

From Tragedy to Opportunity: Long-term Development in Post-Disaster Intentional
Communities in Honduras

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to all those who have been displaced by a disaster and have struggled/continue to struggle to rebuild their lives.

It is also dedicated to my son, Santiago. May you grow up with a desire to serve the most vulnerable.

Abstract

With 2010 witnessing the second highest number of global disasters in history, climate change has spurred interest concerning how non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should respond with long-term development strategies in post-disaster communities, especially those in fragile states. This comparative case study examines how two intentional Honduran communities built for survivors (comprised of traumatized and displaced poor people) of Hurricane Mitch (1998), Divina Providencia and Ciudad España, developed since the disaster. Although initially similar based on demographics, the communities are dramatically different today in social health (defined as low crime, social capital, social cohesion, vision, sustainability, and community participation). My doctoral research combines household surveys (N=1,918), 74 interviews, nine months of ethnography, and archival research in an analysis of what mechanisms shaped the social health trajectory of each community.

I found that both communities have had varying degrees of success and conflict due in large part to the Honduran context and decisions and practices implemented by sponsoring non-governmental organization including: time horizons/long-term commitment, organizational resources, spatial design, community size, and coercive mechanisms by the organizations. Although both communities faced similar constraints, such as trauma and broken social networks, Divina overcame many hurdles with the help of a strong NGO presence, organizational resources, a long-term commitment, and coercive means. It was able to foster cultural structures that created a healthier community than their pre-Mitch neighborhood in Tegucigalpa. Certain emergent norms of community life prevented the Divina community from falling back upon old structures and norms (which were inequitable and socially unhealthy). However, its top-down paternalist approach led to protests by community residents, the creation of dependency on the NGO, and issues of probable long-term sustainability without organizational support. While Ciudad España did have better social health than the former communities in Tegucigalpa, its partnership approach failed to establish emergent norms that would have promoted stronger social health indicators. There was less NGO influence, fewer organizational resources over time, shorter time commitment, and almost no coercive means. Although España has lower social health than Divina, the community has had less conflict and is more independent and is likely to have a more sustainable political system over time.

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List of Abbreviations

ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
CESAL	Centro de Estudio y Solidaridad con América Latina
España	Ciudad España
DFID	Department For International Development
Divina	Divina Providencia
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
Fundación	Fundación Cristo de El Picacho
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
INGO	International Non-governmental Organization
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GN	Global North
GS	Global South
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
NPI	New Partnership Initiatives
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NSF	National Science Foundation
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PERI	Public Entity Risk Institute
PTSD	Post-traumatic Stress Disorder
Red Cross	Red Cross of Honduras (Cruz Roja Hondureño)
RCS	Red Cross of Spain (Cruz Roja Española)
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programs
UNAH	Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WHO	World Health Organization

Chapter 1. Introduction

“The number of disasters and the scale of their impacts continue to grow, driven largely by the increasing vulnerability to natural hazards, but also by the effects of climate change, threatening the lives and livelihoods of ever more millions of people and the achievements of the Millennium Development Goals. There is growing urgency to increase efforts to implement the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005- 2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters. The world is not on track to achieve the aim of a substantive reduction in disaster losses by 2015²”--Ban Ki Moon, Secretary General of the United Nations¹

The Category 5 Hurricane Mitch (October 1998) devastated the small Central American nation of Honduras. Tied for the fourth strongest hurricane on record surpassing even Katrina², Hurricane Mitch topped out at a central pressure of 905 millibars with winds averaging 155 knots (180 m.p.h.). It was not only the wind but the rain that ravaged the country. As the hurricane slowed and later stalled, becoming a tropical storm over central Honduras, it deposited approximately 25 inches of rain in 36 hours and 10 inches in 6 hours, between October 29th and 31st (Met Office 2011).

The human cost of Hurricane Mitch was enormous. Official estimates count 5,657 deaths for the country and up to 12,000 for the isthmus although the exact number remains unknown. Directly affecting more than half the population of Honduras, it displaced 2.1 million people and according to some agencies, put the country back 50 years in its development (Barrios et. al. 2000; Jackson 2005). The former Minister of Health noted that nearly 70% of the vital national infrastructure was damaged (Castellanos 2011). Entire lengths of highways were washed away or layered with so

¹ The Secretary General’s Report on the implementation of the ISDR to the UN General Assembly 62nd Session 2007.

² To put it in perspective for the U.S., it was more powerful than Katrina (905 to 902 millibar), maintained Category 5 status for twice as long, stayed in the country longer, displaced millions of more people (Mitch displaced 2.1 million, Katrina 250,000) and killed five times as many residents.

much sediment as to be impassable, 170 bridges were badly damaged or completely destroyed, and 75 dams broke flooding whole communities. The normally quiet Choluteca River that snakes through the capital city Tegucigalpa's downtown reached record level flooding, six times its normal width in some areas, leaving eighteen feet of mud and a massive amount of destruction in its wake. As Ramon Espinol, former-mayor of Morolica explained, "I will never forget hearing people around me crying out that they had lost everything. Older people asking, "How will I rebuild my house? Everything that I had is gone. How will I carry on living?" (UNICEF 2010).

From within this tragedy, amazingly, arose opportunity. In the aftermath of Mitch a vision was born in the minds of Hondurans, foreign donors, and development workers—the nation was not only going to be re-built; it would be transformed. When donors, government officials, and Honduran civil society met in May 1999 to discuss the reconstruction effort they signed an agreement declaring, "The Presidents of Central America made clear their view of the tragedy as a unique opportunity to rebuild – not the same – but a better Central America" (IADB 1999).

This manuscript takes the ideas of opportunity and transformation, especially as witnessed in the building of new intentional communities, as its starting point. With the highest amount of disaster donations up to that moment flooding into the nation, new intentional resettlements were built in safer locations for Mitch survivors who had lost their homes. Excitement rumbled among the people; they had a dream, a hope to leave the violence and poverty of Tegucigalpa and create new healthy communities.

Broadly, planners had a vision that with such resources, these communities could be built as models for future disaster reconstruction and resettlement throughout the world. The donor/nation reconstruction agreement asserted this recognition: “Reconstruction must not be at the expense of transformation” (IADB 1999). Specifically, residents and organizational leaders in the metro area of Tegucigalpa, one of the most violent cities in the world, viewed this as an opportunity for individual families to leave the crime and violence of the city and start a new life. Indeed, in comparison to the city, one resident, Don Hernan saw this as a move to “paradise.” At a media conference, an NGO president claimed, “Our goal was to create a new Honduran,” which in turn would be the foundation to develop Honduras (Ferrera 2009).

It has been nearly fourteen years since the hurricane. The question remains: “Was there a transformation?” Marisa Ensor and colleagues (2010) have found that at the national level, even though there were some positive changes in society, the country as a whole is not much better off than it was. The World Bank, Red Cross, Inter-American Development Bank, CESAL, and the United Nations have done similar studies over the years and found successes on the smaller scale in gender equity and in making progress toward the millennium goals. Nationally, however, transformation did not occur as the country continues to grapple with corruption and clientelism, the highest homicide rate in the world, and growing economic inequality.

Bridging Disaster Recovery and Community Development

Although it is well-recognized that human and natural vulnerability and hazards continue to increase³, this type of post-disaster research in fragile states continues to be only a small sub-discipline in the social sciences and remains limited geographically and longitudinally (Tierney 2007). Much of the disaster literature historically has been bounded by focus on preparedness, response, relief, and mitigation. Although this is changing, the least researched field continues to be recovery⁴.

Within the disaster recovery literature, resettlement of communities as a recovery and mitigation strategy continues to be an understudied and complicated research question (Holt 1981). Many studies exist but are often very specific, investigating involuntary resettlements (Ali Badri et. al. 2006), development-provoked resettlements (Hall 1994; Oliver-Smith 2009; OECD 1991), refugee resettlements (Nawyn 2006), and conflict-driven resettlements (Ellis and Barakat 1996). The strengths of this are the insights into characteristics of and policy implications for resettlements in various contexts. The weakness, however, is that most investigations are done within a few years of the initial movement of people leaving quiet the link between recovery and community development. The few works on intentional resettlements built for disaster survivors, such as Anthony Oliver-Smith's multi-year work in post-earthquake Peru (1986 1992]) and Ali Badri's and colleagues (2006) review of resettlements in Iran eleven years after

³ U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Valerie Amos, says the appeal for 7.4 billion in humanitarian aid reflects the scale, depth, frequency and complexity of crises situations around the world. She has explained that people are particularly vulnerable as the global economic crisis has weakened their ability to withstand shock, food and fuel prices are well above historical averages and the global recession has hit trade, affecting even the poorest people (Amos 2011).

⁴ Kreps 1984: 318; "Recovery Workshop" hosted by the Public Entity Risk Institute and the National Science Foundation (October 2010), the recovery literature is growing but continues to be the least investigated.

the Majil earthquake, provide the longitudinal data needed to discuss resettlements turned communities after more than a decade, but are also context specific.

My objective in this dissertation is to understand the mechanisms⁵ that encourage this movement from resettlement (recovery) to community (development) using community social health as a measure. Community social health is defined by six indicators: low crime, social capital, social cohesion, vision, sustainability, and community participation. As will be discussed in chapter 4, these six were chosen based on previous goals set forth by national governments, conversations with NGO staff and community residents, and a review of the sociological and disaster literatures that discuss what creates a healthy community. These indicators also take into account the particular social ills that plague the country and its cities (high crime and social isolation) as well as the circumstances of the post-disaster community residents (trauma and lack of social networks).

I chose social health to provide an alternative measure to many of those currently employed when discussing post-disaster community recovery and development. Three examples will showcase what is and is not prioritized in recovery praxis. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA 2011), the largest emergency management organizations in the world, defines its guiding recovery principles as: housing, infrastructure, business, public health (including emotional and psychological), and mitigation. The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR 2012) classifies disaster recovery as “The restoration, and improvement where

⁵ I define social mechanisms following Mahoney (2001: 576)--“unobserved relations or processes that generate outcomes.”

appropriate, of facilities, livelihoods and living conditions of disaster-affected communities, including efforts to reduce disaster risk factors.” Finally, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC 2006a) describes their recovery goals as the construction of shelter and housing, livelihoods for survivors, capacity building, and physical health.

What is noticeable in all three of these definitions is that the goals and measures of success in disaster recovery are focused on infrastructure and economic development. This is a critical and necessary part of recovery. Yet, what has yet to be well researched is the link between disaster recovery and community development. This dissertation is an attempt to bridge these two literatures by illustrating that residents who are resettled have particular challenges and opportunities. Since these Hondurans were most significantly impacted by the disaster, recovery will also be a longer process that bleeds into community development. It is at this juncture—where recovery as resettlement turns into the development of a community—that I hope to discuss the mechanisms that can encourage social health as it applies to new intentional communities composed of traumatized, displaced, and poor disaster survivors. In sum, I hope to answer two questions: how can we measure the social success of a project? And for survivors, when does a resettlement become a community?

Although community social health is a dynamic measure of recovery and community development, it does not measure characteristics such as democracy or economic development directly. Rather, the goal is to provide indicators that can illustrate the broader social health of a community over time. In this way, not only will

post-disaster resettlement measure the infrastructure of the place and economic and physical health of the people, it can also prioritize strategies and resources to develop civic participation, protect citizens from crime through the building of collective efficacy, create cohesion among residents in order to work for the good of the community, build sustainable social structures and institutions, and create a positive and coherent outlook for the future.

To investigate social health I examine two new intentional communities of survivors (along with five others as a comparative average), Ciudad Divina Providencia and Ciudad España and ask the following questions: What is the national context (the peculiarities of the Honduran history, culture and institutions) in which these communities were founded? Have these communities encountered greater social health than the rest of the nation in general and Tegucigalpa in particular? Knowing that these two communities and their residents had many similar initial characteristics but varied significantly in the six indicators of their current community health, what caused them to take divergent development trajectories? What are the praxes of sponsoring non-governmental organizations that may have impacted these trajectories? What theoretical and practical lessons can we learn from the experiences of the long-term development in these new post-Mitch communities that may be applied to the next post-disaster locale?

Additionally, development processes often have latent consequences, which also need to be examined to give a holistic picture of social health. In the case of these communities, as each organization implemented certain praxes (paternalistic and partnership) to guide the community, each praxis incurred unforeseen outcomes that

continues to impact the well-being of the community. More specifically, the NGO that utilized a paternalistic approach created greater dependency on the organization, leaving residents with less capacity to lead the community on their own. On the other hand, the NGO that implemented a partnership with the community did not provide the guidance and social structure needed by vulnerable survivors. This community, then, had lower social health characteristics but greater capacity for self-governance. These latent outcomes will be discussed in detail in chapter eight.

Post-Disaster New Intentional Resettlements/Community

To begin, a definition of community is in order. While the definition continues to be fluid, community is broadly defined as a group of people with similar self-interest in a bounded geographic location (Crow 2007; Calhoun 1983; see also Beck 2001). In addition, for our purposes, other descriptors should be added to this definition due to the specific nature of post-disaster new and intentional resettlements. Below are seven characteristics that differentiate post-disaster resettlements qua communities from an established community. Each characteristic illustrates the unique demographics, challenges, and opportunities of these resettlements.

First, in the case of the two post-disaster resettlements, each is an intentional community, or a community that was built with a particular purpose in mind. Intentional communities have most often been referred to in the context of communitarian movements. According to Zablocki in *The Joyful Community*,

An intentional community is a group of persons associated together [voluntarily] for the purpose of establishing a whole way of life. As such, it shall display to some degree, each of the following characteristics: common geographical location; economic interdependence; social,

cultural, educational, and spiritual inter-exchange of uplift and development. A minimum of three families or five adult members is required to constitute an intentional community (1971: 19).

In the case of the valley, residents chose voluntarily to live in a bounded geographic location, to be economically interdependent, and to share to some extent a social vision for the community defined in part by the NGO and in part by residents. Two differences, however, are that residents did not choose who would be in the community (this was determined by the NGO) and the vision for the community was not always shared, at times creating significant conflict between the NGO and residents, and residents amongst themselves.

Second, each community is a “new” community (Beck 2001). As shown in figure 1.1, many neighborhoods were completely destroyed either by rivers or landslides, and rebuilding was not possible. To prevent this from happening again the communities were built in a geologically safe area north of the city where there was open unused land⁶ (although there were neighboring communities). Since no services existed for water, sewage, and electricity, they needed to be built, along with other necessary infrastructure including new homes, roads, markets, and parks. New communities are not only faced the creation of material resources (e.g. housing, clinics, markets, parks, churches, schools, etc.), but must also meet many non-material resource needs such as local support networks, an organized social structure, emergent norms, informal social control

⁶ The communities were not built in isolation. There were more than a dozen small towns throughout the valley before construction began. España and Divina were both built near established small towns.

mechanisms, new power relations and political organizations, and even a new community culture. How these social resources are created is still not well understood.

Third, this type of re-settlement is unique. In most instances, when citizens move from one town or neighborhood to another (other than new track housing) they are moving into a built environment that is already complete and may have been occupied for decades or centuries. Infrastructure, including schools, parks, paths, and roads are already present, and there is little choice or creative capacity to shape the physical environment. The natural environment has also been contoured around the needs of the community. Additionally, there are histories, stories, scars, personalities, and even local cultures already in place. When a family moves into an established community, they acclimate to the existing norms and values of the neighborhood in order to fit in⁷. For residents in a *new* community, the norms and values must first be created providing a unique opportunity to define the community, physical and socially.

When the first residents arrived in both Divina and Ciudad España, the built and natural environments were still construction sites. The land was laid bare of its plants and curves for the efficient erection of homes. It was an open canvas for residents to decide how they wanted to utilize the pockets of space in corners, around homes, along the road, and in the parks. This creative process was encouraged and institutionalized by the Red Cross and the Fundación. Each community had a political body, a committee equal to all other committees, for the development and beautification of the natural

⁷ This is not to say that each family does not bring its own sense of norms and values. Some examples include a religious identity, national culture, and beliefs about community. These will be discussed further in chapter five.

environment, called the *Junta de Reforestación* (Committee for Reforestation) in Divina and as a committee of the *patronato* (governing political body) in Ciudad España.

Figure 1.1 Ciudad Divina Providencia circa 1999 (Photo provided by the Fundación)



Figure 1.2 Ciudad España November 1999 (RCH and RCS 2002)



Third, the communities as separate entities were also culturally “open” in terms of how things in the community were done. Residents came from dozens of different neighborhoods in Tegucigalpa, and each brought their own understanding and

expectations of the “community” based on their prior experience and socialization in Tegucigalpa, but lacked a long-term social network or community cultural toolkit (Swidler 1986)⁸ for their new home. These characteristics made the culture a negotiated process on a level unseen in most established neighborhoods.

Culture (the way in which things are done), emergent norms (the boundaries defining appropriate behavior when there is a new situation), and vision (the belief about the way community should be) was also an opportunity for transformation. Most residents came from dangerous and polluted neighborhoods in Tegucigalpa, areas often unsafe at night and for vulnerable populations.

Father Carlitos, the Catholic priest who served the whole valley from 2005 to 2009, explains,

Tegucigalpa, for example, is at times a disagreeable climate to live: the air and the natural environment is contaminated with the climate of violence. People continue to come to the capital but it is not open to them. [Residents] live locked inside and they do not have clean air. The children, for example, are locked inside the fence only watching the cars pass by.

Tegucigalpa is in many ways an unhealthy place to be. Yet, when residents arrive in the valley, they have a different experience. Carlitos continues,

Some find it hard to adapt to live in a more comfortable climate, they run, ride bikes, have space to sow a plant, a green garden, not only a cement floor. There is green space, they can walk and can live in a dignified manner. But the mentality of the people is always to live locked up. This environment helps them to remove themselves from the problems [of

⁸ Each new community is different. Some previous neighborhoods were well organized and were able to maintain their social networks, moving large portions of the lost neighborhood together. In other instances, extended families stayed together. Mapping post-disaster social networks is important and will be looked at in a follow-up study (Morrow 1999).

the city], to relax more, and to not live stressed out. I think people have a change in their mindset.

Carlitos believed that moving away from the city could bring about a change within people, a change of mentality, a change of culture.⁹ Whether or not the structure for this occurrence was available to each community, and whether residents accepted a change or drift back into a Tegucigalpa mentality regarding public and private spaces, remained a choice made by each individual, but shaped by each community's cultural development.

Fourth, the communities were built in a post-disaster context. Anthropologist Anthony Oliver-Smith once noted, "Any discussion of a disaster and its effects on a community must consider the issues of adaptation and changes as well as drama and impact" (1992: 14). Building on this idea, discovering how new communities adapt and change in the long-term and post-NGO context is unique and must be studied as such. Most academic post-disaster research continues to focus on themes such as physical and mental health (psychology, psychiatry, and social work), mitigation (sociology and urban planning), short-term (1-5 years) recovery, and infrastructure (geography and engineering). Although all of these are important components to community development, they cannot speak to the social sustainability of particular post-disaster development theories.

Discerning the strategies that promote or detract from the development and sustainability of newly-built communities is of critical importance both to organizations and to the post-disaster communities themselves. As NGOs continue to respond to

⁹ How much environment shapes human behavior and morality and vice versa continues to be debated.

natural disasters throughout the world and find a need to relocate whole populations, understanding how to do so in a long-term viable way is imperative.¹⁰ Concomitantly, survivors should find themselves in a better situation than before the hurricane, not only in two or five years, but also in ten or twenty years. Critical objective research continues to need development in this area.

Fifth, and as referred to earlier, the selection process also differs from that of established communities (usually defined by class). In the new communities selection was a two-way endeavor. Organizations did have the opportunity to choose residents but residents also had an opportunity to choose the community where they wanted to live and the NGO they wanted to work with. Each NGO had their own qualifications for prospective community members, and numerous factors went into the choice; including but not limited to move-in date, family and social networks, cost, location, and organizational support. This selection process slotted a majority of residents into their community of choice although there were a few residents who did not fit well with where they landed. According to organizational statistics, both Divina and España have had about a 10% residential changeover since inception.

Sixth, each community was inhabited by a particular population, one that was traumatized and of a similar socio-economic status. My survey of all seven communities illustrated that at least 75% of all residents had some type of trauma associated with Mitch. Of this population, on a three-level scale of very bad, bad, and normal, an average of 44% of residents noted their trauma was very bad. Trauma has been found to

¹⁰ Refugee settlements are often considered temporary and therefore goals of creating community culture and norms are not a priority for NGOs.

negatively impact community reconstruction and development efforts. Steinberg explains how this trauma may have impacted the development of these particular communities.

Effective community participation takes time, and necessitates continuous facilitation... Experience demonstrates that people were still too preoccupied with their trauma of personal losses, their family members and their personal belongings. Lengthy and frequent community planning meetings and decisions for the public good and community affairs obviously had to take second rank of order (2007: 164).

Unlike most community development ventures, organizations also had to address issues of trauma (and perhaps accompanying victim mentality [Hoffman 1999]) even before starting to develop issues of social health (see also Etzioni's [1995] discussion of inverting symbiosis).

Furthermore, in order to be eligible for a home, a prospective resident must prove that they had lost their home or that their home was in an at-risk zone¹¹ and that they had no other home elsewhere. By definition this limited the homes to survivors who had a lower socio-economic level and were more likely to live near or in dangerous areas, either along the river or on unsafely steep hillsides. Wealthy Hondurans were either not affected, were able to rebuild or reinforce their home, or relocate on their own.

Seventh, like every nation-state Honduras has its own peculiar history and culture. Since one of the organizations was a Catholic NGO and the other was secular, historical church-state relations created a unique type of legitimacy and authority for the Fundación. The less political and social revolutionary culture of Honduras in comparison

¹¹ This changed over time, however, as the need for post-Mitch housing slowed and organizations turned to the needs of the poor, elderly, and disabled.

to its neighbors may have also encouraged residents to follow the strong leadership of a Catholic organization, which would not have worked in other Central American countries.

Finally, with fragile or absentee state unable to maintain much of its social contract with citizens and a traumatized population, NGOs had an exceptional amount of agency in the development and direction of their respective community. Unlike established communities, the sponsoring organization had significant power to guide and influence the community. Some NGOs implemented social control mechanisms and were constantly involved in the shaping of the community while others let the community decide for itself and still others provided almost no social support. In sum, these seven characteristics illustrate the unique feature of these post-disaster intentional new communities.

Table 1.1 Unique Features of Post-disaster Resettlements

Feature	Opportunity	Challenge
Intentional	People come together under a new vision	Who defines the direction and vision of the community?
New	Many cultural constructs are open to change	Are norms challenged or maintained by residents?
Culturally open	Re-define culture in a way that is healthier than Tegucigalpa	Return to a more closed, anomic, and violent environment similar to Tegucigalpa
Post-disaster context	Offer a holistic change for a marginalized population and empowers residents to take control of their lives	Create new communities but without leadership accountability, vision or cohesion creating more problems
Selection Process	Select on particular criteria that may encourage social health	Difficult to discern correct characteristics and resident's "real" situation; excludes some based on particular values
Particular Population, Trauma	An opportunity for empowerment through overcoming trauma and developing civic skills	Maintain and reproduce a victim mentality
Honduran culture and history	More inclined to follow strong leadership and structures	Does this inclination lead to greater dependency on other organizations
NGO influence	Empowerment, support of institutions, and sustainability	Dependency or no support of institutions

Research Questions

With so many resources - a chance at life in a new location, a supportive non-governmental organization (NGO), new infrastructure, an opportunity to define their community - was there a significant long-term transformation? Were the resettlements able to develop into a community that was healthier than their pre-Mitch Tegucigalpa neighborhood? If so, how? If not, why?

Beyond the Honduran context, the development of each community was shaped by the complicated resource constraints and development praxes of the two NGOs,

respectively. On the one hand, the Red Cross of Honduras is a massive organization that works on numerous fronts, making the focus and time commitment and long-term presence to one community much more difficult.¹² Practically, the Red Cross had a much more participatory tactic toward community development, otherwise known as a “partnership” approach. This partnership focused on the empowerment of residents to take responsibility for their community, which they were able to do, breaking any dependency. This independence, however, led lower social health outcomes since emergent norms were unable to be created, permitting the community to fall back on previous cultural structures.

In contrast, the Fundación provided both more material resources toward the social development of the community and used a paternalistic approach toward the development of Divina Providencia. The small size of the organization and its dedication to only one project enabled the Fundación to devote more organizational resources and make a long-term commitment (15 years) to the community. In addition, the Fundación maintained a top-down technocratic approach and a paternalist ideology in its relationship with Divina, due in part because it had the resources and the commitment. The NGO had a much more connected relationship with the community and adjusted decisions according to perceived need. This high involvement and intervention, however, also led to protests and pushback by the residents concerning some of the Fundación

¹² Don Ricardo, first president of Ciudad España and who worked very closely with the Red Cross, explained to me in a recent conversation that this conflict is not only organizational but also ideological. The older Red Cross leaders want to focus only on disaster mitigation, preparedness, and relief. The younger leaders also want to do development work.

policies and practices as well as dependency by leaders. How and why these resources and praxes mattered will also be discussed.

Dissertation Overview

My inquiry into the social health of post-disaster new communities follows a chronological approach with a focus on path dependency, social norms, and individual or organizational agency (Sewell 2005; Aminzade 1992). To begin, chapter two provides a literature review of various community development strategies as well as their critiques. The goal of the chapter is to lay a landscape of possible explanatory mechanisms for the divergent trajectories.

Chapter three, research design and methodology, covers the specifics of the study. The chapter discusses how the cases were selected and the use of comparative case study as an analytical strategy. In addition, data collection and methodological processes are described to illustrate the reliability and validity of the data.

Chapter four addresses the current social health outcomes of Divina and España. The section begins with a definition of community social health and indicators of social health from various sources. It then illustrates the similarities between communities, which show that the comparison is valid. Once validity is established, the social health of Divina and España are compared to one another, to the health of Tegucigalpa, to the health of the average of five post-disaster communities, and to national statistics. Specifically, this paper will critically assess the differences between the social health of Divina and España in comparison, especially in the areas of crime and collective efficacy.

Chapter five, Hurricane Mitch, gives context to the situations from which these communities arose. How the hazard of a category 5 hurricane became a disaster is due at least in part to the vulnerabilities in which people were living--historical, institutional, environmental, social, political, and economic—and which the NGOs tried to effectively mitigate in the development of the new communities. Additionally, residents possessed a particular background when they entered the community, which ultimately contoured the development of that community. The chapter continues by detailing the event, the effect on an individual level, and a discussion of relief efforts, all of which provide a foundation to understand the birth of Divina and España.

Chapters six and seven consist of descriptions and sociological analyses of Divina and the Fundación (chapter six), and España and the Red Cross (chapter seven). Although there could be book-length commentary on each community and each organization and the many factors that may have shaped both communities' development, I focused on what I found, through discussion with residents and NGO staff, to be the most significant factors: community infrastructure; NGO philosophy, practice and relationship with residents; resident demographics; and member beliefs about the community, social life and conflict. Each of these factors will also be analyzed for its possible influence on the current social health of the community. Drawing on the perspectives of different agents, chapters six and seven provide fertile soil for understanding the development of Divina and España over time.

The final chapter will attempt to connect the characteristics of Divina/Fundación and España/Red Cross and their respective development processes to their current social

health outcomes. As these connections become apparent, I will discuss the significance of each for various sociological literatures and also offer practical suggestions for development workers currently engaged in community resettlements. I close with a discussion of policy implications and potential future research suggestions.

My interest in disasters and community development began while I was volunteering at an orphanage of 560 children in Honduras in 2001 and 2002. During this time I visited numerous parts of the country devastated by Hurricane Mitch (1998) and it became clear that some resettlements were thriving, while others were in disarray. Four years later (2005), on a return trip to Honduras, evidence of this social health disparity was even more clearly discernible. As I was driving with the executive director of the Fundación Cristo de El Picacho to deliver some soccer equipment to the children of Divina, she explained to me that there was a growing crime problem in the community. She noted that the situation in the neighboring town, Ciudad España, was growing out of control and the gang members in that community were now targeting nearby communities. The situation had become so severe that cars would simply drive up to the doorstep of homes at night when residents were out, shuffle everything of value from home to car, and drive off without any concern of being caught¹³. Other residents assured me that the executive director's assessment was true. Ciudad España was an unsafe place for residents or visitors. The idea that these two communities had such disparate long-

¹³ I could not validate the criminals came from Ciudad España or any other community in the valley although other Divina residents echoed her claim.

term development trajectories, especially in the context of having shared many similar characteristics at their starting points, stayed with me.

In 2008, as I considered dissertation ideas, questioning the mechanisms of differential community development trajectories returned. Having enjoyed living in Honduras previously, the thought of returning to study such a significant topic was appealing. With a travel grant from the University of Minnesota, I was able to return to Honduras for eight days for a preliminary investigation of project feasibility. After interviewing Red Cross and Fundación staff, religious leaders from each community, and community members, I grew enthusiastic at the significance of this study both for these individual communities and organizations, and also as to utilize findings to assist successful sustainability and social health to future resettlements. Indeed, the study seemed particularly important after discussions with employees of the Red Cross and the Fundación. When I asked them what theories or philosophies they drew upon for their community development strategy, both directors looked at me and essentially said the same thing—“We did the best that we could with what we had.” Fortunately, all parties committed to support the study, thereby opening doors that would make the investigation possible.

Chapter 2. Literature Review

The foundational knowledge on which to build this research is vast. The following literature review, then, focuses on development theories that can address why these two communities had such significantly different trajectories. To do so, however, we must first understand the actors, goals, and practices utilized to attain those goals. The discussion of literature will then focus on these three aspects of development. Following the section on development, I will explain why the comparative case study and the analytical lens of path dependency are the strongest frameworks through which to address the research questions.

Any discussion of community is complicated. Dozens if not hundreds of mechanisms shape how communities develop, thereby making any discussion of the topic incomplete. This is further obscured in these communities by their background as “new,” “intentional,” and NGO directed resettlements after a disaster. This dissertation, then, is an effort to clarify how these special communities and organizations work together to build a healthy community. By addressing these issues, the paper intends to create a bridge between the two literatures of disaster recovery and community development¹⁴ as seen in intentional resettlements.

To build this bridge, a broader theoretical lens must be used to decipher important actors and mechanisms over time in the development process. The path dependency model is precisely that lens. This model, as described by Pierson (2000), provides both an analytical framework to decipher the development process over time and addresses

¹⁴Development is an extremely contentious theoretical concept. For this project, I will use the common development organization definition: the improvement in a community’s capacity to provide for its own basic needs (Vakil 1997).

important debates about how the recovery process moves to development. This framework incorporates initial conditions, key processes (practices) and goals, and important actors. In short, my four key questions are: “Who are the community development protagonists?,” “What are the initial similarities and differences between the communities?,” and “What in the community will be developed and how will this be done?” The path dependency model offers an excellent framework to identify protagonists, compare changes over time, discuss the development process and goals, and connect each aspect to one another.

Who is the development protagonist?

The question of agency is core to any conception of development. There continues to be debate surrounding who should lead development efforts at the local level. Some scholars argue that a top-down strategy is the most efficient while others passionately pursue a participatory grassroots approach. Over time, different actors - the state, NGOs, residents or a mix of some combination of the three - have all been considered the solution, and yet problems remain. The following paragraphs will discuss each actor and the benefits and drawbacks of their leadership of the development process as it applies to post-Mitch community building and re-settlement, with an emphasis on their roles in the communities of Divina Providencia and Ciudad España.

Historically, the social and economic development and well-being of a nation’s citizenry was the responsibility of the government, defined often as the welfare state (McMichael 2011). To be sure, there were non-governmental organizations, mostly in the form of missionary groups or religious organizations, which addressed the social ills

by providing immediate social services, but this was often in the remote regions of the state. Since the late 1970s and the scaling back of large governments due to neoliberal policies (often forcibly implemented [Robinson 2004: Chapter 2]), NGOs have grown in number, size, and influence, and have had an increasingly meaningful role in providing goods and services to constituents. This is no more clearly seen than in the context of disaster relief and recovery (Jackson 2005).

Changes in the nation-state and the role of NGOs in providing services fit well with the new neoliberal paradigm. First, Western governments and foundations who had focused their aid through nation-states were reluctant to give funds to unreliable, corrupt, or socialist governments leaving a vacuum for NGOs (Craig and Mayo 1995). Donors channeled their assistance through organizations and church bodies—an “NGO-ization of the mainline churches’ (Gifford 1994) because churches in effect became NGOs involved in development programs” (Bornstein 2005: 15). Neoliberal advocates found this change refreshing as it freed up funds that could be utilized for debt repayment and created a competitive market for social services, which, economically speaking, should have lowered service costs. Second, debt repayment and structural adjustment programs (SAPs) have deepened inequality throughout the world, including Latin America, affecting the role of the nation-state. SAPs cut civil service jobs and work and replaced them with local and international NGOs, which further weakened the state and created greater instability. Third, for Neoliberal proponents, civil society could also work through NGOs, offering citizens many positive opportunities to pressure governments for democracy and good governance. NGOs could be vehicles for development programs

and empowerment of the poor leaving a smaller state (Mohan and Stokke 2000). The weaknesses of the state will be further discussed in chapter 3.

The Honduran Red Cross is a case in point. The organization initially did not want to get involved with house building, as their historical strength and mission lie in emergency relief, not recovery and development. However, after the government petitioned the Red Cross to build a community, they did so, choosing to help about 800 families from Tegucigalpa (and many more throughout the country). Naomi (2008), a top director for the Honduran Red Cross of social projects for the nation, including Ciudad España, explained,

There was a commitment - the Honduran Red Cross would provide housing to families, and the government committed to provide the land on which to build, all basic services to the population, such as education, basic health, access roads, and others. The whole process was originally going to take less than a year but the government had to prepare the land for Red Cross to build.

Yet by the time the government had the land rights and had the land terraced, more than three years had passed and not a single house had been built. This was not the only problem. The government, due in part to corruption and in part to disorganization, did not fulfill its promise to provide water for the homes. As a high level waterworks employee in España, Don Roberto explained that after years of waiting, the Honduran Red Cross finally gave up on the government services promised and asked the American Red Cross to build a water system for the community, which it subsequently did. The same issues occurred with building a school, a clinic, a police station, a library, roads, and a community center - all of which were constructed by the Honduran Red Cross in

partnership with other NGOs. Without state support or guidance, the Fundación and the Red Cross were obliged to complete the entire construction, re-settlement and development on their own¹⁵.

Indeed, in terms of disaster research, the influence of the external NGO in communities cannot be overstated. Within these relationships, external NGOs provide material resources for the construction of houses and community institutions (schools, clinics, community centers), social resources for the creation of governing boards and leadership training, educational resources for child and adult education (including technical classes), and guidance in running the community.¹⁶ They also often make critical decisions about the long-term goals of the community and the means of reaching those outcomes. In this case, the naming of these goals can create a particular discourse, garnered in part from philosophies being implemented by other NGOs and influenced by general theories of political economy promoted by the Global North and IFIs. The means to achieving these goals also are influenced by external forces and shape the policies implemented by NGOs. Non-governmental organizations play a significant role in negotiating and translating theories and practices from the Global North and the needs and concerns of the Global South. After Mitch, organizations played a critical role, arguably an even more important role than the government, in providing aid to people due to their large networks and contacts throughout the country (Morris et. al. 2002). The

¹⁵ The critical role of the NGOs was also asserted by residents. In almost every interview I conducted with community residents and leaders I asked, “Why did Divina and España turn out so much differently?” The answer almost always included the phrase, “The Fundación.”

¹⁶ It should be noted that there are many similarities between NGOs and community based organizations (CBOs). However, the disruptions of a disaster make local and citizen group organizing difficult. CBOs are therefore less common in these circumstances.

question as to whether this is a positive or negative role on post-disaster communities necessitates further research.

There are also critiques of NGOs as well, some of which directly apply to the organizations working in the Amaratéca Valley. In brief, some of the major concerns with INGO and NGO development efforts are:

NGO growth in the global South has weakened the political and social influence of the state

NGO work is often not sustainable in the long-term

NGOs working on the grassroots level often do not address structural issues

NGO accountability procedures are often distorted toward donors rather than partner NGOs or beneficiaries

The record of NGO and INGO in capacity building (empowerment) is low

NGO “partnerships” and other relationship philosophies can be highly unequal and may maintain historical hierarchies of power¹⁷

Although unfair to generalize these critiques to every NGO and INGO, identifying them does remain necessary in order to understand the positive and negative influence organizations may have on their constituents. These concerns will be addressed throughout the rest of the dissertation, addressing the general validity of some, while contextualizing and the usefulness of others.

Particularly important to this study is the flexibility that an NGO has to change with the needs of the community. This has been difficult for many organizations in the past.

This organizational flexibility is not always possible in the bureaucratic and highly structured management of NGOs which must answer to previous and potential funders who are often on a significantly different timeline than those on the ground. as NGOs become more involved in large-scale service delivery (or grow for other reasons) and become more

¹⁷ (Edwards 1999; Lister 2000; Ferguson 1990; Townsend et. al. 2002)

reliant on official funding, one might expect some fall-off in their flexibility, speed of response, and ability to innovate (Edward and Hulme 1996b: 8).

As Tellman (2011) found in the post-disaster recovery of Santiago Texacuangos, El Salvador after Tropical Storm Ida (2009), shifting needs and context must be met with organizations' elasticity for it to be successful. Independence from historical philosophies and formal funding restrictions enables an NGO to meet the community where it is with what it requires.

Local Empowerment and Participation

“[T]he need for popular participation is not just sanctimonious rubbish. Indeed, the idea of development cannot be disassociated from it.” --Amartya Sen (quoted in Pritchett and Woolcock 2004)

Empowerment¹⁸ has only come to the fore in Western development practices over the past three decades (Friedmann 1998: vi). However, in this time it has become a common development strategy for NGOs and INGOs working in the Global South. The 1993 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) human development report explained “People’s participation is becoming the central issue of our time” and the World Bank has included empowerment as one of its main objectives for community participation. Empowering the poor, then, has become an almost universal slogan (Thomas 1992 as cited by Craig and Mayo 1995: 2). The following section will briefly examine the way in which empowerment has come to be defined and implemented, especially in Latin America.

¹⁸ I define empowerment as the encouragement of the underprivileged to self-develop a critical consciousness, self-develop a sense of efficacy in addressing personal and professional issues, and to self-develop the capacity (skills and knowledge) to do so. It is also known as capacity-building.

More recently, John Friedmann (1998) published a book entitled *Empowerment: The Politics of Alternative Development*, explaining the role of empowerment in development. He believes the concept induces the growth of three kinds of power: social, political, and psychological. Social refers to increasing access to information, knowledge, skills, and resources. Political power refers to the ability to vote, share views and engage in collective action. Lastly, psychological power refers to an individual sense of potency or self-confident behavior. In total, the goal of empowerment is not to subvert the current economic or political system but rather to restrain mainstream models by making them accountable to citizens and balancing the current inequality of power.

Other theorists deconstruct different forms of power as related to empowerment. Parsons and the functionalist school believe power in society is a variable sum and can continually increase as people work collectively to achieve certain goals. Empowerment of the poor is possible within the existing social order without a negative influence on the elite. Max Weber disagreed, arguing that power is a zero-sum game and contentious. There is a fixed amount; and for some to gain, others must lose. Power, then, involves the ability of one group to realize their will over another. In the example of empowering the poor, they would need to reallocate power from those who already have it. A third theorist, Karl Marx, reasoned that political power and economic power cannot be separated, and are limited under capitalism. So although the poor can fight for their rights, the broader structures restrain how much they can actually gain. How one defines power significantly affects how people are “empowered” within a sociopolitical context (Craig and Mayo 1995).

Empowerment is also a contentious and complex strategy because it questions fundamental assumptions about development. Questions concerning who knows best about how a community should develop and who should have control over the process must be negotiated in the development process (Mohan and Stokke 2000: 252). Indeed, historically the vast majority of development narratives maintain a paternalistic relationship that is hierarchical, preserves the power structure, and enables practitioners to keep control on the process.¹⁹ Empowerment discards all this in favor of the messy way in which people figure it out for themselves. Cupples agrees, concluding “It is impossible to produce prescriptive recommendations for development practices. Attention to context, and principally to the geographies at play, is fundamental. This is why the arrival of aid in a given context is complex in terms of its ability to generate self-esteem or empowerment among beneficiaries” (2007:169). Within post-disaster development, the question remains regarding how outside organizations might attempt to empower those living in their communities, and what results from their decisions whether or not to intercede.

There are problems, however, when development is done with a singular focus on the local level and empowering the individual or small communities. By having narrow and geographically specific goals, structural issues such as political repression or unequal distributions of land are often sidelined. Locally specific programs can also be difficult to replicate (scale up) as the particulars of a community may vary significantly from

¹⁹ This can be both positive and negative. “Accountability” enables practitioners to avoid problems of corruption or the garnering of power by a few individuals. At the same time, it withholds the ability of a community or group to grow (unevenly of course) and learn to be self-sustaining on its own.

those of another locale (Hulme and Edwards 1992; Najam 2008). Additionally, some failed local development projects have “blamed the victim” by finger pointing cultural issues (values, norms, traditions) as hurdles to development, rather than as organizational misunderstandings of the situation or ignorance of the broader social, political, and economic context (Mohan and Stokke 2000). Lummis explains it most concisely,

The development metaphor, teaching people to see themselves as obstacles to development, promotes a colonization of consciousness of the deepest sort and its profoundly antidemocratic: it takes away from the hands of people the possibility of defining their own ways of social life (1991: 49).

Depending on the philosophy drawn upon by the NGO, even development on the local or community level can disempower and create dependency, having the opposite effect of the NGO intention.

Three broad critiques of local empowerment and participation should be noted. First, by focusing attention on the local level, structural inequality, hierarchy, and power relations can become hidden or masked. Second, Western development practitioners have historically romanticized, essentialized, or exoticized the local. Indeed, Western literature is rife with examples describing the happy poor, the ignorant poor, and the noble savages (Mohan and Stokke 2000: 249; Kipling 1899; Lummis 1991). Previous theories have also “blamed the victim” for their underdevelopment, reproducing particular power hierarchical ideas, and preventing opportunity for self-guided sustainable development. In sum, although local development is perhaps the most palatable to the critical development worker or NGO, it often maintains hidden

assumptions that can be just as problematic as non-critical development practices (Cook and Kothari 2001).

Throughout the study the one category that became apparent as critically important outlined the narrative regarding development and concomitant practice of the NGO, which subsequently shaped each community's trajectory. Much like the analogy of giving a woman a fish or teaching her to fish, two far ends of the community development spectrum are paternalism and participatory. Between these two extremes lie dozens of philosophies that attempt to walk the line of Western know-how, technology, and resources distinct from indigenous knowledge, agency, and vision for their own life. Moving from macro- to meso- to micro-level development, this false binary will be discussed in each section. In chapters six and seven, the practices of the Fundación and of the Red Cross will illustrate where they land on the spectrum and how this may have affected the ability of each community to maintain sovereignty, for better or for worse, in their development process.

What in the community will be developed and how will this be done?

Once we recognize who is doing the development, we need to understand the goals of development (including definitions and philosophy of development). Different goals held by different agents can lead to significant conflict and counterproductive behavior by one or both parties. This section will describe several goals showcased in the literature: economic, community, and “of” versus “in” community development.

Economic Development

There are many development theories that shed light onto the mechanisms which pushed each community on a divergent social health trajectory. Moving from broadest to most specific, modernization or classical Marxist theory for different reasons would highlight economic differences. This could be differences in terms of funds proffered to the community by the NGO or in terms of the money that community members possessed when they entered the community. For modernization proponents, the more economic resources a community had, the better their outcome would be as they would be farther along the stages of development. For Marxist theorists such as Gunder-Frank (1972) and the dependency school, the presence of money would be important, but the flow and direction of money and its ability to create inequality between agents is also significant. In the case of post-disaster communities, this includes the unequal economic, social and political relationships between the NGO and the community, especially if that power tilted on behalf of the organization. More money does not necessarily mean economic development, but may in fact mean increased inequality.

Perhaps the most widespread critique is that development efforts are really a development of Western capitalism. “Economic development means mobilizing more and more people into hierarchical organizations where their work is disciplined under the rule of maximization of efficiency. And it means mobilizing more and more people as consumers, that is, people whose livelihood depends on the things produced by those big organizations.” (Lummis, 1991: 57) Escobar adds to this definition noting:

Development was—and continues to be for the most part—a top-down, ethnocentric, and technocratic approach, which treated people and cultures as abstract concepts, statistical figures to be moved up and down in the

charts of 'progress'...Development was conceived not as a cultural process...but instead as a system of more or less universally applicable technical interventions intended to deliver some 'badly needed' goods to a 'target' population. It comes as no surprise that development became a force so destructive to Third World cultures, ironically in the bane of people's interests (1995: 44).

In their definition, the goal of development was defined in a strict fashion by First World countries as material consumerism. It was closely aligned with the dominant understanding of wealth and poverty of that time, modernization theory and was highly ethnocentric in creating a hierarchy of nations and people based specifically on economic indicators. Those in the Third World, especially those who were supposed to be helped by this effort, were never consulted or even asked what kind of development they wanted. Indeed, defining development in this narrow way marginalized other types of goals (such as health, education, housing, etc.).

Only recently has the United Nations Development Programme redefined development outside of the economic realm (GDP per capita) as the human development index. Although not perfect (it does not take into account ecological costs of development), many argue much better measure of people's lives than the purely economic statistics (McMichael 2011: Chapter 1).

Community Development

The history of community research dates back to the origins of our discipline generally (Durkheim 1995 [1912]) and to the famous Chicago school in the United States (Addams 1910; Shaw and McKay 1969; Whyte 1943). Although studies had moved away from the structural issues affecting community health to the personal (residents),

there is a resurgence to return to the ideas first proposed by the Chicago school, specifically community social context (Logan 2003). This dissertation will take the social context approach, not only addressing which mechanisms create social problems, but also which create social health.

Community development has been defined as the increase of local self-sufficiency, enhancement of local capacity for problem solving, and promotion of material and nonmaterial conditions of life (Schwartz 1981; Fromm and Maccoby 1970) and has its own disciplines (community studies, urban studies) as well as its own journals. The meaning of community development, however, has changed over time. Centuries ago, nation-states lacked the infrastructure and ability to socially and economically develop their hinterlands of their territory. Social development was left to religious groups (usually in the form of Christianization) while economic development was left to elite entrepreneurs who “developed” an area by bringing native groups into the capitalist economy. As states began to industrialize or capitalize on their natural resources, national development became possible.²⁰ As noted above, it made sense for earlier theories of political economy, such as modernization and world-systems, to utilize the nation as their level of analysis. Even today, proponents of neoliberalism align with certain Marxists sects in their belief that markets and states are responsible for social equality and welfare growth. Yet, in the new development era, the shift has returned toward a localized and non-capitalist approach. From grassroots NGOs to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to the Grameen Bank, interest in community

²⁰ There are a number of reasons for this change. For an overview see Paige 1975: Ch. 1; for changes in Latin America see Cardoso and Fallato 1979.

development has grown exponentially in the last two decades. As we will see in chapter four, though there may be a consensus on what a community is, the meaning of *development* of the community continues to be debated at the local, state, and national levels.

“Of” versus “In” Community Development

Perhaps the most significant debate in the community development literature is whether efforts should focus on the development “of” or “in” the community. More specifically, is “community” the causal factor in the well-being (social, political, and economic) of residents or is it denotative of the stratification system, the power structure, or the human ecology that prevails in a locality? Three major theorists take the former position. Durkheim (1984[1893]; 1951[1897]) and later the functionalist school argued that a society creates social structures and values and norms that play a role in maintaining a stable social whole. Alinsky (1971) emphasized democratic citizen participation that would open channels of communication and cooperation between local groups. Finally, Summers notes (1986: 356) “The creation and maintenance of social structures... which mediate between individuals and society, are essential to the well-being of humans. Development of the community requires attention to these integrative structures.” Other development narratives such as social capital, empowerment, and solidarity efforts align with this type of strategy.

Conversely, development *in* the community has been the traditional focus of development efforts including economic growth, modernization, and improved social services. Community, then, is more about the social processes that happen to the parts

(seen as micro-units) rather than to the whole. Community economic development is perhaps the most common example. The emphasis is on job creation and raising the real incomes of residents, and judging the ability of individuals or families to utilize resources efficiently. Narratives such as community assistance, the use of motivators, the rungs on a ladder metaphor, all boats rise with the tide (neoliberal policy), and social engineering all align with this type of development.

This is not to say that development “of” and “in” community is mutually exclusive. Indeed, they can work in concert (e.g. social capital creates greater job opportunities for individuals) and in conflict (social engineering may disempower specific populations). Either way, community development should be looked at as both a means and an ends process. Of the many community development paradigms that understand development as a process, paternalism and partnership best capture the spirit and the ideological symbolism of the Fundación and the Red Cross as will be discussed below²¹.

In the same vein, this comparative case study speaks to the question: should development be a top-down or bottom-up process or something in between? To elucidate this question, two development philosophies, paternalism and partnership, will be described in depth, and will lay the foundation for understanding both the Fundación’s and the Red Cross’ approach to community development.

²¹ I recognize some narratives overlap, organizations often utilize multiple narratives, and narratives have had different interpretations over time. Nevertheless, I believe the table is useful to analytically deconstruct dominant development paradigms.

As touched on above, a significant debate concerns whether development should be a top-down (Rostow 1960; Weber 1946) or a bottom-up process (Chambers 1997; USAID 1997; Woller and Woodworth 2001). Modernist and neoliberal advocates believe communities (or nations) need “authoritative intervention” from above. Science, technology, “high modernism” and technocrats can enlighten these communities and help them progress on the road of development. Alternately, many activists (including many NGOs) claim that development must be participatory and democratic. This participatory, democratically-based ideology claims that people know what is best for themselves, and that a change agent must work hand-in-hand with potential beneficiaries to develop a successful program (Gorjestani 2001). For this comparative case study, the participation debate, especially as it intends to affect community development, is essential. As we will see, the Fundación takes a paternalistic approach that attempts to create and support community institutions and structures (“of” community) while the Red Cross takes a participatory approach (“in” community). There are positives and negatives to both strategies, many of which will be discussed below.

Paternalism

Paternalism continues to be a contentious concept in literatures ranging in diversity from philosophy to development²². As a macro-socio-economic paradigm, paternalism has been used to describe the conservative and authoritarian political regimes of Latin America during the 19th century (Woodward 1984). Although the Liberal

²² Although much of this comes directly from the literature, I have also drawn from my nineteen years of experience working with development agencies in Latin America and Africa and five years of directing a small NGO that works with the empowerment of children in nine GS countries.

revolution during the late 19th century encouraged greater democracy, the idea of elite and non-elite continued. Even today, the attitude of many economic elite toward their laborers and household staff remains one of ownership (Green, 1996: 23; Cardoso Falletto 1979).

Drawing on the philosophical understanding of paternalism (Dworkin 2010), I define it in the case of the Fundación in Divina adopting a specific strategy of paternalism with three characteristics: the NGO's involvement on behalf of the welfare of the Divina community, the organization's involvement of Divina leadership's autonomy, and the NGO's involvement without the consent of residents.

Paternalism, also known as benevolent aid and oppressive benevolence, is perhaps the oldest form of development. Historically, churches played a major role in the redistribution of wealth and service to the poor. The church could do little to combat the structural issues creating poverty, and therefore focused its attention on the temporary relief of suffering. Weber (1968) also discussed this idea, describing it as a legitimated form of authority but one which will dissipate with the rise of rational bureaucracy and other forms of legitimacy. Padavic and Earnest (1994) build on this concept under the theme of labor management, noting that as a form of legitimacy, it is not necessarily univocal.

