that Sr. Carmen, director and founder of the Institute, told us she had dispensed to a woman who was an object of repeated battering. “We’d never advise a wife to leave her husband,” Vibha volunteered, risking accuracy or veracity to insinuate that this was somehow out of tune with Asian folkways. Ann was perceived as “acting just like her country” when one Saturday morning she had gotten out of bed and, still groggy, grouchily asked the three women chatting in the room across the hall to quiet down or move so she could resume her sleep. And at a session one afternoon, Gail and Ann found themselves abandoned in their request for a schedule change, a turnabout from the previous night when everyone had supported their proposal.

Interrogations of sisterhood and essentialism

This assertion of cultural pride, which resulted in self-identification as “Third World” subjects, effectively laid to rest a prior worry of mine. All indications up until then led me to believe that my efforts at consciousness-raising around inequalities of gender had produced the reductive notion that, since women share a common oppression, all women are sisters. The fact is, there was a push for just this stand among some Filipina facilitators—a predisposition bound up, I suspect, with the exhilaration infusing a women’s movement in its initial stages. Extolling universal sisterhood on the grounds that all women regardless of class, race, or other structuring relations are potential victims of male violence, a Filipina feminist at one point spiritedly asserted that “a victory for women anywhere is a victory for us.” I queried the statement by asking everyone to consider who the women are who are inclined to celebrate which women’s victories. (How many British—or U.S., French, etc.—women have celebrated as their own triumph the successes won by Philippine slumdweller women, assuming Western women even hear about such campaigns?) Although I thought that the criticism I was making involved no convoluted reasoning, I failed to get my point across. To my chagrin, moreover, I noted that in a collective project the participants were assigned, murals depicting their vision of a better society, practically all the drawings iterated the same essentializing motif of global sisterhood.

Mapping the terrain for solidarity

To place this assumption of sisterhood in perspective, I sought to draw out women’s similarities and differences by situating us Asian/Pacific women squarely within the international economic order. I summed up our common experiences as elaborated in the country report that each participant had delivered early on: massive rural to urban migration; ever-increasing poverty and homelessness; militarization; cash crop production, and production of consumer goods for export; dominance of multinationals; external debt; structural adjustments dictated by international lending agencies like the International Monetary

Fund and the World Bank. Within this framework, we discussed how feudal traditions and religiosity function to disadvantage women severely; how large numbers of women migrate overseas as domestics or, in the absence of an opportunity to leave, stay home to work at backbreaking labor or in the informal sector; how women's "nimble fingers" and "docility" ("genetic" credentials authenticated by a garment factory president we interviewed, who also cited women's ability to sit patiently) qualify them for low-paid employment on the assembly line; how women succumb to mail-order-bride catalogs or the "entertainment industry" when limited options for a living wage are available. In short, it became sufficiently manifest that there was no way we could speak of Asian/Pacific women without at the same time implicating relations of power inscribed in ties connecting nations of the North with those of the South.

After our exploration of the above issues, I expected that the women would now apprehend commonalities and differences in another light. This they did, as the anti-Western posture described earlier attests. Not only had they withdrawn subscription to a universal sisterhood with "women everywhere," but they also pushed ahead of me. When they articulated "difference," the tone was not celebratory, and not a soul proclaimed the wonders of diversity. "Difference" here meant the carving out of a distinct positionality within the global system, not a locally confined, oscillating "oppositional consciousness" (Sandoval 1991) that one can conveniently choose to hoist or drop at will. Such a positioning should not detract from what I previously remarked upon as their cognition of multiple, shifting, and fluctuating identities, where the reference was to their immediate communities. Now none of this was asserted in abstractions, but rather in the most down-to-earth, concrete terms. I should add that the communication of ideas was further hampered by the use of English, a second language for all of us, spoken with very limited proficiency by at least half the group. But when several participants began to pose what remains of indigenous cultures as instruments to keep at bay corrupting social forces believed to cause the decay of the "West," and when Filipinos (saddled by a hapless colonial mentality, courtesy

of the U.S. empire) became relegated to a space distant from other Asian/Pacific peoples, then the invocation of some sort of overarching narrative could not but become perfectly clear.

The politics of difference

Let me pause to underline the theoretical undercurrents in the preceding discussion. The ability to appreciate the tremendous variety of female experience has doubtless been made possible by the politics of difference, a paradigm shift provoked by charges of racism brought by women of color. But these Asian/Pacific women's enunciation of difference departs from that favored by those whom Teresa Ebert calls "ludic" postmodernists, who merely celebrate and validate difference and care little about explaining the whys and wherefores (1993). The fact is, even as postmodernists foreground the enormous complexity of human identity by posing, at minimum, the trilogy of gender, race, and class, Sylvia Walby states that in practice, analysis is restricted "at best [to] only two out of three of gender, 'race' and class, and often only one of these" (1992, 33). Further, the women's invocation of an anti-imperialist posture is one that, demanding an overarching narrative, no postmodernist would sanction. To reinstate a transformational project, Ebert proposes the reconstitution of a "resistance" postmodernism that does not shy away from grand theory, but her voice has yet to be joined by others.

Some postmodernist versions claim to account for contemporary global conditions; for example, the notion of "scattered hegemonies" (Grewal and Kaplan 1994). In this instance, the authority of Gramsci is used to appropriate the concept of hegemony detached from the historical materialist framework from which it derives its meaning. Hence while the writers nominally deploy the term, they at the same time reject its real substance. One attempt to combine materialist feminism, in the form of a "global social analytic," with postmodernism's critique of the subject and of epistemology is seen in the work of Rosemary Hennessy (1993). But this formulation provides little that would illustrate its workability.

Challenges to feminist pedagogy

I began to see then that one of my more critical tasks was to listen closely to suppositions put forth, which for the most part were inchoate and scattered (uttered in conversations at mealtime, in songs we sang, in skits and group exercises, in travels within the city and to adjoining towns), and to render these in fairly coherent conceptual terms. That is what I tried to do to make the themes of difference and sameness come alive and assume a meaningful place in our thinking as feminists. Yet as it turned out, I was as vulnerable to lapses as anyone else in the room.

Because our meetings averaged six and a half hours every day, I was constantly in search of some activity or exercise to vary the pace or format of our sessions. I decided to start one morning with a narration of how some women in a poor neighborhood in Lima, Peru organized around wife abuse. All the women had purchased whistles that they agreed to blow whenever a beating occurred, a strategy meant to embarrass or shame the perpetrator, and ultimately to bring him in line. I admired the Peruvian women's ingenuity and assumed that everyone hearing the account would also. Reinforced by a Filipina friend who informed me that village women in a southern province had devised a similar scheme, substituting the clanging of pots and pans for whistles, I was positive that the story would go over well. I was wrong. Leilani from Papua New Guinea, the poorest in the group (she could only afford rubber thongs), and in many ways the most outspoken, just about roared, "No! In my country that won't work! If women did that, the man would gather his relatives and they would all go and beat up the whistle-blowers!" Taken aback, I asked why. Others eventually spoke up with Leilani to reject the strategy, reasoning that it could only backfire. "Why, that is like broadcasting the woman's failings as a wife to the entire neighborhood!" This reaction indicated to me that the laborious educational drive waged behind the scenes before whistle-blowing could be utilized as a shaming mechanism, had to be made visible. In any case, at session's end, we settled down to discuss methods more in harmony with each of

our respective cultures, most of these proceeding along the lines of consciousness-raising and obtaining community support. How to turn collective sentiments around to root out misogynist customs was the dilemma the group faced as feminist organizers.

On the surface, I did not handle the above incident awkwardly at all. The truth is that I myself had no clue that I had made a slip until some time elapsed, and only after a bit of reflection. For was not my eagerness to tell the Peruvian women's whistle-blowing story a result of my being captive to certain unwarranted assumptions? Was not my failure to anticipate a negative response the consequence of a tacit homogenization of women's experience, uncalled for by the matter at hand? My mistake was to lump together carelessly in my mind, under the unspoken rubric "Third World," Peruvian women of one specific neighborhood with the group of "Asian/Pacific women" in my midst. By refusing my proposal (conversant as they were with their own societal mores), Leilani and the rest forced my recognition of the group as separate and identifiable from one community of Peruvian women. In addition, their objection compelled me to reckon with the tremendous diversity within the group itself—disparities along the lines of race, nationality/ethnicity, class, caste, and religion that had been concealed by the convenient geographic label "Asian/Pacific." If nothing else, was not the derogation of the Philippines as "westernized," and therefore not quite "Asian," evidence of such an understanding?

And what about within their own societies? It was evident that these women were not oblivious to diversity there, either. For example, after having presented feminist theories offering explanations of women's subordination (liberal, radical, Marxist, Marxist/feminist), I wanted to test for comprehension by asking which paradigms would prove most applicable or relevant in their own countries. Rather than speaking for "women back home" as a unified entity, or on their own behalf (which no one did), many of the participants gauged the worth of the theories in terms of the sector addressed, thus: for middle-class and rich women in the city, liberal feminism; for the poor in the city and agricultural areas, Marxist/feminism, and so on. This sensitivity to differential locations was likewise confirmed in the course

evaluation. Several class members noted their appreciation of the reminder I issued to refer back constantly to women's lives in their own societies; this they found to be a good means to help clarify the explanatory potential of these feminist theories, and also to test their own understanding. In preparing my module outline, I believed that reminder to be useful and necessary; I now doubt its sufficiency. Integrated with that directive should have been the demand for greater specificity: "Which women?"

What was most instructive for me in this experience? Above all, it was heartening to see that women could have their eyes wide open to the cleavages separating women and still remain committed to the search for a common ground for feminist solidarity. Here awareness of multiple standpoints did not appear to weaken presumptions of mutual agreement; in effect, solidarity (indeed, solidarity as "Third World" people demarcated by the metropolis/periphery divide) as both a guiding principle and a goal was assumed, differences notwithstanding. It must be remarked that the program itself was designed so that this aim remained in sight throughout. To illustrate, the final assignment in the last module required every participant to draw up a concrete plan of action, which each then shared with the rest for the express purpose of exploring the possibility of collaborative ventures in the region. The participants, furthermore, had target populations with whom they were already involved—unemployed youth, illiterate women, domestic helpers, church organizations, to mention a few—and could envision the outcomes they were seeking.

Heterogenous identities, "Third World" realities

Beyond the course requirements and the peculiar composition of the group, however, I maintain that other determinants prevail that enable women like these to move ahead in the face of troublesome contradictions. Previously, I referred to the manner in which their locatedness, a kind of surefootedness, if you will, secures these women—plural, heterogenous identities and all—to the unembellished realities of their "Third World" contexts. This is why the decision to dump hoary practices like arranged marriage, however oppressive, could not be reached or carried out in

any facile fashion, and certainly not on an individual basis. I think it is exactly their location in the “Third World” that makes people like this group of Asian/Pacific women painfully aware of social conditions, whatever their station in life may be. I wish to emphasize this factor—the beneficent burden of being unable to deny or ignore social reality—because I believe that it is only in contraposition to prevailing material, social, and political realities that the feasibility or desirability of social change can even begin to be imagined and conceptualized. Such a change would include those everyday practices that take their toll on women’s lives and are at the same time indissociable from policies enacted on an international level.

Conclusion

To repeat, I am not convinced of the utility of current feminist thought in this transformative project, or even in the more limited one of making sense of these Asian/Pacific women’s articulations of experience. One response might be, following the politics of difference, to claim to honor the uniqueness of these women as subaltern “others” by conceiving them as “pure difference and opposition” with whom one has no connection (Larrain 1995, 284). In the now-globalized order where computerization and the power of the media penetrate every nook and cranny of the planet, it cannot be said that the problem is paucity of information about “Third World” women. In fact, it may be possible to say with plausibility that when a preponderance of information obtains and the impulse for struggle does not, “othering” becomes a useful device for the simultaneous profession of sympathy and distance. The late seventies and early eighties witnessed and extolled the inception of an international women’s movement, yet feminist theoretical production in the West has remained impervious and successfully preserved its parochialism.

If, for the subaltern, the key features of seventies feminism were its outright exclusivity and essentialism, the pluralism of postmodern feminism of the midnineties has not been any more hospitable. Although appearing thoroughly revised and “radical” in its basic tenets of multiplicity, flux, and indeterminacy,

postmodern feminism retains much that brings to mind the old market-driven, liberal pluralism that equally reinforced a monadic individualism inseparable from the capitalist system.

If the above is correct, how do we make sense of “Third World” women’s lives and restore a socially transformative agenda? As has been alluded to earlier, what is required, above all, is a comprehensive analysis of the division of labor in a world capitalist system in which the affluence of core nations decisively rests on the maldevelopment of peripheral formations. For feminists to fail to reckon with matters of political economy is clearly to ignore the lives of the majority of women in the United States as well as the rest of the world. The “postmodern condition,” after all, entails a global economic restructuring where the recruitment of women workers has been crucial both in the industrialization process in developing countries and the deindustrialization of the United States (McAllister 1994). In the enterprise of reinstating struggle, then, the element of class has to be reintroduced—not class in its current usage of lifestyle or occupation, but class as in labor-capital contradictions. Teresa Ebert, decrying “ludic” postmodernists’ preoccupation with the discursive and symbolic, proposes precisely this, a historical-materialist feminism that could serve as the basis for a new international collectivity (1996, 301–302). If feminist theoreticians in the industrial West heed this challenge, it may yet become possible to establish networks of struggle and solidarity with these Asian/Pacific women and others of subaltern status whose lives and consciousness are at once enabled by the reality of community and disabled by the fact of empire.

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Liberalism as a Crisis in Democratic Theory: Three Critiques Reconsidered

Edwin A. Roberts

Introduction

This essay is an attempt to clear the theoretical and ideological haze that has come to surround our popular conception of democracy. This clearing will involve an overview of a school of thought I am calling “the democratic critique of liberalism.” I argue here that any attempt to promote values more aligned with democratic than with liberal social and political theory will inevitably, no matter how controversially, lead in a socialist and generally anticapitalist direction.

In today’s ideological climate, liberal political theory, capitalist economics, and market values stand at the arch of a form of triumphalism. Almost without challenge, liberal ideals hold court as the conventional wisdom. As a result, around the world, and especially in the industrialized countries, public acceptance and understanding of the positions of the anticapitalist democratic Left are considerably diminished from two decades ago. Some associate this decline with the breakdown of once-popular left political strategies, such as the social protest movements of the sixties or the Eurosocialist and Eurocommunist revivals of the seventies and early eighties. Alternatively, one might read the decline of the Left as being part of the general structural crisis of late capitalism. This interpretation would involve analyzing the lack of political will to engage in social reform in the industrialized world as a symptom of the exhaustion of the social and

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economic resources needed to sustain the modern capitalist welfare state (see Habermas 1973).

Receiving little attention has been a way of viewing the crisis that would lead us to see the current failure of the Left to articulate its position in a strong and theoretically coherent manner as a crisis in contemporary understanding of democratic theory. The mass media and most establishment pundits dub this period as the triumph of democracy. This is incoherent theoretically, because, in the history of political thought, the Left has presented the strongest articulation of the democratic ideal. From Rousseau and Jefferson in the eighteenth century, to the ethical radicals and Christian socialists in the early nineteenth, to the Marxists and social democrats in the late nineteenth century and the twentieth, the discourse of democracy in Western political thought has been dominated by what in historical context has been recognized as the Left.

A perceived triumph of democracy today is being equated in the popular imagination with the triumph of liberal capitalist society and its ideals. Given the actual history of the relationship between democracy as an ideal and liberalism as both a theory and a practice, our current understanding of the term *democracy* can only be seen as representing a crisis in democratic theory.

The problem of resurgent liberalism

Public debate today is dominated by an aggressive, assertive, and fully reconstituted classical liberalism often presented under the guise of conservatism, democratic capitalism, or even neoliberalism. Economic, and social theory abounds with neo-Lockean, Benthamite, and neo-Smithian arguments. Examples include an unbounded defense of exclusive economic privilege, which is especially pronounced in the zero-sum logic found in U.S. movements against taxation and public service. Another example is the dominance of mass-media and think-tank policy analysts who explain poverty and social pathologies by devising ever more elaborate theories for blaming the defective personal characteristics of the poor, often simply repeating the social theorems of the eighteenth-century utilitarians.¹

Finally, governments around the world are preoccupied with

privatization, deregulation, and general antiegalitarianism, most often in the guise of competitiveness and efficiency as solutions to late capitalism's problems of chronic economic stagnation. In this ideological climate, values such as equity, distributional empowerment, and social justice have been proclaimed almost passé. In their place, the reign of the classic eighteenth-century self-interested individuals has been declared, with their faith, classical liberalism, enthroned as the permanent victor in the modern war of ideas.² What is most ironic about all of this is that these trends have been depicted in both the mass media and in leading journals of opinion as being aspects of democratization.

It is imperative for the Left to find some effective way to refute the notion that the triumph of classical liberalism has anything to do with the victory of democracy. One strategy is to harness and rechannel the current wave of "democratic" sentiment into a revival of authentic democratic theory.

The democratic critique of liberalism

The practice of using the democratic ideal to refute liberalism, although an established tradition in recent political theory, is yet in serious need of a reinvigoration. The most recent incarnation of the democratic critique of liberalism occurred with the rise of the new social movements in the 1960s and 1970s, such as Black power, women's liberation, and environmentalism. Theorists of these movements argued that, both historically and theoretically, liberalism and so-called liberal democratic societies have actually shown a hostility to the development of substantive, rather than procedural, democracy. These theorists argued that we must revise our understanding of democracy not just as a model of society, but as a model for analyzing modern society. Reevaluating the theory behind the democratic critique of liberalism can help us see that whenever liberalism is on the upsurge, as it is today, it means a crisis in democratic theory.

To accomplish this task, I analyze here the ideas of three major representatives of this tradition in three key works: C. B. Macpherson's *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy*, Benjamin Barber's *Strong Democracy*, and Andrew Levine's *Arguing for Socialism*. These works contain nearly all of the core

theoretical elements needed to reconstruct a basic understanding of how liberalism has helped to undermine the democratic ideal. My intent is to provide some theoretical clarity and coherence about what this tradition can offer a reconstituted democratic Left. Four questions raised by these works highlight the differences between democracy and liberalism relating to social ontology, freedom, property, and technology. I conclude by suggesting how this tradition might be helped and reinvigorated by incorporating insights drawn from antiracist and feminist scholarship.

Something should first be said about what we mean by the term *democracy*. In “Democracy, Utopian and Scientific,” C. B. Macpherson argues that in order for a political theory to make sense it must have both a utopian and a scientific character—both a transcendent vision of what it wants to bring about, and concrete insight into the laws and motions of political and economic life that would help develop this vision out of actual historical realities (1985, 120–32). My definition of *democracy* is based on a combination of the democratic vision and insights into the problems that have been encountered in trying to make that vision an actuality.

Democracy is a set of interlocking and mutually dependent moral principles, a political ideal and an economic system. Democracy has an ethical, psychological, and historical dimension. The simplest definition of democracy is the famous slogan of the French Revolution, “liberty, equality, fraternity.” The guiding principle of democracy is that self-understanding is possible only under a system of self-rule that promotes equal self-development. The goals of democracy are development, improvement, and inclusion. What democrats want to develop is our understanding of what forces help us refine and shape our ability to enhance our innate capacities to control our social environments, so that we may achieve autonomy and solidarity in combating isolation and disempowerment. What democrats want to improve is our personality, so that we may adapt to develop our life circumstances and fashion a drive for cooperation, mutual respect, and justice. In essence, democracy wants to include all those whom it is possible to include in the process of

social, political, and economic decision making. The ends of democracy are the emergence of a more free, equal, and ultimately human life-world.³

The definition outlined here is to varying degrees compatible with the concept of democracy found in the three works discussed here. They differ primarily on what it might take to bring such a society about. These theorists can be classified as: Macpherson (democratic liberalism), Barber (communitarianism), and Levine (democratic Marxism). My focus is on what unites them—an implicit, or in Levine’s case explicit, recognition that any movement toward real democracy will have to involve at least some movement toward socialism—a movement that is more advanced than any current welfare statist form of social liberalism.

