

**To Pray Again as a Catholic:
The Renewal of Catholicism in Western Ukraine**

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The origins of the Ukrainian Catholic Church lie in the time when much of present-day Ukraine formed part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It was then, in 1596, that for a variety of reasons, many of the Orthodox bishops of the region decided to accept communion with Rome.⁽¹⁾ After almost four hundred years the resulting Union of Brest remains a contentious subject.⁽²⁾ The new "Uniate" Church formally recognized the Pope as Head of the Church, but maintained its traditional Byzantine or eastern rite, calendar, its right to ordain married men as priests, and its right to elect its own bishops. The Church was centered in dioceses in Ukraine and Belarus, and in the late eighteenth century had a following of some twelve million faithful.⁽³⁾ The partitions of Poland in the 1770s and 1790s divided these adherents between two of the three partitioning powers. In the areas absorbed by the Russian Empire the Uniate Church was systematically harassed and in time abolished, its property confiscated by the Russian Orthodox Church. In the areas taken by Austria, the very opposite was true. The Austrian government strengthened the Uniate Church (whose official name soon became the "Greek Catholic Church"), provided opportunities for theological education for its priests, and placed it on an equal legal footing with the Roman Catholic Church (though practical equality was often lacking). The main seat of the Church came to be established in the city of L'viv, as it could no longer operate in the Russian-occupied areas, including Kiev, the original seat of the Church's Metropolitan.⁽⁴⁾ During the nineteenth century the Greek Catholic Church

came to be regarded as the national church of Ukrainians in Galicia, and many of its priests were in the forefront of the Ukrainian national revival.

In the twentieth century, spanning both the last years under Austria and the inter-war period under Poland, the Greek Catholic Church had the good fortune of having Andrei Sheptytsky (1865-1944) as its leader. He was Archbishop-Metropolitan of L'viv from 1900 to 1944. His enormous devotion to his Church has been recognized world-wide and the process for his beatification is currently in motion. Christian unity was among his many projects, and Sheptytsky strove for greater understanding between the Christian Churches of East and West. He correctly identified ignorance about each other as one of the major stumbling blocks in what he called "the movement towards church unity." Although he may initially have regarded his own Church as a model for the attainment of this church unity, in later life he came to see that a different approach, through an ecumenical movement, would have a greater opportunity of achieving this prized objective.⁽⁵⁾

When he died in 1944, Sheptytsky's Church in Europe consisted of the Archdiocese of L'viv, with 1.5 million members, the diocese of Peremyshl with 1.2 million faithful, the diocese of Stanyslaviv with over one million, plus a Vicariate in the Lemko region (130,000) and parishes among Ukrainians in Poland. There were also Greek Catholic dioceses in Mukachevo-Uzhorod and in Preshov (both in inter-war Czechoslovakia).⁽⁶⁾ In addition to Metropolitan Sheptytsky, the hierarchy consisted of seven other bishops. There were some 2500 diocesan priests and several thousand regular clergy and sisters. The Greek Catholic Church administered 4000 churches and chapels, several publishing houses, a theological academy, seminaries, high schools, orphanages, and other institutions for charitable and educational purposes. In West Ukraine the Greek Catholic Church, which I shall call the Ukrainian Catholic Church from this point onwards, truly played a "pivotal integrating role" for Ukrainians.⁽⁷⁾

In September 1939, West Ukraine was occupied by Soviet troops and annexed to the U.S.S.R. as part of the Ukrainian S.S.R. The Ukrainian Catholic Church was now exposed to Communist persecution, though the full force of Soviet repression did not fall upon it and its faithful until the Soviet reoccupation of the West Ukrainian lands in 1944. In 1945 and 1946 the Church, hitherto a force to be reckoned with, seemingly crumbled in the face of Soviet violence. Its eight bishops were accused of collaborating with the Germans and sentenced to long years of hard labor, imprisonment and exile. The four established exarchates and the apostolic visitature on Soviet territory were liquidated. At a minimum estimate, over 700 Ukrainian Catholic priests were imprisoned, many being sentenced to long terms in labor camps and/or deported to Central Asia.⁽⁸⁾ On orders from the Kremlin, a Sobor (synod) was convened by a self-styled "Initiative Group," in L'viv in 1946, which met without any Ukrainian Catholic bishops and dutifully revoked the Union of Brest--only a minority of Ukrainian Catholic clergy took part, yet this enforced decision was used as the "legal" basis to dissolve the Ukrainian Catholic Church, which was deemed by the Soviets to have voluntarily reunited itself to the Russian Orthodox Church.⁽⁹⁾ 2,772 parishes with their 4119 churches and chapels were seized; most of the buildings were closed but some were given over to the Russian Orthodox Church or

