

Foundations of Global Giving

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Abstract

Sociologists have long been interested in the origins of generosity, altruism, and solidarity in society. Similarly, this dissertation examines the global origins of philanthropic activity and its consequences. More specifically, I situate philanthropic and charitable activity in what Boli (2006) has called a global moral order that champions virtue and positions voluntary associations, including foundations and charities, as legitimate moral actors for solving global problems (see also Schofer and Longhofer 2011). I begin by using multilevel modeling techniques to examine the effects of national context on membership in charitable and humanitarian organizations in 35 countries. I find that charitable membership is shaped by connections to world society at the country level and cosmopolitanism at the individual level. The next empirical chapter explores the global origins of philanthropic organizations. Through a statistical analysis of grantmaking foundations in a large number of countries from 1970 to 2005, I suggest that philanthropic activity derives in part from ties to world society and the rationalization of the domestic philanthropic sector through local “bridging” organizations. The final empirical chapter examines the impact foundations have on the social sectors in which they operate. Again adopting a global purview, I find that foundations have a positive impact on promoting arts institutions, improving health outcomes for children, and reducing carbon emissions. I conclude the dissertation with a discussion of what these three studies tell us about world society and the role philanthropic organizations play in its construction and enactment.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: TOWARD A GLOBAL STUDY OF GIVING

Giving is a social invention. Although economists, biologists, and psychologists have poured much ink over the ‘hard-wired’ triggers that make us give, how we go about doing so is constantly under social construction. As Barnett (2011: 25) comments in his history of humanitarianism, theories that locate compassion within individuals often overlook the institutions of compassion that have emerged along side them. These so-called institutions of compassion, whether it is a national relief agency, global philanthropic foundation, or a local soup kitchen, are more than aggregates of individual impulses, motives, and beliefs. These organizations are also constituted, empowered, and constrained by their external environment (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Even the wealthy philanthropist himself, no matter how generous or altruistic, is a creature of his surroundings. It is for this reason that Americans rarely identify themselves as altruistic for fear of being paradoxically perceived as selfish – our culture constrains how we think about and describe our benevolent actions (Wuthnow 1991; also Healy 2004, 2006). This dissertation begins with this idea that acts of giving must be situated in their proper social contexts.

Giving is also an increasingly global phenomenon. Modern institutions of philanthropy continue to sprout throughout the world in the form of foundations, charities, relief agencies, socially responsible corporations, and, more recently, social networking campaigns. Whereas foundations, for example, were once thought to be “strange creatures” of American democracy (Nielsen 1972; also Foundation Center

2010a), scholars are beginning to explore similar institutions emerging elsewhere (e.g., Anheier and Winder 2007; Ibrahim and Sherif 2008). Take, for example, the community foundation, a public grantmaking organization whose endowments are supported by multiple donors and serve local populations, the first of which began in Cleveland in 1914. In 2000, there were barely more than 900 of these organizations in the world, 700 of which were located in the North America; by 2010, more than 1,600 community foundations were in operation, but North America accounted for only half.¹ Table 1.1 lists a sample of countries where community foundations have grown and the years in which they were founded. However, with the exception of a few case studies, the prior literature has only scratched the surface of how philanthropic institutions vary across countries, much less how globalization itself may shape compassionate acts within them.

Modern philanthropy is not simply spreading or emerging in countries outside of the United States and Europe – it is also becoming increasingly organized as a global community itself. For example, in June of 2008, I attended the annual meeting of an international network of “social change philanthropists” at a conference center in Washington, DC. Foundation trustees, program officers, private donors, grant recipients, and activists from all over the world convened to discuss topics ranging from microfinance and fundraising to climate change and human rights. Similar global philanthropic communities have emerged in recent years, including the Global Philanthropists Circle (founded in 2001), Grantmakers Without Borders (2000), Worldwide Initiatives for Grantmaker Support (1999), the Clinton Global Initiative (2005), and the Global Philanthropy Forum (2001). A director of one of these networks

¹ http://www.wings-community-foundation-report.com/gsr_2010/gsr_theme_facts/regional-growth.cfm

Table 1.1 Sample of Community Foundations

Country	Community Foundations	Founding Years (when available)
Anguilla	1	1999
Belgium	2	2001, 2004
Bosnia	1	2003
Bulgaria	13	2000, 2002(2), 2003(3), 2004, 2005(3), 2006
Czech Republic	4	1993, 1997, 1998, 2003
Egypt	2	2006, 2007
Estonia	3	2002, 2004(2)
India	6	1991, 1997, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2006
Israel	1	1966
Japan	1	1991
Kenya	1	1997
Latvia	6	2003(2)
Lithuania	8	1998, 2002(4), 2004, 2005
Macedonia	1	2007
New Zealand	8	1989, 1991, 2000, 2002, 2003(2), 2005, 2007
Philippines	4	1989, 1999, 2006, 2007
Poland	22	1998(2), 1999(11), 2000, 2001(2), 2002(2)
Romania	2	2007, 2008
Russia	27	1998, 1999(3), 2000(3), 2001(2), 2002(3), 2003(4), 2004, 2005(2), 2006(6)
Slovak Republic	12	1994, 1996(3), 1998(5), 1999, 2002, 2007
South Africa	6	2000, 2001
Spain	1	2002
Tanzania	4	2006(2), 2007(2)
Thailand	4	2006(2), 2007(2)
Turkey	1	2008
Uganda	1	2004
Ukraine	1	1995
Zimbabwe	1	1998

Source: Worldwide Initiatives for Grantmaker Support.

described to me an ongoing movement to create a “global compact” for philanthropy wherein countries would agree to make international grantmaking easier through relaxed restrictions on incoming funds. Although no such compact yet exists, its very possibility


reflects the “imagined community” that global philanthropists are trying to build (Anderson 1991).

International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) with significant funding portfolios have also risen in recent years. Boli and Thomas (1999) and other neoinstitutional scholars have written much about the rise of INGOs since World War II, but few have looked to those INGOs that are classified as funds or foundations. These organizations include the African Refugees Foundation (founded in Nigeria in 1993), the Global Fund for Women (1987 in the United States), and the World Wide Fund for Nature (Switzerland in 1961). Figure 1.1 charts the rise of these international funds and foundations since 1945 using data from the Union of International Associations. There are now nearly 350 of such organizations, the majority of which were founded since 1980.² Such funds and foundations are important participants in global society yet little is known about their origins or impacts.

Global dimensions of giving can also be seen in the sheer volume of international funds flowing from U.S. foundations and other organizations. According to the Foundation Center (2010b), international grantmaking – that is, grants to international recipients or U.S. organizations with international operations – comprised nearly 25 percent (or approximately \$7 billion) of all grant dollars given by U.S. foundations in 2008 compared to just 10 percent (and \$1.6 billion) ten years earlier. To illustrate the key players in this growing field, Table 1.2 lists the fifteen largest U.S. foundations by international giving in 2008. Among the old guard of Rockefeller, Ford, and Carnegie are

² For a breakdown of some sectors in which these philanthropic INGOs operate, see Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4.

Figure 1.1. Growth of Philanthropic International Nongovernmental Organizations



newer foundations that emerged from the software and financial sectors, including most notably the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which makes up the lion's share of international giving. According to the Foundation Center (2010a), nearly sixty percent of foundations currently engaged in international grantmaking were founded since 1990. And, international grantmaking from foundations merely scratches the surface of global philanthropic flows when broadly defined. According to the Hudson Institute for Global Prosperity (2011), a nonpartisan research institution that has been publishing the "Index of Global Philanthropy" since 2006, United States foundations, corporations, private and voluntary organizations, universities and colleges, and religious organizations contributed more than \$37.5 billion to developing countries in 2009.

Table 1.2. Top 15 U.S. Foundations by International Giving, 2008

Foundation	Year Founded	Amount of Grants
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation	1994	\$2,741,720,975
William and Flora Hewlett Foundation	1967	622,874,631
Ford Foundation	1936	282,366,082
Susan Thompson Buffett Foundation	1964	186,991,109
David and Lucile Packard Foundation	1964	122,831,562
Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation	2000	115,376,014
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation	1975	102,480,230
Rockefeller Foundation	1913	78,012,342
Andrew W. Mellon Foundation	1969	60,618,900
Carnegie Corporation of New York	1911	58,329,716
Turner Global Foundation	1990	50,000,000
Lincy Foundation	1989	49,858,168
Silicon Valley Community Foundation	2007	45,702,876
Howard G. Buffett Foundation	1999	38,288,239
Citi Foundation	1994	37,971,000

Source: Foundation Center (2010b).

What accounts for the recent rise of global giving in its various dimensions? The privatization of state services, upsurges in private wealth, and the heightened visibility of humanitarian crises have likely played important roles. Hammack and Heydemann (2009) attribute global philanthropy to such events like the fall of the Soviet bloc, which spurred efforts to revive civil society through NGOs and nonprofits, as well as the global rise of individual rights and organizational autonomy. In the neoinstitutional tradition, Drori, Meyer, and Hwang (2006) situate the rise of organizations more broadly within the context of world society. Similarly, in this dissertation, I turn to the literature on world society to explain the contours of philanthropic and charitable activity across the globe. More specifically, I situate philanthropic and charitable activity in what Boli (2006) has called a global moral order that champions virtue and positions voluntary associations,


including foundations and charities, as legitimate moral actors for solving global problems (see also Schofer and Longhofer 2011).

To this end, I have developed a study comprised of three empirical chapters that each addresses fundamental but understudied questions about philanthropic activity. Although the chapters were written independently, they each point to a similar underlying theme: *Forms of giving are constituted in the global system but such constitution does not render their consequences epiphenomenal*. Through each empirical analysis, I attempt to show how individual impulses and functional breakdowns in the social fabric alone cannot explain the rise of giving in recent years. Instead, we must adopt a global purview attuned to transnational structures and organizations to fully understand giving in our complex and interdependent world. These chapters (summarized in Figure 1.2) include the following:

Chapter 2: Putting Giving into Context: Examining the Effects of Religiosity, Trust, and World Society on Charitable Activity

Social scientists have long been interested in the motives behind individual charitable giving. However, few studies have looked at how charity is embedded in social context, particularly from a cross-national perspective. This chapter uses multilevel modeling techniques to examine the effects of national context on membership in charitable and humanitarian organizations in 35 countries. I find that charitable membership is shaped by connections to world society at the country level and cosmopolitanism at the individual level. Conventional measures of income, social capital,

Figure 1.2 Dissertation Structure



and religiosity also hold up. Lastly, I do not find that charitable membership is a response to recent natural disasters or a reduced welfare state. I conclude the chapter by discussing implications of the results for our understanding of charitable activity and its roots in an increasingly expanding global humanitarian order.

Chapter 3: Diffusion of Global Grantmaking Organizations, 1970-2005

The past three decades have been coined the “global associational revolution” to describe the worldwide upsurge in private, voluntary, and nonprofit organizations (Salamon et al. 2004). At the forefront of this revolution is the modern philanthropic foundation. Through a statistical analysis of the formation of grantmaking foundations in a large number of countries from 1970 to 2005, this chapter demonstrates how philanthropy is a social activity embedded in domestic and international structures and transformations that present an array of opportunities and constraints. I suggest that grantmaking foundations derive in part from ties to world society and the rationalization of the domestic philanthropic sector through local “bridging” organizations. Foundations are also positively associated with the level of wealth and inequality in a society, as well as its legal structures and level of democracy. I also show how global grantmaking has

begun to replace more traditional sources of aid, such as bilateral development assistance, as a dominant model for mobilizing private wealth for the public good in the modern period.

Chapter 4: Do Foundations Matter? Exploring the Consequences of Charitable Organizations across Three Social Sectors

What is the role of foundations in contemporary society? Prior scholars have argued that foundations are key agents of social change, operating as important social entrepreneurs, institution builders, and risk takers in mostly American society (Anheier and Hammack 2010). This chapter reexamines the role of foundations in the context of more diffuse world society effects (Schofer and Hironaka 2005). More specifically, I extend the analysis of grantmaking foundations in Chapter 3 by examining their consequences in three social sectors: the arts, children's health, and the environment. Although exploratory, the results in the chapter are quite promising. In all three sectors, foundations have a positive impact on promoting arts institutions, improving health outcomes for children, and reducing carbon emissions. At first glance, the results confirm the taken-for-granted assumption in the literature that foundations are fundamentally powerful social change agents. However, in this chapter I once again offer an institutional theory of foundation effects that situates them in a wider environment that bolsters their authority and empowers them as 'actors' in the sectors in which they operate. I also explore whether foundations are mere substitutions for the public sector and whether foundations operate indirectly through other civil society organizations.

Myths and Consequences of Global Giving

Each chapter was written as a “stand alone” paper with its own literature review, methodology, and results section, and thus there is some redundancy across the three chapters. I have tried to minimize this redundancy when possible. I conclude the dissertation with a discussion of what these three studies tell us about world society and the role philanthropic organizations play in its construction and enactment. Whereas in previous work we have suggested that voluntary associations may be nothing more than a myth in that their formation may be detached from their supposed benefits (Schofer and Longhofer 2011), the results in this dissertation suggest we recalibrate our assumptions about epiphenomenal outcomes in world society.

CHAPTER 2

PUTTING GIVING INTO CONTEXT: EXAMINING THE EFFECTS OF RELIGIOSITY, TRUST, AND WORLD SOCIETY ON CHARITABLE ACTIVITY

2.1 Introduction

Charity has been described as the “natural expression of democratic life” (Gross 2002: 29). Early scholarly accounts of charitable activity, such as Tocqueville’s (1835, 1840) observations of civic association in 19th-century America and Mauss’s (1925) ethnographic studies of gift-giving in Polynesian society, found that charitable giving is an important source of reciprocity and social solidarity. Since then the academic literature on charitable giving has grown to be quite vast, comprising theoretical and empirical works in disciplines ranging from sociology, psychology, and economics to marketing, philosophy, and biology (for a review, see Bekkers and Woepking 2011; Berking 1999; Wilson 2000). However, with a few exceptions, the prior literature has only recently begun to examine how and why charitable activity varies across countries, much less how globalization itself may shape benevolent acts within them. According to a 2010 Gallup survey, more than 70 percent of people in Australia, Ireland, Switzerland, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Malta, Hong Kong, Thailand, and Morocco gave money to a charitable organization in the previous month (Charities Aid Foundation 2010). Related, giving to international causes has experienced more growth in U.S. philanthropic giving than any other subsector in recent years, rising by more than 15 percent between 2009 and 2010 (Giving USA 2011). These significant numbers, as well as increased awareness of

worldwide charitable activity following humanitarian disasters in Haiti, Japan, and elsewhere, highlight the need for further research on the global dimensions of charity.

Much of what is known about individual charity and benevolence stems from empirical studies of why individuals donate money to charitable organizations and causes (e.g., Weipking and Maas 2009; Havens, O’Herlihy, and Schervisch 2006). One of the key findings from this literature is that people are more likely to contribute money when asked to do so by a charitable organization (Bekkers and Weipking 2011; Clotfelter 1993). In addition to soliciting donations through campaigns and funding drives, organizations are also important social networks through which opportunities and obligations to participate in a charitable cause are communicated, organized, and shared (Havens, O’Herlihy, and Schervisch 2006; also Healy 2004). Yet, despite a wealth of knowledge about why people donate money, we know much less about why people participate in the organizations that are most likely to solicit and encourage those donations.

Why individuals commit to organizations, whether it is charities, coffee shops, or multinational corporations, has been a longstanding puzzle in the social sciences (e.g., Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2009). And, while individual characteristics are certainly important, it is clear that social context also plays a role. As Healy (2004, 2006) illustrates in his study of blood and organ procurement, charitable acts are highly organized through institutions that provide the incentives and opportunities individuals work with in the process of making a donation. Similarly, Borgnovi (2008) found that contextual factors, such as religious pluralism and overall levels of attendance, are

important predictors of volunteer activity in the United States (see also Ruiter and De Graaf 2006). Contextual factors reveal key social norms, such as reciprocity or altruism, that encourage people to join and commit to a charitable organization, as well as competitive factors that may deter it, such as benevolent welfare systems that “crowd out” the need for a large charitable sector.

This chapter uses multilevel modeling techniques to uncover the importance of contextual factors in explaining membership in charitable and humanitarian organizations in 35 countries. More specifically, I argue that three sets of contextual factors are particularly consequential: 1) *national religious participation*, which indicate key social networks through which charitable organizations operate; 2) *national trust*, which reveals norms of reciprocity that facilitate charitable acts in which recipients are oftentimes anonymous; and 3) *national cosmopolitanism and ties to world society* that together indicate awareness of global problems and models for how to solve them through charitable and humanitarian interventions. I focus specifically on this third set of contextual factors because, while religion and trust are well-travelled ground when it comes to studies of charity, global factors are still oftentimes overlooked. This chapter illustrates how individual charitable acts are indicative of a world culture that champions virtue (Boli 2006) and a global humanitarian order that continues to incorporate more nonstate actors in its operation (Barnett and Weiss 2008). In contrast, I do not find that charitable membership is a direct response to humanitarian crises or a shrinking welfare state, suggesting that rationalist and functionalist explanations alone cannot account for recent rises in global giving.

2.2 Why Charitable Membership?

Why study membership in charitable organizations as opposed to charitable donations and volunteer time? At least three reasons come to mind. First, as mentioned earlier, charitable organizations are important antecedents to charitable giving. As Healy (2004: 69) notes, one-shot acts of altruism are “structured, promoted, and made logistically possible by organizations with a strong interest in producing it” (also Havens, O’Herlihy, and Schervisch 2006). Thus, organizational memberships provide insight into how charity is structured in society, but they are also significant predictors for more conventional measures of charitable activity.

Second, recent literature on voluntary associations has decried the rise of memberless associations to which participants merely contribute money rather than time, effort, and leadership (Weir and Ganz 1995; Putnam 2000; though see Walker, McCarthy, and Baumgartner 2011). These critics fear that financial contributions alone dilute the face-to-face interactions that democracy requires to function effectively. An argument can be made that charitable contributions, particularly such practices as donating small amounts of money via text messages, are an extension of this phenomenon. By studying membership in charitable organizations – which presumably require some degree of sustained commitment – rather than simply contributions to them, this study provides a richer portrait of charitable activity beyond donations, though I am agnostic about whether donations are any less democratic than other forms of participation.

Finally, there is simply better data on charitable memberships across countries. The data used here comes from the World Values Survey, a well-respected cross-national survey that includes data on organization memberships, values, social networks, religiosity, and other important variables of interest. Individuals are also perhaps less likely to overstate their membership in charitable organizations, whereas responses to questions about yearly donations, for example, are less consistent due to various biases (Brooks 2004). In the conclusion I compare aggregated giving and volunteering numbers to membership numbers in the countries in this analysis and, while moderately correlated, it is clear that membership is a much more conservative but not necessarily less accurate indicator of individual charitable activity. Rather, it is clear that charitable practice is a multifaceted and wide-ranging act across societies, and this chapter provides a new analysis of one important but understudied dimension.

2.3 Charity as an Individual Act: Income, Education, and Values

Why do people join charitable and humanitarian organizations? Before putting charitable acts into a social context, it is reasonable to review conventional predictors of charitable giving, as these are likely to also be important for membership. The prior literature has primarily focused on motives, goals, and calculations that lead some people to give and others to pass. For example, economists have looked at the impact of tax deductions and public versus private benefits (e.g., Steinberg 1987; Andreoni 1989, 1990; for a review, see Vesterlund 2006). The argument is straightforward: an individual's decision to donate is based on a rational calculation of the cost of a charitable donation,

i.e., the cost remaining after the tax benefit is deducted from the last donated dollar. For example, an individual who falls into the 33% tax bracket of the United States would see a net cost for a \$100 charitable deduction fall to \$67. However, economists have generally found weak evidence of a tax subsidy being the primary reason to donate money, suggesting instead that income, age, and education are far stronger predictors (Andreoni 2004).

Wilson and Musick (1997) found that volunteer work derives in part from individual inventories of human capital. Income has long been found to be an important predictor of charitable giving, particularly donations, for straightforward reasons (Havens, O’Herlihy, and Schervisch 2006). Similarly, education increases the likelihood one will engage in charitable acts due to specialized skills, knowledge, and other desired “qualifications” that make somebody likely to be solicited for volunteer work (Wilson and Musick 1997). Weipking and Maas (2009) found that education also increases charitable giving due to greater financial resources, higher levels of cognitive ability (as measured via education and verbal ability), and more interpersonal trust. Education can also bring about greater awareness of issues and events in need of charitable assistance. Although studies like Wilson and Musick (1997) and Weipking and Maas (2009) examine volumes of charitable activity, such as volunteer hours and monetary amounts donated to charitable causes, it is expected that income and education will have similar effects on membership in charitable organizations. Studies of voluntary association memberships and other civic activities continually find positive effects of education and,

in some cases, income (Ruiter and De Graff 2006; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001; Brady et al. 1995). Thus, I expect:

Hypothesis 1: Education will be positively associated with membership in a charitable organization.