Macpherson: The democratic liberal critique

Nature of the critique

C. B. Macpherson is a seminal figure in the contemporary attempt to revive authentic democratic thought. His project began with a reinterpretation of the foundations of modern political theory, concentrating on the works of Hobbes and Locke in his now classic text, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (1962). He showed that the thoughts of the founders of classical liberalism were imbued with the idea of individual freedom as rooted in possession, ownership, and private economic gain. From this work onward, the principal theme informing Macpherson’s project might be called the “antinomies of liberal democracy.” Macpherson sought to explain the paradox of how two theories that were foundationally antithetical (liberalism and democracy) came to be wed in an almost inseparable bond in the politics and ideology of Western industrial societies. His position is that of a democratic-liberal because he undertook to and find a way to develop a model of society that would be truly democratic and yet retain the essential qualities of Western liberal society.⁴

The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (1977) was for Macpherson a sort of culminating effort, bringing together themes that he had been developing for over a decade. Here

Macpherson argues that before the nineteenth century, all liberal theorists had argued for a class-divided society in which the claims of democracy were rejected in deference to the exclusive rights of property holders. While all earlier democratic theorists argued for a one-class or classless society dedicated to building the “just polity,” in the nineteenth century liberal theorists began to reconfigure their arguments to justify the existence of democratic mechanisms for securing the consent of the governed. They did not address the fact that such mechanisms were in direct contradiction to the foundations of liberalism in both theory and practice (10–12).

Macpherson’s study outlines the development of a series of historically successive models designed by liberal theorists to cope with the growing demands for more substantive democracy, which were the result of the evolving democratization of political mechanisms. Macpherson claims that all models devised to make liberal societies more democratic have so far been flawed in their approach to what real democratization would entail. Hence, he argues, “no society that has called itself liberal-democratic has in fact been so” (21–22). The proof of this claim is found in three historically successive models for a liberal democracy, which Macpherson renders from the history of political theory and the actual practices of “liberal-democratic” societies. Each model, he points out, was based on the failures of the previous one, and the roots of their failures, he believes, lay in their inability to reconcile genuinely democratic ideals with the framework of liberalism.

The first of these models is what he calls the “Protective Democracy” of Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, based on the philosophy of utilitarianism. This was the first attempt at a democratic theory in which the justification for democracy (in this case limited to a defense of an expanded franchise), is subsumed under the claims of liberalism. Bentham and Mill saw that if society were to maintain order, it needed to make people feel more secure and protected. Both men believed that people desire to gain and maximize utilities, and can be controlled by a kind of arithmetical calculation of pain and pleasure. They advocated, therefore, an expanded, but still very limited, democratic

franchise in order that people might register their desires. They both believed, however, that the purpose of voting was to secure responsible legislation, defined as that which would not threaten men of rank and economic privilege (Macpherson 1977, 42–44). Thus political democracy is just a protective mechanism for self-interested, acquisitive individuals seeking to maximize their utilities (25–26). This model is so blatantly antithetical to the goals of democracy that one might ask how it qualifies for consideration at all. Macpherson’s answer is that this model is of interest as the first attempt by liberal theorists to reconceive democracy in such a way as to strip it of its qualitative content.

More interesting for our analysis is the second model, “Developmental Democracy.” Its principles were first articulated by the neo-utilitarian John Stuart Mill, expanded by idealists influenced by T. H. Green, and then later adopted by pragmatists like John Dewey. In this model, the pursuit of self-interest is reread as a qualitative rather than a quantitative pursuit. Beginning with J. S. Mill, liberal theorists focused on the truly devastating effects of inequality resulting from nineteenth-century capitalism’s reliance on the unrestrained forces of the market. Mill, especially, realized that public demands for greater equality and the calls for more substantive democracy were rooted in questions associated with class power, an example being the Chartist revolts of the 1830s (46). However, the remedy that became most attractive to liberals was to try to make the problems of class insignificant or at least manageable. How were they to do this? According to Macpherson, it was by promoting the ideal of political democracy as a space to develop civic bonds. Through the practical activities of public debate and party politics, it was thought, a person could develop his or her intellect, virtue, and social skills to the point where the problems associated with class inequality would be minimized (59).

Macpherson, although in favor of these goals, responded that this model suffered from a descriptive unreality: in fact, the problems of class exploitation could not be mediated by the existence of quasi-democratic institutions. The inequality caused by liberal market society would continue to limit seriously the egalitarian claims of developmental freedom (62–63).

These contradictions become more acute in the final model Macpherson subjected to his critique—the “Equilibrium Model of Democracy,” often called the plural-elite model of liberal democracy.⁵ First articulated in 1942 by Joseph Schumpeter in his very influential *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (1947), this model brought the conceptions of the theory of elites found in Mosca, Pareto, and Michels together in a defense of liberal society. For Schumpeter, democracy as an ideal was unworkable and dangerous because it threatened the stability of capitalist market society by focusing on the concept of equity. Yet, as Schumpeter saw it, the demand for more democracy needed to be fed. The solution to this problem was to refine democracy as a mechanical and procedural device for choosing governments. Macpherson calls this the “Entrepreneurial-Market” analogy, in which voters are seen as consumers and politicians as sellers of political goods. However, these political goods are always expressed in terms of means not ends. Voters do not make decisions; they fight for a share of the rewards of decisions made for them. They do not develop their own ideals; they choose from among ideals made acceptable for them to choose from (87).

Macpherson argues that this model is descriptively realistic in that all known liberal democratic societies have assumed these principles for their governance. He adds however, that it is not justifiably realistic in that the model is based on a “fallacy of a self-evident good” in that it assumes the only suitable models for effective democratic government will be ones in which a marketized humanity controlled by market institutions is confined to market behaviors. Macpherson counters that in market society, the general lack of equality makes each voter, like each consumer, a victim of ineffective purchasing power, and thus, ineffective demand power. Macpherson explains this with the example of comparing the effective demand of a poor uneducated trucker against that of a powerful head of a trucking company. The former compared to the latter is almost negligible in the market and thus he points out logically in a marketized politics the same would hold true. In addition, he argues that if politicians are to be salesmen, then politics must become advertising and thus consent will be manufactured (87–88). Therefore,

in the equilibrium model, we find that even democratic mechanisms are devoid of content in order to protect liberal market institutions from any real democratization.

Contributions to the tradition

Macpherson's main contribution is in explaining how liberal models of society are invariably descriptive as modes of explanation. Liberals have often been disingenuous in the way they defend and prop up the status quo while claiming simply to explain the way society is really organized. Since a liberal society is invariably a capitalist society, anything which is perceived as a threat to that system is described by liberal theory as either dangerous or impossible or both. Macpherson demonstrates that because democracy is always seen as a threat to market society, the demand for it must not only be checked, but also tamed into a subordinate of liberalism. As Macpherson shows time and again, figures such as Bentham, J. S. Mill, and Schumpeter all recognized the people's demand for greater democracy, yet each went out of his way to avoid the substance of democracy for the semblance. We can therefore understand why all so-called "liberal-democratic" societies lack substantive democracy. Once liberalism becomes the normative model for society, it becomes aggressively antitranscendental, seeking to preclude all further development except as a version of itself. Democracy, however, both as an ideal and as a practice, is aggressively transcendental, questioning even those institutions it has brought into existence.

Barber: The communitarian critique

Nature of the critique

Benjamin R. Barber's *Strong Democracy* (1984) is as vigorous an attack on liberalism as can be found in the democratic tradition. It lays out what it hopes to be a comprehensive critique of every possible claim advanced in favor of a liberal outlook and tries to find those elements within the liberal tradition that are most antithetical to the claims of democracy. The perspective Barber takes is that of a communitarian.⁶ Those who defend this theory argue that citizenship is one of the most important identities a person can develop. They defend greater dialog,

participation, and control in public decision making and place a strong emphasis on responsibility. Barber argues that his ideal community would be what he calls a “strong democracy,” an experimental community dedicated to the civic ideal (95).

Liberalism, according to Barber, has failed to produce any effective form of democratic society; liberal democratic systems have tended to twist movements for greater democracy into pathologically undemocratic directions. Liberalism, Barber believes, creates a frame of mind and mode of behavior that turn genuine democratic ends into nondemocratic means. Examples of this would be interest-group politics, neopopulism (especially of the racist and authoritarian kind), and the rise of mass society. All of these movements, Barber claims, seem to their proponents to be democratic but they in fact almost always degenerate into examples of stupefied, self-interested individuals merely acting in some collective fashion. Barber identifies this problem as one deeply rooted in the premises of liberal theory about human nature, knowledge, and politics. For liberals, he argues, democracy is always optional, conditional and a means to other ends (xiii–xiv).

Barber maintains that theoretically, liberalism values most privacy, property, interest, and rights—all values meant to exclude and separate. Democracy values community, justice, citizenship, and participation—values meant to include and build bonds. A real difference between the two that Barber emphasizes is that in liberalism, the state guarantees values, while in democracy, values guarantee the state. The best way to explain this distinction is that a system can be called liberal as long as it is trying to be liberal, i.e., if it protects and promotes exclusive interest and rights rooted in private property. But a system can only call itself democratic if it actually is democratic. It must actually be a just community of active self-developing citizens or else it is a system that needs to be democratized. This of course means that democracy as a system might never be achieved, but for Barber that is not the same as arguing that a society cannot be dedicated in all its principles to democratic values. This is the essence of his claim to be a promoter of strong democracy. He does not envision the overthrow of liberal society, only that its

pathologies (as he would describe them) be checked by some greater emphasis on democratic principles. Democracy never can be for the few, while what liberalism calls liberty, always is. Because of its value dispositions liberalism will hold the state's legitimacy to its ability to keep democratic values in check. Therefore, Barber sees the problem as one of having the dominant value dispositions within society reversed.

Within liberalism, Barber finds three dominant dispositions unified by one primary assumption. These are its anarchist values, realist means, and minimalist temperament. By *anarchist values* Barber means a failure to view any sort of political (public) action as a good in itself. Instead, liberalism always views politics as a means to some private end. Accordingly, Barber notes, "we find the loathsome anti-democratic idea of elections as a choice between the lesser evil" (10).

Realist means is Barber's term for a preoccupation with power as the art of manipulation. For in liberalism the ideas of justice and equity only appear as forms of moderation and mercy. As such, the law is never a manifestation of the sovereign will of the community, but is instead, he claims, "merely a mode of reward and punishment for individual behaviors" (13).

Minimalist temperament relates to the central paradox in liberalism: that liberals do not even fully accept the liberal order itself because rooted in liberal theory is a drive for only the most minimal element possible in any sort of public action. In this sense, liberalism makes the idea of any system of collective expression, even a liberal one, seem intolerable. A liberal system must therefore simply be a means of mediating between actors, providing pluralism among participants and heterogeneity of opinions. Yet these are not what they seem. In the liberal order, mediation, pluralism, and heterogeneity are all promoted, not as signs of trust and bonding, but as aspects of skepticism, distrust, and isolation. For Barber, the liberal promotes toleration and diversity not out of a love of fairness, "but simply because he expects so little even from himself" (18).

What all three of these dispositions have in common is the assumption that conflict is the normal mode of life. In Barber's view, the political subject in liberalism is a private occupier of

space whose every interaction is a conflict over resources, appetites, exclusive power, and ego satisfactions (what Macpherson meant by the term *possessive individualism*). In liberal society, the idea of a public good is denied and the claims of justice are repressed in deference to the normality of conflict. Yet, Barber explains, the argument that there ought to be an alternative to such a society is tolerated, and liberalism is forced to deal with the demands for more democracy that its fear of power creates. In its theoretic structure, however, liberalism has little regard for these claims, and therefore they will be frustrated and seldom (if ever) fulfilled. Barber goes on to criticize liberalism for its Newtonian politics (mechanistic, static, conflict oriented), Cartesian epistemology (dogmatic skepticism), and apolitical psychology (fallacy of composition: if it is true or good for me, it must be true or good for all), and concludes that in the end, liberalism will actually deteriorate based on its own contradictions.

While it seems clear from the evidence Barber provides that the history of liberalism in both theory and practice is rife with the values he describes, problems remain. A major objection one might raise (from within the democratic tradition) is that his argument underestimates the sense in which liberal values have in themselves been able to generate principles of collective expression and action, especially concerning the issue of class. A good example is found in Barber's own discussion of liberalism's "minimalist temperament" or "apolitical psychology." The target of Barber's charge of embodying this principle, James Madison, was quite aware of the nature and intensity of economic solidarity involved in the successful pursuit of private interest by the owning class. The problem of class power is one Barber tends to ignore, to the general detriment of his case.

Contributions to the tradition

In a very revealing metaphor, Barber claims that in liberal democratic societies, politics is simply *zookeeping*. Everyone is kept well in his or her exclusive domain and we make sure no one gets hurt. Barber's argument is not so much that this is what really happens, but is the more interesting charge that this is the ideal that liberal theory upholds. What Barber adds to the

democratic critique is a deep hermeneutical understanding of how much liberal theory is committed to the very ideals that democracy as an ideal in itself was meant to refute. By exploring liberalism at its preconceptual, epistemological, and psychological levels, Barber has given a clear expression of why liberal theorists fail to take seriously the values in democratic theory and always reduce them from their content to their form. What Barber explores is a system of indoctrination and miseducation. Liberalism tells people that it is natural and necessary for their freedom and continued well-being that they live in a state of antagonism and contempt for their fellow citizens. The next questions are: what is the nature of the system that needs to perpetuate these values, and are there other means of defending the ends it claims can be sustained only by it and its values?

Levine: The democratic Marxist critique

Nature of the critique

In Levine, we find many of the same themes articulated by Macpherson and Barber. However, instead of simply exploring the antidemocratic proclivities of liberalism, Levine bases his critique on an alternative framework that contrasts liberal ideals and values with those of a system that seeks to subsume them and build on this supersession, arguing that the best of what liberalism promises can only be achieved in a postliberal society.⁷ Levine's *Arguing for Socialism* (1988) is an attempt to show that the Marxian case for democratic socialism remains the only coherent theory to show how and why we ought to transition from a liberal to a democratic society. Drawing on a very Rousseauian-influenced form of democratic Marxism, Levine argues that in all areas where fair comparisons can be made, it can be shown that the core demands of liberalism as a creed can be fulfilled only after liberal capitalism has been replaced by democratic socialism.

Levine begins with the general proposition that the good society as defined by both liberalism and socialism is one that promotes freedom. Given that, one could compare liberal and socialist values in order to decide which embody the fullest possible notion of freedom. Levine's analysis draws heavily on

the methods used by analytical Marxists, especially G. A. Cohen and John E. Roemer. Using their method of propositional logic, Levine is able to draw out the elements in each theory that lend themselves to comparison. In its substance, much of Levine's version of Marxist theory is highly orthodox, and it cannot be argued that it is outside of the mainstream of Marxists theories on the nature of democracy.⁸

Using the techniques of analytic philosophy, Levine opens his case by arguing that there are actually three distinct notions, not one, of freedom in modern political theory, which he designates as: (F(1)) or Liberty, freedom as noninterference; (F(2)) or Capacity, the freedom of expanded ability; and (F(3)) or Autonomy, freedom as self-determination (21–22). Levine argues that liberalism's most important flaw is its insistence that (F(1)) is the only true and actual form of freedom. Liberals therefore only tolerate the drive for (F(2)) and (F(3)) as long as it does not interfere with the specific pursuit of one's (F(1)). This creates a contradiction and a logical trap, for it makes the pursuit of (F(1)) an end in itself when it is self-defined as only a means. A second problem is that liberalism actually argues that (F(1)) is natural, in that people are innately self-interested individuals, and thus one always ought to seek optimal noninterference in one's pursuits—that is, (F(1)). The problem, according to Levine, is that this can only be done if one has the means to do so, but if X seeks (F(1)) at optimal levels, what if the only way to get it is to remove or take Y's (F(1))? In that case, freedom would be self-defeating and thus, an unattainable goal (34–36).

In one of his most difficult yet impressive arguments, Levine points out that from its very beginning, liberalism has realized the paradox inherent in its definition of freedom. Its solution has been to support the idea of the state as a defender of private interests and interactional space. The state grants the ability to practice proscribed political values called liberties (speech, worship, assemblage, etc.). These "freedoms," we are told, are protected only because they are the price for letting us carry on our private war for economic subsistence. According to liberal theory, if we change the value of the freedom X seeks from Y we can reconcile the intractable conflict over each wanting the

other's freedom. How? If you have the capacity to be free (F(2)), and you have the autonomy in which to pursue freedom (F(3)), then, the argument goes, you are allowed the liberty to try to be free. In this argument, (F(2)) and (F(3)) are redefined as "liberties," while (F(1)) remains an economic category, unfettered private gain.

This for Levine is why liberals believe that if you cannot buy an airline because it is not open to private sales you are unfree. However, they reject the claim that if you cannot afford an airplane ticket you are unfree. As Levine points out, this distinction is inherently illogical, for in the second case, the person could be said to be unfree because the labor market and price system are imposed institutional impediments (intentional or unintentional) that work to the disadvantage of most persons and therefore weaken their capacity to be free and develop the autonomy to use whatever liberty they might have. The same cannot be said for those who can afford an airline.

An alternative solution might be to change social and political institutions so that popular control over the means of subsistence is developed, leaving one with the capacity to achieve real autonomy. The reason this does not occur to liberals is that they have already agreed that the private pursuit of personal gain against others who seek the same is the only proper goal for a human being. Hence, they are not interested in people's capacity to be free or to have the autonomy to enjoy freedom and use it wisely, especially if this would interfere with their goals or hold them accountable for their consequences.

From this point Levine begins to make his most crucial argument, which is that when democracy becomes a goal, autonomy (F(3)) becomes a more important form of freedom than liberty (F(1)), and socialism becomes comparatively more desirable for those who seek real freedom, than capitalism. He demonstrates this by comparing the values of liberalism and socialism in three areas, the distributional (equity), the aggregate (welfare), and the political (democracy), arguing that he can show how the only effective way out of the dilemma of freedom (reconciling autonomy and capacity with liberty) is to move from liberalism to democracy and eventually from capitalism to socialism. I will

concentrate only on the political for it is here that Levine demonstrates how and why liberalism, in its concept of democracy, is defective and destructive of our ability to understand or compare democracy and socialism.

The first political value in which Levine compares the two systems of thought is what he calls small “d” democracy, that is, “a mechanism of public decision making” (127). Levine argues that in liberal theory, democracy is conceived as a system of collective choice in which voting blocks are actually meant to stand for individual decision makers. Why? Because liberalism dislikes the idea of collective identity so much that it must make the group (when inevitable) appear as a magnified individual. This is seen in the theory of pluralism. In pluralism, group activity is not seen as transformative. As an ordinate-aggregate theory, it seeks merely to have people take their socially acceptable private choices and amplify them. The object is to create a form of democracy that actually does not have to be either democratic or even choice responsive, as long as there is room for individualized group responses to be stated (125). Secondly, Levine points out that liberalism’s preference for capitalism means that group interests will likely be organized-institutionalized, private economic decisions. Thus, public choice becomes transmogrified into privatized interests (131). I believe that these criticisms should not preclude some notion of a socialist pluralism. It must be made clear in any critique such as Levine’s where it is that capitalism specifically is the core problem. This is where I see Marxism, with its social-relations emphasis, helping to demonstrate more precisely than other theories how and why liberal values work against those promoting democracy. There is, as G. A. Cohen has demonstrated, a fetishism of principles in capitalist legal relations that obscures the effective ownership of the basic forms of decision-making power. This then deludes one into thinking that all interests are equal in being interests (1978, chap. 5; 1989, chap. 2). Moreover, this failure is shown to be substantive rather than attitudinal or procedural, as some liberal critics would have it.