converted to other uses.⁽¹⁰⁾ Monasteries and convents were confiscated; most were closed, but again some of the buildings were handed over to the Russian Orthodox Church. After the so-called Sobor of 1946 there was another wave of arrests of Ukrainian Catholic priests, monks, nuns and seminarians. Around one thousand clergy--mostly married priests--accepted their integration into the Russian Orthodox Church; other clergy "went underground" to minister to their faithful in secret; some escaped to the West. Of the over four million faithful the majority after a brief flurry of resistance and boycott of the Russian Orthodox Church either turned in the new situation to the few remaining Roman Catholic churches (whose parishioners were otherwise ethnic Poles), or attended the now Russian Orthodox churches, where the ritual was not very different from that to which they had been accustomed. How many of these, and of their pastors, inwardly remained Ukrainian Catholics is of course impossible to state with any accuracy, but the response of the population once the Ukrainian Catholic Church was again able to function openly in West Ukraine suggests that many were Orthodox in name only.

Despite the brutal suppression, a "catacomb" Ukrainian Catholic Church formed in West Ukraine. Priests were secretly ordained both in West Ukraine, and in the forced labor camps, while a handful of bishops were secretly consecrated.⁽¹¹⁾ Masses were clandestinely organized, sometimes in believers' houses or apartments, sometimes in forest clearings, occasionally in former Ukrainian Catholic church buildings. The sacraments of baptism, marriage and burial were secretly administered by the catacomb priests who pursued very different occupations during the workday.

With de-Stalinization and amnesty in the 1950s, and the return of some of the exiled priests and of others secretly ordained in the camps, the number of underground Ukrainian Catholic clergy increased slightly in West Ukraine. But this brief respite was soon followed by another wave of repression, unleashed by Khrushchev in the late 1950s and early 1960s, with renewed arrests and punishment of catacomb priests and organizers of secret seminaries. The Russian Orthodox Church was also a victim of this repression, yet a large number of its parishes were allowed to remain in West Ukraine. Even under Khrushchev, however, there was one surprising development. Through the intermediacy of the American publisher Norman Cousins, Pope John XXIII persuaded Khrushchev in 1963 to release Archbishop-Metropolitan Slipyj, Sheptytsky's successor in L'viv, after nearly 18 years of imprisonment. There was also an undertaking by the Vatican that this by now 70 year old cleric would quietly live out the remaining years of his life in Rome.⁽¹²⁾

In 1968, the Uniate Church in Czechoslovakia was restored. This worried the Kremlin and the Moscow Patriarchate. In West Ukraine there was another spate of searches, fines, beatings, arrests and imprisonment of Ukrainian Catholic clergy and laymen, among them Bishop Vasyl Velychkowsky of Lutsk.⁽¹³⁾ Metropolitan Slipyj in Rome, although isolated, was becoming very vocal on behalf of his Church, for he saw that in the late 1960s and early 1970s the Vatican's relations with the Moscow Patriarchate seemed to indicate that the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Ukraine was to be abandoned by Rome for the sake of ecumenical unity.⁽¹⁴⁾

Ukrainian dissidents took up the cause of the persecuted Church in the 1970s, as did Lithuanian Catholic dissenters and even some Russian ones, the most prominent of whom was to be the famous Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov. Nevertheless, except for the Russian Orthodox Church, whose pastoral activities remained severely circumscribed, and the small number of legal Roman Catholic, Lutheran and Mennonite congregations, religious communities everywhere were ground down by the Soviet anti-religious propaganda, various types of disincentives, and punishments for breaches of the laws against religious organization. Being regarded as a "national" Church, an unwelcome "remnant," and owing allegiance to a foreign sovereign, the catacomb Ukrainian Catholic Church was a particular target for the KGB, the militia, the Communist Party and its subordinate organizations, and anti-religious propaganda in the Soviet press.