Within a paternalist model, both provider and receiver fill specific roles in relationship. In the case of organizations, the provider maintains a legitimate authority, may gain a sense of satisfaction in the serving of those in need, and has flexibility in how rules are followed and goods are distributed. For example, in providing programs, the

NGO or IFI often make demands of the community, creating a producer-consumer political and possibly economic transaction. The organization can, however, choose whether to enforce the rules or not, thereby changing the relationship into a social one, where the NGO is benefactor and lenient provider, while the resident becomes grateful subservient. The recipient obtains the necessary foodstuffs, shelter, clothing, etc. to continue living. The provider often benefits, either directly from the relationship (such as financial gain in the context of the *encomienda* system in Latin America), or in other cases, through other rewards such as a psychological boost (volunteers building homes in the GS), or reinforcement of legitimacy (such as the Catholic Church saving souls). This type of development is especially beneficial in short-term situations such as when dealing with a disaster, famine, war, etc.

Of the many critiques of paternalism, I will focus on the most relevant four. Primarily, paternalist actions are often more band-aid than cure. It may relieve the immediate suffering but does not address the structural inequality that caused the suffering. By not questioning the underpinnings of suffering, it thereby maintains the status-quo in the distribution of wealth and power relations. Donors, especially, protect their own privilege while feeling as if they are giving back in a meaningful way. Additionally, Ellerman (2007) notes that this strategy can undercut or override (*vis-à-vis* Illich's "counter-productivity") recipients' identification with feelings of self-help, and may reinforce a lack of self-confidence. Furthermore, paternalism can also create

dependency between donor and receiver. Like the historical “cargo cults²³,” recipients can come to depend on the deliverance of necessities, and learn to wait for them to appear rather than to use their own abilities and resources to obtain what they need.

Paternalism also risks being a one-way relationship between donor and recipient. Donors or NGO staff are often not obliged to any particular community—there is no lack of communities who need the help and services NGOs can provide. Communities and leaders, then, are placed in a subservient position knowing that the NGO can leave at any moment, creating particular power relationships that may reinforce a colonial mentality, or disempower local creativity in efforts to solve their own problems (Lummis 1991; Porzecanski 1989; Escobar 1995: 44). This is often reinforced by technocratic practices—developers arrive with ready-made ideas on how to solve the problems of people they have not met in, places they have not been, and in cultures they do not understand and communities accept this help as it is (hopefully) better than no help.

Partnerships

The concept of “partnerships” has uncertain roots but has become a recent hot approach for development organizations. Some scholars link the policy mandate to a 1968 World Bank Report entitled “Partners in Development” written by ex-Prime Minister Lester Pearson. Others believe it had roots in the radical solidarity movements of the 1960s and 1970s in Latin America (Hailey 2000).

²³ Cargo cults refer to Pacific Island groups that became dependent on foreign cargo drops and reproduced the actions of the foreigners (such as putting on headphones and building wood planes) long after they left in the hopes that resources would again fall from the sky.

From an NGO point of view, partnerships (sometimes called collaboration, coalition, accompaniment, and development alliances) can be summarized as: “a working relationship that is characterized by a shared sense of purpose, mutual respect and the willingness to negotiate” (Lister 2000: 228). Although it most often refers to a relationship between a Northern NGO and a Southern NGO, it is also used to describe other relationships including donor-NGO, NGO-community, and NGO and a GS nation-state. Inherent in post-disaster development is a relationship between NGOs (or the state) and the communities that have been devastated. If this can be defined as a partnership, theoretically they will have more success than a relationship that may be paternal and therefore less egalitarian. Partnerships offer a way to bridge the strategies and goals of the two groups by building social capital through an equal sharing of power by each group (Brown 1996).

More recently the concept gained greater visibility during the recommitment of the OECD-DAC (1995) to work strategically with national governments on what would eventually be called the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). Indeed, the term “partnerships,” later defined in 1996 as:

An emphasis on the developing country itself as the starting point for development co-operation efforts that reflect local circumstances, encourage local commitment and participation, and foster the strengthening of local capacities. It suggests that locally owned country development strategies and targets should emerge from dialogue by local authorities with their people and with their external partners. Rather than a situation in which each donor and multilateral agency has its own development strategy for a particular country, the ideal should be a locally-owned development strategy which external partners can all support...[it] places a premium on knowledge of local circumstances and the freedom to act flexibly in a manner that is responsive to local conditions (Michel 1996: 32).

This idea would later become MDG goal 8, “A Global Partnership for Development.” Although these specific national level problems and the role of IFIs, the UN, and the OECD in addressing these problems, the idea became a part of the development vocabulary.

On the organizational and local level, Brinkerhoff (2002: 1) offers a more definitive and process-based definition: “organizations form partnerships not only to enhance outcomes, whether qualitatively or quantitatively, but also to produce synergistic rewards, where the outcomes of the partnership as a whole are greater than the sum of what individual partners contribute.” USAID also followed suit with its own policy entitled New Partnerships Initiatives (NPI).

NPI is an integrated approach to sustainable development that uses strategic partnering and the active engagement of civil society, the business community, and institutions of democratic local governance to bolster the ability of local communities to play a lead role in their own development (USAID 1997).

Partnerships have been middle ground between paternalism and local autonomy. Groups can work together for the betterment of the poor utilizing both local and Western knowledge and experience. There are clear opportunities: wealth and particular technological knowledge is primarily in Global North nations and poverty and a lack of highly-skilled and educated workers exists in the Global South. It is in both the economic, social and political interests of the GN to help improve the (or at least make bearable) living standards in order to avoid mass immigration (as seen in Mexico), terrorist threats, and the drug and modern slave trade. On a more positive note, GS

countries are able to provide economic markets for GN products, ideas and inventions that cannot be seen due to Western biases, and, as some would argue, particular values that would encourage greater social capital among citizens.

Partnerships are also considered the most sustainable for two reasons. The goal is to listen to and base decisions and projects on the needs of what the people ask for themselves. It is a bottom-up approach, thereby innately promoting buy-in to the project. Additionally, it creates greater independence than many other development initiatives, which will ideally enable greater sustainability.

The partnership paradigm also has its critiques, many of which are similar to those of paternalism. The strength of the practice can also be its downfall. A 2011 article found that partnership strategies developed in poverty-reduction strategy papers did not work at the national level in Honduras because there was no real buy-in. The project was too focused on rational planning and not on the importance of politicking (Dijkstra 2011). Occasionally, partnerships may also fail due to infighting within a community, a lack of social development along with economic development, or an unsustainable commitment by an organization. Like paternalism, partnerships also have benefits and drawbacks on the side of the NGO and the community.

Path Dependency

To provide a temporal explanation of the divergent trajectories, a path dependency model will be utilized to explain the divergent development trajectories over time. Path dependency is a theoretical framework that describes phenomenon can be explained by past choices and external events, which shape subsequent development

“paths” and current outcomes (David 1985). Although the framework has been found to have faults (Page 2006; Goldstone 1998) such as the broad critique that path dependency only illustrates that “history matters”, refining the framework to a narrower conception can reliably parse out which events in history were likely critical junctures in divergence. Many scholars have found value in the framework, notably Aminzade (1992), Tilley (1994), David (2000), and Pierson (2000). Although there are multiple components that can be used in a path dependency explanation, I will focus on three: the important initial conditions and mechanisms that set the development process moving, key processes that sustain movement along the path, and processes that provide increasing returns (Aminzade 1992: 462-463; Pierson 2000). Path dependency will also be discussed in further depth in chapter seven to explain how initial differences and key processes sent each community on a divergent trajectory.

In sum, this dissertation attempts to parse out the strengths and weaknesses of the paternalist and partnership approaches as they were implemented in post-disaster resettlements in Honduras. Understanding how different approaches led to different social health outcomes will provide theoretical insight into questions posed by disaster recovery theorists as to how resettlements become communities, but also to inquiries by community development scholars concerning how communities are created. Before jumping into the case studies, the following two chapters will provide the methodological resources of the research study and the historical context into which the communities were born.

Chapter 3. Research Design and Methodology

Leonardo da Vinci once exclaimed, “He who loves practice without theory is like the sailor who boards ship without a rudder and compass and never knows where he may cast.” To be the sailor prepared, my rudder will be the comparative case study method as a research strategy to investigate the differences between the social health of Divina Providencia and Ciudad España. This analytical framework provides the reflective measurement of two initially similar phenomena and their divergence over time in the social world. My compass is the theoretical framework of path dependency. While a comparative community case studies offer cross-sectional data, path dependency addresses the temporal development of each community. Together, these two complimentary organizing structures provide a holistic picture of the initial similarities, changes over time, and current differences of Divina and España.

This chapter is divided into three sections. I will describe the practicality of the comparative case study method as it applies to this study. This section will also explain how the communities were chosen based on initial similarities between resident background and particular NGO practices. Additionally, I will introduce my methodology: document analysis, surveys, interviews, ethnography, and conference presentations. The chapter will conclude with data collection challenges specific to the field site.

Comparative Case Study

Comparative case studies²⁴ have been criticized for insufficient precision due to lack of quantification, a difficulty in testing for validity, and an over-inference of the qualitative data (Flyvbjerg 2011; CSU 2011). While these concerns are noteworthy, they are not insurmountable. For this explanatory project, the comparative case study was the ideal strategy. Yin (1981) explains the case study as having two parts. “As a research strategy, the distinguishing characteristic of the case study is that it attempts to examine: (a) a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when (b) the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” To truly understand community development, context must be an integral part of the study. There exist too many variables and observations than the standard survey or experimental design can recognize, making each irrelevant (Yin 1981). Neither surveys nor an experimental design (due to feasibility) could provide the holistic picture or complexity needed to theorize development trajectories. Additionally, to sort out phenomenon and reality, substantial detail and connections between actors and events must be thoroughly explored. Only a detailed description of cases can supply this information in any meaningful way.

Other critiques include the validity, reliability and generalizability of findings using the comparative case method (CSU 2011). I made a significant effort to address each concern. Since the nature of this case study is qualitative and open to bias and interpretation, I took data validity very seriously. To strengthen my data, I spent nine

²⁴ For a broader discussion on case studies in particular, please see Mahoney (2001), Ragin (2000) and Hedstrom and Swedburg (1998).

months living in the Amaratéca valley at a similar socio-economic level as many of the residents. I ate, worked, played, argued, and laughed with residents in all seven communities. Moreover, since I was living in the valley I had excellent access to both NGOs and residents, enabling me to maintain a discussion with several stakeholders (holding varied perspectives) concerning my facts and interpretation. To increase the reliability of the data, I triangulated my data through different collection methods and standpoints including ethnography, interviews, surveys, and document analysis. Each served to sync, validate, or reject information I gained through another source. Crime stories brought up in interviews, for example, were supported by police station statistics, my participant observation of resident actions, and community-wide surveys that explored resident opinions about security.

Lastly, to get a sense of the generalizability of the case studies I engaged in peer consultation with other academics, practitioners, and community leaders. The most important example of this dialogue was a conference I directed called *Tragedia y Oportunidad: Desarrollo Comunitario a Largo Plazo* (Tragedy and Opportunity: Long-term Community Development) in May 2009. This conference brought together survivors from five communities and staff from three NGOs working in the wake of Tropical Storm Ida (El Salvador) with survivors from three communities and staff from six NGOs eleven years after Hurricane Mitch (Honduras) to share ideas and strategies. One of the most significant outcomes of the conference was the recognition that long-term community development must be developed in the context of the needs of the people. Even the two similar nations of El Salvador and Honduras have significantly

different beliefs about the role of politics in each of their nations, and in local-level development. What worked in Honduras would likely have supported different outcomes in El Salvador. In conclusion, the strategies are generalizable, with the recognition that they must be adapted at the local level in order to achieve maximum efficacy and success.

Comparative case studies, especially those that explore the development of phenomena, face the challenge of addressing both temporal and spatial issues while also accounting for external events (Ragin 1987). In these seven communities, the comparative nature does have some variance in time of founding (each was founded at a different point within a six-year time frame) and time of NGO involvement. These differences, though, do not negate their nearly identical geological and geographic characteristics, all being located within the same valley. In contrast to the difficulties faced by transnational scholars, comparing these communities is less complicated (Wallerstein 1981; McMichael 2011).

As Kohn argues, the researcher must also know what is being compared, whether it be the object (the communities studied), context (generality over space and time), unit of analysis (how phenomena are systematically related to characteristics), or trans-nature of components in a broader system (1989 cited by Oyen [1990: 301]). In the case of the divergent trajectories as seen in crime, social capital, and civic participation, it makes the most sense to look at the unit of analysis (the characteristics of each community) that may have affected these social phenomena. More specifically, I will focus the characteristics of place, people, and history and organization, as well as the practices of agents.

Why Divina and España?

Perhaps the most important question in a comparative analysis is whether the objects of study are similar enough to conduct a comparison. In the social world, opportunities that provide the perfect environment to do such an investigation are rare. There are, however, similarities between groups, nations, institutions, phenomenon, and organizations that we attempt to utilize the parallels and similarities that do exist. In post-disaster recovery analysis, Dr. Rick Sylves of the University of Delaware (2011) has noted that “Disasters are not unique. There are commonalities and experiences that need to be understood and developed.” By extension, disaster recovery and community development also have commonalities that make them comparable. This section highlights pre-Mitch characteristics—(race, neighborhood of origin, status as a survivor, level of trauma, new community natural and built environment) and long-term community development characteristics (physical health, NGO goals for the community, NGO material input) shared by either residents or by the communities themselves. Divina and España, as will be discussed in depth later, have enough commonality to enable a comparative case study.

The Amarateca Valley

After Hurricane Mitch, hundreds of thousands of people were without homes or lived in at-risk zones on the periphery of rivers and hillsides. Some neighborhoods were washed away (as shown in figure 1.1) while others flooded, and still others were buried. Survivors

flocked to find shelter in *macro-albergues* (large scale temporary shelters), in churches and schools, or by crowding in with family members. Many could not return either due to the complete disappearance of the land (see figure 1.1) or the zone was designated uninhabitable. To support this large group of displaced survivors, international and national non-governmental organizations began a process of gathering donations, buying land, building infrastructure, selecting residents, and later resettling the survivors in new communities. The largest network of these new communities was located about thirty kilometers north of Tegucigalpa in the Valle de Amarateca. Seven communities (San Miguel Arcangel, La Joya, La Roca, Villa el Porvenir, Nuevo Sacramento, Ciudad España, and Ciudad Divina Providencia) were built by seven different NGOs (CARITAS/CESAL, Habitat for Humanity Honduras, Fundación Nuevo Sacramento, Adventist Development and Relief Agency [ADRA], Red Cross of Honduras [Red Cross] and Spain, and the Fundación Cristo De El Picacho [Fundación] respectively). In total, these seven organizations constructed nearly 4,000

Figure 3.1 Drastic shift in a River Bank
(Castellanos 2006)



new homes and re-settled approximately 18,300 Mitch survivors and others in need (Reduniversitaria 2009).

Figure 3.2 Valle De Amarateca (Amarateca Valley)

Map taken from Google Maps




Table 3.1 New Intentional Communities in the Valle de Amarateca

	Community Name	Homes	Main Sponsoring Organization
1	Ciudad Divina Providencia (City of Divine Providence)	586	Fundación Cristo de El Picacho
2	Ciudad España (City of Spain)	1,285	Red Cross of Honduras, Spain, U.S., Switzerland
3	Nuevo Sacramento (New Sacramento)	177	Self-developed (funds from the US)
4	Villa el Porvenir (Community of the Future)	465	ADRA
5	La Roca (The Rock)	77	Ven a Servir
6	La Joya (The Jewel)	355	Habitat for Humanity
7	San Miguel Arcangel (Saint Michael the Archangel)	502	CARITAS CESAL
8	Northwest boundary of Tegucigalpa metro area		
Notice the mountainous nature or the area dividing the Amarateca valley from Tegucigalpa and bounding the region.			

Of these seven communities I investigated six, leaving out Nuevo Sacramento because of transportation issues and safety concerns²⁵. Due to the nature of the study I was asked by a seventh organization, Fundación Nueva Esperanza, to also investigate the social health of their new community, Nueva Esperanza (New Hope). Like the others, the community was built for survivors of Mitch (200 families in total) with the sponsorship of the Fundación Nueva Esperanza. This community was located in a rural area about an hour and a half south of Tegucigalpa.

Since discussing all six communities would be excessive, two were chosen for their specific similarities and differences. Initially, I looked for commonality in demographics, geographic location, long-term NGO relationships, and infrastructure within newly constructed communities, as well as differences in development trajectories. This delimitation left five possible communities in the Amarateca valley. Ciudad Divina Providencia (Providencia) and Ciudad España (España) both offered strategic sites for a comparative analysis of community development, given their similarities immediately after the hurricane in contrast to their dramatically different situations today. Members of each community arrived from the same neighborhoods in Tegucigalpa, racial homogeneity²⁶, and had relatively comparable working and lower-middle class socio-economic statuses. In addition, the communities in which they arrived had similar local infrastructure and are within walking distance of one another (about four kilometers).

²⁵ A Honduran friend was shot at while driving home from working in the Nuevo Sacramento.

²⁶ As will be discussed below, most Hondurans consider themselves *mestizo* or mixed blood.

NGO Goals and Commitment

In addition to community composition, it was also important to find cases where NGOs played comparable roles within the community. Of the various models for case selection, I chose the maximum variation cases (Flyvbjerg 2011)—communities that have numerous similarities but also significant differences. From the seven communities built in the Amaratéca valley, only the Red Cross of Honduras (Red Cross), which built España, and Fundación Cristo de El Picacho (Fundación), a Catholic organization that built Providencia, remained for several years after completed construction, still working in the communities. Both organizations maintained working offices for years and have played a continuing and integral role in the daily business of its respective community. Both hold similar goals (long-term self-sustaining growth and prosperity for community members). Both the Fundación and the Honduran Red Cross claimed to be building a “model community,” one that will be an example to future post-disaster resettlements. In the case of the Fundación, the President of the organization, Juan Ferrera, went as far as to say that they wanted to create “a new Honduran,” a Honduran citizen who would be able to use the new community as a stepping stone to economic security and a better life (broadly defined)²⁷. The Red Cross saw this as an opportunity to set a blueprint for future projects. Far from momentary or whimsical efforts, the high goals set by each NGO set them apart from others.

In addition, by 2009, most organizations had moved on to other projects. In San Miguel Archangel, the Catholic organization CARITAS was dismissed by residents

²⁷ President Ferrera, gave an impassioned speech about the goals of the Fundación on October 29, 2009, at the inaugural television show “Cuentas de Cristo de El Picacho.”

because the residents had severe disagreements with the NGO. La Joya had not been in touch with Habitat for Humanity in years, and informally, Habitat has recognized the community to be a significant failure (Siembieda 2009). In Nueva Esperanza, the organization was only peripherally involved in economic development. They did maintain a full-time social worker, but she mostly collected mortgage payments. In La Roca the residents had not heard from Ven a Servir for years and in Porvenir, ADRA maintained only a loose connection, mainly through mortgage payments. The Red Cross and Fundación maintained the longest tenure in Ciudad España (9 years) and Divina Providencia (11 years and continuing), respectively. They put the most amount of time into community development programs and even though the Red Cross officially withdrew in 2007, they maintained an office in the community until 2009. The Fundación continues to work with residents on projects, as well as collect mortgage and water payments for the community. Combined, these seven similarities provide a foundation that makes Divina and España the best two communities to contrast as they also have some of the most significant divergence in social health issues and crime (discussed in Chapter 5).

Unique characteristics of Divina and España

Just as there are similarities, there are differences. The first difference, which will be addressed at length in chapter five, is the selection process. Perhaps the difference in social health between the communities was due only to the quality of people brought into the community. This is a valid issue and one that will not be minimized. It can, however, be addressed in three ways. One, the selection process for both NGOs was from

the same pool of survivors. There were standard criteria to be eligible for these communities that were used to choose or reject residents based on these characteristics. In addition, residents also had a choice regarding in which community they chose to reside. They also had the free will to stay or to leave, although there were consequences with either choice. Also, Divina was not immune to, and España plagued by, problems. Residents who contribute outstanding positivity and those who contribute little inhabit both communities. Finally, there is little conclusive evidence that being tied to a particular religion or making a certain income will produce better community social health, given similar opportunities. Criminality, social capital, and other signs of community health are not inherent in any particular class or demographic, though they may be more likely in one or another. It is important not to dismiss many of the other social factors involved in the process in the effort to reach a simple mono-casual explanation.

Community Differences

Table 3.2 Community Resident Differences

Community	# of families in the community	% Monthly Household income >8,000 L	Catholic	Evangelical
Divina Providencia	583	42%	61%	29%
Ciudad España*	1285	24%	23%	45%
La Joya	285 (353)	16%	17%	57%
Villa El Porvenir	428 (317)	27%	19%	53%
La Roca	80 (70)	29%	29%	41%
San Miguel Arcangel	498	24%	26%	37%
Nueva Esperanza	200 (150)	30%	39%	45%
Total Average	583	30%	34%	42%

Just as there would be differences in a comparison of any two given populations there are differences between the seven communities. One finds that Divina holds the highest percentage of monthly income and number of Catholics per capita. They exceed the other communities, unlike España, which fits closely with the average of all of the communities (though slightly low on education and household income).

The size of each community is also an important difference. The smallest community, La Roca, with 80 homes and the largest community, Ciudad España, with 1,285 homes, illustrate how different organizations approached their communities with the resources they were able to obtain. The size, especially between España and Divina, will also be a factor in the ease at which social capital and collective efficacy can be created, thereby affecting the communities' long-term health in different ways.

Looking at these differences, one might suppose that the differences in social health could be attributed directly to the differences in individuals, thereby only pointing to a great selection process. However, community is a complicated structure, and social health cannot be attributed to only those who have relatively more money. Indeed, on the community level, there are examples of deviance such as the syphilis epidemic among youth of Rockdale County, Georgia. This small wealthy, well-educated and predominantly white suburb county of Atlanta, was found to have widespread syphilis within particular high school social groups in comparison to state and national averages. Sociologists found that even with high education, racial homogeneity and high wealth, there was a great deal of disconnect among parents and youth, and the youth felt a sense of anomie within their life (PBS 1999). There is an expectation, often, that concomitant with increases in economic wealth are increases in social health. In reality, this is not a straight-forward correlation. Like Rockdale County, we would expect the community with the higher per family material input would obtain higher social health scores. This was not the case. Wealth helps the effort toward social health, but is not sufficient to cause it.

If we were to make differences in income the major reason for the social health outcome disparities, then we would pinpoint the selection process as the determining factor. This has two separate consequences. The first would give the organizations a high degree of agency and understanding to know what type of person would be the best to obtain for the long-term health of the community. Selection is based on a value system. In Divina's case it was based on Catholic values, values which looking over the long

history of the church have shown significant deficiencies in health (e.g. the crusades).

The Fundación also illustrated that it was not completely successful in its choosing, as it was forced to relocate or to remove six to eight percent of its residents over the last eight years. The second consequence also validates the importance of the NGO. The fact that the Fundación would utilize a stricter selection process illustrates its paternalistic approach, thereby supporting my thesis that the NGOs philosophy and practices are the critical component in the community development process.

Examples of wealth not correlating with homicide are also illustrated internationally. If we take a nation as a significant community, then Bangladesh should have one of the lowest social health levels in the world and yet when we compare crime statistics this is not the case. Indeed, the United States has thirty times the GDP per capita as Bangladesh and yet also maintains twice the murder rate. On the opposite side of the spectrum, Honduras has about 2.7 times higher GDP per capita than Bangladesh and also has a homicide rate 33 times higher per capita. There must be another significant factor beyond income.

Even with high incomes, a group of residents new to an area may have a difficult time creating the social structures necessary for long-term social health. Although they may be able to organize, an organized community may or may not be strong enough to fight off gang influences (Tellman 2010 personal interview). How are decisions made when people are traumatized? Wealth can surely help, but alone, cannot address these broader issues.

Though similar in demographics and infrastructure, current social conditions in each community are remarkably different. Providencia thrives economically, sustains a low crime rate, and exhibits high involvement in community activities. There is a general sense of safety for vulnerable populations such as women and children. In contrast, España is plagued by gang problems, crime, and other social ills. Murder has also been a recurring issue in España along with increasing substance abuse. The comparison of two similar communities starting with nothing but experiencing drastically different outcomes offers a unique opportunity for advancing our understanding of the social (or causal) mechanisms that shape community developmental trajectories.

To contextualize Divina and España, I have added a third group—the statistical average features of five similar post-disaster intentional communities (La Joya, La Roca, Porvenir, Nueva Esperanza and San Miguel Arcangel). Four of the five communities (Nueva Esperanza being the exception) are also in the Amaratéca Valley. I chose to use the average characteristics of all five communities rather than picking only one for methodological reasons. First, each community is unique in many ways. Examples include: differences in NGO time and resources in the community, the secular or religious nature of each NGO, the population of community, the selection process, the number of houses, etc. Choosing only one community would create increased complexity in the comparison of Divina and España. Yet, by drawing on the average of the five communities, the goal is to soften possible outlier characteristics of any one particular community, thus providing a clearer picture of what the average community looks like. On a practical level, combining the five communities afforded a much larger

N, strengthening the validity of claims.²⁸ Chapter four will also provide much greater detail on the similar and unique characteristics of Divina and España.

Methodology and Data Collection

To investigate the research questions mentioned in chapter one, I will use document analysis of the communities, randomly sampled household surveys, in-depth interviews, and nine months of ethnography. Each method will be described below at length.

Documents

Organizational records and literature are excellent forms of data to illustrate how each organization framed their goals and strategies, and will offer a basis from which to check the reliability of organizational strategies. Documents also provide the historical data to trace back changes in NGO or community behavior or policies, the specifics of infrastructure, and the initial efforts that may have been forgotten by the people involved. Additionally, documents highlight the use of religious language and the influence of Catholic morality on community laws and norms (e.g. harsher informal social controls) by the Fundación, which subsequently enabled me to draw conclusions about the influence of religion in Providencia, as the Red Cross proffered significantly less stringent regulations and less morality discourse within their own community.

I obtained records and documents from each NGO and community political organization, which provided perspectives of each entity concerning their role and

²⁸ A disadvantage of using an average is that it is creating a comparison to a hypothetical “average” community. Yet, as noted above, I argue the insight provided by presenting an average of communities far outweighs the drawbacks.

responsibility. These records included public information such as reports, published articles, news briefs, press releases, and documentaries detailing the community development process. I also obtained private internal documents, including development timetables, NGO and community self-studies, and financial information. Complete police records from each community (Divina and España only) also provided excellent data on differences in type and amount of crime. This information supplemented and enabled a triangulation of survey, interview, and ethnographic data.

Survey

To detail the demographics of Divina, I am drawing on my survey of 449 households of a possible 545. There are 583 houses total in Divina—however, twenty-five of the homes were vacant as noted by the Fundación and we believe that many more were vacant as well, having returned to each home at least four times on different days and different times. We also had a 3% rejection rate (thirteen families declined to respond).

A 96 question household survey was conducted as a census in Divina (N=449 of 585 homes), a random sample²⁹ in España (N=506 of 1,285 homes), and a census in the five other communities. These surveys contained 96 questions broken into eight parts: resident demographics; quality of life before and after Mitch; politics, agency and leadership; civic participation, social capital, cohesion, and religion; collective efficacy; social control and delinquency; disaster, trauma, and NGO support; and individual and community changes over time. They thus provided a significant amount of information

²⁹ The random sample was defined by choosing every third home in the community.

about the social health of each community in comparison to the past, in the present, and with a vision for the future.

Table 3.3 Community Surveys

Community	# of surveys conducted	# of homes* +	% of homes surveyed
Divina Providencia (Divine Providence)	449	583	77
Ciudad España** (City of Spain)	506	1285	39
San Miguel Arcangel (Saint Michael the Archangel)	321	498	64
La Joya (The Jewel)	261	285 (353)	92 (74)
Villa El Porvenir (Town of the Future)	224	428 (317)	52 (71)
La Roca (The Rock)	43	80 (70)	61
Nueva Esperanza*** (New Hope)	114	200 (150)****	57 (76)
Total	1918	3359	-
<p>* Numbers in parentheses are conflicting numbers about the number of houses there are in the community. As the number changes so does the percentage surveyed. **This is an intentional representative random sample of the homes in España. ***According to NGO officials, about 25% of the homes in the community are vacant in this community. ****According to NGO officials, only 150 homes were occupied at the time of the survey. + On average about 10% of homes are vacant or only have limited use (e.g. vacation homes). With this taken into account, my percentage of total homes surveyed would increase.</p>			

Figure 3.3 The Survey Team



To conduct almost 2,000 surveys I hired seven Hondurans to go door-to-door through the communities. Each interviewer went through a screening process for maturity and intellectual capacity. Their ages ranged from 24-34 and all were from Tegucigalpa and only one of them was familiar with the communities. Each received four hours of training by myself and by a Honduran woman proficient in survey methods. Over the first two weeks, we debriefed the survey experience as a group daily, after which we debriefed weekly, and surveys from each interviewer were randomly checked for accuracy, clarity, and completeness. For safety reasons, the interviewers also worked only in pairs. The surveys followed the order of the table above beginning in Divina on September 1st, 2009 and ending in Nueva Esperanza on April 30, 2010.

The survey questions were vetted through a four stage process for purposes of clarification and for use of culturally appropriate language. Most of the question answers were either yes-no or used a three to four term Likert-like scale as answers. There were five short open-ended questions as well, which enabled the survey to collect follow-up information detailing the reasoning behind each resident's beliefs. Each survey was also slightly modified to specifically fit the community—items changed include organizational names, years, etc. A generic English version of the survey is in the appendix.

The survey process also took into account the context of each community. Due to safety, we performed the surveys during the day in all of the communities except for Divina Providencia (which explains the higher response rate). Otherwise, there were numerous residents who worked during the day and only minors were home, or the homes were vacant. To adjust for the residents who were not home, we also visited communities on Saturdays, which increased the response rate slightly (though increased the resident annoyance factor significantly). We also visited every home occupied home from two to six times. Interviewers also noted whether residents refused to take the survey, whether residents were not home, or whether the houses were vacant. The refusal rate was about 3% on average for the seven communities. In sum, we believe we have a representative sample of each community.

Survey data was entered by two research assistants, and checked for accuracy by either myself or one of the research assistants. The data was investigated for skew among interviewers and any found to have problems with variables were removed from the analysis.

In the text of the manuscript, I chose to use the surveys to illustrate differences between community members in Divina and España in comparison to an average of the five other new post-disaster communities I studied. This is done for theoretical and practical reasons. Theoretically, each community has the same founding principles and is made up of similar demographics. Yet, each community has had different interactions with the religious or secular NGO, for different amounts of time. Each community is of different size populations, different land boundaries, and different economic and political

make up. Rather than compare it to only one other community as done in other studies, I chose to use the average of all five communities to level out any outliers or inconsistencies in the data and the response. Since my goal is to obtain the background information of residents and the general feeling they have toward their sponsoring NGO and their community, utilizing the average is the most efficient use of data. Practically, combining the communities increases the N from a maximum of 321 (San Miguel as the largest single community) to a maximum of 961 for all five communities. Together I believe this increases the validity and reliability of the data.

It should be noted that I did not provide the “N” (number of cases) for each community statistic for two practical reasons. The high number of cases from Divina (at least four hundred) and España (at least four-hundred and fifty) and the five communities combined and averaged (at least eight hundred and fifty) made the small variations in N insignificant to the analysis. Similarly, since I have included over seventy tables, adding the N to each community in each table would add unnecessary information and numbers to an already statistically dense paper.³⁰

Interviews

I conducted in-depth interviews with key Red Cross and Fundación staff holding various levels of responsibility within each organization. These interviews offered an opportunity to understand how development is defined by differing levels of the organization, as well as how workers used language to explain their development philosophy and strategy, and aspects about the community. I also investigated if and how

³⁰ These numbers are available upon request.

the NGO's and community's ability to negotiate development processes created different outcomes. Questions were largely open-ended and touched on various aspects of life before the community, community development, NGO-resident relations, and general social health. These interviews offer an opportunity to understand how development is defined by various levels of the organization as well as how workers use religious or non-religious language to explain aspects about the community.

Additionally, during three different periods (August 2008, September 2009-June 2010, August 2011) I conducted 74 in-depth interviews with key Red Cross and Fundación staff representing various levels of responsibility in each organization, community members and leaders, religious leaders, and government officials. Each interview lasted in duration from one half hour to two and a half hours, with the average interview lasting slightly longer than an hour; most were recorded and about 50% were transcribed in Spanish by a native Spanish speaker.

Ethnography

In addition, some data discussed below comes from my nine months of living within the community. As discussed in chapter 2, my residence, especially with my family, enabled me incredible access to all aspects of the community's life (Gutmann 1996). Similarly, my role as tournament co-director of the *colonia's* soccer league also gave me particularly good entrée into the daily lives of residents.

From September 2009 to June 2010, I lived in the Valle de Amarateca investigating each community's development and relationship with the sponsoring NGO. I lived with my family in Divina Providencia, in a five-room dorm previously occupied

by a group of nuns. This was a fortuitous opportunity in many ways. First, my family was safe in this dorm, secluded slightly from the community. Second, we became completely integrated into the Divina community. We ate, drank, worked, and played alongside residents and were privileged to live on the level of many residents in the valley. I can speak with the authority of experience about the living situation in the valley. Third, since Divina was the farthest community from Tegucigalpa in the valley, I could ride the bus from Divina directly to all of the communities except for Ciudad España and Nueva Esperanza³¹. Fourth, as part of my time in the communities, I also wanted to contribute positively to my new home communities. As the executive director of The Fútbol Project, a 501c3 that empowers orphaned and underprivileged children through soccer, I was able to put on a tournament in Divina and provide equipment to teams in España. This provided significant entrée to residents whom I otherwise would not have met, and contributed to creating a positive rapport with the communities in general.

Of course, my time spent in the various communities was unequal due to my living situation. I recognize that there may be bias in my analysis either for or against Divina because of this fact. In writing I have continually returned to my statistical, interview, and document data in order to assure that as much bias as possible is eliminated from the manuscript. My original bias was toward Divina due to its significantly higher social health outcomes and wanting to find out what they had done

³¹To arrive in Ciudad España, I had to wait for a second bust to go up to the community. Nueva Esperanza was located on the south side of Tegucigalpa, about 1.5 hours from Divina by car. Three interviewers and I only spent three days and two nights in the community.

well to obtain these results³². Over time I have realized that though Divina has the highest social health outcomes, this has not been to the exclusion of success in other communities.

In a similar vein, the current level of success may dwindle without the continued social control mechanisms implemented by the Fundación. I have re-evaluated my work as if I were a resident of Ciudad España looking back at Divina and at the Red Cross. This has significantly altered my viewpoint, which I hope shines through in the analysis.

Ethnographic Research in Tegucigalpa

An ethnographic approach of the neighborhoods of Tegucigalpa from which residents arrived in Divina and España was chosen for three reasons. First, based on over 950 surveys, more than 93% of Divina and España residents came from the Tegucigalpa metro area and thus it is a suitable location to look at social health. Second, reliable statistical data on social health, and crime in particular, can be hard to encounter³³. Of the data I found, especially along politically hot topics such as crime rates, corruption, poverty (World Bank 2006), etc., the data was often significantly different and at times contradictory depending on the source. By utilizing an ethnographic approach, I could triangulate inconsistencies and illustrate the effects of crime and distrust among local residents. Rich field notes of the communities and Tegucigalpa also provide residents with a comparison of where residents came from to where they are today; more than 95%

³² Although both the Fundación and the Red Cross were institutional supporters of my work, it was the Fundación that provided my family and I a place to live in Divina that made the work more feasible.

³³ Crime statistics are difficult to obtain in Honduras or can be highly inconsistent nationally, at the city level, and locally. Years are often skipped between UN, World Bank, OCAVI (2009), and government statistics and numbers can often be significantly different among organizations and scholars. My own interactions with police chiefs in different parts of the country also illustrated an unwillingness to share data. The statistics below are brought together from numerous sources.

of residents surveyed are from the Tegucigalpa metro area, and therefore we can ask questions that compare and contrast their new community to their previous one.

Residents in España and Divina also came from the same or from nearby neighborhoods, as also illustrated by the surveys (See Figure A.2 in the Appendix).

Living in Divina and spending weeks in España, I was intimately familiar with both communities. My surveys and interviews took me to homes in all sectors and participant observation brought me from dirt soccer fields to the local corn fields; from the source of España's water system, an eight hour round trip walk through the hills, to Divina's biofiltration waste water system. I prayed with residents in Divina, played with children in España, implemented a soccer tournament in Divina, and donated jerseys to six teams in España. I was heavily involved in community activities in Divina and when possible in España making me a resident expert on the valley generally and Divina and España specifically.

I also feel competent in my cultural and historical knowledge of Honduras to conduct ethnography of the communities. I draw on nearly two years of living in Honduras (2001-2002 and 2009-2010). Each period was in a community less than a forty-five minute drive of Tegucigalpa. Nine of the months (September 2009-June 2010) were spent living in Divina Providencia and commuting an average of once a week to conduct field surveys in Ciudad España. During those two years I spent time in the capital an average of four days a month, and, having friends throughout the city, I became comfortable with about a dozen of the major neighborhoods. I was familiar with the public bus system, taking taxis, and walking throughout downtown. Although I had been

through many of the peripheral neighborhoods, my personal and professional life were centered in around the *parque central*.

Crime Statistics

Numerous methodologies have been explored in order to best understand the many facets and complexities of studying the subject of crime (Kleck, Tark and Bellows 2006). In much the same way, I also wanted to illustrate how crime is either similar or different among the communities and Tegucigalpa, not only in numbers but in real-life experiences. Starting with a general description of crime in Honduras, I will use statistics from Tegucigalpa to highlight macro-level influences that may have shaped the development of crime within the trajectory of the communities.

As noted above, I have also obtained the complete crime statistics of Divina and España. Based on these numbers and questions concerning delinquency and security, I attempt to illustrate the general amount of and sentiment concerning community crime. To reinforce these findings I applied an ethnographic approach to capture personal experiences and changes in fear of crime in the capital city Tegucigalpa. Applying a deeply qualitative methodology will provide a comparative dimension not only between the communities, but also of the communities and where residents probably would have lived, had Mitch not occurred.³⁴

³⁴ A large development of this topic is beyond the purview of this manuscript. The goal is to offer some evidence that even though there is a large difference between communities, both communities have a higher degree of social health than Tegucigalpa as a whole.

Data Collection Challenges

The data derived from organizational and community documents, surveys, interviews, and ethnography of these communities, provides a detailed picture of the development of these communities since their inceptions. There were, however, challenges in obtaining this data, as described below.

Part of the challenge was particular information was simply not available. Missing documents, lost data, uncooperative police officers and residents, unasked questions, and people who had left the community for different reasons all could have added to my understanding of each community's development. I was most disappointed by the National Honduran Library in Tegucigalpa. The entire building was smaller than one floor of one of one of the libraries at the University of Minnesota. Most sadly, perhaps, was that I owned more books about Hurricane Mitch than the national library.

I was also keenly aware of my positionality as an outsider when engaging in participant observation. Throughout my research I tried to be self-reflective in how my involvement and relationship with each NGO and community may affect others' perceptions of my work, as well affecting my own conclusions. I was also a foreigner from the U.S., and in Honduras foreigners are usually connected to NGOs, Peace Corps volunteers, the largest military base in Central America (Palmerola Air Force Base), and historical colonial domination. Yet, gaining acceptance was easier than I had anticipated. Since I had volunteered for thirteen months previously at an orphanage in Honduras, I knew the cultural protocol and local Spanish colloquialism. I also used my previous life experience as a youth minister to connect with religious leaders and church members. Additionally, having a family, especially a six-month old child, provided another bonding

opportunity as a family, which is a significant cultural value (see Gutmann 1996). Finally, as a decent soccer player and director of The Fútbol Project, I used playing soccer and providing soccer equipment to both communities as an opportunity to better know residents and players from other communities.

Another challenge was the coup d'état in June 2009. Arriving only a few months after the event (September), protests, riots, and government crackdowns were not uncommon. The military had created checkpoints throughout the country to prevent terrorist attacks against the new administration. The government had also enforced a 10pm national curfew and on occasion would block all communication activities in the country—including phone, internet, TV, radio—during which the whole nation would be silenced in order to guard against the resistance party communicating to adherents about future protest sites and times. Although this only happened between June 2009 and the elections in January 2010, it was disruptive to the work and wellbeing of the entire country.

The most significant problems associated with the coup were in the major cities. In the case of the communities of Amaratéca the curfew was not heavily enforced--the police were out and people kept indoors more than usual, but common knowledge held that there was no threat of violence or demonstrations in the valley. There were days when buses would not run and/or military checkpoints would turn people away who were trying to enter the capital and therefore no one could go to work in Tegucigalpa. For the people of Divina and the surrounding communities, the impact was more philosophical than economic.

The coup polarized the nation. Many of those who stood by the disposed President Zelaya joined the National Popular Resistance Front (FNRP), which took to the streets in protest. Others maintained the legitimacy of the coup and stood by the interim president Roberto Micheletti. The highest ranked Roman Catholic clergy in Honduras and one of the most influential persons in the country, Cardinal Oscar Rodriguez, stood by the coup upsetting millions of Catholics who disagreed. Most NGOs found ways around the issue; the polarized political system historically encouraged major organizations to possess political ties on both sides to assure their funds or work would not be eliminated by the government. While these NGOs were protected from losing resources and from party anger, the Fundación, as a project of the Cardinal, was heavily criticized for standing by the coup. Although there were some residents and even employees who were frustrated by this action, minor grumbling was the only result.

In sum, although there were challenges, I obtained significant data from my interviews, surveys, documents and nine month ethnographic investigation of the communities. Chapters four, five, and six will showcase what I found most relevant for my research question.

Chapter 4. Social Development Outcomes

Community social health is neither a new nor an agreed upon concept. Indeed, some would argue that there is no universally useful conceptualization of social health, but rather a locally specific and self-defined notion by residents. Others believe that, like human rights, there are foundational characteristics that all communities must possess in order to be considered healthy (e.g. low crime). This chapter takes the second approach. Based on the experiences of Divina and España residents, findings from the academic literature, and definitions of social health from Latin and North American governments, I have chosen six characteristics that offer a useful starting point to discuss social health. The characteristics are: crime, community participation, social capital, collective efficacy, vision, and community sustainability. These characteristics will be defined, developed, and examined through the experiences of each community.

Why Community “Social” Health?

“GDP measures everything, except that which makes life worthwhile.” Robert F.

Kennedy

Community health can be categorized and measured in any number of ways including economic (e.g. employment, poverty, GDP), political (governing efficacy and transparency, democratic processes, corruption), or infrastructure (urban planning, green spaces, housing quotas). I chose to focus on the social indicators based on my early conversations with residents and NGO staff. Almost all noted that the social aspects of survivor resettlement and community development stood out as key factors in shaping each community’s trajectory. More specifically, crime rates (general security), the role

of the NGO, and collective efficacy were all named as principle factors, with everything else developing from these issues. The following six reasons assert the necessity of social health measures in accurately assessing the overall health and success of a community.

First, I listened to residents and NGO staff members talk about their community. Although I had ideas about possible mechanisms of influence based on preliminary interviews, it was necessary to set aside my hypotheses and allow the most important mechanisms to appear on their own. To avoid the possibility of allowing my conjecture to sway my perspective of residents, I spent the first three of nine months simply watching and listening. I attended community events, explored surrounding areas, played soccer and had conversations with anyone willing to talk. My conversations were open-ended and without a clear end goal; rather, I believed that through inserting myself into the field and listening, resident values, hopes and concerns for their community would appear (Charmaz 2002). Indeed, time brought to the fore the salient issues, which in the minds of most, concerned social issues.

Second, aside from social issues being personally important to residents and staff, I chose the metric of community social health because it is an important and yet underdeveloped area of research. Much of the post-disaster literature has been focused on economic development or infrastructure replacement, and relatively little attention has been given to the question of how people actually like living in these communities, especially in the long-term (Recovery Workshop 2010). Part of the reason for this is both tradition and measurement. There has been a long-held belief in the development industry that if average income in a post-disaster community rises 4%, then the

community is “developing.” A large amount of the development literature critiques this type of research, and yet it continues (Rubin 2011).

Third, infrastructure has always been an important measurement of recovery, but it can be appended by indicators of social health. Seeing new buildings rise, the number of families in new homes, the number of people receiving clean water - are all much easier to quantify. These characteristics are also more immediately and easily understood to donors than long-term social development, which takes years if not decades to observe. Solidly built, structurally sound homes are clearly important. However, as occurred in the case of one community, if a gang forces community members to pay a “war tax” and residents are afraid to leave, then a strong roof over one’s head does not offer as strong a sense of security as it might have in other circumstances of greater overall community safety. Social health offers an important measure that appends traditional evaluations of recovery success.

Fourth, although governments have indexed the level of social indicators in comparison over time or between cities or nations, these indicators have never comprehensively been reviewed in new post-disaster intentional communities. Additionally, the particular nature of these communities—new intentional communities with similar initial populations but different outcomes—offered an opportunity to understand community development in a unique way. Questions concerning emergent culture, norms, values etc., development trajectories, post-disaster trauma and recovery, organization role in development and others could be addressed in this distinctive comparison.

Fifth, the social science literature and government initiatives provide a foundation of measurements and definitions that characterize community social health. These reports have been called: quality of life reports, scorecards, portraits, profiles, compasses, vital signs, community vitality, community well-being, road maps, social development initiatives, etc. Within these reports are various metrics called social indicators, which are measured and then used as guiding principles for future development strategies, city plans (IISP 2011), government national plans (Scott 2010; CMCD 2010), and even the Healthy Cities Initiative promoted by the World Health Organization (WHO 2011). The reports can be narrow, focusing only on economic or physical health indicators, or as broad as measuring numerous characteristics from all aspects of community or national life. Costa Rica, for example, draws upon some common social indicators (such as civic participation) but also includes economic, education, and health indicators (MPNPE 2007). Panama, in their 2006 community social well-being report, highlighted issues of social exclusion, conflict, social infrastructure (health and education) and access to basic services as issues preventing social health in communities (Republica de Panama 2006). One of the most comprehensive social well-being reports is the recent Canadian study entitled “Community Vitality: A Report of The Canadian Index of Wellbeing” (Scott 2010). The study pinpoints specific social health indicators which have been highlighted in the academic literature (Chambers 1997; Edwards and Hulme 1996; Mohan and Stokke 2000; Plunkett 1995; Putnam 2001; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997; Smith and Wenger 2007).

Community Social Health: A Definition

Community social health is an index of six characteristics that highlight different aspects of the social life of a community. As noted above, these six were chosen through a combination of early conversations with residents and NGO staff, the academic literature, an investigation of how governments define community health, and my own experience having lived in the country for over two years. The six most prominent indicators³⁵ are: low crime, social capital, collective efficacy, community participation, vision, and community sustainability³⁶.

Table 4.1 Social health indicators, community measurements and literature citations

Indicator	Measurement	Citation
Low crime	Police records Survey	Shaw and McKay 1969; Scott 2010
Social Capital	Survey	Coleman 1988; Putnam 2001
Collective Efficacy	Survey, participant observation	Sampson and Wilson 1995; Sampson 1997
Community Participation	Survey, interviews	De Tocqueville, 1835; Chambers 1997; Mohan and Stokke 2000; Scott 2010
Vision ³⁷	Survey, Documents	Smith and Wenger 2007
Community Sustainability	Documents Interviews	Edwards 1996; Craig and Mayo 1995

Originally, the ambitious study was aimed at measuring and analyzing all six of these indicators. Although the measurements have been compiled, space and time considerations will focus this dissertation most prominently on differences in crime,

³⁵ For the academic audience I use the terminology defined by the literature rather than by residents (e.g. social capital=trust of neighbor).

³⁶ It must be noted that this is only one of many ways to describe social health and in no way do I claim it to be comprehensive.

³⁷ One concept not addressed by residents and only touched on by the literature is a community's vision for the future. However, the development of almost any organization, bureaucracy, political structure, or community necessitates a common vision to be achieved in order progress and avoid immobilizing conflict. Not only must this vision of "community" be agreed upon, it must also continually be reproduced to function.

social capital, collective efficacy and community participation as measures of social health.³⁸ However, before these characteristics are discussed I will evaluate the similarities and differences of the communities to demonstrate their comparability.

Comparability of Communities

As can be seen in table 4.2 below, each community was built by a different NGO, was a different size, and cost residents different monetary amounts in order to obtain a home. The communities are similar in the relative³⁹ time residents moved in, the sizes of the homes, the location of the homes (all of which are in the Amaratca Valley except Nueva Esperanza), and each community's infrastructure (roads, sewers, water, schools, clinics, etc. See Appendix Table A.1 and A.2). In terms of resident similarities and differences, the similarities far outweigh the differences both in scope and in frequency. Based on my survey, more than 90% of residents from all communities originally came from Tegucigalpa, they arrived with similar levels of trauma, they have similar family sizes, similar average household income, and similar current levels of physical health.

³⁸ Data in Tegucigalpa and Honduras generally are scarce. After an exhaustive article and book search, I contacted other Honduran scholars and was unable to find data that would be useful to compare Divina and España social health variables with neighborhoods in Tegucigalpa.

³⁹ I use relative in the comparison of communities with the average of all seven communities. In other words, there are few outlier characteristics and those will be specifically mentioned.

Table 4.2 Community Facts

Community	Purchase cost (2002 dollars) Lempiras/dollars	Date Inhabited	House Size Land Area Meters Sq.
Divina Providencia	125,000 L \$8,446	December 2000	36 120
Ciudad España*	500 hours of work	November 2002	47.1 120
La Joya	75,000 L \$5,282	October 2000	48 132
Villa El Porvenir	21,600 L \$1,521	October 2000	52.8 140
La Roca	43,000 L \$3,028	October 2000	46 112
San Miguel Arcangel	33,000 L \$2,230	February 2001	40 108
Nueva Esperanza	90,000 L \$6,338	March 1999	41 192
Average cost of a home for only materials and labor (not land, survey, infrastructure, etc.) ⁴⁰	76,220 L \$4,763		

Unfortunately, data on initial demographics of incoming residents is unattainable. The Fundación information of the original residents, including socio-economic level, neighborhood of residency, religious affiliation, family size, etc. were lost in a changeover of computer hard drives and I was unable to obtain any information from the Red Cross to protect resident privacy. This information would have helped define the exact differences and similarities between the residents of Divina and España showing how similar their starting points were. It also would have shown changes in economic circumstances over time, and whether this had an impact on long-term social health. Without this information, this manuscript relies on questions for which residents reflect

⁴⁰ As explained by Pineda-Aviles 2005.

on their circumstances before Mitch, right after Mitch, now, and a comparison between 2009 and 2010 (the years the survey was given) and their pre-Mitch life circumstances.

Table 4.3 Community Resident Similarities

Community	From in or near Teguc.	Bad or very bad Post-Mitch Trauma	Median # of children	Remittances <10% of income	Residents in good physical health today
Divina Providencia	97%	71%	2	90%	50%
Ciudad España*	100%	76%	2	90%	50%
La Joya	95%	67%	2	86%	58%
Villa El Porvenir	100%	69%	2	87%	62%
La Roca	100%	75%	2	92%	62%
San Miguel Arcangel	91%	76%	2	98%	47%
Nueva Esperanza	100%	75%	2	92%	62%
Total Average	98%	73%	2	90%	55%

Shared Characteristics

These seven communities also shared many common traits such as racial ancestry.