Hypothesis 2: Income will be positively associated with membership in a charitable organization.

Social psychologists have also looked for individual motives and the relationship between giving and other pro-social attitudes (i.e., altruism) and behaviors (e.g., Pilliavin and Chang 1990). Clary et al. (1996), for example, found that people volunteer to satisfy particular social and psychological goals, such as upholding humanitarian values, boosting their own self-esteem, or expanding their knowledge of the world around them (see also Fong 2007; Bekkers 2007; Bekkers and Wiepking 2011; Bekkers and Bowman 2008). Pro-social values reflect the willingness of donors to improve their surroundings, as well as their reputations, through charitable acts. Other pro-social values that haven't been linked to charitable acts include post-materialism, commitment to human rights, and social justice (for a review, see Bekkers and Wiepking 2011; Bekkers and Bowman 2008). Among the most salient of pro-social values is a personal commitment to altruistic and helping behaviors. In contrast, charitable giving is likely deterred by more fiscally conservative social values. For example, a strong belief in the value of thrift (i.e., saving money) may make one less likely to be generous with money and thus less likely pay dues to a charitable organization. Thus, I expect:

Hypothesis 3: Altruism and a willingness to help others will be positively associated with membership in a charitable organization.

Hypothesis 4: Stronger beliefs in the value of thrift will be negatively associated with membership in a charitable organization.

The above hypotheses address the importance of human capital and individual value orientations that likely compel a person to join a charitable organization. As Wilson (2000) points out in his review of volunteering research, sociologists tend to treat such motives and values less as predispositions and more as discourses that give salience to particular forms of social action. Thus, Smith and others have called for more integrative theories of charity and other altruistic actions that take into account more contextual factors that give meaning to those motives and values. In the next few pages, I discuss two contextual factors – religiosity and trust – that I argue operate above and beyond the individual level.

2.4 Putting Charity into Context I: Religion and Trust

Religion has long played an important role in shaping the charitable sector in the United States and elsewhere. As such, the association between individual religiosity and the giving of time and money to both secular and religious causes is well established, particularly in the U.S. context (for examples, see Putnam 2000; Wuthnow 1991; Clain and Zech 1999). Wilson and Musick (1997) argue that religious participation prepares individuals for charitable work, which besets upon them elite status as a “good citizen” and other forms of cultural capital. Along different lines, Weipking and Maas (2009) use

membership in a religious organization as a proxy for social networks. Solicitations for donations often take place through religious organizations, and norms of charity are typically stronger in religious organizations than in secular ones (Wuthnow 1991). Religion may also work through the pro-social value orientations mentioned earlier, particularly if such values are strongly tied to religious doctrines akin to the “golden rule” found in many Christian parables, for example.

Religion also plays an important role at a more structural level. Borgonovi (2008) found that individuals in more devoutly religious counties in the United States were more likely to give to religious causes. According to Borgonovi (2008: 107), religious context, such as pluralism in faiths or prevalence of church attendance, “might influence giving and volunteering through the creation and maintenance of social norms, by promoting competitive forces among different religious institutions, and by fostering a better fit between individuals and religious organizations” that are often facilitators of organized charity. Similarly, Ruiters and De Graff (2009) found that more devout countries have higher levels of volunteering due to more religious adherents and their larger social networks, which are essential for spreading knowledge about charitable causes and recruiting people to contribute to them. In both cases, overall religiosity has a spillover effect that likely increases charitable participation among people who may or may not be religious themselves. Thus, I expect:

Hypothesis 5: Individual religiosity will be positively associated with membership in a charitable organization.

Hypothesis 5a: A high level of religiosity at the national level will be positively associated with membership in a charitable organization.

In addition to religiosity, trust has also been linked to charitable giving (Weipking and Maas 2009). At the individual level, trust is required to give money to strangers and unfamiliar organizations (Uslaner 2002). Trust has also been linked to civic engagement more broadly through Putnam's (2000) work on social capital in the United States (see also Paxton 2007). Trust and other forms of social capital "lubricate" social life, engendering norms and communicative channels needed to pursue common interests (Putnam 2000). Similarly, Paxton's (2002) work on generalized levels of social capital and democracy suggests trust can operate as a space for spreading norms and discourses that spur collective action. However, trust alone does not always facilitate charitable activities. Saxton and Benson (2005) found that some forms of social capital, such as political engagement, led to growth in nonprofit sectors in U.S. countries, but interpersonal trust did not (though see Nissan et al. 2009). Still yet, it seems reasonable to expect trust at both the individual and contextual level to be positively associated with individual charitable acts:

Hypothesis 6: An individual's trust in others will be positively associated with membership in a charitable organization.

Hypothesis 6a: A high level of trust at the national level will be positively associated with membership in a charitable organization.

Both religiosity and trust are expected to operate at the individual level as well as the contextual level; that is, devout and trusting societies are expected to increase the probability of joining a charitable organization even if individuals are not necessarily religious or very trusting themselves. The next section turns to the effects of cosmopolitanism and world society as important bedrocks of charitable activity.

2.5 Putting Charity into Context II: Cosmopolitanism and World Society

This chapter suggests that charitable activity is a global phenomenon in two senses of the word. The first, and most obvious, is based on the observation that charitable activity has grown in numbers in many of the parts of the globe, particularly in countries outside of Western Europe and the United States. However, it has also become a global phenomenon in a more profound sense. This section argues that modern charitable giving – oftentimes imagined as an outcome of strategic individuals with certain capacities, resources, and altruistic motives – is actually constituted at the global level as a ‘blueprint’ for how to ameliorate suffering in the modern world. Put differently, charitable giving is not simply a choice of individual actors, but is rather the enactment of particular moral and virtuous ‘scripts’ constituted in world society that render charity possible and meaningful at the individual level.

World society refers to the system of international organizations and institutions that essentially make up and sustain a global culture comprised of highly rationalized models and discourses for how to organize the social world (Meyer 2010; Boli and Thomas 1999; Meyer et al. 1997). A key dimension of world society is that it is

essentially stateless; that is, without a supranational state to overcome increased competition and interdependence among states, a more diffuse yet highly coordinated, rationalized world culture has emerged in its stead. As a consequence, “ideas arise that people and groups must become the carriers of responsibility and capacity to do the business” of nation-states (Meyer 2010: 6). For example, a key carrier of such responsibility and capacity is the international nongovernmental organization (INGO), which broadcasts rules and ideas to other social actors for how social problems, such as environmental degradation, human rights abuses, and poverty, should be mitigated (see also, in a related tradition, Keck and Sikkink 1998).

An example of how collective pursuits have become the responsibility of nonstate actors in world society is the United Nations Volunteers program. UN Volunteers (UNV) is a program started in 1971 and administered by the United Nations Development Programme designed to increase the role of volunteers in development practice. Between 1998 and 2005, the number of UNV volunteers grew from 3,643 to more than 8,000 worldwide. According to their website, there are currently more than 7,500 volunteers operating in more than 130 countries. UNV volunteers work in the areas such as humanitarian relief, technical cooperation, human rights promotion, vocational training, and, most recently, violence prevention. UNV also promotes and supports International Volunteer Day, which has been observed by the United Nations every December 5 since 1985, and was the focal point of the International Year of Volunteers in 2001. The UNV mission statement reflects many of the principles Boli and Thomas (1999) identify as the building blocks of world society, most notably universalism and voluntaristic authority:

“It is universal, inclusive and embraces volunteer action in all its diversity. It values free will, commitment, engagement and solidarity, which are the foundations of volunteerism.”³ Like INGOs, UNV provide resources and training to encourage local volunteerism, as well as relays dominant world culture discourses that legitimate volunteering and other charitable acts.

According to Boli (2006), world society also comprises a global moral order that celebrates virtue, particularly among individuals and voluntary associations. Whereas states and corporations are often cast as ineffective bureaucracies or corrupt pariahs, voluntary associations and individuals are constructed as moral actors capable of choosing good from evil. Thus, world society comprises and transmits normative claims, based on broad conceptions of justice and human rights, about how to protect vulnerable and excluded groups, such as the poor and victims of humanitarian crises (Boli 2006). Yet, moral pursuits in world society are also accompanied by a deeply entrenched commitment to rational action. As Boli and Lechner (2009:333) point out, “rational action is strongly legitimated as the superior mode of behavior” in world society, “and the rationalized cultural environment offers an enormous array of rationalized means by which actors can pursue their interests.” Put simply, in a rationalized global order, some moral claims and strategies for pursuing them become more dominant than others.

Nowhere is this idea of a global rationalized, moral order more pronounced, and more contested, than the field of humanitarianism. Barnett and Weiss (2008) lay out in detail profound changes the global humanitarian system has experienced over the past two decades, much of which can be characterized as a dramatic expansion in size and

³ <http://www.unv.org/about-us/who-we-are/mission-statement.html>

scope due to, among other things, increased involvement of new outside actors (i.e., NGOs) and amplified awareness of global humanitarian crises. Humanitarianism in its modern form exhibits both the rational and the moral components of world culture. On one hand, what Calhoun (2008a) calls the “imperative to reduce suffering” is based on a widely shared moral commitment to ideas of charity and benevolence as a response to emergencies. Perhaps the most famous example of this classic approach to humanitarianism is the International Committee of the Red Cross, founded in 1863 to provide neutral assistance to those injured during wartime. On the other hand, there also exists a more rational aspect of humanitarianism – to mitigate disaster while also improving the overall life conditions of humanity (Calhoun 2008a; see also Weber 1968). Moreover, humanitarianism is increasingly pushed in a more instrumentally rational direction where large organizations and donors strive for improved efficiency and greater returns on their charitable investments. A high-profile example of such rationalization was the 2008 appointment of Luis Ubiñas, the former director of a global consulting firm, to head the Ford Foundation, the second largest foundation in the United States with a storied history of international humanitarian work. The appointment made waves across the philanthropic world and signaled a new era of increased accountability in the charitable sector. These two related but often-conflicting imperatives – one moral, or value-rational, and the other instrumentally-rational – reflect key elements, such as progress, universalism, and voluntaristic authority, that Boli and Thomas (1999; also Boli 2006) identify as the cornerstones of world society.

Calhoun (2008:73) also notes “humanitarian response to emergencies is quintessentially cosmopolitan.” According to Brown and Held (2010:1), “cosmopolitanism maintains that there are moral obligations owed to all human beings based solely on our humanity alone” (Brown and Held 2010: 1). Similarly, as Calhoun (2008b) describes elsewhere, cosmopolitanism comprises an ethical orientation toward a common and universal humanity and a political project based on building participatory institutions. A cosmopolitan orientation indicates an awareness of global tragedies as well as the goals of international organizations hoping to mitigate those tragedies and, as Bekkers and Weipking (2011) point out, awareness of need has long been found to be an important predictor of charitable acts. It is also a diffuse cosmopolitanism, or world citizenship, that grants individuals the authority and agency to pursue solutions to social problems through rationalized means like organized charity (Boli and Thomas 1999).

In sum, charitable and humanitarian acts by individuals reflect both the moral and rational culture of world society as well as a cosmopolitan worldview. Although both are distinct processes in their own right, I suggest it makes sense to conceptualize cosmopolitanism as one form of adoption of world culture at the individual level. World society scholars have responded by showing how hunting for mechanisms for multiple, diffuse cultural processes is bound to overwhelm in most cases (Schofer, Hironaka, Frank, and Longhofer, forthcoming; Schofer and Hironaka 2005). Still yet, research can be advanced by looking for evidence of world culture adoption at the individual level. For example, Meyer (2010) summarizes the neoinstitutional literature on education,

which has demonstrated how educational attainment is as much about becoming a legitimately empowered actor as it is about acquiring necessary skills for employment. In other words, evidence of world culture adoption by an individual can be revealed through behaviors and orientations that are highly legitimated and structured (also Boli, Ramirez, and Meyer 1985). While identifying the specific situational mechanism that ties macro-level world culture to micro-level interactions can be a difficult and sometimes fruitless task, we can at least see evidence of its effects at the individual level (Jepperson and Meyer 2011). In the case of charitable activity, a pro-social act that has become increasingly institutionalized and globally diffuse in recent decades, the exhibition of particularly global or cosmopolitan ethical or value orientations likely increases the likelihood someone will give, and thus I expect:

Hypothesis 7: A cosmopolitan worldview will be positively associated with membership in a charitable organization.

Hypothesis 7a: A high level of cosmopolitanism at the national level will be positively associated with membership in a charitable organization.

In addition to cosmopolitanism, national ties to world society via INGO memberships are also an important source of normative pressure and legitimation for individual charity. As mentioned above, INGOs provide a window into the content of world society and transmit models of how it should be enacted to the national level (Boli and Thomas 1999). Yet, few studies have looked at the effects of world society ties on individual behaviors. Much of this literature has instead looked at the effects of world society on policy outcomes or other state behaviors (e.g., Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui

2005; Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000), but a similar corollary can be made at the level of individuals. More INGO memberships in a country broadcast strong signals to citizens about their responsibilities to participate in charitable endeavors both locally and abroad. In addition, INGOs also comprise key social networks that organize and facilitate charitable action. Organizations like Oxfam and World Vision, for example, rely on hundreds of volunteers and millions of dollars in charitable contributions for their global efforts, providing key infrastructure for the solicitation of funds as well as recruitment into various programs. Moreover, such organizations are instrumental in spurring the formation of more local charitable organizations, which are also required for individual membership in them (Schofer and Longhofer 2011). And thus:

Hypothesis 8: National ties to world society via INGO memberships will be positively associated with membership in a charitable organization.

INGOs may also indicate another contextual factor that should be mentioned. Marquis and Toffel (2011) find that democratization mediates the effect of INGO ties on corporate environmental disclosure, suggesting that INGOs may also indicate a country's openness to democratization in addition to the diffusion global ideas. Democracy has long been tied to charity as well as membership in voluntary associations (i.e., Tocqueville 1835, 1840; Gross 2002; Paxton 2002; Schofer and Longhofer 2011). An open political space is required for civic participation and is reflective of other social norms and discourses that encourage charitable activity, such as reciprocity. Thus, in addition to a general effect on charitable membership, I also hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 9: The level of democracy within a country will mediate the effect of national ties to world society on membership in a charitable organization.

In addition to the contextual effects of religiosity, trust, and world society, two control variables are also worth discussing in brief. First, I control for whether local catastrophes invite charitable activity. Perhaps not surprisingly, the common wisdom surrounding charity is that it is an emergent response to need or deprivation caused by poverty, disasters, and other forms of disenfranchisement. For example, Rodriguez, Trainor, and Quarantelli (2006) describe the variety of prosocial and charitable behavior that emerged after Hurricane Katrina, a disaster that was noted in the media more for its antisocial reactions than its altruistic ones (see also Quarantelli 1984). Similarly, Wilcsik and Marquis (2011) found that natural disasters in a community increased philanthropic contributions from local corporations in the United States, though only when the disaster itself was relatively small. Of course, not all charitable or humanitarian activity is a direct response to crisis: emergency relief aid, for example, rose sharply in the 1990s despite a decline in civil wars and refugees worldwide, in part due to the rise of internally displaced persons but also shifts in major-power foreign policy (Fearon 2006).

In addition to natural disasters, I also control for government spending. Earlier I mentioned the idea that charitable gifts are based on rational calculations of the tax subsidy that may accompany them. A similar rational calculation can be made at the national level. Economic theories of nonprofits suggest that a larger government should decrease or “crowd out” the need for charitable activity (Salamon 1995; Nissan et al. 2009; Coorbin 1999). Or, when charities are heavily supported by the government, the

public benefit of individual giving to charity is minimized, leaving only thank-you gifts, reputation boosts, or the so-called “warm glow” left as a private benefit (Vesterlund 2006; Andreoni 1990). Therefore, it is fitting that a control be included for a large welfare state that may reduce not only the overall size of the charitable sector, but also membership within it. I discuss additional reasons for why a state may crowd out charity, as well as alternative theories, in Chapter 3.

2.6 Data and Methods

Data on charitable membership comes from the fifth wave (2005-2008) of the World Values Survey (WVS). The WVS is a cross-national survey designed to capture societal differences in values and their effects on various political and social indicators (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). The WVS, along with the European Values Survey (EVS), has been carried out in 97 countries and has covered more than 90 percent (in terms of its sample) of the world’s population over five waves since 1981. All surveys are conducted face-to-face in the local language by a team of WVS researchers using random probability samples whenever possible. The survey is best known for its use in Inglehart’s work on shifts toward more “post-materialist” values in more affluent countries over the past three decades (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart 1997). The 2005-2008 wave includes basic demographic information, value and attitude measures, and organization memberships for more than 77,000 respondents in 54 countries. The 35 countries for this analysis were chosen based on data availability with the exception of India, which turned out to be an influential outlier due to its extremely high level of

charitable membership. Each respondent in the dataset is assigned a non-integer probability weight, typically based on age and education, to account for potential sampling problems in some countries. These probability weights are used in the descriptive statistics in this chapter; however, they cannot be used in the multilevel logit models.⁴

The dependent variable is a binary measure of membership in a charitable organization. Respondents were asked to respond to a series of questions about active and inactive memberships in a range of organizations, including religious groups, sports clubs, labor unions, political parties, and environmental organizations. This data has been used reliably in previous studies (see Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001 for an example). Respondents in the 2005-2008 wave were also asked if they were an active member, inactive member, or not a member of a charitable or humanitarian organization. Because it is difficult to determine how active and inactive memberships are distinguished, and this chapter addresses willingness to simply join rather than carry on an active membership, responses were collapsed into two categories with “active” and “inactive” responses coded as “member” (1=member, 0=not a member). Table 2.1 reports the weighted-sample means for charitable membership for all countries in the WVS.

Most independent variables were also taken from the fifth WVS wave and include the following:

⁴ To make sure the results in this analysis were not affected by unweighted data, I included the individual weights as an independent variable. If the weight has a significant effect on the dependent variable, or if it substantially changes the effect of other independent variables, then a sample bias is likely. However, this was not the case and so I do not include the weights in the analyses presented here. Weights do have a greater effect on descriptive data, however; therefore, I use weights when aggregating survey measures to the national level.

Table 2.1 Charitable Membership Percentage by Country

Country	N	Percent	Country	N	Percent
India	2001	56.90%	* Slovenia	1037	17.30%
* Mali	1261	39.70%	Taiwan	1227	16.20%
New Zealand	842	38.10%	* Vietnam	1495	15.40%
* Canada	2149	34.90%	Malaysia	1199	14.10%
* Switzerland	1234	33.70%	Cyprus	1023	13.90%
* Sweden	999	33.50%	Argentina	1002	12.90%
* Indonesia	1948	33.40%	Peru	1495	12.50%
* Norway	1024	31.60%	* Germany	2042	10.40%
Great Britain	1030	30.70%	* Poland	998	10.30%
* Australia	1334	29.70%	* Spain	1199	9.40%
* United States	1215	29.30%	South Korea	1197	9.10%
* Ethiopia	1459	29.00%	* China	1989	7.90%
* Rwanda	1468	28.50%	* Moldova	1046	7.70%
* Zambia	1418	26.50%	* Burkina Faso	1371	7.60%
* Trinidad and Tobago	1002	24.70%	* Uruguay	994	7.20%
Iran	2646	23.80%	Colombia	3025	6.40%
* Mexico	1527	23.60%	Russia	2016	5.70%
Andorra	1003	22.40%	Morocco	1163	5.10%
* Ghana	1470	21.70%	* Ukraine	993	4.90%
* Chile	1000	21.60%	* Japan	1042	4.80%
Italy	999	21.10%	Serbia	1200	4.10%
* Finland	1007	20.90%	Jordan	1200	3.00%
Netherlands	1019	20.70%	* Egypt	3051	2.50%
France	1000	20.60%	* Turkey	1346	2.20%
* Brazil	1477	19.80%	* Bulgaria	1000	2.00%
* South Africa	2988	19.10%	* Romania	1773	1.20%
* Thailand	1517	19.00%	* Georgia	1495	0.40%
			Total	76656	17.70%

* Countries in analysis

Household income: Household income is measured using a ten-point scale representing country-specific income deciles. Respondents were shown a card with income groups in local currencies and then asked to identify which group they belonged to based on all wages, salaries, pensions, and other incomes (1=lowest decile). This variable was then centered on the country mean.