The only important change in Soviet religious policy from the time of Stalin was that Brezhnev allowed religious organizations to exist as legal entities in 1975.⁽¹⁵⁾ This, however, did not apply to the unrecognized and still illegal Ukrainian Catholic Church. Nevertheless, the Church survived, priests were ordained, bishops were secretly consecrated, and the faithful were served, in spite of the restrictions, harassment and punishment. Persecution was not uniformly severe, however. Much depended on instructions from Moscow, based on periodic Soviet analyses of the international situation and of the strength of religion in West Ukraine, and on the whims of the Ukrainian and local communist authorities.⁽¹⁶⁾

In 1985, when Gorbachev emerged as leader of the U.S.S.R., it was estimated that there were between 20 and 30 million people in the Soviet Union who were adherents of one faith or another. But most of those who attended church were old people, mainly women.⁽¹⁷⁾ Significantly, however, religious observance was most widespread in West Ukraine. When Gorbachev started to talk about glasnost, or openness, many people, including the religious, began to be cautiously optimistic. By early 1988 glasnost did indeed begin to extend to religion. The most important sign of this was the way in which Gorbachev treated the 1000th anniversary of the coming of Christianity to Kievan Rus. Although the planned celebrations were to take place in Moscow (and ultimately also in Kiev) and to be controlled by the Russian Orthodox Church, the fact that there were to be celebrations at all seemed an amazing concession.

For a long time, the Vatican showed an unusual passivity with respect to the persecution of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Soviet Ukraine. It has been well said that the Ukrainian Catholic Church was trapped "in the grip of world political, ideological and religious processes."⁽¹⁸⁾ This Church was caught between, on the one hand, the ideology and political system of the Soviet Union, together with its subservient Russian Orthodox Church, which also had its own reasons for denying the existence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church; and on the other hand the Holy See with its cherished ecumenical aims, prominent among which was the pursuit of Christian unity embracing the Russian Orthodox Church. Subsidiary to that goal, but in practice connected with it, was the desire for better relations with the Soviet Union, so as to secure liberty of conscience and other improvements for all believers in the U.S.S.R. The second of these objectives was pursued whenever opportunity offered; the first was the Vatican's constant leitmotif.

Neither, in fact, augured well for the repressed Ukrainian Catholic Church. Its interests were for a long time ignored while the Papacy pursued its wider objectives; taking up the cause of the illegal catacomb Church, a very sensitive issue vis-à-vis the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet state, and the Russian Orthodox Church, would be regarded as a "provocation" and jeopardize the greater aims.

Pope John XXIII invited Orthodox observers to attend the Church Council that we know as Vatican II, and some did come. There were statements on ecumenism and the Pope established a Commission for the Promotion of Christian Unity. Also, his 1961 Encyclical Mater et Magistra, in which the Pope asserted that world leaders held a responsibility before God and "before history" for world peace, evoked a response from the Soviet Union, which always tried to use peace initiatives for its own purposes. In short order there was contact between Khrushchev and the Pope, and a new era began for Vatican-Moscow relations. The Commission for Christian Unity, the Congregation for Eastern Churches, the Papal Secretariat of State, and others inside the Vatican were "seeking a political rapprochement with the Soviet government, and ecumenical contacts with the Moscow Patriarchate."⁽¹⁹⁾