The second political value dealt with by Levine is representative government. This has always been a difficult area for

comparative focus because of the way in which liberalism insists on seeing a separation between the state and civil society. In classical liberal theory, government is actually the only real arena open to collective choice and decision making. In Levine's view, however, what liberals really intend by this is that politics is the only profession open to collective choice. We all are given a say in who gets to run the political factory (government), but our participation is marginalized to periodic voting because governance is not as important for nonpoliticians whose real world is said to be that of private economic interaction in the realm of civil society (136–37).

This means, Levine says somewhat rhetorically, that liberals prefer government in the form of *benevolent despotism*, in which direct control and direct responsibility are removed in favor of virtual representation. Liberals believe one is virtually represented when those elected are doing so not because they were directly chosen by the population but because they know what is best for the public.⁹ Why should this be so? Liberal theory is quite uniform in its answers to this question. The state and civil society should be separate because the people cannot maintain order. In other words, public power should be exclusive to political interest, while private economic power is to be an arena exclusive to individual conflict. Historically the bourgeois have claimed that in the state no interest has exclusive power, because its only concerns are those that transcend the petty private disputes that are the mainstay of civil society. Order is maintained by keeping the public from using state power to intervene in these affairs. Yet what is this order that needs to be maintained by the people's representatives? It is the order found in the total acceptance of liberal values and capitalist economic security. The people, liberals have argued, if given a chance, would use state power to reshape and redress the inequality and disadvantages of civil life, a temptation they should be relieved of entertaining.

Given this, Levine argues any movement toward greater democratic accountability should be automatically seen as aimed against the liberal view of government, not in accordance with it (140–41), because any such movement could be effective only if

it involved the overthrow of exclusive economic power as the dominant force in political and social life. Hence, to understand the need for more democracy one must see the connection between state power and the power held by some in what is called civil society.¹⁰

Finally, Levine deals with what he considers to be one of the chief defects of liberal political theory, its conception of rights. In Levine's view, although rights are socially necessary, they are theoretically defective because of a general analytic sloppiness on the part of the rights theorists, especially in their understanding of history.

According to classical rights theory, liberal society and capitalist economic relations both engender rights, in that only societies that have them respect rights claims (144). Nonetheless, Levine counters that actually rights claims are not intrinsic to liberal society but are correctives to its abuses. They are, he maintains, fundamentally ad hoc. How can this be so? A possible response may be that the founders of liberal theory, specifically Hobbes and Locke, defended the idea of rights before theirs was truly a liberal society? Levine offers an example—the status of labor—illustrating the validity of his point for both liberal theory and the practice of societies inspired by it. Labor in liberal societies always is transformed into a commodity and an exchange value which becomes factored into the production process as a requirement of capital accumulation. The worth of human labor is thus subordinated to someone else's ends. Against this, liberal theory promotes the development of the idea of *inalienable human rights* that cannot be sold (free expression, religion, etc.); these ad hoc rights become the only basis for human dignity, and the ideological saving grace of the system (145–46).

For Levine, rights are ad hoc because they only exist if you claim them and then the powers that grant them have to respect them. Still, what happens if one rights claim conflicts with another? An example would be my right to own property and your right not to be owned as a piece of property (slavery). The answer is that the state will have to use its coercive power to enforce one rights claim as a higher good. But where does the state gain such notions? Again, the answer is that someone will

have to be the final arbitrator. In democratic theory, rights could only have meaning if they always enforced the fullest human dignity, which somehow must become an “end in itself” (146–48). This is clear in both the writings of liberal theorists and the practices of liberal societies.¹¹

Levine’s conclusion is that only a true democracy in the Rousseauian sense of a society dedicated to educating its people to be free, equal, and autonomous could achieve a transformative rather than a negative conception of rights. A liberal society wedded to capitalist economic relations will always subordinate rights claims to instrumentalities of the status quo of privatized ego-calculation. For Levine, this makes rights in liberalism simply cosmetic applications—in other words, capitalism with a human face (151–52).

Contributions to the tradition

By his application of an alternative method (Marxism), in accord with an alternative system (socialism), Levine’s work is able to penetrate not just beneath the surface of the antidemocratic aspects of liberalism, but into why these problems are necessarily inherent in liberalism’s process of maturation as a social system.

What Levine shows is that as liberalism has evolved, it has needed to become more democratic. This is a point common to all figures in the tradition; however, what he adds to our understanding is that logically and historically the need to democratize liberalism has not been simply an element of the system propping itself up, but of its internal contradictions preparing the system for its supersession by democracy itself. Democratization in liberal societies is not an act of reform; it is revolutionary, in that it undermines the very foundations of the liberal order. Therefore, we can say the degree to which liberal values and norms persist unmodified by those of democratic theory is a measure of the degree to which a particular liberal society is moving in a reactionary and counterrevolutionary direction. What drives the liberal’s antidemocratic and counterrevolutionary impulse? It is the connection between liberalism as a system of values and the capitalist social and economic relations

engendering these values. What we can conclude from this is that just as liberalism needs capitalist economic relations to truly understand itself, so democracy will be dependent on socialist relations to make itself coherent.

The best way to demonstrate this is to explain how almost everything that most people have come to expect from liberal democratic societies (freedom, justice, equity, social welfare, and human rights) would be better served and improved on in a democratic socialist order. Levine's major accomplishment is to show that in order to continue this work, we will need to combine the values of the wider democratic tradition, with the historical, political, and economic insights of Marxism. This will in turn help us in explaining both how liberalism continues to frustrate the pronounced demand for democracy world-wide, and the values necessary to overcome it.

Reflections on some critical questions

If we are to continue this tradition and revive genuine democratic thought and politics in the face of resurgent liberalism, building on the foundations given us by the subject we have analyzed, our attention must be drawn to questions where democratic and liberal thought find themselves in the most fundamental conflict, questions that when addressed will further point us toward learning how to build and promote an authentic democratic outlook. Throughout its history the democratic critique of liberalism has focused on four questions, social ontology, freedom, property, and technology. In addressing each question, democratic theorists have shown how the positions taken by liberalism on these questions have had a fundamentally corrosive effect on the ability of people to either understand or promote an authentic democratic outlook.

The question of social ontology

As Carol Gould maintained in her challenging book *Rethinking Democracy*, the existence and maintenance of any political or social theory presupposes a coherent ontological foundation (1990, 91). The question of social ontology relates to the issue of the general state of being engendered by a social system, as well

as how that relates to the condition of its subjects in both the natural and ideal sense of their living within it. The liberal answer to this question is something Levine calls (*F(1)*) or *liberty*, while for Macpherson it is labeled *possessive individualism*. What both explain is that in liberalism the nature of our social being is as an atomistic piece of a larger collection of atomistic pieces that all seek pure self-direction through the rational calculation of self-interests. Accordingly, we are said to seek the purest possible satisfaction of these interests as devised and articulated within our single frame of reference. This ontology is based entirely on the idea that in order to live well, one must live at the expense of others and in doing so one must, as a rule, extract and/or devalue the potential of others.

Barber would concur, adding that the values individualism embodies contain a contradiction, between its view of humans as aggressive predatory beings and its ideal of the self-sufficient anarchist. He believes this contradiction leads ironically to the development of mentalities that are pathological and authoritarian in that they encourage a drive for the removal of all potential sources of opposition and adverse opinion as a means of achieving freedom. This in turn makes democracy seem the chief obstacle to what liberal ontology conceives of as individual fulfillment. Only in the overcoming of this ontology of atomistic individualism is any development of real democracy possible. However, when we look closely at the central question of how each person understands the root problems inherent in liberalism's social ontology versus that of democracy, Barber, Macpherson, and Levine begin to part company. While Barber is cast off in his own direction, Macpherson can be seen as being drawn toward the positions taken by Levine, although this attraction is not mutual.

Macpherson identified himself clearly with the developmental democracy of J. S. Mill and T. H. Green, but stated that he also increasingly came to see that a major defect in their thinking was their inability to see that the inequities of liberal-democratic society were not based on an inadequate attentiveness to issues of fairness, as they thought, but were inherent in the capitalist economic system (Macpherson 1985, 114). For Macpherson,

Marx was the key thinker of Mill and Green's period who understood this, and, he added, it is the exceptional figures among contemporary Marxists who still understand this today. Indeed, Macpherson claimed that for a thinking liberal democrat of the Mill/Green variety, it would be difficult to find fault with the philosophic underpinnings of Marx's enterprise (64). In claiming that capitalism is inherently antihuman, in that it limits our capacity for freedom, Macpherson parts company with his own tradition.

Barber, on the other hand, stated rather plainly that for the strong democrat there is no corresponding economic system. He rejected Marxism (as a form of economic determinism!) and claimed "it is the capitalist logic and epistemology that offends democracy rather than capitalist institutions or even values" (1984, 253). This stance is difficult to justify and highly equivocal, even in Barber's own text, but it is firmly rejected by both Macpherson and Levine for historical as well as theoretical reasons.

The connection between Macpherson and Levine, nevertheless, is based on the movement of Macpherson in Levine's direction. Two major differences remain between them: Levine's reasons for believing in democracy and his conception of what freedom under democracy would mean. First, Levine argues that the case for democracy is rooted in the proofs we can draw from what he calls "the rational kernel of Marx's theory of historical materialism," which is that the level of the development of productive forces makes democratic socialism historically possible, even if politically difficult (1988, 194). Macpherson is in this regard more historicist than historical, basing his claims against liberalism on its hermeneutical failures in not seeing its own contradictions within the present order.

Secondly, Levine's conception of a free society is not one rooted in what he calls *capacity freedom* or ($F(2)$), which is the equivalent of Macpherson's *developmental democracy*. Instead it is his view that true freedom entails *autonomy* or ($F(3)$), the freedom to be self-actualizing. This, claims Levine, means going beyond a system where one's capacities are enhanced to a realm in which the mode of production that made self-actualizing

impossible, both historically and logically, is overthrown. This realm can only be communism (Levine 1988, 212–13). Macpherson, on the other hand, was wedded to the belief that the present system could be modified and reformed, if liberal democrats could become more aware of the need to put market concepts and capitalist power relations under more democratic considerations. Thus the differences between the two can be summed up in the fact that for Levine, the case for democracy hinges on the possibility of an explicitly postliberal and postcapitalist society, while for Macpherson, this prospect was more questionable and in some ways, under present circumstances, less than desirable (Macpherson 1973, 170–84). It is a great curiosity that for all his sophistication in matters of political economy, throughout most of his works Macpherson found it impossible to envision any type of postliberal society except one based on state bureaucratic socialism of the Soviet type, hence his great hesitations in this area.

Carol Gould argues that democracy should be seen as representing a third way between the individualism of liberal ontology and holism of traditional socialism in that democratic ontology recognizes that individuals choose their social relations which in turn then define their lives (1990, 105–6). However, the democratic tradition actually has shown the obverse to be true both historically and logically. Social relations constitute the levels of consciousness available to construct systems of choice rationality. The contradictions within social relations create the circumstances in which one is able to realize that an alternative ontology is possible and consequently to begin to struggle against both the social relations and the ontology that promotes them. Gould does in some ways realize this (107–9). My main point, however, is that the choice between ontologies becomes apparent in the working out of the relational contradictions within social formations, not vice versa.

The question of freedom

This question takes up where the previous debate ended. In his famous essay, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” the philosopher Isaiah Berlin maintains that the Western political tradition

actually contains two distinct concepts of freedom, *positive liberty* and *negative liberty*. Positive liberty is the freedom to develop yourself fully as a human being; negative liberty is the simple freedom from coercion in your daily life (Berlin 1969, 42–43). However, Berlin's two concepts were not articulated as some detached observation of an interesting facet of Western political thought. His was a deliberate attempt to argue the case that only negative liberty is compatible with freedom as such. He therefore provides (somewhat unwittingly) a classic example of the way liberalism devalues and repudiates the democratic ideal.

Democratic critics would insist that instead of two standards of liberty in which one negates the other, it can be demonstrated that one standard of liberty encompasses the concerns of both the positive and negative conception. Macpherson is helpful in showing that the love of liberty as a lack of coercion means that the negative liberal should then fear the extractive power of others. This means one needs the ability to gain for oneself by forcing a transfer of someone else's innate capacities to oneself at a net loss to the other (Macpherson 1973, 12–13). Nonetheless it is only when one is able to develop one's essential qualities, free from the imposed and unequal power relations that social, political and economic institutions enforce in the interest of exploitation and private gain, that it becomes possible to live a uniquely unfettered life.

As Levine would argue, the essential goal of negative liberty only becomes possible in a society dedicated to positive liberty. This again highlights the educational aspects of the democratic project. We must free people from the illusion that liberal values are compatible with democratic values, something many today believe as common sense. One of the most consistent themes in democratic theory down through the centuries is that the people cannot overcome what enslaves them as long as their mentality tells them to keep polishing their own chains (Cunningham 1987, 237–38).

The question of property

Here we reach the most important question for understanding liberalism as an ideological and historical entity distinct from

democracy. Liberalism should above all be seen as the political theory of private property because it demands that property be organized for the exclusive use and gain of specific individuals, which is to be accomplished at the expense of all other considerations. As such, liberalism is directly related to the rise of capitalism and the emergence of capitalist social relations.

Democracy, on the other hand, is the political theory of human potential. It argues that society and its resources ought to be organized to provide for the full development and expansion of the innate human capacities of all its citizens. As an ideal, democracy is much older than liberalism, because it relates to the issues of social injustice for all excluded peoples in all times, while modern democracy dates directly to the assault on human dignity associated with capitalism.

Using a great deal of historical evidence, democratic critics have demonstrated that in liberal societies, where the exclusive property right has been challenged, liberals have been quite willing to abandon even the most elementary signs of democratization such as civil rights and liberties in order to preserve private property. Even more fundamentally, as Macpherson and Levine demonstrate, in societies that call themselves liberal democracies, the key demand of democratic theory, access to the means of life, is consistently reconfigured so that access is a simple general availability of utilities. Democracy is simply a mechanism for getting things, and human attributes are seen as salable, alienable properties. Consequently the democratic ideal is perverted into its opposite.

I maintain that these insights would be very difficult to comprehend without the help of the best elements of the Marxian critique of capitalism, making such analysis indispensable for the renewal of democratic theory. My claim is borne out by the fact that Macpherson and Barber (both non-Marxists), at varying points and to varying degrees, were willing to admit to this point (Macpherson 1985, 63–65; Barber 1984, 252).

The question of technology

Technology is not so much a new category as it is a subcategory of property. Exclusive ownership, key to a liberal society,

places the fruits of human endeavor in the form of technological advancement in the hands of the few. Democratic critics assert that this is one of the greatest dangers for human freedom, for without real democratic accountability, specialists and experts become by default a new elite, and the public's appreciation of the rights to access become ever lessened as they learn merely to avoid all direct responsibility as beyond their privilege.

The history of science demonstrates that the advancement of technology is a collective human endeavor and never the act of isolated individuals. It is also clear from the record that when the control and ownership of technology remain the exclusive privilege of the very few, it is always to the detriment of more people than are served.¹² The democratization of technology is today one of the most important social, political, economic, and especially environmental necessities for the advocates of an authentic democratic revival.¹³

***Conclusion: Toward new directions
and renewing the tradition***

I have argued, through a reexamination of some of the key works of its outstanding proponents, that the democratic critique of liberalism is greatly in need of a theoretical revitalization. With the Left in strong retreat on political and intellectual fronts, it is time to reinvest in the defense and development of those ideas and arguments in which the concept of the Left was conceived, specifically, democratization of human society and politics. This defense should include a strong emphasis on the importance of collective self-expression as a means of building character and developing a sense of social power and responsibility. People must be able to see that the privatized, atomized conceptions of personal life and social interaction held out by liberals are both delusive and dangerous. They are delusive, because no one who really behaves in this manner achieves much in actuality. Powerful economic interests, especially corporate capitalists and the political figures who serve them, owe their success to conscious collective action. It is dangerous because all those rugged individualists who promote this ideology with calls for decentralization and local control are very

busy amassing unchecked power and eroding any real avenues of democratic accountability that such measures might otherwise enhance.

Unexplored directions still exist, however, in which to seek the reasons for liberalism's resistance to real democratization. Two promising areas to examine in order to understand resurgent liberalism as a crisis in democratic theory are the works of antiracist and feminist scholars. Writers such as Macpherson, Barber, and Levine show that a major difference between the democratic and liberal traditions is the degree to which democracy depends on access to and inclusion in the means of life and labor, while liberalism defends the belief that exclusion and isolation are both natural and necessary. When it comes to understanding the essence of the problems of exclusion and isolation in liberal society, what could be better focal points than racism and sexism?

The United States is undoubtedly the premiere liberal society existing today—"the liberal empire," in the words of the perceptive foreign policy scholar Walter Russell Mead, in that it is both fortress and enforcer of the liberal ideal world wide (1987, 33–34). This ideal has, for many decades, gone under the guise of democracy; still, nothing has put this facade to the test more than the country's centuries-long history of racial injustice. The betrayal of democracy by racism was a lifelong theme in the works of the most important of all African American scholars, W. E. B. Du Bois. His *Black Reconstruction* (1935) is a masterful account of how the potential for radical democracy in the United States was crushed by a "dictatorship of property" that existed in both the North and the South after the Civil War (Robinson 1983, 282–85). Du Bois was a pioneer in the understanding of how the doctrine of majority rule (a favorite weapon of the demagogues of white supremacy) was a travesty of the democratic ideal, in that it ignored the real purpose of democracy to develop a system for the control and full inclusion of all peoples in decision-making processes of all social, political, and economic institutions (Marable 1983, 11–15).

Nowhere in all his vast writings, however, did Du Bois lay out a rigorous and systematic explanation of his theory of

democracy, nor did he ever explain the relationship of America's liberal ideology to its persistent racism. One might very well be able to reconstruct such a theory from his works, as a few scholars have recently attempted to do (Horne 1986; Marable 1986 and 1994, section 3). Still, his great and important contribution is to historical scholarship in documenting the failure of America's democratic promise. Among African Americans as well as Latino and Asian scholars generally, there is no extant well-developed body of scholarship on the subject of how liberalism's antidemocratic elements have contributed to the problems of racial injustice.¹⁴ One reason for this lack may be that many antiracist scholars have been preoccupied with issues involving how to combat racism in its institutional practices, leaving little room for exploring issues of social ontology. Clearly no one involved in this struggle should discount the necessity for such work in helping to raise general questions about how we analyze even the most common of racial problems.

If antiracist scholars have taught us a great deal about how the promise of democracy has been checked and frustrated in the history of liberal societies, feminist scholars have proved particularly helpful in supplying information on why this might be so. In explaining mentalities dedicated to promoting and maintaining exclusive privilege in the name of individual freedom, the study of sexism has provided a wealth of information. For example, Mary Wollstonecraft, the first major feminist thinker of the Enlightenment, was an inspired Rousseauian, who was quite aware of the limitations of the "sage of Geneva" on the issue of gender. She brilliantly reconstructed his defense of education as an essential democratizing institution, to make a plea for the revolutionary government of France to adopt a charter of women's rights. Hers was an inspiring example of liberating the liberator (Wollstonecraft 1989, 17, 51–52).

