I present a descriptive and normative account of mindreading with an epistemological foundation. I begin with the epistemology of knowing-what-it's-like by developing two new concepts of knowledge: experiential-knowledge and shared experiential-knowledge. Experiential-knowledge, or "knowing-what-it-is-like," is formulated from Frank Jackson's (1986) notion of qualia and grounds shared experiential-knowledge, or "knowing-what-it-is-like-to-be-someone-else." Shared experiential-knowledge is designed specifically for application in the mindreading debate of how we attribute mental states to other people, as it resolves outstanding issues regarding the cognitive processes used for reading the minds of other people. Next, I turn to the mindreading component and develop a unique independence theory of mindreading by showing how some instances of mindreading are achieved wholly by simulation and some wholly by theorizing. My primary argument is that theorizing is used for mindreading when (accurate) simulation is not possible because shared experiential-knowledge is absent. Key support for my thesis is derived from the seminal works of Alvin Goldman's (2006) simulation-theory; Shaun Nichols's (2004) sentimental rules, as well as his work on psychopathology and autism; and Simon Baron-Cohen's (2003) work on autism. Lastly, I conclude with the epistemology of mindreading by specifying the justification conditions for knowing the mental states of other people, as opposed to possessing mere (true) beliefs about them. We shall see that such knowledge arises in two ways: in the case of simulation, simulation plus shared experiential-knowledge justifies the true beliefs about other people's mental states; and, in the case of theorizing, induction justifies them.