The Ukrainian Catholic Church under its exiled leader, Archbishop-Metropolitan (after 1965: Cardinal) Slipyj, appeared as the major obstacle to such a rapprochement and contact. Slipyj's distinguished biographer, Jaroslav Pelican, has noted that "in the Rome for which he and his church had sacrificed so much, the Ukrainian metropolitan felt increasingly hemmed in by what he called ... 'the negative attitude' he continued to encounter from 'the sacred congregations of the Roman curia.'"⁽²⁰⁾ From 1968 onwards Slipyj increasingly escaped from the silence to which the Vatican would have liked to condemn him. He assumed the role of an articulate church leader. Despite criticism from many Vatican quarters, he "launched a great plan of revival" of his Church.⁽²¹⁾ The plan involved drawing attention to the plight of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and putting it fully on the Christian map as a "Sister Church" to the Roman Latin-rite Church, with its own Patriarch.⁽²²⁾ Slipyj's well-publicized activities found considerable support in the North American diaspora and in other quarters too, and were embarrassing for the Vatican⁽²³⁾. Rome had chosen to acquiesce in the Soviet treatment of Ukrainian Catholics. It did not protest the denunciations of the Church by Metropolitan Filaret of the Russian Orthodox Church in Kiev, nor the persecution of the Church's leaders in Ukraine, especially Bishop Velychkowsky. Rome remained silent in the face of derogatory remarks about the Ukrainian Catholic Church made by Moscow Patriarch Pimen at his enthronement in 1971 in the presence of Cardinal Jan Willebrands, President of the Commission for Promoting Christian Unity.⁽²⁴⁾ These and numerous other acts and omissions lead to the conclusion that until the end of the 1970s Rome was prepared to abandon the Ukrainian Catholics to their fate, in return for peace and rapprochement with the Soviet Union and other communist countries and in order to facilitate ecumenical dialogue with the Russian Orthodox Church.

The election of the Polish Pope was the principal factor that brought about a change in the Vatican's stance. John Paul II's background had given him a thorough knowledge of communist aims and methods, and he understood much about the conditions in which the

Ukrainian Catholic Church existed. His concern for this Church and for Catholics in Lithuania and elsewhere in the Soviet system was expressed very soon after his enthronement. Turning the other cheek was clearly no longer the order of the day.⁽²⁵⁾ The Soviets retaliated with another wave of strong repression in West Ukraine; the Russian Orthodox Church vehemently denounced the "Uniate remnants"; the Moscow Patriarchate stated that it was getting "the impression of a change in ecumenical policy."⁽²⁶⁾ Even Cardinal Willebrands, normally compliant in his dealings with the Russian Orthodox Church, noted in his response that some in the Orthodox Church "would even prefer that [the] liquidation" of Catholic Uniate Churches "be a prerequisite for dialogue" on ecumenism.⁽²⁷⁾

Other reasons for a change in Vatican policy may be sought in the continued tough resilience of the Church in West Ukraine, the increasingly vocal concern expressed in the Ukrainian Catholic diaspora (with which the exiled Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church at times associated itself), the heating-up of the Cold War after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and perhaps above all in the continued and inventive plans of Cardinal Slipyj. On November 20, 1978, Slipyj, accompanied by other Ukrainian Catholic hierarchs, revealed to the new Pope John Paul II their plan for the celebration of the millennium of Christianity in Rus during the ten years leading up to 1988 itself. It took the Holy See four months to devise the Pope's official response. It was a subtle document. The proposed celebration "indeed touched Us exceedingly." His Holiness made reference to "the Ukrainian nation, whose achievements and trials are matters especially of love and concern to Us." Clearly implying that this had been lacking in the Soviet sphere in the past, Pope John Paul II stated that

"(w)ithout doubt, a genuine ecumenical spirit ... ought to be shown and also proved by a special respect toward your Church among other Catholic Churches of the eastern world which have their distinct rites. In the future we expect very much from the very motive and testimony of an ecumenical spirit which Our Brothers of the Orthodox Churches, Patriarchs and Bishops, are displaying, as also their Clergy and all the communities."

Having earlier drawn attention to the catholicity and "extraordinary riches of the universal Church" before its division in the eleventh century, and to the sad state of the Church's "disrupted unity," which was "contrary to the will of Christ the Lord," the Pope invoked not only ecumenism but also the principle of religious freedom as enshrined in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁽²⁸⁾

There is much in this document which expresses sentiments extant before the accession of John Paul II: the need for Church unity, the strengthening of the ecumenical spirit, the support of the principle of religious freedom. New, however, is the expression of special love and concern for the Ukrainian people, the reproach that some Churches have not shown enough respect toward Slipyj's Church, and the expectation that Orthodox Churches would display a more ecumenical spirit towards Eastern Catholic Churches in the future.⁽²⁹⁾