There are minorities in Honduras such as on the north coast and bay islands, which have a large Garifuna population, a group of African slave descendents who now maintain their livelihood through fishing and tourism. Western Honduras is populated with different indigenous groups who continue to maintain many of their cultural practices. The rest of the nation though, and to a large extent even the north and the west, are dominated by *Mestizo*—a mixture of native Honduran and Spanish blood. The CIA Factbook states that the racial makeup of Hondurans is 7% Amerindian, 2% of African descent, 2% white, and 90% *Mestizo*.

Having lived in and around Tegucigalpa for more than two years I would argue that 90% would be a low estimate for the city. Divina Providencia mirrors Tegucigalpa

in its racial demographic. During my tenure, there were three Black families and zero indigenous families in the community. The other 582 families would consider themselves purely Honduran—questions about race would not receive meaningful response. Additionally, I did not notice any black or indigenous families in España or the other five communities. Therefore, rather than focus on cultural differences based on race or even on neighborhood, I will look at the presence of religion in chapters five and six as an important difference between the two communities.

Family is a core value in Honduras, as it is in much of Latin America. There are stories of feuds in the department of Olancho where two families would avenge the deaths of their own family members by killing a member of the other family. Another example of the strength of family ties are the transnational networks that support family members through remittances or that pay a coyote for relatives to cross into the United States (Ratha 2003). To further highlight this family bond, within the seven communities I studied, an average of 55% of households had five or more people living in the home.

However, while blood family is often tight knit, marriage and partnerships are less rigid than in many other parts of the world for at least three reasons. First, getting married and the subsequent customs involved (dressing up, paying the church, having a reception, etc.) are prohibitively expensive. Couples often use any extra money they might have on basic necessities such as education, home repair, or helping another relative in financial crisis. Second, there is little social gain in getting married. People who are married do receive a heightened respect, but this is tied to other factors such as role in the community and socio-economic status. It is unclear if married couples receive

esteem because they are married, or because they have the wealth to have gotten married. Finally, there is little social stigma for long-term relationships in which the couple cohabitate. Indeed, residents who were in a *union libre* (a committed unmarried relationship where the couple lives together) often used the concept of *casado* (married) to describe themselves. Unless clearly specified, the two legally different statuses were often conflated.

The characteristics of family in the communities are defined by their flexibility and breadth. Due in part to a culture of *machismo*, family is often defined more as the mother with children than as a two parent family, especially in lower income homes. Citing Morgan's (1990) definition, Hernandez (2002) explains *machismo* as "the cult of virility. The chief characteristics of this cult are exaggerated aggressiveness and intransigence in male-to-male interpersonal relationships and arrogance and sexual aggression in male-to female relationships." *Machismo* in central Honduras significantly affects family life, defining gender roles and household responsibilities.

Machismo also affects inter-personal relationships between men and women, especially youth. Recent investigations have found that:

Honduran youth are at high risk for physical, psychosocial, and developmental health problems. Lack of access to education or job opportunities contributes to the high rate of teen pregnancy and early marriage in the region, where 24-41% of adolescents marry prior to age 18 years, and 46-63% of youth have had sexual relations prior to age 20. Honduras has the highest rate of births to teens between 15-19 years of age in Central America (with a fertility rate of 114 - 162 births for every 1000 girls between the age of 15-19 years in urban and rural areas, respectively) (Vasquez et. al. 2010; see also PAHO 2007).

Honduras also has the third highest incidence of HIV/AIDS in the region (with Haiti and Guyana reporting the highest rates). Additionally, there continues to be a high birth rate in the country, which is one of the highest outside of Africa and some Pacific Islands (CIA World Factbook 2011; see also WHO 2011), which may also be tied to *machismo* and Honduran culture.

In my ethnographic work in the communities, as part of the *machismo* culture, I found that adolescent boys tend not to stay involved with girls they impregnate, avoiding the responsibility of being tied down. This type of behavior is not culturally embraced but is accepted, and there was no evidence of the imposition of any significant formal or informal sanction toward the young men's actions (see Pine 2008). When Hondurans are in their twenties to early thirties, they begin to look for a mate with whom to settle down. This settling down with one woman is considered a *union libre* and often includes families that have a mix of children from previous and the current relationship.

Two concrete examples clarify these male-female interactions, which are more common in rural areas than in the urban areas. Heidi, a girl of sixteen, did not like school. Her goal, supported by her social network including her family, was to get pregnant with her boyfriend and move in with him at his mother's house, which she subsequently did. A year later (August 2011), they were still together with their beautiful little girl and continued to live with the young man's mother. Serena, a seventeen year old girl, had an open relationship with one of her classmates Julio which she called *amigos con derechos* (translated as "friends with benefits"). She got pregnant accidentally but since she was only a friend of the young man, she felt she had little

recourse to ask him for support of the child. When asked directly as to whether the child's father would be involved she replied, "No. Ni modo?" (No, what can you do?).

Within this relational framework, it is not unheard of for a Honduran man to grow weary of his partner and her children and to find another woman. The problem is especially worrisome as the man, who is often the breadwinner, finds a younger woman, woos her, and asks her to move in with him, pushing his previous "wife" and her children out into the street. This issue was so prevalent that many of the NGOs building homes for post-Mitch survivors, including Habitat for Humanity, Fundación Nueva Esperanza and the Honduran Red Cross mandated that the houses be titled in the woman's name, to ensure that she and her children could not be kicked out. Although this was not the case in Divina, such an action would be cause for the Fundación to take back a home from a Honduran male homeowner.⁴¹

Relocated community members also share other characteristics. Most residents of each community came from the same affected areas of Tegucigalpa.⁴² As found in my survey, more than 95% of residents came from Tegucigalpa (96% in Divina, 100% in España, and 95% in the other communities). Additionally, when residents who came after the first two years are filtered out, less than 1% of residents in Divina are not from Tegucigalpa and 2% of residents in the other 5 communities are from outside the capital. These statistics highlight that the two groups are indeed from the same pool of survivors in Tegucigalpa.

⁴¹ This cultural characteristic may also influence social health. One could speculate that the less machismo in a community, the more social cohesion and collective efficacy leading to less crime.

⁴² I did ask which neighborhood each resident lived in before Mitch and received over 120 different responses within Tegucigalpa. I then had a Tegucigalpa native sort through and code each neighborhood by level of affected area. Residents did come from similar areas/neighborhoods of Tegucigalpa.

Similarly, in order to obtain a home in either community, a person had to meet a minimum of two conditions: they must have lived in a condemned area that they could not return to, and they could not own any other property elsewhere. These conditions distill the pool further to citizens who were victims of the disaster and had nowhere else to live; in other words they had the status of disaster survivor. Those most likely to be in this group were residents who had lived on marginal land--along steep hillsides or near the Choluteca River.

Table 4.4 Suffering in Post-Mitch Living Situation

After the hurricane and in your new temporary home how was your life? Did you not suffer, suffered a little, or suffered a lot?			
	None	Some	A lot
<i>Macro-albergues</i> (Temporary Shelter)	13%	32%	55%
Family	42%	45%	12%
Rented an apartment	25%	47%	28%
In the same house	24%	51%	24%
Other	54%	25%	20%

People who were able to either immigrate (the “other” category) or live with families suffered the least, due in part because families provided practical support and familiarity after such loss. Those who were able either to stay in their same home or rent an apartment were equally split between not suffering at all and suffering a lot, with nearly half responding that they had suffered some.⁴³ Those in *macro-albergues* suffered significantly more than all others. This was affirmed by the various residents I met who spoke about the various *macro-albergues*. According to many residents, although some

⁴³ This was fascinating as I thought residents who were able to stay in their home would have suffered less. It was not until I visited Haiti and saw hundreds of families living in tents in front of their house due to fear of another earthquake that I realized the anxiety Hondurans had, that by living in their home in a high-risk zone, they also risk death.

were well-run and organized, others had rampant crime. Where people lived after the hurricane may have had an impact on their level of secondary trauma (see below), their expectations of the future community, and their social capital and civic participation (residents in the *macro-albergues* had to take care of each other and work to maintain the community).

Level of trauma

Trauma has been considered a significant hurdle to community recovery and development (Erikson 1976, 1994; Gill 2007). The post-disaster trauma literature has found that in many cases, the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) can affect anywhere between five and forty percent of survivors, depending much on the type and severity of the trauma⁴⁴. Goenjian et. al. (2000: 911) discovered that survivors of earthquakes and political violence are at a “high risk of developing severe and chronic posttraumatic stress reactions that are associated with chronic anxiety and depressive reactions.”⁴⁵ The table below demonstrates a much higher rate of survivor trauma than found in other reports.

⁴⁴ This number is highly volatile depending on methodology (North, Kawasaki, Spitznagel, and Hong 2004).

⁴⁵ Although earthquakes are not hurricanes, the literature often speaks of trauma as trauma, no matter the type of natural disaster.

Table 4.5 Types of Self-Reported Trauma by Community⁴⁶

Community	None	Psychological Emotional	Physical (bodily)	Material	Other+
Divina	25%	32%	5%	37%	1%
España	24%	29%	5%	41%	1%
Avg. 5 com.	22%	35%	5%	37%	1%

Z-score *.05, **.01
+ “Other” referred to the death of friends/family or economic loss.

None of the statistics above show a significant difference, meaning that there is no difference between the communities regarding the type of trauma they experienced.

Across the board about 75%+ of residents experienced some type of trauma, but España did not experience significantly more trauma than Divina, as had been expected.

Galea et. al. (2007) had a similar finding of severe trauma after Katrina, noting that there are significant and long-term effects that must be addressed. Others have found that trauma may not be a one-time event. Gill spoke about relocation as a secondary trauma experience by Hurricane Katrina survivors.

In New Orleans, however, prolonged social disruption and uncertainty combined with loss of resources, threats of resource loss, and a lack of return on resource investment have produced chronic individual stress characteristic of communities following technological disasters. Diminished social capital can increase individual stress, particularly when the fabric of social support that normally buffers individual stress is tattered (2007: 622).

Others found that although disasters often have a negative impact on psychological and material well-being, symptoms of trauma waned over time. Green et. al. (1990) found that PTSD in Buffalo Creek disaster survivors declined from 44% to 28% from 1974 to

⁴⁶ In one interview a community resident and leader explained that these numbers could be high as residents, believing they may receive resources, overestimate the trauma they experienced.

1986. Goenjian et. al. (2000) provide a lengthy literature review on the subject highlighting the lingering effects of trauma (PTSD, depression, and anxiety) in the case of survivors of the Mt. St. Helen's volcano eruption, noting that trauma abated, for many, after as few as three years, to lasting a lifetime for others (see also Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow 1991)⁴⁷.

Perhaps it was not the type, but the severity of the trauma, which is then carried with survivors to the next community. As Erikson (1974:185) explains

Secondary trauma can be defined as a blow to the social fabric of a community caused by inadequate responses to an initial hazard even and/or inadequate responses to secondary hazards. Events, occasions, or public perceptions that inhibit timely community recovery and prolong stress and disruption are examples of secondary trauma...impacts of secondary trauma are related to diminished social capital, a corrosive community, chronic stress and negative lifescape changes among individuals, and prolong social disruption in communities.

One would expect that the community with higher trauma severity would have a much more difficult time building the social aspects of community, and that this could contribute to explaining the different outcomes in communities.

To investigate whether this was true, I asked the following question "In your opinion, was your trauma [referring to the previous question of type of trauma]: very bad, bad, or normal?"⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Few long-term (10+ years) have been done to examine effects of disasters over time (Neria, Nandi, and Galea 2008).

⁴⁸ This self-reporting of trauma severity is common in the context of these communities.

Table 4.6 Severity of Trauma

Community	Very Bad	Bad	Normal
Divina	44%	27%	29%
España	42%	34%	24%
Avg. 5 com.	45%	28%	27%
Z-score *.05, **.01			

Interestingly, there is little difference in the severity of trauma. The only statistically significant

difference is between Divina and España in the category of bad trauma. More España residents had “bad” trauma, but the percentages are similar and with Divina having a higher very bad and a higher normal percentage, the differences were thusly tempered.

In addition, trauma has long-term consequences on people, and by association, on their community. Just as the level of trauma was asked of residents, so was whether or not they or any of their family continues to have lingering issues of trauma from the disaster (*secuelas de trauma del desastre*). Unexpectedly, it was Divina which had a higher rate (27%)⁴⁹ of lingering trauma than the other communities (21%) but not statistically different than España (23%).

Finally, perhaps the role of the NGO affected how residents were able to overcome the trauma. It stands to reason that if an NGO provided more resources to a community to deal with trauma, the community would have healthier outcomes. This, however, was not the case. The Red Cross brought in hundreds of support staff to the *macro-albergues* to provide different types of trauma therapy. One Red Cross staff member noted that this provided both positive and negative consequences. Many residents were helped by the process but the Red Cross was in such need that they hired unqualified people to maintain the training (Honduras as a nation does not have a highly

⁴⁹ Statistically significant at .05.

trained trauma therapy population and the ones who did have the training were in great demand after the hurricane). Yet, there were also many benefits as more people received more attention for their needs. The Fundación and other organizations also had programs, but did not have the breadth or the depth that the Red Cross provided. Table 4.7 illustrates that more España residents received trauma aid than any other community, which may have boosted their social health.

In sum, the type, severity, lasting effects of trauma, and NGO attention were not statistically significant, or were not broadly different enough to consider it a mechanism to

send the communities on divergent trajectories (although greater NGO support of España may have helped). Below we will look at physical health, as to whether it played a role in the community development process.

Health

One may conclude that the level of physical health of a community can lead to varied development paths. For example, a poorer community, one that has little money for food, medicine, or doctor visits, would also potentially claim worse social health. Similarly, people who have to spend great amounts of time working may not have the energy to engage or build community. We could also suspect that this type of environment would be mutually reinforcing—as physical health deteriorates, so does social health, and as social health deteriorates, it will lead to a worsening of physical

Table 4.7 Trauma and Organizational support

Did the organization help you deal with trauma [after Mitch]? (Yes)

Divina	27% **
España	44% **
Avg. 5 coms	19%
Z-score: *.05, **.01	

health (due to increases in crime, violence, abuse, etc.). In the Honduran communities, the theory would argue that Ciudad España may have had worse health to begin with and through the cyclical deterioration process, physical and social health should now be worse. This is not the case, however.

Since asking about people's physical health thirteen years ago would not acquire strong data, I asked residents about their physical health in

Table 4.8 “Generally, today your [physical] health is bad, normal, or good?”

	Bad	Normal	Good
Divina	13%	37%*	50%**
España	15%*	35%	50%**
Avg. 5 com.	9%	30%	61%
Z-score *.05, **.01			

the present (2009-10 when the survey was given). I was surprised to find that there were no differences between Divina and España residents. There were differences between Divina and España and the average of the other communities. The average resident in the other communities tends to believe they are in better health than either Divina or España residents.⁵⁰ Differences in physical health, then, are not believed to be a mechanism for the divergent paths.

Natural and Built Environment

Within the Amaratéca Valley sit seven of the new intentional communities built for Mitch survivors. Nestled in the western hills of the valley lie España and Divina. España is hidden from view tucked into a small bowl-shaped area of the pine-forested hills. Divina is visible from the highway that divides the valley and has fewer trees and is

⁵⁰ I have no clear idea about these differences in health. Perhaps there are differences in age among the communities. In my sample I checked for differences in age and between the communities there was either no or only a small significant difference in distribution. My sample, though, was not randomized by age.

hotter, as it is closer to the valley floor. Separated by less than three kilometers, there is no substantive difference in the geology or flora and fauna of the two areas.

As you turn west toward either Divina or España, more often than not you will be greeted by chickens, dogs or the occasional lost cow. In front of you stretch rows of identical red or gray brick homes, broken only by the occasional community building or park. Although the soil is poor, residents have found ways to encourage flowers and plants to grow in their yards, and those who have been more financially successful often add décor and paint to their home. To the unaware observer, the difference between the two is minimal in urban design. Each is centered around a *parque central*, a historical and culturally relevant design. All important offices are within a ten minute walk from any home in the community. Homes face one another, encouraging relationship between residents, and decreasing the opportunity for crime.

Indeed, in infrastructure, Divina and España are almost identical: parks, schools, community buildings, clinics, churches, roads, paths, electricity, sewage and drainage, and house types are identical in terms of functionality (see the appendix for similarities and differences between the physical environments in each community). Divina has the advantage of a central marketplace, where España has running water constantly.⁵¹

The Social Health of Tegucigalpa

Community social health, however, is a measure that cannot be disassociated from the national context. The question as to whether Divina, España, or both are outliers compared to the other Honduran communities, especially neighborhoods in

⁵¹ Divina has it three days a week for 6-8 hours at a time. It is also technically not potable, unlike España's water.

Tegucigalpa, is a worthy one. Unfortunately, of the six characteristics that I use to define social health, crime is the only concrete data that is available at the neighborhood level. This chapter will focus on three aspects of crime: homicide, gang membership, and corruption.

How does Divina and España do in comparison to their Tegucigalpa neighborhoods of origin? While a full answer to this question is outside the purview of this manuscript, I will begin this section by contextualizing the success of the communities via the characteristic of crime. The primary focus remains on crime for three reasons. First, Honduras has an incredible crime rate, especially in and around major cities. Over the last few years Honduras has either had the highest or second highest murder rate per capita in the world outside of warring countries (UN 2009). It defines how people act, when they can move about the city, who they can interact with and trust, where they can go, and what types of work they can accomplish. In short, crime shapes Honduran urban culture. Second, Tegucigalpa, the area where most resettled community members are from, is a hub of high crime. It makes sense then to compare the social health and crime rates of the new communities to that of Tegucigalpa to decide how successful the communities have been. Finally, as both longitudinal and social data are hard to come by in Honduras, crime statistics is one of the few concrete measures available. It is the only characteristic that can be used for comparison, without conducting surveys and interviews in Tegucigalpa neighborhoods - an inherently dangerous, difficult, and time-consuming proposal.

The *colonias* and *barrios* of Tegucigalpa are as diverse as they are numerous. Like most cities, some local areas are fairly intimate, where people know and look out for one another, while other districts have high residential turnover, are extraordinarily dangerous, and residents tend not to know each other at all. A history of gang problems in the city, an unreliable and corrupt police force, and high crime (Call 2000) have forced residents into voluntary seclusion in their homes, protected by steel garage doors, high walls with razor wire or broken glass shards embedded in the cement, and grated windows. As one Hoduran friend explained to me after returning from her first visit to the U.S., “The thing that surprised me the most in Los Angeles is that there are no walls around people’s houses.” Finding a home without high levels of security and protection is rare in Tegucigalpa.

Another Tegucigalpa resident, Bella, noted that in her upper-middle class neighborhood (Alta Miramontes), she did not really know any of her neighbors. When asked, she replied, “next door is a journalist, but we believe he had to leave for political reasons. Across the street we don't know him but they have many [social] parties. On the other side of us is a small family, I don't know their name. The rest of the houses I don't know either.” Bella maintains a family home that is standard for their neighborhood. The front gate is solid steel, about twelve feet high with electrical wire above. The walls of their home buttress the two homes next to theirs and also have electrical wire alongside the top of each cement wall. Finally they share a back wall with a neighbor on another street, and shards of metal and glass were inlaid in the cement of the fourteen foot high wall. Finally, a watchman roams the two hundred yard street 24

hours a day with a machete and cell phone (even though he often does not have minutes to call anyone) in case there are any problems. Although there are differences depending on neighborhood (the wealthier homes also include security cameras, guards, and even artillery while the poor may only have bars on the windows) the message is the same—crime is rampant and one must protect one's family.

The general experience in Tegucigalpa, whether as a foreigner or resident, is similar. During the day in any major city, one needs to be aware of their surroundings, who is around them, and where the nearest safe place is, whether it be a restaurant, a business, or even the middle of the street. At night, the streets are quiet. I know of no one who walks the streets in Tegucigalpa for any reason at night. Yet, no matter the time, the city is dangerous. Friends or friends of friends have been robbed at gunpoint in taxis, accosted and then chased into restaurants, shot at while driving, kidnapped for their ATM card, and sadly, raped. As of this writing (December 2011), the Peace Corps has plans to evacuate all 157 volunteers in January 2012 for an indefinite period (Peace Corp 2011). Additionally, the investigation found that 27% of Tegucigalpa residents have been a victim of crime, a rate more than 1.5 times higher than any other city or area in the country (Coleman and Argueta 2008).

Corruption

Like crime, corruption is also rampant. A 2008 study by Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and Vanderbilt University, with support from USAID, found that 34.5% of residents in Tegucigalpa have been a victim of corruption, a rate that is more than twice as high as any other city in the country. When asked about the number

of corrupt civil servants in the country, more than 70% of Honduras believed most public employees were corrupt (see table 3.11). Furthermore, when asked a similar question about the ability to bribe a police officer in order to prevent being detained, 40% noted that it would a high or very high possibility. If the answer “it depends on the situation” is added to the responses, 67% believe the police can be bribed (Latinobarometro 2011f). To put it in perspective, these numbers are higher than all of the neighboring countries except Guatemala (see also International Budget Partnerships 2010, La Tribuna 2010).

Table 4.9 National Honduran Perceptions of Corrupt Civil Servants (%)

No Civil servants are corrupt	< 2%
0-30% Civil servants are corrupt	4%
31-60% Civil servants are corrupt	22%
61-90% Civil servants are corrupt	25%
91-100% Civil servants are corrupt	48%

Homicide

Murders are also rising in Honduras. Currently ranked as the nation with the highest homicide rate per capita in the world, Honduras continues to struggle with violence, especially in the cities. A 2011 *Washington Post* article entitled “Honduras: The World’s Homicide Capital” graphically illustrates the problem the nation faces; 82.1 murders per every 100,000 residents nationally, and homicides tripling since 1995. Even in comparison to its neighbors (El Salvador [66], Guatemala [41], Mexico [18], and Costa Rica [11]), Honduras is extremely violent. Perhaps the most illustrative example is Honduras’ southern neighbor. Even after a major multi-decade civil war, Nicaragua only has one-sixth (13 per 100,000) the murder rate of Honduras (Wikipedia 2011). To address this rising problem, in November 2011, President Sosa Lobo also sent the

military to patrol the streets of San Pedro Sula and Tegucigalpa in order to curb the violence and crime that has been overtaking the country (Stone 2011). These changes have affected citizens; Hondurans are losing hope. Blanca Alvarez, whose child was murdered, exclaimed, “We are living in constant fear. Nothing is going to change here. Nothing.”⁵²

Even I was not immune to the growing violence. On December 23, 2011 my friend Marco, who I knew from soccer and from a church I attended in Tegucigalpa, was murdered. He was on a daily route of collecting weekly payments from small restaurants for chicken bought from his company. He does not wear flashy jewelry and drives an older car. In a supposedly safe part of Comayaguela in the afternoon, he was held up while driving, shot to death in his car, and robbed. Marco, a good man, leaves two adolescent children and a wife. I know, more than ever, the pessimism and hopelessness felt by many Hondurans that things are not going to change.

Social Capital

The seclusion necessitated by the high crime and murder rates makes social capital a rare quality in Tegucigalpa *colonias*. People who have lived next each other for years may know their neighbors’ faces and perhaps their name and occupation, but are otherwise strangers. There are few examples of community gatherings, celebrations, barbeques or even sports teams based on geographic proximity, in part because of the necessity of long hours of work (little leisure time), and in part because it is dangerous to

⁵² See also the IDB report by Buvinic, Morrison and Shifter (1999) and Caldera’s 2006 book “Prevencion de Maras Y Pandillas: Realidad y Desafios,” which the author mentioned is the only book written on Honduran gangs.

be out at night. Rather, social capital is built and maintained based on beliefs, values, and family. In my experience, Tegucigalpa residents spend their time with family, work associates, or members of the same church, but rarely with their neighbors.

The same goes for other social health variables such as collective efficacy, community vision, civic participation, and even political or local agency to create change. Fear of crime and distrust of law enforcement enforce a social isolation for many, as citizens are forced to jump from safe home bubble to safe work bubble to safe shopping bubble and finally a return to the safe home bubble. In each bubble (except the home) there are security guards. This social isolation and anomie of the city (that existed both pre- and post-Mitch) contrasts starkly with the ways in which community members speak about their own experience within the new communities. Highlighting these differences will illustrate where residents came from and where they end up in terms of local social health.

Are residents better off than in Tegucigalpa?

A primary question is how the two communities stand in comparison to their city of origin. Relocation continues to be debated among scholars, most of whom view it as problematic and difficult to do well. Najarian et. al. (2001) found that relocated women had higher levels of PTSD than women who remained in their original location. Boeni and Jigyasuii (2005) discovered that after the Indonesia Earthquake and Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004), the Bam Earthquake (2003) and the Gujarat Earthquake (2001), relocation was often done without the proper cultural and ecological consideration necessary to maintain healthy communities. Jha (2010: 182), on behalf of the World

Bank, highlighted that “Relocation disrupts lives and should be kept to a minimum.”

Yet, many of these studies were done within a few years of the disaster and therefore do not offer a long-term assessment of relocation.

My findings showcase that when relocated residents are asked to evaluate their lives before the earthquake, and also when the survey was taken (11 years later), most residents claimed that their lives were either equal to or better than their previous neighborhood.⁵³ Divina residents, in particular, are distinguished as having the best social health of all of the communities. The following graphs and tables detail the responses of more than 1,900 residents in seven post-disaster new intentional communities.

Residents were asked to compare their lives and neighborhoods to where they had lived before Mitch. The following tables specifically delineate that the vast majority of residents believe the social health of their community is either the same or better than it had been in Tegucigalpa.

Table 4.10 Differences in Delinquency

In comparison to the community where you lived before Mitch, is the delinquency in the community less, equal, or more?			
	less	same	more
Divina	95% **	4% **	1%
España	68% **	19% *	13% *
Avg. 5 coms.	80%	13%	6%
Z score .05*, .01 **			

⁵³ Since conducting surveys in 130 neighborhoods in Tegucigalpa was not feasible, I asked residents to compare their life now to their previous life in Tegucigalpa. These questions provide insight into resident opinions about the past, present, and future of their community respectively.

In regards to delinquency, which could arguably be the most important characteristic given that Honduras has the highest homicide rate in the world, an average of the seven communities yields that 93% of residents believe that delinquency is lower or the same than in their previous community. This is a significant improvement of livelihoods in comparison to Tegucigalpa. Divina, especially, showcases the possibility, where 95% of residents now see less crime than previously.

Table 4.11 Differences in Participation

In comparison to the community where you lived before Mitch, your participation in the community is: less, equal, or more?			
	less	equal	more
Divina	8% **	29% **	63% **
España	28%	33% **	39%
Avg. 5 coms.	23%	43%	34%
Z score .05*, .01 **			

Table 4.13 also shows that, for the majority, most resident participation has also either increased or stayed the same. Community participation has been found to have numerous benefits for society, including decreased crime, higher social cohesion, and greater involvement in politics.

This, of course, makes sense. Living in a much smaller area that is removed from the city, maintains less violence, and is encouraged by the sponsoring NGO, there should be a difference in participation. The difference in participation can be seen more as a commentary on the anomie in Tegucigalpa than the strengths of these communities. Across the board, most residents increased their participation illustrating that they have a desire to do so but may have felt unable to in their Tegucigalpa neighborhood.

Table 4.12 Change in Trust

In comparison to the community where you lived before Mitch, your trust in your neighbors is less, equal, or more?			
	less	equal	more
Divina	13%	29% **	58% **
España	20% *	40%	40%
Avg. 5 coms.	13%	44%	43%
Z score .05*, .01 **			

Additionally, trust increased for at least forty percent of each community, and more than 80% of residents said their trust was equal to or greater than in their community of origin. This is a substantial improvement. Yet, Divina again is distinguished, as nearly sixty percent of residents in Divina trust their neighbors more now. This is a phenomenally high number, which provide dividends for other social health variables such as participation and lower crime.

This trust was also clearly apparent within the communities. Comparing the neighborhoods in which I spent time in Tegucigalpa, there was a much greater sense of people knowing one another and trusting one another. Residents knew each other, would wave to one another, have neighbors watch the kids for a minute, or share goods when times were difficult. The markets and pulperias are another good example. People would often buy on credit from vendors as everyone knew everyone and the community shared a common social capital. In Tegucigalpa, this was much less the case, possibly due to the high crime and violence barriers forcing people to live behind walls and barred windows (see Pine 2008: Ch. 1).

Table 4.13 Differences in Employment

Is your employment worse, equal, or better than your employment before the hurricane?			
	worse	equal	better
Divina	30%	27% **	43% **
España	41% *	34% **	25%
Avg. 5 coms.	34%	43%	23%
Z score .05*, .01 **			

Employment as well is equal or better for most, this despite the fact that 1997(3.2%) and 1998 (4.0%) had lower unemployment rates than in 2009 (4.6%) (Econstats 2010)⁵⁴.


Again, Divina stands out as gaining better employment while 41% of España residents now have worse employment.

Although each community varies on each specific indicator, most residents (63%) in all seven communities believe their lives are better now and nearly 90% of residents believe their lives are the same or better than their lives before Mitch⁵⁵. This is a positive sign for development workers and NGOs; in general, residents see the relocation as positive overall.

⁵⁴ Unemployment is counted differently depending on the organization. These statistics are in conflict with others although they originate from the IMF.

⁵⁵ Some argue that this is a result of time rather than place. I take resident opinions more literally. Since the past is continually being constructed, opinions ebb and flow. In late 2009 when the survey was taken, residents believed their lives were better (see Johnson and Sherman 1990 for more on past reconstruction).

Figure 4.1 In comparison to your life generally before Mitch, your life today is:



While the majority of residents from all communities believe their life is better than before Mitch, there are inter-community differences. Graph 3.16 illustrates a significant disparity between Divina, the group average of five other communities, and España. Twice as many residents from España proclaim their lives as worse than residents from Divina or from the group average. Divina also had the highest level of life change from pre- to post-Mitch. This is surprising, given that based on their socio-economic level, the move was not as big of a change as it was for poorer residents. This difference may illustrate that the social aspects of community are even more important than the physical infrastructure.

Other opinions also support the finding that resettlement has been positive for most residents. Both the Fundación and the Red Cross stressed the belief that their respective community was to be a model, an example for the country, and perhaps for the world. Residents moving in were made aware of this fact from the very beginning; they were moving into an experiment of sorts but one in which they would be provided with significant resources in order to live better lives. To ascertain the success of this

endeavor through resident opinion, I asked whether or not they live in a model community. The results are below. Positively, a majority of residents in Divina and España noted that they live in a model community, connoting at least some appreciation for where they live.

While the first two graphs illustrate resident satisfaction in comparison to the past, and residents' current belief about the type of community they live in, the

Table 4.14 Model Community
Do you believe your community is a model community for the country? (YES)

Divina	88% **
España	72% **
Avg. 5 coms.	46%
Z score .05*, .01**	

following question investigates opinions about the future. When asked whether their “community is headed on a bad, good⁵⁶, or very good path?” residents overwhelmingly chose a good path. Seen as the middle road, they are not negative about the communities' future but are not zealously positive about it, either.

Table 4.15 Outlook on Community Future

Is the community headed on a bad, good, or very good path?

Community	Bad	Good	Very Good
Divina (N=433)	11% **	62%	27% **
España (N=479)	22% *	69%	10%
Avg. 5 other communities (N=926)	27%	67%	7%
Z score .05*, .01**			

Again, there is a noticeable and statistically significant difference between Divina and España in the other two categories. Divina residents are much more positive about their communities' future than España residents. This optimism may showcase that

⁵⁶ The translation of “*bien*” can mean good, fine, or well in the sense: “How are you?” “I am fine.” It is an in-between state.

Divina is a better place to live with a higher prognosis of success from the residents' viewpoints.

Resident perception is also similar to the national progress of the Honduras. LAPOP (LatinoBarometro 2011g) asks Hondurans about their perception of the

Table 4.16 Perceptions of National Progress

Progressing	11%
Standstill	55%
Decline	34%

progress of the country. Is it progressing, standing still, or declining? Table 4.17 from 2008 demonstrates that most Honduran citizens are not overly optimistic about their nation's momentum. Comparatively, community residents are more confident in their community's development than that of their nation, also a positive sign for the communities.

Where residents arrived from may also have had an impact. As can be seen from the table below, residents from each community came from different living arrangements after Mitch.

Table 4.17 Post-Mitch Living Situation

Where did you live after Hurricane Mitch but before moving into your current community?

	<i>Macro-albergues</i> (Temporary Shelter)	Rented an apartment	In the same house	Family	Other ⁵⁷
Divina	15% **	34% **	23% **	22%	5%
España	47%	24%	11%	14% **	4%
Avg. 5 com.	43%	24%	8%	21%	5%
Z score .05*, .01 **					

Divina residents come from significantly different post-Mitch circumstances than the average. Residents may have had better opportunities either to rent an apartment or to live in the same house, and thus avoid living in the *macro-albergues*, where residents

⁵⁷ Other refers to residents who may have immigrated abroad or left the area.

suffered the most. Although this issue did not come up often in conversations, it may illustrate that the Divina residents had greater initial wealth than those of España.

The Social Health of España and Divina

As noted earlier crime levels in Honduras are high, both in Tegucigalpa and nationally. The question, then, is whether or not España, Divina and the five other communities follow suit. One would expect that new communities could go in either direction. With significant support from NGOs it seems that communities could break the mold and live more peacefully than their established neighbors. Or, without support, a community could quickly fall into chaos and lose the ability to self-govern or control residents (as happened in La Joya). The following section will discuss the social health outcomes of España and Divina.

España

According to Don Jose, Ciudad España suffers from *mala fama* (a bad reputation). The media, especially newspaper articles, exacerbated the crime problems in the community for their own monetary gain. As I was speaking with friends and other professionals in Tegucigalpa concerning my work, many were concerned. I was told that it was too dangerous for anyone, let alone a gringo, to enter these communities, including España. Indeed, the only way my sponsoring organization permitted me to originally visit the community was to be accompanied by a woman who was well-known through the valley for her participation in the Catholic Church.

The fear was not unfounded. The España community has suffered its share of criminal activity including gang violence. Two incidences stand out. The first was a

story told by residents and confirmed by the police. A woman was caught up in drugs, possibly with her boyfriend. To make an example out of her, gang members killed her, cut her into little pieces, and attempted to flush her down a toilet (Claudia 2009). Other homicides in the community include a double murder, an intentional drowning, massive trauma to the head with a blunt object, and shootings (Ciudad España police reports 2004-2010). The second story was shared by officer Valladares (2009). He described a situation in España in which the police received complaints about a loud party late at night. One officer went to check out the problem, leaving the other officer at the station. When the officer approached the door where the party was located, he was accosted by a drunk man, also the owner of the home. As the officer began to take the man away to the station, the drunk man's family members surrounded them, and the son of the drunk man stabbed the officer in the back. None of the family was ever charged with a crime. "Now," officer Valladares added, "we don't go anywhere by ourselves." Indeed, anytime I saw the officers outside of the station they wore bulletproof vests, carried handguns, and on occasion they were also armed with semi-automatic rifles.

Upon arriving and spending time in Ciudad España, I realized the *mala fama* that Don Ricardo had described was indeed only a bad reputation. The city itself is quiet for the most part, with kids playing soccer in the street and women walking to visit friends, holding colorful umbrellas to protect them from the sun. Walking the perimeter and up and down almost every street, and interviewing individuals from throughout the community, I felt comfortable in España almost all of the time. Notwithstanding the story above, even officer Valladares (2009) admitted that "People say Ciudad España is

much worse than it actually is.” Padre Eduardo and Padre Carlitos echoed this sentiment. Eduardo, a Christian minister in España, lived in the *macro-albergues* with the people and moved to the community with them. He explained that due to his extroversion, his occupation, and his coaching of local soccer teams, he has never had a problem with any residents. Similarly, the Catholic priest Fr. Carlitos has always felt comfortable, even arriving late at night to visit someone dying or leaving late after being invited to dinner.

When they see my car...all of the youth [say] ‘Here comes Father,’ ‘See you later Father,’ ‘Give me a ride Father,’ and so I am not afraid... When I go to Ciudad España, sometimes I arrive at eleven at night because I ate with a family after mass, and no, I have not been afraid. I see the youth when I enter Ciudad España and I am not afraid. ‘[They tell me] ‘There are groups [gangs], Father, be careful.’ But, no, I believe in talking to the young person, saying hello, creating friendships.

Don Rudy, the director of the waterworks in España, and Don Pablo, a leather artisan in España, also feel *tranquilo* (calm) in the community. When asked about crime, they both mentioned that they have always felt safe in the community.

My most recent visit to Ciudad España reaffirmed the feeling. My friend Ernesto accompanied me to España on a regular afternoon in August 2011. He is a security guard in Divina, but has lived most of his life in one of the nearby villages in the valley. I had asked him to join me in the trip as I would be driving there in another friend’s car, and Pastor Eduardo and other valley residents had warned that the community had become even more dangerous since I was last there in May 2010 (following the national trend). The visit took me through about 60% of the town as I located friends and interviewees, as well as took photos I had missed during my previous stay. More than once Ernesto under his breath would tell me to “Be careful” or “Look out for those guys” as we walked

between meetings. It was clear that he was much more uncomfortable than I was; whether this was due to my ignorance and his wisdom, or my familiarity and his understanding of the community based on *mala fama*, was difficult to tell.⁵⁸

Divina

In comparison, Divina was not well-known outside of the valley, due in part because of its smaller size and in part because it did not have the international fanfare of España⁵⁹. The reputation within the valley, according to residents in La Joya, Ciudad España and San Miguel Archangel, was that it was a very nice community, a wealthier community, although most people I spoke with had never been there. Having spent time in the community five years earlier and being reassured by the Fundación that things had not changed, I felt very comfortable returning to Divina and using it as my home base community for the nine month long ethnographic portion of study.

One of my first activities in the community was to speak with the police. I found the station and police officers to be significantly different than those of España. In España, the police station was set apart from the community and had a foreboding feel. An eight foot high chain link fence surrounded the compound. In order to obtain the attention of the officers, a resident had to bang the chain lock against the fence and an officer would come out to hear the problem and possibly let the person in. In Divina, the approximate location of the station was similar to España, not in the center of town, but not on the periphery either. The station, though, had no fence around it, and the front

⁵⁸ It should also be noted that I did not live in España and therefore I was always more comfortable in Divina than España.

⁵⁹ Ciudad España has been heralded as a major success story by the IFRC.

door was often left wide open, even when the police were out on patrol. More than once I found myself sitting inside the front room for a half hour before an officer returned. The actions of the officers in the community were also different. Only about half of the time I ran into an officer in the community was he (there were only men officers) armed with a handgun. I also only rarely saw them in bulletproof vests (and usually only the new officers wore them) and as one resident remarked to me with humor, “The only thing the police do around here is hit on our girls.”

The energy of Divina was also different. There had been no homicides in the community, a fact in which residents found great pride. There were no back alleys and no extended threatening glances from groups of young men. My partner also felt very comfortable taking walks around the community with our six-month-old multiple times a day and night. She only once had a negative encounter with a bus employee, who was high on drugs at the time. In contrast, I would have not have been at ease allowing them to walk unaccompanied in España and would have never have condoned them strolling the streets at night; I would not have done so myself. Four questions in the survey also confirm that this sentiment is not only a gringo perspective, but shared by community residents as well.

Table 4.18 Resident Feelings of Security in the Community⁶⁰

Survey Questions	Divina	España	Avg. of 5 com.
1. Have you or another family member been a victim of crime in your community?	Yes: 7%	Yes: 10%	Yes: 10%
2. How do you feel in the community: Not secure [1], somewhat secure [2] Very secure [3]?	1: 2% 2: 17% ** 3: 80% **	1: 6% 2: 30% 3: 64%	1: 6% 2: 33% 3: 61%
3. Are you afraid to go out at night [in your community]?	Yes: 6% **	Yes: 24% *	Yes: 19%
4. In comparison to the community where you lived before Mitch, is the delinquency in the community: less [1], equal [2], or more [3]?	1: 95% ** 2: 4% ** 3: 1% **	1: 68% ** 2: 19% * 3: 13% *	1: 80% 2: 13% 3: 6%
Z-test significance: *.05, **.01 compared to avg. of 5 communities.			

Although there were more crime events per capita in España, there was no statistical difference between Divina and España, or either community and the average of the other post-Mitch intentional communities. This is intriguing, as we would expect the victim rate to be higher in España, as they have had a higher reported crime rate. It remains unclear why the victim rate would be the same while reported crimes and feelings of security would be so different. This will be developed further in chapter seven.

In the question concerning how secure one feels in the community, España is not much different than the average. This may provide insight into the question of *mala fama*. España is not worse off in terms of perception of security in comparison to neighboring intentional communities, and is arguably significantly better than Tegucigalpa, as results are seen in question four. Residents in Divina, however, feel significantly safer, with four-fifths of residents feeling very secure and almost everyone

⁶⁰ Many of these questions came originally from Sampson's Chicago neighborhood study.

else feeling somewhat secure. In one of the most violent non-warring countries in the world, this is a noteworthy achievement.

Similarly, whether or not people are afraid to go out at night is also a considerable facet, illustrating that Divina residents feel safer in their community than España residents, or residents of the other communities. This is worth mentioning especially in light of the fact that there is almost no difference in crime victimization. Even with similar levels of crime, one explanation of the difference in feeling secure could be the types of crime realized in each community, as seen in the next section.

Crime

Turning to the actual crime statistics of Divina and España⁶¹, there is also a significant difference between communities. España has a much higher crime rate in general than Divina, except for theft and kidnappings. Homicide is the crime that stands out most significantly. Divina residents recognize that their community is an outlier in this regard, and I heard it repeated at almost every town gathering I attended. Leaders would announce almost every meeting “We have yet to have a violent death in our community,” as an exclamation point for the need to vote, the importance of community building, or paying the bill to fix the road. It was both a sense of pride, cohesion, and motivation to continue doing whatever necessary to keep the community free of violent crime.

⁶¹ Of the five communities there was either no police station, criminal records had been lost, or criminal record requests were denied.

Table 4.19 Criminal Activity in Divina and España--01/2004 to 12/2009
(Actual number of events in parentheses)

	# of crimes per 1,000 people**	Average # of crimes per year**	Murders per 1,000**	Kidnappings per 1,000**	Rapes per 1,000**	Thefts per 1,000**
Divina	95.4	42	0.0 (0)	0.7 (2)	0.7 (2)	12.1 (34)
España	270.7	116	3.42+ (20)	0.514 (3)	1.37 (8)	8.9 (52)

Z-test significance: *.05, **.01
 +The homicide rate in España (.49) averaged annually is still half of that in Tegucigalpa (1.13) (Honduras Weekly 2011), and nationally (.821) (Washington Post 2011).

España residents, however, felt very differently. Spending, on average, one day a week in España, there were streets and areas that I would actively circumvent, even after dozens of visits. I was told by residents to avoid these streets—streets with young men gambling on the side of a house and the smell of marijuana. Whether the danger was real or perceived, my instincts reinforced my desire to evade the area. Interestingly, Nina (2009), a resident of España who shared a home with her mother, sister and nephew, explained to me that since living in the community they have never left their home unoccupied. Someone was always at the house. The family believed that leaving the house empty was an invitation for thieves to enter and take the little that they own. Indeed, after their next door neighbor moved out, the house was stripped bare—electrical wires, faucets, roof tiles--anything not cemented down. Although many neighbors know who stole these resources, no one called the police for fear of retribution.

While Divina has less crime statistically, it does have its share of crime. In visiting a house where residents had recently moved out due to a marriage in the family, it was also stripped of electrical wire, windows, and tubing within a week.

Figure 4.2 Abandoned Stripped España home



Table 4.20 Delinquency—Young people causing trouble

In your community, groups of young people in the streets causing trouble is not a problem, is a small problem, or a large problem?			
	not a problem	a small problem	a large problem
Divina	31% **	28%	41% **
España	12% **	19% **	69% **
Avg. 5 com.	20%	29%	52%
Z score *.05, **.01			

Other concerns of delinquency were also found in the survey as seen in Table 4.21 above. Comparing Divina and España for example, there is nearly a 30% difference in concern about groups of young people (*jovenes*) as a large problem. As has been well-documented, delinquency follows a skewed bell curve over time peaking in the late 20s and declining after 30 (FBI 2011). Concern with young people causing problems illustrates that there may be greater underlying issues not being addressed such as unemployment.

This notable difference is one that affects more than crime victims; it affects the entire atmosphere of a community. When nearly 70% of residents see young people as a large problem, it changes interactions between older residents and the youth. As described by Sampson and Groves (1989), this may also have an effect on the social organization of community structures, creating a cycle of distrust, broken social networks, crime, and further distrust. I was warned not to visit particular areas of communities due to the clear fact that there were youth doing drugs and gambling. Even during the day I would often avoid certain streets or walkways due to a concern for my own safety.

Table 4.21 Delinquency—selling of drugs and alcohol

In the community, the selling and use of drugs and alcohol not a problem, is a small problem, or a large problem?			
	not a problem	a small problem	a large problem
Divina	17% **	22% *	61% **
España	3%	8% **	89%
Avg. 5 com.	6%	16%	78%
Z score *.05, **.01			

Table 4.22 Delinquency—Graffiti

In your community, graffiti on the walls is not a problem, is a small problem, or a large problem?			
	not a problem	a small problem	a large problem
Divina	6%	28% **	65% **
España	4%	14% *	82%
Avg. 5 com.	4%	18%	77%
Z score *.05, **.01			

Similarly, drugs and graffiti also illustrate deeper social issues. As with young people causing problems, there is a much larger concern about the selling of drugs and alcohol (illegal in all communities) and graffiti. This is supported by my own

observations wherein I ran into numerous drunk or high men in España much more often than in Divina. Graffiti, however, was different. Following Sampson's methodology to investigate physical signs, I asked a research assistant to walk every block in all seven communities, marking the number of times she saws signs of physical or social disorder. Surprisingly, the results were almost insignificant between the communities, especially between España and Divina. It is unclear why Divina residents may be less concerned about it than their counterparts, except that it may be due not to the quantity of the graffiti but rather the "quality." The type of graffiti, whether it is adolescent angst, pride in their soccer club, or gang markings, would potentially increase or decrease concern depending on the source and meaning. With the ubiquity and growing numbers of gang membership, perhaps community levels of concern about graffiti point out deeper social issues.

Police, corruption, and reporting

The statistics above must also be taken in context. One would expect there to be less crime in a community with more police per capita, which was often the case in Divina. One may also expect that the likelihood of crime reporting would also rise in the belief that there are active police in the community, which is not the case. A previous study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (Hart and Rennison 2003) has shown that violent crime is more likely to be reported than non-violent or property crime. Other studies have noted, in contrast, that rape is often underreported (Koss and Gidycz 1895; Koss 1992), which may illustrate why the two have similar levels.

Table 4.23 Number of police and confidence in the police

	# of full-time police per 1,000 residents	Do you feel you can report a crime that happens in the community? (Yes)
Divina	.35-.71 (1-2)	86%**
España	.34 (2)	62%
Avg. 5 coms.	(0-2)	67%
Z-test significance: *.05, **.01		

Crime, however, is rarely reported. According to police officer Valladares (2009),

There is at least seven times more crime that actually is reported. The crimes that are reported are usually the less significant crimes. People do not want to offend anyone as the police might tell the criminal who reported them and the criminal would take revenge.

Even with these dreary statistics, Divina residents feel much more comfortable reporting crime than España residents, as seen in Table 3.24. There is a 24% gap between Divina residents who feel they can go to the police concerning a crime, which hints that underreporting is common in España. In light of this, and of concerns about retribution, España's crime may actually be much higher than reported.

This sentiment was supported by many interviewees. As I was leaving, an incident illustrated this point. A Honduran engineer, Julio, was asked to work in a remote post-Mitch resettlement called Nuevo Sacramento. He had worked there dozens of times over the last five years and had visited once a week over the previous two months to check on the construction of a soccer field for the community. In April 2010, as he was

leaving the community, a man stood in the middle of the road pointing a gun at the windshield. Rather than stop and get robbed (possibly including the theft of his car), Julio hit the gas and the man shot twice at him missing both times. Julio decided not to go to the police for fear that the man would find out and come looking for him in retribution.⁶²

This was not a unique incident. Multiple residents from each community had little to no faith in the police, noting that they are *en la cama* (in bed with) the thieves. To illustrate the reality of this concern, in November 2011, one-hundred and seventy-six top Honduran police officers were recently fired; and a half dozen put into custody for charges connected to corruption and theft of government property including 300 automatic rifles with ammunition (BBC 2011). In 2010, the LAPOP survey found that when Hondurans are asked about their level of confidence in the police (on a four point Likert scale from not at all to very much), 68% of Honduras said they had little to no confidence (Latinobarometro 2011e).

Community Effect

To check as to whether perceptions of crime and security were a community effect, I also asked residents to compare current delinquency to the delinquency in the community in which they had lived before. This question enables a better comparison, as many of the residents from Divina and España came from the same pre-Mitch neighborhoods in Tegucigalpa. The difference is astounding. 96% of residents in Divina believe their community has less delinquency, while only 80% in the five communities

⁶² See also Consultoria 2011 “La Policia Bajo la Lupa.”

and 68% in España feel similarly. The opposite is also significant. Only 1% of residents in Divina believe there is now more delinquency, compared to 6% in the five communities and 13% in España.

In sum, the average Divina resident feels considerably safer in their community than the average España resident. They have had less crime, less severe crime, and feel more comfortable reporting crimes, all of which may have a multiplying effect on future security and crime issues.

Other Social Health Characteristics

Although the focus of this chapter thus far has been on crime, two other variables also reflect differences in the social health of each community. Drawing heavily on Sampson, Raderbuesh, and Earls (1997), I use the concepts of collective efficacy (social cohesion and trust [social capital] combined with informal social control). In addition, I investigate civic community levels of participation in searching for similarities and differences.

Thomas (2007) defines the value and necessary characteristics of collective efficacy at the neighborhood level.

The willingness of local residents to intervene for the common good depends in large part on conditions of mutual trust and solidarity among neighbors. Indeed, one is unlikely to intervene in a neighborhood context in which the rules are unclear and people mistrust or fear one another. It follows that socially cohesive neighborhoods will prove the most fertile contexts for the realization of informal social control. In sum, it is the linkage of mutual trust and the willingness to intervene for the common good that defines the neighborhood context of collective efficacy.

To address some of the issues of crime and corruption noted above, a valuable explanation is collective efficacy. The creation of cohesive neighborhoods and communal efforts at informal social control provide dividends of decreased criminal activity. In the cases of Divina and España, a clear pattern appears; as collective efficacy increases, crime decreases.

Beginning with the ideas of community social cohesion and trust, Sampson, Radebuesh and Earls (1997) describe the concept as represented by five conceptually related items. Drawing on variables utilized in the Chicago crime study, community residents were asked the following questions in our survey on a yes-no basis or four level scale: “Do you believe your neighbors share the same values as you do; Is there a sense of living in community?; Is the community disunited, united, or very united?; If you had a need, do you think your neighbor would help you?; Recognizing somebody from the community is: very difficult, difficult, easy, or very easy?; how easy is it to recognize someone who is NOT from the community: very difficult, difficult, easy, or very easy?” The results are shown below.

Table 4.24 Collective Efficacy 1

	Do you believe your neighbors share the same values as you do? (Yes)	Is there a sense of living in community? (Yes)
Divina	54%	93%
España	32% **	87%
Avg. 5 com.	53%	89%
Z score *.05, **.01		

For shared values and a sense of living in community, the only significant difference is that España residents believe they have greater value heterogeneity within

their community than their counterparts do. This could be due in part to the size of the community, the different *macro-albergues* from which residents arrived, or the type of social development implemented by the Red Cross. This may also influence other characteristics of the community, such as social capital and informal social control.