Formal education: Education is measured using two dummy variables. Secondary education is measured as completing secondary education, which may include some college (1=completed secondary education). Tertiary education is measured as completing to degree a university education (1=completed tertiary education). Having not completed secondary education is the reference category.

Altruistic Values: A dichotomous measure of general altruistic values was constructed based on a survey question about helping people. Each respondent was given a card with descriptions of anonymous people and asked how closely he or she identifies with them. One description was as follows: “It is important to this person to help the people nearby; to care for their well-being.” Responses of “very much like me” and “like me” were coded as 1.

Thrift Values: Respondents were also asked to list qualities that children should be encouraged to learn at home, one of which was “thrift, saving money and things.” It is hypothesized that a person who values thriftiness is less likely to join a charitable organization in which they may be asked to make a monetary contribution. The variable is dichotomous (1=thrift mentioned as a quality).

The following three variables comprise both individual level indicators and, when aggregated to the national level, contextual measures:

Religiosity: I use a dummy variable indicating a high frequency of church attendance as an indicator of individual religiosity (1=attend church at least once a week). This measure was then aggregated using the sample weights to calculate the percent of the national population that attends church at least once a week.

Trust: Social trust is measured as a dichotomous variable based on an answer to the question, “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” (1=most people can be trusted). The measure was then aggregated at the national level using sample weights.

Cosmopolitanism: Schueth and O’Laughlin (2008) use WVS data in their study of geographical differences in levels of cosmopolitanism. They operationalize cosmopolitanism as whether an individual identifies himself as a “world citizen.” I use a similar measure in this study. Individuals in the fifth WVS wave were asked how strongly they agreed with the statement: “I see myself as a world citizen.” Responses of either “strongly agree” or “agree” were coded as 1; all other non-missing responses were coded as 0. This measure was then averaged at the national level using the sampling weights.

The following variables reflect country characteristics that are not derived from the World Values Survey, all of which are measured in 2005:

Natural disasters: There are many ways to measure the effect of natural disasters. I use the total number of deaths resulting from all natural disasters in a country from 2000-2005. Data come from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disaster’s International Disaster Database (www.emdat.be). The total number of deaths in the five-year period is then logged to account for skew.

Government spending: Measured in a conventional manner as total government expenditures as percent of gross domestic product (World Bank 2010).

INGOs: A standard measure of ties to world society is the number of individual memberships in INGOs. Data on INGO membership comes from the Yearbook of International Associations (UIA, various years). I use a per capita measure (memberships per thousand people) to control for overall density of world society ties. The measure is logged to account for skew and aid in interpretation.

Democracy: Democracy is measured as a thirteen-point scale reflecting the level of civil liberties and political freedoms in a country (Freedom House 2009).

I also include dummy variables for gender (1=female), age 35 and younger, age 65 and older, and full-time and part-time employment. These control variables are consistent with prior studies on charitable giving (Weipking and Mass 2009). All individual-level, non-dummy variables are centered on the country mean; all country-level variables are centered on the grand mean.

I use a modeling technique to predict a dichotomous outcome – membership in a charitable organization – using data with a two-level hierarchical structure. A multilevel model is necessary due to the nested nature of my data (i.e., individuals nested within countries), which violates the assumption of independence required for a conventional logistic regression. More specifically, I use the *xtmelogit* command in Stata to fit a multilevel logit model with a country-level random intercept, thus correcting for the clustered nature of my data. This particular command uses maximum-likelihood estimation with adaptive quadrature to fit the following null equation:

$$\log \left[\frac{\text{prob}(\text{member})}{1 - \text{prob}(\text{member})} \right] = \beta_0 + \mu_{0j}$$

where β_0 is the intercept shared by all countries and μ_{0j} is the random effect unique to country j . Independent variables at the individual (level-1) and country (level-2) levels can then be included as explanatory factors, resulting in the following equation:

$$\log\left[\frac{\text{prob}(\text{member})}{1 - \text{prob}(\text{member})}\right] = \beta_0 + \beta_{\text{CONTROLS}_{ij}} + \beta_{\text{ALTRUISM}_{ij}} + \beta_{\text{THRIFT}_{ij}} + \beta_{\text{CHURCH}_{ij}} + \beta_{\text{TRUST}_{ij}} + \beta_{\text{WORLDCITIZEN}_{ij}} + \beta_{\text{DISASTERS}_{ij}} + \beta_{\text{GOVTSPEND}_{ij}} + \beta_{\text{CHURCH}_j} + \beta_{\text{TRUST}_j} + \beta_{\text{WORLDCIT}_j} + \beta_{\text{INGO}_j} + \beta_{\text{DEMOCRACY}_j} + \mu_{0j}$$

In this equation, level-1 variables are denoted with subscript ij , with i referring to the individual and j referring to the country; similarly, all level-2 variables are denoted with j . All explanatory variables are fixed, meaning the effect is not assumed to vary across countries and only the intercept is considered random. Also, because a logit model reports regression coefficients rather than odds ratios, I report exponentiated coefficients to show the change in odds of belonging to a charitable organization based on changes in the independent variables. Coefficients are reported in Appendix A.

2.7 Results

The null model (not presented here) partitions the variance between the individual and country-levels and reports the random effect of charitable membership at the country-level, or the variance that can be attributed to country-specific differences. The null model reports a residual variance (σ^2) of 1.306 for the country-level random effect. The variance partition coefficient (VPC) can be calculated by dividing the level-2 variance by the total variance for both levels ($1.306/[1.306+3.289]$), resulting in a VPC=0.284; in other words, 28.4% of the variance in charitable membership is a function of differences

Table 2.2 Multilevel Logistic Regression of Charitable Association Membership in 35 Countries

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Level-1 Variables						
<i>Controls</i>						
Female	1.13*** (0.028)	1.11*** (0.028)	1.11*** (0.028)	1.11*** (0.028)	1.11*** (0.028)	1.11*** (0.028)
Under 35	0.79*** (0.031)	0.81*** (0.031)	0.81*** (0.031)	0.81*** (0.031)	0.81*** (0.031)	0.81*** (0.031)
Over 65	1.25*** (0.049)	1.20*** (0.049)	1.20*** (0.049)	1.21*** (0.049)	1.21*** (0.049)	1.21*** (0.049)
<i>Human Resources</i>						
Secondary education	1.47*** (0.037)	1.45*** (0.037)	1.45*** (0.037)	1.45*** (0.037)	1.45*** (0.037)	1.45*** (0.037)
Higher education	2.15*** (0.042)	2.08*** (0.043)	2.08*** (0.043)	2.07*** (0.043)	2.07*** (0.043)	2.08*** (0.043)
Employed full-time	1.07* (0.033)	1.07* (0.033)	1.07* (0.033)	1.08* (0.033)	1.08* (0.033)	1.08* (0.033)
Employed part-time	1.21*** (0.054)	1.21*** (0.054)	1.21*** (0.054)	1.21*** (0.054)	1.21*** (0.054)	1.21*** (0.054)
Income	1.04*** (0.006)	1.04*** (0.006)	1.04*** (0.006)	1.04*** (0.006)	1.04*** (0.006)	1.04*** (0.006)
<i>Giving Values</i>						
Altruism	1.58*** (0.031)	1.53*** (0.031)	1.53*** (0.031)	1.53*** (0.031)	1.53*** (0.031)	1.53*** (0.031)
Thriftiness	0.94* (0.030)	0.95 (0.030)	0.95 (0.030)	0.95 (0.030)	0.95 (0.030)	0.95 (0.030)
<i>Social Resources</i>						
Church attendance		1.46*** (0.033)	1.46*** (0.033)	1.46*** (0.034)	1.46*** (0.034)	1.46*** (0.034)
Trust in others		1.24*** (0.032)	1.25*** (0.032)	1.24*** (0.032)	1.24*** (0.032)	1.24*** (0.032)
<i>World Polity Links</i>						
World citizenship		1.25*** (0.039)	1.25*** (0.039)	1.25*** (0.039)	1.25*** (0.039)	1.25*** (0.039)
Level-2 Variables						
<i>Controls</i>						
Deaths from disasters (ln)			1.05 (0.071)	0.97 (0.056)	1.00 (0.057)	0.99 (0.056)

Govt. expend. (% GDP)		0.99 (0.043)	0.99 (0.034)	0.99 (0.030)	0.97 (0.030)	
<i>Social Resources</i>						
Church attendance (%)			1.03*** (0.007)	1.02** (0.008)	1.02** (0.007)	
Trust in others (%)			1.04*** (0.010)	1.03** (0.010)	1.03** (0.010)	
<i>World Polity Links</i>						
World citizenship (%)				1.03* (0.012)	1.03** (0.012)	
INGOs per capita (ln)				8.79* (1.035)	4.76 (1.059)	
<i>Democratization</i>						
Democracy					1.07 ⁺ (0.043)	
Constant	0.10*** (0.205)	0.07*** (0.197)	0.07*** (0.198)	0.06*** (0.156)	0.06*** (0.139)	0.06*** (0.139)
<i>Random Effects</i>						
Intercept (var.)	1.400*** (0.347)	1.258*** (0.313)	1.237*** (0.307)	0.700*** (0.177)	0.534*** (0.136)	0.492*** (0.126)
Observations	40,211	40,211	40,211	40,211	40,211	40,211
Number of groups	35	35	35	35	35	35

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

at the country level. Because the dependent variable is a log-scale and can thus be difficult to interpret, predicted probabilities can also be calculated. For example, the null model reports a constant (β_0) of -1.795, which can be exponentiated ($\exp[-1.795]=0.167$) to produce an odds of joining a charitable membership of 16.7%, or a corresponding probability of 14.3% ($0.167/[1+0.167]$), for an average country.⁵

⁵ Similarly, the information on the level-2 variance (yielding a standard deviation of 1.143) can be used to calculate predicted probabilities that fall within the coverage interval of two standard deviations. In this model, 95% of countries fall within the predicted probability range of 1.7% and 30.8%: $\exp(-1.795 \pm 2.286)/[1+\exp(-1.795 \pm 2.286)]$.

Results from the remaining models are presented in Table 2.2. The analysis begins with the conventional measures for education, income, and values. Both education measures have positive, significant effects, although the odds ratio for completing university is substantially greater: completing a university education increases the odds of joining a charitable membership by 115%. Income also has a significant effect, although the effect is relatively small. A one-unit, or decile, increase above the mean income within a country interval increases the odds of membership by 4%. In other words, the odds of someone in the highest income decile joining a charity are 1.4 times higher than the odds of someone in the lowest income decile ($\exp[10 \times 0.039]$). In addition to income and education, females are also more likely than males to join a charity, as are older individuals more likely than younger ones. Altruism has by far the biggest effect: individuals with strong feelings toward helping others are 58% more likely than non-altruistic individuals to join a charity. Conversely, thrifty attitudes are associated with slightly less odds of becoming a member, suggesting that individuals are less likely to join a charity if they feel that money should be saved rather than spent and, possibly, donated.

Model 2 includes the level-1 variables for church attendance, trust, and world citizenship. As expected, all three variables significantly increase the likelihood an individual will join a charitable organization. Frequent church attendance has the largest effect. The odds for individuals who attend a church service once a week are 46% larger than the odds of a non-frequent church attendee. Similarly, a trust in others increases the odds of joining by 24%, and world citizenship has a similar effect size (25%). The

addition of these three variables also decreases the random intercept variance, but only slightly, leaving 24% of the variance attributable to unobserved country-level factors. Predicted probabilities were also calculated by keeping all predictor variables at their observed values. For example, the probability of a “world citizen” joining a charity is 20.7%, or nearly twice the probability of a non-world citizen joining (11%). In sum, Model 2 finds evidence to support most of my individual-level hypotheses: as expected, charitable membership is positively associated with income, education, and altruism, but also trust in others, individual religiosity, and a cosmopolitan worldview. The only hypothesis that is not supported is thrift, which drops out of significance in the full model.

Model 3 introduces the level-2 controls for natural disasters and government spending. Deaths from local disasters are associated with a greater likelihood of joining a charitable organization, but the coefficient fails to reach statistical significance. Although the non-significant finding is robust in this case, it does not necessarily mean that charitable acts are not responses to local need. One could imagine a local disaster leading to great efforts by volunteers and donors in response, but perhaps joining a charitable organization, which requires paying dues and volunteering time whether disasters occur or not, is simply a much different social phenomenon. It is also possible that deaths from disasters are a poor predictor of local need, but other measures, such as poverty levels and post-conflict regions, also produced similar (non-significant) results.⁶ Likewise, government spending is not associated with charitable membership. Although

⁶ I also tried including a measure of local inequality using a Gini score; although in the expected positive direction, the effect was not significant.

calculations of tax subsidies and public benefits may take place at the individual level, there is no evidence to suggest that a more benevolent state crowds out the space for a charitable sector.

Model 4 includes the contextual effects of trust and church attendance. As expected, both variables have positive and significant effects. A one-percent increase in frequent church attendance within a country is associated with a 3 percent increase in the odds of joining. Although these results seem small, there is a great deal of variance in both variables, suggesting that individuals in a country like Zambia, where church attendance is nearly 40 percent above the mean, are more likely to be affected by their devout location, and thus more likely to join a charitable membership, than a country like Norway or Sweden, where weekly church attendance is much less common. Similarly, a one-percent increase in trust is associated with a 4 percent increase in odds. It should also be noted that the inclusion of both measures reduced the country-level random effect variance substantially, suggesting that at least some of the differences at the country-level can be attributed to variations in trust and church attendance across them.

The two level-2 world polity variables are included in Model 5. Average world citizenship in a country increases the odds of joining by 3 percent. Again, this is a small change that masks large differences across countries in their cosmopolitanism. For example, only around half of respondents classified themselves as world citizens in many eastern European countries, whereas countries like Thailand, Indonesia, and Rwanda all have means well over 90%. The INGO measure also has a positive effect. Because the variable is logged, it can be interpreted as a percent change: a one-percent increase in

INGOs per capita increases the odds ratio by a factor of seven. However, the scale of the measure is still quite small, with all countries having less than one INGO per 1,000 people. Yet, there is evidence to suggest that ties to the world polity increase the likelihood of joining a charitable organization. This may be due to the diffusion of moral claims about individual responsibility or it may reflect the networks through which local charitable organizations operate; that is, a country with more INGO memberships may simply have more organizations that charitable and humanitarian organizations can support and therefore more charitable organizations to join. It is also worth noting that the addition of the world polity measures also reduces the country-level random effect variance. A recalculated variance partition coefficient reports that the addition of the level-2 variables leaves approximately 13% of the variance to be explained by unobserved covariates.


Finally, Model 6 includes the measure for democracy. As expected, the inclusion of democracy reduces the size and significance of the INGO measure ($p=0.14$). Meanwhile, democracy has a positive but only marginally significant effect on membership. A one-unit increase above the mean is associated with a 7 percent increase in the odds. This supports the idea that charity is part and parcel of democracy – an idea as old as the hills – but also something more novel for the world polity. Ties to the world polity partly indicate a country's openness to democratic participation and should thus be considered not simply a measure of ties to a diffuse culture but also something akin to a transnational political opportunity structure (see Schofer and Longhofer 2011).

2.8 Discussion

This chapter improves the literature on charity by developing a theoretical model that highlights the importance of global culture in shaping individual motives to give. Weipking and Maas (2009) and others note that such theoretical models – more specifically, those that look at the role of context on individual charity – are rare in the literature on charity and philanthropy (see also Borgnovi 2008; Wilson 2000). In sum, a substantial amount of the variance in charitable membership can be explained by looking to the contextual effects of religiosity, trust, and ties to the world polity, both through INGOs and the adoption of a cosmopolitan worldview. That these effects are robust when controlling for conventional explanatory factors at the individual level – particularly income, education, and altruistic values – is especially instructive.

However, it should be noted that membership in a charitable or humanitarian organization is not the only way to give. Rather, charitable acts are socially constructed across multiple dimensions, ranging from membership in a charity to monetary donations, volunteering, remittances, and just generally helping others in need. Moreover, acts of giving move in many directions – from individuals to other individuals, from individuals to institutions, and from institutions back to individuals, for example – and this chapter captures only one of these. Figure 2.1 reports the percentage of charitable memberships along with the percentage of people who gave money or volunteered for an organization for the 35 countries in this study. Data on donations and volunteering are taken from the 2010 World Giving Index, an annual report produced by the U.K.-based Charities Aid Foundation. More specifically, the giving percentages are taken from a

Figure 2.1. Diversity of Charitable Activity Across 35 Countries



Gallup WorldView World Poll that asked respondents to report whether they gave money or volunteered time to an organization in the previous month. Although there is a general affinity between charitable membership, donations, and volunteering (membership correlates at .55 and .63 with each, respectively), it is also clear that charitable memberships are a conservative estimate of overall giving patterns. Still yet, charitable memberships provide a lens into how charity is organized across societies. Without organizations to solicit donations and recruit volunteers, there would be much less giving across these countries – and these organizations require members to sustain them.

This chapter also adds to a rich and growing literature on the global humanitarian system by turning attention to individual humanitarian participation in a cross-national context. The international humanitarian system has undoubtedly undergone significant increases in size and scope since the end of the Cold War, but scholars are still coming to grips with its expansion and shifting missions (Barnett and Weiss 2008). There is quite simply a paucity of data on the number of humanitarian organizations across the globe, the size of their budgets and personnel, and so on. Moreover, the rise of nongovernmental organizations, foundations and charities, and multinational corporations with philanthropic missions has simply made keeping up with the changing landscape even more taxing. Although this chapter does little in regard to mapping the organizational topography of global humanitarianism, it does provide insight into who is most likely to join those humanitarian organizations.

CHAPTER 3

DIFFUSION OF GLOBAL GRANTMAKING ORGANIZATIONS, 1970-2005

3.1 Introduction

The past several decades marked what has been coined the “global associational revolution,” a phrase describing the momentous upsurge in private, voluntary, and non-profit activity throughout much of the modern world (Salamon et al. 2004). Formal organizations ranging from self-help groups and community foundations to environmental organizations and soup kitchens have emerged at a rapid pace, as has attention paid by scholars and policymakers to their potential as key sources of various public goods and services. As such, many recent studies have begun to examine the comparative elements of associations and, more specifically, their roots in global civil society (e.g., Longhofer and Schofer 2010; Salamon et al. 2004).

At the forefront of the global upsurge in civic association is the modern philanthropic foundation. Foundations are increasingly looked to as vehicles for the semiprivatization of state services and expressions of civic virtues. Changing relationships between the state, civil society, and the global economy, as well as increased wealth in most developed countries over the past three decades (and, more recently, China and India), have generated record numbers of foundations in much of the world (Anheier and Toepler 1999). Yet, despite the increased visibility of philanthropy worldwide, little is known about foundation sectors outside the United States and a select group of European countries (though see Anheier and Toepler 1999; Anheier, Simmons, and Winder 2007; Johnson 2010).

Whereas Chapter 2 examined individual participation in charitable organizations, this chapter examines the origins of the organizations themselves. Drawing upon a statistical analysis of the density of grantmaking organizations in more than 100 countries from 1970 to 2005, this chapter systematically addresses: (1) whether grantmaking foundations are simply a product of societal affluence and education; (2) whether grantmaking foundations are associated with national-level inequality and public sector size; (3) the extent to which grantmaking foundations are tied to global civil society and an emergent transnational philanthropic community; and (4) whether foundations involved in global grantmaking (i.e. international aid) follow similar trajectories as foundations involved in domestic grantmaking. I find that ties to global civil society and the presence of local “bridging” organizations, or partners of global philanthropic membership organizations, are important predictors of grantmaking organizations. Foundations are also positively associated with national wealth, education, democracy, common law, and income inequality. Analyses of a smaller sample also find that global grantmaking organizations, particularly those involved in international aid, are negatively associated with more traditional forms of state-based aid (i.e., outgoing bilateral development assistance). However, I do not find support for the notion that foundations are primarily functional responses to humanitarian concerns. I conclude the paper with a discussion of the mutually constitutive relationship between philanthropy and global civil society.

3.2 Foundations as a Global Phenomenon

Long thought to be “strange creatures” of democratic (and particularly American) society, scholars have long sought to explain why seemingly private organizations, like philanthropic foundations, participate in the pursuit of public goods (Nielsen 1972; Powell and Clemens 1998). However, Anheier and Daly (2010) point out that few private organizations have received less scholarly attention than foundations. Comparative work on the “associational revolution” has largely focused on the growing number of international organizations, specific subsets of voluntary associations (i.e., environmental non-governmental organizations), or other measures of “third sector” size, such as non-profit employment (e.g., Boli and Thomas 1999; Paxton 2002; Longhofer and Schofer 2010; Salamon et al. 2004). Foundation research, on other hand, consists primarily of historical accounts of individual foundations or snapshots of individual countries, in part due to a paucity of comparable data across philanthropic sectors (e.g., Anheier and Daly 2007; Fleishman 2007).

