Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota
The essential structural characteristic of an auction is that
a bidder will either win or lose, and there is a different payoff
function for each of these two outcomes. In this paper, a symmetric
auction model is formulated and analyzed as a game with incomplete
information. Special cases of this model include many price auction
arrangements, but the specification allows for "bidding" competition
on the basis of non-price signals such as design proposals, educational
credentials, etc. Common properties and economic applications
of such signalling auction models are discussed.
Holt, C.A. Jr., (1979), "A Theory of Signalling Auctions", Discussion Paper No. 110, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota.
Holt, Charles A. Jr..
A Theory of Signalling Auctions.
Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota.
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