Table 4.25 Collective Efficacy 2

	Recognizing somebody from the community is (%):				Recognize someone who is NOT from the community?			
	very difficult	difficult	easy	very easy	very difficult	difficult	easy	very easy
Divina	3	13**	62	22**	5	16**	51	29**
España	11	35**	50**	4	14*	49**	32**	5
Avg. 5 com.	6	25	65	4	8	38	49	6
Z score *.05, **.01								

Like table 4.26 above, Divina and España are differentiated by how easy or difficult it is to recognize somebody from or not from the community. In short, 84% of Divina residents find it easy or very easy to recognize someone from the community while only 54% in España and 69% in the other communities feel the same. As for those not from the community, 80% of Divina residents find this easy or very easy while 37% of España residents and 55% of the communities believe this. This is also supported by my own observations of the communities where residents often acknowledged their neighbors by name, while in España and the other communities this occurred less often. This difference could be due in part to the size of the community, although all of the communities other than España were smaller than Divina, illustrating that other mechanisms must also be at play.

Table 4.26 Collective Efficacy 3

	If you had a need, do you think your neighbor would help you?	Is the community disunited, united, or very united?		
		Yes	not united	semi-united
Divina	88%	11%**	58%**	31%**
España	74%**	31%	46%	23%
Avg. 5 com.	84%	32%	46%	23%
Z score *.05, **.01				

Finally table 4.27 highlights the feeling of service to one's neighbor and the feelings toward the broader unity of the community. The differences are found in the former in España, and the latter in Divina, using the average of the five communities as reference. In service, about 14% less España residents felt the desire to help a neighbor in need than in Divina. Additionally, España as a community felt equally united as the average, but much less united than Divina. The repercussions of this may have an impact on social capital and social control, and possibly in civic participation.

Table 4.27 Current Social Capital

How much do you trust your neighbors: not at all, a little, a lot? **			
	not at all	a little	a lot
Divina	7%	35%**	57%**
España	19%*	43%	38%
Avg. 5 com.	12%	49%*	39%
Z score *.05, **.01			

I also wanted to find out what the difference was between the communities as it came to basic trust. Surveys reveal that Divina residents identify with much more trust than the average, and especially more so than España. As noted earlier, the ramifications of the lack of trust could play a major role in how residents work together for the betterment of the community.

Informal Social Control

Again using the seminal work of Sampson, Raderbuesh and Earls (1997) as a foundation, residents were asked about the likelihood of them or their neighbor working for the protection or benefit of the community. Called informal social control, the concept maintains that when residents work as individuals to protect the community, the community has a greater chance for successful social health. “Informal social control” was represented by five questions using a three-item Likert-type scale or yes-no answers. (“Do you think, in general: your neighbors control their children bad, well, or very well; your neighbors send their kids to school almost never, usually, or almost always; If someone was trying to sell drugs to your children or other children in the community, would your neighbors stop them?; If a thief entered your house do you think a neighbor would do something to stop them?”).

Table 4.28 Informal Social Control 1

	Do you think, in general, your neighbors control their children bad, well, or very well?			Do you think, in general, your neighbors send their kids to school almost never, usually, or almost always?		
	Bad	Well	Very Well	almost never	sometimes	almost always
Divina	11%	57%	32%	0%	7%	93%
España	18% **	53% **	30%	1%	9%	90%
Avg. 5 com.	8%	64%	28%	1%	9%	91%
Z score *.05, **.01						

The only difference between the two questions above was the level of control residents believed their neighbors had over their children. Although España did have a significant difference, the difference was small compared to Divina. Due to the differences in criminal activity, one theory might have been that the informal social

control measures found important by Sampson et. al. would have been significantly different. This lack of difference could be due to a number of reasons. Perhaps they do care for their children in the same way even though this does not coincide with the crime statistics. Maybe there was a definitional misunderstanding as I used the Spanish word *niños* which means kids rather than the word *jovenes* which means adolescents. Kids are much easier to control and send to school than adolescents.

Table 4.29 Informal Social Control 2

	If someone was trying to sell drugs to your children or other children in the community, would your neighbors stop them? (Yes)	If a thief entered your house do you think a neighbor would do something to stop them? (Yes)
Divina	85%*	85%*
España	66%	65%
Avg. 5 com.	79%	79%
Z score *.05, **.01		

The questions asked in table 4.30 were asked on the survey in the order they appear and seem to obtain almost identical results. A significantly larger majority of Divina residents (20% more than España) trust that their neighbor would intervene either to protect their children or their home. This illustrates a much higher level of social trust and cohesion—more evidence supporting the differential in social health thesis.

Table 4.30 Civic Participation

	Divina	España	Avg. 5 coms
Did you participate in any formation offered by the [NGO name] or other organization in the community? (Yes)	38% **	24%	17%
Two years ago there was a soccer tournament in the com. Did you or someone from your home participate? (Yes)	43% **	28% *	N/A+
Do you vote? (Yes)	72% **	56%	58%
Do you participate in any community organization? (Yes)	36% **	16%	13%
Do you participate in the church? (Yes)	49% **	43% **	57%
Are you involved in classes, projects or activities in the community? (Yes)	37% **	17%	17%
If there was a service project in the community, would you participate? (Yes)	88%	95%	92%
Z score *.05, **.01 compared to avg. 5 coms. +Not all five of the communities held a soccer tournament in 2007.			

Finally, civic participation is also notably different. There are essentially three time periods being referenced in this set of questions. The first two questions ask whether in the past the person has participated either with NGO formations (capacity-building classes) or in the soccer tournament. On both counts, Divina participation is significantly higher than España by about 1.5 times more residents participating. The following four questions are set in the present—does the respondent vote, participate in any organizations, participate in church, or become involved in community activities? On every measure, Divina has a higher participation rate than the other communities. España is no different than the average, except for being lower on the church participation question. The last question addresses a future service project in the community. Here, perhaps due in part to the participatory nature of the project, España is

higher than Divina by about seven percent more residents, though both are high in general.

Conclusions and Questions


The analysis above offers a spectrum of challenges and insights to development workers. Most residents in general are content in their current living circumstances, and believe that they live better than they did before Hurricane Mitch. Compared to national crime and opinion statistics, these perceptions are true and residents have a reason to be grateful for the move. They are generally safer, have a more positive outlook on the future, believe their community is on the right track, may have more confidence in the police, and as we will see later, many communities have better infrastructure than in the city.

Conversely, there are significant differences between the communities in terms of social health, especially in crime and vision, but also in terms of collective efficacy, social capital, informal social control and civic participation. This development stratification (wherein each community began with similar starting points but has followed significantly different trajectories) poses a number of theoretical and practical questions. The umbrella question is “why?” What were the important social mechanisms that shaped each community? Did some of the peculiarities of each community and organization act as an initial condition, while future practices (key processes) directed the development path? Can we decipher whether the findings above denote an example of positive and negative increasing returns? The following three chapters will describe Hurricane Mitch and its effect, and the communities of Divina and España respectively.

Descriptive evidence will align itself delineating the reasons that specific paths were chosen, and particular processes reinforced, especially as it refers to culture. The final chapter will distill and analyze discovered differences and how they contributed to the guidance of each community along its own particular path and trajectory.

Chapter 5. Vulnerability, Hurricane Mitch, and its aftermath

Figure 5.1 Hurricane Mitch hovering off the north coast of Honduras
October 27, 1998 (NOAA 1998)



Hurricane Mitch took five days to work its way through Honduras, sending 180 mph winds ripping through the north coast. Some areas were deluged with up to 36 inches of rain.

According to the International Federation of the Red Cross, global natural disasters have increased significantly since 1960 and have impacted inhabitants on every continent. In the decade between 1994 and 2003, over 2.6 billion people were affected by

a natural or technological disaster and more than 600,000 died. More recently, MunichRE (2011) found that 2010 had the second highest number of disasters since 1880. However, deaths were far from diversified. Low human-development countries had a seven times higher mortality rate than highly developed countries, and the number of reported disasters is rising most dramatically in the low and middle human-development countries (Red Cross 2004). In addition, due to inadequate response capabilities, lives that may have been saved post-disaster are often lost. As our world continues to warm, populate, and urbanize at an astounding rate, especially in the Global South, these growing urban centers simultaneously create environmental vulnerability (destruction of natural mitigation resources, including reefs, trees, creation of dams, loss of soils) and human vulnerability (urban sprawl to riverbanks and up hillsides, with a severe lack of organized construction or disaster planning). Sadly, increasing disasters, environmental damage and urbanization creates high vulnerability throughout the world.

In this chapter I will briefly describe the roots of vulnerability, the event, and the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in Honduras. The discussions will build on one another to provide a holistic picture of why and how the storm occurred and the devastation it left behind. It will also contextualize how these factors would have long-term consequences on the resettled communities, specifically highlighting where and in what condition the survivors arrived.

As is so often cited, there is no such thing as a natural disaster. A natural hazard becomes a disaster only in relationship to a vulnerable human population.

The concept of vulnerability expresses the multidimensionality of disasters by focusing attention on the totality of relationships in a given social

situation which constitute a condition that, in combination with environmental forces, produces a disaster (Bankoff, Frerks, and Hilhorst 2004).

Beginning with the concept of vulnerability, then, natural disasters are never natural and cannot be fully understood outside of their historical and geographical context (Smith 2006). Over the last sixty years, Honduras, like many countries of the Global South, saw a significant population shift from rural to urban areas. This exponential growth of people increased the density of cities and also the inability to cope with further population increase. It caused Honduras to be particularly vulnerable, which led to redefining Mitch from a natural meteorological occurrence to a disaster. This section will discuss trends both Honduran broadly and Tegucigalpa specifically as this is from where the populations being studied were drawn.

Honduras—Historical Context

Since its “founding” and naming of the country by Christopher Columbus, Honduras has been a place of extremes. The traditional story describes Columbus leading the Spanish fleet southwest from Jamaica and encountering rough seas in especially deep waters off the north-eastern coast of the unnamed land. The weather was treacherous that early August of 1502 (during the hurricane season) and it took the fleet 28 days to negotiate the length of the north coast of Honduras and find calmer waters off the east coast of Nicaragua. After arriving safely, Columbus is cited as saying “*Gracias a Dios que hemos dejado estas honduras*” (“Thank God we have left these depths”). The far eastern state of Honduras then received the name *Gracias a Dios* (“Thank God”) and the country as a whole was called *Honduras*. The following paragraphs will illustrate the

social and geographic vulnerabilities of the nation as a whole and the capital city, Tegucigalpa, in particular.

Honduras can be considered a politically and economically weak state. Browsing the short history of Honduras since independence (1821), it is clear that the nation has always had difficulty creating a strong centralized government that was not a dictatorship. Although achieving independence from Spain in 1821, the small nation quickly requested and was soon admitted as a protectorate of the Mexican empire for a short time. Honduras then joined the other isthmus nations which broke away from Mexico, forming part of the Central American Federation. The federation, under the leadership of Honduran native Francisco Morazán, had underlying contradictions that tore the fabric of the fragile union of states. Race issues (especially in Guatemala), maintaining control over broad and diverse geographic distance, interests of the economic elite, localized revolts, and tensions between the church and its conservative political order versus the upcoming liberal faction led to the dissolution of the federation, with Honduras withdrawing in 1838 (Woodward 1984, chapter 4). From 1839 to the early 1880s, Honduras had numerous civil wars, due in part to the inability of its government to gain any semblance of control over the country, as they had few economic resources and poor communications with official outposts (Valrela Osorio 2004).

After the 1880s and for a century following, the country had only moments of democracy with long stretches of dictatorships, often supported by nations such as the U.S. as a hedge against communism. It is only since 1982 that the nation has maintained a sustainable democracy with seven democratically elected presidents. The last president

Jose Manuel "Mel" Zelaya Rosales, however, was ousted from his presidential palace in his pajamas by the military, on the order of the congress. Protests for his return to the presidency ran well into 2010, illustrating the deep political divide among the citizenry.

In addition to political instability, Honduras has had a slow economic development and consistent fiscal dependency on foreign investment and/or aid. Throughout most of its history, the nation has relied on subsistence agriculture, cattle, and minerals (such as silver) as its main economic motor. By the 1880s, foreign investors became interested in the isthmus for commodity export. Concomitantly, coffee was introduced (after Costa Rica was extremely successful in bean production) but only became a major export after World War II. Other commodities followed suit, most notably bananas as introduced and cultivated by the United Fruit Company (now Chiquita Brands) and Standard Fruit (subsumed by the Dole Food Company). These U.S.-based corporations utilized the north coast as a massive banana plantation, eventually providing Honduras with the unflattering title "original banana republic." Currently, Honduras' major exports continue to be coffee, bananas, cotton, and lumber (Europa World 2010).

Theorists take different stands on how this historical political and economic development created the current poverty in the country. World-system theorists note that the creation of an export commodity economy set Honduras on a cycle of poverty that cannot be broken (Wallerstein 1974; Cardoso and Falletto 1979).⁶³ Due to their original peripheral role in supporting Spain and later the United States, Honduras never had an

⁶³ Dependency has been a contested history as some scholars argue that it was not external influences but rather the banana unions that forced the state into a subservient position (Euraque 1996). See also Stern 1988.

opportunity to grow a strong and diverse economy. It also did not have the resources or capacity to begin the industrialization process since so much of the nation's wealth was pulled from the soil to enrich the core nations. Indeed, more than \$60 million of silver was pulled from the ground between 1882 and 1954 by the New York and Honduras Rosario Mining Company, based in New York City (New York and Honduras Rosario Mining Company 1957). The two major banana companies, United Fruit and Standard Fruit, have historically been and currently reside in the United States.

After World War II and as part of the U.S. cold war strategy, Honduras became a geopolitical staging ground for U.S. interference in the revolutions of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. In return for massive foreign and military aid, the U.S. government-supported Honduran military dictatorships and juntas permitted American troops, military hardware and resources to move throughout the isthmus to intervene in neighboring civil wars (American planes bombing Guatemala City to remove democratically elected Arbenz in 1954; supporting the Contra war against the Sandinista government in the 1980s; and training Guatemalan troops to repress the civil war (1960s-1990s). Indeed, although Honduras is a tiny nation of now eight million, in 2000 the USAID had more staff in the country than anywhere else in the world except for Egypt, and Honduras has had nearly the highest number of Peace Corps volunteers⁶⁴ than any

⁶⁴ Even the Peace Corps has joined in sending around 180 volunteers to the small country each year—the second highest number per capita in the world (State Department 2011).

other country (Siembieda 2011). Today it would be a unique Honduran who has not worked with some foreign NGO at some point in his or her life.⁶⁵

Institutional Vulnerability--State Fragility

Defining a fragile state, especially in the aftermath of a disaster, depends on how the label “fragile” is characterized (Bratton 1989). One of the most common definitions of a fragile state was developed by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee OECD/DAC (2007): “States are fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safe guard the security and human rights of their populations.” Additionally, the Department For International Development defines fragile states more in terms of its social contract with the citizenry: “those where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor” (DFID 2005). For the purposes of this paper, both definitions of fragility apply --a politically weak state that cannot fulfill its social contract through serving its constituents, especially in a post-disaster setting.

Although Honduras is not always indexed as a fragile state⁶⁶, there is considerable evidence the government did not have the capacity to provide the basic functions needed after Hurricane Mitch. Two years before the hurricane, social scientists warned of the nation’s vulnerability as it did not have the national apparatus or the capacity to deal with disaster. “In Honduras and Costa Rica, community work for disaster evacuations are not

⁶⁵ This connection could have been of benefit or detriment. In my case, since I had lived in Honduras for so long before arriving at the community, I was well accepted by residents. Those who did not know me, however, usually thought I was from another *gringo* NGO and had no feelings either way.

⁶⁶ There is a call to see fragile states as dynamic and a changing rather than a static characteristic.

usually planned, but rather are spontaneous responses of support at the time of emergency” (Leon and Lavell 1996: 61, translated by author). Indeed, even before Hurricane Mitch had finished roaring through the country, the government was already in disarray and even basic services could not be provided. Jackson (2005: Ch. 10) points out in the initial days following Mitch it was the World Bank, the International Development Bank, and USAID who took control of logistical issues and decided how and what was to be done in relief effort. In fact when asked about the Honduran emergency commission (COPECO), IFI staff commented the agency “was unprepared and had no funds. It was unable to perform at all” for emergency response and relief, let alone recovery (Jackson 2005: 262, Jeffrey 1999). Due in part to the weakness of the Honduran state to deal with the disaster and the amount of human and material capital obtained by the NGOs, the Honduran Congress had little choice but to follow the programs and actions decided upon by foreign development actors (Jackson 2005). The fragile (and minimal) social contract between government and citizenry had been broken, creating a space to be filled by organizations.

While NGO intervention on behalf of citizens has a long history, it is only during the last few decades that organizations have gained significant prominence. The fall of the Berlin Wall created an opportunity for Western governments and multilateral donors to reevaluate the significance and purpose of development. In partial response to the inefficient, increasingly impoverished (Sassen 2006; Babb 2005) and corrupt governments of the Global South and their inability to provide services universally to constituents, international financial institutions and donors’ writ large turned their

attention to the growing number of NGOs to supplement states in poverty alleviation, social welfare, and the development of civil society (Fischer 1997; Mohan and Stokke 2000; Craig and Mayo 1995). NGOs were seen as a cost-effective provider of services, especially to the poor, in what was called the New Policy Agenda (Edwards and Hulme 1996: 67-68). This agenda encouraged good governance among states, and NGOs were seen as a possible counterweight to state decision-making by their encouragement of a stronger civil society. Even with pushback from national governments who resisted these changes, NGOs nonetheless became a greater presence in service provision in the Global South (Fischer 1997).

The increasing presence of NGOs in the Global South and political/economic conflicts with national government were clearly seen in post-Mitch Honduras (Fischer 1997; Mohan and Stokke 2000; Craig and Mayo 1995). Although there was a need for outside assistance in the relief and recovery effort, the Honduran state was concerned about being sidelined, and that reconstruction funding would bypass governmental coffers (due to concerns of corruption) and go directly to NGOs (Jackson 2005; Bratton 1989; for Nicaragua see Bradshaw et. al. 2001). The state marginalized grassroots organizations that wanted a voice in the rebuilding process. It was only during the Stockholm Summit that Honduran state representatives were pressured by international donors to meet directly with representatives of Honduran civil society (Jackson 2005: Ch. 10).

The same fragility of the Honduran state that necessitated intercession by organizations during the relief phase continued in the disaster recovery phase. During the

1999 Stockholm Summit, international donors and IFIs knew there was a need for significant involvement by “civil society,” including NGOs. However, the Honduran state felt threatened by funding being diverted away from them toward organizations. Bradshaw, Linneker, and Zúniga (2001: 14) found the Central American governments actively resisting the growing pressure from international donors to work with organizations and civil society in the creation of national reconstruction plans. O’Neill (2000) saw this resistance specifically in Honduras noting

One year after Mitch their [the donors] analysis is that the reconstruction process is going slowly and that transformation has not yet begun. In addition, during 10 months the Central Government has not opened real spaces for civil participation in the definition and management of new policies, programs and development projects.

However, this did not stop organizations from coming together to have a voice in the reconstruction process. O’neill goes on to explain,

While governmental coordination has been virtually nil, the NGO sector has restructured regional groups and these have greatly benefited from newly created networks in Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua. In Honduras, the country with the weakest NGO capacity in the region, changes have been dramatic with the creation of Interforos, a coalition bringing together almost 500 grassroots organizations and NGOs.

Indeed, Espacio Interforos defined themselves in contrast to the fragility of the government, focusing on “equity in the access and control over resources and benefits; the efficiency and efficacy and transparency of the institutional state; and democratization with citizen participation” (Espacio Interforos 2011).

Like many poor third world nation-states, Honduras did not have the national apparatus, capacity, or legitimacy to deal with disaster. There was not a disaster relief and recovery plan in place when Mitch struck, and thus the government did not even know where to begin. Government services were already stretched and understaffed due to significant lacks in funding. There were so many problems throughout the country that responsibility was gladly handed over to NGOs to help with the rebuilding process.

The inability of the Honduran government to confront the enormity of the disaster pushed government officials to hand over much of the recovery and reconstruction efforts to national and transnational NGOs (Jackson 2005). This was not a new phenomenon. In 1974, Hurricane Fifi roared through Honduras killing several thousand and displacing hundreds of thousands. Although not as devastating as Mitch, Fifi was to that time the most devastating natural disaster the country had witnessed. Unlike the nation-state of today, the Honduran government was able to create some resettlements that were as successful as those created by organizations (Snarr and Brown 1978).

Throughout my interviews with NGO staff, I repeatedly heard complaints about the lack of government involvement and support in the community building process. Organizations were encouraged to take full responsibility of their projects—issues such as water works, road construction, schools, housing, etc. were handed over by the state to the participating NGOs. Promises were made by the government to take care of some aspects of the community building process (putting in sewer lines, roads, schools, clinics, police stations, electricity, potable water, etc.) but rarely and only after significant persistence and time were some of these basic services provided. Habitat for Humanity's

La Joya community is an example. Habitat's job was to build homes and move people in while the government was to provide basic plumbing and electricity (PI Diana 2010). Although the community was the first built in the Valle de Amaratéca, it was one of the last to obtain these services precisely because they had to wait for the government to build the system (Siembieda 2010). To this day Habitat waterworks are not up to par with many of the other post-Mitch intentional communities in the valley. To contrast, according to the executive director, the Fundación did not have those expectations of the government, having seen government inefficiencies on other projects. This NGO then took on the responsibility itself, either finding external funding to implement the service or persistently and through political contacts gaining these services through the government (Rivera 2010). Like the Fundación most organizations needed to look for funding elsewhere not only to build homes, relocate survivors, and offer community-building classes, but also to build the entire basic infrastructure.

Along with this is inability to address the titanic aftermath of Mitch, the government faced legitimacy issues in the eyes of its citizenry. Years of corruption and cronyism left citizens looking toward churches and organizations, rather than to the national government for help. Officials had no choice but to hand over much of the recovery and reconstruction efforts to increasingly powerful national and global NGOs (Jackson 2005; Klein 2008; Edwards 1999), even when the NGOs did not feel suited to do the work (Gray, Bebbington, and Collison 2006). According to one Red Cross social worker, the government begged the organization to manage its temporary shelters and

eventually build new communities for survivors even when the organization did not want that responsibility.

Church/State relations

Another interpretation, however, is that the Honduran state was not weak so much as it was guile. According to Euraque (1996), it was not so much what the government lacked as the decisions that were made based on the interests of the state. He argues that the strength of the Honduran state was to let capital (owners of banana plantations and labor (workers in the plantations) fight out there issues without the government getting involved. It was better for the state NOT to take sides and let an agreement be worked out between the two parties.

Linking this theory to the post-Mitch situation, it was not only that the state did not have the capacity but also that it was a strategic decision to hand over responsibility to NGOs. Having the institutional memory that not involving itself is beneficial to the continuance of the state, it would make sense to step away and play the victim of the tragedy, drawing upon sentiments of historical dependency. In sum, it could be interpreted that the Honduran state had a political culture that chose to step away from rebuilding responsibility as a way to maintain the institutional structure, without risking failure in the recovery and development process.

National Culture

On a national level, Honduras has a particular culture that may have prepped it to be more open to structured norm development, leading Divina to greater social health success. Three observations support this belief: a recent survey of public opinion

concerning social order, a qualitative analysis of an international conference, and historical context. The first is taken from a top opinion survey utilized throughout Latin America called *Latinobarometro*, and compares citizens from Honduras and its neighbor El Salvador. Table 7.2 reveals that for the total responses asking the average Honduran and Salvadoran citizen about social order versus freedom, Hondurans were significantly more likely to prefer to live in an ordered society (this is also true when comparing Honduras with all Central American countries). Additionally, when asked about the “As citizens, we should show more respect for authority,” 25.2% of Hondurans strongly agreed while only 13.1% of Salvadorans (the average for all of Central America was 13.8%) agreed. A second and qualitative observation occurred during the conference I directed called “*Tragedia y Oportunidad: El Desarrollo Comunitario en el Largo Plazo*” in which recent survivors of the 2009 Tropical Storm Ida in El Salvador came to the Valle de Amaratéca for a three day conference. Talks were given by Honduran NGOs and community leaders with time for discussion afterward. One of the major takeaways from this conference was the frustration and even anger of the Salvadorans toward the Fundación. They believed the NGO was “controlling” the population in Divina and did not like their practices of social control even after I showed them the differences in social health outcomes.

Table 5.1 Order or Freedom

Honduras, El Salvador, and Central American Averages (2006, 2009)
(Latinobarometro[d] 2011)

	I prefer to live in an orderly society although some freedoms are limited.	I prefer to live in a society where all rights are respected, although there may be less order as a result.
Honduras	72.1 %	28.2 %
El Salvador	63.6%	36.3%
Avg. C.A.	64.7%	35.3%

All of this makes sense in the context of the nation's history. Honduras has been ruled by authoritarian leaders throughout much of its history, no different than the rest of Central America. Yet, unlike Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua, Honduras never had a revolution, a fact about which most Hondurans are proud. Indeed, upon visiting the national history museum in Tegucigalpa, a guide noted that the first president of Honduras did not carry a gun into his office (like its three neighbors) but rather books. The Honduran historian, Jose Francisco Guevara-Escudero, in an informal conversation at a 2010 Fulbright conference, had a similar belief. He spoke of a greater passivity of the people in comparison to its nation-state neighbors (Guevara-Escudero 2010). Others, such as Euraque (1996) have highlighted that it was not what Honduras lacked but rather what it had. Honduras had strong unions in the North and, with the help of moderate politicians, those unions were able to shape the political agenda protecting the country from civil war. While I do not claim that this relatively non-violent history and relative political passivity were causal factors, they may explain why the social norms and control of residents by the Fundación was widely accepted and viewed by most residents as useful, whereas in a different place or context it may not have been (Chaskel 2009).


Along the same lines, the national culture as historically influenced by the Roman Catholic religion may also have been a mechanism affecting the salience of each organization. The urban design of each community provides an excellent analogy to illustrate this issue. In Divina, the Catholic Church is the largest and most centrally located building in the community. It is where people meet; it is near the central park, the market, the bus stop, the elementary school, the Fundación office, the library, and the previous day care. To leave the community from six of the nine sectors, one must pass by the church. This Spanish colonial design illustrates the power, prestige and legitimacy of authority of the church and its representatives. The Fundación, led by the most highly-ranked member of the Catholic Church in Honduras, Cardinal Rodríguez, was provided almost without question the privilege and authority necessary to implement their development philosophy in the way they saw fit (See Milgram 1974).

Vulnerability to Hazards

Honduras is prone to major weather events. In any given year there is a 5 to 10 percent chance the nation will be hit (within 15 miles of the coast) by a major tropical storm or hurricane. Mitch was a major storm; according to many statistics, the fourth most powerful hurricane ever in the Caribbean, and far stronger than Katrina. It was not only the magnitude of the hurricane but also its trajectory that contributed to the breadth and depth of damage it caused. Rather than work its way north through the Caribbean, briefly bouncing off of Central America, Mitch stayed put on the north coast for three days before heading south directly through the country, and finally exited west through Guatemala.

Thus, in the latter part of October 1998, a perfect storm was created from high human vulnerability and a worst-case scenario hurricane. The effect of Mitch can only fully be described by general statistics, along with the personal stories of survivors; these macro and micro perspectives combined work to create the fullest understanding of the scope of the disaster. This section will give a human face to the statistics by providing a flavor of the daily challenges residents faced. Finally, as scholars have long noted, disasters show cracks in social structures and systems. Most pertinent to this case study is how the aftermath of Mitch as a bounded event (October 26-October 30) illustrated the significant weaknesses of the national Honduran government to deal with catastrophe (Jackson 2005). Mitch could not be handled by the Honduran people or its government; the only way it could begin its recovery process was through massive foreign governmental and non-governmental intervention. This need led to an abdication of the social contract by the nation-state and bestowment of those responsibilities upon organizations. Organizations, with no real desire to do so, had no choice but to build and define the social development of their new communities *carte blanche*, with little or no state interference or influence (unlike the more recent example of Chile [Siembieda et. al. forthcoming]). Described in brief, each of these three areas: increasing vulnerability over time, technical and personal stories of the hurricane, and the social and politics cracks it caused, will sets the stage for understanding the factors leading to differentiated community trajectories.

Figure 5.2 Political and Topographic map of Honduras
(The blue dot is Tegucigalpa) (Map original from Wikicommons 2011)



Topographic Vulnerability

Honduras can be easily divided into four geographic quadrants—the western mountains, the central hills and plains, the tropical north coast and the eastern rainforest. From the southwest corner where the country touches the Pacific at the Gulf of Fonseca, plains rise to hills in the central of the country and slowly slope and widen to the broad north coast. It has a peculiar beauty in each of its major areas, dry and arid in the South and progressively wetter heading north. Too much rain has caused problems in the past due to flooding, while long hot summers have led to famine in the rural parts of the country.

As noted above in any given year, Honduras has a 5-10% chance of being struck by a hurricane. According to one dataset, Honduras is brushed (within 60 miles) by a tropical storm or hurricane every 4.21 years and hit directly every 13.9 years. Yet, it is

not the frequency of hazards, but rather human vulnerability that has caused the most loss. According to a 2003 study done by Pielke and colleagues,

While intense Atlantic hurricanes were more common between the 1940s and 1960s, they were in comparison much reduced in the 1970s through the early 1990s (Landsea et. al.1999). Thus, it is logical to hypothesize that increasing societal vulnerability, rather than more frequent or intense hurricanes, is the primary cause of increasing hurricane-related losses in Central America and the Caribbean, as has been shown to be the case in the United States (104).

Although Pielke and associates were correct in pointing out the increasing societal vulnerability, they were tragically wrong concerning the frequency and intensity of storms and hurricanes.

Table 5.2 Major Storms to Impact Honduras


Year	Month	Storm Name	Wind-Miles Per Hour	Deaths
1892	October	Hurricane "7"	85	Unknown
1893	July	Hurricane "2"	85	Unknown
1934	June	Hurricane "2"	85	1,000-5,000
1935	October	Hurricane "5"	85	2,150
1941	September	Hurricane "4"	110	50
1961	July	Hurricane Hattie	105	275
1966	June	Hurricane Alma	125	73
1969	September	Hurricane Francelia	110	0
1971	September	Hurricane Edith	110	30
1974	September	Hurricane Fifi	110	8-12,000
1978	September	Hurricane Greta	130	0
1988	September	Hurricane Gilbert	185	12
1998	October	Hurricane Mitch	140-180	9-12,000
2001	October	Hurricane Iris	140	31
2007	September	Hurricane Felix	160	26
2009	November	Tropical Storm Ida	60	0
Data collected from Williams 2011; NOAA 2011; and Weather Underground 2011				

Environmental Changes in Honduras

A confluence of factors has led to significant changes in land use in Honduras, setting the stage for recent natural hazards to turn into disasters. On the positive side, according to World Bank estimates, the arable land has had little change in Honduras over the last 50 years drifting between 26% and 32% of all land mass since 1960.

Permanent cropland has increased over the same period 1.6% to 3.2% of total Honduran land. On the negative side, there has been a significant decrease in forested land thus creating broader natural vulnerability. In 1960, 60% of all land mass in Honduras was covered in pine, oak, and various tropical hardwoods. By 2000 this fell to 49% and by 2007 it dropped another 10%. Over the last 47 years, this equals a loss of 30%, 498 square kilometers, or 18,909 square miles of forest (World Bank 2011; Lacey 2007).


Figure 5.3 Changing Forest Cover of Honduras in 1940
(Castellanos 2011)



Color codes

- Light green—Broad leaf tropical forest*
- Olive—Pine forest and tall oak*
- Dark Green—Mangroves*
- Dark Yellow—Blanket of pine trees*
- Yellow—Land with no natural vegetation*

Figure 5.4 Changing Forest Cover of Honduras 1987-1992
(Castellanos 2011)



Color codes

- Light green—Broad leaf tropical forest*
- Olive—Pine forest and tall oak*
- Dark Green—Mangroves*
- Dark Yellow—Blanket of pine trees*
- Yellow—Land with no natural vegetation*

According to one NGO that works officially with the Honduran government, there are a number of socio-economic reasons for this rapid decline.

In the north coast, years of cattle pasturage has left pastureland compacted and highly eroded, meanwhile logging has almost destroyed the once abundant hardwood stands. In the highlands, cultivation of steep terrain and the high use of agrochemicals in coffee and vegetable production has left streams and aquifers polluted and full of silt. In the Central valleys, extensive logging has damaged important watersheds leaving population centers with less and less water. Southern Honduras (with its longer dry season and lower levels of rainfall) has suffered from centuries of free range cattle farming, and shortening of the cycle of slash and burn agriculture...Honduras has been a center of recent sales in tropical timber, both the abundant pine and less common tropical hardwoods (Trees for the Future 2011).

Figure 5.5 Traditional tortilla making using forest wood



Along with these broader problems, Hondurans themselves are also contributing to deforestation via using forests as fuel wood. Increasing energy prices have forced the poor to head to the forests to obtain firewood for cooking. It is not uncommon to see a small shelter set up just outside of the house where the women cook tortillas for sale and meals for the family. In many of the communities I studied, cutting down trees is illegal and looked down

upon, at least by community leaders. After a local religious leader in Ciudad España and I watched an older man drag two 20 foot-long narrow pine trees through the community, I asked him about deforestation. His response was mixed. “Do you see all of these hills? These hills were full of trees and now there are only a few left. It is illegal to cut down

the trees. People are poor, what else can they do?" This is a micro- and macro-level problem. On the familial level, this inefficient way of cooking affects individuals as the fire produces illness-generating smoke that fills the home. Another organization working in Honduras to address deforestation found that "700,000 households in Honduras (90% of rural households and 50% of urban households) use fuel wood for cooking" (Ashden 2008). They also noted that the amount of smoke that comes from using fuel woods is nearly equal to smoking two packs of cigarettes a day. On the macro scale, deforestation no matter its cause has major consequences for disaster vulnerability. The positive mitigating factors that trees, brush, grasses and other plants provide are that they maintain the structure of the soil and they prevent mudslides and the siltification of rivers and dams. Their placement also slows the water and encourages drainage and natural pooling; deforested land speeds the current and increases the amount of water, creating greater devastation downriver. To close with a disconcerting proposition, "It is likely that natural disasters will be the most significant external shock to Honduras in the next 15-20 years" (Freeman 2004: 10).


Social Vulnerability

Urban Migration

Figure 5.6 Tegucigalpa Housing
Steep Hillsides and uncontrolled and unregulated growth in Tegucigalpa



Figure 5.7 Tegucigalpa Growth
Change in Percentage of Honduran Urban Population (World Bank 2011)



Urban migration is also an increasing problem for those looking to reduce risk.

According to Leon and Lavell (1996: 58)

In urban areas, especially in metropolitan cities and intermediate areas, the presence of environmental stresses is closely related to forms of territorial occupation. The settlements in areas with fragile and unstable soils, with steep slope and in floodplains as a result of illegal occupation by the impoverished, create a particular risk to large populations. This risk, along with the existence of physical factors constitute threats to certain areas and sectors; the characteristics and living conditions of the population living in this area, illustrates their significant vulnerability to disaster (Translation by author).

This description tackles the problems faced by Tegucigalpa residents. The little available flat terrain in the city was utilized years ago, leaving new migrants forced to find housing on the steep unstable slopes outside of the city. This, combined with inadequate building

materials and construction techniques, creates a dangerous situation for those who have the least resiliency (resources to deal with a disaster) (see also Boyer and Pell 1999).

Tegucigalpa—A Vulnerable City

Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras, was originally a mining town for the riches of gold and silver coveted by international mining companies. Founded in the late 16th century on the site of a native settlement alongside the Choluteca River, the city remained small, due in large part to a lack of economic growth once the valuable metals disappeared. At its peak, the city was beautiful, with large colonial buildings and well-cared for parks and ornate churches. Indeed, the geometric outline so representative of Spanish design, the tight streets better suited for horse and carriage than bus and taxi, and subtle reminders of history--a statue, elaborate architecture flourishes, or the restored palatial homes of the upper class--give visitors a flavor of an era gone by.


The capital's center, *Parque Central* (central park), sits two blocks east of the river, bounded by Cathedral San Miguel to the south, a pedestrian walkway to the north, businesses to the east, and government buildings of congress to the west. From the *Parque Central*, one of the lowest parts of the valley, the city spreads in all directions up the mountainsides. Most of the growth has been over the last century, as economic hardship and environmental challenges (such as drought) in rural areas forced people, predominantly men, to migrate from the hinterlands looking for work opportunity.

In 1996, a representative from the Honduran government of data collection (CEPROD) wrote a short article published two years before Mitch on the vulnerability of major cities in Honduras. Concerning Tegucigalpa, Patricio Leon noted,

Between 1971 and 1980 44 new settlements were built, 23 of which were occupied illegally, not formally urbanized and without basic services and some even along the boulevards near the centers of employment... Official estimates report today there are 201 marginal settlements originating in the past decade [1977-1988] with approximately 80% originating from invasions and which now hold about 60% of the capitals population. Of the total precarious settlements (legalized or not), 16% lack clean water, 9% lack electricity, 90% lack storm drainage systems, and 78% lack sewage systems. The deficiency of soil characteristics - in terms of height, geological risk, and distance - limits their access to services and the improvement of their homes. (Translation by author).

In his assessment, Leon drew on a 1988 study. Although dated, the study highlighted the massive unorganized urban growth trend that Tegucigalpa followed.

Table 5.3 Population Growth and projected growth in Tegucigalpa
(Princeton 2003; See also UN 2005)



As illustrated in the graph above, over the last sixty years (1950 to 2010), the population of Tegucigalpa metro area (Distrito Central) has increased nearly 938% and will double again between 2004 and 2031(Princeton 2003). With this exponential growth, it is unimaginable that any city would be able to adjust so quickly, especially

with a government that lacked legitimacy, infrastructural capabilities, human capital vis-à-vis education, and a lack of economic resources.

The results of this massive urban migration in terms of disaster vulnerability pushed an unsafe situation to catastrophic proportion. Like a house that was already unstable, the increased migration added more weight to strained streets, sewers, schools, hospitals and housing. As people arrived in the city over the last half century, there was nowhere to build. Migrants, then, carved spaces into the sides of the mountains⁶⁷. The stairs up these hills were little more than uneven dirt steps that would wash away and need to be re-dug each rainy season. Those who could not go up were forced to go down. Migrants built temporary shelters along the river that in some seasons could get washed away by the rising water.

Figure 5.8 Massive River Flooding
(Castellanos 2011)



Over the past 25 years, the urban land area of Tegucigalpa has more than tripled in size. Most of this expansion occurred between the mid-1970s and late 1980s. Fueled by rapid

population growth, the urban area of the city grew from approximately 2,360 hectares in 1975 to 6,020 hectares in 1987. During this period the city experienced declining


⁶⁷ The airport in Tegucigalpa (Toncontin) is one of the deadliest airports in the world due to the mountainous terrain. A total of eleven planes have crashed at this airport due to the difficulty in landing.

population density, as the percent growth in urban expansion (155%) outpaced the percent growth in population (83%). By 1987 per capita land consumption had grown from roughly 0.007 ha/person (in 1975) to more than 0.01 ha/person. Between 1987 and 2000, Tegucigalpa continued to grow, expanding by roughly 2,340 hectares. This unmanaged growth in such uncertain terrain was a precursor for widespread and devastating problems.

The Event: Hurricane Mitch

On Wednesday October 21, 1998, a tropical depression formed in the southern Caribbean Sea. As the depression turned into a tropical storm, it was named “Mitch.” The storm drifted northwest slowly as it grew in size and intensity. From October 23rd to the 26th, the storm quickly increased in ferocity from a tropical storm with 60 knot winds, to a Saffir-Simpson Category 5 hurricane with winds of 155 knots. By the end of Monday, October 26th, and through the following Tuesday, the winds had reached and maintained a peak of 157 knots (180 m.p.h.), just off of the northeast coast of Honduras.

Figure 5.9 Trajectory of Hurricane Mitch
(NOAA 2011)



On Wednesday the 28th, the problem was no longer the wind, which had decreased to 105 knots, but the massive amounts of rain. Due to the slow trajectory of Mitch, Central America, especially Honduras was inundated with rainfall and subsequent flooding. The slow movement of the storm had caused heavy rain in Central America, and between October 26th and the 31st, reports from the extreme south of the country and the north of the country were similar: 914 mm (36 inches) of rain were recorded, which is 42 times the expected rain during the same period and under normal conditions. The 5 days noted above produced the equivalent amount of rain to 212 days of an average year. Once Mitch made landfall it weakened rapidly. The mountainous regions of Honduras, however, continued to “squeeze” moisture from the storm. Mitch finally exited Honduras late Monday, October 31st. Amazingly, Mitch continued on through Florida across the Atlantic, finally losing its storm qualities on November 9th, north of Great Britain (NOAA 1998; IADB 2000; see also USGS 2002).

Figure 5.10 Tegucigalpa Metro Area
 Flooding (Yellow) and Landslides (Purple)
 (Castellanos 2011)




Table 5.4 Summary of Damages in Honduras from Hurricane Mitch

Individuals

Dead	5,657
Injured	12,272
Missing	8,058
Homeless	441,150

Urban centers

Cities that suffered severe damage	21
Total number of cities affected	60

Housing

Houses destroyed	66,188
Houses damaged	82,735

Health Infrastructure

Health centers damaged	123
Health centers destroyed	8
Aqueducts destroyed	1743
Latrines destroyed	53,435

(Secretaria de Salud de Honduras 1999 as cited in Ensor and Ensor 2010)

After Mitch finally ceded, nearly a half million people were in desperate need of shelter, and one out of every two Hondurans had been impacted to varying degree. In Tegucigalpa alone, more than 150,000 people were left homeless and many neighborhoods, especially the city's poorest, lacked clean potable water. Cases of dengue, typhoid, hepatitis and malaria were reported throughout the city.

On the national level, there was broad economic and infrastructure devastation. A journalist following the disaster quoted Cardinal Oscar Rodriguez Maradiaga to capture the economic impact of Mitch.

Perhaps worst of all, he said, was the sweeping destruction of Honduras's banana and coffee plantations, which for years have been the country's main cash crops and the source of much of its foreign exchange...International lending agencies estimated that Honduras and Nicaragua, the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere after Haiti, suffered about \$5 billion in losses, equivalent to nearly half their gross national products (Sengupta 1998).

Figure 5.11 Downtown Tegucigalpa Post-Mitch⁶⁸

Kara, an office worker for the Fundación told me about Tegucigalpa and Comayagua's circumstances following Mitch. She explained,



There was mud everywhere. You could not even imagine. Comayagua was unrecognizable. And you had to walk everywhere. There was no transportation for anything. You had to walk, through the mud to get to the grocery store where they were handing out food. It took me a full day to walk to the store, receive the oil and beans, and return home. I returned home at 6pm. I went to another grocery store another time and they sent me to a different grocery store. And I had to walk. Everyone had to walk. Everyone suffered even the rich. The rich did not have many privileges except for corruption. The corruption gave foodstuffs and materials to the rich while everyone else had to wait in line. The cars full of food would drive up to their house and we had to wait in the mud. Also, since there was mud everywhere, some men made a business out of it. They were willing to carry those on their way to work on their shoulders. They carried many women on their way to work and made some good money doing it. When you were walking through the mud you had no idea what you were walking on. You had no idea what was underneath. You knew that you were probably stepping on dead people but you did not know. This was especially bad in Centennial Park. There the river washed everything from cars to trees to people. It was bad. They would uncover people and they were totally decomposed. (Interview May 3, 2010 with author)

⁶⁸ (Nueva Esperanza 2010).

Mud and bodies were not the only problem. Throughout the city disease proliferated, especially conjunctivitis, hepatitis, typhoid and dengue, and even a new disease was encountered—leptospirosis. Food and clean water were hard to come by, highways were destroyed, bridges washed away, communication was down, and there was an influx of migrants from rural areas in search of the aid that was directed at cities. This combination, along with the significant population living in this precarious situation “without a roof, without a job, lost [dead] family members, disheartened, sick, uncertain about the future” created problems of social instability and protest (Stefanovics 1999).

The Human Countenance During and After Mitch

Stories abound from Hondurans as people reflect on this national turning-point event. Like all disasters, Mitch brought misery and tears along with heroism and joy. The narratives below describe both sides--death and tragedy, the suffering of the five long days during which Mitch pounded the small country - while other stories luxuriate in the small successes, the lives saved, the reunion of families and ordinary people doing extraordinary things. In order to give a broad account beyond the respondents I interviewed, I drew on various media outlets and commentary for supplementary anecdotes. The following two are drawn from interviews conducted by the British Broadcasting Company, and the third was documented in a Houston Catholic Worker report.

One woman clutched the grandchild she saved from the waves. One of her daughters and a sister are dead. Another, called Maria, lost five members of her extended family, and Pedro Lopez lost his wife and four children. He wept as he remembered how they cried out “Father! Father!” as they were trapped under rocks after they had tumbled down the mountain. He was trapped too and could save only himself as the waters rose.

So why did the tragedy kill so many in a country which was already so poor? Pedro Lopez has the answer - it was the poverty which killed them. If the authorities cared, if he had been richer, he would not have lived literally on the edge, on a cliff-top which collapsed under the force of the hurricane. All that is left of his house now is one wall. When we opened his front door, it opened onto nothing and we could see across the valley to the Tegucigalpa country club (BBC 1998).

However, it was already too late to go to take refuge in the shelters because the water had already risen up to our necks and the force of the wind was leveling trees, homes, cars and everything else it found in its path. I remember how, in our desperation, we tried to leave the house to save ourselves, how we saw a metal sheet ripped off the roof of another house decapitate a woman who had gone out into the middle of the water. At that time we fled the house. My husband managed to make it to a tree trunk that was floating along in the water. Grabbing on to it, we clung to the trunk and let the current carry us. When below us we saw a very tall tree, it occurred to my husband that we could climb it to save ourselves. With much effort, we did manage to climb it, tying up our son so that he wouldn't fall into the water. It got dark. The tremendous cold made our bodies tremble. Our wet clothes stuck to us and without any blanket to cover us from the oppressive cold, we thought we would die. In this way, and without a bite to eat, we spent four long days. We survived only on the dirty water I managed to trap by submerging my sweater in the water and squeezing it into our mouths. And although this could have given us an infection, since the current was carrying dead bodies, trash, mud and dead animals, I knew this was the only way to survive. (Sylvia [Houston Catholic Worker] 1999)

Maria is another case. When Mitch hit she was a single mother with three children who worked cleaning the homes of wealthy Hondurans. Her house washed away, and she remembers with great emotion and distress sleeping under a bridge with her three children, concerned about food, their safety, and where they would go. However, she ends her description on a bright note, explaining that she was blessed to have made it to the temporary shelters set up by the Red Cross where she was given a

small temporary home to live in (PI Mariana 2008). From the first steps of survival, relief efforts were soon to follow.

Post-Mitch Relief

As noted earlier, the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch found more than half a million displaced people throughout the country. The area most affected physically and hardest to address logistically were the urban centers in and around San Pedro Sula and Tegucigalpa, where land was at a premium. Most survivors in these areas were forced to find alternative places to live, having either lost their home or having their neighborhood defined as at-risk, and therefore uninhabitable. Fortunately, most residents either had the means to rent an apartment, live in the same home that was at risk but not condemned, or had family members take them in. About one out of every five displaced persons, however, either had to move into the temporary shelters (set up in partnership between the government and NGOs) or were forced to move away from Tegucigalpa completely.

Table 5.5 Post-Mitch Living Situations

Where did you live after the hurricane but before living in the community?

Community	Temporary shelter	With family	Rented a house or an apt.	In the same house	Other+
Divina	15% **	22%	34% **	23% **	5%
España	47%	14% **	24%	11%	4%
Avg. 5 com.	43%	21%	24%	8%	5%
Z-test *.05, **.01 +Other usually referred to either migration in-country or internationally.					

No matter where they moved, each of the survivors had their own particular hurdles. Many would hear promises made by government or organization officials concerning X housing project and other promises about Y housing project. Timing was

also a problem. Many survivors lived in the *macro-albergues* (temporary shelters) set up by various international NGOs. While some were safe and run efficiently, others were taken over by gangs and became incredibly dangerous places to live. Thin sheets of plastic separated families in three-meter by five-meter rooms, and rape and robbery were not uncommon. According to Santiago the Fundación employee, just to speak of life in the *macro-albergues* could bring a person to tears years later.

Figure 5.12 Macro-albergue in Tegucigalpa




Photo from Honduran Red Cross (2008)

Future community residents also came from a diversity of neighborhoods. The current makeup of the community illustrates that families came from more than 100 different neighborhoods throughout the urban area of Tegucigalpa and its sister city Comayagua⁶⁹. Although many of these neighborhoods are not large and do not claim

⁶⁹For the sake of parsimony, when I refer to Tegucigalpa throughout the rest of the paper, I am referring to all neighborhoods within and around the city proper.

any particular cohesion based on values, where one comes from does affect one's interaction with other Tegucigalpa residents. Like many big cities, socio-economic status is a factor in how people know areas--claiming to be from a particular neighborhood such as the "Mercado" in Comayagua will gain someone a degree of suspicion while those from Loma Linda may gain someone more respect. Therefore, because socio-economic status about community residents before Mitch is unavailable, I will use the proxy of neighborhood as a factor to compare Divina residents with those of other communities.

Table 5.6 Post-Disaster Difficulty in Living Situation

After the hurricane, your new temporary home, how was your life. Did not suffer, suffered a little (<i>poco</i>), suffered a lot (<i>mucho</i>)			
Community	Did not suffer	Suffered some	Suffered a lot
Divina	26%	47%**	27%*
España	22%	37%	41%*
Avg. 5 com.	26%	40%	34%
Z-test *.05, **.01			

Table 5.7 Type of Post Mitch Housing by Level of Difficulty

Community	Did not suffer	suffered a little	suffered a lot
Temp. housing	13%	32%	55%
With family	42%	45%	12%
Rented an apart. or house	25%	47%	28%
Same house	24%	51%	24%

In addition to arriving from a diversity of neighborhoods, residents had very different experiences in their living situations after Mitch. Although I set up a scale that I believed would move from worst to best in terms of post-disaster situations—temporary shelter, living with family, renting an apartment, and the highest being living in one's same home--the results were surprising. Table 5.6 illustrates, as we would expect, that people who lived in temporary shelters did suffer the most. However, it also shows that

the residents who had moved in with family members actually suffered the least, and not those who lived at home or moved into an apartment.⁷⁰ My interviews offer two explanations for this. First, Honduras is a highly family-centric country. For many, family comes before friends, work, and even personal freedom. It makes sense, then, that survivors would rely on family members not only for the material support of a home, but also for the psychological and social support of fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers, and often extended family. Second, survivors were also traumatized by Mitch. Stories concerning children and adults going into a panic during a thunderstorm, or continuing to have nightmares about floods even years later, were common. Remaining in a house deemed unsuitable by the state, living in fear of another Mitch may have promoted more suffering by residents living in their own home than by those who moved to presumably safer ground with family members. This is important both in understanding how people suffered in the liminal time and space after Mitch but before moving to Divina, as well as in thinking through how this may have affected the development of culture in their future community. This question will be further developed in chapter 4.

Resettlement of Mitch Survivors

Much research has been done regarding how people are resettled into new areas in disaster literatures (Oliver-Smith 1992; Oliver-Smith 2009; Morello-Frosch et. al. 2010.), but there are few studies of the long-term consequences of re-settlements. In addition to not knowing the consequences, scholars lack the data to describe differentiation in these consequences.

⁷⁰This finding holds true across all of the communities I studied.

So what is to be done with so many people left stranded, people who cannot return to where they once lived, either because they did not own the land where they live; everything they owned is now gone; or they live in areas that are near the river or were on a precarious hillside and the government will not let them return, due to the high risk of future floods or mudslides? The short-term solution is temporary shelters in Honduras (at this time called *macro-albergues*). The long term solution was much more difficult to solve.

