Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota
A broad class of 2-person threat games for which a unique
pure strategy Nash bargaining solution exists is characterized in
terms of three, simple, empirically meaningful restrictions on the
joint objective function: compact domain, continuity, and "corner
concavity." Connectedness [in particular, convexity] of the strategy
and payoff sets is not required. In addition, conditions are given
for the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium threat solution.
Connectedness of the strategy and payoff sets is again not required.
Tesfatsion, L., (1975), "Pure Strategy Nash Bargaining Solutions", Discussion Paper No. 61, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota.
Pure Strategy Nash Bargaining Solutions.
Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota.
Retrieved from the University of Minnesota Digital Conservancy,
Content distributed via the University of Minnesota's Digital Conservancy may be subject to additional license and use restrictions applied by the depositor.