Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota
A new concept of balancedness for games in normal form is introduced,
called weak balanacedness. It is shown that the a-core of a weakly balanced
game with an infinite dimensional strategy space and without ordered preferences
is nonempty. Using this result we prove core existence theorems for economies
(either exchange economies of coalitional production economies) with infinitely
many commodities and without ordered preferences, by converting the economy to a
game and showing that the derived game is weakly balanced. Surprisingly, no
convexity assumption on preferences is needed to demonstrate that the game
derived from the economy is weakly balanced.
Yannelis, N.C., (1985), "On Cores of Weakly Balanced Games without Ordered Preferences", Discussion Paper No. 224, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota.
Yannelis, Nicholas C..
On Cores of Weakly Balanced Games Without Ordered Preferences.
Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota.
Retrieved from the University of Minnesota Digital Conservancy,
Content distributed via the University of Minnesota's Digital Conservancy may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.