The resolution for about 2,600 families was to re-settle about 26 kilometers north of the capital, in an area called the Valle de Amaratéca. Here national and international organizations built seven new communities for survivors of the hurricane. All within a fifteen minute drive of one another, three communities border one another, one is in walking distance of these three, two are within walking distance of one another, and one is isolated in the hills. As noted earlier, for purposes of clarity and data, the focus remains on Divina and España, along with the average of the other five post-disaster communities. The following two chapters will detail each community in turn.

Chapter 6. Divina Providencia and the Fundación

Drive north from Tegucigalpa on the highway for about 35 minutes and soon you will descend into a beautiful and mountainous valley called the Valle de Amaratéca. You will notice thousands of pine trees, green scrub brush, and pockets of identical houses scattered about the valley. Billows of smoke rise from the Café Indo coffee processing plant on the right and the Café Maya plant on the left⁷¹. The smell is inviting on a calm day. Soon you are in the lowest part of the valley, where streaks of brown illustrate the dirt roads that wind their way up into the mountains well worn by foot, tire, and hoof. Take the last road on the left--the one before you head up the mountain on the other side of the valley. Remember to hold onto the seat in front of you, to avoid hitting your head on the roof due to the dips and bumps. Climb around the cow pasture, avoid the ditch on the right side and thorny branches on the left. Follow the sign up the hill to Divina Providencia. There, workers cutting grass will stop and wave, or nod, wondering who is entering their community. If they know you they will shout with a raised hand *compa* or *tio*, endearing names that remind you of the friendship you maintain. Be careful of the skinny dogs and roaming cattle on the road; and as you enter the community you will notice the microcosm of glory and sadness that is Honduras. People laughing alongside burning trash, kids playing barefoot with a flat soccer ball on a dirt field, abandoned cars alongside beautiful gardens, and gentle smiles that turn into growls when talking about politics.

⁷¹ These coffee processing plants were in the valley long before the resettlements were built. Therefore, the companies hired few new employees even though there was a large surplus of labor.

As you enter the center of town just beyond the central park, notice the Catholic Church on the right. It is the biggest building in town by far, but is simply built with a red roof and a dozen trees surrounding the cement structure. Now look left—the brick building, only the length of two cars, is the old pre-school that was run by Capuchin nuns. They left about two years ago and the place has been closed, to the great dismay of the community, ever since. Holler at the gate so that we can let you in. Would you like some coffee? It happens to be our nicest amenity alongside our refrigerator and stove. However, both work only when there is electricity - which is most of the time—just like our water (Alaniz field notes 9-23-09).

Divina is an intentional community built for survivors of hurricane Mitch and built with donated funds from international organization and churches by the Fundación Cristo de El Picacho. Building began in 1999 and continuing to some extent continues into the present. The original plan was ambitious, with the goal of constructing 800 homes. Limited by funding and geographic space, the Fundación settled on 585 homes, most of which have been inhabited since 2002.

This chapter is devoted to an in-depth description of the community and organization and an analysis of the interaction between the two. The goal is to provide the reader with enough background to understand how Divina ended up with the social health it currently has and how the theories explained above either help or detract from this understanding. To do so, I have chosen to detail the community holistically and the Fundación especially its philosophy and practices. I begin with a description of the material aspects of Divina Providencia—its land use, infrastructure, economy, and

physical development over time. I then move on to discuss the residents of Divina. I focus on Divina's leadership, the demographics of the people, the role of religion and family in the community. The following section outlines the life and vision of the Fundación in Divina. I start with a background description of the organization and address how their community development philosophy shaped not only the selection process, but the entire project. I then turn to describing how the Fundación's basic underlying development approach, paternalism, affected its practices in dealing with Divina residents. This is seen most prominently in the use of social control to define the community's trajectory as well as the conflict that came about because of those practices.

Neither the Fundación nor Divina residents are stationary. Over time their sense of identity, their roles, and their relationship with the other change in both positive and negative ways. I touch on these changes throughout the chapter, focusing on when and how the relationship significantly changed.

Divina's Land Use and Infrastructure

Figure 6.1 Divina Providencia with key



Table 6.1 Map Key

1	Main Road to highway. A dirt road that floods and creates traffic problems.
2	Central Square. This area includes the market on the right, the central park center, and the Catholic church on the left.
3	This is the Fundación's office. It is a combination of two houses.
4	Elementary school. Just north of the school is the old day care that is now a community hall.
5	Bus station.
6	Workshops. This large building houses four workshops where adolescents and adults took vocational classes. Connected to the building were the living quarters connected of the four nuns who ran the workshop for six years. Now used for small group meetings.
7	Multi-sports complex. Usually used for short-sided soccer games. It has changing rooms, bathrooms (that do not work), and stadium seating.
8	Middle and high school buildings.
9	Road to Rio Frio and the only local bar (100 meters beyond Divina limits).
10	Police Station.

The above photograph shows all of the homes and most of the terrain of Divina Providencia. The dirt road in the upper right hand (#1) corner arrives at the main highway after about two kilometers. As you enter the town you notice on the right a road branching off leading to other communities that have existed for centuries. On the left is sector 1, which is where the first houses were built and occupied. The houses continued to be built toward the left until they finished the school, in which case they built sectors four, five, and six moving from the right of the market (#2) up. The community was completed with sectors seven, eight and nine moving down and left from the elementary school (#4).

A number of important points are illustrated on the map. First, notice how the main road enters into the community and the center of town. Taking the bus (#5), the most common commuting method of transportation, forces people to pass through half the town, meters away from their neighbor houses. All roads lead to this thoroughfare that sees the first bus leave at 4:30am and the last one return at 8pm. In addition, Divina residents are almost the sole users of this part of the road as neighbor villagers take the dirt roads heading north to get home. Due in part to the few cars owned by residents and by the low outside traffic the community sees, residents will give a hard look and at an unknown car or motorcycle wandering through town.

In addition, due to the main road being the only convenient way in or out of the community, a resident sees the same people day in and day out; near the market Don Francisco, ninety-two years old, rests regularly beneath branches of the same tree every day, watching people and waving to the cars. Often he naps in the same spot in the early

afternoon. There is the gentleman with a mental illness who sits at the end of town all day staring at the mountains but does not bother anybody; and the neighborhood women walking from home to the market and back. Although it is wonderful to see friends entering and leaving the community, it also gives Main Street a “fish bowl” feeling where everyone in the community knows everyone else’s business.

Following numerical order, #2 pinpoints the heart of the community. The lively market, open seven days a week from 6 until 6pm has 44 of its 52 stalls filled with vendors selling everything from hardware to groceries, hot lunch to school supplies, DVDS to clothing, and services such as haircuts and bike repair. Next to the market is the central park, which boasts beautiful red brick paths, well-groomed brush and flowers, and a four-meter tall water fountain. Set up in the shape of a small amphitheatre, the west (market side) area has a large concrete platform that acts as a stage for speakers, dance troupes, and other community events. On the east side lays a plaque in gratitude to the Fundación and Cardinal Oscar Rodriguez for founding the community. Not fifteen yards away, every evening from five to twenty men play cards or dominoes (occasionally for money) on small concrete slabs. As I was leaving, the men had gathered money among themselves to put a roof up and fix the seating so that they could play in the rain and out of the heat of the sun.

Interestingly, although the park (#2) was originally designed by the Fundación, the Fundación worked out an agreement that they would provide the materials if residents provided the labor. This is one of the partnerships between residents/NGOs considered a success both because the people enjoy it and the Fundación is proud of the joint effort.

Throughout the year, the park attracts much foot traffic. For older residents and families with children, the park is often a destination for evening strolls or an opportunity to catch up with friends. For adolescents, the park offers just enough dark corners to sneak in a romantic moment with a partner. On weekend evenings, about twice a month, the park is used for many types of outdoor activities including concerts, dance competitions, prayer meetings, fundraisers, and talent shows for children.

Next to the park is the Roman Catholic Church, the largest building in the community besides the schools. Standing prominently in front of the day care and elementary school (#4), and close to the bus stop (#5), it acts as the central hub of the community. The church also maintains a large open space for parking on Sundays, though during the week the kids use it for soccer or bicycling, and townswomen use it to sell oranges and *cathratchas*⁷². Further down the street stands the Fundación office, a quiet building made up of two combined houses, fitting in nicely with the surrounding homes. Far from ostentatious, a small covered patio with simple blue tiles and metal chairs invites visitors to sit and wait to meet with the accountant, engineer or social worker.

On the periphery of the town lie four important destinations, though important for significantly different reasons. Location six (#6) and eight (#8) pinpoint the vocational school (now closed due to a lack of funds from both the government and NGOs) and the high school. Location seven represents the mini concrete soccer field where youth play throughout the day. Here, young kids are able to play from two until four and the old

⁷² A traditional Honduran foodstuff of a fried corn tortilla, refried pinto beans, lettuce, cheese, and salsa.

adolescents and young men gather to play from four until much after dark. More recently, however, the community came together and with some funds donated by a U.S. NGO, and repaired the fences and lights, so that tournaments could be held at night. Point ten (#10) is the police station. The small four-room concrete building—a greeting area with two chairs, a small desk and a non-working telephone, two small holding cells, and a back bedroom for the night police officer—is painted yellow with a bright department insignia painted on the front. It is occupied only about half of the time; the other half the officers spend walking the community and/or flirting with the local girls. Speaking with the police, they felt very much the same way about the peace in Divina. Speaking with Officer Ramirez in Divina and Officer Valladares in Ciudad España, both agree that they would rather be in the Valle de Amaratéca than in Tegucigalpa, and in Divina rather than Ciudad España.

Finally, location nine (#9) represents the west boundary of the community and a small trail that leads into Rio Frio. The reason that it is important is that it is often referred to jokingly as sector *diez* (ten). Since there are really only nine sectors in the community, men often go to sector *diez*, as that is where the local bar and shady hangout is located. As one Divina resident warned me, “Ryan, you should never go to sector ten at night. Bad things happen there. People get drunk and get into fights. Sometimes people get stabbed.” While this may have been true at some point, according to police records this never happened or at least was never reported. Talking with other men in the community, it was considered a shady place, seen with both a hint of disdain and appeal. My own experience both during the day and at night was that this small bar was very

unthreatening as were the men who frequented the locale. Indeed, the only thing that differentiated the bar from any other house in the area was a small dirt patio with some wood benches and a painted sign of the local beer.

On any given Divina evening, as long as it is not raining, no less than a hundred adult residents are out and about the community visiting friends, attending church, civic, or sports meetings, buying ingredients from the local *pulperia*⁷³, or just taking a walk after the temperature cooled. Children and adolescents are out and about chasing one another, running errands for parents, or just hanging out. There are no less than six mini-soccer games going on under the streetlamps of Divina on any given evening. For most residents, it is difficult to move from one's house to the store, the soccer field, or the church without running into someone and having a brief conversation with them.

This type of semi-densely and physically-bounded community creates a social environment where it is difficult to not engage in social interaction. It is possible to walk the periphery of the community, avoiding contact with other residents and catch the bus down the road. Yet, resident interaction is common; people know one another either through living in the same sector, having gone through the same capacity-building classes, through the church, through the school, or through social clubs. The exceptions

⁷³ A *pulperia* is an informal store, usually based in someone's home. *Pulperias* usually sell small items such as hygiene products, sodas, bottled water, snacks, and possibly small cleaning supplies. In Divina the Fundación prohibits the selling of products from one's home. However, *pulperias* are such a cultural norm that there is no enforcement (other than the selling of alcohol) and at last count about 60% of the blocks had at least one *pulperia*.

to this rule are those who work in Tegucigalpa full-time⁷⁴. Catching the bus at 4 or 5am and returning at 6 or 7pm six days a week leaves little free time to socialize.

The question arises as to the influence of the small townships surrounding Divina. Superficially, there are no rules or issues with the interchange of Divina residents and their neighbors in Las Moras and Rio Frio. The physical boundaries are defined by barbed wire fences, but the fences' purpose is more to highlight the borders (land disputes are common) and to prevent cattle from wandering aimlessly into the town (which happens anyway). All roads and paths leading in and out of the community are open to cars and people at any time with two exceptions. First, Divina residents had voted to implement a community-wide curfew at ten pm. After ten pm, the police would stop and question anyone out wandering in the community. If you have a good reason, you are led home. If you do not, you are either told to leave or put behind bars until morning. The other exception is in response to a crime problem years ago. According to Hugo Pineda (2010), Divina resident since 2001, only after two and a half years was the police station constructed and officers employed (March 2002). Before this time, new residents were appearing, no one knew who belonged and who did not, and robbery of goods from unoccupied homes became a major problem. The community came together in this moment and created a vigilance group to patrol at night. Residents came together and through the organization of the *Comite Civico Social*, they implemented this patrol without the help or support of the Fundación. About once a month, each household

⁷⁴ I was unable to obtain accurate numbers of residents who work in Tegucigalpa. It does seem clear that Divina, percentage wise, does have more residents who work in the city than España. I would estimate it was around ten percent of adults work in the capital and slightly less in España.

would take a turn providing a man or woman who would stay up all night walking the community. Each adult had a whistle and if the volunteer watchperson saw a problem, she would whistle and every neighbor would come out of their houses armed with machetes, sticks, or other weapons they might have. In addition, each sector raised funds to put up a chain across corollary roads. This was done to prevent a car from pulling up in front of a home and loading up with stolen goods. The system was highly successful at decreasing crime, and residents continue to speak about the experience with a sense of pride.

Table 6.2 Timeline of housing construction by section

Steps	Section	Number of homes	Approximate building time	Approximate time of move-in
1	1	41	July 1999 to July 2000	October and November 2000
	2	64		
	3	63		
	4	51		
	5	89		
2	6	83	May 2000 to July 2001	May 2000 to July 2001
	7	80		
	8	41		
	9	29		
3	9 cont.	41	July 2001 to March 2003	March 2003
Total		583		
Source: CESAL 2008: 47-49 (Some of these number conflict with those of the Fundación slightly)				

Above we also see the speed at which the houses went up. Since the houses were built not by future residents but by different construction companies, Divina had three hundred houses up within 21 months of the disaster. The Fundación was also able to move residents in by 2001, three years before España residents settled in their homes.

Community Design

Geographers, urban planners, engineers and architects continually remind us the importance of space and design of a community. This is perhaps even more critical in creating a new intentional community, built with international funds, for survivors who are brought together through necessity and without strong networks of support. The infrastructure blueprint could either encourage, discourage, or influence in both directions the building of “community” among residents. In Divina, as the map above illustrates, the plan encourages constant interaction between residents. No matter what sector a resident lives in, she cannot escape running into community members either through bringing her kids to school, going to church, buying food at the market, or catching a bus.

Divina’s layout was designed by a group of Honduran architects and urban planners who maintained a number of community-appropriate cultural elements. Some of these include: building homes that look traditional, the needs of beneficiaries who participated in the design of the homes, the average number of family members, the distribution of utilities, and the dimensions of the homes, which offered residents both a little private backyard and a small public front yard (CESAL 2008: 54). Although the property space surrounding the home would be considered very small for someone arriving from a rural area, it felt large and spacious to someone from Tegucigalpa. Most residents appreciated the size and design of both the house and of the space.

According to CESAL (2008: 53), a Spanish NGO that supported the building of many houses (through financing from the Spanish government and technicians), the housing characteristics were built with six important ideas that shaped the community culture. The goals were:

To not create dependency. Materials should be easily attainable. The home should be a means, not an end in itself [to self-sustainability].

The homes are built in a manner that fits with local skill sets, and are more economical than technical.

The homes are respectful of the socio-cultural reality, understanding that the process is constantly evolving. There is a focus on practicality and not nostalgia.

The homes should be acceptable to future residents.

The homes should permit local adaptation, should be easy to understand, and favorable to resident adaptation rather than a one-size-fits all model.

The homes should be built at a standard that is similar to the economic standard of the region.

Seen below is an example of a home that addresses all six of these criteria. The house is made of cinder block, common and inexpensive for most Hondurans. Fixing a problem or building onto the existing structure is relatively straightforward and can be done by most men who have worked in construction. In addition, both the building and the grounds allow residents to make the edifice their own home. Some people have gardens, others have weeds, others have a garage, others use the yards as storage. The homes also fit within the Valle de Amaratéca; there are houses that are much more grand and beautiful and there are others that are smaller and made of mud and brick. The new homes are within both the economic and socio-cultural standards of the area.

Strolling along the dusty roads of the community, familial socio-economic status is easily seen from the street. Those with less wealth have not had the resources to improve their home and terrain.

Figure 6.2 An Average Street and Home in Divina Providencia



Unpainted walls, an open unfenced green space, and general emptiness illustrate these homes. Most residents, however, have been able to make improvements. Many families have painted their home with vibrant colors, others have put up walls or fences around their home (perhaps a cultural throwback to living in Tegucigalpa), while others have added on rooms and even second stories to their houses. An estimated 75% of houses show considerable enhancement over the original models.

Community Utilities

Similar to all of the other post-disaster communities, but unlike established neighboring communities, Divina has electricity in each home, running water two to three days a week, indoor plumbing, a waste-management treatment plant, and trash collection. The electricity is on approximately 95% of the time. During thunderstorms, the electricity will often go down not only for Divina but for the entire valley. A great

amenity for Divina residents is running water in the home, even though it only runs for a few hours, two to three times a week. Residents fill a *pila* or large tub to provide them with water in the intermittent time. A waste-management plant is also used for black and gray water, clearing the water of solids before it enters the local river. Finally, the county level trash agency picks up trash twice weekly. The community often still has trash on the sides of roads and in green areas. This is due to a culture of dropping trash where it is convenient and, on trash days, residents leave their trash in plastic bags outside of their home where the roaming dogs pick through them.

When residents were asked about their town, they almost unanimously liked living in Divina and almost ninety percent of residents believed that their community was a model community for other post-disaster settlements.

Divina's Economy

As noted earlier, there is a thriving marketplace in the central square of Divina. The vast majority of stalls are open, offering Divina residents everything from toys to clothing to fresh vegetables to video games. Since 2002 when the market was opened, the number of occupied stalls has never been below 75% of the stalls available. The marketplace is the biggest within a five-kilometer radius, and therefore attracts residents from local communities and people who live in villages from the surrounding hills.

Figure 6.3 Formal Market



Figure 6.4 Informal Home Store (Pulperia)



Community	With	Without
Divina (N=42)	60%	40%
España (N=82)	89% **	11% **
Avg. 5 coms. (N=84)	58%	42%
Z score *.05, **.01		

There is also a thriving informal economy in Divina. As part of our physical and social disorder survey, we identified the number of streets with at least one informal store (*Pulperia*).

Pulperias are illegal in both Divina and España as each organization wanted to promote a central market. *Pulperias* popped up, however, to address the small and quick needs of members such as snacks, phone minutes, soda, toiletries, etc. These stores take very little starter investment, signs are usually provided by different companies (as seen in the photo above), and residents can make a small fortune through the sheer quantity of selling small necessities. Table 3.2 illustrates that more than half of Divina streets have at least one *pulperia*; comparable with the average of the other five communities. In comparison to Ciudad España, Divina had a much lower rate of streets with informal stores; possibly illustrating the stronger central market of Divina.

Table 6.4 Remittances as Percentage of Total Monthly Income

Community	<i>0% of income</i>	<i>1-10% of income</i>	<i>11% or more of income</i>
Divina	31%**	59%**	10%
España	1%	89%	10%
Avg. 5 communities	1%	90%	9%
Z score .05*, .01**			

As income is not generated in the community (except from locals from other communities who buy foodstuffs at the market) most of the revenue that enters Divina arrives either as remittances or from those who work in the valley or in Tegucigalpa. As seen in table 3.3 about a third of Divina residents receive no remittances whatsoever. Sixty percent receive a small support from remittances as only 1-10% of their total monthly salary while ten percent rely more heavily on the subsidy, obtaining more than ten percent of their income from relatives abroad. Those who work outside of the community tend to have either blue-collar jobs in the valley (construction, brick making, general manual labor) or in Tegucigalpa (housecleaning, selling newspapers on the street, selling medicine on buses. Others have white-collar jobs in business, work for the government, or in the health field (nurses), teaching, or law (there is one lawyer in Divina).

For those who must commute to Tegucigalpa, most either take the bus or request a ride with one of the few families who own and drive cars⁷⁵ in the community. As noted above, buses in Divina run every thirty minutes, from 4:30 a.m. with the last bus arriving at 7:30 in the evening. The morning buses are consistently full until seven a.m., by which time most residents need to be at work in the city. Since the bus ride is anywhere from

⁷⁵ There are a number of cars in the community but many of them are not driven due to the high cost of maintenance, gasoline (which is unsubsidized), and government taxes.

fifty minutes to one hundred and twenty minutes, residents who work in town often cannot participate in the political process or social activities of the communities except on weekends. Indeed, the recent president of the CCS worked for the national electric company and although he was elected, he admitted to the board that he would do his best but would be absent a significant amount of time (ethnographic notes May 18th, 2010). Interestingly, some of the best and brightest in Divina cannot participate in the community development process because they have to work.

Divina's Leadership

Don Francisco is perhaps the most well-respected person in Divina. The regal and handsome seventy-two year old maintains an impeccable appearance. He is often dressed in khaki pants and a collared white shirt that contrasts against his dark brown skin. He walks slowly and with care, the same manner with which he speaks to children and adults. He is widowed as of 2008, when cancer took his wife, but has a grandson that now lives with him to keep him company. He spends his days involved in various community organizations; especially those connected with the Catholic Church. He takes walks with friends and helps those he sees in need. As another resident shared with me, if there was one person who could unite the community, it would be Don Francisco. In many ways, his role in the community rivals that of Doña Rosa, although he would be too humble to admit to it.

Don Francisco's role has been multifaceted. After Mitch, his house was in an at-risk area, forcing him and his wife to move into one of the local churches. As a beloved elder of the church, he was called upon by the priest to organize and support the

temporary relocation of thousands of families in different parishes. Like a social worker, he would listen to the needs of particular families and then match them with resources in other parishes or with other organizations. When the Fundación began its recruitment via local priests, Don Francisco was asked if he would be interested in relocating to Divina Providencia. He accepted and began helping the Fundación find families in need, who would fit the criteria to live in the community.

Don Francisco, although an ideal resident in terms of his leadership, offers the reader an idea of what type of residents the Fundación were looking for: committed to the church, financially self-sufficient, moral, hard working, service-minded, and committed to the well-being of the community. They found many families through their strict selection process, people who were willing to take advantage of new opportunities to get ahead.

Divina's Residents

Although all Mitch stories are different, Mariana has a fairly common tale of difficulty and relief. When Mitch hit she was a single mother with three children who worked cleaning homes of wealthy Hondurans. Her house washed away and she remembers, with great emotion and distress, sleeping under a bridge with her three children concerned about food, their safety, and where they would go. After the storm, the family made its way to one of the larger temporary shelters. She was grateful, in hindsight, that the shelter she ended up at was one of the safer *macro-albergues*. They lived together in a three- by five-meter space, protected by four walls of plastic and wood beams. She volunteered in the temporary shelters, took classes, and raised her children.

When she found out about the various projects, she was drawn to Divina. “I chose to live in the community for my kids. I believed it would give them better opportunities in the future. I knew there would be a major sacrifice on my part, though, to work to pay the mortgage.” Indeed, she has sacrificed. Now with four children, Mariana has to work seven days a week cleaning homes in the capital. She often leaves at 4:30 am to arrive at her employer’s home by seven, and although she commonly leaves the city around five or six, the two hour bus ride returns her home for only a couple of hours of rest and relaxation before going to sleep in the same four by five meter bedroom with four children. Amazingly, Mariana has managed to continually pay off her mortgage each month and is encouraged that three of her four children have stayed in school. When asked directly about her experience in Divina, she simply replies, “I like it very much.”⁷⁶

Living about two hundred yards away, Don Guatano is short in stature but large in humility. He has a dark complexion, deep kind brown eyes and jet-black hair. A married man and father of four girls, Don Bernardo (as he is affectionately known) is not a leader, does not put too much thought into politics, goes to church every Sunday, and loves soccer. He is one of the few residents who works for the Fundación; as a guard of the workshop grounds, his hours are six a.m. to six p.m. six days a week on odd weeks and six p.m. to six a.m. seven days a week even weeks. He makes the national minimum wage of 5,500 Lempiras a month but has been active in setting up a micro-enterprise farm

⁷⁶ It should also be noted that not all residents were affected equally or as dramatically as noted above. Some resident’s homes were not damaged in the disaster but they lived in an unsafe area and were forced to relocate. Others, however, fit more in line with the stories above.

with some other residents to make a little extra money. His wife takes care of the girls who are between 8 and 18.

Table 6.5 2010 Cost of Living in Divina Providencia For Don Bernardo

Cost per Month	Lempiras	U.S. Dollars
Minimum Wage Income for Don Bernardo	5,500	\$289
Water	-150	\$7
Electricity	-100	\$5
Mortgage	-1,388	\$73
Transportation for one to the city (e.g. high school, groceries, etc.)	-1,175	\$61
Left over income after the above	=2,697	\$142
If left over income is spent on food per person (six in total)	450	\$24
Education, health, travel, savings, home repairs, sports, etc.	0	0

Livelihoods

Unfortunately, obtaining an accurate account of employment for residents has been a difficult task. Although I asked about occupation before and after Mitch, our surveyors mostly interviewed residents who were at home during the day, which were usually stay at home women. The only accurate data available was a 2004 self-study by the Fundación and a Spanish organization called *Centro de Estudios y Solidaridad con America Latina* (CESAL). The study provides some insight into the general means of attaining money for families both based on employment status and type.

Table 6.6 Employment Status of Divina Residents in 2004
(Fundación and CESAL 2004: 29-34)

	Youth over 12 not studying	Women	Men
Unemployed ⁷⁷	78%	21%	7%
Temporary work	7%	12%	20%
Permanent work	14%	67%	72%

In order to create the table above, I am using the definitions provided by the Red Cross study, as they are more inclusive and robust than that of the Fundación. The definitions of self-employed, manual labor and permanent work are noted below (Red Cross and Ciudad España 2007: 23-29).

Self-employment: This employment is done by those who have few opportunities in the labor market. Most women are self-employed as an extension of domestic work, as they have developed their skills and abilities to work in other areas. [examples include tailors, merchants (from selling firewood, candy, water bags on buses, making and selling tortillas, selling food and snacks, to established businesses)]

Manual Labor: Ciudad España, which have been constructed with this method and encouraged the development of skills and abilities, especially in men in the areas of masonry, plumbing, electricity among others. These jobs are temporary and in most cases without social protections and not very well paid. The work performed by women has even worse conditions. [examples include construction workers, gardeners, painters,

⁷⁷ According to the World Bank (Data 2011), in 2004 Honduras had a national unemployment rate of 6%. More recently in 2009, unemployment in Tegucigalpa topped at 8.1% (Proceso Digital 2010).

welders; others in the transport category as drivers, fare collectors, repair of tires and other small businesses like machine operators (sawmills).]

Permanent work: Professionals or institutional employees in the public, private, and corporate level. They are people who have a permanent salary and greater social security. [Examples include: stylists, clerks, nurses, cooks, teachers, secretaries, therapists, nurses, janitors, clerks, bakers, managers, waitresses and dental assistant, administrators, mechanics, teachers, cashiers, clerks, shopkeepers, policemen, broadcasters, radio operators, military dependents, bakers, surveyor, winemaker.

Together, these three categories can accurately divide up employment based on the social and economic context of Honduras.

Based on the definitions above, Divina and España have significant differences in the percentage of residents who are self-employed and who do manual labor. An initial question might be whether the economy significantly changed during the four years. The answer is that it actually changed for the better in Honduras. According to the World Bank (2011), the unemployment declined from 6% in 2004 to 2.9% in 2007.

Table 6.7 Employment Type of Divina and España Residents over 12 in 2004
(Fundación and CESAL 2004: 29-34; Red Cross and España 2007)⁷⁸

	Unemployed	Self-Employed	Manual Labor	Permanent
Divina (2004) N=501	5%	26%*	41%*	34%
España (2007) N=1,513	Unknown+	33%	34%	33%
Z score *.05, **.01 +Since this is unknown all of the percentages for España would change increasing or decreasing the difference between communities.				

⁷⁸ Although it would be more accurate to obtain number from the same year, the data does not exist.

Table 6.6 evidences the differences in employment between the two communities. A possible explanation of the inverse relationship between self-employed and manual labor may be that when a family member (usually a man) engages in manual labor, then another family member (usually the woman) can focus more on taking care of the children and household. On the other hand, when a man cannot find work, the woman of the house begins to find ways to help support the family, such as selling tortillas or opening a home market. If the business is successful, the man may then focus his energy on this informal work, which is easier than laying brick or digging ditches. In all of the communities I did my investigation in, there is a general goal that the man should try to make enough money so his spouse can stay home and care for the children. This traditional family practice is maintained by both economic and social factors. From my observations, economically, jobs tend to go to men no matter the skill level, unless the job is seen as a woman's job, such as a secretary, an office assistant, or a teacher or nurse. Socially, as noted earlier, family is an important part of Honduran culture and life. The idea of having two parents working is not a goal, and women tend to have less career ambition and opportunity than in a country like the United States.

Divina's Families

Family unity or isolation can also create conflict, breaking the broader community social capital bridge (Putnam 2001). In Divina, Doña Rosa explained, "We did not know that it was of benefit to have families come together." On the positive end, families can work together, pool resources, and help each other with common issues like childcare,

microloans or knowledge about job opportunities. Doña Rosa described the challenge of related families working together to control aspects of the community. She elucidated how the Fundación attempted to split up families by assigning them homes in different parts of the community to avoid the nepotism that plagues Honduran culture. One instance in particular was the sports complex. Due to the democratic nature of the *Cómite Cívico*, a single family was able to create a voting bloc that in many ways was a return to the *patronato* system⁷⁹ the Fundación and many community members were hoping to avoid. A more concrete example was the use of this voting bloc to control the community's sports complex. Members of the same family were all voted onto the board of sports and recreation. This gave them control over the sports complex and they ran it like a family. Only relatives or friends of relatives were permitted to use the facility. This situation was finally ended not by political pushback but by a major storm, which destroyed the fence and enabled anyone to enter the complex at will. As many Hondurans have pointed out to me, "Family interest comes first."

Persons per Household

⁷⁹ Briefly, the *patronato* system, as the legal political system in Honduran rural communities, is a democratic process where leaders run on a slate platform rather than as individuals. It is a winner takes all system, as the president is able to appoint all of his subordinates throughout the community. Although it has received a negative reputation for corruption and nepotism, the system maintains proponents and until recently was the only form of local government allowed.

Table 6.8 Persons per household

# of persons per household	Divina	España	Average of five other com.
1	2%	3%	2%
2	7%	5%	7%
3	14%	12%	14%
4	21%	20%	24%
5	26%	18%	21%
6 or more	30%	42%**	31%

Z score .05*, .01** compared to avg. of group

Looking at the distribution of persons per household, we find that Divina has no significant differences from the average of the other communities. Interestingly, 77% of homes in Divina have four or more people living in them, quite a feat for a structure the size of the average hotel room (Garrido 2011). It is notable, however, that there is a statistical difference between Divina and España in those living in homes with six or more people. This may indicate greater wealth in Divina as fewer people choose to live in such a small space.

Children

Like many poor nations, Honduras is a relatively young country. Nationally, the country's median age of citizens is 21 years (Indexmundi 2011), and this is similar in the Valle de Amaratéca. In Divina, eighty-eight percent of households have children under the age of eighteen living there. Most of these (63%) have three or more children.

Table 6.9 Number of children living in a household

	0	1	2	3	4 or more
Divina	12%	24%	29%	23%	11%
España	9%	21%	25%*	21%	24%**
Avg. 5 coms	11%	23%	31%	21%	14%

Z-score *.05, ** .01 compared to avg. of group

Notable in this chart is the number of children per household – it is significantly lower in Divina than España. In this case, España seems to be the outlier with three times as many households having five or more children than any of the other communities. Divina, then, is a particularly average community, while España has more kids per household generally.

It is also worthwhile to highlight the marital status of residents and whether or not they have children.

Table 6.10 Marital status of adult respondent

	Single	Married	Free Union	Widowed ⁸⁰	Without children
Divina Total Households	39%**	35%*	23%**	4%	
España Total Households	33%	25%	40%	3%	
Avg. 5 communities Total Households	28%	29%	39%	3%	

Marital status of an adult in the home and children

Divina Households with children	31%**	33%**	21%**	1%	12%
España Households with children	28%	23%	37%	1%	9%
Avg. 5 communities Households with children	24%	26%	37%	0%	10%
Z-score * .05, ** .01 (Comparison group—Avg. 5 coms.)					

⁸⁰ Widowed can be seen as a good proxy for the accuracy of the surveys. By not finding significant differences in widowed but finding them in other categories supports the reliability of these measures.

This table illustrates, interestingly, that the largest portion of adult respondents in Divina are single and that many of these single adults have children. My time in the community supports this and that it is not men but rather women who are the single mother household breadwinners. Marta is a particular case in point. Marta has dark skin and even darker curly hair. At twenty-eight she is a single mother of an eight year old boy and six year old girl. The father of her children left years ago and she has no expectations of financial support or even ever seeing him again. She works for the Catholic Church as a secretary and makes the minimum wage of 5,500 Lempiras or about \$289 a month. Although not enough to cover all of her expenses, she, like many of the other single working mothers in Divina, finds a way to make ends meet. Marta is not against finding a partner to settle down with; rather, with two kids, full time employment and no extra money, she is confined to meet another resident in Divina, or nobody at all.

The second largest group of Divina residents, about one-third, is married.⁸¹ Due to the fact that marriage is such an expensive undertaking, this is a surprisingly high number as seen in comparison to Ciudad España and the other communities. Conversely, free unions are much less common in Divina. This may be due to the high religiosity and Catholic nature of the community.

⁸¹ Marriage and free union are often interchangeable in Honduran Spanish parlance. However, since the surveys offer both categories, residents had the opportunities to choose the specific category that fit their situation.

Religion and Religiosity

Religion and religiosity in both communities is an important feature. Due to the complexity of the topic, a deep analysis is beyond the scope of this dissertation. What follows is a brief overview of Divina's faith.

Table 6.11 Religion by Community

	Catholic	Protestant	Evangelical	None	Other
Divina	61%**	0%	29%**	10%**	0%
España	23%	2%	45%	29%*	1%
Avg. 5 com.	28%	1%	47%	22%	2%
Z-score * .05, **.01 (Comparison group—Avg. 5 coms.)					

These statistics are fascinating both in how they do not fit standard evaluations (e.g. CIA Factbook [2011] which places Honduran Catholics at 98%) nor near the average of the other communities at 28%. The Fundación may have had greater success negotiating this process due to its Catholic philosophy and structure and paternalistic practices which provided the organization a certain degree of legitimacy.⁸² Indeed, according to informal discussion with residents throughout the valley, due to its significant connection with the Fundación Divina is known as the most Catholic community in the area. It has the largest church in the Amaratéca valley and the only priest who provides mass for the valley lives in Divina. Additionally, the Cardinal recently (2010) built a large two story home for three priests in Divina, which they will use as their home as they serve the rest of the valley. As will be discussed in the selection process section below, there was an informal effort on the part of the Fundación

⁸²According to the CIA World Factbook, 98% of Hondurans are Roman Catholic. In addition, the history of Honduras and the importance of the church in society and politics arguably provide the organization with greater legitimacy and respect (or disdain).

to initially select mostly Catholics into the community, although this did not happen as they had planned.

Divina residents are also outliers in their religiosity, as measured by church attendance. According to our survey, only 13% of residents never attend services, even on major holidays. This figure is twice as high in the other communities and nearly three times as high in España. There is no statistically significant difference between those who attend only on holidays; however, the difference between religions is highlighted in how often per week residents attend services: 32% of Divina residents attend every week and 36% attend twice or more.

Table 6.12 Religiosity by Community


Community	Do not attend	Attend on Holidays	Attend every week	Attend two or more times each week
Divina	13%**	20%	32%**	36%
España	32%**	16%	17%**	35%
Avg. 5 Coms.	26%	18%	24%	33%
Z-score *.05, **.01 (3 rd group is the comparison group)				

Another statistic of interest is the relatively high number of Catholics and low number of atheists in Divina. This is the reverse for España. Fittingly, the religious attendance is also significantly lower creating less opportunity for social interaction. As discussed by Durkheim this difference could have played a major role in the ability of each community to create and maintain social cohesion, an agreed upon culture, and even social control (1979; 1995).

The Fundación: Philosophy and Practice

As explained above, the Fundación was a religious monument-focused organization turned philanthropic, which developed into a community-development NGO. Like many other communities, the Fundación had significant control over the decision-making process and vision of what its housing project was going to look like. This section will develop the choices the Fundación made in terms of its selection of residents, development philosophy, and practices.

Figure 6.5 The Fundación Cristo De El Picacho Symbol⁸³



The Fundación Cristo de El Picacho was founded not for social purposes but rather as an organization to build a national monument. In 1997, in preparation for the Roman Catholic proclaimed Year of Jubilee, 2000, the Honduran Cardinal Oscar Rodriguez wanted to create a monument for the country that would represent faith, love, and family unity. He brought together key elite Hondurans to fundraise and build the statue. To legitimate the process and fundraising, this group created an organization called the Fundación Cristo de El Picacho (Foundation of the Christ of El Picacho) after the monument (Christ resurrected) and its location, the mountain of El Picacho. In January of 1998, seven months after initial construction, the monument was inaugurated and continues to be a major landmark and tourist attraction standing above the city of Tegucigalpa.

⁸³ The picture below is the same as the monument and the symbol for the organization.

Nine months later, Mitch devastated the country, especially Tegucigalpa. The Cardinal turned to the Fundación and asked, “How can we help?” They decided upon building a community for survivors. The mission was to “return to the most vulnerable [survivors] the possibility of recovering their normal life, as well as transform them using a holistic vision, oriented toward strengthening education and evangelism with the end result of generating a new type of citizen with a sensitivity to solidarity and community well-being” (Fundación 2004, 1). By November of the same year, the organization was already fundraising, designing, and planning the community.

This section explores four aspects of the influence of the Fundación on the community. The first section describes the physical environment and how it may have influenced the development of the community. The second section develops the Fundación’s selection process of Divina residents and the impact this may have had on the long-term social health of the community. The third section will discuss the philosophy and practice of the Fundación vis-à-vis the community. Finally, the chapter will conclude with the organization’s relationship to the community.

Fundación Community Development Philosophy

Doña Rosa is a small woman and grandmother who can shift from a stern and critical look to a broad and generous smile in a moment. She is tenacious and passionate, especially about the well-being of Divina Providencia. An original member of the Fundación, her background as a social worker and her desire to help the survivors of Mitch pushed the organization in the direction of community-building, raising her status to vice-president of the Fundación, subordinate only to the symbolic president Cardinal

Oscar Rodriguez Maradiaga. Doña Rosa was the key person in designing the selection process. She waded through thousands of applications to select the first few hundred families. She gave capacity-building classes before residents moved into the community, found social workers to support the community, and was the most important player in shaping the social design of Divina Providencia. To understand the Fundación's role in Divina necessitates understanding Doña Rosa.

Her reputation preceded my first of many interviews with her—I was told she is direct, takes no fluff from others, and is *the* person to speak to about the development of Divina, at least from the Fundación's perspective. If she approved of my work, I would be granted access to anything the Fundación had—documents, resources, and contacts, including a potential interview with the Cardinal. If she disapproved, I would need to find another community.

Doña Rosa lived up to her reputation. Arriving at an upscale home in Tegucigalpa, I was greeted by the executive director of the Fundación and brought into a comfortable living room with pictures of family and a small coffee table with petite dessert snacks. Although small in stature and, for the moment laid up on the couch with a broken leg, her presence was overwhelming. After a short cordial introduction and a gift of fancy chocolate I began my interview. I was quickly interrupted. “Tell me again what you are studying and how this will be of benefit to the Fundación” she exclaimed in excellent English. Surprised and humbled, I quickly reiterated the goals of my research and the importance of Divina as a case study. Only after a few more critical and probing questions was she satisfied, and opened up to the interview process. Although I was able

to ask the questions I needed about the Fundación and development of Divina, I felt a visceral difference in who was in charge and who needed to be grateful for this opportunity.

Indeed, I believe my interaction with Doña Rosa is a suitable starting point to describe the philosophy of the Fundación and its relationship to Divina. As has been cited in other studies, the difference between development worker and development receiver is often tangible. This relationship has also been described in the religious setting where there is a separation, a significant distinction between those who have been ordained as shepherds, and the lowly flock of followers. Doña Rosa did not need me; I needed her; and the distinction was clear to both parties. Similarly, the Fundación does not need Divina Providencia, but the residents need the Fundación. The relationship can be understood through what Smesler (1998: 5) calls ambivalence; the organization and the community both love and hate one another as part of their ever-changing relationship.⁸⁴ My interaction with Doña Rosa, then, seems a fitting example of the powerlessness that many of the residents felt in their interactions with the Fundación.

The tagline espoused by Doña Rosa and other Fundación staff is that Divina was created to be a self-governed and sustainable model community. More specifically, the objective of the Fundación in founding Divina was “to create a project in support of and to accompany families and communities in their process of adaptation, social organization, and capacity for self-governance” (Fundación 2004: 14). Unlike other projects, which focused almost solely on material recovery such as housing,

⁸⁴ This will be developed in-depth in Chapter 5.

infrastructure, and employment, the Fundación saw their role as transforming Divina residents and creating a model community.

How the Fundación fulfilled this philosophy is also important. As noted above, there was an intense and highly organized selection process to weed out potential problem residents and find prospects who would fit the desired result noted above. This included finding heads of households who were dependable, who were willing to take on a debt for their home, who wanted to be civically engaged, and, at least in the initial years, who were Catholic. As one Red Cross employee confided, concerning the difference between the residents of their housing project Ciudad España and the selected residents of Divina, “They [the Fundación] got the best and we got the rest.”

Although this was a bit of over exaggeration according to my statistics, it does highlight the sentiment the Red Cross held toward the people they were serving.

Similarly, the organization recognized that transforming individuals is not a short-term project. The Fundación planned on maintaining an office and a significant presence within the community for fifteen years. Once the houses were paid off, and after this length of time, there should be no doubt that the community could stand on its own. Although the Fundación’s long-term presence created problems (discussed below), it also offered a stability and consistency that many residents wanted and needed, especially in the early years of the community. The Fundación was there to support residents using the money that came from mortgage payments, as well as guide the community in the Catholic-Christian spirit.

This Catholic-Christian spirit is integrated into the community design. As explained in a recent 2010 Fundación report,


The original vision of the Divina Providencia housing project was established to function under a System of New Evangelization (SINE) in which the parish was the moral axis of the community in obtaining the Catholic-Christian goals, governing the organization of the community...it is of the highest importance to maintain the parish participation and representation of the parish in the organization of the community, as was designed. If an organization is detached from the church, it runs the risk of falling into the hands of one of the many [evangelical] sects in Divina Providencia (Informe, 2010).

This report illustrates both the original goals of the Fundación—to make the parish the moral center and to maintain a voice in the decision-making process—along with the current goal of protecting the community from evangelical Protestant influence.

Initially, the Fundación had partnered with two orders of Catholic religious sisters: the Franciscan Capuchin nuns from Mexico and the Sisters of our Perpetual Relief from Honduras. Thus, when broader community decisions were being made about the community, both orders, the Fundación, and the residents each had a say and vote. After nearly four years with the project, each order for various reasons moved on to other projects in Tegucigalpa, leaving the spiritual leadership of the community to the community priest. The priest was not interested in having this much influence within the community and also withdrew, leaving the Fundación and community leaders to wrestle out the issues with no third party to help find a middle ground.


Figure 6.6, 6.7, and 6.8. Changing relationships of the Fundación, Catholic Church and Community

(adapted from a Fundación internal document)



In addition to defining the relationship between these three actors, the Fundación also defined a new political system for Divina Providencia called the *Cómite Cívico Social* (CCS) or the Social Civic Committee to replace the traditional *patronato* system. The Fundación had recognized the risks of a *patronato* system and decided to form the CCS, so that the organization and the church would have more influence.

Figure 6.9 The Structure of the Comité Cívico Social



Unlike the *patronato*, the CCS is ideally made up of three equal powers—the Church, the Fundación and the community *Comité Cívico*. The Church receives two voting members, the Fundación has two voting members, including the president and the attorney, and the community maintains four voting members. Easily recognizable in this structure is the power and influence both the Fundación and the Church have in community decision-making. The power distribution does offer a check-and-balance between the three entities, but as many informants told me, it gives too much influence to the organization and the Catholic Church. Indeed, since the CCS was instituted in 2002 there have continually been community members rallying against it, with the hope of implementing a *patronato*. This continued in 2010 when there was enough of a movement initiated by residents to spark talks of a referendum on the CCS (though it did not happen). It did, however, encourage the Fundación to move more quickly to separate the organization from the community. By July of 2011 the two were legally separated,

although the church itself had some influence as seen in graph 6.8. Over time the influence of each group has ebbed and flowed, but the majority of decision-making power has been consistently held by the Fundación.

In many ways, this move from the common *patronato* system to the CCS had a significant influence on the type of presence the Fundación maintained within the community. Not only were residents moving into an entirely new community, with new neighbors, new rules (as will be described later), and new expectations, they also had an entirely new form of governance. The change was from traditional authority to a characteristically rational-legal authority, in which the Fundación had created a system of hierarchy and power that would shape the development of Divina in significant ways (Weber 1968). Not only did the Fundación maintain a large level of influence over the community, they were able to protect the community from issues of nepotism and corruption faced by other communities. The discussion of these issues will be developed further in Chapter 7.

Selection Process of Future Divina Residents

Divina Providencia had a significantly different process than Habitat, the Red Cross or any of the four other communities I studied for four distinct reasons. First, the Fundación had a difficult time obtaining land and funding for their project. Funding came slowly and erratically as Cardinal Oscar Rodriguez met with his colleagues throughout Europe soliciting donations for what was promised to be a model community. In addition, basic infrastructure such as water, sewage, electricity, and roads had to be created in what had been a hilly cow pasture and wooded area. Also, rather than have

residents build their own homes as other projects did, the Fundación decided to have professional workers construct the housing so that new residents received a complete and “dignified home.” It took almost three years to move the first residents into the community, creating both push and pull factors for prospective residents. The push was a need for a home, especially for those living in the temporary shelters. The pull was the desire not to pick the first project but to find the right project for their particular family, even if it meant waiting (PI Mariana 2008).

With so much need, organizations utilized different strategies to select which survivors would be accepted into the community. The iterative process was far from clear. Due to the lack of records kept by the Honduran state on issues such as marriages, crime records (many of which were destroyed in the floods), residency, home ownership, etc., it was difficult for NGO employees to discern who was actually in need, and who was merely trying to take advantage of the system.

The selection process also focused on affected parishes, rather than on the *macro-albergues* like other communities. This also provided a possible difference between residents; while both *macro-albergues* and churches would take anyone who was in need, it is likely those who attended a particular church would go there for help. Since the church also holds a prestige and measure of social control over members that is stricter than that of the Red Cross, it is possible that particularly bad elements of society would actively avoid churches for assistance and find help where they have more autonomy (Wolseth 2008). In addition, as the churches were smaller and already had a type of social capital that was increased during and after the disaster (people working together on

rebuilding efforts), drawing future residents from these groups may have increased the initial level of social trust and connection among neighbors.

Table 6.13 Housing Opportunity Options

How did you find out about the opportunity to live in your community?

	An Organization	A Church	Family members	Other
Divina	11% **	65% **	14% *	11%
España	60% **	10%	19%	11%
Avg. 5 com.	50%	13%	21%	15%
Z-score *.05, **.01 (3 rd group is the comparison group)				

The table above also shows how the selection process may have begun immediately after Mitch rather than months later when residents had the ability to decide on a project. The majority of Divina residents found out about the opportunity directly from the church, in contrast to España and the other communities, which were mostly found out about through an organization such as the Red Cross. We can speculate, then, that where residents found out about a housing project had a major influence on where they would eventually end up.

Second, the Fundación wanted to build capacity in residents before they arrived in the community, especially the first two hundred families, in order to set a particular expectation and culture for residents. Every Friday from five thirty to nine pm the Fundación held classes, put on by either Catholic clergy, social workers, or respected members of the community. Topics ranged from basic logistical information concerning mortgage payment and the design of the community, to more interpretive ideas, such as how to live as neighbors. These classes were held throughout the city in different parish

centers, totaling twenty-four capacity-building classes. Not attending would forfeit the chance of obtaining a home (PI Karen 2009; PI de Eyl 2009).

There was also a particular focus on the first two hundred families, for practical and theoretical reasons. The Fundación did not know how much money they were going to receive to build the new community. Money that was promised did not always come through, and fundraising was difficult for the local and Honduran organization without many international ties. This constraint led the Fundación to focus first on a manageable goal of two hundred families. Even still, Doña Rosa, a social worker and vice-president of the Fundación, wisely advocated for excellent training of the first families, believing that these families would be the grassroots leaders of the community and would set a particular standard that new residents would abide by. In addition, at these meetings a community began to form as prospective residents mingled and a sense of connectedness was created (PI Doña Rosa; PI Xela 2010).

Third, during the capacity building practicum, prospective residents were vetted through a strict selection and application process. Rather than work through the temporary shelters like other organizations, the Fundación went directly to four large meta-parishes, each with numerous smaller parishes under their umbrella, which were working directly with survivors. At that level the organization contacted Catholic priests, nuns, and religious who lived or worked in parishes in the affected areas asking for names of survivors as possible candidates for the community. Concomitant with this process, Doña Rosa, working closely with numerous other organizations and Fundación board members, created a formal selection process for potential candidates. Once this list

had been narrowed, the Fundación had prospective residents fill out a six page application form detailing family demographic, employment and housing history, faith and proof of faith, corresponding aptitudes for living in community--such as having volunteered in a neighborhood organization, worked in the church or a cooperative or been involved in sports or politics, as well as other manual or professional skills the candidate maintained. There was also a particular religious bent to the applications with one of the nine sections of the questionnaire, entitled "religion" solicited three questions: "What is your religion?"; How are we able to know that you are Catholic?"; and, "Parish Name." The questionnaire ended by asking the resident for three references and a description of why they wanted to live in the new community. Once complete, the applications were followed up by social workers who checked the backgrounds of each resident and their children, to fact check the veracity of the application, e.g. if the family owned another home, and whether there were individuals with criminal records or gang affiliations. Each application was given points based on criteria noted in the box below.

Table 6.14 Fundación Selection Criteria

(Cesal 2008, 64; Dona Rosita 2009)

Category	Points	Explanation
Necessity of a home	15	Home flooded or destroyed
	10	Public Establishments: Reside in temporary housing or precarious housing for refugees
	10	Bad condition of home
	9	Residence in places or construction that should not be used for residential purposes
	7	Live in overcrowded conditions
	6	Live with friends without relational ties
Personal and Family Circumstances	2 or 5	Number of family members that will live in the home 2 points for every member, 5 points if a person has a physical or mental disability
	5	Single mother households preferred Also taken into account are income qualifications and those that have had prolonged unemployment
Special Cases	?	Taken into account separately are families who need some type of subsidy (elderly, disabilities, single mothers with many children and cannot work, etc.)

After the application pool had been narrowed based on the criteria above and the strength of the application, each head of household or households was interviewed by a social worker, with the social workers' impressions subsequently noted on the application. Thousands of applications were sorted through to find the right candidates for Divina.