A strong current of contemporary feminist scholarship is critical of liberalism's antidemocratic proclivities, a great deal of which is aimed at the current neoliberal assault on social welfare policies and its often very misogynist assumptions about motherhood.¹⁵ Another current in feminist thinking has dealt directly with the issues of democratic theory, in some cases critical of the

democratic tradition itself for not paying enough attention to gender issues.¹⁶

On the question of the differences in social ontology between liberalism and democracy, an important feminist scholar is Carole Pateman. Her *The Sexual Contract* (1988) and later work show an exact and convincing link between classical liberal contract theory and patriarchal ideology. The exemplary figure in Pateman's theory is none other than the founder of liberalism and modern political theory, Thomas Hobbes. According to Pateman, Hobbes was both a patriarchal thinker and a convinced antipaternalist. "He believed that men ruled women by natural right but did not believe men had a natural right to rule women," Pateman argues (1991, 54). This very subtle paradox is explained by the fact that Hobbes saw the subordination of women as a political act perpetuated in the name of a trans-historical right.

In Hobbes and subsequently inherent in all liberal doctrine is the view that individuals are equal in nature but must struggle against each other for survival, because they are both cowardly and infinitely greedy by instinct. The social contract allows all people to find peace by protecting them from one another and enforcing respect for their accrual of material gain (Macpherson 1973, 240–44). What Pateman has added to our understanding of this is that Hobbes realized that in the war of all against all, which liberalism imagines nature to be, the female is the first victim, in that her *mother-right* is absorbed into the male *conjugal-right* (Pateman 1991, 59–60). This means roughly that in the name of competitive advantage, the male is given the legal power to strip the female of the fruits of her labor.

What makes this modern right of expropriation distinctive is that it is neither metaphysical nor divine, but practical. The sexual contract guarantees female inferiority by giving men security from an extra form of competition, thus leaving them better equipped to deal with other men. Under liberalism, patriarchy seems more natural and necessary, because it is only logical in a society based on petty suspicion, individual conflict and competition that one would need to use every discriminatory advantage that one could possibly construct or justify in order to feel more secure and hence free. Though Pateman is not clear on this point,

I see this aspect of liberal thought as one of the foundational properties of its ideological role within capitalist society. Given this, it becomes easier to understand why it is that liberal societies have no difficulty in claiming they are opposed to racism and sexism in principle, but have such an extraordinary time dealing with and removing them in substantive practice.

Liberalism teaches that all are equal but resorts to sophistry in believing that equality is not an end in itself. It does not believe equity matters because every gain for the individual is measured against some loss. Good fortune is not a measure of well-being but of advance over and above others. The motivations for this belief are said to be either fear of losing things or a natural (infinite) desire to have them. Neither claim is ever to be connected to the system's self-perpetuating ontological principles from which liberal theory draws its goals; instead they are attributed to common sense. Thus a woman's good fortune is either to be counted to that of her immediate male superior, or it is some form of loss to another rival. When movements for women's liberation confront and try to break down these norms, Hobbesian ontology tells some men that the war of all against all has just opened up a new front, so they resist in the name of their freedom (privileges). Even some women become convinced that they have lost the security of the cloak of neutrality and support notions of traditional female inferiority.¹⁷

While these views can be rationalized in the state of being (ontology) engendered by liberal ideology, a democratic ontology would welcome the autonomy of women and accept it as a sign of the strengthening of the community as a whole. In democratic theory, the power of expropriation can be used only to remove exclusive privilege and open pathways of inclusion.

In conclusion, it is clear that the democratic antiliberal tradition can be reinvigorated by learning a few lessons from its neglected kin in the antiracist and feminist traditions. Today the movements they have inspired continue to act as a vanguard in keeping pressure on the liberal order and fighting its drift toward reaction and antidemocratic excess. Still, neither tradition alone is capable of understanding all the elements of private power and social exclusion that are entrenched in the liberal mentality, especially those related to complex areas of liberal theory such

as its possessive individualism, entrenched anti-democratic values, and their direct connection to capitalist social relations—all areas which the critiques of Macpherson, Barber, and Levine so richly explore.

The emergence of an actual democratic mind set among the people will, as all the theorists we have discussed have made plain, come about only as an aspect of the struggle to achieve it. It can never be planted from above, but as Macpherson pointed out, there must be some coherent notion of what democracy as an ideal is meant to stand for and what history has shown us it is possible to achieve. My argument is that the democratic critique of liberalism must be reinvigorated and then integrated into wider currency for public debate. I believe I have demonstrated that this tradition is full of insightful and convincing arguments that show how, on almost every count, the people's demands for greater accountability, responsibility, and personal autonomy (which the neoliberals claim they are dedicated to promoting) can be better served by democratic than by liberal ends. Properly explained, the democratic critique of liberalism has provided excellent demonstrations of how any movement toward reinvigorating classical liberal doctrines is a step backward in the evolution of political, social, and economic thought. What this tradition needs for the future is a wider forum of articulation and for its proponents to summon the courage and sustain the conviction to promote and defend its principles.

*Department of Political Science
California State University, Long Beach*

NOTES

1. For the history and inherent logic of the utilitarian attacks on the poor, see Phillip Abrams 1968, and especially Eric Hobsbawm 1968.

2. A definitive example of this trend is Mickey Kaus's argument that the idea of real social equality is dead, leaving only procedural equity as an ideal for the Left to defend (1992).

3. I have been greatly influenced in my understanding of both the ideals and the possibilities of democracy by the works of Jürgen Habermas. Robert Holub 1991 gives a good overview of Habermas's work as both democratic theorist and citizen.

4. In his final work, *The Rise and Fall of Economic Justice* (1985), Macpherson admits that his views were tainted by his poor understanding of the Marxist tradition, and his ignorance of the richness and diversity of its non-totalitarian and unmechanistic variants. It appears he was modifying his views in the light of this new knowledge (64), but sadly he died two years later without exploring this theme in much detail.

5. In a superb recent critique of this school with special attention to the work of Robert Dahl, Ted Honderich argues that a better term for this theory is “hierarchic democracy,” because its major qualifications for inclusion in the governing process—wealth, status, and income—make only about 10% of the population effectively represented (1994, 48–66).

6. Although Barber has identified himself with this movement, his work is far more sophisticated and interesting than almost anything thus far produced in its school of thought. Compare, for example, his work with that of the leading figure of communitarianism, Amitai Etzioni, whose *The Spirit of Community* (1993) is blatantly nationalistic as well as totally uninformed by issues of race, gender, and class.

7. In an earlier work, Levine engaged in a direct critique of liberal democratic theory that did not rely on comparing it to an alternative system (1981). On the issue of supersession (paramount in Levine), Frank Cunningham argues that Macpherson also had such a theory but his was to be a supersession by extension, meaning it would simply reorient liberalism’s priorities in a more democratic direction (1987, 168–72). This is a project whose efficacy I believe this paper will call into doubt.

8. The relationship between Marxist and democratic theory is examined rigorously in the following works: Michael Harrington, *Socialism* (1972) and *The Twilight of Capitalism* (1976); Frank Cunningham, *Democratic Theory and Socialism* (1987); Ben Fine, *Marxism and the Rule of Law* (1984); Alan Hunt, ed., *Marxism and Democracy* (1980); and Allen E. Buchanan, *Marx and Justice* (1982).

9. Macpherson documents the history of this mentality quite well, showing that Bentham and James Mill would have excluded all women from voting, as well as men under forty and the poorest third of the population, while the more democratic John Stuart Mill would merely give more votes to the better-educated and wealthy classes (1977, 38, 57–59).

10. A brilliant critique of the liberal idea of civil society as well as some of its contemporary apologists on the left is Ellen Meiksins Wood’s “The Uses and Abuses of Civil Society” (1990).

11. Macpherson remains an excellent source for explaining this aspect of liberalism, especially in *The Real World of Democracy* (1966) and *Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval* (1973). See Levine 1981 for a more elaborate case against rights.

12. A defense and elaboration of this position can be found in *The Social Function of Science* (1967) by the British Marxist and pioneer physicist J. D. Bernal.

13. A good sample of the important and useful work being done on this front by the so-called Red-Greens, see the collection edited by Martin O’Conner, *Is Capitalism Sustainable?* (1994).

14. An interesting effort on this front is the volume *The Year Left 2: Towards Rainbow Socialism* (Davis et al. 1987).

15. A leading figure in this struggle is Nancy Fraser, whose “Clintonism, welfare and the antisocial Wage: The emergence of a neoliberal political imaginary” (1993) is an interesting critique of the discourse of liberal triumphalism. Also of interest are a number of the essays in an anthology edited by Irene Diamond (1983).

16. An intriguing discussion of how some theorists in the democratic tradition have overlooked the importance of gender is found in chapter 11 of Carol Gould’s *Rethinking Democracy* (1990). More specific and concise is Lynda Lange’s Macpherson-influenced “Rousseau and Modern Feminism” (1981), in which she argues for a nonliberal democratic feminism.

17. German Marxist feminists faced this problem at the turn of the century, when the SPD supported bills for female emancipation. See Anne Lopes and Gary Roth 1993.

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Dialectical Materialism and the Quantum Controversy: The Viewpoints of Fock, Langevin, and Taketani

Olival Freire Jr.

1. Introduction

An analysis of the controversy among Marxists over the interpretation of quantum physics is of historical and theoretical interest. It can contribute to both the historical and theoretical understanding of the subject and aid in the study of socialist experience, especially of the linkage of science and ideology. As we shall see, the approaches in the thirties were different from the fifties. In this case study we find a remarkable similitude among the interpretations of quantum theory associated with Vladimir A. Fock (USSR, 1898–1974), Paul Langevin (France, 1872–1946), and Mituo Taketani (Japan, 1911–), each of these physicists coming from apparently distinct national and scientific traditions. Nevertheless, they shared a common political-philosophical approach.

This paper presents examples of their dialectical and materialist interpretations of quantum mechanics formulated mostly in the 1930s. One of them, Fock, developed his thoughts in the course of the 1950s. These interpretations, however, were very far from the dominant approach in Marxist philosophy of science in the 1950s. Consequently, we suggest that the political-ideological atmosphere of that time was adverse to the interpretations of Fock, Langevin, and Taketani and that the

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dominant thesis in the Marxist camp at that time prejudiced the development of Marxist thought on the subject.

2. Fock's, Langevin's, and Taketani's interpretations of quantum theory

Fock made several expressive developments in quantum theory (QT). The Hartree-Fock method, for example, became a fundamental tool for modern molecular physics. He was a great diffuser of this theory in the USSR, writing the first textbook in the Russian language on the subject. He also carried out research on relativity theory and was a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In 1936 Fock published a Russian translation of the 1935 Einstein-Bohr debates. In the foreword to these papers, he defended Bohr's position in the debate. He claimed that QT required new methods of description because

in classical physics it is assumed that, provided the means of observation are used sufficiently careful[ly], they cannot have an appreciable influence on the object under investigation, and if they have, this influence can be taken into account by introducing the corresponding correction. It is therefore possible to discard the means of observation in all reasoning referring to classical physics. . . . But in quantum physics it is necessary to take into account not only the mechanical motion of the observation means, but in some schematized form also their internal constitution. (1957, 647)¹

So he concludes that in QT

not only accuracy in the quantitative sense, but also formulation of qualitatively new properties of micro-objects requires new methods of description, and above all a new element of relativity—with respect to the observation means—has to be introduced. (1957, 648)

He analyzed particle-wave duality and concluded that Bohr's concept of complementarity² expresses an essential feature of quantum objects, i.e., "in this more general formulation the behavior of atomic objects is not separated from their interaction

with the observation means” (Fock 1957, 649). The Soviet physicist saw the probabilistic quantum description as a property of the ensemble of the effects of an experimental arrangement in atomic physics.³ Such a requirement has epistemological implications for the causality principle. He wrote:

The recognition of this fact means rejection of classical determinism and demands new forms of expression for the causality principle. . . . [I]n quantum physics the concept of probability is a primary concept and plays a fundamental role. It constitutes the basis of the quantum-mechanical concept of the state of an object. (1957, 650)

Therefore Fock claimed that the causality principle, once free from deterministic description, will allow for the impossibility of influencing the past and the existence of a limiting velocity of propagation of all actions equal to that of light in free space. These requirements are satisfied in QT. The wave function that describes a quantum state was considered by him to objectively describe “potential possibilities.” He distinguished “potentially possible” from “the accomplished” events. These categories are deterministically related in classical physics, although they are probabilistically related in QT. Therefore our daily experience, according to which one must make “a sharp distinction between the potential possibilities and their realization,” is recovered (1957, 652).

Paul Langevin conducted research on magnetism, gaseous ions, and ultrasonics. He was the first, and the principal, diffuser of relativity theory in France. He took over the chairmanship of the Solvay Council from Lorentz in 1927. He also had an impact as an educator, elaborating the Langevin-Wallon Plan after World War II. He was arrested during the Nazi occupation and escaped to Switzerland in 1944. In 1948 his ashes were transferred to the Panthéon to be placed among the heroes of the French nation. In the nineteen thirties Langevin wrote on the interpretation of quantum mechanics. During that period, debates among French physicists and philosophers were dominated by the question of determinism. A thorough and integrated interpretation of Langevin’s thought is possible only through close inspection of the development of his ideas.⁴ He identified the

source of the crisis produced by quantum theory as the mechanistic approach employed in the representation of the new phenomena,

He realized that the concept of individualizable object (detached from the universe), which is basic in classical physics, was a product of the mechanistic conception. New quantum statistics and its idea of indistinguishable particles were used by Langevin as support for his ideas. He claimed that only by letting go the old concept would it be possible to synthesize the wave and particle features of matter and, consequently, Bohr's "complementarity principle" would be an inadequate proposition.

The following words synthesize Langevin's thoughts in the early thirties: "As a matter of fact, it is not really a failure of determinism but a failure of the mechanistic view" (1934, 35). Thus, he did not see quantum conceptual changes as concentrated on determinism. But Langevin's most developed ideas about the issue of determinism in quantum theory were expressed from 1935 on. He distinguished what he called fatalism, which corresponds to the determinism of classical physics, from the new probabilistic determinism of quantum theory. He believed that the latter represented a humanization of science. He said:

I add, yet, that in regard to the plan of action, this conception of absolute determinism leads to fatalism, to the ineffectiveness of all human effort in face of the implacable development resulting from the finest details of the events involved in the initial impulse received by the Universe. . . . I insist moreover that the new conceptions render science both more humane and closer to life owing to their consequences on the moral order. Far from leading to a Laplacian fatalism in face of the inevitable course of the projectile-Universe, the new determinism is a doctrine of action, conforming well to the role that science should play, to its origins and its goals.

Thus the French physicist attributed a positive epistemological value to this conceptual innovation. He returned to this question in his last address, in which he spoke about the new probabilistic

determinism associated with quantum theory (Langevin 1945).

Mituo Taketani worked in Yukawa's group during the thirties. He is the coauthor of one of the papers in which meson theory was developed. He was arrested by Japanese militarist rulers. After the World War II he worked in particle physics and in the history and philosophy of physics.⁵ He wrote on philosophy of science, especially in connection with quantum mechanics, from 1936 on. He saw the wave function as describing the essential properties of quantum objects. He said:

In quantum mechanics, the two contradicting phenomenal forms of wave and particle—the two pictures that exclude each another in the *Verstand* which is historically as old as the study itself, is grasped through their unification into the essential concept of state. (1971a, 31–3)

He considered quantum probability as completely distinct from probability in classical physics and criticized the hidden-parameters hypothesis as a “thinking that will find no rest without mechanistic causality” but he also criticized those who saw in the weakness of this hypothesis “the wills of electrons” or their “desire to be in the region of God.” For Taketani, the completeness of QT was in no way conditioned by hidden parameters. “Quantum theory,” he said, “sets itself forth as one that can be complete without these parameters.” Taketani regarded Bohr's point of view in the 1935 debate with Einstein as an evolution in his thought: “Bohr's reply in the Bohr-Einstein's debate could be said to be based on a more advanced viewpoint than previous ones in this regard” (1971a).

Taketani's interpretation of QT is better understood when we take into account his “three-stage theory.” It was developed as a logic of scientific development and played an important role in the defense of the Yukawa group's meson hypothesis.⁶ The claim held by the scientific community of the 1930s against the introduction of new entities or substances in physical theories is well known to historians of modern physics. Thus the meson, as a particle in meson field theory, faced obstacles to its general acceptance until its experimental discovery. Taketani considered scientific development as running in three stages, which he

called phenomenological, substantialistic, and essentialistic. Quantum theory was in the essentialistic stage, and, in Taketani's conception, the new step in the development of modern physics should be a substantialistic stage in which it was natural to introduce new entities as particles and fields. Thus Taketani's "three-stage theory" was, in the 1930s, a support for meson theory.

As Taketani saw QT as a third-stage theory, i.e., a theory in the essentialistic stage, we can assume that he saw QT as a complete one.

3. *A remarkable similitude*

As a consequence of the similitude between Fock's, Langevin's, and Taketani's interpretations of quantum theory, we can summarize the following points as common thoughts among these three physicists: (a) They did not consider quantum theory as an incomplete theory; (b) they valued highly the breakdown of classical determinism; and (c) they did not reject the nonvanishing interaction between the atomic systems and the means of observation that is expressed by the quantum of action as represented by Planck's constant. In an earlier work, I characterized these interpretations not only as realistic, but also as "dialectical and materialistic thoughts" on quantum mechanics (Freire 1991). This characterization is vindicated by the writings of these three physicists.

I have indicated that their positions are closer to Bohr's than to Einstein's in the history of the quantum controversy. Yet their interpretations retain their own originality. This also applies to their criticism of idealist and positivist viewpoints on QT. Langevin, for instance, criticized Eddington's, Jeans's, and Jordan's attacks on materialism and Dirac's position on the free will of electrons (1934, 33; 1939b, 1). Taketani originally published his *Dialectics of Nature: On Quantum Mechanics* in 1936 in the cultural and antimilitarist Japanese journal *Sekai Bunka*. His criticisms of those who referred to "the wills of electrons" were directed against conservative Japanese thinkers. Fock's originality is seen in his dialogues with Niels Bohr from 1957 on (see Freire 1994).

4. The dominant view among Marxists

These interpretations are very far from the dominant ones in Soviet Marxist philosophy of science during the 1950s. Those years are known as those of the “Zhdanovshchina”⁷ in Soviet cultural life. Their effects on the arts, literature, and genetics in the USSR and among Marxists in general are well studied, but their repercussions on the interpretations of quantum theory are not so well known. Loren R. Graham studied their consequences on quantum physics in the USSR (1973). By this time Soviet physicists and philosophers, e.g., Blokhintsev, Terletskii, and others, saw QT as incomplete, as a statistical theory without a basic theory.

Terletskii expressed that position as follows:

The results of the 1947–1948 debates established that quantum theory is not a theory of individual micro-objects, as maintained by the complementarity principle. It is an adequate theory only for statistical ensembles of micro-objects. Quantum mechanics cannot completely represent the movement of an individual micro-object (electron, photon, etc.) but only that of an ensemble of identical micro-objects that are simultaneous events or events in a series of successive experiments. (Terletskii 1952, 137)

This standard thesis—quantum theory is a statistical one, therefore an incomplete theory—was a common position underlying distinct research programs aiming at completing quantum theory.⁸ It was also accompanied by a total rejection of the complementarity interpretation, which was seen as an idealistic and positivistic conception. This standard thesis naturally underestimates, or rejects, the necessary conceptual changes and the epistemological implications of QT, including the breakdown of classical determinism. It is therefore very far from the interpretations being discussed here.