Foundations are important objects of study for reasons beyond a lack of scholarly research. Not just simple expressions of human generosity, foundations are also thought to be important sources of social and political change (see also Chapter 4). In the United States and Britain, philanthropic organizations and individual philanthropists have long been important benefactors of non-profits organizations and the services they provide. Foundation scholar Joel Fleishman (2007) has praised many American foundations for being catalysts of change in the United States and abroad, citing PBS, the 911 emergency response system, and the Green Revolution as key examples of influential philanthropic

contributions. As another example, take the case of environmental protection. Foundations were instrumental in the forest-certification movement in the U.S., transforming protests over deforestation into a successful market-based alternative (Bartley 2007). Ecological foundations provided important symbolic and material support for environmental mobilization in much of the developing world, as well (Longhofer and Schofer 2010).

More recently, the international activities of foundations have captured scholarly interest and the public imagination. Charities and foundations, most notably the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, have played a prominent role in U.S. development and relief activities since World War II (McCleary 2009; Keck and Sikkink 1998). However, it wasn't until recent years that global grantmaking reached such unprecedented levels. International grantmaking comprised less than 6 percent of all U.S. grant dollars in 1982; by 2008, this number increased to nearly 25 percent (Foundation Center 2010). The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation alone contributed nearly \$2.3 billion to its global health and education programs in 2008, increasing its global giving by 50 percent from the previous year and cementing its position as the global leader in charitable giving.

The rise in global philanthropic activity is not a uniquely American phenomenon, either. Estimated global philanthropic giving among OECD countries reached \$52 billion in 2009, or roughly half of all official development flows from OECD governments. (Hudson Institute 2011) Though most of this private giving is concentrated in the United States, international giving continues to grow in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, and elsewhere. Further, the emergence of grantmaking organizations in non-

Western parts of the world continues to draw attention from policymakers and social scientists (for an example of philanthropy in Arab countries, see Ibrahim and Sherif 2008). According to a recent report on global philanthropy by the Worldwide Initiatives for Grantmaker Support (WINGS), a leading global membership network of grantmakers and foundations, “there appears to be a growing conviction that philanthropy has an important role to play in addressing human challenges and strengthening civil society,” characterized by increased efforts by governments, corporations, and individuals to promote and institutionalize philanthropic giving, particularly in countries with smaller or less mature philanthropic sectors (Johnson 2010).

One vivid example of the rise in organized philanthropy is the community foundation, mentioned briefly in Chapter 1. Community foundations are philanthropic organizations supported by multiple donors that primarily fund projects at the community level, such as the Cleveland Foundation in the United States (Zhu and Knoke 2009). Although community foundations began in the early twentieth century in the United States (the Cleveland Foundation, widely considered to be the first community foundation, was established in 1913), they have spread like wildfire over the past decade, growing from less than 900 worldwide in 2000 to more than 1,700 in 2010.⁷ Although much of this growth remains concentrated in Europe and the United States, community foundations are also rising in number in much of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, in large part due to significant support from the international community and the decline of state services in many of these countries.

⁷ http://wings-community-foundation-report.com/gsr_2010/gsr_home/home.cfm

Thus, it is imperative that a comparative study of foundations approaches them as a global phenomenon. According to Hewa and Stapleton (2010: 9), “the core values and practices of the twenty-first century are consistent with those of the underlying principles of organized philanthropy, and as the global community becomes increasingly open and connected, philanthropy will play a decisive role in shaping the new international order.” This paper builds on the notion that organized philanthropy and its central organization, the foundation, have global dimensions worthy of study. However, the unavailability of statistical data, as well as cross-national differences in philanthropic laws and traditions, has made such research difficult. Taking these challenges into account, I focus specifically on formal grantmaking organizations, including foundations, endowments, and charities. Thus, I exclude operating foundations, individual donations, and non-grantmaking nongovernmental organizations from my analyses.

I also give special attention to organizations involved in international grantmaking, i.e., foundations that administer a significant portion of grants to recipients based outside the home country or domestic nongovernmental organizations focused on global issues. These “global grantmakers” have risen at a rapid pace across the globe since the 1960s, with some of the greatest increases in regions outside of North America and Western Europe (see Data section). Whereas the number of global grantmaking organizations increased by more than threefold in industrialized Western countries between 1960 and 2007, the number of similar organizations in non-Western countries increased by a factor of ten. Thus, in my hypotheses, I note when a particular

phenomenon is likely to encourage the formation global foundations as well as more general ones.

3.3 Conventional Explanations for the Global Rise of Foundations

What social, political, and economic conditions account for the efflorescence of foundations in the recent period? Below I briefly summarize three sets of hypotheses drawn from the literature: 1) foundations as a function of wealth and inequality; 2) foundations as a function of domestic political structures, namely democracy, state size, and the law; and 3) foundations as a response to local needs (i.e., humanitarian crises).

Wealth and Inequality

In a recent report on institutional philanthropy from the Worldwide Initiatives for Grantmaker Support, global private wealth stemming from the privatization of state services, intensified global economic integration, and transfer of wealth to younger generations is cited as a vital “prerequisite to a robust philanthropic sector” (Johnson 2010: 7). Scholarly work on foundations also stresses the role of affluence in facilitating philanthropic activity, a point bolstered by the record rise of private wealth in the United States, Britain, and Germany in the late 1990s (Anheier and Toepler 1999: 5; also Fleishman 2007; Schervisch et al. 1986). A similar point is echoed in Inglehart’s (1997) work on post-materialism, in which economic security and affluence brings about more altruistic attitudes. Thus, my first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Affluence, as measured by GDP per capita, will be positively associated with the overall level of grantmaking foundations.

Critics have suggested philanthropic activity is tied not just to overall levels of affluence, but also concentrations of wealth or overall levels of inequality (e.g., Roelofs 2003). Early U.S. philanthropists, such as Henry Ford and John D. Rockefeller, faced heavy skepticism from a public distrustful of their charitable activities. This skepticism mounted over the twentieth century as changes in the progressive income tax and estate tax laws made setting up a foundation a convenient way of avoiding or reducing taxes (Prewitt 2006). A cursory examination by Anheier and Toepler (1999) found that while income inequality and foundations grew at similar rates in the United States from the 1960s through the 1980s, foundations also grew in Western Europe, where inequality has remained relatively low and stable (Anheier and Toepler 1999). However, the relationship warrants more systematic consideration:

Hypothesis 2: Income inequality, as measured by a Gini score, will be positively associated with the overall level of grantmaking foundations.

Democracy, Government Size, and Common Law

Prior work on foundations has suggested that philanthropic organizations and foundations have the potential to function as an important “third sector” for pursuing various public goods (Anheier and Toepler 1999; Prewitt 2006). Much of this literature has taken on the flavor of the work of Putnam and others, who have long pointed to the positive association between civic engagement, including philanthropy, and democracy

(Putnam 2000; Paxton 2002; Tocqueville 1835). This is in contrast to many post-socialist countries, where foundations, particularly grantmaking organizations, did not emerge in great numbers until after the democratic transitions. Thus, the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: Democracy will be positively associated with the overall level of grantmaking foundations.

An extension of the democratic or “third sector” argument suggests that foundations, like other non-profit organizations, function as a source of public benefit when the state or the market does not (or cannot) provide particular services (Hansmann 1987; Douglas 1987). This is akin to the suggestion made in Chapter 2, in which a larger public sector reduces the public benefit of an individual donation and, as it follows, a smaller public sector boosts the benefit of giving and volunteering (although I found no evidence of this in my analysis). This may be because the state itself plays an important role in cultivating the philanthropic sector through tax legislation, direct involvement in the operation of foundations, or sharing responsibility with them in providing public goods (Anheier and Toepler 1999). In the United States, philanthropic activity is closely intertwined with the expansion of government spending in areas like education, health, and job training (where nonprofits provide most services), as well as rising per capita GDP (which allows citizens to purchase more services) (Heydemann and Hammack 2009: 4). Similarly, Anheier and Daly (2007) argue that foundation sectors are likely to be larger in corporatist countries in which the state works closely with non-profits in the provision of public goods, such as Germany. In contrast, foundations remain small and less influential in statist France, where the discretionary powers of the state and the

absence of explicit legislation limit philanthropic activity (Archambault, Boumendil, and Tsyboula 1999). The notion that a large state and the philanthropic sector can be complementary, rather than competitive, as well as the conclusions drawn from Chapter 2, leads to my fourth hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: State size, as measured by government consumption, will be positively associated with the overall level of grantmaking foundations.

Finally, I briefly explore the relationship between legal systems and the philanthropic sector. As suggested above, the state plays an important role in establishing and upholding the legislative environment in which foundations and non-profits operate, most commonly through the designation of tax exemption status. Unfortunately, there are no reliable data on tax exemption laws across countries, though previous scholars have argued that tax exemption status is quite difficult to achieve in civil law systems (Anheier and List 2005). As a consequence, countries like France and Japan have many non-profit organizations yet very few tax-exempt ones. In contrast, laws concerning public benefit are less complicated and achieving tax-exempt status is easier in common law countries, such as Britain and the United States, where tax exemption is given to a broad range of charitable organizations. Because of data limitations, I examine the differences between common and civil law systems more broadly:

Hypothesis 5: The presence of a common law system will be positively associated with the overall level of grantmaking foundations.

Humanitarian Crises

The international field of humanitarianism, of which philanthropy is a part, continues to expand as coordinated responses to global emergencies by international organizations and nation-states grow and become more complex (Barnett and Weiss 2008). As a consequence, mounting concern over problems ranging from climate change and food insecurity to malaria and genocide has been met with record amounts of donations given by U.S. charities and foundations through international grants (Frumkin 2010). The recent earthquakes in China, Haiti, and Japan, and the growth of what has been coined “philanthrocapitalism,” or the potential of Bill Gates and other wealthy individuals to solve monumental problems in the global system (Bishop and Green 2008), suggest that crises and catastrophes may spur philanthropic mobilization, particularly at the international level. Although I found little evidence of this at the individual level, it is worth exploring at the organizational one:

Hypothesis 6: Humanitarian crises, measured as natural disasters and ongoing civil wars, will be positively associated with the overall level of grantmaking foundations.

Hypothesis 6a: Humanitarian crises, measured as natural disasters and ongoing civil wars, will be positively associated with the overall level of global grantmaking foundations.

3.4 World Society Explanations for the Global Rise of Foundations

The above hypotheses suggest that foundations are a function of private wealth, domestic political institutions, or humanitarian crises. However, many sociologists remain skeptical that philanthropic giving stems from an individual's altruism or wealth alone, and humanitarian crises happen too often with varying levels of philanthropic responses. And, although the state certainly plays an important role in the facilitation of philanthropic giving, the rise of international grantmaking and the spread of philanthropic models across borders further suggests that global dynamics may be at play (Hammack and Heydemann 2009).

This section extends the institutional argument introduced in Chapter 2 by highlighting the role of the global system in the diffusion of foundations across countries. I introduced this dissertation with the claim that giving is a social invention and thus we must look to its collective origins. This claim is drawn from institutional theory, which contends that the behavior of individual actors stems from shared cultural systems rather than individual motives or characteristics (Schneiberg and Clemens 2006). In his study of European blood donors, Healy (2000, 2006) found that the organization of collection systems (i.e., whether the Red Cross or national blood banks do the collecting) shapes how often people donate blood and the meaning of donating itself. According to Healy, systems of giving and altruism are social inventions rather than natural inclinations. Similarly, I argue that philanthropic institutions, like other forms of giving, are social inventions embedded in transnational as well as domestic structures that encourage and constrain the formation of grantmaking organizations. To disentangle these transnational

structures and thus provide a more macro explanation of the rise of philanthropic foundations, I once again turn to the neoinstitutional literature on “world society.”

Although I have so far introduced world society as a way to explain individual behaviors, neoinstitutionalism is originally a variant of organizational sociology that emphasizes how the cultural environment, including its legitimizing myths and rituals, shapes organizational forms, identities, and actions (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Scholars have since adapted this argument to explain the global system, which they argue comprises the historical and transnational construction of a “world society” containing cultural “blueprints” that legitimate the reorganization of social life around a rationalized set of principles, such as progress, universalism, and individualism (Meyer, Drori, and Hwang 2006; Drori 2005; Boli and Thomas 1999; Meyer et al. 1997; Boli 2005; Schofer et al., forthcoming). Moreover, these principles are embodied in the organizational structures of world society – such as multinational corporations, international non-governmental organizations, and the United Nations – which have expanded at unprecedented rates since World War II. Previous scholars have shown how the rationalized culture of world society produces a great deal of isomorphism in nation-state structures and policies, such as constitutions (Boli 1987), ministerial structures (Kim, Jang, and Hwang 2000), and environmental protection efforts (Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000).

Recent work in the neoinstitutional tradition has also begun to look at how world society produces notions of actorhood among national organizations. Organizations tend to reflect ideas and models in their environment, and this environment has become

increasingly globalized (Drori, Meyer, and Hwang 2006). For example, Longhofer and Schofer (2010) found that the global environmental regime was instrumental in providing both material and symbolic support to local environmental organizations, particularly in the developing world. Combined with the expansion of mass education and a growing global consensus on notions of human rights, world society generates a sense of empowerment for individuals and organizations at all levels to pursue various collective goods constituted in the global sphere. World society has thus produced a taken-for-granted participatory narrative in which formal organizations and individual actors have become legitimate purveyors of services and duties previously assigned to nation-states, and thus organizations are filling up every social arena imaginable (Meyer, Drori, and Hwang 2006: 41).

Scholars in this tradition thus expect organizations to proliferate and expand over time, but that the source of such proliferation and expansion rests in their global environment. The diffusion of grantmaking foundations over the past three decades suggests a similar global dynamic. Many European countries have already begun to “liberalize” their legal frameworks regarding the operation of foundations to better resemble American regulations, thus reflecting increasing institutional isomorphism in philanthropic laws (Hammack and Heydemann 2009: 11). This chapter suggests that world society has also facilitated the widespread diffusion of norms and practices for how to mobilize private wealth through formal grantmaking foundations. The organizations that make up world society and carry models and discourses to lower levels of the social order – namely, INGOs – should provide wellsprings for the formation of national

foundations. INGOs have commonly been used as a proxy for measuring how connected a nation is to the world polity through what has been coined the “global linkages strategy” (Schneiberg and Clements 2006), and I follow a similar strategy here. However, it is also worth pointing out that INGOs also absorb many of the grants that foundations administer and thus the relationship between INGOs and foundations may be more direct than how I have portrayed it here. Thus, my first world society hypothesis:

Hypothesis 7: Ties to world society, as measured by memberships in international nongovernmental organizations, will be positively associated with the overall level of grantmaking foundations.

Because world society theory is essentially a theory of global interconnectedness at both the state and nonstate level, I suggest that world society ties will also increase the presence of global grantmaking foundations, which should reflect models in world society even more closely (i.e., those foundations involved in international grantmaking or programs):

Hypothesis 7a: Ties to world society, as measured by memberships in international nongovernmental organizations, will be positively associated with the overall level of global grantmaking foundations.

Previous scholars have lamented the lack of mechanisms articulated in the world society perspective, and particularly mechanisms to explain how global discourses and models become institutionalized at the domestic level (e.g., Tilly 1999). Whereas INGOs reflect the cultural content and organizational expression of world society, scholars have recently begun to investigate how the diffusion of global models also relies on domestic

“receptor sites” assigned with the task of “unscrambling global signals for local constituencies” (Frank, Hardinge, and Wossick-Corea 2009: 277; Frank and McEneaney 1999). Similarly, I argue that local philanthropic support organizations function as important “bridges” between the global philanthropic movement and the local grantmaking sector.

For example, one of the most prominent global philanthropic networks is the Worldwide Initiatives for Grantmaker Support (WINGS). As Leat (2007: 200) points out, WINGS is not a foundation itself, but it may be seen as a “global actor in that it aspires to work worldwide to support and encourage sharing of practice and advocacy among organizations that support the development of philanthropic institutions and good practice.” WINGS works with nearly 150 domestic organizations around the globe in its mission to build domestic philanthropic institutions and spread ‘best practices’ to national philanthropic sectors. Many of these domestic “bridges” are like the Council on Foundations in the United States, a nonprofit membership organization that provides technical and advisory services for grantmakers, such as legal information and professional development. The Council on Foundations has become especially instrumental in providing legal resources and leadership training for foundations interested in the field of global grantmaking.⁸ Other examples of WINGS “bridges” include the Association for Community Relations in Romania, the Japan Foundation Center, and the South African Community Grantmakers Leadership Cooperative.

Previous research has noted the increasing professionalization and rationalization of the U.S. nonprofit sector (Hwang and Powell 2009). This chapter suggests that these

⁸ <http://www.cof.org/whoweserve/international/index.cfm>

support organizations, or bridges, also reflect the rationalization of the domestic philanthropic sector, as they are instrumental in the diffusion of theories and models for how philanthropy can and should be done (Hammack and Heydemann 2009). Previous scholars have shown how rationalized forms of governance are derived from world society, which comprises the “institutional core” of the modern culture of rationality (Drori, Meyer, and Jang 2006: 210; see also Meyer et al. 1997; Meyer, Drori, and Hwang 2006). Not surprisingly, many coordinating organizations were founded with direct support from the international community. For example, the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, Synergos, the Ford Foundation, and the Inter-American Foundation all sponsored the Mexican Center for Philanthropy (CEMEFI), founded in 1988 (Hammack and Heydemann 2009: 11). Thus, the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 8: The presence of a philanthropic “bridging” organization will be positively associated with the overall level of grantmaking foundations.

Hypothesis 8a: The presence of a philanthropic “bridging” organization will be positively associated with the overall level of global grantmaking foundations.

World society scholars have also suggested that the expansion of new organizational activity at the transnational level has also made the world seem more stateless. For example, Hwang (2006) documents the decline of state development planning over the latter half of the twentieth century and the rise of non-state actors involved in development, particularly market actors and nonprofit organizations. This chapter suggests a similar dynamic in the field of international aid and relief. Nonprofit and voluntary associations have long played an important role in United States

development and relief policy despite decreased government funding for relief activities in recent years (McCleary 2009). However, the decline of the nation-state as a central actor in world society suggests that the rise of grantmaking organizations may be inversely related to nation-state relief and aid activities. The cumulative shortfall of bilateral development assistance has reached nearly \$4 trillion since donor countries agreed to contribute 0.7% of gross national income to international aid in 1970s.⁹ The decline in bilateral development assistance from national governments mirrors the rise in global grantmaking organizations over the same period, as well as the recent expansion of world society, and thus:

Hypothesis 9: Bilateral development assistance from donor countries will be negatively associated with the overall level of grantmaking foundations.

Hypothesis 9a: Bilateral development assistance from donor countries will be negatively associated with the overall level of global grantmaking foundations.

This effect should be especially evident in the field of international aid:

Hypothesis 9b: Bilateral development assistance from donor countries will be negatively associated with the overall level of global grantmaking foundations in the field of international aid.

Finally, I consider another global explanation for the diffusion of grantmaking foundations that is not necessarily part of the world society argument. Foundations are more than legal entities serving the public good—they are also social, cultural, and political institutions often criticized for operating outside of democratic control (Anheier

⁹ <http://www.globalissues.org/article/35/foreign-aid-development-assistance#ForeignAidNumbersinChartsandGraphs>

and Daly 2007). Scholars have been particularly skeptical of the international activities of American foundations, going so far as to suggest that philanthropy, like more traditional forms of aid, actually serves to maintain global inequality by preserving the accumulation of wealth by an elite few (see Roelofs 2003; Arnove 1980; also Sklair 2001; Vogel 2006). Thus, following the insights of world-systems scholars, one might expect global grantmaking to be closely intertwined with unbalanced global economic processes (Wallerstein 1974). Although the relationship between global grantmaking and global capitalism in countries outside of the U.S. context is unclear, the possibility merits examination:

Hypothesis 10: Integration into the global economy, as measured by trade, will be positively associated with the overall level of grantmaking foundations.

Hypothesis 10a: Integration into the global economy, as measured by trade, will be positively associated with the overall level of global grantmaking foundations.

To sum up, this paper suggests that world society encourages the formation of grantmaking foundations through the diffusion of norms and practices for how to use private money for the public good. As a consequence, grantmaking has become a dominant model for enacting widespread principles constituted in world society. To test for these competing domestic and transnational explanations, I have developed statistical analyses of cross-national longitudinal data on the formation of grantmaking foundations in a large number of countries.