A final difference was that residents in Divina were required to pay seven hundred and fifty Lempiras every month for fifteen years (with an annual increase of 8% to account for inflation) rather than build their own home. The Fundación believed that paying a mortgage had two intrinsic benefits: the importance to residents of purchasing a home over time and the added revenue that the mortgage would provide the Fundación. The NGO was convinced that buying a home, not just outright home ownership, would

promote greater residential stability⁸⁵ and give residents a larger stake in their community over the long-term⁸⁶. Mortgages also forced residents to find ways of making a living in order to keep their home. Those members who did not want to work or did not want to pay were identified and legally forced to leave. Although this happened rarely - only ten of the sixty families that left the project were asked to leave - it did set a clear standard that residents were to pay or risk losing their home. Again, Smesler's (1998) description of ambivalence was created within the residents, as they loved what the Fundación had done for them but did not like the high social control they maintained over the community. This will be developed more in the following section.

Table 6.15 Mortgages

Initial Mortgage Payment per month in 2002 *slightly more for two bedroom homes	750 Lempiras (\$35)
Yearly Mortgage Interest Increase per year (matches average inflation)	8%
Mortgage Payment per month in 2010	1,388 (\$73)
Mortgage length	15 years
% of homes paid off in 2010	0%, 4% debt forgiven
% of homes behind on the mortgage—0-3 months (2010)	72%
% of homes behind on the mortgage--4 or more months (2010)	28%
(Statistics gathered from internal Fundación documents)	

In addition, because the land and the homes were donated by foreign governments, churches, and organizations, the mortgages are essentially investment funds

⁸⁵ People were strongly encouraged to stay in the community. One formal way of doing so was by legally defining the mortgage as rent until year ten. After year ten, people could sell their house only to the Fundación and would receive a percentage of their mortgage back.

⁸⁶ Paying for a home versus receiving a home as a gift or as a reward for constructing it is still debated in the literature and in the field.

that do not directly pay off debt. The Fundación, then, as opposed to handing over homes to residents and then continuing the search for external funding to maintain the community and pay staff, decided that resident mortgage payments would pay for these expenses and the excess would create a revolving community development fund. This fund would be used at the discretion of the *CCS* to address communal needs such as repairing roads, and building parks, as well as pay for the overhead of the Fundación staff. In essence it was a tax, contentiously controlled by the Fundación, for ongoing projects and related expenses.

A few selected survivors were far from the Fundación's model citizen, such as Don Francisco noted above. The Fundación unknowingly selected a family who sold drugs in the community. They also selected: a few residents with heavy mental illness causing problems in the community, residents who were anti-Catholic and anti-Fundación, residents who quickly rented their home and moved away, residents who did not want to work and did not want to pay the mortgage, and residents who were incapable of making payments due to a disability (their debts were forgiven by the Cardinal). Although tight, the application process was not infallible, nor could the organization prevent residents from lying on their application. Selecting residents is not as clear as it may seem and in a community as large as 500+ families, there is a statistical likelihood of deviant residents.

The Fundación's Paternalism of Divina

Returning to Doña Rosa, she is the embodiment, the personality of the Fundación toward Divina. More than once Doña Rosa used the metaphor of a parent caring for her

child to define NGO/community relations. “The parent had to raise the child, teach the child right, accept the push back of the child, and eventually let the child go.” It was the role of the Fundación to teach the child through the sternness of formal and informal means of social control as well as through the encouragement and positive support of resident goals. One afternoon, sitting in Divina as residents were casting votes for their next CCS, Doña Rosa mentioned to me “Many of the residents here never had or paid for services such as water or trash. Many lived next to the river and would just throw their trash in the river and it would float away. We had to teach them not only how to put the trash in the trash can, but to also learn to live for the well-being of everyone, not just themselves.” Divina residents had to be taught how to live in community—leaving it to residents would, in the minds of the Fundación, lead to a regression to their previous behavior as it was in Tegucigalpa—a state of poverty, violence, distrust, crime, and moral failure.

Paternalism continues to be a contentious concept in literatures. Drawing on the philosophical understanding of paternalism (Dworkin 2010), I define it in the case of the Fundación and Divina as having three characteristics: the organization’s interference of Divina’s autonomy, the NGOs interference on behalf of the welfare of Divina, and the NGO’s interference without the consent of residents. A few examples will help clarify this point.

Neither the Fundación staff nor residents would deny that the organization intercedes into the affairs of the community, usually for the beneficence of the community, on almost a daily basis. During the work week the organization has between

4-6 employees working in the office, a hundred meters from the central park. The employees--a secretary, an accountant, an engineer and two social workers--were constantly working on projects for the community. The accountant interacted with each head of household on a monthly basis as they came to the office to pay their mortgage, the engineer was constantly running throughout the community in his Toyota 4Runner directing the repair of a water pipe here, building a new fence there, or designing a new soccer field for the high school on the other side of town. Belkis and Oscar, the social workers, not only acted as the intermediary between the Fundación and residents, they also solved problems (such as arguments between neighbors, fighting adolescents, or bridging political rivalries), initiated new capacity-building classes, and encouraged civic participation. In addition to the full-time staff, the Fundación had also brought in a number of specialists to encourage startups of micro-enterprises over the years. From tortilla making to sewing to welding to growing and selling *pastes* (loofa-like sponges), the NGO has worked closely with other organizations to bring in economic opportunities for residents.

Social Control

In the social arena, the community was also highly structured by the Fundación, restricting resident freedom in certain small ways. The most striking example of this structure is a four-page document that was signed by each head of household called the “Manual of Conduct and Community Coexistence.” In brief, the manual explains twenty community-specific rules that are beyond those set out by the Honduran government. The most important of these rules are the following:

2. The Comité Cívico Social has the ability to evict residents for very grave infractions. The determination of these infractions will be decided upon by the Comité.
3. There is no selling of alcohol or informal business in Divina Providencia.
11. A person may lose their home for continued bad behavior, including physical or verbal abuse toward family members, neighbors, or project authorities.
13. The head of household is responsible for all of those within his/her household.
15. It is strictly prohibited to gamble using cards, dice, roosters, or anything else (2002).

Interestingly, it was the Fundación that requested that the first two hundred families collaborate with the organization to develop these rules. According to Xela (PI 2009), one of the original residents and recent secretary for the CCS, in 2002, residents collaborated on creating a list of community rules. When the list was in draft form, resident leaders went door-to-door explaining the rules to others requesting feedback. The rules were accepted almost unanimously. When I asked about whether there was any pushback from residents she noted that some residents believed they should be able to do whatever they wanted to their home such as kick the door and break it (in anger). Xela went on to say, however, that few changes were made to the final enactment.

While these appear to be fair rules for a model community, they may have undermined the autonomy of Divina members as it was the Fundación, not the residents nor the police, who enforced sanctions. Future residents consent to these rules as part of accepting a home in the community, but they had no say in their development and have no way to change, adjust, or eliminate the rules other than objection through formal channels. Moreover, the Fundación has acted on this code of conduct unilaterally by evicting more than ten families for both behavior and large mortgage debt. In these evictions, residents are reminded who is ultimately in charge of the community.

Residents knew the rules and lived by them. The Fundación was considered “*estricto*” (strict or inflexible) by residents - the rumblings resulting from the organization’s decisions to kick people out are heard on occasion. Other rules are also highly enforced. Ernesto (2010), who worked six days a week in Divina as a guard, explained to me, “There *is* a cantina in town [Divina]. It is a secret. But if you like, I will get you some *aguardiente* [hard alcohol].” Although Ernesto was willing to get the alcohol for me, he was hesitant about taking me to the cantina for fear that the Fundación might find out and the homeowners would lose their house. This was despite my having lived in the community for about eight months and having known Ernesto since my first week in the community.

Don Paolo is in his late 50s but appears to be much older. His wizened skin is dark brown, weather-beaten by the wind and damaged by the sun. He and his family were one of the first 200 families to move into Divina, and he has worked for the Fundación intermittently through the years, doing various jobs mostly in construction. In 2008, Don Paolo’s wife accused him of physical abuse. Although he denies the charges, the assault claim went to court and he was charged with abuse. Although he did not serve jail time, Don Paolo was ordered to pay his spouse a monthly stipend. The Fundación went a step further and told him that he could no longer live in his home, though his wife and children could stay.

Belkis, a Fundación social worker, explained another phenomenon of NGO resident influence in Divina and throughout the valley. By 2005,

The Fundación had realized that it was losing money on Divina Providencia and that the project was not self-sustaining in part because a

number of community members were not paying their rent or their water bill. Because they were in the red, two things happened. First, the Fundación created a list of people who had defaulted on their mortgage and then selected out those who could not pay due to their post-Mitch experiences. They sent letters to those who had defaulted on their payment but who they knew could pay but did not want to. The Fundación told the people that they had signed an agreement in which they promised to pay their mortgage. In addition, they had the initial choice to choose to live in Divina Providencia knowing that they would have to pay but that the money would be reinvested in community projects and development. However, in order to have these projects, people would have to pay what they agreed to pay. Second, the Fundación closed a number of subsidized projects (the daycare, the kindergarten, and the technical center [which provided classes in areas such as welding, sewing, computers, etc], and the employment center.

This created significant conflict between residents and the Fundación. The movement, led by a charismatic leader who was either loved or despised by other community members, claimed that because the houses were donated using international aid, residents should not have to pay for them. To claim this right, those in the movement stopped paying their mortgage and pushed for a *patronato* to replace the *Comite Civico Social*, which would give community leaders the legal right to hand homes over to residents. In protest a number of families marched through the community, protested and shut down the major highway between Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, and even surrounded the church so the priest (as a representative of the Catholic organization) could not leave his residence. After a long legal dispute, the courts ruled in favor of the Fundación and the tenants who had stopped paying their mortgage and were causing a great deal of division in the community were evicted in 2006 (*El Heraldo* February 23, 2006; PI Belkis 2009; PI Dona Rosa 2009).

While unclear exactly where the movement started, it spread to other new communities and had different results. Five miles south and on the bus route to Tegucigalpa lies San Miguel Archangel, another new community that was built by a Catholic organization called CARITAS. In many ways similar to the Fundación, CARITAS also maintained noteworthy interest in the community of 500 homes. Rather than have a team working on-site five days a week and an organization devoted almost solely to the project, the NGO left much of the responsibility to the community priest to work out any issues with community leaders. Myra tells that the San Miguel residents shared the same angst residents in Divina had with paying mortgages. In anger at CARITAS for not responding to their requests for an elimination of resident debts, they surrounded the priest's home. Terrified, the priest left never to return, and CARITAS turned homes over to the *patronato*, washing their hands of the project.

Lastly, decisions about the development fund (financed by resident mortgage payments) and land are decided upon *not* by the Comité Cívico Social, but by the Fundación board of directors. The board chooses the projects, chooses how to use the money, and does not share any of the information with the community until a decision has been reached. In addition, the Fundación has withheld exactly how much money is in the fund throughout the life of the community, leaving residents wondering where exactly all their payments are going. There is also frustration concerning the acres of green space that is part of Divina but not utilized by anyone. One three-acre parcel in particular was originally designated for more housing but has since remained fallow. Many residents feel similar to Don Paolo (2009), "They should just give us the land." The Fundación

responds in kind. When I asked the director about it, she explained that the organization was willing to give the land to the people if they were willing to do something useful with it. According to her, they had yet to come up with a viable proposal, and so in 2009 the land was put up for sale.

Paternalism is relative. How people feel about the sponsoring organization can be influenced by many things, and tell us little in isolation. Therefore, to assure that it was not just Divina residents who maintained a particular gripe against the NGO, I asked residents in seven communities the same three questions about their relationship with the sponsoring organization in order to compare the results. In addition, to make sure I was in fact studying paternalism as defined above, I asked three questions to get at different dimensions of the paternal relationship between themselves and the Fundación. Below are my findings.

Table 6.16 Opinions about the NGO

In the last few years, do you wish the NGO would have:

	Left as soon as possible	Had less influence	Had the same influence	Had greater influence
Divina (N=441)	7%	13% **	34%	46% **
España (N=447)	7%	5%	29%	60%
Avg. of five com.(N=932)	7%	4%	33%	56%
Z-test significance .05*, .01** (Avg. is the comparison group)				

Table 6.16 highlights the desire of Divina residents that the Fundación would have had less influence within the community than the average of the six other communities. Indeed, more than 2.5 times the residents had wished the Fundación played

a lesser role in community affairs than the average (it was also higher than any one community). This sentiment is supported by many informal conversations I had with members who feel the Fundación has interfered in community issues and/or overstayed its welcome and should move on.

Table 6.17 Issues with NGO
Have you had problems with the organization?

Community	Yes
Divina	9% **
España	2%
Avg. of five communities	4%
Z-test significance .05*, .01**	

Similarly, Table 6.17 illustrates that a significantly larger percentage of residents have had problems with the Fundación than the average of communities (and each of the

communities individually). Although this could have been for many reasons, the most common explanation I heard from members was due to having to pay the mortgage when they had no money, the lack of transparency by the organization in its financial accounting, and the poor treatment of some residents by the Fundación, especially those who have been evicted. There is no doubt that the Fundación has brought great benefit to Divina in all areas but they have also had considerably more problems with residents.

Table 6.18 Concern for losing one's home

Community	Yes
Divina	72% **
España	60% **
Avg. of five communities	51%
Z-test significance .05*, .01**	

Finally, table 6.18 underlines the apprehension residents feel with the Fundación. When asked, "Are you concerned that the organization can

take away your home for your poor behavior in the community?" almost three-quarters of the community are concerned that the Fundación will evict them for behavioral issues, in contrast to just over half of other residents on average (this is also true of the

communities individually). The Fundación maintains a level of social control over residents that is seen on their part as benevolent but understood by residents as impeding on their autonomy.

Paternalism, however, should not be confused with patronizing. Doña Rosa and other Fundación staff tried to encourage the growth of the community through intervention without an air of superiority. Of course, there were board members and Fundación staff that did/do have a belief that they are “better” (e.g. more cultured, more educated, wealthier) than the residents, and this did have an effect on shaping the way in which the Fundación interacted with the community. As will be discussed later, there has been an underlying internal tension in the organization about whether the community has received *toda en la boca* (everything in their mouth) and the Fundación should move on versus continuing to support the social and economic development of the community. However, those who feel and act as if they were above the residents are outliers in the NGO, although that belief was implicit in the Fundación philosophy.

In sum, the Fundación has created and upholds a paternalistic philosophy and practice toward Divina Providencia. The organization to the present continues to intercede in the political, social, and economic aspects of Divina’s development. From the Fundación’s side, their work is seen as necessary and beneficial. From the residents’ perspective, the Fundación is often controlling and overstepping its role. From a more objective standpoint, the Fundación’s paternalism may have been one of the most significant factors in the long-term social health of Divina. Whether this is the case or not will be discussed in greater depth in chapter 5.

Conflict

As noted above, over sixty families (about 9%) have left the Divina project since inception. Most of these families, according to a top level Fundación employee Myra, left of their own volition. Some left for family reasons, some because they were far behind on their mortgage, and others are unknown. The Fundación bought homes for and moved five families to other communities in the Valle de Amaratéca on request of the Cardinal, as they were in particular need and could not work to pay their mortgage due to disabilities or other significant reasons.

Ten families (<2%) were forced out of the community by the Fundación. There were several reasons for this. In all of the cases, the family had defaulted on their mortgage for years. In one case, the mortgage default was the legal reason, but the practical reason was that the head of household was accused of selling drugs. In the case of seven others, the families had joined together to dispute the mortgage payments for their homes. They claimed that the homes were donated and that they should therefore not have to pay for them, criticizing the Fundación as taking advantage of the situation. As part of their critique, they claimed that the political system of the *Cómite Cívico Social* was only a puppet for the Fundación and that Divina would do better to return to a *patronato*—a *patronato* which could eliminate the payment of mortgages altogether. Additionally, these families went to the streets to protest the Fundación, spoke on the air about their situation, and invited the Honduran media to look into the situation. *El Herald*, one of the two largest newspapers in the country, published a small article outlining the circumstances, nationally broadcasting the conflict, which placed significant pressure on the Fundación.

Figure 6.10 Divina Residents Protesting the Fundacion



Photo from *El Heraldo* (2006)

Finally, after a multi-year process, the Fundación obtained a court order to remove these families (El Heraldo 2006). The police came and removed all of the families' possessions placing them on the side of the road. In response, the families contacted the national press. Drawing on the post-Mitch sympathies for survivors, the families tainted the reputation of the Fundación and the Cardinal claiming that they were kicked out for political reasons rather than for not paying their mortgage. Although the decision and its enactment were finalized in 2006, it was a particularly traumatic event for the community, which residents bring up as supporting evidence of the Fundación's mismanagement of the community.

Conflict concerning the mortgage and water payments was the most commonly mentioned. Honduras is a hard place to live. A crippled economy, political nepotism, a large unskilled labor pool and a small labor market leads to consistently high unemployment and underemployment. Residents often cannot pay, not because they do

not want to or are lazy, but because there is often no work available. There are clear signs of entrepreneurship within the community; a successful tortilla-making business, two large ponds on a hillside where half a dozen men worked together to create a water channel so they could grow tilapia. Others have ventured into working the land growing *pastes* and beans for the markets in Tegucigalpa.

As one Fundación employee noted, the organization finds itself between heaven and earth, between God's compassion for human frailty and the necessity of holding people responsible for their commitments such as paying their mortgage (Landaverri 2009). The Fundación recognizes the difficulty of finding work, and understands, based on their daily interactions with residents which families are really trying hard to succeed and the others who are just freeriders. The Fundación has to make a decision of how to deal with both in a fair way. In five cases of residents with disabilities who would never be able to pay, the Fundación bought five homes in Ciudad España so they could live there and not be under the pressure to pay a mortgage. In most other cases, the Fundación has been lenient allowing residents to accrue a few months of mortgage debt to upwards of seventy months non-payment (Rivera 2010). This is also illustrated in the fact that even though many households (over 70%) have significant mortgage debt, less than 2% have been forcibly removed from the community. When asked about the biggest problem the Fundación faces in working with Divina, Belkis, a social worker for the Fundación, explained the two faces of the Fundación. She explained,

We are both God and the Devil. We want to promote God's love and compassion but we are also the ones pushing people to pay even when it is very difficult for them to pay. We should never have held the

responsibility of talking to people about paying their mortgage. It would have been better for a bank to do that.

Indeed, the Fundación did have two faces in the eyes of residents. Just as a parent must be the provider and the disciplinarian, so acted the Fundación in Divina.

Conclusion

While not perfect, Divina Providencia offers a glimpse of what a new resettlement following a natural disaster can look like. To describe the project's path as linear, its relationship with the Fundación as only paternalistic or its social development as a model of social health is simplistic. Rather, Divina's development has been more like writing a cursive L—the pen moves forward and up and then backward and down only to start moving forward and up once again. The dialectical relationship between the Fundación and Divina residents showcase the nuance and idiosyncrasies of development as well as its patterns and processes. However, understanding whether these processes are case specific or whether they are able to be generalized necessitates a second case. The following chapter will narrate the development of a similar post-Mitch re-settled community, Ciudad España, built less than four kilometers south of Divina.

Table 6.19 Community Timeline

The Fundación, Ciudad Divina Providencia, and External Events

	Fundación Cristo de El Picacho	Ciudad Divina Providencia	External events
1998			
	Land is analyzed and the community is planned		October 28-November 1- Hurricane Mitch Massive amounts of aid flow into the country
1999			
	Fundación begins fundraisng April-a pact is signed with the Honduran government concerning the land	October-The first stone is laid in the new community	Stockholm conference defines transformation not just reconstruction as goal for Honduras
2000			
	Infrastructure and initial housing is built between 1999 and 2001 The selection process happens throughout 2000 and 2001	Construction continues	
2001			
	Capacity building classes are given to prospective residents	October The first 250 families receive keys to their home	Severe Drought
2002			
	Social workers are hired to work in and with the community Capuchin sisters live and work in community	The first Comité Cívico Social is formed	Severe Drought
2003			
	Infrastructure continually being built	Between 2002 and 2003 all of the homes are given to families totaling 583	
2004			
	New police station installed		New President Maduro: Gang Reduction Strategy- decreases crime
2005			
			Hurricanes Katrina, Stan, Wilma, Beta and Gamma

			damage northern Honduras
2006			
	Sisters of Perpetuo Socorro leave the community	5 families protest against the Fundación for losing their homes—national news	
2007			
		Cómite Cívico stop monthly meetings with Fundación	
2008			
	Fundación plans to leave	Workshops closed due to losing money	Global economic crisis creates high unemployment (including in the valley)
2009			
	Cardinal and the Fundación support the coup	Tensions rise in community as people are divided. Resistance mvmt. afraid of Fundación	Honduras highest per capita homicides in the world June-Honduras Presidential coup d'état Resistance mvmt. Formed Tropical Storm Ida
2010			
	Fundación implements slow withdrawal from community	Elections of new Comité Cívico	New Elections Porfirio Lobo Sosa elected
2011			
	Fundación hands over political power Fundación hands over loans to Banco Occidente	Elections of Water board	

Chapter 7. Ciudad España



Poema A Ciudad España

Por Barrio Maya
Somos Naciones Unidas.
Ciudad España, nueva ideal
La mirada en el futuro
Ha empezado su gestar.

Ciudad España
Hace que el hombre
Se sienta en libertad.
Construyendo en todo el orbe
Una gran fraternidad.

Del amor la ley triunfante.
Lazos de odio romperá.
El esfuerzo y sacrificio
Que Cruz Roja nos brinda
Y nos brindara.

Al hacer juntos Ciudad España
La vida nos cambio
Sublimando al hombre
Difundiendo amistad.

Con fé humana y esperanza
Ciudad España hará la
Hermandad y prosperidad.
(IFRC Monografía 2007b)

A Poem to Ciudad España

To Barrio Maya
We are the United Nations.
Ciudad España, new ideal
Looking into the future
You have begun your quest.

Ciudad España
You make the man
Feel free.
Building around the world
A great fraternity.

The law of love triumphant.
Links of hate will be broken.
The effort and sacrifice
that the Red Cross offered us
And may offer us.

To work together Ciudad España
Life changes us
Sublimating man
Spreading friendship.

With human faith and hope
Ciudad España will create
Brotherhood and prosperity.

Ciudad España

The half-paved, half-dirt road winds its way up a mountain of pine and shrub. Corn fields and spotted cattle dot the landscape. The road gets worse, then better, then worse. At one point around a bend, the street drops fifty feet to cross a creek and rises another 100 feet before maintaining a less acute angle. The story goes that in the winter time the creek would submerge the small concrete and rock bridge, leaving Ciudad España and neighboring towns isolated, although this has since been fixed. Near the creek, brightly colored clothes are hung to dry on the fence posts and barbed wire in front of adobe homes. The ride is longer than to Divina, as España is higher in the hills with a steeper climb and more turns. Leaving the town, however, is beautiful. There is a vista of the southern part of the valley, where the mountains slide gradually into the valley floor (Alaniz Field Notes October 28, 2009).

España is built in a small basin on the edge of the mountains. At the bottom of the basin lay the main offices, the soccer fields and the central park. The houses are built up the hills in all directions. Schools are built near the top of the hills, as is the health center, the police station, and the slightly removed market. There is only one way in and out of the valley - along the road mentioned above (Alaniz Field Notes November 17, 2009).

Arriving in España one notices that although there are more than 1,270 homes in the city, the community feels spacious and light. There are broad sidewalks between the rows of homes that are purposely too narrow for cars.

Figure 7.1 Main road, Ciudad España



Each home has both a small front and backyard, enabling residents to plant fruit trees or flowers, or to personalize the space to their liking. Pine trees line the hills surrounding the community, interspersed with tall grass and the occasional scrub brush. The air is pure and clean, and on the outskirts of town the wind is cool and refreshing. On the eastern most point of the community lies a vista of the entire valley, a view that enables one to momentarily forget the struggles of daily life.

España is an intentional community built for survivors of Hurricane Mitch. Due in large part to government bureaucracy and inefficiencies, Ciudad España took the longest to construct and to move in residents of any intentional community in the valley. Although the process took more than four years to initiate the building process, and two more years before the community functioned as one (see infrastructure timeline), the Honduran Red Cross was able to procure the massive funding it took to construct this city. The Red Cross of Spain, Switzerland, and the United States (among others) poured

money into the Honduran Red Cross coffers. Spain in particular devoted so many resources to the construction that the community was named after the country (*España* means “Spain”) and the queen of Spain, Sofía Margarita Victoria Federica, visited the community in February 2001.

This chapter will provide a rich description of Ciudad España and of the Red Cross of Honduras, as well as the interface between the two. To begin, I will describe the important material characteristics of España including its land use, infrastructure, economy, and physical development over time. The following section will describe the people - who the leaders and stakeholders are, what the community looks like demographically, and the significance of religion. The third section will sketch out the historical roots, the mission, and the role the Red Cross of Honduras played in the development of the community. Areas explained in depth will include the NGO’s community development philosophy and how the basic underlying development approach and partnership affected its interactions with España residents. Examples of partnership will also be discussed as well as how the practice of partnership may have had unintended consequences for the organization and residents. The section will conclude with the leaving and yet continued influence of the HRC in Ciudad España.

Community Land Use and Infrastructure

Figure 7.2 Map and Key of Ciudad España



# key	Infrastructure or important building
1	Main road to highway. It is a dirt road although before elections it is often leveled.
2	Central Square. This area included a barber shop, library, an open area to the market on the right, the central park center, and the Catholic church on the left.
3	This was the Red Cross office. It is a standalone building with eight rooms. A small community center sits to the north and the waterworks to the south of the office.
4	Elementary school.
5	Bus station.
6	Workshops and Marketplace.
7	Multi-sports complex. Usually used for short-sided soccer games.
8	Middle and high school buildings.
9	The closest legal bar.
10	Police station.
11	Senior center.

From the main highway to España the six kilometer distance generally takes 20 minutes by bus depending often on the bus driver. The center of España is the last stop (#5) and as the bus enters (typically dangerously fast), a cloud of dust arises from the town's dirt roads. Doctor Berto (2010), a Cuban who worked for three years in España and six months in Divina, found that the greatest problem in both towns but especially España was the dust. The dirt in España is fine and the town has no paved streets. Dust is kicked up from bus traffic, from the wind, and even from cattle grazing on the weeds of the soccer field. Berto found that respiratory problems were the biggest physical hazard in the community, both from dust particles in the air and families cooking with wood fires inside or too near the home.

Just before entering the community, and off of the map, are two large buildings meant to be used either for industry or for vocational workshops (#6). Adjacent is a large white building with 88 stalls for vendors, only four of which were open consistently (Ruiz 2009). The Red Cross had hoped this would be a bustling center of micro-enterprise supported by residents and the local communities. According to Don Pablo, it was fairly successful in the beginning until May of 2005 in which the two nighttime guards were gunned down due to some debts they owed. After that the market lost its momentum. Behind the market is a cultural center that is also used for youth group meetings.

Between the market and vocational workshops and Ciudad España proper lies a brightly painted blue and yellow building with a small patio and multiple windows through which to serve customers (#9). When open, this general store/bar will serve

anything from a cold bag of water on a hot day, to chips and plantains, to the beer of your choice. On the edge of Ciudad España but within the town boundaries of Agua Blanca, it does not have to follow the España rules that no alcohol is to be sold within the boundaries of the community.

Entering the central park of the community (#2), houses spiral in all directions quite beautifully. Unfortunately, the central park has a dust and a shade problem; the sun is strong in Honduras and temperatures can often be in the 90s, yet there are only a few shade trees in the central park, thereby discouraging residents from using it as a gathering space. Enrique, the proprietor of a barber shop also in the park, had to close in 2010, blaming the high cost of rent and electricity. Across the street from the closed barber shop is the closed library. Alejandro, a previous president of the Water Works and the highest ranking elected official in España (since there was no *patronato* at the time), explained its closure. The Red Cross, after providing capacity and leadership building classes to a group of youth, handed the running of the library over to them. Although initially successful, the library was closed by the Red Cross after allegations that the youth were “doing bad things” in the library.

East from the barber shop a hundred yards is the multi-sports complex (#7) with basketball hoops and soccer goals. The concrete floor is bounded by one meter high concrete walls, which are extended another two meters by chain link fence. This enclosed field is popular in Latin America since the walls and fence keep a soccer game going indefinitely. The problem during my tenure in the community was that over nine months more and more of the fencing and piping were stolen. While at first there were a

few holes in the fence, by the time I left there was no fence left and only a few supporting poles. This was not an isolated incident. In touring the community I began to recognize many of the metal Red Cross or warning signs originally put up in the community had been taken down and used as fencing around a private residence. On the same note, both Don Ricardo and Pastor Eduardo explained the significant disappearance of trees in the community. Don Ricardo estimated a loss of fifty to sixty trees a day or nearly 1,500 trees a month. The wood was being used to create charcoal or for cooking by residents.

Up the road from the library about two hundred yards sits an empty dirt lot with a small wood structure connected to a large tin roof extending out about fifty feet. This is the space designated for the Catholic Church. The structure holds plastic chairs, a table, and other necessities to hold weekly Mass. A lack of interest by members to take on the difficult task of raising funds coupled with the Catholic Church's focus elsewhere has left the community with a church roof but no building. Of the almost 6,000 residents in the community, only about 50 people show up to any given mass.

On the South side of the park lie three important buildings: the community center, the Red Cross office (#3), and the Water Works. The community center is mostly a small hall with a few adjacent offices. One of the offices was recently rented by a group of youth entrepreneurs. With a small loan and the belief that the community needed internet access, they started an internet café with four computers. As of June 2010 it was thriving. The Red Cross building sits empty, but the waterworks building has a beautiful interior courtyard with blossoming flowers and grass. Residents come here to pay their

monthly water bill and to complain about plumbing problems. Behind all three buildings sits the full-sized soccer field where youth and adults play on weekends.

In the mornings children and adolescents walk north up the hill to the elementary (#4) and high school (#8). Community members built the school. Don Ricardo shares the story which relates the beginning of building: the *patronato* asked residents for extra workdays beyond what they gave for their home. The community came together and built the schools and the police station. Since that time, the high school has been heavily defaced by graffiti. When I visited, a significant amount of trash littered the property.

Down the hill southwest and then up an adjacent hill sit the senior center and police station. The senior center is a popular amenity for senior citizens to meet, talk, play cards, and take classes. Further up is the España police station. The station is bounded on two sides by a steep ledge that drops nearly twenty feet, and also maintains an eight foot high chain link fence around the perimeter. In order to enter, a resident must bang on the fence post with the lock to gain the attention of the officer inside. Many community members and the police themselves park their cars within the fence of the police station property to ensure it was protected.

Due to its placement in the hills, the community remains fairly isolated except for the three communities that dot the road between the highway and España proper. At the floor of the valley below España lies Tamara, perhaps the largest and oldest community in the valley. Tamara has the local high school for the entire valley and maintains some economic development, boasting the only specialty stores in the valley. Between España and Tamara is an air force training ground that is not used often but still utilizes much of

the flat space in the area. Just above the air force land is a small area where one of the original towns, Agua Blanca, is located. Agua Blanca is a generally poor town with people continuing to live in adobe homes and maintaining a subsistence lifestyle. The exception to this rule are those who benefited significantly from the growth of España, such as the families who opened bars and pool halls just outside of España boundaries, and residents who found jobs as part of the greater development of the area (transportation, as workers with NGOs, or with the local government). Finally, to the North and between España and Divina lies Las Moras. Las Moras, like Rio Frio on the other side of Divina, continues to be a poor town. The only business of note is a bar and dance hall that many of Divina's youth attend.

Community Design

According to Dr. William Siembieda (2009), chair of the urban planning department at Cal Poly San Luis Obispo and author of a post-Mitch plan of the valley, España was one of the best designed communities in the country. From the housing design to the use of space, and the water system to the location of various infrastructure, the community was a model for others. Indeed, there are valuable aspects to the community. First, there are only a few main roads, with most houses separated by a large sidewalk. Each sidewalk was paved and had gutters to prevent flooding of homes and problems with mud during the rainy season. This also had positive dividends on health.

The less mud, trash and animal fecal material located in and around homes, the less illness residents experienced in the community; a fact especially important due to the high national infant mortality rate (20 per 1000 [World Bank Data 2011]).

Figure 7.3 An average street and home in Ciudad España



Second, like Divina, the design followed the historical Spanish model of a central plaza surrounded by homes. A significant difference, however, was that España's central plaza was very large, perhaps ten times the size of that of Divina. It included a full-sized soccer field, a *cancha* (indoor concrete soccer mini-field), and a large cement common space for carnivals, temporary markets or meetings, or other community activities. Like Divina, there were almost no trees that provided shade from the intense sun in the central park and so it was unused until the late evening. There were few benches to lounge on, nothing to block the wind or dust off of the dirt roads, and there was often trash littering the area. According to urban planners, this set up would not have been conducive to the growth and development of social capital within the community (Jackson 2003).

Figure 7.4 Central Park Soccer Field



Figure 7.5 Central Park Common Space



Photos taken by author, August 2011

Lastly, unlike Divina the central park did not have a church or a market but rather the Red Cross office, the water commission office, and a small meeting space for the *patronato*. Churches and markets are traditionally gathering space for residents both formally (to go to mass or buy necessities) or informally (to hang out or as a meeting spot). España's market, as will be described below, was set outside of the community nearly a half-mile away from some member's homes. Additionally, the churches are spread out throughout the community and the Catholic church, the religion with the most followers, did not have a real building to hold mass, again preventing the space from being used either formally⁸⁷ or informally.

Community Homes

A significant difference from Divina in the homes is how they were built. The goal of the homes was to "have quality construction, security against crime, and have a

⁸⁷ Due to the open air nature of the church, the wind would often blow knocking over the chalice of wine. After a time, the priest was fed up with the spilling of the blood of Christ and no longer was willing to hold mass there (Claudia 2010).

contemporary architectonic and esthetic quality to encourage a better perception of the home and of the community” (RCH 2002). They were just that. The Red Cross had four different models of homes built to break up the monotony of more than a thousand similar homes. They were made well, of local material, easily repaired by almost anyone and had a steel door and bars on the windows to prevent crime. The homes themselves, in comparison to other communities’, were also slightly smaller but had larger properties. This would enable - perhaps even encourage - a resident to add on to her property so extended family could also live there.

The informal conversations I had with residents about their home were positive. Like Divina, España residents had electricity about 95% of the time (except during valley-wide blackouts, often due to thunderstorms). España also receives trash pickup every few days and has a similar trash problem to Divina although on a larger scale due to its larger population. The most common positive response I received, however, was that residents were grateful for continuous running water. España continues to be the only new community that receives running water consistently.

España’s Economy

España also had a two-tier economy that has essentially become a single tier. Initially, the Red Cross saw an old mill nearby as a perfect structure to renovate for a community market. It was an ideal building but not an ideal location. Standing a ten to twenty minute walk uphill from the community, the market was not conducive to buying groceries and carrying them back home in the heat of the day.

As mentioned earlier, the España market had significant problems from the beginning due to location, but these were exacerbated by social conditions. According to Don Pablo, the businesses thrived in the market. Most of the stalls were open and there was significant entrepreneurship in the community. Over time, however, businesses could not succeed, as too little money was coming into the community to sustain specialty shops.

The final blow to the market was a tragedy. According to a Ciudad España police report, on May 14, 2006 late in the evening a black, white, and beige car drove to Ciudad España with mal intentions. Arriving from Olancho (the far northwest of Honduras), the men inside had come to take revenge against the two guards of the market in retaliation for an unknown crime. They were successful. The next morning the guards were found dead with multiple gunshot wounds in their bodies. Pastor Eduardo (2010) explained that the market closed down for a time after this and never really came back. Indeed, on last visit only four of the eighty-four stalls were in use.

With the decline of the formal market, even though it was illegal by community rules, the informal economy - specifically the *pulperias* - flourished. The creation of *pulperias* was in demand, simple, and cost-effective. With the market being so far from many resident homes, it made sense that if someone was selling home basics and foodstuffs down the street, a resident would choose the closer, especially if it was on the way from the bus stop or school. Pure convenience created demand. In addition, the effort was simple. Unlike many countries, there is no tax and no permit or zoning restrictions. A resident merely needed to put up a sign, have product, open the door, and

leave someone at home to service customers (I have had elementary school children take my money and give me a Pepsi). Additionally, it was cost effective. For selling a product, a manufacturer (usually Coca-Cola or Pepsi) would paint your house for free as long as it was in their colors and with their logo (see photo below).

Figure 7.6 Formal Market



Photos taken by the author (2010)

Figure 7.7 Informal Home Stores



Thus, with such ease informal businesses sprang up throughout the community. In one field survey, we found that 89% of streets or walkways maintained informal businesses, a number significantly higher than either Divina (60%) or the other communities (58%).

España's Leadership


Don Ricardo is a kind but serious man. The president of the *patronato* for five years and currently appointed interim president of the water commission (as of August 2011), Don Ricardo is viewed by residents and by the Red Cross as one of the few go-to people for action and leadership. I met him initially at his home, one of the largest in the community, as it has a second floor. Although I had an introduction from Pastor

Eduardo, the two bulldogs in his yard kept me on my toes. I was soon able to relax on his sofa as his wife brought us soda and we began our conversation. Don Ricardo is a heavy-set man in his mid-fifties, perhaps five feet six inches tall, and balding. He knows how to dress well when out in the community but today he is comfortable in a light t-shirt and shorts. He speaks clearly and concisely, quietly and with great intention as if sharing secrets to the past and present.

His role in the community has ebbed and flowed. As the first president of the *patronato* he had to deal with the initial difficulties of a disorganized mass moving in and living together. Although the Red Cross was there to help, they left daily at 4pm and it was up to him and the other leaders to maintain order after hours, with the help of the often-ambivalent police force. He noted that the community had accomplished much under his tenure; each family contributed time and effort to the building of the schools just as they had for the building of homes. The process was completely self-organized and they were able to do it without the help (other than financial) of the Red Cross. In addition, when gangs became a significant problem in the community, especially in 2004 and 2005, Don Ricardo spoke with government representatives to provide greater security. A special unit was brought into the community under the guise of door-to-door broom salespersons, houses were pinpointed for gang residence, and one early morning all of the houses were raided and the gang members were taken to prison. According to Ricardo this was a great feat and a positive change in community direction. In many ways, his personality reflects that of the community—serious due to the poverty and insecurity of the community but kind and generous with those he felt close to. What is

different, however, is that Don Ricardo was willing to confront the major issue of gang violence in his community while most other residents have been resigned to accepting gangs as part of España (as it was probably familiar to wherever they had lived before Mitch).

Figure 7.8 The structure of the Patronato



España's Residents

Nina is a 34 year old woman who speaks briskly, asks straight questions, and is seen as generous. She is slightly overweight like most Honduran women and wears an apron most of the day. She is constantly cooking and does not mind hollering either at her nephew or at the neighbor. She lives with her mother, sister, and nephew in a two bedroom España home between the library and the high school. Nina is not a leader, often does not vote “*porque no vale*” (because it does not matter), and is trying to make it day by day selling corn tortillas and *charamuscas* (flavored frozen drinks). After expenses she makes approximately 40 Lempiras (\$2.00) a day or nearly 1,200 (\$60) a

month, which supports the four of them. She and her family are Catholic, but because there is no mass available in the community, they do not attend.

Table 7.1 2010 Cost of Living in España for Nina		
Cost per Month	Lempiras	U.S. Dollars
Minimum Wage Income for Don Bernardo	1,200	\$60
Water	-50	\$2.50
Electricity	-100	\$5
Mortgage	-0	\$0
Transportation for one to the city (e.g. groceries, etc.)	-200	\$10
Left over income after the above	=850	\$43
If left over income is spent on food per person (four in total)	213	\$10.63 (per person per month)
Education, health, travel, savings, home repairs, sports, etc.	0	0

Livelihoods

It is difficult to determine the exact nature of resident livelihoods in España by 2010 as there had been no recent study of the community and my survey only obtained the livelihood of respondents. The Red Cross and the community, however, implemented their own self-study and found the following statistics for employment as defined by the Red Cross in Chapter three (Red Cross and Ciudad España 2007: 23-29).

Table 7.2 Employment status of España Residents in 2007

	Daughter	Mothers	Sons	Fathers	Totals
Self-employed	22	237	43	201	503
Manual Labor	8	117	77	313	515
Permanent Work	36	233	58	168	495

España's livelihood demographics illustrate that residents are equally split between three tiers of employment—working from home,

working in manual labor, or permanent work.

The numbers also show the type of work each

gender was relegated to; with women often

extending their home life activities (such as

cooking) to the public sphere selling their

goods just outside of their home (see Figure

7.9). Permanent work was also high for

women with jobs such as cooking, cleaning, secretary positions, and nurses outpacing the

men's permanent worker status which included positions such as security guards,

mechanics, and machine operators.

Figure 7.9 Self-employed woman in España selling outside her home
(Red Cross and España 2007)



When these numbers are standardized and compared to the numbers of Divina, the statistics demonstrate that España residents, even though they have about equal permanent work, may be less wealthy. In both communities it is the men who usually do the manual labor jobs and women who find themselves in the permanent or self-employed categories. In España, there are less people (men) who have jobs in manual labor, which may push the women of the household to find other means to gain income. They found their outlet through self-employment in the community where they can raise their children, care for the household and make a small income. What this also means, however, is that less money is entering the community through external work. While in theory this could mean more independence through money recycling instead of

permitting it to leave the community, because España has no production of food within the community, it necessarily must return to Tegucigalpa.

Without an internal market or production of goods within the community, most income for residents comes from either remittances or work in Tegucigalpa. Almost all (99%) of residents receive some kind of support from remittances in España, which is the same as the other communities but high compared to Divina (69%). However, about 90% of España residents who receive remittances obtain only about 1-10% of their income from this means.

Table 7.3 Employment Type

Divina and España Residents over 12

(Fundación and CESAL 2004: 29-34; Red Cross and España 2007)⁸⁸

	Self-Employed	Manual Labor	Permanent
Divina (2004) N=501	25%	41%	34%
España (2007) N=1,513	33%	34%	33%

Persons per Household

As noted earlier, although the houses are small, large families find ways of fitting people in. This often means multiple family members sharing not only bedrooms but often beds. In España, two out of five homes have six or more occupants and according to our survey a handful had more than ten. Although household size is interpreted as having a negative correlation on household expenditures, this may be a wrong assumption as there is a benefit in cost efficacy (Lanjouw and Ravallion 1995).

⁸⁸ Although it would be more accurate to obtain number from the same year, the data does not exist.

Nevertheless, cramming six people into such a small space is uncomfortable even if most are children (as seen below).

Table 7.4 Persons per household

# of persons per household	Divina	España	Average of five other com.
1	2%	3%	2%
2	7%	5%	7%
3	14%	12%	14%
4	21%	20%	24%
5	26%	18%	21%
6 or more	30%	42%**	31%

Z score .05*, .01** compared to avg. of group

Children

Much like the higher number of persons per household, España also has a higher number of children (under 18) per home with a more than ten percent difference over Divina or the average of the other communities as seen in the table below.

Table 7.5 Number of children living in a household

	0	1	2	3	4 or more
Divina	12%	24%	29%	23%	11%
España	9%	21%	25%*	21%	24%**
Avg. 5	11%	23%	31%	21%	14%

Z-score *.05, **.01 compared to avg. of group

Table 7.4 illustrates that España has a much younger population than Divina, and many more dependents, which may have an impact on wealth per household. It also may mean that there are less adults per capita in España, which may have other unknown social consequences.

The marital status and marital status with children also illustrates differences in the communities.

Table 7.6 Marital status of adults

	Single	Married	Free Union	Widowed ⁸⁹	Without children
Divina Total Households	39%**	35%*	23%**	4%	
España Total Households	33%*	25%	40%**	3%	
Avg. 5 communities Total Households	28%	29%	39%	3%	

Marital status of an adult in the home and children

Divina Households with children	31%**	33%**	21%**	1%	12%
España Households with children	28%	23%	37%	1%	9%
Avg. 5 communities Households with children	24%	26%	37%	0%	10%
Z-score * .05, ** .01 (Comparison group—Avg. 5 coms.)					

According to the statistics gathered from my survey, the largest group of adult residents lives in a free union, or two adults freely living together without any formal or legal commitment to one another. Just over a third of the population is single and a quarter is married. The table above also demonstrates that España households with children are not significantly different than other communities although they are different than Divina regarding the number of homes with married or free union relationships. In practice, much of the reason people are married or in a free union has to do with finances. For most, it is simply just too costly to get married. Additionally, since a significant number of residents are evangelical and not Catholic, there is more social pressure to keep the family together rather than the ritual of getting married.

⁸⁹ Widowed can be seen as a good proxy for the accuracy of the surveys. By not finding significant differences in widowed but finding them in other categories supports the reliability of these measures.

Religion and Religiosity

As noted above, España is much closer to the average than Divina. Table 6.?? illustrates that there is no real difference between España and the other communities⁹⁰; Unlike Divina, España had no religion-based selection process..

Table 7.7 Religion by Community

	Catholic	Protestant	Evangelical	None	Other
Divina	61%**	0%	29%	10%	0%
España	23%	2%	45%	29%	1%
Avg. 5 com.	28%	1%	47%	22%	2%
Z-score * .05, **.01 (Comparison group—Avg. 5 coms.)					

Unlike the Fundación, the secular Red Cross did not utilize religious frames or ideologies in their work. Theirs was an internationalist and development oriented strategy that had a similar goal of creating a model community but through very different means; capacity building, leadership, organization and foundational infrastructure. It was not that the Red Cross was against religion; indeed, the largest Methodist church in the area was built on the border of España and is connected to the infrastructure of the town. The Catholic Church owns a plot of land in the community, and numerous other evangelical sects have come and gone through the community, two of which have constructed their own independent churches. There is no lack of faith in España, although it looks significantly different than that in Divina.

Another important difference is the lower religiosity of España residents. In comparison to Divina, two and a half times more residents do not attend any services and only about half as many attend weekly services.

⁹⁰ As can be seen elsewhere through Latin America, there has been an increasingly large conversion of born Catholics to evangelical sects (Robbins 2004)

Entering España from the main road about one hundred beyond the turn down in the center of town lies what has been jokingly referred to as “the castle.” The Methodist church stands at the top part of the community and can be seen from almost any home. Although there are only two stories of useable space, the roof extends into the heavens another six meters. The outside is painted tan with sharp red borders.

Figure 7.10The Methodist Church, Ciudad España



Table 7.8 Religiosity by Community

Community	Do not attend	Attend on Holidays	Attend every week	Attend two or more times each week
Divina	13% **	20%	32% **	36%
España	32% **	16%	17% **	35%
Avg. 5 Coms.	26%	18%	24%	33%
Z-score *.05, **.01 (3 rd group is the comparison group)				

The question has arisen regarding the lack of a Catholic Church building, and how fewer services might affect the community. It seems plausible that because church-going España residents were faced with the decision to either attend mass in Divina (a costly and time consuming effort) or have mass outside, there would be a decline in participation and attendance. This also may help explain the differences in no attendance and attendance of once a week against both the average of the five communities and Divina.

In sum, España had similarities and differences to Divina from the beginning. Similarities included infrastructure, similar material inputs into the community, geographic location to the city, urban planning, and transportation. The people also had similarities such as arriving from the same neighborhoods, strong leadership, a comparable socio-economic level, and levels and types of trauma. Differences, however, are also numerous, less so in infrastructure than as in the social system of political systems and community economy; and also demographically in religion, religiosity, and marital status.

The Red Cross: Philosophy and Practice

The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent was founded in Geneva in 1862 when Swiss businessman Henry Dunant was struck by the suffering of wounded and dying soldiers and lack of medical care after Italy's Battle of Solferino. He returned to Geneva to create a committee of influential elites who shared his concern. Word spread and by August of 1864 twelve states had ratified a convention of ten binding rules which guaranteed neutrality and protection for wounded enemy soldiers and those caring for them in an armed conflict. Currently the organization is guided by seven fundamental principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality (IFRC 2011a).

It was not until 1937 that the Red Cross of Honduras was created. Since then, the organization has grown to 45 branch offices in all sixteen departments of the country. The focus is no longer on war casualties but rather on community programs such as "disaster preparedness and response, and blood donor recruitment, pre-hospital emergency, community health, housing, water and sanitation, principles and values, and education for community development." The most significant in the history of the Honduran Red Cross was the relief and recovery of the country after Hurricane Mitch (RCH 2011).

Immediate response to Hurricane Mitch

After Hurricane Mitch, perhaps the first organization setting up housing and relief efforts was the Honduran Red Cross. Building temporary shelters, distributing food, and organizing logistics throughout the country, the Red Cross of Honduras and its

international partners accomplished its mission of emergency relief. What the organization did not expect was to be building entire communities for survivors.

As days turned into weeks and weeks into months, the organization quickly put up large groupings of temporary housing, called *macro-albergues*, for displaced survivors. These wood and plastic shelters became home to thousands of survivors in the major cities. While working on the *macro-albergues*, the HRC was asked by the government to build a new housing settlement for survivors in and around the Tegucigalpa metro area.⁹¹ Naomi explained that the organization initially refused on account that it was not their work to do community development - indeed, it was beyond their capability (2008). However, faced with such overwhelming need, the HRC agreed and spoke with its international partners, notably the Red Cross of Spain, Switzerland, and the United States. With this alliance and land donated by the government in the Valle de Amaratéca, Ciudad España was born (Red Cross Video 2004).⁹²

Ciudad España was heralded by the Red Cross as a model community and even received a visit by the queen of Spain (Moreno 2001). With completely new infrastructure, some of the best waterworks in the country, the promise of factory employment and a well-designed community, residents were hopeful that their new community would indeed fulfill the promises made to them.

⁹¹ Currently, this is an organizational conflict between those who believe the Red Cross should only provide emergency relief and others who believe it should also move into development (Ratinam 2011)

⁹² Ciudad España or Spain city was named after the Spanish Red Cross for the amount of resources and effort they put into the community.

Red Cross Community Development Philosophy

Naomi, like her Divina counterpart Doña Rosa, is a powerful woman. In her late forties, with kind eyes, a sharp intellect and deep compassion, Naomi was the Coordinator of Social Projects for the Honduran and Spanish Red Cross. She led the social development throughout the country after Hurricane Mitch with a special focus on Ciudad España.

Busy, overworked, and spread thin over the entire nation, the Red Cross of Honduras did not have the resources it needed to help all those affected. One report from the Red Cross of Spain which had the largest force in Honduras at the time found that the Red Cross had been involved in over 169 projects throughout the country, including ten housing projects with a total of 1,955 homes, 71 schools, and dozens of specific development projects in the areas of health, economic development, agriculture and water and sanitation (RCS 2002).

The HRC also had to continually change its timeframe and therefore its philosophy. At first it was to move from emergency management to house builder. Once the house building aspect was completed the government or another organization would take over the role of community developer. This was not the case, and so the government asked them to remain another two years to get the community up and running. When those two years were complete, the community as a whole pleaded with HRC administration to remain, which they did for an additional three years. In contrast to the Fundación's 15 year vision made during the initial months of planning, HRC staffers were forced to continually shift their development agenda as they prolonged their presence.

As noted in the Ciudad España Plan (2002), the goal of the HRC was: “A comprehensive intervention aimed at developing a new safe and healthy sustainable community” for survivors of Hurricane Mitch. In a document created by the Red Cross of Spain, the goal of Ciudad España had even a more specific goal.