This issue and several others on the relationship between science and philosophy were debated in the USSR in the thirties. Fock participated actively in those debates. According to Graham (1966, 385) and Vucinich (1980), they did not, however,

give rise to a dominant position among Soviet Marxists. Joravsky disagrees with this assertion; he affirms that “in the late 1930s the apparatus of terror arrested at least twenty-one other physicists and philosophers (besides B. M. Hessen), who defended modern physics” (1986, 116). Josephson also says that Soviet physicists “were required to reject a number of contemporary (and in many cases correct) theories of such ‘idealists’ as Niels Bohr and Erwin Schrödinger” (1988, 61). Nevertheless, they do not present evidence for this correlation.

The peculiarity of the interpretations made by Fock, Langevin, and Taketani lies not only in their distance from dominant Soviet Marxism but also in their distance from the hidden-variables program developed by Bohm, Vigier, and de Broglie in the 1950s. Hidden variables first interested de Broglie in the twenties, but he gave up this approach after the Fifth Solvay Congress in 1927. Subsequently, in 1952, David Bohm “revived” the hidden-variables program (Jammer (1974, 261). After Bohm’s work, de Broglie returned to his early interest in it.

The hidden-variables program considers quantum theory as incomplete and looks for models where the causal description of physical phenomena is recovered, although these models must coincide with quantum-mechanical results (see Bohm 1952; De Broglie 1956). This emphasis on causal description in the hidden-variables program—that is, on the recovery of determinism—is, of course, in contradiction to the interpretations of Fock, Langevin, and Taketani.

5. Fock, Langevin, and Taketani in an adverse atmosphere

The interpretations of QT by Fock, Langevin, and Taketani were not well received in the political-ideological atmosphere of the 1950s. They were accepted by Marxist physicists but were contrary to the dominant interpretations in the ideological camp. The standard interpretation of QT in the USSR was the Party’s and state’s quasi-official position. Graham called this period “the age of the banishment of complementarity” in the USSR (1973, 80).

Noteworthy evidence of that banishment is found in the sudden and significant interruption in the exchange of

correspondence between Niels Bohr and Soviet physicists between 1947 and 1957.⁹ Landau and Bohr exchanged twenty-one letters before the World War II, none between 1947 and 1957, and seven between 1957 and 1962. From Kapitza there are four letters before 1946 and none from then on. Between Fock and Bohr there are two in 1936 and sixteen between 1957 and 1962.

The adverse atmosphere was not restricted to the USSR (see Cross 1991). The dominance of Zhdanovshchina, during Stalin's hegemonistic leadership, extended outside the USSR through the strong organizational influence of other Communist parties. It prevailed from 1947 on and only dissipated after Stalin's death. Zhdanovshchina arose under conditions of great world tension. It was a mistaken Soviet response to the Cold War initiated by the United States. As Graham says,

In the very period when Soviet politicians were finding bourgeois idealism lurking in the minds of Soviet scientists, many American politicians were convinced that the State Department was infested with Communists. (1973, 19).

The case of France, a country in which Marxism had a strong influence among physicists,¹⁰ presents one example of the spread of Zhdanovshchina. The claim of the incompleteness of QT was made in a strongly ideological way. For instance, the "National Days of Study of Communist Intellectuals" adopted those positions. Eugène Cotton's speech reporting the conclusions is an example:

After the 1947 great discussion, the true character of quantum mechanics has been demonstrated: The Heisenberg principle is a statistical theory of an ensemble of micro-objects. . . . Papers have appeared in scientific journals of several countries: Janossy, an Einstein collaborator, who has returned to Hungary; Vigier, Régnier, and Schatzman in France; Bohm, a radical American physicist working in Brazil, all of them have published theoretical attempts to go beyond actual quantum mechanics, seriously criticizing the old complementarity view. (1953a, 170)

During the fifties French Marxist physicists and philosophers struggled against the breakdown of classical determinism by QT. Marxist journals like *La Pensée* and *La Nouvelle Critique* published several papers on the interpretation of QT, all maintaining what I have called the dominant thesis.

I think that this factor—Zhdanovshchina and its great influence over all Marxists—in addition to the revival of the hidden-variables deterministic view constituted an unfavorable atmosphere for the acceptance of Fock's, Langevin's, and Taketani's interpretations.

Not all supporters of the hidden-variables program were Marxists, but it was sustained in a strongly ideological way as the only dialectical materialist view on the interpretation of quantum mechanics. J.-P. Vigié, a Marxist physicist, for instance, wrote that “the theory we are developing with David Bohm is, from my point of view, an illustration of dialectical materialism, which we propose to put in the place of classical concepts” (1954).

6. Implications depending on national and personal circumstances

The adverse atmosphere had different implications for different scientists depending on their circumstances. Fock suffered subtle, however effective, restrictions. He freely maintained his position by publishing his papers in the Russian language.¹¹ But his ideas on interpretation of QT were not included in foreign languages or abroad in the various discussions of the subject in Marxist publications. In France, for example, *Les Editions de la Nouvelle Critique*, a publishing house close to the Communist Party, published two books between 1952 and 1957 with several papers on the interpretation of QT and on the philosophy of modern physics. The first had only papers by Soviet physicists and philosophers, all of the authors supporting the dominant thesis (*Questions scientifiques—physique* 1952). There was not a single paper by Fock on quantum mechanics, although there was a paper by him on general relativity. The second one included six papers out of nine by Soviet authors (*Recherches internationales à la lumière du marxisme* 1957). The book was exclusively

dedicated to the interpretation of QT. Fock is cited by two authors (L. Janossy and D. Alexandrov) in contradictory ways; however, no paper by Fock appears. The absence of Fock's papers during the fifties indicates, from my point of view, that his interpretation was seen by Marxists as foreign to their philosophy. The absence of Fock's papers on the interpretation of QT was not limited only to those books. Despite scores of papers on the subject in French Marxist journals, like *La Nouvelle Critique* and *La Pensée*, all of them kept within the compass of the dominant thesis. Only in 1960 was this silencing of Fock's voice in French Marxism broken with a publication in *La Pensée*.

From 1957 on, however, Fock continued working intensively with philosophical problems in quantum mechanics. He went to Copenhagen for discussions with Niels Bohr, published the results of that meeting, and reported Bohr's shift of position. As a consequence of this dialogue, several papers by Bohr were published in Soviet journals and Bohr visited the USSR in 1961 (see Freire 1994). Fock continued to publish work on the interpretation of QT up to the seventies (1965, 1971). Thus Fock is well known in the literature about the history of QT; he is quoted, for instance, by Jammer, Graham, and Mehra, who recognized the uniqueness of his interpretation. Graham speaks of "the role of dialectical materialism: the authentic phase" in contrast to "Stalinist ideology and the Lysenko affair," and includes Fock as well as the psychologist L. S. Vygotsky and the biochemist A. I. Oparin as examples of the former (1993, 99).

Langevin did not experience the consequences of Zhdanovshchina because he died in 1946. But his thoughts suffered what I have called an epistemological blockage from French Marxist physicists and philosophers (Freire 1993). He received several memorials as a citizen, scientist, and educator, but his thoughts on QT were distorted. Only his criticism of the mechanistic view was remembered, but his defense of the new probabilistic determinism—as a humanization of science—was never mentioned, or was actually omitted. His interpretation of QT was identified with those of Einstein or Blokhintsev—QT as a statistical theory.

That context was peculiarly French. The hidden-variables program and its emphasis on the restoration of classical determinism was very strong there. This can be explained, to some extent, by the leadership of J.-P. Vigièr, and of the well-known Nobel Prize-winner Louis de Broglie. The inclusion of Marxist physicists who did not share the entire hidden-variables program emphasized the restoration of classical determinism. Eugène Cotton, for example, who had reservations about the successfulness of Bohm and Vigièr's work, asserted that "the giving up of complementarity indeterminism was imposed by the recent criticisms" (Cotton 1953b). This struggle against the quantum physical indeterminism was a very great departure from the value of the new probabilistic determinism attributed to it by Langevin (a humanization of science) and effectively directed against his thoughts as well.

The consequences of that epistemological blockage were long lasting and survived in French Marxist journals up to the beginning of the seventies. Even today, as a result of that blockage, authors such as Jammer (1974, 443), Pestre (1984, 144), Cross (1991, 747), and Home and Whitaker (1992, 225) misunderstand Langevin's ideas.¹² Only in the seventies did authors like Paty (1973), Maiocchi (1975), and Bensaude-Vincent (1987), who uncovered Langevin's entire interpretation, appear.

Further research on the consequences of the attitudes of the fifties in the case of Taketani's interpretation is needed. Certainly other factors, such as the language barrier, played a role. An English version of Taketani's papers was first published in 1971. The atmosphere of the fifties was evidently not favorable in regard to Taketani's views on QT. He seemed to recognize this when he wrote, in 1958, that only a few years ago quantum interpretations were solved in other countries along similar lines to his own interpretation. This was the beginning of the relaxation of atmosphere in the Soviet attitude. The lack of attention to Taketani's ideas by Marxist thinkers in philosophy of science is, in my opinion, an indication of the adverse atmosphere that had existed. The fact of the matter is that even today his interpretation of QT has been ignored by many experts in the quantum controversy.

The level of intolerance was strongly conditioned by national and personal circumstances. The effect on Léon Rosenfeld was not so strong, for example. Here was a physicist who in the fifties defended Bohr's interpretation of QT as compatible with dialectical materialism, or rather as a dialectical achievement. Rosenfeld was probably the principal opponent in the West to the atmosphere in the Marxist camp (see Rosenfeld 1979). Therefore his case is well established in the literature and he is considered a declared Marxist defending Bohr's positions. It is noteworthy that a bibliography compiled in the seventies on the history and philosophy of quantum physics included Rosenfeld and Fock, but neither Langevin nor Taketani (Nilson 1976).

Finally, it should be noted that the debate about interpretations of QT from the 1920s to the present has been, throughout the world, a debate with strong philosophical features. Thus it is an excellent example of a strong interaction between science and ideology. The Marxist movement fomented and supported, in the fifties, "the creation of a more critical atmosphere toward the complementarity philosophy," speculated Jammer (1974, 251). In my view the preponderance of that "dominant thesis" in the Marxist camp was a hindrance to the development of Marxist thought. On the one hand, it evidences a distorted relationship among state, Party, and philosophical and scientific issues. On the other hand, it has revealed a mechanistic bias in the Marxism of this century that was responsible for the raising of an opposition (although I consider it an artificial one) between the development of Marxist philosophy and the historical development of science. Interpretations by Fock, Langevin, and Taketani express, nevertheless, other potentialities in the Marxist camp.

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*Institute of Physics
Federal University of Bahia
Brazil*

NOTES

1. There was little modification in Fock's position from 1930s through the 1950s. For this evolution see Graham 1973, 73, 93–101.

2. The micro-objects, that is, the material objects of the atomic and sub-atomic world of quantum physics, are neither waves nor particles but manifest themselves phenomenologically in either wave-like or particle-like behavior, but never both ways simultaneously. For example, in classical physics a wave is spread out and is not localizable to a point-like object, while particles are considered to have uniquely determinable positions. In passing through a narrow horizontal slit to enter an experimental apparatus to impinge upon a phosphorescent screen (similar to the picture screen of a television set), a beam of particles—or rather, micro-objects—will produce flashes on the screen that are spread out over a vertical region on the screen, the cumulative effect of which will be similar to the diffraction pattern produced by water waves impinging on a barrier with a slit in it. Moreover, any attempt to localize the vertical position of the micro-object entering the slit by narrowing the slit leads to an increase in the vertical spread of the flashes on the screen. In interacting with the screen to produce a flash at a highly localizable position, the micro-object is displaying particle-like, and not wave-like, behavior. The incompatibility of the simultaneous occurrence of wave-like and particle-like behavior was first suggested by Bohr and is known as the complementarity principle.—Ed.

3. In QT the position, for example, at which an individual flash would occur in the physical setup described in note 2 could only be predicted statistically and not uniquely for each flash. In the 1930s Bohr and Einstein exchanged views publicly on the question of whether QT offered a complete description of the microworld of quantum physics. Einstein argued that physics is about the properties of the physical world and that if a theory cannot predict uniquely the outcome of an individual experimental interaction, the theory is incomplete. Bohr took the position (which he later modified) that physics is about our knowledge of the physical world, and that since QT gives all the knowledge there is to know, it is a complete theory. A subsequent form of the debate was about whether the statistical nature of QT applies to the behavior of individual particles (that is, whether a unique cause can produce a range of effects in accordance with statistical laws), in which case QT would be complete, or whether there are some physical properties (hidden parameters) that have not yet been discovered that give rise to the statistical spread. In the latter case, as long as these parameters remain unknown (hidden), the statistical predictions of QT apply only to the ensemble of particles involved in a given experimental setup and are not the result of the intrinsically statistical character of the individual interaction (see discussion in Hörz et al. 1980, 65–114).—Ed.

4. Three papers by Langevin are fundamental to this analysis (1934, 1939, 1944).

5. For the epistemological writings of Taketani, see *Progress of Theoretical Physics*, Suppl. no 50 (1971). For a review of his (Japanese language) books on the history of quantum mechanics, see Ito 1994.

6. For the “three-stages theory” see Taketani 1971b; Sakata, 1971. For discussion of opposition to the meson theory see Taketani 1971c, 1991.
7. “Zhdanovshchina” was named after A. A. Zhdanov, Stalin’s assistant in the Central Committee of the CPSU. Graham identifies “Zhdanovshchina” as the most intense ideological campaign in the history of Soviet scholarship (1973).
8. Mehra called this position “the collectivistic-materialistic view” (1974). See also Graham 1973 for a review on the distinct positions behind that common one aiming to complete the QT.
9. See Catalog of the Bohr Scientific Correspondence in *Archives for the History of Quantum Physics*—American Institute of Physics.
10. After World War II, apart from Nobel Prize-winner Frédéric Joliot-Curie and Paul Langevin, Marxist physicists included Jean-Pierre Vigier, Lurçat, Francis Fer, Philippe Leruste, Francis Halbwachs, Evry Schatzman, and Eugène Cotton.
11. See, for example, his critique of Blokhintsev’s interpretation in Fock 1952.
12. For a discussion with Cross, see Freire 1992 and Cross 1992.

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China's Economic Reform

Li Yining

China's economic reform was initiated in 1979. Its target model was to establish a socialist market economic system; that is, while public ownership remains dominant, China is to rely on the market mechanism to allocate resources for economic development.

China's economic reform started in the rural areas. With the implementation of a household contract responsibility system, the Chinese economy, particularly the rural economy, entered into a new stage. Agricultural output increased and the living standard of farmers improved. Surplus rural labor found jobs in township enterprises, whose output value currently constitutes over one third of the national figure.

At the beginning of 1992, on an investigative tour of the South, Comrade Deng Xiaoping made important speeches that accelerated China's economic reform. In October 1992 the Fourteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China set forth the target model to establish a socialist market economic system. Since then China has shifted its focus of economic reform onto state enterprises and the establishment of a corporate system. In the meantime, investment-system reform, banking-system reform, and the reform of the foreign-trade system were also put on the agenda.

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1. Enterprise reform

Enterprise reform is the central link of China's economic reform. China must develop its economy at a faster speed in order to narrow the economic and technological gap with the advanced countries of the world. The higher growth rate, however, could only be achieved by basically maintaining the parity between general social demand and general social supply. The reason why the Chinese economy was in the past always accompanied by ups and downs with constant overheating and retrenchments has much to do with the fact that the conduct of the enterprises, the main [component of] the market [economy], is not standardized. The lack of self-restraint mechanisms on the part of enterprises may cause investment and consumption to be out of control, which in turn will result in overheated social demand. At the same time the enterprises are devoid of incentive mechanisms and are not interested in producing short-line products [products that do not bring in immediate financial benefits—Ed.]; therefore, the effective social supply cannot meet social demand, and a disparity between general social supply and social demand inevitably emerges. In the absence of incentive mechanisms and self-restraint mechanisms on the part of enterprises, it is understandable that the state macrocontrol measures designed to balance supply and demand always become ineffectual.

The establishment of a modern enterprise system will lead to the market's standardization in the conduct of the main market. The enterprises, as the bulk [of the economy], will then be able to restrict expansion in investment and consumption in the light of their own interests, and will increase production of marketable products according to social demand and market guidance. The relations between general social demand and social supply will become normal.

The establishment of a modern enterprise system means that the existing large- and medium-sized state enterprises will be regrouped, by stages and in groups, in the form of corporations (limited liability [closely held] or share-holding corporations). After the regrouping, the corporations should independently manage their business according to law, assume responsibility for their own profits and losses, and pay any taxes due. The

corporations should also bear the responsibility of preserving and increasing the value of the capital for the shareholders. In this way, not only the incentive and self-restraint mechanisms in the enterprise are formed, but these mechanisms of incentive and self-restraint will also be integrated through the improvement of the corporation's internal organization structure and functioning of the stockholders meeting, board of directors, and board of supervisors. This integration, reflected in the business management and production activities of the corporations, will surely bring new vitality to the Chinese macroeconomy.

Under a modern enterprise system, corporations that undertake investment risks themselves will take a prudent attitude in investment matters. They must try every means to avoid making unprofitable and low-profit investments or investments that cannot be turned into production capacity promptly. They must strive for the best possible return on investments. Only when investments are checked by profitability and investors face the responsibility for profit and loss can investments basically be put under control.

Under the modern enterprise system, government is separate from the enterprises, and government should not directly intervene in the business and production activities of the enterprises. The corporation, under the influence of state macrocontrol, should organize production in line with market needs. If the products the corporation provides are not marketable, the corporation itself should assume responsibility for the losses incurred. In this way long-line products [products that bring in immediate financial benefits] will no longer be the hot goods of the enterprises, and short-line products will not be left in the cold. The problem between general social demand and social supply can therefore be solved. We believe that after the establishment of a modern enterprise system and after the macrocontrol operates, it is highly possible for the Chinese economy to maintain faster and sustained growth in a basically stable economic environment.

2. Investment-system reform

Before reform and opening up, the Chinese investment system was dependent on a planned economy characterized

predominantly by the following factors: investment made by state enterprises and institutions, state financial appropriation, central decision-making, investment exclusively by the government, and plans and quotas. These five factors reflected the features of the planned economy. After more than a decade of reform and opening up, China has got rid of the traditional planned investment model. For example, it has given greater investment decision-making powers to local governments and enterprises, implemented the compensated use of capital, introduced market mechanisms, and improved macrocontrol. As a result the following changes have taken place in the field of investment:

First, the diversification of investment bodies as compared to the previous practice in which the state enterprises and institutions constituted the predominant investors. The system of the state being the main investor has shifted toward a diversified pattern whereby investments are made by the state, the collectives, individuals, and foreign businesspeople.

Second, the shift from the previous state financial appropriation to the present multichannel financing. With the diversified pattern of investment by the state, the collectives, individuals, and foreign businesspeople gradually taking shape, apart from the state financial appropriation, a combination of financing and fund-raising channels has been formed. These include bank loans and credits, foreign capital absorption, social fund-collecting (the issue of stocks and company bonds), as well as fund-raising by different departments, localities, enterprises, and institutions themselves.

Third, the shift from decisions by the central government to multitiered decision-making in investment and financing. With the diversification of investment bodies and the formation of multiple fund-raising channels, the investment decisions can be made at different levels including central and local governments, enterprises, and institutions.