3.5 Data and Methods

Data on grantmaking foundations are taken from the *Europa International Foundation Directory* (Routledge 2006). The *Directory*, first published in 1974, includes eighteen volumes of descriptive data for over 2,500 foundations, trusts, charities, and other grant-making NGOs, including those with an explicit international focus. The location, founding dates, and geographic focus were recorded for each organization in the 2006 *Directory*. Founding dates were available for approximately 90% of the foundations listed and missing founding dates were distributed evenly amongst all of the countries, suggesting no immediate biases in this regard. A cross-national time series dataset (i.e., each unit of analysis is a country year, such as Algeria 1960, Algeria 1961, etc.) was constructed for approximately 160 countries in the contemporary period. All data from the *Directory* are used with one exception: When possible, all non-grantmaking foundations, such as operating foundations or voluntary associations, were omitted to ensure some structural equivalency across countries. In other words, rather than examining the overall size of the global philanthropic sector, I am only looking at the diffusion of one particular organizational form – the grantmaking foundation.

Previous studies have noted potential sources of bias that accompany data taken from organizational directories. For example, Minkoff (2002) suggests that national organizational directories often undercount organizations not located in capitol cities. Similarly, cross-national data sources, such as the one used here, likely underestimate the presence of smaller, short-lived organizations (Longhofer and Schofer 2010). Such bias is likely less of an issue here given the generous endowments, professionalization, and

formal legal status of many foundations, though I recognize the limitation. The data used here correlates at around .8 with a more general measure of voluntary associations taken from the 2001 *Encyclopedia of Associations: International Organizations* (Gale Research Group 2001), suggesting its face validity is quite good.

Three dependent variables are analyzed: 1) the cumulative number of grantmaking foundations active in a given year, including those whose geographic focus is primarily domestic; 2) the cumulative number of grantmaking foundations with a geographic focus outside the home country (“global foundations”); and 3) the cumulative number of global grantmaking foundations involved in the field of international aid, which is used in an analysis of a smaller sample than the main models. These organizations were coded using a subject index in the *Directory*. The log of each measure is used to account for skew and aid in interpretation.

Independent variables (see Table 3.1 for descriptive statistics) include:

Affluence: Although aggregate levels of wealth are a poor measure for the private wealth of any individual philanthropist, changes in the overall level of wealth in a country should predict the size of the philanthropic sector. Gross domestic product per capita data are taken from the World Development Indicators and are logged to account for skew (World Bank 2010).

Population: Included as a control variable, I take the natural log to correct for skew (World Bank 2010).

Inequality: Data on income inequality within a country are taken from the Estimated Household Income Inequality Data Set (EHII) created by the University of Texas

Inequality Project (UTIP 2004). Gini coefficients are a commonly used measure in income inequality research (see Firebaugh 2003, Alderson and Nielsen 2002 for examples). A Gini value of zero indicates that income is equally divided among all members of a given population. Conversely, a high Gini value indicates a high concentration of wealth among a smaller proportion of the population.

Secondary Enrollment Ratio: I also include a control for secondary school enrollments using the gross secondary enrollment ratio. Data, originally provided by UNESCO, are taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2010). Education has been shown to be a strong predictor of civic engagement and associational activity (e.g., Schofer and Longhofer 2009).

Democracy: Democracy is measured as the sum of two seven-point indices for civil liberties and political freedoms, with higher values representing stronger democracy (Freedom House 2009).

Government Consumption: To control for the size of the state, I include a measure of government consumption as percent of GDP. Consumption data are taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2010).

Common Law: Common law countries are measured with a dummy variable (1=common law tradition; 0=no common law tradition). Data is taken from Powell and Mitchell (2007).

Trade: I also include the total sum of imports and exports as percent of GDP as a measure of global economic integration (World Bank 2010).

Natural Disasters: I include two global measures of humanitarian crises. The first is a dummy variable representing a natural disaster anywhere in the world with a death toll of more than 10,000 in the past 3 years.

Civil Wars: The second measure of humanitarian crisis is civil war. Data on wars is coded as the total number of ongoing civil wars in a given year and comes from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.¹⁰

World Polity “Ties”: Ties to the world polity are measured in a conventional manner as national memberships in international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). Previous research has shown that INGO memberships are a good measure of the degree to which countries are embedded in world society (Boli and Thomas 1999). Data are taken from the Union of International Associations (1984-2008), which records the number of international organizations to which members of a particular country belong. The “ties” measured is logged to account for skew and aid in interpretation.

World Society “Bridges”: I also include a measure of the presence of a national, non-grantmaking organization that is a partner of the WINGS global network. These “bridging” organizations are charged with coordinating the local philanthropic sector and typically provide technical assistance for local grantmakers on legal matters and best practices. The variable is the cumulative number of WINGS partners based on when they were originally founded. Data were coded from the WINGS webpage.

Outgoing Aid: Finally, I include a measure of bilateral outgoing development assistance as proportion of GNI. The decline of bilateral development assistance in the 1990s mirrors the notion that world society has become more stateless and should thus be

¹⁰ <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/>

negatively associated with the rise of global grantmaking organizations. Data is taken from the AidData database¹¹ and is only available for the 23 Development Assistance Committee countries, so it is not included in the main models.

Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.
Total foundations, ln	2605	1.74	1.39
Global foundations, ln	2605	1.23	1.37
Aid foundations, ln	2605	0.87	1.16
GDP per capita, ln	2605	7.96	1.47
Population, ln	2605	16.37	1.57
Secondary education ratio	2605	66.47	30.41
Democracy	2605	9.95	3.54
Government consumption	2605	15.45	5.54
Inequality	2605	38.07	9.86
Natural disasters	2605	0.85	0.36
Civil wars	2605	10.54	3.30
Trade, percent GDP	2605	68.73	38.75
INGO memberships, ln	2605	6.42	1.12
WINGS partners	2605	0.55	2.32
Official development assistance (% GNI)	668	0.40	0.25

I use pooled panel regression models to predict the cumulative number of grantmaking foundations active each year for the 1970-2005 period. Panel models offer many advantages that cross-sectional OLS regression models do not, such as the ability to draw upon temporal variability in the data and the ability to use random effects to address variation between countries with a panel-specific error term. Because pooling data introduces the potential problem of serial autocorrelation from one year to the next, I estimate generalized least-square random effects models with an AR(1) correction (Baltagi 1995). It should be noted that a fixed effects model, which controls for

¹¹ www.aiddata.org

unobserved heterogeneity but is a less efficient estimator, is preferable based on the results of a Hausman test, but fixed effects models cannot be estimated with time-invariant covariates like the common law variable used here (Halaby 2004). Fixed effects models without the common law variable yielded similar results, however. I also replicate two main models with year included in the equation to account for a possible time trend; results from these models are noted with a Δ in Table 3.2. Finally, because my data is primarily a count of foundations active in a given year, and is thus overdispersed for years and/or countries for which no foundations exist, I also estimate negative binomial models with clustered standard errors. These results are mostly consistent with the GLS random effects models and are therefore presented in Appendix B.

3.6 Results

Table 3.2 presents the results of pooled panel regression models predicting all grantmaking foundations and those with a global focus for approximately 130 countries. Model 1 predicts total number of grantmaking organizations and includes all of the domestic-level variables. As expected, affluence (as measured by GDP per capita) is positively associated with the overall number of grantmaking organizations. Inequality is also significantly associated with the overall number of grantmaking organizations, lending support to the critical notion that philanthropy derives from wealth concentration in addition to overall affluence. Democracy is positively associated with changes in the overall level of grantmaking foundations within each country, although the effect is relatively small (a single unit increase in democracy increases the log of the overall

Table 3.2. GLS Random Effects Models with Ar(1) Disturbances Predicting Foundation Density, 1970-2005

<i>Dependent variable</i>	Model 1 All	Model 2 All	Model 3 All		Model 4 "Global" only	
GDP (ln)	0.398*** (0.031)	0.399*** (0.031)	0.397*** (0.031)	Δ	0.266*** (0.027)	Δ
Population (ln)	0.497*** (0.034)	0.497*** (0.034)	0.450*** (0.034)	Δ	0.361*** (0.035)	Δ
Income inequality, net	0.010*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)	Δ	0.004* (0.002)	Δ
Secondary enrollment	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	Δ	0.002*** (0.001)	Δ
Democracy	0.014*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.003)	Δ	0.011*** (0.002)	Δ
Government consumption	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)	
Common law	0.270* (0.136)	0.270* (0.136)	0.275* (0.130)	Δ	0.431** (0.140)	Δ
Natural disasters		-0.007 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.006)		-0.002 (0.005)	
Civil wars		0.0002 (0.001)	0.0004 (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)	
Trade			0.0003 (0.0003)		0.0005* (0.0002)	Δ
INGO memberships (ln)			0.062*** (0.007)	Δ	0.014* (0.006)	
WINGS partners			0.021* (0.008)		0.017** (0.007)	Δ
Constant	-10.489*** (0.630)	-10.493*** (0.630)	-9.893*** (0.624)	Δ	-7.565*** (0.608)	Δ
R-square	0.68	0.68	0.72		0.61	
Rho	0.93	0.93	0.93		0.94	
Number of countries	106	106	105		105	

Unstandardized coefficients, standard errors in parentheses

Δ Coefficient significant at the .10 level when year included in the model

* p < .05, ** p < .10, *** p < .001

number of grantmaking organizations by less than 2 percent). This finding is supported by prior research that finds a positive relationship between civic engagement and democracy (Paxton 2002). Government consumption is not significantly associated with the level of grantmaking organizations. Prior research suggests an expanded state is associated with more civic participation (e.g., Schofer and Longhofer 2009), but this does not seem to be the case with foundations, in particular. Anheier and Daly (2007) find that foundations are more common in a liberal state with a relatively small public sector, such as the United States, and a similar process may be happening here. A common law tradition is positive and significant, consistent with the hypothesis that the restrictions on tax-exempt status for non-profits in civil law countries may limit the formation of grantmaking foundations. Education is also significantly associated with overall levels of foundations.

Model 2 includes the two measures of humanitarian crises. Natural disasters are negatively associated with grantmaking foundations, whereas civil wars have a small, positive effect on foundations. However, because both variables fall short of significance, I find no support for the idea that philanthropic giving is a direct (and functional) response to humanitarian crises. As suggested earlier, humanitarian crises are growing in number but are also becoming more complex. Although they might mobilize nation-states and international organizations to intervene, they do not appear to encourage the formation of new foundations from scratch. The negative direction of the major disasters effect, in particular, is somewhat consistent with a prior finding by Tilcsik and Marquis

(2011) in which corporate giving was not associated with larger crises in the United States.

Model 3 includes the three global measures: trade, INGO ties, and WINGS partners. Trade does not have a significant effect on the presence of overall grantmaking foundations; thus I find little support for the idea that grantmaking is, in part, tied to global economic integration. INGOs have a seemingly small effect on foundations; a one percent increase in INGO memberships is associated with a 0.06 percent increase in foundations. However, INGO memberships increase, on average, ten percent annually in most countries, so this effect is relatively large. WINGS partners also have a positive effect, lending support to my second world society hypothesis that the presence of philanthropic “bridges” is positively associated with grantmaking sectors. However, this effect fails to reach significance when year is included in the model (whereas other effects remain consistent).

Model 4 examines the size of the global grantmaking sector; that is, foundations involved in international activities of some sort. As with Model 1, global grantmaking foundations are significantly associated with affluence, inequality, education, democracy, and common law tradition. Inequality is also positive and significant. Again, government consumption is not significantly associated with grantmaking foundations. Surprisingly, global grantmakers are not significantly associated with global humanitarian crises; neither civil wars nor natural disasters have a positive and significant effect. Again, this may be because humanitarian crises tend to spur interventions from established charities (i.e., Red Cross) and mobilize individual-level actions (i.e., donations), but not the

formation of new grantmaking organizations. It may also be due to how the variable itself is measured: a disaster in country A may inspire the formation of a global grantmaking organization in country B, for example. However, I am unable at this point to control for this particular network effect.

Unlike Model 3, trade has a positive and significant effect on global grantmaking organizations, lending support to the hypothesis that international philanthropy partly stems from a country's economic activities (Roelofs 2003). Future research will examine whether economic ties between countries, particularly between developing and developed countries, is positively associated with grantmaking between them. For example, are foundations in the United States more likely to administer grants to its trade partners? Unfortunately, the data used here do not yet allow for this type of analysis.

Finally, the world society variables are positively associated with global grantmaking organizations, although only WINGS partners stays significant when year is included in the model. The presence of a “bridging” organization—a local non-grantmaking organization “tapped into” the global philanthropic system—has a positive effect on the number of global grantmaking organizations in a country. Consistent with the argument that world society is an important source of models and discourses facilitating the diffusion of global grantmaking, there is a positive, significant effect of INGO memberships and bridging organizations on grantmaking organizations. In sum, the analyses presented here lend support to most of my hypotheses; more specifically, grantmaking foundations are positively associated with embeddedness in world society, democracy, legal traditions, affluence, and inequality. However, they are not a function

of state size or humanitarian crises. Also, it does not appear to be the case that domestic and global foundations follow different trajectories; in both Models 3 and 4, the effects are mostly the same with the exception of trade.

A set of corollary analyses is presented in Appendix B. The negative binomial models are perhaps a better fit for the count data employed here, especially in earlier years when there was greater overdispersion. Many of the main effects hold up: affluence, democracy, common law, and INGO memberships all have positive effects on the size of the grantmaking sector. However, two differences stand out: inequality and WINGS partners no longer have significant effects, and inequality actually flips negative. Thus, although the random effects models suggest that inequality may encourage the formation of grantmaking foundations, the result is not robust and should be investigated through future research.

Table 3.3 presents random effects models that include a measure of official development assistance from governments. The small sample presents problems for panel models, such as the inability to control for many covariates and the potential bias posed by extreme outliers, so results should still be taken with caution. Model 5 examines the effect of aid on the overall number of grantmaking foundations. As expected, aid has a significant, negative effect on the number of grantmaking organizations. Similarly, Model 6 reports a negative effect of outgoing aid on global grantmaking organizations, though it is only marginally significant. However, in Model 7, which includes only global grantmaking organizations with a programmatic focus on international aid, official

Table 3.3. GLS Random Effects Models with Ar(1) Disturbances Predicting Foundation Density in 23 Development Assistance Committee Countries, 1970-2005

<i>Dependent variable</i>	Model 5 All foundations	Model 6 Global only	Model 7 Aid only
Official development assistance (% GNI)	-0.051* (0.022)	-0.058+ (0.030)	-0.093* (0.043)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.491*** (0.040)	0.604*** (0.051)	0.559*** (0.067)
Population (ln)	0.559*** (0.076)	0.581*** (0.079)	0.459*** (0.072)
Government consumption	0.014*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.003)	0.019*** (0.004)
Common law	0.748** (0.268)	0.594* (0.270)	0.724** (0.239)
Natural disasters	0.001 (0.004)	0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (0.008)
Civil wars	0.0003 (0.001)	0.0003 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
INGO memberships (ln)	0.038* (0.015)	0.047* (0.020)	0.067* (0.028)
Constant	-11.413*** (1.186)	-13.347*** (1.258)	-11.706*** (1.231)
R-square	0.73	0.72	0.70
Rho	0.97	0.95	0.92
Number of countries	23	23	23

Unstandardized coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

development assistance has a much larger negative effect, thus lending support to my third set of hypotheses: as world society becomes more stateless and national governments play less of a role in the field of aid and relief, non-state actors, such as

global grantmaking organizations, become key development actors. However, the low sample size, particularly among non-OECD countries, indicates that further research is needed to confirm this hypothesis.

3.7 Discussion

Previous research on philanthropy has largely focused on individual donors or state and market-based theories to explain the rise of philanthropic sectors across national contexts. However, little comparative research has been done on philanthropic sectors in a large number of countries to either confirm or cast doubt on these theories. The lack of comparative research, and the principally domestic theories that motivate much of prior research, suggest that a global theory of foundations is needed. To this end, this chapter examines both temporal and cross-national trends in the emergence of grantmaking organizations and, in particular, those organizations engaged in international grantmaking, using a unique organizational-level dataset of foundations over the 1970-2005 period. The chapter set out to show whether grantmaking foundations are simply a product of affluence and education, or whether they are also associated with income inequality and public sector size. The analyses suggest that affluence, education, and democracy are all positively associated with foundations, but so is inequality, thereby revealing the tension underlying the growing popularity of the “philanthrocapitalists.”

Like the previous chapter, this one also set out to determine whether grantmaking foundations are tied to global civil society and a transnational philanthropic community. The results of my analysis show that the diffusion of grantmaking foundations within

countries is related to how tightly countries are embedded in world society, as well the presence of local “bridges” charged with deciphering its cultural models and discourses. Moreover, global grantmaking organizations are negatively associated with official bilateral aid from governments, further suggesting that grantmaking has become a dominant model for mobilizing private wealth for the public good in the modern period. However, despite their roots in global civil society, it does not appear that global grantmaking foundations follow a vastly different trajectory than other foundations; in other words, grantmaking is a global phenomenon, but it is not necessarily global in itself.

The analysis in this chapter provides a starting point for developing a macrosociological approach to studying cross-national differences in global philanthropic sectors. Anheier and Daly (2007) provide a useful typology for studying cross-national foundations sectors by looking to the size of the public sector in relation to the size of the “third” sector. The results presented here suggest that researchers should also look at how deeply a country is embedded in world society, particularly when looking at the emergence of global grantmaking organizations. Future research on non-profits and foundations will benefit from more comparative research on similar organizations using datasets like the one employed here. Further research will also shed light on the impact these foundations have in the sectors in which they operate, a topic I turn to in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 4

DO FOUNDATIONS MATTER? EXPLORING THE CONSEQUENCES OF CHARITABLE ACTIVITY ACROSS THREE SOCIAL SECTORS

4.1 Introduction

The previous two chapters attempted to explain the global origins of philanthropic activity at the individual and organizational levels, both important topics for our sociological understanding of altruism and charity. I have attempted to show how philanthropic activities are more than aggregates of individual values, impulses, and behaviors; rather, they are collective phenomena embedded in social contexts that are increasingly cosmopolitan and transnational. This chapter addresses the following question: Does any of this charitable activity really matter? In a diffuse world society abundant with multinational firms with corporate social responsibility initiatives, international organizations and transnational social movements, and states with large (if shrinking) public sectors, does a local philanthropic sector really lead to its desired outcomes?

There is ample reason to think that foundations matter although to what extent is debated. Putnam's (2000) work on social capital has framed much of the debate, suggesting that voluntary associations and, by extension, philanthropies are inherently beneficial institutions. Similarly, Anheier and Daly (2004: 159) make the case that "foundations are a potentially global force – not as powerful as nation states and transnational corporations, to be sure, but nonetheless independent global actors capable of moving social and political agendas and meeting unmet needs." Anheier and

Hammack (2010) point to a number of general contributions that foundations have made in the United States, including the relief of immediate needs (such as relief to the poor and disabled) and the creation of innovative policies, public perceptions, and achievements (such as in the arts and sciences) (see also Fleishman 2007). Still, skepticism remains. Scholars have pointed to the ineffectiveness of foundations that stems from their poor use of resources, amateurish goals, and paternalistic tendencies, not to mention their role as potential tax shelters and dynasty preservers (Anheier and Hammack 2010; see also Frumkin 2006; Nielsen 1972, 1985; Arnove 1982; Roelofs 2003; and others).

Despite a wealth of literature on foundations from all points along the spectrum, from the laudatory to the critical, empirical research on their impact in specific sectors and, more broadly, across societies is rare. This lacuna is partly due to seemingly insurmountable methodological difficulties, such as creating comparable measures of philanthropic sectors across disparate societies as well as choosing appropriate outcome measures. We should not let such skepticism impede the empirical research that can be done so long as the research is conducted with these challenges in mind. To advance our understanding of philanthropic impacts across society in a systematic yet modest way, I draw on Anheier and Hammack's (2010) advice to examine specific sectors at particular times, though I once again adopt a global purview. More specifically, I compare the general effects of specific philanthropic sectors across a large number of countries in three different domains of public goods: 1) arts and humanities, 2) children's health, and 3) environmental protection.

Although exploratory, the overall story painted in this chapter is sensible and quite promising. In all three sectors, evidence suggests that foundations have a positive impact on promoting arts institutions, improving major health outcomes for children, and reducing carbon emissions in most countries. The effects are not always direct, however: foundations sometimes act indirectly through other civic organizations (in the case of the arts) or interact negatively with the size of the public sector (in the case of health). I begin the chapter with an overview of theories regarding the role of philanthropy in catalyzing social change, including an institutional approach that I think best captures how foundations operate at the aggregate level. More specifically, I argue, and my results confirm, that foundations operate in society in a way similar to that of INGOs – in particular sectors, they lead to desired outcomes like more conventional world societies, perhaps as a mechanism for the diffusion of world culture or more directly as a measure of local resources. After reviewing this argument, I then introduce the three sectors analyzed, each of which address key debates in the literature, including foundations as conduits of funds and symbolic resources, foundations as possible mediators of other civic organization effects, and foundations as expressions of broader global culture.