The near future vision of Ciudad España is a self-managing community that addresses its own problems and goals, whose residents live together peacefully, and with opportunities for training, caring for personal health, and economic improvement. This is what guides the Red Cross, along with the construction of housing and other basic infrastructure. The implementation of projects is aimed at: community empowerment; the promotion of health in the family and community; a holistic approach to education through support of the schools, community, family, and people of all ages; and improving the income potential of families in Ciudad España. All this, with an expectation of participation to work *with and for* the community” (RCS 2002: 9 translation and italics by author)

The HRC took a partnership approach to building España. NGO partnerships with citizens (sometimes called collaboration, coalition, accompaniment, and development alliances) can be summarized as: “a working relationship that is characterized by a shared sense of purpose, mutual respect and the willingness to negotiate” (Lister 2000: 228). The organization focused heavily on empowerment and capacity building, offering dozens of classes that provided different types of employable skills (e.g. tourism, client services, human relations)⁹³ to survivors. Once the community was built and residents resettled, the HRC stepped back, respecting the autonomy of the community to manage itself. As Naomi, the director of social programs in Honduras including Ciudad España, explained to me, “We only give them (España) the orientation of how to do it and where to go. If they need something, advice, support, well, we give it

⁹³ Osorto 2010.

to them but we are not over them. It is only little by little [we provide] because the community is relatively young.” She goes on to explain that their goal was community self-sustainability. By creating clear guidelines concerning their role, the organization wanted to continue to serve the people through support but also by letting the community develop on its own terms.

According to Fiona, a HRC social worker and staffer in Ciudad España for the entirety of the development process, the motto in addressing resident concerns was the following: “We wanted residents to come to us for help. But we were not going to help them. We were only going to show them which other doors [e.g. government departments] they needed to knock on.” Knowing that the organization was not going to be around forever, the HRC focuses on breaking any sense of dependency the community may have gained over the years. Their hands-off approach put the responsibility back onto the community, especially community leadership--with varying degrees of success.

Another clear practice of partnership was the decision by the HRC to use a participatory model to owning a home. Unlike the Fundación model in Divina in which residents take on a fifteen year mortgage paid to the Fundación, the HRC had residents literally build the community from the ground up to encourage greater commitment to the community and to avoid incurring debt; with the extra disposable income residents would be able to spend it on living essentials rather than a mortgage or rent. One member from each family had to commit to working 40 hours a week for 40 weeks on building homes and infrastructure for España. Once their work was completed, residents would be given the keys to their new home through a lottery system. A similar housing development

scheme was used by other organizations working in the Amaratéca valley including Habitat for Humanity and the Adventist Development and Relief Agency.

The HRC staff also had different expectations of their role in the post-disaster recovery effort. Naomi and her co-worker Ignacio, who also ran social programs in España, noted that the HRC did not necessarily want to be involved in community development projects. In addition, the organization was involved in multiple housing projects throughout the country; indeed, after Hurricane Mitch the different international arms of the Red Cross through HRC had worked in over 500 projects helping more than 1,000,000 citizens from 1998-2008 (IFRC 2008). Unlike the Fundación which directed their energies at only one project, the HRC was spread thin in service to multiple communities.

A final illustration of the partnership paradigm was the HRC's non-interference with España leadership. Implementing the most widely used political setup in Honduras, España residents wanted a *patronato* (similar to a board of directors) to run their community. Made up of seven members, it is a winner-take-all slate system. As one compares the statutes of the *patronato* to the statutes of the *Comite Civico Social*, the paternalist/partnership split becomes apparent. While the CCS document is full of references to the Fundación with Fundación board members sitting on the CCS, the España statutes make no reference to the Red Cross at all.

As reviewed in chapter two, the idea of partnerships has been around and is often applauded for its empowerment of residents (Craig and Mayo 1995; Mohan and Stokke 2000; Ellerman 2007). Yet, based on the evidence, perhaps a post-disaster new

community like España may not have been ready for such a system, as a general malaise and corruption soon plagued the administration. In speaking with the first and longest-serving president of the *patronato*, Don Jose, he confided that the current appointed officials have done little to improve the community. This sentiment was echoed by multiple other residents, and was anchored by the fact that although the *patronato* was supposed to hold elections in 2008, they were not initiated until June 2011. Additionally, members of the *patronato* engaged in corrupt dealings, stealing from the community coffers in 2006 and more recently from the water works fund in 2009-2010. Even though the España community was far less dependent on an outside organization for resources and support, it also had to wrestle with significant governing inefficacy issues that Divina did not.

The HRC of Honduras utilized a partnership development strategy that also had strengths and weaknesses in affecting community social health. While avoiding dependency and encouraging citizen participation, the actions of residents illustrate that greater involvement by the organization may have been beneficial. However, without strong oversight and a long-term involvement strategy, significant engagement in all aspects of community life (especially politics), and a strong social control mechanism to evict problem residents, the Red Cross could not prevent the encroachment of violence and crime into the community. This is not to say they did not try, but their overarching philosophy was counter to using their power to impose social order.

Selection Process of España Residents

The selection process into Ciudad España was not much of a selection process at all. In the years following Mitch, people had found ways in Tegucigalpa to cope with being homeless either by renting, living with friends or family members, or most commonly living in the temporary shelters set up for them. As communities were being built, word was passed around through informal networks about various housing opportunities for Mitch survivors. Some communities had a particular selection process, others took recommendations from churches, while still others took anyone who needed a home.

Due to a number of extraneous factors⁹⁴, the Red Cross took almost six years to build and re-settle survivors from where ever they were living to Ciudad España. Throughout this time in Tegucigalpa, survivors were finding other communities to live in, and they were finally able to leave their temporary *macro-albergues*.

Table 7.9 Housing Opportunity Option

How did you find out about the opportunity to live in your community? Through:

Community	An Organization	A Church	Family members	Other
Divina	11% **	65% **	14% *	11%
España	60% **	10%	19%	11%
Avg. 5 com.	50%	13%	21%	15%
Z-score *.05, **.01				

⁹⁴ It is unclear all of the reasons why it took the HRC so long to build the community. Yet, according to staff, there were number holdups on the part of the government, it was self-built which took longer, such a large track of land was difficult to find, and the Red Cross was already spread thin.

Table 7.9 illustrates just how these informal social networks worked to provide information. In España, the vast majority of residents had heard about the new community through an organization, probably the Red Cross. This is similar to the other communities but in sharp contrast to Divina where most residents heard about it through the Church.

House Payment

The Honduran Red Cross also decided that rather than have the people buy their homes over time, they were going to use a participatory model: both to keep people from going into debt (and thus enabling them to save money and have it go toward what they believed they needed), and also to encourage them identify with a stronger commitment to the community itself. This is a foundational belief by many organizations including those who also worked in the Amaratéca valley including Habitat for Humanity and Adventist Development and Relief Association (ADRA). However, what was not completely thought through were the assets and capabilities of residents to self-govern with a state that did not have much capability of servicing these communities and highly vulnerable individuals who had broken social networks, new neighbors, and little training in community development techniques. This is not to say that they could not have done it, but there were many significant hurdles.

Each family had to commit to working 40 hours each week, over the course of 40 weeks, in order to obtain title to the home. At first, the Red Cross had people building their own homes, along with community building projects such as the schools, the clinic, and the parks. However staff soon found that residents were stealing material from other

residents for their own homes. To avoid this problem, a lottery system was formed in which every forty homes would be randomly assigned to forty families who had worked their forty weeks.

Recovery and Development

"Infrastructure is one thing, but building a community in people's minds is another thing," said Jose Ramon Oliva, the Honduran Red Cross official in charge of planning in Ciudad España. He said the project had earned the attention of aid workers in Asia who are working to rebuild after the Dec. 26 tsunami" (Lloyd 2005).

The Red Cross also took a different approach from the other communities in terms of social development. Since most of the future residents of España had come from the *macro-albergues*, it was there that the Honduran Red Cross offered dozens of courses and capacity building classes for those interested in taking them. One woman, Doña Julia (2010), explained that she had a “stack of diplomas” from the Red Cross in self-esteem, tourism, client service, and human relations, but they did not really help her find a job. None of the classes were mandatory in the *macro-albergues*, although weekly chores such as cleaning the communal bathrooms and picking up trash, were compulsory. Thus, the Red Cross had a more communitarian approach in its efforts to build capacity in all of its residents as opposed to Divina’s focus on the first two hundred families.

Conflict

'No, the Red Cross did not do much. The Red Cross did not work in the social area. They worked in constructions, all of the infrastructure; but not in the social area. They came to work in the social area the last two years, after all of the things had been given.

It was almost impossible to make people think in a different way. –Ciudad España resident, member of the *Patronato*

Table 7.10 Opinions about the NGO

In the last few years, do you wish the NGO would have:

	Left as soon as possible	Had less influence	Had the same influence	Had greater influence
Divina	7%	13%**	34%	46%**
España	7%	5%	29%	60%
Avg. of five com.	7%	4%	33%	56%
Z-test significance .05*, .01** (Avg. is the comparison group)				

Table 7.9 highlights the desire of España residents that the Red Cross would have stayed and helped with the community’s development. In fact, almost 90% either wanted the organization to have the same or greater influence on the community. Except for the España leadership, who were disappointed by the work of the Red Cross, almost all of the residents I spoke with wished that the Red Cross had not left. As Doña Julia explained, “My experience was good with the Red Cross...They worked for our well-being...They offered tools for the people to better themselves and they saw the need for development within the community.” I also asked her about what the Red Cross did not do so well. Julia explained, “They left us to walk alone.”

Although residents may have felt abandoned, the Red Cross continued to support community development efforts through 2007. The organization brought in other NGOs to provide services to the community; many organizations to this day continue to work in the community. Additionally, while the CODELES were not as successful as the Red Cross had hoped, other groups were. A women’s group that was formed as a

neighborhood improvement association has continued since residents first moved into the community. Youth dance groups, sports and cultural have also been a consistent and successful presence for many of the youth in España.

Along the same lines, Table 7.10 Shows that only about 2% of households had experienced any problem with the Red Cross. The organization got along well with people and was generally respected and well-regarded.

Table 7.11 Problems with NGO

Have you had problems with the organization?

Community	Yes
Divina	9%**
España	2%
Avg. of five communities	4%
Z-test significance .05*, .01** (Avg. is the comparison group)	


Table 7.12 Concern for losing one's home

Community	Yes
Divina	72%**
España	60%**
Avg. of five communities	51%
Z-test significance .05*, .01** (Avg. is the comparison group)	

Finally, table 7.12 shows the fear residents felt about losing their homes. 60% of households in España were concerned that they could lose

their home for their behavior in the community, a surprisingly high number due to the fact that the Red Cross had no presence when this survey was issued. Yet, as explained by Don Jose, land and home titles had not been completely settled (due to government incompetence, according to Red Cross employees) and so there was concern by residents that they still did not really own their homes.

Figure 7.11 Notice to España community members



The large sign above, like the three others posted in the community, may have increased this worry. It says:

Honduran Red Cross

General notice to the population.

Residents should remember that the constructed homes in Ciudad España are for the exclusive use of the family with title. Therefore, the home is a family asset, which you may not sell. Selling is illegal, and those who do so will be brought to court.

Like the Fundación, the Red Cross knew of the illegal renting and selling of properties;

which in turn forced them to place these large signs up near the road entering the

community, in the central square, and again in different parts of the community. Unlike

the Fundación, however, the Red Cross did not take strong action against any of the

community members. There was no public eviction; and those who did sell or buy homes

within the community are currently under investigation; they will likely lose their homes eventually, but nothing has come of it thus far.

The Red Cross also made it a point to change the relationship with the community when they moved the community from the *macro-albergues* to Ciudad España, Ignacio, a head social worker of Ciudad España explained,

We start from the *macro-albergues*, we were there four years. Of those four years, two of the years we maintained a very paternalistic attitude. Since 2001, we began the process of working more in different subjects to address the more general problem of the community--the topics of education and health. The community itself saw their own problems and began seeking advice and solutions with our support. But we did not do things for them. This process of metamorphosis is not easy. [Residents would say] 'I'm comfortable here [being provided for], I do not want to walk alone.' The process was not easy.

Now they come to the community and have another view that they are not going to receive everything. In fact, when we were there, [they would say] 'I broke a light bulb.' [expecting the Red Cross to fix it]. If they have problems with water, there is the water board, the same organization they composed themselves. When there is no light, there is ENEE [national electric company]. We would teach that good resources are available and that you just have to go get them, but not necessarily from the Red Cross. We provided guidance and advice, as facilitator. But we stopped giving residents chewed up bits to swallow.

Conclusion

Ciudad España not only started with many differences than Divina, but the Red Cross also had a fundamentally different approach to community development than the Fundación. Demographically, España maintained a poorer resident membership, even though many of the members from each community originated from the same pre-Mitch neighborhoods. The Red Cross also took a partnership approach to development that shaped the future trajectory of the community. By not maintaining a strong presence, especially in the social arena, by not having a long-term approach to community

development, and by having no social control mechanisms (e.g. mortgages), the Red Cross could only ask the participation of residents, not require it. Finally, the larger population of the community made development, social cohesion, and social capital more challenging than it would have been in a smaller community.

Table 7.13 Community Timeline
 Red Cross, Ciudad España, and External Events

Community Timeline	Red Cross	Ciudad España	External events
1998			
October	Immediate relief throughout the country Construction of temporary shelters for survivors	N/A	October 28- November 1- Hurricane Mitch Massive amounts of aid flow into the country
1999			
	Maintenance of shelters throughout the country	N/A	Stockholm conference defines transformation not just reconstruction as goal for Honduras
2000			
	Building begins		
2001			
	Building continues Addressing drought throughout the country		Severe Drought
2002			
	Building continues	500 families are moved into the community	Severe Drought
2003			
	Building continues Implementation of CODELES	Police station opens	
2004			
		All families are moved in 1 murder	New President Maduro: Gang Reduction Strategy- decreases crime
2005			
	End of CODELES	3 murders	Hurricanes Katrina, Stan, Wilma, Beta and Gamma damage northern Honduras
2006			
		4 murders	

2007			
	Officially the community is are handed over to the residents	2 murders	
2008			
	1-2 staff members occasionally in the community	No <i>Patronato</i> 4 murders	Global economic crisis creates high unemployment (including in the valley)
2009			
	1-2 staff members occasionally in the community	No <i>Patronato</i> 5 murders	Honduras highest per capita homicides in the world June-Honduras Presidential coup d'état Resistance mvmt formed Tropical Storm Ida
2010			
	No longer had any staff in the community	3 murders	New Elections Porfirio Lobo Sosa elected

Chapter 8. Connecting Process to Outcome

“I see a beautiful city and a brilliant people rising from this abyss, and, in their struggles to be truly free, in their triumphs and defeats, through long years to come, I see the evil of this time and of the previous time of which this is the natural birth, gradually making expiation for itself and wearing out.”-Charles Dickens’ A Tale of Two Cities

Much like Dickens’ narrative of the hope springing forth during the French Revolution, in the destructive wake of Hurricane Mitch (1998) Hondurans believed that with the aid of foreign nations and NGOs, they too could overcome the poverty and crime that plagued their country. This dissertation is only a small effort at investigating whether this hope was achieved; did new intentional communities realize what the Red Cross and Cardinal Rodriguez claimed to be “model communities?” Twelve years after the hurricane each resettlement has had challenges, conflict, and hardship. Yet, each has been successful at achieving at least some of its goals—creating a safe (by Honduran standards) community for survivors to re-start their lives with greater opportunity. Within this success, however, is significant difference depending on the measure.

This chapter will attempt to explain how and why those differences exist, especially between Divina and España. To begin, I will briefly review this dissertation as a reference to the logic of the argument. I then discuss the two major mechanisms that help explain divergent community trajectories as seen in the differences of social health indicators. The first mechanism is context. Indeed, although I argue that each community held the possibility for similar community health outcomes from the very beginning, each community had many pre-determined characteristics (e.g. material

resources, NGO praxis and timeframe, Honduran culture, etc.) that had already carved a path for residents even before then arrived.

Although many of the development resources shaped a particular path for the community, these did not pre-determine the course each community would take. Even the best of intentions, practices, and resources, will only bring the community so far unless there is a standard, a cultural normative that promotes health living within the community. This second mechanism is the particular norms created by the NGO and community. Using a path dependency framework, I argue that the initial conditions, process of social norm formation, reproduction and reinforcement of emergent norms, and the mechanism of increasing returns, directed each community's trajectory along a different path. In order to do so, I will begin with a description of path dependency as a useful analytical tool in understanding these communities. I then follow the chronological development of the community (initial conditions, social norm formation, norm reinforcement, and increasing returns) highlighting the most significant mechanisms or differences between each and discussing how this may have affected its trajectory. The chapter will conclude with future research questions.

Review of Previous Chapters

A brief review of the dissertation thus far will help elucidate the long and winding path that has brought us to this point. Chapter one of this paper sets forth the research agenda and importance of this study. Indeed, many of the initial questions have been answered. We have found that Divina and España have encountered greater social health than the rest of the nation in general and Tegucigalpa in particular. We also can conclude

that although both were successful, Divina had higher social health indicators than España and the average of the five communities even with many similar initial characteristics. The peculiarities of the Honduran history and culture, and non-governmental organizations have also been discussed as important contextual factors in understanding community trajectory.

Chapter two provided a foundation of previous literature by discussing the post-disaster recovery and community development process. Who initiates the development process, what type of process they use as well as their guiding philosophy are important determinants on the future trajectory of the community as described by the path dependency model. This chapter describes how the development of Divina and España tie together the disaster recovery and community development literatures as well as highlights the importance of using social health indicators alongside traditional recovery measures.

Chapter three described the soundness of the research design and methodology, respectively. Beginning with the suitability of the comparative case study and these two communities, this section also discussed community similarities and differences showing that although different, Divina and España are still valid and comparable cases. The four data collection methods, document analysis, surveys, interviews, and ethnography are also defined. The chapter closes with the various data collection challenges faced in the field and in the analysis of the data.

In chapter four, through a description of each community's social health outcomes, we discover that all of the communities studied are in fact much healthier

places to be than Tegucigalpa both in terms of their perceptions, my own ethnographic findings, and national statistics. Additionally, in comparison to the five other communities' average, Divina is significantly higher on almost all social health indicators while España is about average—sometimes above and sometimes below. Finally, we found that the major social health differences between Divina and España are in the types, levels, and perceptions of crime, civic participation, social capital, collective efficacy, and vision of the community as a model and its future.

Chapter five described the context before, during, and after Hurricane Mitch. Pre-Mitch characteristics and vulnerabilities of the country, political, cultural, institutional, environmental, are discussed to illustrate the high vulnerability of Honduras to natural hazards. Tegucigalpa was particularly vulnerable due to the high poverty, weak government, and high recent urban migration. Hurricane Mitch is also detailed, as its havoc and devastation of the country created an opportunity for Honduras to be re-built and re-organized in a way that would be beneficial to the effected poor majority. After Mitch, scholars have found that the rebuilding of the country did not happen to the extent hoped for by the international community and Hondurans themselves (Ensor 2010). Yet, for individual resettled communities, my findings suggest that there have been significant gains.

Chapters six and seven gave a broad overview of Divina Providencia's and Ciudad España's infrastructure, resident demographics, and community life. In addition, the Fundación's and Honduran Red Cross' background, philosophy, and practices in the respective communities were also described. These chapters also discussed the processes

that encouraged or discouraged the creation of social structures that would provide sustainable social health.

Finally, as noted above, this chapter will attempt to connect the unique characteristics of NGOs, communities, and the Honduran context in order to answer the initial research question: why did these communities turn out differently? The chapter will conclude with theoretical and policy implications

Initial Differences and Context

The Fundación and the Red Cross played critical roles in the creation of culture within each of these communities. As discussed in chapters six and seven, both organizations had significant similarities in infrastructure, material resource commitment, and initial support of residents. The divergence, however, in time horizon, spatial design, community size and resident selection, and coercive mechanisms created a set of social structures that both enabled and constrained different aspects of community development.

First, the time horizon by both organizations was significantly different. The Fundación from the very beginning committed to being in the community for fifteen years. It was the organization's only project besides the improvement of the Cristo statue. The Red Cross, due to its many projects and internal philosophical differences concerning the mission of the organization, was hesitant to even build homes. Once they did, each year the NGO had to be convinced to stay and maintain programs, which cost money that would be taken away from other relief programs. In addition, due to differences in payment structures, the Fundación had a consistent income flow from

resident mortgages while the Honduran Red Cross had to continually look for outside resources to support España's development.

Second, the centralized location of the market, park, and Catholic church created a meeting space for residents that encouraged social capital. Most residents had to pass through this central location to enter or leave the community creating many opportunities for social interaction. España's infrastructure is not as conducive to social interaction. The market is distant from most residents, up a hill, and has been closed longer than it has been open. There are many more church denominations in España and since churches were not given land in España, all of the churches were located on the periphery of the community, decreasing the chance for community members to interact. The only church that was provided land was the Catholic church. However, the Cardinal decided to focus his funds on the development of Divina's church, where priests living in Divina would be able to drive and minister to the other communities in the valley. España, along with five of the other new communities in the valley, are without a brick and mortar Catholic church. This also decreased interaction among residents that could have created stronger social networks and collective efficacy.

Third, community size and resident selection process are also major differences between Divina and España. Divina, with a selected 583 families is much more homogenous than the less strictly selected 1285 families in España. One of the principle characteristics of the selection process, religion, may powerfully add to the mechanism of culture, which impacts social health. People with the same religious values, mores, norms, and beliefs about hierarchy and community will also be more likely to adhere to

the same set of principles set forth by a Catholic organization led by the Cardinal. España's heterogeneity, on the other hand, created conflicting ideas about community, conflicting values (most apparent were evangelical Christians and Catholic Christians), and beliefs about hierarchy. The secular hands off approach of the Red Cross to community development may have encouraged diversity of goals, norms and values rather than unifying the community under one common vision. Without a strong common vision by the NGO, the socially vulnerable residents were unable to pull together a coherent sense of community, which affected their social health outcomes.

Finally, the philosophy of each organization also promoted the structural conditions noted above. The Fundación's paternalist and top-down development model reinforced the long-term commitment, Catholic hierarchical model (which is culturally understood and respected by Honduran Catholics), and NGO provided vision given to Divina residents. The development model made sense and was easy to follow strong leadership. The drawback of this method was the creation of dependency by the Fundación and the future concern that residents will be unable to lead their own community once the organization leaves.

The Red Cross' partnership approach also supported the path trajectory already created by the structural conditions of España. As noted above, the Red Cross stepped away from a community already vulnerable and heterogeneous. With already greater diversity amongst residents than Divina and a much larger population, it would seem that such an organization would necessitate even greater guidance to create a sense of community. Without strong support, the residents of España struggled to create new


norms and to protect itself from corruption, crime and gang activity. It is this missing sense of community that also may have led to lower social health outcomes. Although having lower levels of social health, Ciudad España residents have been directing their own community for years, making them a completely independent entity

Community Development and Path Dependence

A path dependency framework offers guidance in explaining which key processes set the community on one particular trajectory rather than another as well as sustained the movement along that path (Aminzade 1992). Together, these processes provide an opportunity for the creation of increasing return mechanisms or self-reinforcing/positive feedback processes that makes a reversal or divergence from the path difficult (Pierson 2000: 252). In the case of Divina Providencia and Ciudad España, I argue that although they had similar initial conditions, it was the divergent NGO practices that formed different preliminary social norms⁹⁵. These social norms were reinforced differently by each organization and community, which promoted increasing returns for dissimilar norms, thus creating a particular path for its respective community.

⁹⁵ This has also been discussed as emergent norms in the disaster literature. See Turner and Killian 1987.

Figure 8.1 Path Creation and Reinforcement over Time



To illustrate how the process of path dependence occurred for each community, I have constructed a conceptual chronological figure (8.1). As seen above, there are four periods which each community follows as part of its development from resettlement to community⁹⁶. The initial conditions (1) are the similarities between each community wherein, like Pierson's (2000) color ball and urn analogy, any path can be chosen. For Divina and España context is critical. Their similarity as post-disaster new intentional communities provided comparable starting points as discussed in chapter one and three. Their paths were not pre-defined by any given characteristic.

⁹⁶ This is not a Rostovian-type stage theory (1960) as there is no definitive goal, but rather a description of how a development path is formed and reproduced in post-disaster new communities.

The second time period (2) is defined by the formation of social norms⁹⁷. I define social norms as formal or informal rules that define expected, acceptable, or required behavior in particular circumstances, and which are learned through social interaction.⁹⁸ In the cases of Divina and España, I focus on the social norms of trust, social cohesion, and collective efficacy, especially as they apply to crime rates. Importantly, due to the new nature of the communities, the lack of long-term social networks and the fact it was a complete re-settlement ensured that each community's social norms were open to redefinition⁹⁹. These norms were initially redefined by the NGO as it created the vision for the community, decided upon the selection process, planned the infrastructure, and literally built the community. In order to live in the community residents had to accept those norms. Thus, the NGO had a critical role in the primary shaping of community social norms.

Almost immediately, however, residents and the NGO engaged in a conciliation or conflict of social norms (3--subsequent processes). Once residents moved into the community, they had to decide whether and how much they would buy into each norm. It is at this point where conflict began. The NGO and some residents became proponents of its social norm ideals while other individuals and groups or residents (no community was completely unified) decided which norms to accept and which to contest. This

⁹⁷ Although there are many structures that influence a community, I focus on social structures that may influence the social health of the community. I recognize that this is a false division. As I noted in chapter four, all aspects of community life affects its social health. For this dissertation, however, I will narrow the discussion to only social structures as I have found these to be the most significant development mechanism.

⁹⁸ See the Social Norms National Research Center at the University of Virginia for an excellent overview (<http://www.socialnormsresources.org/>).

⁹⁹ This is unlike most other population moves or resettlements except perhaps long-term refugee camps.

conciliation is the second critical element in the shaping of social norms of the communities. Each action taken by the NGO and residents to reinforce a structure or permit its change is important to the new norms that will eventually guide the community.

Once the norms have been settled enough to provide stability for residents, the social norms begin to take on a life of their own, in a process of increasing returns (4). As Durkheim (1984 [1893]) noted in reference to social facts, these social norms are *sui generis* and have become part of the habitus (Bourdieu 1977). The type and strength of these norms will determine, through increasing returns, the relative amount of social health. To use the snowball metaphor, if high trust, high social cohesion, and high collective efficacy are developed and reinforced as norms (expectations), the practice (beliefs, values, and activities) will continue to build upon itself and residents will be sanctioned for not upholding the standard (norm). A social norm of high trust, for example, will in turn continue to reproduce trust as untrustworthy behavior is negatively sanctioned. A norm of passive acceptance of the top-down decisions of paternalistic leaders will reproduce quiescence rather than active civic engagement and democratic participation.

This is not only true for present residents but also when new residents move into the community. The norms set in place and shared with them are the norms they will abide by and share with for the next cohort of residents who enter.¹⁰⁰ As will be explained below, the timing and type of training for the very first families (between 20

¹⁰⁰ It could be speculated that this has ramifications for community children as well.

and 200 depending on the community) is incredibly important as they accept and reinforce, change or reject the norms promoted by the NGO, which have continuing ramifications on what the following cohort is expected to do. In order to change this cycle of structure reproduction, a powerful externality must be introduced and affect norms on many levels. The rest of the chapter will attempt to illustrate this conceptual model using the divergent trajectories of Divina and España.

Initial conditions

Pierson's (2000: 251) claim that "large consequences may result from relatively small or contingent events" enables us to understand the importance of subsequent conditions set forth by the NGO and maintained and reproduced by the community. I argue that the initial conditions of these communities were comparable, but the stochastic processes within each new community and the increasing returns of those processes affected its long-term outcomes.

Reviewing chapters six and seven we recognize that there are numerous similarities that would provide a foundation for a comparison of community development. Residents had many similar backgrounds of race, post-Mitch trauma, origin of pre-Mitch home, and current health. Both organizations also had comparable characteristics in their timeframe, vision for the community, the infrastructure they built, and geographic location of the new communities. These similarities suggest that the communities could have taken the same development trajectory had they received similar key practices (processes) that would have provided each with the structure necessary to develop in a socially healthy way (Goldstone 1998).

As I have illustrated, the Fundación did have a stricter selection process. Unlike Coleman's et. al. (1981) Catholic versus public school report, the idea of selection process as a major determinant is important but not a significant mechanism in the development of the communities. While I believe it had latent effects on the community vis-à-vis social capital due to religious homogeneity, I would argue that it did not have the manifest effect to make the communities incomparable for three reasons. While some residents had the credentials to go to Divina, they chose not to due to heavily religious nature of the Fundación. The opposite was also true. Residents had the opportunity to go to España but chose to apply and were accepted to enter Divina. Second, we recognize just how difficult it is to obtain a group of people together that are the right fit. In graduate school we see that even with all of the information provided by applicants, which is also more verifiable than what the NGOs had in post-Mitch Honduras, we still have a 10% drop out rate highlighting the wrong fit or bad selection by the committee. This is complicated by the fact that both groups have a choice—the people and the institution. In a post-disaster poor country, finding the data about people and making sure they are the right fit is arguably more difficult. To explain the differences in outcome as originating only in the selection process, then, is inadequate.

Even with the Fundación's stricter selection, the process was not perfect. Almost every Fundación staff member related to me the various difficulties they have run into in working with Divina residents—problems no different than those in España. As explained in Chapter four, there were some “bad apples” that caused numerous problems in the community. In the same way, España has numerous amazing families that have

contributed greatly to the well-being of the community. Additionally, if it was about selection then the Fundación failed in its attempt to obtain the right people.¹⁰¹ About ten percent of Divina residents either left or were asked to leave for various reasons. This percentage matches that of España. One would assume that had the Fundación had a better selection process, they would also have a higher retention rate. This is also supported by the necessary expulsion of resident from Divina for selling drugs and causing problems. Similarly, although the Fundación was hoping for a 100% Catholic community, according to my survey only about 60% of residents are Catholic. To explain this difference, Fundación staff explained that some of the residents lied to obtain a home in Divina.

There is no question that the strict selection process of the Fundación resulted in a much more homogenous group of residents than the open process of the Red Cross. This homogeneity did enable residents to create a sense of community with greater ease than España. Yet, the larger difference cannot solely be based on selection.

As mentioned in chapter four, residents in both communities did have numerous similar characteristics including the level of post-disaster trauma, current ideas of physical health, number of children, and neighborhoods of origin (although the number from which they were drawn). Demographic differences included economic (relatively), religion, religiosity, household size, and number of communities from which the residents were drawn from. Yet, the question is whether these factors alone can account for differing crime levels, collective efficacy, and civic participation. I would argue no.

¹⁰¹ How does one define good and bad residents? This is inherently difficult and problematic.

Although one's economic status is more likely to lead to higher or lower crime rates, it does not mean that within this community it will happen. The same is true with collective efficacy and participation. These community characteristics cannot be directly tied to resident economic level, religiosity, and family size since individual family characteristics do not necessarily equal community characteristics. To say that differences in income created divergent outcomes prevents the incorporation of emergent process and interaction explanations in the creation of community. One type of selection process over the other did not guarantee greater social health, although I would argue it encouraged it. In addition to these characteristics, I also argue that the stakeholders and national culture were common among residents from both communities. Had these two conditions not been available the social health outcomes of Divina and España may have been significantly altered.¹⁰²

Stakeholders (Characteristics of the Honduran State, NGOs, and Residents)

It is a general expectation that after a disaster the government will play the largest role in the reconstruction and resettlement of survivors. This belief is supported by findings throughout the world. In the U.S., the national and local governments took responsibility for the well-being of survivors, albeit not perfectly (e.g. Greenberg, Kansas and New Orleans, Louisiana). The state played a major role in the rebuilding of these communities, providing significant resources both to infrastructure rebuilding and community empowerment. Chile, after the March 2010 earthquake, is another positive

¹⁰² Beyond selection process, we must also recognize the long-term social control mechanisms in place during the development of the community. The Red Cross did not have the power to regulate community behavior while the Fundación did.

example of the local and national governments taking charge of the situation and obtaining excellent results (Siembieda, Johnson, and Francko forthcoming). Yet, the Honduran fragile state played only a small role in either community's development and is not seen by NGOs or residents as a major factor in their relocation or well-being. While the state did provide resources for some infrastructure and education, as described in chapters six and seven, the NGOs were mostly on their own. The lack of state presence led to an unsupervised recovery and development process that created long-term stratification within the valley (Alaniz 2012).

Timing is also important among stakeholders. Although residents did not define the parameters or infrastructure of the community, residents immediately began to negotiate especially the social and political environments with the sponsoring organization. The "Who does the development?" question asked earlier in this chapter, then, is answered by "It depends." Initially the organization had almost total control over defining the community. As time progressed, the goals and practices of the organization and the desires of the resettled residents conciliated a particular power arrangement, which will be discussed in a following section.

National Culture

As discussed in chapter five, the Honduran national culture may have also played a role in the particular development process taken by each community. This culture is particularly visible during the "Tragedia y Oportunidad" conference in which fifteen Salvadoran community leaders and NGO directors conversed with various Honduran actors about post-disaster recovery and development. The most prominent difference

between the neighboring countries was the Salvadoran disgust of the Fundación. The Salvadorans almost unanimously believed that the Fundación, due to its alignment with the Catholic church, was a corrupt organization that was exploiting vulnerable disaster survivors for the gain of the Fundación board. It was a business. Indeed, there was visceral anger amongst some of the Salvadoran NGO staff.

This makes sense in the cultural context of El Salvador. Historically, the country has been politically polarized including a dozen year (1980-1992) civil war that all of the participants lived through. During the war the church was split with some (including those following liberation theology backing the leftist revolutionaries called the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) while the upper hierarchy supported the ARENA authoritarian government (Duigan 1989; Montgomery 1995).

The Hondurans, no matter their political background, were less hostile and more trusting of powerful NGOS. This Honduran cultural trait, at least among residents in the valley, provided an opportunity for NGOs to have a particularly high amount of power and discretion over how they would develop the new communities. The legitimacy of the Catholic Church had an impact on the community but as a contested structuring mechanism rather than one of ideological cloaking of a capitalist plan. This was seen in June 2009 after Cardinal Rodriguez supported the coup, essentially splitting the community and the Fundación in half based on political allegiance. Residents did not change their politics because of the Fundación or the Cardinal (nor were they encouraged to) although they did chose to submit to much stricter community guidelines than in other communities. The illustration that political ideology did not play a central role in shaping

acceptance of Church legitimacy is also found in the religious makeup of the community. Even with religious (Catholic) prerequisites such as obtaining a letter of reference from a clergy member, only 60% of the community considers themselves Catholic.

In contrast, the Red Cross, although having an excellent reputation in the country, did not receive the immediate legitimacy, authority and trust like the Fundación. Residents loved the organization for its generous support but interviews highlighted that they had both less respect for and less fear of the NGO. Combined with the desire of the Red Cross not to guide and control the community but to rather have it be self-regulated (using informal social control via the *patronato*) and self-run, it makes sense that their impact on the community would look different. The national acceptance of authority, the historical role of the church, and the legitimacy of the Catholic Church made both the creation and conciliation of structures easier for the Fundación since residents were already familiar with those types of structures. Had these particular initial conditions not been present or had they been changed (e.g. more confrontational against the Catholic Church like in El Salvador), one can imagine very different results.

Formation of Social Norms

One of the unique characteristics of a new intentional community created by an NGO is the necessity for the organization to define parameters for the community beforehand. A community culture and various norms that organize the community are not clear by definition as each resident arrives with different expectations for her new community. In addition, residents have a unique background of living in peripheral areas and being a recent victim of the hurricane, usually including trauma. One of the roles of

the NGO is to create a vision for the community that people can buy into and that will have long-term positive social health consequences. This is no easy task.

I argue that the Fundación and its structured approach to community development incorporated a focus on the creation of (emergent) norms and institutions. In contrast, the Red Cross partnership strategy encouraged an agency and independence-driven development. Unbeknownst to either organization were other key characteristics and processes—scope of work, selection process, community development pre-resettlement, social development, buy-in, social control, and the type of leadership support—that would drive each community along a particular trajectory. Much of this lack of knowledge concerning these mechanisms was not due to effort; rather, as noted earlier neither organization had experience with community development. According to Doña Rosa and Naomi, both organizations were doing the best they could with the resources and knowledge they had available often making ad hoc decisions.

In the case of Divina and España, the social norms are in a dialectical relationship with social health. I argue that it is the formation and reinforcement of social norms that give rise to social health or lack of health and in return social health reproduces the social norm. Since the NGOs had the responsibility to initially create and later reinforce those social norms, each organization, arguably, is the most significant mechanism in the social health outcome of each community. A following example will clarify this point.

I have shown that Divina had much stricter practices of social control due in large part to the influence of the Fundación. The Fundación's practices created a norm of social control—to follow the rules set forth became the informal and formal sanctioned

behavior. Following and later maintaining the rules then became the cultural expectation and value (collective efficacy) of the community. Sanctions were imposed upon the people and many residents felt comfortable imposing sanctions (informal and formal) upon themselves as well as their own vision that supported the norm (“We have never had violent death in our community”). In this case, social control created social norms, which in turn reproduced the same level of social control. As we see below, the same can go for neighborly trust, community participation, and collective efficacy. The philosophy and practice of the NGO at the very beginning and the maintenance of that same practice over time were the critical elements in the creation of what type of social norms would be created.

In a similar vein, I also argue that if no norms are put into place then residents will fall back on previous norms (Inglehart and Baker 2000). If this is the case, what we would see in communities with weaker social norm formation, is a return to norms common in Tegucigalpa (see chapter three). España, the community which did not receive clear norms, should have similar level of social health as Tegucigalpa. Whether this was a constant feature of España or whether there was a peak of social health from initial structures and then reversion to lesser health as those were not maintained is an important question for future research.

Scope of Work

There is no doubt that both the Red Cross and the Fundación spent high amounts of resources helping survivors to re-gain a sense of normalcy. The Red Cross had provided emergency relief throughout the country, built numerous *macro-albergues*, and

eventually constructed over 2,500 for survivors. The organization had perhaps the broadest reach of any one NGO. The Fundación, however, focused solely on serving a small group of residents in Tegucigalpa. They initially went to the various parishes to find out how many survivors there were and what the future community capacity could hold. Although they had a much larger goal of 800 homes originally, the organization began by working directly with two hundred families.

The scope of work of each organization impacted their ability to focus on their respective community. According to Naomi, the Red Cross was spread thin throughout the country with full-time employees overworked. In contrast, the Fundación had just finished the monument project when the hurricane hit. Even though they also were understaffed and worked mostly on a volunteer basis initially, everyone on the Fundación had a unitary goal and vision for the project. It was easier for the Fundación to set specific social norms and reinforce them since there was only one project and it was a project of less than 600 families.

Selection Process

Differences in resident background as well may also have been an important mechanism in the development of social norms. Although residents from both communities were similar in many ways, the fact that some chose to go to a more structured, Catholic-sponsored and mortgage-based community may illustrate they had a different value system. It could be argued that the future Divina residents' value system was more attune to the hierarchy and social control implemented by the Fundación. Residents in España chose and were chosen by the Red Cross for different reasons. As

the last community to be built, España was filled with everyone else, creating a much more heterogeneous group than that of Divina, which is a plausible drawback to the formation of social norms.

Community development pre-resettlement

The different approaches (partnership and paternalism) to disaster recovery and community resettlement also had an effect on the efforts toward social development of future residents. The Red Cross focused most of its efforts on the maintenance of life in the *macro-albergues* including capacity-building courses such as self-esteem, tourism, client service, human relations and various employment skills. When they were actually building the homes in the community, the Red Cross promoted the idea that “The construction of the home is not an end, but rather a medium to arrive at community development” (CESAL 2008: 74). In addition, the organization held six social goals during the construction stage. These were: equal participation by families in construction projects, maintain security norms at the project, provide appropriate housing for each family (depending on family need and size), manage conflicts, fortify and generate constructive abilities and skills to encourage income generation and maintenance of the home, and to complete the community development through a sensitizing of residents to respect the work that they put into in the community (CESAL 2008: 75-76).

In contrast, the Fundación, after selecting the first 200 families, enforced the rule that a representative of each family had to attend capacity building workshops for six months before they arrived in the community. These workshops were given every Friday at 5:30 to 9pm for six months, held in different parishes and covered themes from the

logistics of how the community would work to skills on what it means to live in community and were led by Don Francisco ad Doña Rosa as well as priests from the various parishes. By 1999 the future residents with the support of the Fundación had already created political structures and social norms enabling them to learn by doing even before the community was built. In addition, as described in chapter five, the *Cómite Cívico Social* was made up of the church, the Fundación and residents. Unlike the España *patronato* which was not formed until people moved in (2004), Divina members were already being trained and practicing decision-making with the support of professional organizers (CESAL 2008: 78-79).

Along the same lines as the preparation was the social norms built among residents before entering the community. It would seem that España residents should have had a higher level of social cohesion than those of Divina since a majority of future España residents came from the same *macro-albergues* (where many of them lived together for four years) and also worked together for forty weeks before moving into their home. Yet, in España the formation of norms was not this straight-forward. There were a large number of people moving into the community at once and not necessarily from the same *albergues*. In many cases, future residents hired workers to take their place in order to keep working at their job in the capital (PI Nina 2010). This would mean that although one may know a large number of residents in España, they may live up to a quarter mile away on the other side of the community. The social network and cohesion

built in the *albergues* were disrupted, an event Gill (2007) calls “secondary trauma.” New social networks may have inhibited the acceptance of common social norms.¹⁰³

Divina’s pre-resettlement was significantly different than that of España. According to Karen, a member of one of the first 200 families Divina residents did have strong networks before moving into the community for two reasons. First, each family had to have one representative attend a meeting every Friday evening with their future neighbors in order to learn about the community expectations, get to know one another, and be trained in leadership. If a family representative did not, they risked losing their chance at having a home. I would also argue that these meetings became a unique place for the Fundación to socialize residents into the particular social norms they supported.

The difference in the type and amount of capacity-building and in time spent together illustrate a possible early divergence in future community culture and expectation. When asked about the difference is between the two communities, Belkis, a social worker of the Fundación, explained:

There are regulations from the point of view as is the Manual of Conduct Standards and Community Cooperation. From the standpoint of the home contract, these are the first legal and judicial instruments available to establish minimum standards of living, with respect to neighbors, trying to build solidarity among neighbors, and within the community. Another condition is the whole process of training to be brought into the community. This process has been important since its inception, a constant process of training. Another thing is good communication and openness in the issues in which the Fundación has had to be firm and truthful in order not to impair the vision created from the beginning. For example, we have been approached by residents who wanted a gaming center or a bar since they do not exist here [in Divina]. But you know that

¹⁰³ This is in fact the case within España. One of the ten neighborhoods, Betania, all came from the same *macro-albergue* where they were well organized. They entered into España as a neighborhood and were not separated. Residents noted that they had the highest degree of cohesion and strongest social networks, as would be expected.

opening the doors to this type of business is opening the door to all kinds of problems. They can obtain something [alcohol] from outside but not inside the community... Other than the things mentioned above the community has the church, the spiritual part. The spiritual work that has been done here by the Church has helped. It has allowed this community to be what it wants, a peaceful community.

Belkis succinctly highlights a number of issues that were supported by my own investigation. First, she explains that there were instruments in place including legal and judicial structures that provided norms for the residents. In España norms were also in place and rules set but there was no way to really enforce them since the *patronato* was weak and the Red Cross could not take away homes like the Fundación. The second issue is that people in Divina were trained in a particular way and for a long time. As mentioned above, this training and norms provided a foundation for strong leadership to emerge in Divina but less so in España, as will be discussed later in this chapter.

Third, the connection between the Fundación and the community is meant to be firm and open in order to maintain a common vision. In Divina, this vision set forth by the Fundación was clear and constantly reproduced as seen in the paternalistic relationship. It was to be a “model” community and the acknowledgement that there were no murders consistently reinforced that ideal. In España, the Red Cross did not want to impose any particular community ideals but rather let the residents decide for themselves. This encouragement of participation was positive but may not have provided enough structure in the form of community vision and social boundaries, for residents to pursue.

Fourth, the idea of social control reappears. Belkis replies to the requests for a bar or for gambling with a clear “No”, citing the problems associated with such activity. Indeed, as mentioned in chapter five, social control through social sanctions is a critical part of the Fundación praxis. In España, the Red Cross without any formal power, a weak *patronato*, and a fearful police could not stop residents from turning their house into a cantina. As Pastor Eduardo explained to me in 2009, “There is a hidden bar on almost every block.” The importance of social control will be developed later.

Finally, Belkis connects the religious aspect of Divina and the Fundación to the success of the development process. Indeed, although difficult to quantify, the influence of historically and culturally legitimate morals defining a community must have had some influence, perhaps as informal social control and particular expectations. In España, since the community was not tied to any religious institution, the moral code was defined by the community itself drawing on resident’s pasts (e.g. Tegucigalpa). Without a new set of social norms and cultural expectation of behavior in which to move, residents relied on what they knew and did before in their previous neighborhoods. This is not to say that religious morals themselves are the beneficial issue, but rather the legitimacy and cultural knowledge made the move from social norms residents had in Tegucigalpa to those proposed by the NGO more palatable.

The literature supports the thesis that initial conditions matter. Putnam (1993) found that the regions of Italy which contain the most successful democratic institutions are the same as those who had relatively healthy and well-developed civil society in the nineteenth century. In a similar vein but on the opposite side of the world, Fukuyama

(1995) argues that cultures of “low-trust” are at an economic disadvantage in the global economy due to its challenge with developing large and complex social institutions. Jeannotte (2003:47) adds a note about the importance of buy-in to these norms. “Cultural participation helps to connect individuals to the social spaces occupied by others and encourages ‘buy in’ to institutional rules and shared norms of behavior. Without this ‘buy in,’ individuals are unlikely to enter into willing collaboration with others and without that cooperation, civic engagement and social capital—key components of social cohesion—may be weakened” (see also Buchan 2003). Putnam, Fukuyama, and Jeannotte point to initial norm structures as predictors of future success with social institutions. In a conceptually similar way, the same principles that illustrate norm structures impact on institutions can also be applied to social health. The five initial conditions noted above significantly guided each community’s trajectory.

Social Control over time

NGOs taking on the role of community developers faced large challenges to create spaces free of a culture of violence, gang issues, police or judicial corruption, and crime. Without a strong state presence, a historical cultural framework in the new space, informal social control, organizations felt it necessary to implement stricter guidelines (in comparison to Tegucigalpa) to maintain order in the communities. In the cases of Ciudad España and Divina, many of the rules were the same within the community but their regulation was implemented differently.

Within Divina Providencia, there was very strong social control due in large part to the Fundación control over the homes (mortgage system) and the daily presence of the

organization in the lives of the community. The ability of the Fundación to take away homes is perhaps the most significant mechanism of control. Denis, a resident who previously lived in Divina and now lives in España, explained his understanding of the differences in social order between the two communities.

This [delinquency] is a big problem here in Ciudad España. There are a lot of drugs and the police do not interfere much even though it is their job. In Divina the police are the same but it is very important the influence of the Fundación Cristo de El Picacho because the Fundación is the one who provides order, there [Divina] gangs started to form and they [the Fundación] told the people, well, you must control your children or leave.

Santiago, a Fundación employee, provided a further explanation. He described that it was not the gang member who would lose the home as their name was not on the housing contract. Rather, it would be the mother or relative of the gangster who would lose the home, since the homeowner is responsible for all of the people living in the household.

The Fundación was also present in the community at least five but sometimes seven days a week either collecting payments, working on infrastructure, starting new projects, or resolving problems and conflicts. Oscar, a second full-time social worker for the Fundación describes the NGO role.

I think it's very important that you also have the presence of Fundación Cristo de El Picacho within the housing project through its staff. I think it helps in problems because they [the staff] are there to address problems encountered in daily life and they are within the community as servants of the community. [The Staff] can mediate in situations because when things are off track and the community is losing the vision with which the housing project was created, then the Fundación staff can intervene in order that the community can take the right path.

According to Oscar, it was the organization that kept the community on track and following the vision that the Fundación set forth for the project. This type of focused vision maintenance had powerful ramification on the reproduction of particular social norms.

In contrast to the paternalist approach to social control, the Red Cross' partnership approach led to less social control mechanisms and therefore less social organization and less rigid structure. Although the organization did tremendous work with residents in the *macro-albergues* from 1998 to their arrival in España in 2004, the secondary trauma of resettlement and breaking of social networks in the move may have affected their ability to maintain a common vision. The organization also only stayed for three years in the community providing support, thereby limiting the reinforcement of social norms. The larger España community and heterogeneous population were also hurdles to development as it made social cohesion more difficult. These characteristics along with the hands-off approach of the Red Cross made any unitary vision of development difficult to achieve.

The social control mechanisms that the Fundación had were also not available to the Red Cross. The Red Cross did not have the ability or desire to take homes away from residents. They did not have the resources to maintain staff working in the community (as did the Fundación through mortgage payments). Their organizational focus was also disaster relief not long-term development. The Red Cross also did not step in to shape the political decisions by the community or protect the community from itself in the form of corruption and delinquency.

Crime breeds crime¹⁰⁴. In España, when people sold alcohol in the community, when residents sold their houses, when police officers were assaulted and assailants left unpunished, it permitted others to do the same, backsliding into some of the behavior and social norms of the former neighborhoods in Tegucigalpa. Additionally, as murders began to become common place, people were afraid to leave their homes limiting social capital and participation. When corruption became an issue, many residents gave up on the political system believing that participation and voting would do little good. Less collective efficacy and participation led to less trust and higher crime, creating a circular effect. Divina was able to avoid this cycle due to the strong enforcement of formal and informal sanctions for particular types of behavior. Crime never had a chance to gain a foothold in Divina unlike España.

Conciliation of Norms

As noted earlier, the concept of increasing returns is prominent in the path dependency literature. I argue that increasing returns can also be seen as the reinforcement of social norms. In the case of Divina and España, after the initial norms were created and accepted by the community, they needed to be enforced in order to have a lasting impact. Between the two communities, I argue that differences in community design, material resource input into the community over time, NGO timeframe, participation in the community, and community leadership either maintained or degraded the initial norms set forth by the organization.

¹⁰⁴ This refers to the broken windows theory in criminology (Wilson and Kelling 1982; Keizer, Lindenberg, and Steg 2008) .

Community Design

Geographers and urban planners (Jackson 2003) have pointed out the importance of community design in fostering characteristics such as social capital and decreasing the likelihood of crime. According to Bill Siembieda (2010), chair of the urban planning department at Cal Poly State University, Ciudad España had an extremely well-designed community. The Red Cross had put an amazing amount of time and energy into creating a plan that would be sustainable in infrastructure and social development. The Fundación as well, with a smaller community and less land did the best that they could to design a community that would be risk sensitive to vulnerabilities and sustainable. Both communities are very similar in this respect and in their typical and culturally acceptable Spanish design—a central space to interact with houses shooting out in all directions.

There are two important differences. The first is the usability of the central space. In España, the central space was a large concrete area located next to the soccer field. It could be seen from almost any home in the community. It was fairly clean, there were places to sit and even enough space to hold carnival rides as happened a few times during my tenure in the community. The space, however, was not user friendly in other respects. There were no ornamental plants, only a few trees at the far east end and these shaded a temporary-turned-permanent store that sold clothes and shoes. In Honduras, where the temperatures often reach into the 90s Fahrenheit, a white concrete slab with no shade is not conducive to social interaction. It is also at the lowest part of the community with little protection from the winds kicking up dust off of the soccer field or the main road. Throughout my time in España I did see people sit with umbrellas for short periods and kids use the space for small soccer games but it was not a common gathering area.

This is in contrast to the central park in Divina. Although the space was much smaller, there were ornamental plants throughout the space a few trees though still not offering much shade, and a water fountain that would run on occasion. The space also focused the attention on the east side of the park where a concrete stage was built. This concrete stage was used about every other weekend from dance performances, to fundraisers, to community-wide meetings, to the site of the community nativity. Many of the men would gather and play dominos in the evening there, adolescent couples would stroll through holding hands, and women would let their children run or bike in circles. Interestingly, and perhaps metaphorically, the park in España was open all of the time and had no fence around it. The central park in Divina was enclosed by a six-foot fence and locked often at ten pm until seven or eight the next morning.