Fourth, the shift from investment exclusively by the government to a diversity of investment forms. One should know that under the planned economy, when the state enterprises, financial appropriation, and the central government constituted the main sources of investment, inevitably the state was the exclusive

investor. Now with the diversification of investment bodies, multiple channels of fund-raising, and decentralization of decision-making, a new pattern of joint investment has emerged. For instance, the joint investment by central and local governments, different localities of government and enterprises, state and nonstate investors, and Chinese and foreign partners is becoming very popular.

Fifth, the shift from mainly plans and quotas to the coexistence of market regulation with plans and quotas. In the past, under the planned economy, it was up to the plans and quotas to determine whether the investment action by any investor could be materialized, that is, up to the quotas provided or handed down by the planning authorities. One of the tangible changes in the investment system brought about by the investment-system reform is the increased role of market regulation. In spite of the fact that plans and quotas still remain, the presence of investment activity beyond quotas through market regulation brings new vigor to the investment system.

These five changes featured the progress of investment-system reform in the past ten years, and have been only initial steps. One crucial point is that an investment-risk mechanism has not yet taken shape.

The core of investment-system reform is that the investors should be made accountable for the risks of their investment decisions and management. The fundamental reason why low-profit or unprofitable investment and duplicate projects are not stopped lies in the lack of risk on the part of investors. If this problem is not solved, in a sense, the diversification of investing bodies, decentralization of investment decision-making and the multiple channels of investment will probably contribute to uncontrolled scales of investment. For this reason, the first and foremost task in investment-system reform is to establish a mechanism whereby investors take the risks so as to make China's investment system adaptable to the market economy.

3. Reform of the banking system

China does not have a central bank in a real sense. The right way to bring China's finance to a normal track is to accelerate the

reform of the financial system. The establishment of a real central bank is one of the targets of financial-system reforms. The role of the People's Bank of China is far from that of a central bank. For instance, its main task is to maintain currency stability. But being regarded for years as the central bank, it has had the dual task of stabilizing currency and seeking profitability. These tasks include handling credit business and even setting up economic entities so as to make as much profit as possible. Another example is that in order to stabilize the currency, the central bank has been entitled to formulate and carry out monetary policies in light of the economic conditions of the country without the intervention of financial organs and government departments at different levels. But this is something that the People's Bank of China cannot do. Moreover, as "the bank of banks" the role of the central bank is to manage and regulate finance through monetary policy, but not to interfere in the business activities of the financial institutions. However, so far the People's Bank of China still handles its relationship with other specialized banks in line with the traditional model of a planned economy. This not only hampers the transformation of the operational mechanism of other specialized banks, but also blocks the People's Bank of China from performing its function of managing finance, invigorating the economy, and stabilizing the currency.

But it is not enough only to restructure the central bank. Let's assume that the enterprises of China still have no responsibility for their profits and losses; to what extent can the central bank play its role of financial regulation? If China's specialized banks are not commercial banks, how can the central bank play its role as "the bank of banks"? If no corresponding reform is conducted in China's financial system, will not separating the central bank from other financial organs end up in empty talk?

It is therefore imperative to make the People's Bank of China a real central bank. The nature, tasks, and operational methods of the People's Bank of China should be defined through financial legislation. The central bank law should provide that the People's Bank of China is the central bank of China whose duty is to stabilize the currency so as to maintain financial order and promote economic development. The following important points should

also be specified with regard to the relationship between the People's Bank of China and the government departments, financial organs, and other financial institutions:

(1) The decision by the People's Bank of China concerning annual money-supply growth, once approved by the National People's Congress, must not be changed by anyone. If any change is required, it must be approved by the NPC or its standing committee.

(2) The People's Bank of China should not allow overdrafts by, nor should it provide loans to, the Treasury. In case of emergency, ratification by the NPC or its standing committee should be required for the Treasury to overdraw or get loans from the People's Bank of China.

(3) The People's Bank of China should not directly purchase government bonds. For the sake of financial regulation, the bank can purchase and sell government bonds in the open market.

(4) The People's Bank of China should fulfill its monetary policy objectives through monetary policy instruments such as adjusting discount and rediscount rate, the required saving reserve rate of financial institutions, and purchasing and selling government bonds in the open market. It should not intervene in normal business activities of financial institutions, nor should it directly involve itself in interbank lending in the monetary market and invest in economic entities.

(5) The People's Bank of China should issue loans to financial institutions in the form of governmental bond mortgage loans and commercial bills discount loans.

Through reform, the specialized banks in China will be transformed into commercial banks adaptable to the market economy. The banks, motivated by profitability, enjoy the right to run their own business independently. For instance, the banks have the right to decide the orientation and the sizes of their loans, handle nonrefundable loans, and exercise discretion about their profits. All banking business is conducted in accordance with profit principles of commercial banks. Therefore, like the People's Bank of China's being transformed into a real central bank, the commercialization of specialized banks forms one of

the key elements in China's financial-system reform.

As specialized banks evolve into commercial banks, China's capital market will take on a new look. On the one hand, credit capital will become commodities, and the credit-quotas management under the planned economy will give way to credit-market regulation and to the supply and demand of credit capital; on the other hand, the interest-rate mechanism should be adaptable to the market, that is, influenced by the central bank's monetary policies like discount and rediscount rates, and commercial banks may adjust their interest rates according to market conditions so that the interest rate can effectively play its role in regulating the economy and the capital market.

4. Reform of the foreign-trade system

In China's foreign-trade system the allocation of import and export quotas has always been a matter of common concern. Since import and export quotas are to be issued by the departments concerned, corruption in foreign-trade practice is often closely related to their misallocation. There is a pressing need to tackle this problem in foreign-trade reform.

In the past the greatest error in the allocation of import and export quotas was a high degree of arbitrariness on the part of competent departments, in that they were more likely to give the quotas to companies and economic organizations with which they had cordial relations in order to get benefits. To correct this error, trade experts proposed that tendering for and auctioning of the import and export quotas be implemented. This is feasible. In the future, the allocation of quotas may take the form of tendering and auctioning, but will not be restricted to these forms of allocation. Competent foreign-trade departments should, whether or not tendering and auctioning are to be adopted, allocate the quotas in the light of the principle of ensuring effectiveness, fairness, and open and equal competition.

How can the allocation be made in an effective, fair, open, and competitive way? Through tendering, auctioning, or other methods. Each of these methods is somewhat different from the others. Auction is seemingly the most open and fair way, in that no restriction on credentials is imposed, and any enterprise can

obtain quotas through open contest. Tendering is a fairer and rather open way too. Tenderers should pass certain credential examination, but the question is whether the examination is fair and whether the base number of the tenderers is prematurely disclosed. That will depend on the improvement in the tendering mechanism. If tendering for and auctioning of the import and export quotas are not applied and the foreign-trade department and other relevant departments still take charge of the allocation, the following five points must be observed:

1. The allocation of quotas must be openly announced in advance, enabling all the enterprises wishing to get the quotas to know in advance the ways in which quotas will be issued so as to decide whether or not to participate in the competition.

2. Competent quotas departments should judge the applicants according to their past performance in import and export business before deciding to whom these quotas should be issued. Those performing better should have greater opportunity to get the quotas.

3. Competent departments should also judge the business capacity of the applicants before deciding to whom the quotas are to be issued, including whether the applicants have sufficient capital, ample goods supply, and enough business staff. Competent departments should issue quotas to the qualified enterprises.

4. For a given period of time, did the applicants abide by the law while conducting import and export business? Those who abide by the law should be given preference in getting the quotas.

5. If no secrecy matters are involved, the result of the allocation (to whom the quotas are finally given) should be open, or at least be made known to other applicants.

We believe that so long as these five points are observed, quotas allocation will be much better even if no tendering or auctioning is practiced.

An important issue in foreign-trade management is the choice of method to be applied, approval by the foreign trade department or registration. In a market economy, the approval system should give way to the registration system. That is to say, apart from the production and management of a small number of departments and products, involvement in economic activities should shift

from approval to a registration system. However, the current foreign-trade administration in China still takes the form of approval and can only be expected to transform to the registration system in the future.

The recently adopted Foreign Trade Law has the following provisions concerning foreign-trade enterprises: enterprises applying for foreign-trade business can only be entitled to do the business after obtaining approval from the foreign-trade department under the State Council. This is the approval system, or rather, a highly centralized approval system. There are three reasons for not immediately carrying out the registration system in China:

1. So far the foreign-trade enterprises in China are not entities with well-defined property rights that independently manage their own business and assume responsibilities for their losses and profits. These enterprises are still devoid of self-restraint mechanisms, and those enterprises engaging in foreign trade do not actually bear foreign-trade risks. If the registration, instead of approval, system is practiced, the enterprises which do not bear foreign-trade risks may engage in foreign trade. This will jeopardize China's economic interests.

2. In foreign-trade activities it is a matter of credibility for these foreign-trade enterprises to honor their contracts, guarantee their product quality, and improve after-sale services. At this moment the market mechanism in China is not well established and the market order has not been normalized. This partly explains why it is not easy to wipe out fake and poor-quality products from the market. Consequently, at the current stage it is necessary to conduct strict quality control on foreign-trade enterprises in order to ensure healthy foreign-trade growth, and it is also necessary to retain approval procedures in the coming years.

3. In countries and regions where the registration system is applied, foreign-trade coordination and service organizations like the chamber of import and export business usually have a real role to play. Foreign-trade enterprises join the chamber, and the latter keeps an eye on the former to see whether they abide by the law and follow the rules of ethical business and fair competition. They also have the right to take measures to punish those

enterprises that do not abide by the rules. Now in China chambers of import and export business are not self-disciplined organizations for businesspeople in foreign trade. Enterprises usually do not regard the chambers as their own organizations, but as another type of administrative body. As a result, the chambers cannot play their appropriate role. This is one of the reasons why the registration system is not applied now.

It should be pointed out that the approval system in foreign trade is a transitional phenomenon. As the structural reform of foreign-trade enterprises advances and the market order becomes normal and better, and also as the chambers play their real role, China will shift from the approval to the registration system by the end of this century or, at the latest, early next century. By then, apart from certain industries and products that still require approval by the foreign-trade department of the State Council, registration will be universally carried out.

5. Problems facing China's economic development

Since 1992 China's economic development has obviously accelerated. In the meanwhile, however, China's economic problems also stand out, and have accumulated over years. As a Chinese saying goes, it takes more than one cold day for the river to freeze three inches deep. A slowdown in economic development will not reduce problems, but will give rise to new problems. I once drew the analogy to riding a bicycle: if ridden too fast, the bicycle would fall over; riding at a faster speed, it would be straight and steady; riding slowly, it would stagger; and once stopped, the bicycle will topple. This is true to the Chinese economy: developing too fast would create troubles, but slightly faster is better than slower. In spite of this, we must look squarely at the problems emerging from the accelerated economic growth, for the already existing problems have constituted pressure on China's economic development. If we turn a blind eye to these problems, it is not impossible that they may cause social disturbances in the future.

In general, there are three issues to be considered. First, inflation. People both at home and abroad are paying attention to the fact of inflation. In analyzing the causes of inflation, we

should look at the economic system, then the economic structural reasons, and we must understand that price hikes are the inevitable consequence of the removal of price control. Main investors do not take investment risk in the course of fast economic development due to the dragging effect of the belated reform in the investment, finance, and enterprise systems. As a result, unprofitable or low-profit investment is not stopped, leading to excessive investment scales far more sizeable than the economy can handle. So inflation of this nature is related to the economic system. The economic structural reasons are: when economic development is accelerated, the shortage of products of some bottleneck sectors will cause price hikes of these products and pressure on the prices of other goods to rise. The industrial-structural adjustment, however, is contained by the economic system and therefore can hardly make progress. Obviously there are profound and deep-lying reasons behind inflation, and so long as the tremendous pressure of inflation exists, social instability may occur. In addition to retrenching demand, the Chinese government took three measures to counter inflation: (1) increase the food supply by placing tremendous efforts on the agricultural sector; (2) temporarily halt the adjustment of public fee standards; (3) fight against the conduct of seeking exorbitant profit, monopolizing and stabilizing people's minds.

Second, unemployment. In China there are more than ten million people reaching the age of eighteen every year. These people need jobs. No matter what the economic situation is, these people should be provided with job opportunities. There are, moreover, large numbers of surplus rural labor moving out to look for jobs. Poorly managed state enterprises need to get rid of redundancy, and factories that have declared bankruptcy or stopped production also need to find a way out. This makes unemployment an all-time problem. In China unemployment has become a dilemma. If reform quickens, more enterprises will declare bankruptcy, leading to more unemployed workers. If reform slows down, loss-making factories would continue to make loss to the degree that no state financial resources can handle. The surplus labor unleashed from the agricultural sector might cause social disturbances, if no suitable jobs are found. At present four measures have been taken by the Chinese government to tackle

this problem: (1) facilitate more employment channels encouraging individuals to be self-employed; (2) speed up the reform of the social security system; (3) strengthen vocational training to enable unemployed workers to find new jobs; and (4) give employment guidance by providing employment information.

Third, widening income gaps. The distribution under the planned economic system was marked by egalitarianism. Although it hampered the development of productive forces, people felt self-intoxicated and quite at ease because everybody seemed to get more or less the same pay. In a market economy, income gaps among regions and individuals widened. Although the proportion of poor families in the country dropped and the living standard of the majority of families substantially improved, the widening gaps of income and living standards between regions and individuals has aroused even more social concerns. This is another issue that cannot be resolved in the near future. So long as the economy keeps growing at a faster speed, the economic growth in poor areas will generally be lower than in the developed areas, and the income growth of poor families lower than rich families. The contradictions may therefore widen. But if economic growth slowed down, it would be more difficult for the poor families in poverty-stricken areas to become better off. Therefore, the Chinese government has mainly adopted three measures to counter this problem: (1) encourage cooperative and joint ventures between economically developed areas and backward areas; (2) accelerate the construction of transport and energy facilities in the backward areas; and (3) encourage developed areas to move labor-intensive enterprises to backward areas or set up branches there.

6. China: an enormous potential market

At present China has three advantages to attract foreign investment: low land-use cost, low labor cost, and preferential taxation. Other important conditions, such as energy supply, communication and transportation, and market capacity, rank second. A realistic question foreign investors face is: will the preferential terms with which China attracts foreign investment change in the course of time? Or will the advantages of low land-use cost, low

labor cost, and preferential taxation gradually disappear? If these advantages for foreign business are gone, what is the point of investing in China? It is necessary to analyze this realistic question.

Let's discuss preferential taxation first. The preferential taxation granted to foreign investors is closely related to the industrial structures, product structures, regional patterns, and technology makeup. The structure of investment directly affects the degree and length of preferential taxation. Many countries in the world, even if their economies are highly developed, still give preferential tax policies to foreign investors in the light of industrial structure, product structure, regional pattern, and technology makeup. It is therefore believed that as long as foreign investment meets the structural requirement, the preferential tax policies China grants to foreign investors will be long-term ones.

Then let's take a look at the question of labor cost. Analysis can be made from absolute labor cost and relative labor cost. Absolute labor cost refers to the absolute level of wages, which will certainly rise with economic growth and inflation. We can put aside inflation for the time being and look at things from the point of view of economic growth. It is true that the absolute wage level will always rise with economic growth, but there are two objective factors restricting the level of absolute-wage rise. Large numbers of surplus rural labor will come to the labor market and lead to the oversupply of labor forces. More important, the broad masses of Chinese working people, particularly the surplus labor from the countryside, are usually of low educational level and professional skills, and it takes time for them to improve. These factors restrict the margin of absolute-wage rise. Over a longer period of time, the absolute-wage rise in China will definitely not lead to the disappearance of the advantage with which China attracts foreign investment.

Now let's turn to relative labor cost, referring to the labor cost in China as compared to that of other countries in Southeast Asia (or the Asia-Pacific region). At the moment China's labor cost is relatively low, but what about the future? The labor cost in China will certainly rise, but likewise the labor cost in other countries

will rise too. If the labor cost in a country always stays where it was, it probably indicates worsening of the economy or social disorders in that particular country. If this is the case, that country would lack the investment environment for foreign investors, and so China will not lose the advantage of relatively low labor cost. If the Chinese economy develops rapidly and workers' wages increase substantially with the improvement of their educational and technical qualities, then it must be accompanied by the fact that the productivity of Chinese workers also rises to a large extent. This would still be attractive to foreign investors.

Last, let's come to land-use cost. As a precious resource the price of land will definitely rise with China's economic growth. But one should see that the rise in land price is very uneven, with big coastal cities and cities along the Yangtze River and their adjacent areas soaring highest, while medium- and small-sized cities and inland provinces lag far behind. China has a vast hinterland where the land-use cost and price rise vary. In due course, not only will foreign investment gradually move inland, but the domestic fund will also flow from coastal to inland areas, and from big to medium- and small-sized cities. The advantage in land-use cost will be associated with the move of international investment. Moreover, we should also note that although at the moment China's energy supply, transportation, and market capacity are not as important as other conditions like land-use cost, labor cost, and tax concessions, these conditions will definitely improve with the development of China's economy. For example, with the development of productive forces, energy, and raw-material supply will become increasingly sufficient, and transportation will be more convenient. Improved personal income will lead to constant expansion in market capacity. These conditions may therefore play a greater role in attracting foreign investment.

In making investment decisions, foreign investors should take all factors into account in viewing China as a place of long-term investment. Such analysis shows that it is a correct decision for farsighted foreign investors to come to China. In brief, we are deeply convinced that by the end of this century or early in the next, through economic restructuring, the socialist market

economy will be initially established in China, and the country's economy will grow at a sustained pace. By that time the Chinese people will play a greater role in the world economy.

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Guang Hua School of Management
Beijing University

Labor and Economic Development

Clark Everling

Talk presented at the Regional Labor Task Force Meeting of the Committees of Correspondence, New York, 18 November 1995.

I want to provide something of an introduction to today's program and to stress what I see as the primary and most essential question facing the labor movement as a consequence of economic globalization: the problem of economic development. I will consider briefly something of labor's history and the history of transnational corporations, the economic power of those corporations, and the ways in which the present forms of economic development create bases for labor and social struggles.

In looking to the future, we must first of all look to the past. We must understand that our past is imperfect, that the golden years of 1945 to the recession of the early 1970s, which signaled the end of postwar prosperity, were never quite so golden.

I want to cite three problems of postwar economic development which are intertwined with our problems today and our challenges ahead.

a. First, economic expansion was heavily dependent upon incomes. The ability of corporations to insist upon an economy based upon incomes rather than social rights, such as full employment, undermined the security of economic development, reduced social relationships to money relationships, and left

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capitalists highly mobile in their abilities to export capital.

b. Second, the postwar economy, like today's, was heavily dependent upon export-based growth. This helped shift the focus of economic development to the transnational corporations.

c. Third, collective bargaining, as it came to be practiced by most parts of the labor movement, emphasized wage and benefit bargaining over struggles for social rights and social solidarity: for example, individual contracts providing supplementary unemployment benefits rather than national unemployment compensation; contractually guaranteed health insurance rather than national health care.

Everything that I have mentioned so far also enabled a high degree of capital mobility, and the export of capital internationally increasingly took the form of productive investments:

a. By the late 1950s, U.S. banks had established an international banking system which operated independently of U.S. government banking regulations.

b. Productive investments, especially in Europe during the 1950s, made U.S. corporations the number one or two producers in the industries of many of those countries by the late 1950s.

c. By the early 1960s each major U.S. corporation had established an international system of production that looked increasingly toward global markets. By the late 1960s, the highest productivities and lowest wages for U.S. companies were in their operations outside the United States.

d. By the early 1970s, the second largest economy in the world after the United States itself consisted of U.S. corporations operating outside the United States. U.S. international banks had more dollars in their possession outside the United States than any government in the world except the United States itself.