This chapter builds on my prior work (Schofer and Longhofer 2011; Longhofer and Schofer 2010) and the previous two chapters of this dissertation by exploring whether the global dimensions of local philanthropic sectors across multiple societies enhance their association with social change or merely render them epiphenomenal, a tension simmering in the literature on transnationalism and civic life (e.g., Stark, Vedres,

and Bruszt 2006). I focus on this important issue rather than related, micro-level questions, such as how individual foundations can become more effective through strategic philanthropy and non-profit management. Also, due to the global level approach of this chapter, I am only able to trace the effect of the organizational dimensions of local philanthropic sectors and not the dispersal of funds and the implementation of specific programs. Data on endowment sizes or grants made across societies is simply not available across countries or across time. This is not to say that the organizations themselves should not be discounted, however. As Anheier and Winder (2007: 3) point out, these foundations “are nonetheless philanthropic institutions that that are more reflective of local needs and capacities, and with greater innovative potential than some ready-made, imported legal form could offer.” Moreover, as I have attempted to show in the previous two chapters, much can be gained by looking to how philanthropy is organized in society. Organizations provide the infrastructure for charity and more sustained forms of giving, and are thus important sociological phenomena in their own right.

4.2 Foundations as Agents of Social Change

Foundations have long held great promise as agents of social change. However, pinning down such social change is easier said than done. For John D. Rockefeller, philanthropic giving was intended to tackle the root causes of social problems. Because finding a root cause is oftentimes no easier than locating a needle in a haystack, particularly as the roots go deeper and deeper, foundation expert Kenneth Prewitt (2004:

5) simply summed up the aims of foundations as such: “less of the bad things – poverty, war, sickness, illiteracy, violence, parochialism, hunger; and, conversely, more of the good things – freedom, art, understanding, security, education, health.” Yet, despite a wealth of knowledge on the aims and origins of foundations, the simple fact remains that “we know much more about how foundations came to be than what they accomplish” (Prewitt 2006: 37).

One exception is a recent edited volume from Anheier and Hammack (2010), in which they and their colleagues chart the influences American foundations have made in public school reforms, higher education, arts and culture, scientific research, social welfare, healthcare, and public policy. Their volume is impressive in large part because it is one of the first to cast a wide net on the contributions of foundations to society. It also focuses solely on the American case, which provides a useful starting point for theorizing foundation influence but offers much less in terms of a global comparison. Keeping in mind that the literature on foundation contributions is still quite new and primarily based on a few case studies, I attempt to distill some preliminary hypotheses for a global analysis.

Drawing from Gordon and Babchuk’s (1959) widely cited typology of civic associations, foundations might be considered a form of instrumental association, designed to exert influence over or improve particular social conditions through their disbursement of money, knowledge, and persuasion. The mechanisms through which foundations exert influence and bring about change are many. For example, Prewitt (2006) suggests six different “change strategies” that foundations adopt to put their

philanthropic dollars to use, including 1) creating new knowledge, such as through scholarships and libraries; 2) applying knowledge by investing in scientific research or specific professions; 3) analyzing public policy to better advance public purposes; 4) pushing governments to adopt more progressive policies; 5) supporting social movements in areas like women's rights, environmental protection, and civil rights; and 6) delivering social services through their grant-making, oftentimes as a way to pilot a new innovation.

Anheier and Hammack (2010) offer their own taxonomy of foundation roles, including foundations as social entrepreneurs (for responding to social needs beyond the market), institution builders (by building coalitions across sectors), risk takers (by investing in areas where success is uncertain), and value conservers (by supporting practices treasured by donors but unsupported more generally). A more critical take is offered by Dowie (2001), who, in his investigative history of American foundations, argues that foundations primarily serve as “leveraged influence” over social and public policy which has led to both successful and unsuccessful consequences. While such taxonomies elucidate how individual foundations attempt to effect change, they offer little in terms of understanding how philanthropic sectors, which encompass many different strategies that collectively may bring about change even if individual foundations flounder, might be associated with particular social goods. Such theories also assume that foundations are by definition powerful actors with real interests rather than expressions of larger social institutions that may render very different expectations of their consequences, a point I discuss further in the coming pages. Still yet, the literature offers a simple hypothesis worth exploring:

Hypothesis 1: Philanthropic foundations will be positively associated with desired outcomes in the social sectors in which they operate.

Additional expectations of philanthropic consequences can be drawn by looking at the relationship of foundations to other actors operating in the sector, most notably the state and other civil society organizations. A corollary of the market and state-failure theories discussed in Chapter 3 (though largely unsupported) can be extended here; that is, foundations intervene in sectors where other social service providers do not, and thus their effects should be more pronounced in these sectors. Foundations, like other non-profit organizations, are “quasi-state” and “quasi-market” actors in that they provide goods and services the public either needs or wants (Prewitt 2006). Given the superior size and scope of both the state and the market, the foundation sector must “secure its place by proving that it offers what neither the state nor the market provides” (Prewitt 2006: 357; see also Weisbrod 1987; Salamon 1992). We might also think of this as the substitution hypothesis: foundations hold comparative advantages that make them well-suited to substitute for the public sector despite their relative lack of wealth (Anheier and Hammack 2010). Thus, we should expect foundations to have stronger effects in sectors or societies where they are central service providers relative to the state.

An illustration of this idea can be found in the history of healthcare in the United States. In the first three decades of the twentieth century, foundations played a central role in establishing regional healthcare hierarchies of hospitals, clinics, and research centers (Fox 2010). However, in the post-WW II era, foundations struggled to maintain relevancy in these areas as the federal government began to implement programs like

Medicare and Medicaid, which increased public healthcare spending by shifting healthcare costs to the state and federal government. Today, foundations continue to search for more specialized niches as the U.S. government continues to increase spending in healthcare (or they have chosen to tackle global health challenges like the Gates Foundation).

There is reason to suggest such “crowding out” is a uniquely American phenomenon. The state has long played an important role in fostering a vibrant philanthropic sector in places like Sweden, where a generous welfare state works alongside an estimated 30,000 foundations (Anheier 2001). Similarly, Schofer and Longhofer (2011) found in a cross-national analysis that larger nation-states (in terms of scope and size) foster more civic associations through establishing public agendas and legitimating private participation in pursuing them. Still, prior research has yet to trace whether the size of the foundation sector in a generous welfare state enhances or reduces its effectiveness in bringing about social change. It still seems reasonable to hypothesize that effects of philanthropic sectors will be inversely associated with the effect of the public sector in some domains (i.e., healthcare), a possibility that can be explored statistically via an interaction effect:

Hypothesis 2: The effect of philanthropic foundations will interact negatively with the size of the public sector.

In addition to working vis-à-vis the state, foundations also operate indirectly through partnerships with and the direct funding of other civil society organizations, such as voluntary associations and social movement organizations. As discussed in Chapter 3,

the past few decades have been coined the “global associational revolution” (Salamon et al. 2004), and foundations have certainly played a role in its development. Funding civil society organizations is one example of foundations as “institution builders,” a term Anheier and Hammack (2010) use to describe the role foundations play in forging coalitions and offering financial resources to other organizations pursuing needs unmet elsewhere. Oliviero and Simmons (2007) cite the rise of transparency movements as one example where foundations have provided key resources to civil society organizations or started new ones from scratch. If a primary function of foundations is to provide resources to other organizations via grants, then any effect on social change should be mediated through these other organizations.

The notion of foundations as benefactors or patrons of other social change agents has a rich history in the literature on social movements, in which foundations have been viewed as a source of resource mobilization (Mayer and Zald 1977), resource dependency (Pfeiffer and Salancik 2003), pluralistic ideologies (Dahl 1982), or elite cooptation (Domhoff 2002; Bruelle and Jenkins 2005). Critics along these lines tend to suggest that foundations temper the radical elements of social movements and push them in more conservative or conventional directions (e.g., Haines 1984; Ostrower 2002; though see Delfin and Tang 2008). Much of this literature has focused on only one side of the equation – i.e., how funding from foundations leads to dependency or cooptation – and not the impact such funding may have on the social problem being addressed. One notable exception is Bartley’s (2007) work on forest certification, in which he found that foundations were instrumental in constructing an entire “organizational field” of social

movement organizations devoted to creating a market-based alternative to boycotts and other disruptive tactics. In this case, foundations catalyzed an industry of forest certification through its funding priorities. Although I am unable to provide such detailed case studies for the sectors analyzed in this chapter, the general process of civil society organizations mediating the direct effects of foundations produces the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: Philanthropic foundations will be positively associated with improvements in the social sectors in which they operate, but this effect will operate indirectly through other civil society organizations.

Much of the prior literature on foundations begins with the assumption that foundations are fundamentally powerful actors with unique interests and skills that confer upon them particular advantages. If foundations are considered powerful actors in isolation, then the consequences of their activity can be explained by looking to internal factors like strategy, leadership, and endowment size, or possibly external factors of their locality, such as their relationship with the state, other organizations, and their grant recipients, or the circumstances of the problems addressed through their programs. The previous three hypotheses test for these possibilities: foundations can effect change directly as responders to immediate needs or as substitutions for the public sector, or indirectly through the funding of other civil society organizations. However, when foundations are considered expressions of a more diffuse global culture of altruism and virtue that imbues in them authority and legitimacy to pursue social problems, as the previous two chapters have shown, then their consequences are perhaps less obvious.

To further understand the effects of philanthropic organizations, I turn once again to institutional theory. Institutional theory, particularly its more constructivist variants, posits that social action takes place at the meso-level through shared norms and logics among loosely coordinated but mutually oriented actors (Jepperson 1991; see also Fligstein and McAdam 2011). This meso-level of social action has many monikers, including organizational fields (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) and, more recently, strategic action fields (Fligstein and McAdam 2010). According to scholars in this area, actors are themselves derivative of a meso-level cultural system of agency, or norms and scripts that legitimate individuals and organizations as authorities for pursuing various (and also highly scripted) interests (Meyer and Jepperson 2000). However, this is not to suggest that actors do not exist, per se; however, the meso-level institutional environment does heavily shape their actions and perceptions (Schofer et al., forthcoming).

The previous chapter attempted to demonstrate how foundations are manifestations of a world society pinned on common understandings of virtue and generosity. Using the language of institutional theory, the agency of foundations that bestows upon them a scripted sense of responsibility and efficacy constructed at the level of world society. But does the possibility of agency constructed in world society render the effect of constructed actors at the local level – in this case, foundations – epiphenomenal? Do foundations have actual consequences or are they mere expressions of world society? In their study of environmental organizations in Asia, Frank et al. (2007) find this to be the case – the global environmental regime both constructs local environmental actors and leads to environmental policy reforms, but there is very little

connection between policy adoption and the local actors themselves. World society may construct local actors to pursue social change, but translating actorhood into social change might be a different issue altogether, thereby generating the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: Philanthropic foundations will have weak or no effects in countries or sectors where direct world society effects (i.e., INGO ties) are strong.

However, there is reason to think otherwise. Schofer and Hironaka (2005) draw upon Jepperson's (1991) notion of "institutional effects" to explain how countries move along similar paths toward greater environmental protection even when policies are not adopted. They comment that "diffuse and highly-valued cultural models set the stage for a whole host of possible indirect and synergistic effects" (Schofer and Hironaka 2005: 28). In this formulation, foundations may very well have consequences for collective goods, but teasing apart their consequences, especially when considered as a category of institutional effects of world society, might be difficult. Another potential institutional effect of world society is a bolstering of authority that may, in turn, enhance the effectiveness of foundations. For example, in their study of voluntary associations around the globe, Schofer and Longhofer (2011: 578) conclude "the ascendance of associations-as-myth may increase their consequences, as associations are heaped with legitimacy and given greater accordance by formal structures of governance."

There is another reason to think that foundations may lead to desired outcomes beyond their bolstered legitimacy: their social position within their given sector. In their elaborate theory of strategic action fields, Fligstein and McAdam (2011) adopt an interactionist take of social action that situates actors within shared rules, common

understandings, and relationships of a given field. The authors contend that it is within these strategic action fields that actors compete with other actors for advantages and resources, thereby instilling an element of conflict and contestation absent in the more neoinstitutional versions of similar environments. Accordingly, in any given action field, some actors will simply have more social power, more resources, and superior knowledge of the rules of the game that makes them better suited to effecting change than other actors in the field. Fligstein and McAdam identify actors that have a disproportionate amount of power and influence as incumbents, and I would hold that, in some sectors, foundations occupy a similar position. In other words, whereas world society confers upon foundations their sense of actorhood, their sense of efficacy also stems from their resources, strategies, and social position.

This idea makes empirical investigation tricky, as both an institutionalist account of foundations and a more conventional one that takes their actorhood for granted lead to similar conclusions – foundations should, in general, be associated with positive outcomes – and it is only the mechanisms for how they do so that varies. However, it also suggests a more refined expectation that once again looks to world society. If world society confers upon foundations some degree of authority, and if this authority is then translated into positive outcomes in a specific sector, then we should expect foundations to have greater consequences in sectors that are highly reflective of content in world society. Put simply, the authority of foundations should be strong in sectors where world society effects are also strong. In the following analysis, these sectors would most certainly include the environment and children, both of which are central issues in global

society (Frank et al. 2000; Boyle and Kim 2010), and perhaps some particular arts sectors. Thus:

Hypothesis 5: Philanthropic foundations will be positively associated with improvements in social sectors where world society effects are also strong.

Whereas much of the philanthropy literature assumes foundations and philanthropists to be natural, powerful actors, institutional theory holds that they are highly scripted entities embedded in cultural system that constitutes their agency. It is unclear without empirical research if such a possibility should lead to different outcomes, so it is to such analysis that I now turn.

4.3 Research Strategy

Because this is the first study to my knowledge that examines the effects of philanthropic sectors across a large number of countries, I have chosen to conduct brief case studies of three different sectors using statistical modeling techniques. The goal is to test the five hypotheses broadly, meaning that I do not test each hypothesis within each sector but, rather, I test the ones most relevant. For example, in the arts and humanities case, I examine whether foundations have a direct effect on outcomes or if the effect is mediated by other arts organizations; in the case of child health outcomes, I test for the interaction of foundations and public sector size; and, in the case of the environment, I focus on whether foundations have an effect in a sector where conventional world polity effects are well established. It is hoped that this “kitchen sink” approach will allow for better generalizations than an analysis of a single sector can provide.

The main data source for foundation sectors is the 2006 *International Foundation Directory* described in more detail in Chapter 3. Grantmaking foundations were reverse coded along a range of themes using the “subject index” in the directory, including: arts and humanities; environment; law; human rights; education; health and medicine; public welfare; economic affairs; and international affairs. More details on how each sector was then used for analysis are provided in each case. To decrease the repetitive nature of the methods and data sources, I have listed details for all independent variables in Appendix B.

4.4 Do Foundations Still Support the Arts?

My first set of empirical analyses addresses the following hypotheses: foundations will have a positive effect on desired outcomes (*Hypothesis 1*); foundation effects will be mediated by other civil society organizations (*Hypothesis 3*); foundations will have no effect (*Hypothesis 4*); and foundations will have stronger effects in sectors where world society effects are also strong (*Hypothesis 5*). The analyses also address a more straightforward question: Do foundations still support the arts?

The notion that foundations have always been patrons of the arts is a bit misleading, at least in the United States. As Smith (2010) notes, by the end of the nineteenth century, urban elites worked with local and municipal governments to set up botanical gardens, museums, libraries, parks, and more, but it wasn't until the 1920s that the big foundations, such as Rockefeller and Carnegie, took up the arts. This late arrival stems from the peculiar place the arts hold in American culture. Arts are primarily

considered a hybrid mix of public and commercial goods, or what economists have called “merit goods”, and individual donors and a paying public have historically financed their growth through ticket sales and membership fees. As such, “cultural policymaking has always faced an uphill battle in the United States, and foundation support for cultural research and policy innovation has been erratic” (Smith 2010: 266). Such erratic support does not seem to be a uniquely American phenomenon, either. According to a recent European Union report, 82 percent of EU citizens support free access to cultural activities but slightly more than 20 percent feel that foundations and trusts are well suited to launch such activities. In fact, foundations and trusts rank well behind national governments, EU institutions, local and regional governments, and EU citizens themselves (European Commission 2011).

It is not just the hybrid nature of arts as a cultural good that makes foundation support inconsistent – it is also how arts are typically funded. As Toepler (2010) notes, foundations can support the arts through fellowships to individual artists, operating grants that can provide stable funding for a fledgling museum, investments in arts education, or large-scale policy changes (also Smith 2010). Such variety makes generalizing the effects of foundation support for the arts at the aggregate level difficult. Still, Toepler identifies three ways foundations can make impacts in the arts: through economic support (via funding of artistic ventures), artistic support (by promoting or preserving particular art forms), or via policy. For example, the Carnegie Corporation of New York mobilized interest in the arts by funding arts education in colleges and universities, and it is thus why universities remain key cultural actors in the United States (Smith 2010; DiMaggio

1986). However, this is again taken from the American and, to some extent, European Union experience. It is an interesting empirical question whether foundations in other parts of the world increase arts participation or support arts institutions, or if it is primarily consumers, individual donors, or even the state that support such activities.

A lack of cross-national data on arts institutions means that only a modest step toward answering this question is possible. I draw upon two measures that have some reliable data across a large number of countries and a decent number of years that also represent two important realms of the arts: 1) tertiary graduates in the arts and humanities, and 2) cinemas in a country. Both sets of data come from the UNESCO's Framework for Cultural Statistics, which has been tracking cultural statistics of various sorts since the 1980s.¹² Unfortunately, arts education data is only available since 1998, and cinema data cover a five-year time period from 1995 to 1999. Key independent variables include arts foundations (taken from the 2006 *Directory*) and cultural associations, a measure of voluntary, non-grantmaking associations in a country devoted to cultural issues broadly defined, such as arts organizations, sport clubs, hobby associations, and the like. Data are taken from the *Encyclopedia of Associations* electronic database (Gale 2010).¹³ Because the data are pooled panels, and because the short time periods make fixed effects models less reliable (due to too many degrees of freedom lost), I use random effects models to predict four dependent variables: 1) tertiary graduates in the arts and humanities (logged); 2) the percent of total tertiary graduates

¹² Available online at <http://www.uis.unesco.org/culture/Pages/framework-cultural-statistics.aspx>.

with degrees in the arts and humanities; 3) the total number of cinema screens (logged); and 4) the total number of cinema screens per capita (logged).

Table 4.1 GLS Random Effects Models Predicting Arts and Humanities Graduates, 1998-2005

<i>Dependent variable</i>	Model 1 Total (ln)	Model 2 Total (ln)	Model 3 Percent	Model 4 Percent
Population (ln)	1.119*** (0.088)	1.133*** (0.087)	-0.219 (0.771)	-0.283 (0.779)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.603*** (0.105)	0.713*** (0.113)	1.947* (0.944)	1.842 (1.024)
Democracy	0.007 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.017)	-0.196 (0.131)	-0.246 (0.144)
Tertiary enrollments (% gross)	0.018*** (0.003)	0.017*** (0.003)	-0.003 (0.027)	0.001 (0.027)
INGO memberships (ln)	-0.470* (0.202)	-0.412* (0.204)	-4.498** (1.629)	-4.670** (1.676)
Arts foundations (ln)	0.004 (0.120)	0.217 (0.135)	0.791 (1.042)	0.909 (1.201)
Cultural associations (ln)		-0.312** (0.104)		0.183 (0.914)
Constant	-10.635*** (1.345)	-11.896*** (1.366)	30.232* (11.939)	33.116** (12.440)
Observations	449	442	415	408
Number of countries	96	94	90	89

Unstandardized coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .10, *** p < .001

Results for arts and humanities graduates are reported in Table 4.1. Models 1 reports the effects of arts foundations on total graduates in the arts and humanities, as

well as controls for economic development, population, democracy, world polity ties, and gross tertiary education levels (see Appendix B for variable information). As expected, economic development and the overall size of tertiary sector are positively and significantly associated with the number of university graduates in the arts. World polity ties – estimated using the conventional measure of INGO memberships – have a negative effect, suggesting that this particular arts realm is not particularly reflective of content in world society. There is also no significant effect of arts foundations, suggesting that a vibrant philanthropic sector in the arts does not have the same effect the Carnegie Corporation had in the United States in the early twentieth century. Similarly, foundations are not significantly associated with the percent of total graduates with degrees in the arts, thus lending support to my fourth hypothesis that foundations have no effect on desired outcomes, though it is not because world society effects are particularly strong (Model 3). Together the negative INGO effect and the non-effect of foundations lend indirect support to a corollary of my fifth hypothesis: foundations do not have strong effects in sectors unsupported by world society. It also does not seem that other civic organizations engaged in cultural activities are associated with arts education. In Model 2, these organizations even have a puzzling negative effect. Democracy also has a perplexing negative effect in Models 3 and 4, though this makes some sense: in another paper, we found that democracy encourages most types of voluntary associations except cultural ones, possibly due to the diminished threat these organizations pose to non-democratic regimes (Schofer and Longhofer 2010).