Soon afterwards, in 1980, the Pope convened a synod of the Ukrainian Catholic Church of the diaspora, at which the bishops presented to the Pope three names for Coadjutor to the Metropolitan of L'viv. From among these, apparently because he had received the most votes but probably also because he was most congenial to the Curia, the Pope chose Archbishop-Metropolitan Myroslav Ivan Lubachivsky of Philadelphia, who was thus named as the future successor to Metropolitan Slipyj.⁽³⁰⁾ Later the same year the Ukrainian bishops declared the 1946 L'viv synod's decisions uncanonical and illegal.⁽³¹⁾ These initiatives caused concern in Moscow, both to the state and to the Russian Orthodox Church, and as news of them filtered into West Ukraine it gave new hope to the faithful there.⁽³²⁾ As already noted, in the years 1980-83, there was a renewed crackdown on the Ukrainian Catholic underground Church, with many arrests and imprisonments. There were attacks on the Church and the Pope in the Soviet press, radio and television, and Soviet atheist propaganda in the L'viv region reached record levels.⁽³³⁾

The early glasnost years brought no essential change in the situation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in its homeland except--and this was important--that the authorities began to ignore large outdoor masses.⁽³⁴⁾ In Rome, Major-Archbishop Lubachivsky succeeded Cardinal Slipyj upon the latter's death as Metropolitan in exile in 1984. Between 1984 and 1988, religious and human rights activists in Ukraine sent appeals and declarations to Gorbachev and the Soviet government asking for freedom of worship and the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.⁽³⁵⁾ These were ignored and instead more churches in West Ukraine that had been closed were reopened as Russian Orthodox churches. Soviet atheistic propaganda subsided somewhat as the year of the Millennium, 1988, approached. There were fears--which turned out to be unfounded--that glasnost in religion would come to an end once the Millennium celebrations were over. Easter celebrations were allowed in 1988 and were attended by large numbers across the Soviet Union. Gorbachev confirmed on April 27, 1988, that "believers have the full right to express their convictions with dignity."⁽³⁶⁾ The Soviet leader also made it clear that the "mistakes that had been made with regard to the church and believers in the 1930s and the years that followed are being rectified." A new law on freedom of conscience was to be one way to do this.⁽³⁷⁾

Another way was for Russian Orthodox and Soviet authorities to meet with Vatican officials. Some were invited in 1988 to Moscow to attend the Millennium celebrations. The dialogue included reference to the status of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, but in a public statement at the Bolshoi Theatre on June 10, the Vatican's Secretary of State, Cardinal Casaroli, mentioned the Ukrainian Catholics only indirectly.⁽³⁸⁾ There were indeed still obstacles ahead. The new freedoms, it turned out, were to be applied to Ukrainian Catholics in only a limited manner. Appeals made by the underground Ukrainian Catholic Church to the Russian Orthodox Church in an effort to obtain legal status so that it could emerge into the light of day failed to achieve this objective. Still, there was less harassment from 1989 onwards, although sporadic beatings and imprisonment of priests and believers continued in West Ukraine until 1991.

From the spring of 1989 onwards the Ukrainian Catholic diaspora became more proactive and visible in its support for the Church in Ukraine. There were responses to

appeals from priests and their supporters in West Ukraine for liturgical items and chalices for hundreds of churches that were emerging from the underground; religious literature could now also be sent and news items began to appear of churches being returned to Ukrainian Catholics.⁽³⁹⁾

Gorbachev's reforms, designed to change but not to eliminate the old party structure and ways of thinking, did not work as he had hoped between 1985-87. He began to coopt the intellectuals who were eager to support him. As soon as he got them involved, "the genie was out of the bottle."⁽⁴⁰⁾ The response of the new democrats of the various ethnic groups, particularly in the Baltic States and in Ukraine, was to demand more. By late 1987 not only was there the economic crisis which had started Gorbachev on his reforms, but there was a crisis of rising political expectations. On the ground, this meant the beginnings of a profound change in the attitudes which Ukrainians had towards the authorities. The deconstruction of the past that was being undertaken in Moscow News and also in the local press and on television awakened much interest. People looked and listened, talked about it, half-believed it. In 1987 it was still all too novel to be fully accepted. Older people urged caution: they had believed Khrushchev in the late 1950s and ended up for years in Siberia or Central Asia.⁽⁴¹⁾ But by 1988, particularly in West Ukraine, a Canadian traveler was shocked at the openness of the people: "the era of the slumbering mind ... seems to be over. The nation's stirring to life."⁽⁴²⁾ And nowhere were the interests of dissenters, intellectuals, nationalists and democrats more closely linked to rights for a Church than in West Ukraine.⁽⁴³⁾

The question of how religious activism intersected with other forms of political dissent in the Soviet Union is as yet far from clear. That there was interaction and some mutuality of interest seems plain.