Today, transnational corporations (TNCs) are global webs of economic development which the United Nations has called the most significant actors in the global economy.

TNC sales exceed the aggregate output of most countries. The foreign content of output, assets, and employment in many TNCs ranges from 50 percent to over 90 percent. The largest 600 industrial TNCs account for between one-fifth and one-fourth of value-added in production in the leading capitalist countries.

TNCs account for 80 to 90 percent of all of the exports of the United States and 60 percent or more of U.S. imports with at least 50 percent of TNC transactions being internal, buying from and selling to themselves. Approximately 50 percent of the U.S. trade deficit is accounted for by the internal transactions of TNCs. TNCs, both financial and nonfinancial, control the bulk of international lending, have liquid assets in several currencies, and are important participants in world financial markets. The largest 56 TNCs have sales ranging between \$10 billion and \$100 billion. The expansion of the international economy through the TNCs has tended to involve more and more smaller companies, especially in the area of services.

In 1990, slightly less than half the 35,000 TNCs were from four countries: the United States, Japan, Germany, and Switzerland, with the United Kingdom ranking seventh as the most popular home of TNCs. Of the *Fortune* top 500 industrial TNCs, 167 are headquartered in the United States, 111 in Japan, 43 in the United Kingdom, 32 in Germany, and 29 in France. The combined wealth of the top 500 manufacturing and top 500 banking and insurance companies amounts to \$10 trillion, twice the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP).

Investment by TNCs in any given country centers economic development around themselves. This leads to economic regionalization, so that economic development happens for some people in those societies but not others—a social dualism of haves and have-nots in relation to economic development.

But this is equally a crisis of capital and the TNCs. Since the 1960s, TNCs have struggled with the problems of how to maintain market advantages and stay in control of cutting-edge technologies in an increasingly interdependent world where technologies and common needs are ever more widespread and readily identifiable. TNCs help make urban forms of social existence ever more universal, but they want to develop only the forms of urban social space and its requirements which are most profitable to themselves.

As a result, economic development is restricted, and the TNCs answer the economic problem of underconsumption by underproduction. For example, General Motors produces

approximately 30 percent fewer cars today than it did in the early 1980s. DuPont can profit using less than 60 percent of its productive capacities. General Electric restructured and reduced employment and products so that its earnings rose 50 percent during the 1980s, while sales increased only 12 percent.

In their search for profitable investments, TNCs become financial institutions. Many companies, such as GE, make 40 to 60 percent of their profits by acting as banks for themselves and other corporations. Edsel Ford, in his preparation to be CEO, has chosen Ford's financial division as the place to start.

TNCs hold and gain market advantages through their abilities to internalize profitable activities and control costs, while spinning off less profitable operations. This is what TNCs call "perfecting markets." Their internalization of advantages restricts economic development to their own forms. Economic development becomes regionalized around internationally connected operations. For example, according to the *New York Times*, there has been no economic development in New York state since the early 1980s that was not tied to the global economy. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank seek to enforce this economic globalization and regionalization within countries around the world, in part by demanding export-based economies and privatization which can open social services and national wealth to private international financial markets.

Consequently, economic expansion, which depends primarily on global connections, becomes increasingly separated from the economic development of the nation as a whole. TNCs do relatively well, while economic and social decline characterizes life within their home nations. For example, economic expansion after a recession in the United States no longer improves the conditions of those in poverty. Economic expansion and poverty now operate as separate cycles for the first time since 1945. Economic expansion, which used to raise all boats, now raises the yachts but not the rowboats.

Economic regionalization of development in various nations then gets pulled together as negotiations among governments through GATT or NAFTA establish international trading relations based on TNCs' previous connections among those

countries. For example, the initial free-trade agreement with Canada reflected the fact that more than 50 percent of manufacturing sales in Canada were by U.S. TNCs and two-thirds of U.S. exports to Canada were intrafirm transfers by U.S. TNCs to their Canadian subsidiaries. Only 32 corporations accounted for 70 percent of all imports to Canada.

Economic Development

1. Economic development today involves the creation of what is called “high-value” production, distribution, exchange, and consumption through the integration of economic activities within urban space.

a. What Michael Porter of Harvard Business School calls the “value chain” includes, of course, high-technology production and communication facilities, tie-ins to research and development facilities including universities, skilled labor and consultants, and associated corporate services. But it also depends upon the quality of urban infrastructure, housing, education, health care, public and private services, recreation and leisure facilities. TNCs integrate their own operations within the more prosperous portions of urban areas, those that are capable of reproducing their own social requirements.

b. These last mentioned—infrastructure, housing, and so on—are the common elements of the urban neighborhoods and communities within which transnational corporate activities are integrated in advanced capitalist countries like the United States. TNCs are global in their operations, but, on the other hand, 60 percent of all of their communications take place within a radius of 500 miles—that is, within an area that constitutes the core of their operations.

2. Investments in infrastructure, housing, education, health care, and so on are essential to all urban space. In the United States, 51 percent of the people live in cities of larger than 1 million and 78 percent live in cities of larger than 100,000. The rest of the population depends upon urban forms of social requirements; only 1.8 percent live on the land.

a. Infrastructure, housing, education, and health care are essential to urban neighborhoods economic development because

they are bases for employment, incomes, savings, and investment. A wealth of these urban requirements allows an area to develop and generate bases for their further development. Neighborhoods and regions which have these requirements can retain 75 percent or more of their incomes within that area and thus have the bases for that area's own reproduction. Conversely, studies of the European Union and Britain have shown that economic regions are further separated from one another in incomes and economic development than they were at the beginning of the 1970s, and the same is undoubtedly true of the United States.

b. It is this generation of development which forms the basis for the prosperous suburbs known as Edge Cities, but while some people get Edge City, others get Inner City. Closures of facilities and privatization threaten to enforce further decline and social dualism. Government planning for urban and regional development in the United States occurs especially through the military-industrial complex. It was this funding and planning since 1945 which made possible Silicon Valley and Massachusetts Route 128. But even high technology no longer provides secure bases for economic and social development.

(1) Education at all levels is characterized by what Jonathan Kozol has termed "savage inequalities."

(2) Thirty-four percent of white people in the United States are shelter poor and do not have enough for basic necessities after paying for housing. Within the Black community, that figure is 49 percent; for Latinos, it is 50 percent.

(3) In any given year, 43 percent of people are without adequate health care; 20 percent have no coverage, and another 23 percent can afford only very minimal care.

3. The fight for these requirements is a fight for neighborhood and community and for insuring their availability on a neighborhood basis.

a. These struggles are essential to the labor movement because they can mobilize many hard-to-reach temporary workers into social movements around both social and workplace issues which can then be addressed legislatively and provide bases for union organizing.

b. Struggles for neighborhood and community around issues

essential to the social economic development of those communities can restore the community power upon which union organizing in the 1930s was based and which was so essential to the spread of unionism through the civil rights movement. It was in such a struggle that Martin Luther King Jr. lost his life.

4. The slogan of the South African Communist Party is: "Socialism is the Future: Build It Now!"

a. This is a recognition that present-day societies are so highly interdependent and require such coordination in their development that the struggle for basic social needs and representation involves comprehensive views of social development and its coordination and levels of popular participation which are also necessary to building socialism.

b. I am suggesting here also that capitalism is presently a system which involves ever greater levels of social deprivation for more and more people and that the issues that we will discuss here today are further evidence of the ways in which trade-union and social struggles are unified in important new ways.

*Van Arsdale School of Labor Studies
Empire State College, SUNY*

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Iraqi Communist Party: A Profile

On 31 March Iraqi Communists will be celebrating the sixty-second anniversary of the foundation of their Party, which has fought the battles of class struggle and undertaken the tasks of achieving national independence, confronting international monopolies, and defending the national economy, in order to achieve development and social progress.

The Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) came into being in 1934 as an embodiment of the united action of revolutionary intellectuals who were guided by Marxism and the Iraqi working class. Throughout its history of struggles, waging revolutionary battles in the national and class arena, it has made great sacrifices. The founders of the Party and its pioneering leaders mounted the gallows in 1949 as a result of defending Communist ideals and values, manifested in combatting the colonialists and their stooges among reactionary rulers. In 1963, Comrade Salem Adel, the Party's secretary, and tens of Party leaders were martyred because of the resistance they mounted against the fascist counterrevolutionaries who came to power through an American conspiracy to put an end to the economic and social transformations in the country. The Communist Party was a principal driving force behind those transformations since the 14 July 1958 Revolution.

Iraqi Communists scored outstanding feats in the struggle for liberation from imperialism, for abolition of enslaving treaties which had been imposed on Iraq by British imperialists, and for achievement of complete independence and democratic freedoms for the masses. They led the struggles for trade-union freedoms and Party political life, defending the people's welfare, and exposing fascism, Zionism, chauvinism, and nationalist bigotry.

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Alongside these militant feats that consolidated the Party's influence among the people, the Party's history was not free of mistakes and shortcomings resulting from the wrong or defective understanding of the dimensions of the social and national reality in which it worked. Despite being influenced by the "center" of the world Communist movement, the ICP's opinions and analyses were not overall a copy or a mechanical adoption of the positions of the Soviet Communist Party. The ICP had its own independent stands in assessing the nature of the regimes that ruled the country. Its views were sometimes in contradiction with the views of the Soviet Communist Party, especially with regard to the stand towards the Iraqi dictatorial regime. This regime unleashed in 1978 its bloody McCarthy-type anti-Communist campaign. It executed tens of Communists and their supporters, while murdering others under torture. More than 100,000 Communists and their supporters were harassed and detained in response to the Party's demand for an end to the emergency conditions, abolishing the Ba'th Party's monopoly of political power, holding general and democratic parliamentary elections, and promulgating a permanent democratic constitution.

This barbaric campaign against the Party and all pro-democracy forces in the country was followed by a campaign of forcible eviction and deportation of about a quarter of a million Iraqi, revoking their nationality, and looting their possessions under the pretext that they were of Iranian origin. Those measures were a prelude to starting, on 22 September 1980, an aggression contrived by the regime against Iran in the aftermath of the overthrow of the Shah's regime by the popular revolution of 1979. That aggression resulted in war between the two countries, which lasted eight years.

The regime followed that up with a greater folly when it invaded Kuwait in August 1990. This led to intervention by an international alliance headed by the United States, which not only expelled Iraqi troops from Kuwait but also subjected Iraq to a ruthless bombing campaign that was carried out without any military justification. Sanctions and an unjust economic blockade

were imposed, which turned into a punishment for the people rather than for the dictatorship.

The Fifth National Congress of the Party, held in 1993, thus called for arousing the people for lifting the economic blockade, overthrowing the dictatorship, and achieving a united federal democratic alternative.

Based on the pillars of renewal in the Party policy, constructed on the basis of comprehending the changing reality, the Party concentrates in its struggle on activating the internal factor as a principal factor in the struggles to depose the dictatorship. It is referring thereby to the ability possessed by our people and their true revolutionary forces in confronting the dictatorship and achieving the democratic alternative in the political field and social-economic democracy; benefitting from the external factor without relying on it; and recognizing the dual nature of the external factor, especially the policy of American imperialism which deals with the people's issues in accordance with a double-standard policy mainly serving the interests of international monopolies.

Since the late 1980s, the ICP has adopted the theme of democracy and renewal in all fields of Party work, in order to surpass the crisis whose features were becoming evident in various fields of Party activity.

The policy of democratization and renewal in the ICP did not come about as a result of a decision taken by the higher echelons of the Party, emanating from a subjective approach towards the general political reality in the country and the situation inside the Party and the Communist movement in general. This dynamic process was rather dictated by world and domestic events faced by the movement after the collapse of the socialist model in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. It can even be said that the feeling of a deepening crisis in the socialist model and the crisis inside the parties of the movement, including our ICP, had been diagnosed despite the differences in applying the term *crisis* years before the collapse took place.

The existing crisis was dealt with differently, with some starting from frustrated reactions and shaky positions emanating from a nihilistic approach to reality and lack of conviction in

continuing the struggle for a socialist alternative to capitalism and its evils. Others, however, realized that renewal in the Party meant return to the original sources of Marxism: its revolutionary theory and its dialectical materialist methodology. Our Party has determined, since the start of the debate inside the movement about the necessity for renewal and democratization of the Party, the extent of the damage inflicted by the nihilistic approach to the renewal process and its future. The Party stressed the need to be guided by Marxism as a revolutionary and transforming thought in order to undertake the required changes in the Party activity, and for its continuous renewal by relying on the rejuvenating and critical essence of Marxism. The ICP has dealt with renewal in the sense of keeping abreast of the movement of life, adapting to the demands of the modern era, deeper understanding of scientific achievements, relinquishing ideological dogmatism, stagnation, and the holding of things as sacred in their static state.

The renewal policy in the Party was not confined to a specific field of activity to the exclusion of others, because renewal is a living and dynamic process for the whole Party and all its institutions and fields of activity. This process is related to politics and ideology first. This requires getting closer to reality, understanding its movement, relinquishing ready-made formulas and abolishing the outdated old, while consolidating the progressive new on the level of ideology and organization in their philosophical sense, and examining the political line continuously so that it becomes closer to reality and the basic needs of the people and their suffering. In practice, the Party has rid its political discourse of “revolutionary” jargon and ready-made formulas. These principal orientations were stressed in the Fifth National Congress held in November 1993, where Party political slogans were developed calling for a prosperous life in a united federal democratic Iraq. Emphasis was put on democracy as a concept, a practice, and an alternative political system, by relying on the masses of people as a principal basis for change, reconstruction of the country, and its salvation from the woes, catastrophes, and disasters it suffered as a result of the policies of the dictatorship and its follies.

In the field of economic and social transformations which the Party is striving to achieve in a pluralistic democratic Iraq, the Party has relinquished the unrealistic old formulations that sought to define laws of transition to socialism, and has avoided going into the details of forms and concepts concerning the long-term objectives of the Party and its socialist option. In this respect, the programmatic document of the Party has referred to the present and urgent tasks the fulfillment of which would lead to the salvation of the homeland and achieving socioeconomic development.

In the field of the policy of alliance, the Party has endeavored to develop new and dynamic forms for coordination and joint action in accordance with patriotic principles and in such a way as to serve the cause of the struggle to overthrow the dictatorship.

Renewal in the field of Party organizational work has been associated with processes of democratizing inner-Party life and their promotion. On the practical level, the Fourth Party General Council (Conference), held in August 1995, pointed out what was actually achieved in these vital fields. In the field of formulating Party policy and tactics, this process is no longer a monopoly of the Party leaders or a group of cadres after the regular convening of Party Congresses and Conferences.

Qualitatively enlarged meetings have been relied upon in various fields, and the Party's specialized committees have played a more active role. As pointed out by the report issued by the Fourth Party Conference in 1995, this process has added new dimensions characterized by clarity, transparency, and openness through interaction between the various bodies and committees of the Party, and through propagating a summary of the meeting in leading organs and issuing special bulletins for this purpose.

The theme of respecting opinions of others has achieved major democratic strides in the Party, with public press and internal bulletins reflecting the various ideological views. The inner norms of the Party also guarantee the minority's right to announce its opinions in the public Party press. They also commit the Party leadership to conduct inner-Party struggle in a responsible and democratic manner, creating an appropriate

climate and providing the prerequisites for responsible scientific research, free of any manifestation of repression and harassment for ideological or political reasons or convictions about how to analyze and comprehend reality.

Our Party recognizes the significance of the relationship between political democracy in society and inner-Party democracy, and the influence of the first on providing opportunities for the wide practice of inner-Party democracy. The ICP, since its foundation in 1934 and participation in national and class struggle, has been the victim of excesses practiced by the dictatorial and reactionary regimes against the Iraqi people. The issue of political democracy has, therefore, occupied a principal position in the Party's struggle and its programmatic orientations, in conjunction with its patriotic plan and objective for achieving democracy in the economic and social fields, such as to ensure development and achieve social progress.

Party documents have stressed that the ICP is a democratic Party in its internal relationships and its relations with other parties. Its perspectives for relationships in society are based upon the language of dialogue and interaction of civilizations, in order to build a democratic, secular, and civil society which guarantees human rights and secures social progress.

Also in inner-Party life, Party elections have been adopted as means to elect leading cadres on all levels, doing away with the method of preparing a Party list by leading organs. Furthermore, there is stronger conviction of the need for practicing criticism and self-criticism on various Party levels, as a necessity for the development of inner-Party life.

On the level of national elections and the solution of the national problem, the Communist Party is the only deep-rooted Iraqi Party which includes among its members conscious fighters for the cause of workers, peasants, and toilers in general, and for the cause of democracy and social progress in the country as a whole, regardless of national affiliations. The Party includes Arabs, Kurds, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Turkomans, and members from various sects and denominations. The Party has developed new forms for the solution of the Kurdish national question, adopting federalism for the future democratic political system

after the overthrow of the dictatorship. The organization for Iraqi Kurdistan Communists has also been developed to a Kurdistan Communist Party-Iraq within the framework of the Iraqi Communist Party, on the basis of diversity and respect for specific characteristics, within the framework of unity in struggle of all Iraqi Communists.

Concepts of renewal have been stipulated with regard to the guiding code of Marxism and broadening the class base of the Party to include all toilers and manual and mental laborers.

The procession of the past few years has not been easy, however, and not without obstacles and hindrance, which carried along with them many shortcomings in various fields, especially in the field of ideological and organizational work, which has developed with a weak pace that does not match the aspirations of Communists. There are also the loopholes in the field of Party elections and inner-Party life which mainly reflect the fact that renewal and democracy is a continuing process of struggle inside the Party. This is a process of infinite prospects, for when the Party stops renewing itself this would mean inertia, dogmatism, and doing away with the guiding role of revolutionary Marxism.

The urgent task confronting the ICP and the democratic patriotic movement in Iraq at the moment is freeing the people from the ordeals of the economic blockade and dictatorship.

On the level of confronting the blockade and its devastating effects on the country's economy and the lives of the overwhelming majority of the people, the Party struggles to persuade the international community to lift the blockade from the people and allow the sale of oil, which provides 98 percent of hard currency for the Iraqi economy, under the supervision of the international community, in order to secure food and medicine for the people and ensure reactivating the economic cycle in the country's life.

With respect to ridding our homeland and people of the dictatorship, the ICP strives to mobilize all Iraqi opposition forces to depose Saddam Hussein's dictatorial regime and set up a federal democratic alternative which guarantees democratic rights and freedoms for the Iraqi people as a whole, federalism for Iraqi Kurdistan, and national, cultural, and administrative rights for

other nationalities such as the Turkomens and the Assyrians.

Our Party is struggling to set up a broad coalition democratic government which undertakes the task of constructing the democratic alternative, through conducting free elections under the supervision of impartial bodies, leading to a parliament which promulgates a permanent democratic constitution for the country, and putting an irreversible end to the reactionary military dictatorial regimes which have plagued the country for over seventy years.

This profile is taken from the English text submitted to the Marxist Forum by a representative of the Iraqi Communist Party in Europe.

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Book Reviews

Beyond Black and White: Transforming African-American Politics. By Manning Marable. New York: Verso, 1995, 240 pages, cloth \$24.95; 1996, 254 pages, paper \$17.00.

The National Question: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Self-Determination in the Twentieth Century. Edited by Berch Berberoglu. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995, 329 pages, cloth \$49.95, paper \$22.95.

In the United States, a nation comprised of numerous ethnic groups and various “races,” the “national question” has loomed large. Some have suggested that the major reason why this nation, unlike Japan and Germany, for example, has been unable to develop strong political parties based in the labor movement is precisely the presence of racism—that is, racial difference has made it difficult for non-Black workers in particular to ally with those of their class who happen to be of a different “race” and easier to stand with their own “race.”