Table 4.2 GLS Random Effects Models Predicting Cinema Screens, 1995-1999

<i>Dependent variable</i>	Model 5 Total (ln)	Model 6 Total (ln)	Model 7 Per capita (ln)	Model 8 Per capita (ln)
Population (ln)	0.857*** (0.089)	0.817*** (0.090)	-0.087 (0.060)	-0.118* (0.060)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.348** (0.114)	0.217 (0.134)	0.226** (0.078)	0.135 (0.090)
Democracy	0.015 (0.011)	0.016 (0.011)	0.007 (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)
Tertiary enrollments (% gross)	0.012* (0.005)	0.010* (0.005)	0.009* (0.003)	0.007* (0.004)
INGO memberships (ln)	-0.632*** (0.136)	-0.609*** (0.143)	-0.457*** (0.102)	-0.425*** (0.107)
Arts foundations (ln)	0.382*** (0.114)	0.262* (0.125)	0.270*** (0.080)	0.180* (0.088)
Cultural associations (ln)		0.263* (0.112)		0.179* (0.078)
Constant	-7.777*** (1.635)	-6.401*** (1.814)	3.462** (1.079)	4.387*** (1.195)
Observations	152	148	152	148
Number of countries	50	49	50	49

Unstandardized coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
+ p<.10, * p < .05, ** p < .10, *** p < .001

A clearer picture appears in models predicting cinemas in a country (Table 4.2). In Model 6, arts foundations have a positive and significant effect on cinemas. Because both variables are logged, we can interpret it as such: a ten percent increase in arts foundations is associated with a 3.7 percent increase in cinemas [$1.10^{0.38}=1.037$]. Arts foundations have a similar effect on cinemas per capita (Model 7). Also worth noting is

the consistent negative effect of INGO memberships; however, the positive effect of foundations does not lend support to my hypothesis that foundation effects will be strongest in sectors less reflective of world society.

A more complex picture emerges when cultural associations are included. In Model 6, for example, cultural associations not only have a positive effect on cinemas – they also reduce the foundations effect by one third. The same is true for the per capita measure (Model 8). These effects should be interpreted with caution as so few cases are vulnerable to multicollinearity (in this case, foundations and associations correlate at .69). However, it does suggest that foundations are both direct and indirect supporters of this particular arts activity in some countries. It is possible – and perhaps likely – that cultural associations serve as an infrastructure for the enjoyment of arts as a “merit good” (i.e., a good supported by people able and willing to pay for it) in other countries as they are in the United States. For example, if a cinema is created to showcase foreign films in a given community, is it likely to be supported by an arts foundation whose endowment may be invested in arts education or an organized group of local cinephiles willing to support it with weekly ticket sales? Or, put differently, if consumers primarily support cinemas, then cultural associations may be a better indicator of consumer support for the arts than foundations. The analysis here cannot answer a question at this level, but it does hint that both civic organizations and foundations are primary sustainers of cinemas.

To be sure, the analyses above offer more clues than answers. More research with better data is needed to untangle the relationship of philanthropy to arts activities. However, the implications of the results are provocative. I do find evidence that

foundations are positively associated with extracurricular arts activities (i.e., cinemas), but they are not associated with arts activities that Toepler (2010) might claim are more policy driven (i.e., arts education). Perhaps more pressing local needs, as well as the trend toward greater accountability and rationalization confronting the nonprofit world in recent years (Hwang and Powell 2009), direct foundations toward more measurable results than many cultural or artistic goods can provide. The next section looks at one such issue: the health of children in developing countries.

4.5 Foundations, the Public Sector, and Children's Health

This section turns attention to the relationship between foundations and the public sector using the case of health outcomes of children in developing countries, a significant child rights issue over the past three decades. Foundations are increasingly getting involved in human rights issues more generally. According to Benjamin and Quigley (2010), United States foundations granted more than \$70.5 million in the area of human rights in 2001. This is compared to just \$9.4 million ten years earlier. The nearly eight-fold increase over the course of a decade can be attributed to many things, such as increased global interdependency, the end of the cold war, and more complex and severe global problems. It also reveals the ongoing structuration of the global human rights system as propelled through social movements, treaties, and international organizations (see Cole 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Occupying a large space in the global human rights system are the rights of the child. The 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, along with the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, posed new

targets for mostly developing countries dealing with problems like child labor, poor nutrition, low levels of education (primarily for girls), and child marriage (Boyle and Kim 2010). Working alongside states in reaching these targets were a host of global and local nongovernmental organizations, including foundations. Most notably, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has provided a gold standard for foundations, non-profits, and corporations looking to solve problems ranging from malaria and tuberculosis to girls' access to schooling.

Much of this philanthropic intervention has targeted the health sector. For example, of all the foundations in my dataset in non-high income OECD countries, more than one-quarter operated in the field of health in 2005. But have foundations actually been successful in improving key outcomes in the sectors, such as immunizations and infant mortality? Do foundations fulfill a complementary role to the state in this sector or do they substitute for what the state is unable to provide? Do foundations have an effect above and beyond the effect of more direct world polity effects, such as child rights INGOs? This section sheds light on these questions and uncovers the relationship between foundation sectors and the state.

Immunizations and infant mortality rates are important indicators of child well being. Goal 4 of the Millennium Development Goals, for example, urges countries to reduce child mortality by two-thirds by 2015 through boosting nutrition and reducing childhood diseases, like measles, through immunizations. In this analysis, I examine the effects of medical foundations on three dependent variables: 1) the percent of 12-23 month old children immunized against diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (also known as

DPT immunizations); 2) the percent of 12-23 month old children immunized against measles; and 3) the number of infants that die before reaching one year of age (per 1,000 births).¹⁴ Data on all dependent variables come from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2010). Key independent variables include the number of medical foundations in a country (from the 2006 *Directory*), the number of non-grantmaking medical associations (Gale 2010), memberships in child rights INGOs, and government consumption, a measure of public sector size measured as all government purchases of goods and services as percent of GDP (World Bank 2010). Because there are a sufficient number of country-years, and I am primarily interested in child health outcomes *within* countries as medical foundations grow more than health outcomes *across* countries, I use a fixed effects model. I also include a lagged dependent variable in the immunization models to control for prior levels.¹⁵ Because reducing infant mortality and increasing immunizations are greater challenges in the developing world, I focus only on non-high income OECD countries. All models range from 1983 to 2006.

Table 4.3 reports results for the DPT immunization measure. Beginning with Model 9, two findings are worth noting. First, child rights INGOs are positively associated with DPT immunizations, a finding consistent previous literature (Boyle and Kim 2010). Second, medical non-grantmaking associations have no effect. While similar associations were important for cinemas in the previous analysis, this non-finding

¹⁴ The fourth Millenium Development Goal actually refers to child mortality, or the number of children who die before reaching the age of 5. I use infant mortality because there is slightly better data over time, but results for both variables are identical. Infant mortality and child mortality correlate at .99.

¹⁵ I do not include a lagged dependent variable for the infant mortality models. Data is not available for every year and thus the dependent variable is interpolated, leading to high correlation between it and the lagged outcome measure. Thus, these models simply examine cross-sectional relationships rather than change over time. Models without an interpolated dependent variable produce similar effects but with larger standard errors.

Table 4.3 Fixed Effects Models Predicting Childhood DPT Immunizations in Non-OECD Countries, 1983-2006

	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11
Population (ln)	18.066*** (2.808)	17.724*** (2.810)	18.185*** (2.802)
Urban population (%)	0.057 (0.090)	0.050 (0.090)	0.079 (0.090)
GDP per capita (log)	0.794 (1.407)	0.601 (1.409)	0.193 (1.407)
Democracy	-0.021 (0.061)	-0.024 (0.061)	-0.037 (0.061)
Government consumption	-0.013 (0.061)	-0.016 (0.061)	0.117 (0.069)
Trade	-0.081 (0.046)	-0.095* (0.046)	-0.101* (0.046)
Foreign direct investment	0.010 (0.055)	0.007 (0.055)	0.011 (0.055)
Child rights INGOs	0.288** (0.095)	0.286** (0.095)	0.295** (0.094)
Medical associations (ln)	0.474 (0.936)	0.310 (0.939)	0.017 (0.938)
Medical foundations (ln)		3.678* (1.682)	12.302*** (2.726)
Government consumption X medical foundations			-0.568*** (0.142)
Lagged dependent _(t-3)	0.442*** (0.016)	0.442*** (0.016)	0.437*** (0.016)
Constant	-257.944*** (44.936)	-251.589*** (44.991)	-258.860*** (44.870)
Observations	2,272	2,272	2,272
R-squared	0.548	0.549	0.552
Number of countries	115	115	115

Unstandardized coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
+ p<.10, * p < .05, ** p < .10, *** p < .001

suggests that membership organizations are not sufficient for improving this particular child health outcome, perhaps due to the greater funding and logistical challenges in this particular sector.

The effects of foundations are reported in Models 10 and 11. Medical foundations have a positive and significant effect on DPT immunizations: a one percent increase in foundations increases the percentage of children immunized by more than three percent, thus lending support to my first hypothesis that foundations do lead to better outcomes in the fields in which they operate. Model 10 includes the government consumption and foundations interaction effect. Public health represents one possible domain where the state and the philanthropic sector compete in providing particular goods or, out differently, the philanthropic sector may fill in for what the state is unable of unwilling to provide. As expected, the negative and significant interaction term indicates that an increase in the size of government consumption reduces the effect of medical foundations and vice versa. These analyses should be taken with a grain of salt, as interaction effects are vulnerable to outliers and can sometimes produce nonsensical effects, but the implications are intriguing, especially given the tremendous funding challenges facing countries as they attempt to meet the Millennium Development Goals. It may also be possible that DPT immunizations are unique. Models 12 through 14 in Table 4.4 report results for measles immunizations. While effect sizes for foundations and the interaction effect are similar in magnitude and direction as the DPT immunizations, the lack of significant effects lends only weak support to my hypotheses.

Table 4.4 Fixed Effects Models Predicting Childhood Measles Immunizations in Non-OECD Countries, 1983-2006

	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14
Population (ln)	14.854*** (2.910)	14.791*** (2.912)	14.930*** (2.912)
Urban population (%)	0.053 (0.094)	0.048 (0.094)	0.057 (0.095)
GDP per capita (log)	1.084 (1.479)	1.062 (1.479)	0.903 (1.481)
Democracy	-0.015 (0.064)	-0.016 (0.064)	-0.023 (0.064)
Government consumption	-0.047 (0.063)	-0.048 (0.063)	0.013 (0.072)
Trade	-0.099 (0.054)	-0.104 (0.054)	-0.107 (0.054)
Foreign direct investment	-0.025 (0.056)	-0.026 (0.056)	-0.025 (0.056)
Child rights INGOs	0.332*** (0.098)	0.332*** (0.098)	0.337*** (0.098)
Medical associations (ln)	1.808 (0.965)	1.762 (0.968)	1.630 (0.970)
Medical foundations (ln)		1.151 (1.770)	5.114 (2.877)
Government consumption X medical foundations			-0.256 (0.147)
Lagged dependent _(t-3)	0.404*** (0.016)	0.404*** (0.016)	0.403*** (0.016)
Constant	-206.755*** (46.735)	-205.628*** (46.774)	-207.958*** (46.770)
Observations	2,228	2,228	2,228
R-squared	0.515	0.515	0.516
Number of countries	115	115	115

Unstandardized coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
+ p<.10, * p < .05, ** p < .10, *** p < .001

Table 4.5 Fixed Effects Models Predicting Infant Mortality in Non-OECD Countries, 1983-2006

	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17
Population (ln)	-35.472*** (1.635)	-35.381*** (1.610)	-35.710*** (1.613)
Urban population (%)	-0.719*** (0.054)	-0.690*** (0.054)	-0.693*** (0.054)
GDP per capita (ln)	-6.585*** (0.806)	-6.382*** (0.794)	-6.092*** (0.800)
Democracy	-0.390*** (0.045)	-0.356*** (0.045)	-0.347*** (0.045)
Government consumption	-0.009 (0.043)	-0.006 (0.043)	-0.062 (0.047)
Trade	0.125*** (0.028)	0.175*** (0.028)	0.162*** (0.028)
Foreign direct investment	0.049* (0.022)	0.036 (0.022)	0.035 (0.022)
Child rights INGOs	-0.124* (0.060)	-0.108 (0.059)	-0.103 (0.059)
Medical associations (ln)	-6.688*** (0.678)	-5.328*** (0.681)	-5.180*** (0.682)
Medical foundations (ln)		-10.594*** (1.049)	-14.800*** (1.896)
Government consumption X medical foundations			0.291** (0.109)
Constant	716.455*** (26.219)	713.413*** (25.815)	717.547*** (25.837)
Observations	3,308	3,308	3,308
R-squared	0.714	0.723	0.723
Number of countries	116	116	116

Unstandardized coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
+ p<.10, * p < .05, ** p < .10, *** p < .001

Results for infant mortality (Table 4.5) are strikingly similar though perhaps not entirely surprising (as immunizations should theoretically reduce infant mortality). In Model 15, medical associations and child rights INGOs are associated with lower levels of infant mortality. Interestingly, two measures of economic globalization included as control variables – trade and foreign direct investment – are associated with higher levels of the dependent variable. Further research on this issue is warranted. Model 16 introduces medical foundations, which, as expected, generate a negative and significant effect on infant mortality. Once again, there is evidence to suggest that foundations do matter in the health sector. Also worth noting is that medical foundations are still significant even when medical associations are included in the model. In the case of health, there does not seem to be an indication that the effect of foundations is somehow mediated by other civic organizations in the field. Finally, the interaction term of foundations and government consumption is reported in Model 17. In this case, the positive interaction effect shows that a larger public sector in a country shrinks or “crowds out” the effect of foundations in reducing infant mortality. Neither this effect nor the previous interaction effect indicate clearly that foundations “substitute” for the public sector, per se, but nor do foundations or governments enhance the effect of the other in solving child health outcomes.

In sum, I find support for my first hypothesis that foundations lead to desired outcomes and my second hypothesis that foundations have stronger effects when the public sector is smaller. I also find support for my fifth hypothesis that foundations will have a positive effect in sectors more reflective of concerns in the world polity (in this


case, child rights and child health). However, I do not find support for my second or fourth hypotheses: neither local medical associations nor child rights INGOs render the effect of foundations obsolete.

4.6 Foundations, World Society, and Environmental Outcomes

Foundations across the globe have taken up environmental issues at a rapid clip in recent years. According to the Foundation Center, in 2008, U.S. foundations gave more than \$897 million – over half of which came from the Hewlett Foundation – for climate change alone, compared to just \$240 million the year before and \$99 million in 2000.¹⁶ Among philanthropic INGOs (i.e., INGOs that are also classified as funds and foundations), those with an environmental focus grew at a faster rate since 1970 than similar foundations devoted to health, education, and the arts (Figure 4.1). Similarly, in my dataset, nearly one-quarter of domestic foundations operate in the area of environmental protection of some sort. Foundations are also a key supporter of large and influential environmental NGOs. According to their 2010 annual report, foundations make up more than sixty percent of the revenues for Friends of the Earth, an international organization with more than two million memberships spread across 76 countries. The entrée of foundations into environmental protection is not entirely new, either, particularly in the United States, where foundations have long been a part of environmental movements (e.g., Faber and McCarthy 2005; Bartley 2007). Thus, environmental protection is a prime area for examining the effects of philanthropic interventions.

¹⁶ <http://foundationcenter.org/gpf/climatechange/chart-giving.html>

Figure 4.1 Growth of Philanthropic INGOs by Sector



The environment is also an instructive domain for exploring one of the central questions of this chapter: does the loosely coupled nature of the world polity render the effects of foundations inconsequential or epiphenomenal? Schofer and Hironaka (2005) suggest this might be the case, as finding direct causes in such a diffuse field with multiple, overlapping mechanisms is unlikely to lead to success. Yet, they found that the sustained penetration of the environmental world polity led to better environmental outcomes. Similarly, Frank et al. (2007) found that domestic environmental NGOs were not associated with environmental reforms in Asia once world polity ties were taken into account. Related research in the world polity tradition finds indirect support for the effectiveness of foundations in spurring environmental change. For example, Longhofer and Schofer (2010) found that foundations are often important precursors to the

formation of environmental voluntary associations around the globe (though the efficacy of the latter in leading to further change is debated).

This section looks to two cases of environmental harms – carbon emissions and protected lands – to answer the following questions: 1) Do foundations lead to improved environmental outcomes? 2) Do foundations operate indirectly through other domestic environmental organizations? 3) Does the effect of world society ties render the effect of foundations inconsequential or does it possibly enhance their efficacy? I begin by analyzing carbon emissions, a key cause of climate change and a reliable measure of environmental harms for a large number of countries (Jorgenson, Dick, and Shandra 2011). The dependent variable is measured annually as the total kilotons of carbon dioxide emitted as a result of burning fossil fuels in a country, and I take the natural log to correct for skew (World Bank 2010). The key independent variables include the number of environmental foundations in a country in a given year (Routledge 2006), the number of domestic environmental organizations (Gale 2010), and the total number of memberships in INGOs (UIA, various years). I also control for key economic and population variables, including incoming foreign investment and total exports, both of which have been linked to carbon emissions in prior research (Jorgenson, Dick, and Shandra 2011). Please see Appendix B for additional information on the independent variables. To analyze the data, I once again use pooled panel regression with fixed effects. All models range from 1970-2006.

Results from the fixed effects models are presented in Table 4.6. Model 18 includes the economic controls, world society ties, and domestic environmental

associations. Previous research has found that world society ties, particularly memberships in environmental INGOs, lead to reduced carbon emissions (Schofer and

Table 4.6 Fixed Effects Models Predicting CO2 Emissions, 1970-2008

	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20	Model 21
Population (ln)	1.316*** (0.042)	1.309*** (0.041)	1.320*** (0.042)	0.634*** (0.034)
Urban population (%)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.844*** (0.023)	0.854*** (0.022)	0.849*** (0.023)	0.438*** (0.019)
Exports as % GDP (ln)	0.002 (0.018)	0.005 (0.017)	0.005 (0.018)	0.041** (0.013)
Foreign investment (% GDP)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
INGOS (ln)	-0.055*** (0.011)	-0.036*** (0.010)	-0.055*** (0.011)	-0.044*** (0.010)
Environmental associations (ln)	-0.010 (0.018)		0.004 (0.019)	0.015 (0.014)
Environmental foundations (ln)		-0.064** (0.022)	-0.049* (0.024)	-0.031 ⁺ (0.017)
Lagged dependent _(t-3)				0.528*** (0.010)
Constant	-17.553*** (0.633)	-17.622*** (0.621)	-17.672*** (0.635)	-8.544*** (0.510)
Observations	4,575	4,688	4,575	4,510
R-squared	0.593	0.593	0.593	0.775
Number of newid3	163	167	163	163

Unstandardized coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
 + p<.10, * p < .05, ** p < .10, *** p < .001

Hironaka 2005). Similarly, I find that general ties to world society (i.e., INGO memberships) are significantly associated with fewer carbon emissions. In contrast,

domestic environmental associations have no significant effect, though it is in the expected negative direction. Population and GDP per capita are associated with increased carbon emissions, as expected. Interestingly, neither foreign investment nor exports are significantly associated with environmental harms.

The relevant foundations measure is added in Model 19. As expected, environmental foundations are associated with improved carbon emissions within countries, though the effect is relatively small: a one percent increase in foundations is associated with a .06 percent decrease in carbon emissions. In addition, I do not find support for my hypothesis that world society overwhelms the impact of foundations on this particular outcome. Given the negative impact of world society, though, it is possible that the impact of foundations is enhanced because the environmental sector itself is a central issue of the world polity. Put differently, because of the close relationship between world society and foundations within a country, it is possible that the effect of foundations is due to the particularly global nature of environmental harms. However, only further research can tease out this particular implication. I also find no support for the notion that foundations operate indirectly through other non-philanthropic environmental organizations (Model 20). And, as a matter of robustness, I also include a lagged dependent variable in Model 21: foundations still have a negative effect in such a constrictive model, but the significance level falls just shy of .05.