The market is also a significant difference. In Divina the market is centrally located next to the park, near the bus station and near the church. It is perhaps a seven minute walk from the furthest house to the market with little elevation change for most of the homes. The entire market is covered, leaving it to be used as a refuge for residents during a rain storm or from the heat of the sun. In España, the market is far from all of the homes. It is located up the hill on the main road leading out of town. From the closest house it would be probably a four minute walk to the market and a 15 minute walk from the farthest house. From most homes it would probably take 10+ minutes. Although this may seem like a short distance, walking up or down hills with bags full of groceries on a hot summer day is not inviting. Reyna and her son David lived in Divina and moved to España giving them a particular perspective on the differences between the

two. In reference to the markets, David mentioned, “The difference is that in the two communities there is a market and in [Divina] they work together more, Divina has a market environment because it is in the central section and here it is outside [the community].” If distance and lack of connection were not enough, the murder of the two guards sealed the fate of that economic space.

In addition to the market, the difference was also illustrated by the number of *pulperias* found on each street. Following Sampson’s Chicago Study, an assistant research walked every block and wrote notes about the differences about physical and social disorder. Looking only for home-stores, 60% of Divina blocks had them and the average of the five communities had 58%. 89% of España blocks, however, had at least one *pulperia*. This large number may be linked directly to the lack of a strong formal market.

Another influence could be community size. Would having a population in España twice as large as Divina have a significant impact? I would argue yes and no. Undoubtedly, a larger population would be less conducive to the creation of social capital and collective efficacy. Yet, this does not explain everything. There is not a one-to-one correlation between social health and the smaller community size meaning that there must have been other influential mechanisms. Indeed, on some characteristics España would be considered much healthier than some of the communities a fifth of their size. Perhaps it was not just the size but also the introduction of new families to the community that mattered.

It makes sense then that Divina would have higher social capital and collective efficacy due to urban planning; the design was much more conducive to social interaction and the community was much smaller. Two design decisions in particular, the usability of central space and the location of the market led to different consequences in each community. A central park, historically and in many areas, is the hub of activity in the community. It is where people interact, where meetings are held and where people can relax. In España the space was not as inviting and used significantly less than in Divina. Additionally, a removed and later closed marketplace in España is also not encouraging of community networking and connection. España residents tended to stay within their neighborhood blocks, meet in the shade of their homes or along the narrow corridors between houses while Divina residents would spend much time in the park and market often not to buy things but just to be near the liveliest part of town. In España the lack of useful communal space, the size of the community, and fewer community-wide activities led to a factionalism, in which España residents' social network was within their immediate neighbor, not at the community level. Within España this was apparent at the conflict between barrios; a few barrios came from similar neighborhoods and were brought together as a group under a slightly different protocol. They have been slightly more successful in their self-organization which has created hard feelings among some of the other residents.

Material Inputs and Resources

An additional reinforcement was that of material resources. It would seem plausible that the more money spent on infrastructure, social development, staff and

community programs run by the organization, the more successful one community would be over the other. This, however, is not the case. By 2002 the Fundación has spent a total of about ~100,000,000 Lempiras (~\$6,060,600 16.5L=\$1) on Divina while the Red Cross has spent about ~387,500,000 Lempiras (~\$23,484,850) on España. When broken down by the number of homes 585 and 1,250 respectively, the cost per household is \$10,360 in Divina and \$18,787 per household in España. Part of this difference is attributed to the excellent infrastructure, especially water piping and filtration that España now maintains. Still, more resources do not necessarily equal better social health outcomes.

From 2002 to 2011, however, the amount of material inputs differed by each organization into the community. According to the Fundación, through mortgage payments Divina paid upwards of 80,000,000 Lempiras (\$7,222 adjusted for inflation 19L = \$1), which the Fundación directed toward social projects within the community. The mortgages have enabled the organization to maintain a surplus of funds. This was a strategic choice. Since the Fundación knew that it would have to abandon the project once the houses were built (for lack of funds) and to instill values such as work ethic and commitment to the community, they decided to have residents pay small mortgages that would increase by 8% (average inflation in Honduras) each year. These funds were then reinvested into the community. According to Doña Rosa, the value of the community is now worth 180,000,000 Lempiras, an 80% return over ten years even with the expense of maintaining a full-time staff.

After an exhaustive search of Red Cross records and requests for information, I have been unable to obtain the amount spent by the organization on the community after 2002. It is likely the Red Cross spent much more per capita than the Fundación, but that the Fundación spent more over time since the Red Cross was in the community only until 2007 (officially) and 2009 (unofficially), the organization had to obtain recurring funding (unlike the Fundación), and it was spread thin throughout the country.

Even without this number, however, the evidence illustrates that still the Fundación may have had less material input into the community and yet still had better social health outcomes. This fact points to two possible explanations. On the one hand, the fact that the Red Cross had only a limited timeframe in España may have encouraged it to focus its resource use on creating excellent infrastructure and less on social development. The Fundación, however, had a long-term commitment to the community which affected how much they spent on infrastructure and social programs. A less likely explanation may be the misuse of funds or high overhead by the Red Cross although there is little evidence of this.

NGO Timeframe

Another initial condition that may have impacted the development divergence is the timeframe set by each organization. The initial decision by the Fundación to walk with the community for fifteen years and the difficulty the Red Cross had deciding a timeline (see chapter six) had two important effects. First, Divina residents found comfort in the knowledge that the organization was going to be there long-term. It provided stability, consistency, and support, which makes sense when the context

(traumatized disasters survivors relocating to a new community without strong social networks or supports) is taken into account. The Red Cross, however, re-adjusted their timeline multiple times as it was never their intent to develop a community. Re-visiting the question about resident opinions of the role of the NGO, it illustrates that even in Divina which has had the most influence still 80% of residents wished they had the same or greater influence. This number jumps to 88% of España residents illustrating that the vast majority of all residents appreciated the amount of influence the organization had in their community.¹⁰⁵

Table 8.1 In the last few years, do you wish the NGO would have:

	Left as soon as possible	Had less influence	Had the same influence	Had greater influence
Divina (N=441)	7%	13% **	34%	46% **
España (N=447)	7%	5%	29%	60% **
Avg. of five com.(N=932)	7%	4%	33%	56%
Z-test significance .05*, .01** (Avg. is the comparison group)				

One of the most significant quotes I heard came from a conversation I had come from Doña Rosa about the development process. She said that “In Divina it took six years for the resettlement to become a community.” I immediately asked her what she meant. She replied, “It was after six years that people finally started working together as a community; working together on community projects.” Again, in the context of post-disaster new intentional communities, it seems like it would take time and concerted consistent guidance to set the community on a track that was more positive than the one they had known before. In the case of España, the Red Cross did not take the

¹⁰⁵ I recognize that this question conflates time and influence. I believe that the conflation does not change the analysis at least for the purpose of the argument above.

management approach nor did they spend that amount of time in the community. Once the homes and infrastructure were built, it was less than three years that the Red Cross officially handed over the keys to residents.

A third impact of the differences in timeframe was illustrated in the social reproduction and social control of norms, values, and practices. Each organization hoped that the new community would be a healthier place to live than where residents originally came from. In order to make it that way, each organization set forth expectations and standards in which they hoped residents would rise to such as lower alcoholism, less crime and violence, more civic participation and greater social capital than they had known in their previous neighborhoods. However, the difference in the amount of time each organization stayed affected how ingrained those values became.

For example, in Divina, the Fundación and the Catholic Church have always been present constantly re-iterating the vision for the model community. When residents signed up to be in the community, they signed an agreement to live by the rules set forth in the code of conduct written by the community but influenced by the Fundación. If residents stepped beyond that role, the Fundación would step in formally or informally to set them on the right track. Crime was nipped in the bud. Residents knew that there were consequences to misbehavior (such as losing your home or your mother losing her home). They maintained the role of parent and entity which enforced social control thereby bounding the path that could be taken by Divina. Residents accepted this—even though they lost some say in the community development process, they continued to choose to live in the community. When houses did go on the market for whatever reason, dozens of

families would quickly apply to buy the home, illustrating the large desire to live in Divina.

Along the same lines, the long-term commitment by the Fundación to the community enabled continual reinforcement of structures and surveillance of community activity. Though this sounds anti-democratic and perhaps oppressive, what it provided the community was support of political bodies, co-operatives, schools, and other institutions both to continue without as working entities and avoid the ubiquitous corruption and nepotism in the country¹⁰⁶.

The CCS had moments when it faltered, due to weaknesses of leadership or intra-community conflict. Indeed, other than the protests mentioned earlier and direct conflict with the Fundación, the CCS had declining participation over time. An example is the development boards and sector leaders. Meetings were rare if ever for these groups, residents were not sure who was on each board (though they did know who the main leaders of the sectors and community were), and even the CCS had difficulty bringing their board together for monthly or project meetings. Of the many reasons for this decline, according to informal conversations with community leaders, it was due in part to general apathy and in part due to the role of the Fundación as taking care of issues and creating a sense of dependency.

There was also frustration with the Fundación for its overbearing presence in the community. Residents believed that the Fundación would listen to them, but at the end of the day it, not the people, would make the final decision as to what was best for the

¹⁰⁶ For more information about corruption in Honduras, please see Transparency International.

community. This had a disempowering affect on members and may have encouraged the apathy noted above.

Concomitantly, it was the Fundación's social control that maintained norms within the community. There have been no claims of corruption and low crime (a major feat in this part of the world) due in large part because of the risk involved; residents risk losing their home if they steal from the community or are proven to be criminals.¹⁰⁷ This is not to say that social control is the only way to prevent corruption. It was, however, effective in the post-disaster communities with this demographic of residents. With the significant issues of trauma, broken social networks, and discombobulation that is inherent in this type of move, social control mechanisms provided a stable social structure in Divina that was not present in España.

In España, the Red Cross provided a set of values, norms, and vision, but they did not create the long-term social control mechanisms to enforce them. The community-wide vision hoped for by the organization and *patronato* was not maintained due in part to the size of the community, the disconnect between sectors of the community built at different times, and the short time span the organization was in the community. In addition, as illustrated in the crime statistics, España has always had a large crime problem. Without the formal power of being able to take away homes for misbehavior, the Red Cross has been unable to help decrease crime. The same goes for surveillance of community institutions. Since the *patronato* was a separate entity from the organization, the NGO could not interfere with the problems they faced. Even with the theft of

¹⁰⁷ Although during one transitional year the CCS office was robbed of everything of value. (Steinberg 2009)

community funds and separate water funds multiple times by political leaders and the dissolution of the *patronato* for two years, the Red Cross still could not (or did not want to) step in to affect positive changes in politics.

Building on the initial conditions above, three mechanisms bounded and sustained the movement of each community down a particular path: community participation and leadership, buy-in, and externalities. Each is developed below.

Community Participation and Leadership

In many ways this move from the common *patronato* system to the CCS had a significant influence on the type of presence the Fundación had within the community. Not only were residents moving into an entirely new community, with new neighbors, new rules (as will be described later), and new expectations, they also had a new form of governance. The change from traditional authority to a characteristically rational-legal authority in which the Fundación was a part created a system of hierarchy and power that would shape the development of Divina in significant ways (Weber 1968). Not only did the Fundación maintain a large level of influence over the community, they were able to protect the community from issues of nepotism and corruption faced by other communities.

Another theory that may shed light on the issue would be the critique of the development process, especially in the lack of participation promotion by the Fundación. On the one hand, the argument could be made that the heavy handed involvement of the Fundación in the political, social and economic activities of the community prevented residents from taking control over their own lives. Not only could this be seen an

exploitative relationship (the organization receiving and controlling mortgages without resident consent), it may have also reinforced class structures and created a dependent community which may in the future be unstable without the organization (Gunder-Frank 1972). On the other hand, the Red Cross worked directly with the people (partnership) empowering them to take responsibility and command of their community independently—a much more viable option for participatory development.

These arguments, however, do not help explain the divergent outcomes. Although I did hear allegations of corruption by the Fundación, they were no different than the ones I heard of the government, and of every other NGO which built communities.¹⁰⁸ Politically, however, the community as of June 2011 has its own title and no longer needs to go through Fundación channels to request help from the government.

Yet, what are the long-term consequences of the conciliation of social norms as seen in community participation and politics? Based on the tenets of path dependency and social forecasting (Stinson 2011), I speculate that España will maintain its current trajectory finding moments of strengthening the community but not having any drastic changes either for better or for worse. In 2011 a new patronato was voted into office after three years of no governing structures. This could provide the foundation for further social development in the community, although the changes are likely to be small due to what appears to be an entrenched social structure. I do not believe that gangs or significant violence will reappear, as there are enough citizens willing to address these

¹⁰⁸ Indeed, the nation has a culture of accusations and for good reason. While writing this manuscript 176 Honduran police officers were jailed due to corruption charges (BBC 2011).

problems as to prevent them from becoming an issue. In addition, due to the increasing turnover of homes in España, the Red Cross has decided to return and provide further social support of the community. This, arguably, will have numerous positive benefits although again the gains will be minimized by how flexible the social structure is to change.

Divina's future is yet to be determined. On the one hand, the community is highly dependent on the Fundación and has been for some time. The efforts by the Fundación to extract itself have been met with resistance by residents. Since all major decisions were made with input from the Fundación, it is likely that the CCS will have difficulty obtaining legitimacy from their peers. Since the community is comfortable with a top-down political system, it seems that maintaining this form would be of benefit to the CCS and residents. If the CCS does not take a strong tactic toward decision-making, however, this may lead to further loss of legitimacy as residents begin to believe that the CCS is ineffective.

The Fundación created much higher levels of economic, political, and even social dependency of the community upon the organization, which will have consequences in the future. Economically, how the community changes without the Fundación will have to do with how the mortgages are spent. Currently, all mortgage payments are returning to the community in various social and infrastructure projects. However, if this money is taken by the Fundación for other projects, the loss of hundreds of thousands of Lempiras in revenue will hurt many local businesses. Politically, it could be the case that since the CCS will not have the power to foreclose a property either for lack of payment or

behavior, residents will have less respect for their authority. Socially, the organization has been heavily involved in the encouragement of social health projects such as capacity-building classes, fairs, education, and conflict resolution. While I believe the residents have the ability to provide these objectives on their own, many of them have become accustomed to the Fundación doing it for them, reproducing the paternalist/dependency relationship.

Indeed, when asked by the Fundación to give a talk to the board and offer advice on the departure process, I told the directors to withdraw slowly as the community still relied heavily on the Fundación support. The NGO's paternalism may, in this way, have undermined the political sustainability of the community.

On the other hand, the organization has been removing itself from the community over the last three years. The changeover has been going well as of this writing (April 2012), in part because the community and the Fundación need each other. The community can always call upon the support of the Fundación as it is the organizations' only social project and they have the means and commitment to see it succeed even if that means never really leaving the community completely. The Fundación also needs the community for its purpose and existence. Many of the board members have been part of the organization since Mitch and have watched the community grow. It is their "child." Additionally, as one resident mentioned, Divina is the goose that lays the golden egg. It is the mortgages that keep the organization running and which will enable them to begin a second housing project in Tegucigalpa for the desperately poor. Unlike España and the Red Cross, it seems likely the Fundación and Divina will continually be intertwined.

“Buy-in” and commitment to the community

One friend in Divina, Xela, met and married another resident in Divina. They were married and now have two houses as well as two payments. At one point they choose to live without electricity in order to make both house payments. When I asked her why she just doesn't sell the other house she said, “We don't want to sell the other house. We have worked hard to fix up the house, to clear the backyard [extend the backyard by digging into a hill]. We want the house for our children. Also, we will not get any money from the Fundación for our house if we stopped paying.” Sweat equity, a better future for the children, and the contract with the Fundación stating that all payments are considered rent until year ten and then can only be sold back to the Fundación for a portion of the total payments prevented the family from abandoning their second home. This fight for their home is common in Divina. Even though there is a large percent of residents in debt for default on house payments (70% of residents owe three months or more on their mortgage), residents continue to struggle to find decent employment to keep their homes.¹⁰⁹ Divina families know that if they cannot pay (which would be difficult on only one minimum wage salary—see Table 6.5 in chapter 6), they will eventually lose their home. Unlike España where residents have a title and do not pay a mortgage, Divina residents every month have to come up with a mortgage payment perhaps creating a greater incentive to obtain work.

¹⁰⁹ Some residents had debt of more than 72 months. They were not removed from their homes because the social worker concluded that the family had extenuating circumstances. Although many families had debt very few were removed from their homes.

Externalities (National socio-political factors and agents)

Other externalities¹¹⁰ may have affected the development of Divina and España.

The most significant would be the political upheaval and economic changes over the last decade in Honduras. Politically, general trust in politicians has decreased due in large part to increasing corruption and the 2009 coup which polarized the country into the two major political parties (see chapter 3). In terms of the coup and political distrust, both organizations were able to avoid being pulled into the drama and violence that took place after President Zelaya was removed. The Fundación has board members from both political parties, protecting them from losing the entire support of any one party. The Red Cross, as a neutral actor was also protected from any significant changes. Since both organizations were protected, both communities were also protected as they had no formal political affiliation.

Second, economically, the GINI Index has risen from 51.5 in 1999 to 55.6 in 2006 to 57 in 2009, the poverty gap at \$2 and \$1.25 a day (PPP) has also risen over the same time period (11% to 14% and 5% to 8% respectively) (World Bank 2010b). The global recession has had an impact on both communities. Residents in both communities are upper working class in part because they own their own home. Yet, the data illustrates that Divina residents are slightly better off and therefore may have been more resilient to economic downturns. The recession, then, could have impacted España more severely due to its higher level of poverty.

¹¹⁰ I follow the path dependence explanation of externality as an external cost or benefit that influences the future behavior of actors and outcomes (See Page 2006).

A third possible mechanism that could have affected each community was the role of gangs. It is plausible that if one of the communities had trouble with gangs and gang violence while the other was somehow protected from it, this could have created important characteristics that would have touched all aspects of residential life. España did have just that problem. A major gang began to cause problems in the community as they had in a similar fashion in Habitat. Fortunately, the *patronato* and Red Cross had high level connections with politicians who were able to conduct an

investigation.¹¹¹ After gathering the pertinent data, the police swarmed houses of known gang members in España one early morning in 2005.

Since then the community has had little problems with gang related problems. This is

also illustrated in the insignificant difference we found in our 2009 survey asking whether or not residents know a community member who was in the gang (Table 8.2).

In sum, community design, material resource input into the community over time, NGO timeframe, participation in the community, community leadership, and externalities either maintained or deconstructed the social structures originally initiated by the organization. How this happened would have a significant impact on the type of increasing returns the community would produce over time.

Table 8.2 Community gang membership	
Do you know someone in the community who is a member of a gang? (No)	
Divina	93%
España	90%
Avg. 5 coms.	94%

¹¹¹ The investigation came through political connections by community leaders and the Red Cross. It was not initiated by the Honduran government.

Increasing Returns

Pierson's (2000) discussion of increasing returns in which "large consequences may result from relatively small or contingent events" (251) enables us to understand the importance of initial conditions set forth by the NGO and maintained and reproduced by the community.¹¹² So if the key stochastic processes did in fact lead to divergent social health outcomes, we should be able to see differences in resident opinions about their experience in the community over time (David 2001). The following five tables were taken from the seven community survey (N≈1,918) and focused on discovering resident beliefs over time about the social health of their community. I will begin by looking at resident opinions about their community comparing their current status with their status at the beginning of the community, specifically in the areas of life situation, community participation, trust in neighbors, delinquency, opinion about community politics, and livelihood. In short, was there self-reinforcing or positive feedback that, like a snowball, build over time?

In chapter four I provided evidence that there was higher community participation in Divina than España and that this was a sign of higher social health. To evaluate whether this was only a demographic difference, I also asked whether the resident's participation has changed since living in the community.

¹¹² Mahoney's self-reinforcing sequence, in which the "the contingent period corresponds with the initial adoption of a particular institutional arrangement, while the deterministic pattern corresponds with the stable reproduction of this institution over time" (2000: 535). See also Goldstone 1998.

Table 8.3 Community participation over time in the community

Your community participation over time has:			
	decreased	stayed the same	increased
Divina	14% **	39% **	47% **
España	29%	49%	23%
Avg. 5 coms.	25%	53%	21%
Z score: *.05, **.01			

Although there is no statistically significant difference between España and the other communities, there is with Divina. In Divina, community participation has increased for almost half of residents, twice the rate of the other communities. This supports the claim that community participation was a process, not an initial demographic difference. Additionally, the statistics show that there must have been mechanisms encouraging participation in Divina but discouraging it in España and the other communities.

This data does not disaggregate between the level and character of the participation. There are significant qualitative differences between volunteering at the church and playing soccer on the community team. Even though this data is not available, I believe it is still a valuable measure when added to the many other measures used in Chapter 4.

Table 8.4 Trust in neighbors over time in the community

Your trust in your neighbors has: ____ during your time in the community?			
	decreased	stayed the same	increased
Divina	7%	38% **	55% **
España	16% **	52% **	33% **
Avg. 5 coms.	9%	46%	45%
Z score: *.05, **.01			

Turning to neighborly trust, the same conclusions hold true but to a less extent. With this characteristic, España and Divina illustrate the extremes, with the number of España residents twice as high with decreased trust and Divina with more than 1.5 times more residents with increased trust. As one characteristic of social capital, the statistics illustrate that Divina's process has been much more positive than España's or the other communities. It can also be concluded that there were mechanisms in place that supported trust in Divina that were less available in España and the other communities.¹¹³

Table 8.5 Delinquency over time in the community

Generally, from the beginning in the community until now delinquency is less, equal, or more?			
	Less	equal	more
Divina	68%	19%	13%
España	34% **	30% **	36% **
Avg. 5 coms.	72%	18%	10%
Z score: *.05, **.01			

With delinquency España is the outlier and Divina is statistically insignificant in comparison to the control group. España residents are almost equally split between delinquency decreasing, staying the same, or increasing. Much of this may have to do with different perspectives based in gender, age, and sex. Yet, what is striking is the fact that in España almost three times more residents believe that delinquency is increasing than in Divina and the control communities. The opposite is also true. Two-thirds of Divina and the control community residents believe that delinquency is actually decreasing while only one-third of España residents believe the same. This perception

¹¹³ Some theorists, such as Richie and Gill (2007) believe Social Capital can be an organizing framework for disaster research.

not only illustrates how residents feel about their past but also about the future of their community. Although complex and still under theorized, the effect of perceptions of crime has been found to have a “chilling effect” on social capital and community participation (Saegert and Winkel 2004), which may help explain the intersectionality of these different social health characteristics. It has also been found that social integration and individual perceptions of collective efficacy have an inverse relationship to concern about crime, leading one to speculate as to the self-reinforcing cycle of increasing fear of crime lowering social capital and participation, which would again increase the fear of crime (Gibson, Zhaoa, Loyrich, and Gaffney 2002).

Table 8.6 Leadership over time in the community

In comparison to the first years is the community leadership doing worse, the same, or better than the first years?			
	worse	same	better
Divina	15% **	54% **	31% **
España	62% **	27% **	11%
Avg. 5 coms.	52%	35%	13%
Z score: *.05, **.01			

Like community participation, Divina is the outlier in how residents feel about their leadership. As seen above, three and four times more residents in España and the control communities believe that their leadership is actually worse now than in the beginning versus residents in Divina. Two conclusions can be drawn from this. First, as discussed earlier, the strong presence of the Fundación may have been a powerful factor in supporting the CCS’s ability to take root in the community whereas in España the *patronato* did not have the same support and had the opposite results. As will be

discussed later, this may support the claim that the paternalist approach and slow withdrawal from the community may have been the better option in regards to post-disaster community development.

Table 8.7 Life Situation over time in the community

During your time living in the community, your life situation has:			
	gotten worse	stayed the same	gotten better
Divina	4%	28%	68%
España	11%	31%	59%
Avg. 5 coms.	6%	29%	64%
Z score: *.05, **.01			

Finally, although we know that residents believe they are doing much better in comparison to their pre-Mitch neighborhood, since arriving in the community have people's lives gotten better? Comparing Divina and España to the control group, there is no real difference. In fact, generally speaking the communities are all doing well compared to their situation before Mitch. There is, however, a difference between Divina and España. Although nearly a third in both communities said their lives stayed the same, nine percent (statistically significant) more in Divina noted their life situation has gotten better since entering the community illustrating that on every measure of community process over time, Divina has had better results than any other community.

Perhaps this difference was due to the fact that up to 10% of the community had left Divina (the same percentage as España) due to various reasons. Had these ten percent been added back in, there would not be a significant difference. True, indeed, if this were true then España would have the better social health outcome. However, while fifty or so families did leave Divina, it was a similar number in España. Their reason for

leaving was also varied. In Divina, the Fundación relocated about ten families (2%) to other communities since the head of household could not work (often due to a physical disability such as HIV/AIDS) and therefore could not pay the mortgage. Other families left of their own volition either because they obtained housing in the capital with family, they did not want to pay the mortgage, or they were in fact removed (this was a total of about ten families or 2%). I had the opportunity to discuss the differences between Divina and España with six families who had been relocated by the Fundación. Four of the six families wished they had not had to leave but understood the purpose for their dismissal. The other two did have issues with the Fundación, even though they also believed that Divina was a better place to live. In sum, the fact that Divina and España had similar percentages of families leave, that not all of the families were removed, and that not all of the households felt the same about their living environments over time, illustrates that it is unlikely the difference was based on a biased sample.

Community Culture

The tables above provide evidence that there was a process of increasing returns working differently in the communities. Yet, how did the key processes affect the increasing returns? Were the increasing returns embedded in the process? Due to the extraordinary initial conditions of both communities (a new intentional open community, an absent state, no major externalities, the demographics of members selected into each community, national culture, the development of the community over time, and the practices of the NGO over time), each was forced to cobble together a new unique culture that drew on their shared culture of Tegucigalpa but also held an opportunity to create

something better. Returning to the beginning, there was a new hope for Mitch survivors. Would they have the capacity and tools to create this new “Honduran?”

The answer is yes and no. Throughout this dissertation I have illustrated how the initial conditions enabled Divina, more than España, to create a cohesive new community culture with values and goals beyond what they were familiar with in Tegucigalpa. I have argued that along with unique Honduran cultural and historical characteristics the NGOs played a major role in supporting the fragile structures and institutions (political, economic, social, and otherwise) that were necessary for the community to initiate an increasing returns process. It was due to the distinctive nature of the population, displaced, traumatized, poor people in need of order in which the community institutions needed a parent not a partner. There were too many possibilities for dissolution or pushing the community off track. Two examples will help clarify this point.

First, we know that the two communities began at similar though not equal levels with opportunities to change what they had known in Tegucigalpa. Divina had a leg up in terms of social cohesion based on religion and religious values, training, and slightly more wealth and education. We also know that both communities and NGOs wanted to create a place that was healthier than where residents originally came from. I would argue that these initial conditions could have been overcome. However, one of the key processes was NGO practices of social control and insertion into community issues.

On the one hand, the Red Cross did not have a sophisticated application process and due to their lag in construction, it was the last to have a community prepared for receiving many of those not accepted into other communities. Once residents had paid

their dues through 40 weeks of work, the Red Cross handed them their keys and no longer had any control over the activity in the community. Similarly, since the NGO took a partnership approach, they were not able to protect the weak new political, social, and economic institutions from troublemakers in the community and external influences such as gangs. Although the Red Cross had an amazing reputation, their historical organizational philosophy prevented them from using it as a means of control or to shape the community as they saw fit.

The data suggest that this particular type of partnership approach¹¹⁴ was not enough to support the weak initial conditions. The *patronato* declined slowly until it disappeared completely from 2008-2011 for various reasons, including leadership incompetence and corruption, the theft of funds by the water board twice in part due to nepotism, and the decline of block by block supporters of the *patronato*, the CODELES within a year after the Red Cross left. Economically, the market was located in a bad location and once the murder of the guards happened, the project lost all its momentum. Socially, there continue to be problems among neighbors (low trust and cohesion). Crime has ebbed and flowed although the perception of residents is that it is high and many believe it is increasing. This fear, along with the number and graphic nature of the homicides, has made many members afraid to leave their home alone. In sum, although there was a high hope in the beginning of the community to create something different, residents have reverted back to the way of life of Tegucigalpa; isolated, fearful, and self-protective. Most residents I spoke with are either indifferent or even apathetic about the

¹¹⁴ There are as many types of partnership approaches as there are organizations. This refers to a partnership strategy that is particularly hands off in its approach toward development.

future of their community due to the result of key processes—or the failure of key institutions. It is not that they do not want better for themselves and their children; rather, it is that they do not believe they can really affect change. This sentiment reflects the broader feeling in Honduras, as gang influence continues to grow along with the murder rate.

On the other hand, Divina has had a very different experience. The Fundación was able to weed out potentially problematic residents through non-payment of mortgage, which they did. It also stayed heavily involved in politics, economic development, and social conflict. In each of these the Fundación was able to protect budding institutions such as the CCS, the formal market, and maintain order in the community and between residents. The Fundación had the legitimacy of the Catholic Church and the power provided both by their role in building the community and in collecting mortgages. On a more positive note, they also had the respect and even love of many of the residents for what they had done for the community. As Don Hernan said, “*Estamos en el paraíso*” (We are in Paradise).

With the protection of the Fundación each institution was able to avoid problems such as corruption, nepotism, high crime, conflict, massive theft of community materials, etc. The community had a chance to build and maintain working institutions, albeit dependent and initially only semi-democratic ones. This created pride in people of their community. Pride, along with the values instilled in preserving strong institutions and guarding a lofty vision, encouraged residents to keep working for a better community. As they mentioned at every meeting, “We are a model. We have not had any violent

deaths in our community!” From the depths of despair, future Divina residents were able to arise in part due to what may have been constant increasing returns of community affirmation encouraging belief and enthusiasm. In the words of Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975), the famed English economic historian and social reformer “Apathy can be overcome by enthusiasm, and enthusiasm can only be aroused by two things: first, an ideal, which takes the imagination by storm, and second, a definite intelligible plan for carrying that ideal into practice.” While both communities had the ideal (new social structures), it was the Fundación that provided the intelligible plan (reinforcement) that made the continuation of the ideal (increasing returns) possible.

Support of Initial Theories


Returning to our initial theories, we find that many, but not all, help us understand the differences in the communities. The following paragraphs will review the questions posed at the outset: Who is doing the development?; What will be developed?; and How was the development project implemented?

Who is doing the development?

Of the three major actors—the state, NGOs, and residents—only the NGO and residents were significantly involved in the resettlement and development practice. Even within the process the organizations made the vast majority of decisions about the community without resident knowledge and consent. It was impractical at the time as resident selection did not occur until after building was underway. As the process unfolded the Red Cross and Fundación diverged in their role within the communities. The Red Cross invited heavy involvement while at the same time stepping back from the

project providing a partnership but specifically community led partnership. The Fundación had a similar beginning deciding much of the community path. Yet, once residents moved in the Fundación maintained a very strong presence and continued to have significant decision-making influence within the community. Since the Fundación continues to maintain an office within the community and is involved in numerous activities, it has yet to hand over total control of the community to residents. Figure 8.2 is a conceptual illustration of the declining influence of each organization based on their role in decision-making.

Figure 8.2 Influence over decision-making over time



Percentage of influence is calculated as the political decision-making about community issues either by the organization. The Red Cross, for example, makes all decisions about the community until residents move in during 2004. Once the *patronato* is established and most residents have completed their 40 weeks (2005-6), the Red Cross removes itself from significant influence until 2007 when they officially hand over

political rights to the community. The Fundación has had a very different role. Since resident arrival in 2002, the Fundación had significant control over how the community was going to develop. This influence declines over time as residents begin to demand further involvement in how their community is run. By 2008, ten years after Mitch, the Fundación is beginning to pass responsibilities to the community. In 2011, the CCS became the recognized political representative of Divina. The Fundación's role shrank to mortgage collector and support for various infrastructure projects. In sum, I argue that within the particular context of post-disaster new communities with residents who are traumatized and impoverished, an organization that provides strong structures and over time hands over greater responsibility in the maintenance of those structures and institutions will have greater success than an NGO that enables very democratic processes without laying the foundation for solid structures and institutions.

What will be developed? The Formation of Social Norms

The second theoretical question concerned exactly what was to be developed. What we found is that it was not the creation of strong economic mechanisms that provided social health. A strong marketplace and resident wealth clearly have benefits for communities both financially and socially. Yet, between Divina and España I argue the differences were not significant enough to affect social health as a whole.

It also did not matter concerning the infrastructure built, the money put into the community or even the background of the residents to some extent. There were differences— España has better infrastructure, the Red Cross did spend a much higher amount on each family than the Fundación, and residents did have different levels of

wealth and education initially (though the difference was relatively small). One would expect the community with more and better material resources would have better outcomes. This was not the case.

It was also not the development “in community” or the boosting of individuals or households in order to buoy the whole community that created better social health outcomes. Leadership training, economic opportunities, capacity-building, and the like were all beneficial to the communities and should not be undervalued. Yet, these did not provide the community as a whole the structure and form necessary to develop into a cohesive whole.

I argue it was the development “of community,” specifically the formation of social norms.¹¹⁵ This follows the Chicago School and Durkheimian understanding of community as having a life beyond that of the individual members or households. The Fundación took extraordinary steps to define and bound the actions, values, and even culture of the community. Their timeframe commitment was long-term (15 years), their focus was a model community based on Christian values, and their practice was paternalistic. This led to backlash and conflict but as the current statistics illustrate, the community on a whole has much higher marks than Ciudad España. The Red Cross also took important steps toward the development of a sustainable, self-governing, and model community. Their timeframe commitment was short-term (1-4 years continually renewed), their focus was a model community based on the values of empowerment and self-definition, and their practice was partnership. This led to desire by many more

¹¹⁵ This is similar to Turner and Killian’s (1987) description of emergent norms.

España residents for a greater role by the organization as well as kept conflict to a minimum. These differences enabled the Fundación to form and anchor particular social norms in the community that would later be taken for granted and reproduced to the following cohorts.

What are the development practices? How will we get there?

Although the top-down and bottom up development paradigms are often seen as a binary, both the Fundación and the Red Cross did a little of both. In resettlement and community building, decisions have to be made by the sponsoring organization without the knowledge or consent of future residents. Various time and resource restraints make the participatory process difficult in the beginning of the process. At the same time, both organizations included residents once they had moved into the community. The discussion is not as much about a technocratic versus member-led approach as it is about how both were implemented simultaneously. This dissertation argues that an interventionist¹¹⁶, hierarchical structures and technocratic decision-making may provide efficiency and stronger social control mechanisms, as well as better social health along a number of dimensions in post-disaster Honduras. However, this may not be very sustainable if obedience to particular norms are not internalized and if the community residents lack participatory and critical thinking skills and a willingness to question authority. They may lack the ability to collectively and independently make decisions

¹¹⁶ Interventionist is not the same as paternalist. The goal, as defined by Mohan and Stokke (2000) is to avoid the binary top-down vs. grassroots approach for something that responds to local agency while providing structural guidance.

affecting their daily lives once external actors depart and external funding and organizations resources disappear.

It seems, therefore, that under specific conditions (traumatized resettled survivors of a disaster) there may be a need for order and structure in the form of leadership and the formation of social norms. An interventionist approach, then, depending on national cultural and historical context may be able to provide this structure and increasing returns for the community if done with a focus on social health.

Theoretical Ideals vs. Practical Reality

Although there are a number of strengths of this analysis, there are also the inevitable weaknesses. The evidence suggests that a more structured, long-term, and interventionist approach to post-disaster new community development will lead to socially healthier communities over time. There are numerous issues with this conclusion. Perhaps the most significant is what do you do with the families who do not meet a selection standard or that are pushed out of their home for the behavior of their children? Is this not reproducing a system of stratification? My answer is, sadly, yes. In an ideal world, all people would have access to the same resources no matter their background. In the real world, however, NGOs only have limited resources, abilities, time, and human power to help as many people as they can. In Honduras, permitting even one family who has strong ties to a gang to be a part of the community risks the health of the entire community. Decisions have to be made with the hope that those who are not chosen will find resources in another locale. This is not acceptable to some

theorists and activists, but it is the reality of scarce resources faced everyday by development workers and must be acknowledged (not only critiqued) by researchers.

Future Research Agenda

There are a variety of uninvestigated issues in the long-term development of post-disaster new intentional communities. Broadly speaking, as the number and intensity of disasters continues to grow and changes in urbanization and natural environments put more people in the Global South at risk, the topic of relocation before or after a disaster is becoming increasingly salient. As noted earlier, the fact that none of the NGO staff I spoke with had any practical experience or theoretical knowledge in the application of community recovery, resettlement, and development illustrates the great need for this type of research now and in the future. Additionally, within the disaster literature that has been a clear gap between those studying recovery in the short-term and those thinking about the long-term development consequences of those short-term measures. A greater dialogue between these two groups will provide create more successful strategies in both areas.

A similar argument can be made for the rift between practitioners and theorists. The keynote of a recent FEMA conference (FEMA 2011) spoke to this point. On the one hand, since most disaster practitioners are former government employees (police officers, firefighters, EMTs, etc.), they are starving for the knowledge academics can provide. On the other hand, scholars must return to the field, bridging the ivory tower to the muddy roads of post-disaster locales to obtain the data necessary to create new theories of disaster mitigation, recovery and resilience.

Perhaps the most important question is whether the success that Divina has encountered can be maintained once the Fundación withdraws. With future funding my hope is to return bi-annually over the next decade to investigate political, social, and economic changes in each community. More specifically, it will be fascinating to analyze formal and informal mechanisms of social control and whether the community has indeed been put on a sustainable path and the self-regulation has been ingrained or not. The same is true for España. Can community leaders regain a sense of “community” and self-regulation? From my own experience, two residents who had the leadership qualities to enact such change recently lost the four year *patronato* election. We will closely follow the activities of the new leadership.

A second area of future research is the youth of each community. Many of the adolescents were either not born or were too young to remember Mitch. They only know Divina and España. Following their life course and asking whether the intervention of parental re-settlement in one community or the other has created differences is also interesting. I played soccer with kids from both communities. I heard their stories, complaints, jokes, and laughter. Will there be a noticeable difference in the two groups of kids in ten years?

A third research topic is the role of religion in creating homogenous groups that may have been more accepting of a particular development philosophy or practice. How religion influenced the development trajectory of Divina and España is largely unknown, though it is likely that the legitimacy and hierarchy of the Fundación was more palatable

to residents than the Red Cross's partnership approach. In other contexts such as Haiti, how does religion influence organizational legitimacy?

Lastly, an increase in funding for interdisciplinary discussions, like the recent disaster recovery workshop hosted by NSF and PERI (October 2010), is also critical in disaster recovery. Disasters affect all aspects of life. As seen in the post-earthquake Haiti process, it is vital that engineers, architects, and urban planners meet with social scientists, community members, and political leaders. The more stakeholders brought to the table, the greater the buy-in and the broader the understanding of how to do recovery and development effectively and cost-efficiently.

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Appendix

Table A.1 Divina Providencia and Ciudad España Infrastructure and Housing

	Divina Providencia	Ciudad España
Geographic Location	Valle de Amarateca, Honduras (35 Kilometers North of Tegucigalpa) 14 degrees by 14' by 11'' North latitude 87 degrees by 23' by 05'' West Longitude	Valle de Amarateca, Honduras (29 Kilometers North of Tegucigalpa) 14 degrees by 14' by 11'' North latitude 87 degrees by 23' by 05'' West Longitude
Smaller neighborhoods	9	10
Educational/vocational workshops	4 buildings	Many multi-use buildings Intermittent closures of buildings
Police station	1 (2 full-time police officers)	1 (2 full-time police officers)
Offices	2 (Fundación, Comité Cívico Social, Junta de Agua)	1 Red Cross recently abandoned their offices
Schools	2 pre-schools, 1 elementary, 1 middle/high school	2 pre-schools, 1 elementary, 1 middle/high school
Soccer fields	2 small concrete, 4 small dirt	1 small concrete, 1 large dirt, many small dirt

	Divina Providencia	Ciudad España
Central Park	1	1
Small Parks	7	2
Cemetery	0	0
Medical Facilities		
Clinics	1	1
Full-time doctors	1	1
Full-time nurses	1-2	2
Churches		
Catholic	1	1
Evangelical	3 (either just outside of the community or in resident's homes)	10
Protestant	0	1 (Methodist)

Economic Spaces		
Large Market	1 (55 total store stalls, 44 occupied, 11 empty)	1 (88 total store stalls, 10 occupied)
Informal businesses from homes	51 (selling tortillas, foodstuffs, basic supplies)	Many (selling tortillas, foodstuffs, basic supplies)
% of streets with Informal businesses	60%	89%
Community Buildings		
Community center	1	0
Child care	0	1
Cultural center	0	1
Elders	0	1
Computers	0	1
Library	1	1 (not in use)
Internet cafe	1 (private)	1 (private)

Table A.2 Housing Information

HOUSES	Divina Providencia	Ciudad España
Donor/Builder organizations	Fundación Cristo De El Picacho, CESAL, AECI, UE, FHIS, Honduran Government, Adveniat	Red Cross of Honduras, Spain, United States, and Switzerland, CESAL, Honduran Government
Total Cost of community	~100,000,000 Lempiras (~\$6,060,600)	~387,500,000 Lempiras (~\$23,484,850) ¹¹⁷
Cost to build home	\$10,360	\$18,492
# of houses	583, two houses were combined as an office for the Fundación	1270 total homes
Cost to build	196,000 Lempiras	?
Cost to buy	271,000 or 300,00 Lempiras	0
Cost in man hours	0 hours, 0 weeks	40 weeks, 500 hours
Monthly Payment first year	L. 750, \$35	No payments on mortgage
Interest on home per year	8% (average inflation costs)	None

¹¹⁷ (Ortega Dolz 2002)

HOUSES	Divina Providencia	Ciudad España
Total cost of house	L. 125,000*	Work equity
Mortgage timeline	15 years	0
% of homes paid off	4% of families have had their debt forgiven due to economic circumstances	N/A
% of homes in debt	0-3 months 72%	N/A
Avg. number of houses empty	25 (4% of total)	Few (% unknown)
House, land, total size	House 36, yard 84, Total 120-136 meters squared*	
Design	1 bathroom, 1 living room, 1 kitchen area, 1 or 2 bedrooms	1 bathroom, 1 living room, 1 kitchen area, 1 or 2 bedrooms
Material	Cement block or brick	Cement block or brick
Duplexes	Yes	Yes
Single Family	Yes	Yes

Table A.3 Community Utilities, Transportation, and surrounding communities

Com. Utilities and Transport	Divina Providencia	Ciudad España
Water	2-3 days a week for about six hours--The water is semi-potable	All the time—The water is potable
Electricity	About 95% of the time	About 95% of the time
Garbage	2 days a week	2 days a week
Sewage	Biofiltration, treatment tanks, then gravity fed to Rio Frio	treatment tanks
Farmland	About four acres	None
Streets	Good condition	Good condition
Street Types	Paved (about 30%), Dirt (about 70%) in the community about 20% paved	To the community 90% paved, in the community 5% paved
Bus	every 1/2 hour 5 am to 7pm, less on weekends	every 1/2 hour 5 am to 4pm, less on weekends
Length of bus trip to Teguc.	1.25 to 2 hours depending on traffic	1.25 to 2 hours depending on traffic

Surrounding area	Divina Providencia	Ciudad España
River	“Rio Frio” bordering the east of the community	Rio Blanca
Neighboring communities	Rio Frio, Aldea Bonita, Las Moras, and an orphanage for street children (boys) called Diamante	Aqua Blanca, Las Moras, Tamara

* (Cesal 2008)

Table A.4 Survey schedule
Demographics

#	Questions
1.1	What is your name?
1.2	Sex (Male 1, Female 2)
1.3	How old are you?
1.4	What is your highest level of education? (No education [0], elementary to 8th grade [1], high school [2], university [3], graduate program [4])
1.5	Complete Address?
1.6	Where did you live before Mitch?
1.7	What was your occupation before Mitch?
1.8	What is your occupation now?
1.9	Where do you work now?
1.10	Do you have a worse [1], equal[2] or better[3] job now?
1.11	What is your faith? Catholic [1], Protestant [2], Evangelical [3], none [4] or other [5]. If other, what?
1.12	How often do you attend services: do not attend [1], holy days [2], one time a week [3], two times or more a week [4]?
1.13	How did you find the opportunity to live in Ciudad España? Through an organization[1], a church[2], family[3], other[4]? Which?
1.14	Why did you choose Ciudad España (CE) over other communities?
1.15	How many years have you lived in CE? 0-3 years [1], 4-6 years [2], since the beginning [3]
1.16	Are you single[1], married[2], in a free union[3], widowed[4]
1.17	How many adults live in your house now? Men? ___ Women? ___
1.18	How many children live in your house now?
1.19	Generally is your health: poor[1], normal[2], or good[3]?

1.20	What is your monthly household income? (0-600 Lempiras [1], 600-1.200 [2], 1.200-4.500 [3], 4.500-5.500 [4], 5.500-8.000 [5], 8.000-11.000[6], 11.000 or more [7])
1.21	How much of your household income do you receive from remittances? 0[1], 1 - 10% [2], 11-20% [3], 21-30% [4], 31-40% [5], 41%+[6]

Quality of life: Now vs. before Mitch

2.1	Compared to the community you lived in prior to Mitch, is there less[1], equal[2], or more[3] crime in CE?
2.2	Compared to the community you lived in prior to Mitch, do you trust your neighbors less[1], equal [2]or more[3] in CE?
2.3	Compared to the community you lived in prior to Mitch, do you participate in community activities less[1], equal[2] or more [3] in CE?
2.4	Compared to the community you lived in prior to Mitch, is your life worse[1], equal [1]or better[1] in CE?

Politics, political power, and leadership

4.3	Do you think you have a voice in the decision making process? (No [0], Yes [1])
4.4	How much do you trust your leaders none [1], some[2], a lot [3]?

Civic participation, trust, unity and religion

5.1 ^a	Do you vote? (No [0], Yes [1])
5.1b	Do you participate in a community organization? (No [0], Yes [1])
5.1c	Do you participate in the church? (No [0], Yes [1])
5.1d	Are you involved in formations, projects, or activities in the community? (No [0], Yes [1])
5.1e	How many hours a week do you participate in community activities? (0 [0], 1-2 hours [1], 3-4 hours [2], hours 5+ [3])

5.1f	Did you take classes given by an external NGO (such as the Red Cross)? (No [0], Yes [1]) How many?__ When?__ Theme?_____
5.1g	If there was a service project in the community, would you participate? (No [0], Yes [1])
5.2a	CE has a soccer league. Have you or someone in your household participated or participate? (No [0], Yes [1])
5.2b	If so, does the league offer: none [1], some [2] or many [3] social benefits? Like what?
5.3 ^a	Generally, do community members trust their neighbors? (No [0], Yes [1])
5.3b	Generally, how much do you trust your neighbors none[1], some[2], a lot [3]?
5.3c	Do you think your neighbors would help you if you needed help? (No [0], Yes [1])
5.3d	If a thief was robbing your house, would a neighbor intervene? (No [0], Yes [1])
5.3e	If someone was hitting you, would a neighbor intervene? (No [0], Yes [1])
5.3f	If someone was selling drugs to your children, would a neighbor intervene? (No [0], Yes [1])
5.4a	Do you believe other community members share the same values as you? (No [0], Yes [1])
5.4b	Is there a sentiment of community here? (No [0], Yes [1]) Why or why not?
5.4c	In your opinion, is the community not united [1], semi-united [2], or very united [3]?
5.5a	Do you believe religion has played a role in the community development process? (No [0], Yes [1])
5.5b	A negative[1], neutral[2], or positive[3] role?

Familiarity with the neighborhood and neighbors

6.1 ^a	Do you know the names of all of the barrios in Ciudad España? (No [0], Yes [1])
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6.1b	What is the name of the President del <i>Patronato</i> ? They don't know[0], They do know[1]
6.2 ^a	For you to recognize a community member is it very difficult[1], difficult[2], easy[3], or very easy[4]?
6.2b	For you to recognize an outsider of the community is it very difficult[1], difficult[2], easy[3], or very easy[4]?
6.3	Do you believe Ciudad España is a model city for Honduras? (No [0], Yes [1]) Why or why not.

Control Informal y delinquency

7.1 ^a	In general do your neighbors control their children poorly[1], fine[2], or very well[3]?
7.1b	In general do your neighbors send their children to school almost never[1], sometimes[2], or almost all of the time[3]?
7.1c	¿Do you worry the Red Cross may take your home for bad conduct? (No [0], Yes [1])
7.1d	Have you had any problems with the Red Cross? (No [0], Yes [1])
7.1e	In the last few years do you wish the Red Cross would have: left earlier[1], played a lesser role[2], stayed the same[3], played a more important role in the community[4]?
7.2 ^a	Do you feel unsafe[1], fairly safe[2], or very safe [3] in your community?
7.2b	Have you been a victim of crime in CE? (No [0], Yes [1]) How many times?___
7.2c	Are you afraid to be out at night in your community? (No [0], Yes [1])
7.2d	Do you know a community member who is a gang member? (No [0], Yes [1])
7.3 ^a	In your community, groups of young people hanging out in the street: is not a problem [1], is a small problem[2], is a big problem [3]?
7.3b	In your community, the selling and use of drugs and alcohol: is not a problem [1], is a small problem[2], is a big problem [3]?

7.3c	In your community, graffiti on the walls: is not a problem [1], is a small problem[2], is a big problem [3]?
7.3d	In your community, houses and streets that are dirty and not taken care of are: not a problem [1], a small problem[2], a big problem [3]?
7.3f	In your community, public disturbances: is not a problem [1], is a small problem[2], is a big problem [3]?
7.4	Do you feel you can report a crime to the police? (No [0], Yes [1])

Disaster, trauma and help from the NGO

8.1 ^a	What types of trauma (none [0], psychological/emotional[1], physical[2], material[3], all[4]), did you suffer?
8.1b	In your opinion, your trauma was very bad[1], bad[2], or normal[3]?
8.1c	Are you or a family member still dealing with the trauma of the disaster? (No [0], Yes [1])
8.2a	Did the Red Cross help you deal with this trauma? (No [0], Yes [1])
8.2b	Where did you live after the hurricane but before living in the community? In temporary shelters [1], with family [2], rented a house or apartment [3], in your own house [4], other [5]?
8.2c	Did you suffer: not at all [1], a little [2], some [3] or very much in that situation [4]?

Individual and community changes over time





9.1 ^a	Has your civic participation decreased [1], stayed the same [2], or increased[3] during your time in the community?
9.1b	Has your trust in your neighbors decreased [1], stayed the same [2], or increased[3] during your time in the community?
9.2	Generally speaking, is your life in the community today worse [1], the same [2] or better [3] than when you first arrived?

9.3	Has the crime decreased [1], stayed the same [2], or increased [3] during your time in the community?
9.4	Today the <i>patronato</i> functions worse [1], the same [2] or better [3] than they did in the beginning?
9.5a	What are three things you do not like about CE? [WRITE ANSWERS ON BACK]
9.5b	What are three things you like about CE? [WRITE ANSWERS ON BACK]
9.6	Today is the community on a bad [1], good [2], or very good [3] trajectory? Why?

Figure A.1 Select Previous Neighborhoods/ Parishes of Residents



Ciudad España (Red) and Ciudad Divina Providencia (Blue) Pins are NGO offices

-  Fundación Cristo de el Picacho Office
-  Iglesia María Auxiliadora, Barrio Los Dolores, Colonia La Flor del Campo
-  Red Cross Office
-  Colonia Ayestas Colonia Campo Cielo Colonia El Pastel, Colonia La Flor, Barrio La Hoya, Barrio La Guadalupe, Colonia E Manchen, Colonia Soto Colonia La Rosa