Manning Marable, a Columbia University professor, has long been recognized as a stellar analyst of African-American politics and an insightful writer on the complexities of race. In this, his latest collection, he does not disappoint. Displaying his dexterity by ranging from dissections of “Afro-centrism” to analyses of presidential politics, Marable provides an indispensable survey that must be consulted by any who are concerned with the politics of race. One of his more significant contributions is his examination of the popularity of some Black intellectuals. Recent newspaper and magazine articles have devoted substantial

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attention to the rise in influence of Cornel West, his Harvard colleague Henry Louis Gates, my colleague at North Carolina Michael Eric Dyson, bell hooks of the City University of New York, and a number of others. However, another Black intellectual, Adolph Reed of Northwestern University, attracted considerable attention when in the pages of the *Village Voice* he forcefully assaulted West and company, suggesting that their actual intellectual contributions have been minimal and have provided little insight. Marable, a friend of all sides in this debate, sharply dissents, although he adds cautiously, "Few black intellectuals today maintain an authentic, organic relationship with multi-class, black formations which have significant constituencies among working-class and poor people" (168).

Here Marable touches inferentially on an often-misunderstood point that sheds light on why resolving "national questions" in this nation has been so difficult. The evisceration of the labor movement, in particular the CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations) unions led by the Left, has had impact beyond the ranks of the proletariat. The Black population, which for some time has been a disproportionately working-class population, has been particularly hurt by this development. The weakening of class-based organizations has inevitably accelerated a racial consciousness that climaxed with the Million Man March in Washington, D.C.—endorsed by West and Dyson, among others.

Thus it should not be surprising that Black intellectuals—or any intellectuals, for that matter—infrequently maintain links with working-class "constituencies," for the structures present in countries like South Africa that would allow such a relationship to exist are largely absent in this nation. As Marable puts it, many of our intellectuals—Black and non-Black alike—"are sadly disconnected from the social forces and struggles of working-class and poor peoples' communities. And as a result, their political discourse is frequently obscure" (172).

This is a telling point. But Marable is not finished there; despite his acknowledgment of the necessity for class-based organizations, he freely admits that "the existence of separate black institutions or a self-defined, all-black community was not necessarily an impediment to interracial cooperation and multicultural dialogue" (83).

At times this is a hard point for allies of African Americans to accept. Marable tries to explain why he takes the tack that he does and, as usual, his effort is miles ahead of most who tackle such a controversial point.

Marable's level of analysis is matched in the arresting articles assembled by Berch Berberoglu in *The National Question*. This worthy collection provides comprehensive coverage of such diverse nations as South Africa, the former Soviet Union, Turkey, India, Great Britain, Spain, Canada, China, and the former Yugoslavia. In addition, a particularly noteworthy article addresses the question of Puerto Rico—one of the remaining colonial territories controlled by the United States.

Many of the contributors recognize that the decline of the socialist project—like the decline of class-based organizations—has had a negative impact on the evolution of the national question in any number of nations. In writing about the former USSR, Levon Chorbajian observes that “the Soviet system brought benefits to the average person and that independence, including a move to an alternate economic system, could undermine social welfare benefits and workers’ rights throughout the newly former Russian Federation and the former minority republics” (235). Worse, the deterioration of the standard of living and concomitant decline in class consciousness set the stage for a resurgence of ethnic conflict. Strikingly, it seemed that the so-called “minority republics” were less enthusiastic about dissolving the USSR than their counterparts elsewhere: “In a futile effort to preserve the Soviet Union as a semblance of itself, Gorbachev offered the republics broad autonomy within a national union. All five Central Asian republics ratified Gorbachev’s union proposal, but only one of the three Transcaucasian republics and none of the Baltic republics did so.” (234)

This raises intriguing questions that future students of the national question are duty bound to explore. A number of scholars who have examined “race” in the U.S. have been compelled to scrutinize carefully the construction of “whiteness.” David Roediger, Eric Lott, Theodore Allen, Alexander Saxton, and Noel Ignatiev, among others, have commented on various aspects of “white supremacy” within this nation. It would be worthwhile if

their insights were applied on a global scale, since it is evident that “white supremacy” has not been a problem for the United States alone and, indeed, has been an issue of worldwide scope. Such an examination might help us to understand not only why the Soviet Union passed into history, but also the increasingly complicated relations between the United States and Japan, not to mention the United States and China. Moreover, the national question, ironically, is an “international question”; global trends, such as the attack on unions, can help us to understand local and regional matters, such as “race” in the United States. By bringing together in one volume scholarship on so many different nations, this collection seeks to make the kind of global linkages to which I am referring. Unfortunately, however, there is no adequate introduction or conclusion to draw connections among these various nations in a transnational manner.

It would also have been worthwhile if one or more of the contributors had sought to make a connection between the national question and overriding class questions. For example, in my most recent book, *Fire This Time: The Watts Uprising and the 1960s* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1995), I suggest that the decline of working-class organizations in Black Los Angeles not only set the stage for the rise of various nationalist formations, but also coincided with the rise of various lumpen organizations, including gangs. As Stephen Handelman notes in his *Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), the end of the Soviet Union brought in its wake the rise of organized crime on a massive scale. Likewise, a good deal of “ethnic cleansing” in the Balkans can be laid at the door of ethnically based gangs that plunder other ethnic groups on behalf of their own. Future scholars need to examine further the relationship between the rise of ethnocentrism and the rise of the lumpen. When that examination is done, it will be discovered that this volume has to be consulted. This is not only because of the breadth of this collection, covering as it does the four corners of the globe; it is also because each article is well researched and studded with informative footnotes, and the volume itself contains a remarkably comprehensive bibliography.

Those seeking information on the fate of hot spots like the

Balkans would also be well advised to study this volume carefully. Jasminka Udovicki provides a fascinating history of this conflict-ridden region. She disputes the familiar notion that the Balkan region has witnessed ethnic conflict for hundreds of years. Despite the many problems that afflicted socialist Yugoslavia, there is little doubt that Serbs and Croats, Slovenians and Macedonians, Bosnian Christians and Bosnian Muslims lived together, worked together, slept together to an extent that some today might find surprising. Again, the national question is difficult to understand without the class context.

Prof. Udovicki also states sagaciously that in dealing with the breakup of Yugoslavia,

the international community also failed to recognize that the principle of self-determination, politically useful in the framework of colonization of one nation by another, becomes paradoxical when applied to territorial divisions between nationally intermixed populations. Under such circumstances, the principle of self-determination provides perhaps an unwitting legitimation, but a strong one nevertheless, for the bloody carve-up of territories and, ultimately, for genocide. (305)

The author could have added that Germany, the United States, and other NATO countries were so eager to dissolve socialist Yugoslavia that they were not above aligning with or playing on nationalist passions.

As we peek over the horizon at the impending twenty-first century, it is apparent that despite certain homogenizing trends, ethnic difference and the national question will continue to bedevil the planet. Those seeking solutions or simply searching for the latest scholarly musings on this difficult issue would be well advised to read these two volumes. Manning Marable and Berch Berberoglu have not only provided a service to scholars, but, better still, they have provided a service to humanity.

Gerald C. Horne

African and African-American Studies

University of North Carolina

Class Fictions: Shame and Resistance in the British Working-Class Novel, 1890–1945. By Pamela Fox. Durham, N.C., and London: Duke University Press, 1994, 264 pages, cloth \$49.95; paper \$15.95.

Pamela Fox's book is the first major American contribution to an ever-increasing corpus of critical studies that share as their primary purpose the recovery of the rich literary tradition of the British working-class novel. *Class Fictions* stands out because it approaches the British working-class novel with a complexity and intensity rarely found in previous criticism, much of which has merely celebrated the existence of working-class texts.

Fox's explicit intention is to move the critical discourse beyond the "affirmative Left readings" of "Marxist literary critics anxious to prove the existence of working-class agency" (163, 22). She attempts to demonstrate that Marxist critics have been misreading British working-class novels because they have only been willing to accept as authentic a particular mode of collective resistance to class domination (8). Fox contends that, on the other hand, alternative individualistic modes of resistance are also authentic to working-class experience, reflect the reality of working-class desires, and "are in some senses distinct from an organized political agenda" (37). She specifically argues that the occurrences of class shame in British working-class novels signify the working-class desire to create "self-defined" subjectivities that defy markers of class identity (203).

In her analysis of Walter Greenwood's 1933 novel *Love on the Dole*, Fox claims, for instance, that the socialist Larry Meath emerges as the "true" hero of the text because his shame at his working-class alignment motivates him to adopt "middle-class" values as a meaningful revolt against his socially determined subjectivity (134). She asserts that Larry's "attention to ideological domination—backed up by a seemingly contradictory, but distinctly middle-class code of behavior—emerges as the most authentic model of class consciousness in the novel" (83). Fox fails to acknowledge, however, that Larry Meath is a failure as a revolutionary. She does not, in other words, allow for the possibility that the novel *castigates* Larry, as a leftist, for adopting

“middle-class” values and idioms that prevent him from communicating his message of social change to other members of the working class. His “middle-class” values mitigate his sense of radicalism. When, in a moment of revolutionary fervor, the working class is about to confront the police, Larry, as a leader of the movement, attempts to impose an order on his fellow protesters that will not threaten the military apparatus of the bourgeois state (Greenwood 1969, 202). The revolt fails, and Larry is murdered by the very superstructural apparatus he was unwilling to oppose. Far from endorsing his class shame as a viable or “authentic” mode of resistance, *Love on the Dole* concludes that Larry’s shame, which is not shared and seldom understood by the other working-class characters, prevents him from helping the working class, including himself, resist bourgeois hegemony.

Fox’s claim that “shame can serve as an actuating force in revolt” (127) is ultimately unconvincing because she never demonstrates how class shame, within the context of the British working-class novel, leads to any meaningful sort of social change, even on an individualistic level. As Fox presents it, class shame would seem to be counterrevolutionary in that it most often results in the “assimilation,” to use her terminology, of “middle-class codes of behavior.” In her analysis of Robert Tressell’s *The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists*, however, Fox asserts that this assimilation denotes “an active refusal to wear the badge of Otherness” (127). Nonetheless, assimilation can never change the very labor process that defines class alignment in a capitalist society and, in Marxist terms, can never actuate revolt, although it may point to the desire for a change in class positionality. By never challenging the determinants of class, such “resistance” actually has the inimical effect of helping to perpetuate the class structure (as in the case of Larry Meath).

What needs to be interrogated—and is not in this study—is the political motivation compelling these working-class writers, many of whom were committed Marxists and labor activists, to construct these ineffectual fictive models of assimilation/resistance that are grounded in the illusion, as the British Marxist Christopher Caudwell calls it, of self-determination (1937, 66-67).

In her urgency to distance her reading of working-class novels from the earlier “affirmative” Marxist analyses, Fox unfortunately leaves out any cogent and explicit discussion of the concept of class. She never defines *working class*, and she uses the terms *middle class* and *bourgeois* synonymously to indicate the propagators of “dominant culture” and “ideology” (114). She never explicitly indicates what makes a novel a working-class text, a significant omission given the recent criticism on the generic categorization of working-class writing. It only becomes apparent that Fox is talking about working-class interpretations of working-class experience when she attempts to establish authorial alignment by using biographical evidence that is sometimes tenuous, as in the case of Arthur Morrison, author of *A Child of the Jago*.

Despite theoretical weaknesses, *Class Fictions* is perhaps the most provocative study of British working-class literature to date. The original research that went into her project is more than impressive, and critics of all theoretical positions are indebted to Pamela Fox for bringing neglected working-class women writers into the critical discourse. I must also give Fox her due for demonstrating the thematic interrelationship of working-class novels. She goes at least as far as any previous critic in dispelling the misconception that working-class novels are historically isolated phenomena, the creations of rare *idiots savants*. She has presented a work which will, perhaps in part through controversy it may stimulate, help propel the critical discourse on working-class literature forward in its complexity.

Kevin G. Asman
Department of English
Michigan State University

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ABSTRACTS

Delia D. Aguilar, "The Limits of Postmodern Feminism: A Critique from the Periphery"—This essay describes the transactions in a class of Asian/Pacific women enrolled in an intensive intercultural women's studies program in Manila. It presents the dilemmas that evolved in the process of posing "feminism" as a way of viewing women's condition in societies where traditional cultures, while often oppressive to women, are also seen as instruments for resisting Western hegemony. Bound in a web of feudal ties that simultaneously constrain and secure their well-being, the women evinced responses projecting gender not as an autonomous category, but as one always articulated with other social relations. The entire narration is located squarely within the framework of feminist thinking as it has evolved over the past three decades, in particular underscoring the uses and limitations of contemporary postmodernist formulations.

Edwin A. Roberts, "Liberalism as a Crisis in Democratic Theory: Three Critiques Reconsidered"—Ideologically dominant today is a resurgent classical liberalism that emphasizes the market-oriented values of possessive individualism and is often associated with democratization. This essay explores the degree to which this association should be seen as representing a crisis in democratic theory. Three key works by C. B. Macpherson, Benjamin Barber, and Andrew Levine are reevaluated. Representing democratic liberalism, communitarianism, and Marxism respectively, these three maintain that democratization of social and political life entails the downgrading, not expansion, of liberal values. After examining the contributions of these figures to democratic theory, the essay examines overlooked areas, specifically race and gender. The author argues that only by reinvigorating genuinely democratic thinking can an effective left political practice be developed for promoting a just, humane, and progressive social order.

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Olival Freire Jr., “Dialectical Materialism and the Quantum Controversy: The Viewpoints of Fock, Langevin, and Taketani”—A remarkable similarity can be found among the interpretations of quantum physics by Fock (USSR), Langevin (France), and Taketani (Japan). Dogmatic approaches to Marxist philosophy in the 1950s hampered the development of Marxist thought in quantum physics. Nevertheless, Fock, Langevin, and Taketani combatted this dogmatism and developed interpretations of quantum physics that were both dialectical and materialist.

Li Yining, “China’s Economic Reform”—China has put forth a strategy for the development of a socialist market economy in which investment and investment risks are assumed by the local and national governments, individuals, and foreign business units. This article by a Chinese economist details the strategy and discusses the problems associated with its implementation.

Clark Everling, “Labor and Economic Development”—The labor movement is facing new problems as a result of economic globalization. Of particular importance among the factors that have been influencing U.S. economic development are the role of income in economic expansion, the role of exports in economic growth, and the priorities in collective bargaining. Economic expansion, which depends primarily on global connections, becomes increasingly separated from the economic development of the nation as a whole. The connection between the regionalization of economic expansion in the context of transnational operations is discussed.

“Iraqi Communist Party: A Profile”—A statement by the Iraqi Communist Party outlines the policy of democracy and renewal being pursued by the Party since the late 1980s to overcome the crisis whose features were becoming evident in various fields of Party activity. The statement characterizes the urgent task of the Party and the democratic patriotic movement in Iraq as freeing the people from the ordeals of the economic blockade and dictatorship. To solve the national question, the Party proposes a federated Iraq. Kurdistan Communists have formed a Kurdistan

Communist Party-Iraq within the framework of the Iraqi Communist Party.

ABREGES

Delia D Aguilar, «**Les limites du féminisme postmoderne: une critique de la périphérie**»— Cet essai décrit les interactions dans une classe de femmes asiatiques de la côte pacifique, inscrites dans un programme intensif interculturel d'études féministes à Manille. Il présente les dilemmes qui se sont développés durant l'intégration de l'idée d'utiliser le féminisme comme manière de percevoir la condition féminine dans les sociétés ou les cultures traditionnelles. Bien qu'opprimant souvent la femme, ces sociétés et cultures sont aussi perçues comme des instruments permettant de résister à l'hégémonie occidentale. Prises dans des liens féodaux qui à la fois contraignent et assurent leur bien-être, les femmes manifestèrent des réponses qui projetaient le sexe non pas comme une catégorie autonome, mais comme une catégorie s'articulant toujours avec d'autres rapports sociaux. La narration entière se situe tout à fait dans le cadre de la pensée féministe et considère son évolution depuis ces trois dernières décennies. Elle souligne en particulier les emplois et les limites des formulations postmodernes contemporaines.

Edwin A Roberts, «**Le libéralisme en tant que crise dans la théorie démocratique: une reconsidération de trois critiques**»—Aujourd'hui le libéralisme classique connaît un renouveau et domine les débats idéologiques. Ledit libéralisme souligne les valeurs de l'individualisme possessif orientées vers l'économie du marché, et est souvent associé à la démocratisation. Cet essai montre dans quelle mesure cette association doit être perçue comme étant représentative d'une crise dans la théorie démocratique. Trois oeuvres-clefs de C. B. Macpherson, Benjamin Barber et Andrew Levine sont réexaminées. Représentant respectivement le libéralisme démocratique, le communautarisme et la marxisme, ces trois figures stipulent que la démocratisation de la vie politique et sociale engendre la

rétrogradation, et non l'expansion, des valeurs libérales. Après avoir examiné les contributions de ces personnages à la théorie démocratique, l'essai examine des domaines négligés, en particulier concernant la race et le sexe. L'auteur soutient que c'est seulement en donnant à nouveau une vraie rigueur à la pensée démocratique qu'on peut développer une pratique politique efficace de gauche, pour promouvoir un ordre social juste, humain et progressiste.

Olival Freire Jr., «Le Matérialisme dialectique et la controverse quantique: les points de vue de Fock, Langevin et Taketani»—Dans le domaine de la physique quantique, il se dégage une remarquable similitude entre les interprétations émises par Fock, Langevin et Taketani. Dans les années cinquante, des approches dogmatiques appliquées à la philosophie marxiste entravèrent le développement d'une pensée marxiste dans la physique quantique. Toutefois Fock (d'Union Soviétique), Langevin (de France) et Taketani (du Japon) rejetèrent ce dogmatisme et développèrent des interprétations de la physique quantique qui étaient à la fois dialectiques et matérialistes.

Li Yining, «La Réforme économique en Chine»—La Chine a formulé une stratégie qui vise le développement d'une économie socialiste de marché, dans laquelle les individus, les unités d'affaires étrangères et les gouvernements locaux et nationaux entreprennent les investissements et assument les risques. Dans cet article un économiste chinois raconte en détail cette stratégie et discute les problèmes qui s'associent à sa réalisation.

Clark Everling, «Les Ouvriers et le développement économique»—Le mouvement ouvrier aux Etats-Unis est confronté à de nouveaux problèmes qui résultent de la globalisation économique. Parmi les principaux facteurs qui ont influencé le développement économique américain, se trouvent le rôle du revenu dans l'expansion économique, le rôle des exportations dans la croissance économique, et les priorités dans les conventions collectives. L'expansion économique, qui dépend essentiellement de rapports globaux, se sépare de plus en plus du développement général de l'économie de la nation. L'auteur

discute des rapports entre la régionalisation de l'expansion économique dans le contexte des opérations transnationales.

«**Le Parti communiste irakien: un profil**»—Cet exposé fait par le Parti communiste Irakien donne un aperçu de la politique de démocratie et de renouvellement qui est mise en oeuvre par le parti depuis la fin des années quatre-vingt, afin de surmonter la crise qui se manifeste dans plusieurs domaines d'activité du parti. L'exposé définit la tâche urgente du parti et du mouvement démocratique patriotique en Irak, qui est de délivrer le peuple des épreuves imposées par le blocus économique et la dictature. Le parti propose aussi un Irak fédéré pour résoudre la question nationale. Dans le cadre du Parti communiste irakien, les communistes Kurdes ont formé le Parti communiste de Kurdistan—irakien.