In 2007, the U.S. and China nearly engaged in military conflict following China’s Anti-satellite test. Yet, the event went relatively unnoticed by current international scholars? The lack of any comprehensive analysis of space relations, beyond rudimentary realist logic, tends to dismiss space analysis, even as it is becoming an ever important realm. Consequently, I attempt to galvanize international relations explanations of space policies and close deficient questions of space power. This research employs a defensive realist perspective to elucidate the more structural constraints on U.S. and Chinese space policies, specifically ideological, economic, and military constraints. For China, I collected speeches, public policies, CCP committee reports, five-year plans, the People’s Republic of China Yearbooks, and a series of scientific literature, between 1950 to 2011. Due to the secrecy of China’s space program, a comparable quantitative table was impossible. Nevertheless, I constructed a comprehensive basis for an otherwise elusive Chinese policy. My findings illustrate how balance of power logic, characteristic to defensive realism, was a consistent drive for both policies. As both countries’ economic and internal reliance became increasing factors for stability, the protection of these assets, against comparable space actors, became necessary. As I demonstrate, the precarious military standoff in 2007 was merely a result of a historical balancing in space. The ability to prevent an arms race in space I leave to the reader, though I conclude prevention is a plausible alternative for both actors.