The exact relationship between foundations and an environmental harm like carbon emissions is difficult to untangle. Whereas foundations may advocate for particular reforms that urge factories or transportation sectors to reduce their emissions, it

is plausible that the relationship is spurious. Although exploratory, I also examine the relationship between foundations and a more direct outcome of environmental

Table 4.7 OLS Regression Models Predicting Protected Areas, 2008

	Model 22	Model 23	Model 24
Population (ln)	1.320 (1.085)	0.470 (1.045)	0.984 (1.074)
Urban population (%)	0.017 (0.070)	0.010 (0.068)	0.008 (0.069)
GDP per capita (ln)	3.089 (1.603)	1.670 (1.527)	2.505 (1.591)
Exports as % GDP (ln)	1.417 (2.230)	2.283 (2.219)	2.472 (2.230)
Foreign investment (% GDP)	-0.029 (0.045)	-0.015 (0.044)	-0.018 (0.044)
INGOS (ln)	-4.155 (2.767)	-4.590 (2.700)	-5.367 (2.760)
Environmental associations (ln)	-0.059 (1.532)		-2.178 (1.727)
Environmental foundations (ln)		4.147* (1.821)	5.244* (2.100)
Constant	-9.010 (17.185)	12.412 (16.871)	3.773 (17.632)
Countries	148	151	148
R-squared	0.054	0.077	0.094

Unstandardized coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
 + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

mobilization: protected lands, such as national parks. Unfortunately, time-varying data on protected lands is not available for a large number of countries. Instead, I run a simple OLS regression model in 2008 of the percent of terrestrial land that is protected (World

Bank 2010).¹⁷ Results are presented in Table 4.7. Again, results suggest that environmental foundations are associated with improved environmental outcomes above and beyond conventional world polity and domestic association effects. In this particular case, foundations are the only variable to have a large and significant positive effect on protected lands. However, foundations also explain only a small amount of variance in the dependent variable, and thus I am reluctant to draw too strong of a conclusion about the relationship until better data is available. Still, like children’s health and, to a lesser extent, the arts, both sets of analyses indicate that foundations are associated with improved environmental outcomes. Moreover, this effect is a direct one that is not washed away by ties to world society or local environmental associations, the most likely recipients of the many grants that foundations give out.

Table 4.8 Summary of Hypotheses

	Arts	Health	Environment
H1: Foundations will have positive effect.	Some support.	Supported.	Supported.
H2: Foundations will have smaller effect in larger public sectors.	Not tested.	Supported.	Not tested.
H3: Foundation effects will be mediated by other civil society organizations.	No support.	No support.	No support.
H4: Foundations will have no effect when world society ties are controlled.	No support.	No support.	No support.
H5: Foundations will have effect in sectors where world society effects are also strong.	Some support.	Supported.	Supported.

¹⁷ Because I do not have data on foundations in 2008, I use 2006 measures for all independent variables.

4.7 Discussion

I have summed up all of my hypotheses and the results in Table 4.8. In all three sectors, I find at least some support that foundations lead to desired outcomes (with the exception of tertiary graduates in the arts and humanities). I also find that foundations have strong effects in domains where world society effects are also strong, though they also have positive effects in domains where world society ties work in the opposite direction (i.e., arts). Regarding foundations and the state, I find some support that foundations “substitute” for areas, such as the health sector, where the state may have divested, although further research is welcome with improved data. Finally, I find no support for the notion that world society ties or local associations can explain direct foundation effects. Rather, all of this suggests that foundations are a key source of social change in the sectors in which they operate. So what can this tell us about the roles and contributions of foundations more generally? I turn to this point in the conclusion of this dissertation.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION: FOUNDATIONS AS GLOBAL ACTORS

This dissertation explores a classic question in sociology: How and why do people come together to help one another? Durkheim, Tocqueville, and so many others since have written volumes on the origins of generosity, reciprocity, and solidarity in society. And, in most cases, these authors find commonality in one thing – namely, that institutions of giving and virtue are greater than the sum of their parts (e.g., Wuthnow 1991; Healy 2006). Similarly, this dissertation argues that institutions of modern philanthropy are more than the aggregates of altruistic individuals or responses to dire needs. Rather, to understand giving, we must situate it in its proper global and organizational contexts. Giving, both in its individual and collective manifestations, has roots in a virtuous and moral world society (Boli 2006).

Using cross-national survey data, I show how individual membership in charitable and humanitarian organizations is embedded in global institutions as well as local levels of trust and religiosity. To be sure, income, education, and values are important predictors of membership, but my results suggest that social context also plays a significant and overlooked role. The chapter contributes to the literature on world society that has focused more on national policies and less on how global institutions influence individual behavior. Frank and Meyer (2002) have argued that world cultural accounts have led to the decline of nation-states as central collective actors and replaced them with a proliferation of individual roles and identities that script what it is an individual should do in society. This chapter suggests that one such role is that of the ‘giver.’ Giving is still

an act derived from individual resources and values, but it is also one tied to a world society that makes giving itself meaningful to individuals. If anything, it is clear that charitable memberships are not simply responses to disasters or government size, nor are they necessarily based on rational calculations of thrift.

The second empirical chapter makes some progress toward better understanding this organizational landscape by focusing on the global diffusion of grantmaking foundations. To my knowledge, this is the first study of foundations across a large number of societies that is able to systematically compare the effects of democracy, inequality, and local needs on foundation formation. However, the primary implication of this chapter is that global institutional structures provide the wellsprings for grantmaking organizations. In particular, the chapter brings to light two simultaneous, global transformations of modern philanthropy. First, it investigates the diffusion of modern philanthropy and its organizational manifestations as a global phenomenon. Anheier and his colleagues have also begun exploring the emergence of these institutions in societies where philanthropy is less institutionalized, and this study certainly has an affinity with that work (e.g., Anheier, Simmons, and Winder 2007; Anheier and Toepler 2007). Second, the chapter takes into account the organization of philanthropy as a global community that creates, shares, and transmits models and practices for how to cultivate a local philanthropic sector. I find that connections to one global philanthropic network – the Worldwide Initiatives for Grantmaker Support – boost the formation of domestic grantmaking institutions, particularly those organizations involved in international philanthropy. I also find that global foundations emerge when traditional sources of

bilateral aid retract, suggesting a possible reorganization of the international aid architecture.

Whereas the first two empirical chapters are essentially about uncovering the origins of philanthropic activity, the third empirical chapter turns attention to its consequences. Drawing from three mini-case studies of foundation sectors in a large number of countries, I find that: 1) arts foundations are associated with more cinemas in a country, although some of this effect is mediated by local cultural associations, suggesting that consumers are primary supporters of the arts (like in the United States); 2) health foundations improve DPT immunizations and reduce infant mortality in developing countries, as well as interact negatively with the size of the public sector, indicating that foundations may provide public goods the state cannot; and 3) environmental foundations are associated with lower carbon emissions and more protected lands, a result robust to the well-established effects of world society on similar outcomes. Again, this is the first study to my knowledge that has examined the effects of philanthropic sectors in several countries on such a range of outcomes.

This study thus provides an instructive contribution to the vast literature on foundations and philanthropy. Figure 5.1 presents a useful heuristic device for categorizing the prior literature. Much of prior research has adopted a loosely functional approach to philanthropy that positions individual foundations or national nonprofit sectors as responses to needs unmet by the state or the market (in the upper-left hand corner). Such studies typically characterize foundations as powerful actors that spur significant social and political change through their roles as innovators, entrepreneurs,

Figure 5.1 Four Imageries of Philanthropic Activity

	Functional	Institutional
Micro	Outpouring of wealth; response to local crisis of state and market	Embedded in culture and national organizations
Macro	Outpouring of global wealth, response to complex global crises	Embedded in global culture and transnational organizations

and policy advocates (Anheier and Hammack 2010). In contrast, Healy’s (2004, 2006) work on organ procurement provides an institutional account that de-centers the functionalist aspects of altruistic acts by situating them in organizational structures, primarily at the national-level (in the upper-right hand corner). Such organizational structures are not only recipients of charity – they are also active in promoting it. These two approaches can be extended to the increasingly global dimensions of philanthropy. The lower-left hand corner of Figure 5.1 characterizes global giving as an outpouring of global wealth and a response to complex global problems that states and markets alone are unable to solve. This idea is best captured in Bill Gates’s first annual letter to the public in 2009, in which he wrote that “foundations provide something unique” when they intervene “where the market doesn’t naturally work toward the right goals and where innovation requires long-term investments.” In contrast, this dissertation (summarized in the lower-right hand corner) extends Healy’s institutional approach to the

global level by showing how acts of philanthropy are embedded in organizational structures that are themselves globalizing.

This macro-institutional approach also has important implications for the literature on world society, which has been mistakenly criticized for over-determining the actorhood of modern life without paying enough attention to actual action (Schofer et al., forthcoming). Although I argue that charitable acts are scripted in world society, the results of the final chapter show that foundations, in particular, are also powerful agents in their own right in that their presence is associated with improved societal outcomes. Rather than “over-script” charity and assume it is more performance than action (Goffman 1959), this dissertation suggests foundations, charities, and the individuals that participate in them— like INGOs – “see themselves as parties to a genuine social contract” that bolsters their roles – and consequences – in the rational and voluntaristic authority structure of world society (Boli and Thomas 1999: 279).

Limitations and Future Research

This idea points to an admitted limitation of this dissertation. It is important not to think of foundations as mere expressions of world culture, as they are still important coffers of resources. Without measures of where the money from these organizations flows to, it becomes difficult to trace where their influence might lie. Although data is lacking we do have some idea of where foundations, charities, and NGOs direct their money internationally. Koch et al. (2009) recently looked at how aid is increasingly funneled through international NGOs. It is well known by now that official development

Table 5.1 Share of ODA through NGOs, 2008-2009

Country	Share of ODA
Australia	7.6%
Austria	5.3
Belgium	11.5
Canada	10.8
Denmark	13.8
Finland	1.4
France	0.3
Germany	6.2
Greece	0.9
Ireland	38.5
Italy	2.8
Japan	1.7
Korea	1.0
Luxembourg	16.9
Netherlands	20.2
New Zealand	11.2
Norway	-
Portugal	1.7
Spain	17.0
Sweden	12.6
Switzerland	11.7
United Kingdom	5.5
United States	-

Source: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/11/1893159.xls>.

assistance from national governments is increasingly funneled through INGOs. Table 5.1 lists the share of official development assistance that was administered via NGOs in 2005. Nearly 40 percent of Irish aid, for example, and more than 20 percent of Dutch aid is channeled through NGOs (Table 5.1). Drawing from their own survey of the largest INGOs in the world, Koch and his colleagues found that more than \$300 million in aid flowed through NGOs to India, more than \$200 million to Ethiopia, and nearly \$170 million to Sudan in 2005 (Table 5.2). Among the funders, CARE in the United States is by far the largest (nearly \$600 million in 2005), but foundations are not far behind: the

Table 5.2 Top 15 Recipients of NGO Aid, 2005

Country	Aid (USD millions)
United States	\$399.16
India	313.86
Ethiopia	209.57
Sudan	179.65
Indonesia	162.22
Kenya	150.90
Zimbabwe	150.85
Bangladesh	141.09
Uganda	130.81
Sri Lanka	114.49
Malawi	111.08
Zambia	105.05
Brazil	103.80
Angola	97.36
Afghanistan	94.36

Source: Koch et al. (2009).

Table 5.3 Top 15 NGO Aid Donors, 2005

NGO	Aid (USD millions)
CARE (United States)	\$595.08
Adra (United States)	503.28
Kellogg Foundation (United States)	491.20
VSO UK (United Kingdom)	320.90
Rockefeller Foundation (United States)	211.04
CCF (United States)	158.50
World Vision (USA)	158.20
World Vision (Australia)	156.15
Cordaid (Netherlands)	142.34
Misereor (Germany)	141.97
Soros International (United States)	127.98
Action Aid (South Africa)	124.79
World Vision (Canada)	116.88
Ford Foundation (United States)	109.48
Welthungerhilfe (Germany)	107.07

Source: Koch et al. (2009).

Kellogg Foundation administered more than \$500 million, the Rockefeller Foundation came in at more than \$200 million, and the Ford Foundation contributed more than \$100 million in aid (Table 5.3). Put simply, foundations, like other INGOs, are important conduits of aid.

However, tracking the dollars of these private philanthropic organizations gets even more complex. Whereas foundations in Koch et al.'s survey reported the final destination of their money, most of it still flows through other international organizations. I recently compiled all international grants for international development made by all U.S. foundations with annual grantmaking portfolios of more than \$10,000 between 2003 and 2008 (via the Foundation Center's Foundation Directory Online). Although the following table (Table 5.4) is merely illustrative, it paints a compelling picture. Of the nearly \$2.1 billion in grants for international development made by U.S. foundations to organizations outside of the United States, nearly half went to recipients based in Switzerland, where many of the key players of global development regimes, such as the World Health Organization and other United Nations agencies, reside. Nearly 80 percent went to organizations based in Switzerland, England, Germany, and Canada alone. This cursory look at funding flows shows that the relationship between world society and global grantmaking is not a unidirectional process. The world society hypothesis is one that emphasizes the top-down process through which global discourses produce 'actors' at the local level. However, foundations and other grantmaking organizations are not ordinary 'actors': they are oftentimes comprised of elites, they are sources of prestige,

Table 5.4 Share of International Grant Dollars from U.S. Foundations for Development, 2003-2008

Country	Percent
Switzerland	48%
England	17.5
Canada	8.3
Germany	3.2
Netherlands	2.8
India	2.5
Ghana	1.8
Belgium	1.4
Australia	1.4
South Africa	1.4
France	1.3
Rest (95 countries)	10.4

Source: Foundation Center Online (author search).

and they are also producers of the logics that guide a liberal and progressive world society. World society and global philanthropy are perhaps mutually constitutive, and maybe foundations play an important role in constructing global civil society as much as enacting it. In other words, foundations and charities are not simply outgrowths of world society – they may also play significant roles in its transmission, construction, and transformation (see Vogel 2006). It is intended that the research in this dissertation provide a useful starting point for other scholars interested in how world society is propelled along its path.

Finally, adopting a global perspective on giving not only provides a much-needed contribution to the literature on world society – it is also important for our sociological understanding of morality. Scholars have begun revisiting and reviving investigations into the social structures that organize our conceptions of moral goods and pattern our moral actions (e.g., Hitlin and Vaisey 2010; Winchester and Hitlin 2010). It is a deeper

and more complex issue that what can be discussed in this dissertation, but it is worth mentioning in conclusion that the social structures that organize morality are becoming increasingly globalized, and thus “a field as broad and central as the sociology of morality would not be complete without elaborating on the global dimension of moral action, integration, and order” (Frerichs and Munch 2010). This dissertation takes a small but hopefully welcome step toward such elaboration.

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Appendix A. Multilevel Logistic Regression of Charitable Association Membership in 35 Countries

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Level-1 Variables						
<i>Controls</i>						
Female	0.126*** (0.028)	0.106*** (0.028)	0.107*** (0.028)	0.107*** (0.028)	0.108*** (0.028)	0.107*** (0.028)
Under 35	-0.237*** (0.031)	-0.214*** (0.031)	-0.214*** (0.031)	-0.215*** (0.031)	-0.215*** (0.031)	-0.214*** (0.031)
Over 65	0.223*** (0.049)	0.186*** (0.049)	0.186*** (0.049)	0.188*** (0.049)	0.188*** (0.049)	0.187*** (0.049)
<i>Human Resources</i>						
Secondary education	0.385*** (0.037)	0.371*** (0.037)	0.372*** (0.037)	0.371*** (0.037)	0.372*** (0.037)	0.371*** (0.037)
Higher education	0.764*** (0.042)	0.730*** (0.043)	0.730*** (0.043)	0.729*** (0.043)	0.729*** (0.043)	0.728*** (0.043)
Employed full-time	0.068* (0.033)	0.072* (0.033)	0.072* (0.033)	0.073* (0.033)	0.073* (0.033)	0.073* (0.033)
Employed part-time	0.188*** (0.054)	0.192*** (0.054)	0.192*** (0.054)	0.192*** (0.054)	0.192*** (0.054)	0.192*** (0.054)
Income	0.039*** (0.006)	0.037*** (0.006)	0.037*** (0.006)	0.037*** (0.006)	0.037*** (0.006)	0.037*** (0.006)
<i>Giving Values</i>						
Altruism	0.456*** (0.031)	0.425*** (0.031)	0.425*** (0.031)	0.426*** (0.031)	0.426*** (0.031)	0.426*** (0.031)
Thriftiness	-0.060* (0.030)	-0.048 (0.030)	-0.048 (0.030)	-0.049 (0.030)	-0.049 (0.030)	-0.048 (0.030)
<i>Social Resources</i>						
Church attendance		0.380*** (0.033)	0.380*** (0.033)	0.377*** (0.034)	0.377*** (0.034)	0.377*** (0.034)
Trust in others		0.219*** (0.032)	0.220*** (0.032)	0.218*** (0.032)	0.218*** (0.032)	0.218*** (0.032)
<i>World Polity Links</i>						
World citizenship		0.227*** (0.039)	0.226*** (0.039)	0.225*** (0.039)	0.223*** (0.039)	0.223*** (0.039)
Level-2 Variables						
<i>Controls</i>						
Deaths from disasters (ln)			0.047 (0.071)	-0.029 (0.056)	0.003 (0.057)	-0.010 (0.056)

Govt. expend. (% GDP)			-0.011 (0.043)	-0.011 (0.034)	-0.012 (0.030)	-0.027 (0.030)
<i>Social Resources</i>						
Church attendance (%)				0.031*** (0.007)	0.021** (0.008)	0.022** (0.007)
Trust in others (%)				0.042*** (0.010)	0.026** (0.010)	0.027** (0.010)
<i>World Polity Links</i>						
World citizenship (%)					0.031* (0.012)	0.032** (0.012)
INGOs per capita (ln)					2.174* (1.035)	1.559 (1.059)
<i>Democratization</i>						
Democracy						0.071+ (0.043)
Constant	-2.343*** (0.205)	-2.696*** (0.197)	-2.675*** (0.198)	-2.790*** (0.156)	-2.740*** (0.139)	-2.800*** (0.139)
<i>Random Effects</i>						
Intercept (var.)	1.400*** (0.347)	1.258*** (0.313)	1.237*** (0.307)	0.700*** (0.177)	0.534*** (0.136)	0.492*** (0.126)
Observations	40,211	40,211	40,211	40,211	40,211	40,211
Number of groups	35	35	35	35	35	35

Standard errors in parentheses; exponentiated values presented in Appendix A
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .10, *** p < .001

Appendix B. Negative Binomial Regressions of Foundation Density

<i>Dependent variable</i>	Model 1 All foundations	Model 2 Global only
GDP (ln)	0.431*** (0.106)	0.645*** (0.133)
Population (ln)	0.536*** (0.088)	0.561*** (0.113)
Income inequality, net	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.021 (0.014)
Secondary enrollment	0.005 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.005)
Democracy	0.134*** (0.028)	0.143*** (0.036)
Government consumption	0.008 (0.017)	0.001 (0.025)
Common law	0.429** (0.161)	0.782*** (0.222)
Natural disasters	-0.007 (0.020)	-0.016 (0.026)
Civil wars	0.001 (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)
Trade	-0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)
INGO memberships (ln)	0.375** (0.126)	0.626** (0.210)
WINGS partners	0.025 (0.020)	0.017 (0.022)
Constant	-14.706*** (1.683)	-18.363*** (2.063)
Log pseudolikelihood	-7535.66	-5966.10
Countries	105	105

Unstandardized coefficients, clustered standard errors in parentheses
+ p<.10, * p < .05, ** p < .10, *** p < .001

Appendix C. Independent Variables Used in Chapter 4

Variable	Description and/or transformation	Source
Foundations	Coded by sector, logged	Routledge 2006
Population	Total population, logged	World Bank 2010
GDP per capita	Constant \$US, logged	World Bank 2010
Democracy	20-point scale of democracy	Marshall et al. 2011
Tertiary enrollments	Percent gross	World Bank 2010
INGO memberships	Country memberships, logged	UIA, various
CRINGO memberships	Country memberships in child rights INGOs	UIA, various years
Associations	Coded by sector, logged	Gale 2010
Government consumption	Final consumption as percent of GDP	World Bank 2010
Trade	Percent of GDP	World Bank 2010
Foreign direct investment	Net inflows as percent of GDP	World Bank 2010
Urban population	Percent of total	World Bank 2010