Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota
A generalization of the standard n-person game
is presented, with flexible information requirements suitable
for players constrained by bounded rationality.
Strategies (complete contingency plans) are replaced by
"policies," i. e., end-mean pairs of candidate goals and
"controls" (partial contingency plans). The existence of
individual objective functions over the joint policy choice
set is axiomatized in terms of primitive preference and
probability orders. Conditions are given for the existence
of pure policy Nash equilibrium points in n-person
games, and pure policy Nash bargaining and equilibrium
threat solutions in 2-person policy games. Connectedness
of the policy and payoff sets is not required.
Tesfatsion, L., (1976), "Games, Goals, and Bounded Rationality", Discussion Paper No. 63, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota.
Games, Goals, and Bounded Rationality.
Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota.
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