By annexing the western Ukrainian areas and forcibly liquidating the Ukrainian Catholic Church, historically so closely associated with Ukrainian nationalism, the Soviet authorities provided the soil in which religious and other dissent could grow and flourish. However, the harsh repression of the Church, and of the Ukrainian nationalist cause in the late 1940s and early 1950s, ensured that such dissent would take time to become organized, let alone visible.

From the mid-1960s onwards, the Ukrainian dissident movement, primarily in Eastern Ukraine, focused on demands for civil rights guaranteed in the Soviet Constitution but ignored in practice. Writers, academics, lawyers, etc., were arrested and punished in various ways for their boldness. Even though their methods were low-key, consisting mainly of writing letters and statements challenging the authorities and circulating these in samvydav writings, they were given little mercy.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Christian literature was certainly included, but appears not to have been a major component of these writings; what little there was seems to have been chiefly of Baptist provenance. Nevertheless, because the Soviet ideological struggle in Ukraine was "aimed simultaneously at both religion and nationalism," there was ab initio a link between the two for many people.⁽⁴⁵⁾ The West Ukrainian dissident Valentin Moroz, primarily concerned with the harmful effects of Russification, saw this clearly: for the regime, it was "more convenient," he wrote, "to

destroy the foundations of a nation in the guise of a struggle with religion. The church has become such an integral part of cultural life that it is not possible to destroy it without harming the spiritual structure of the nation."⁽⁴⁶⁾

In the early 1970s, the names of persons detained and/or incarcerated for distributing religious literature or for holding religious ceremonies banned by law began to appear in the Moscow underground Chronicle of Current Events and in Ukrainskyi visnyk [Ukrainian Herald]. The former's interest showed that the Ukrainian Catholic Church's situation was beginning to attract the attention of Russian dissidents. In West Ukraine, priests, nuns and simple believers were targets for the KGB and militia. Obviously, many of the activities of the "catacomb church" were well-known, and were attacked by the Soviet press and other media. Anti-religious propaganda stressed accusations that the Ukrainian Catholic Church maintained contact with the hated Vatican, and continued the charges that the Church had been supportive of the Ukrainian nationalist movement during and after the war.⁽⁴⁷⁾ At the same time, in the opinion of one analyst, if Ukrainian Catholic activists, especially nuns, conducted their activities "semiprivate," they were often although not always ignored.⁽⁴⁸⁾ Thus the outlines of the situation were fairly clear by the mid-1970s: there was religious activism and political dissent with a religious connotation, and the repression of dissent and periodically intensified crackdowns on religion.

A number of factors served to bring about a dramatic widening and deepening of the Ukrainian Catholic activist movement, and religious dissidence generally in the Soviet Union. Archbishop Volodymyr Sterniuk of L'viv, who had succeeded Archbishop Vasyl as the local head of the still-illegal Church, began to maintain regular contacts with members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, particularly those who had been imprisoned for dissident activities; and, by the late 1970s, religious dissenters began to seek out and cooperate with civil rights activists.⁽⁴⁹⁾ Second, just like the civil rights activists, religious dissenters began using the Helsinki Accords (of which the Soviet Union was a signatory), in this case to secure religious rights and freedoms.⁽⁵⁰⁾ Third, there seems to have been a generational change, as younger men came to the fore.⁽⁵¹⁾ Doubtless connected with this, religious dissenters became more bold in advertising their demands. In particular, Ukrainian Catholic activists in West Ukraine were openly requesting the legalization of their Church. They had as an example the monster petition sent by Lithuanian Roman Catholics on July 1, 1979, to Chairman Leonid Brezhnev, with over 148,000 signatures, asking for the return of the Catholic church of Mary, Queen of Peace, in Klaipeda--a truly heroic endeavor.⁽⁵²⁾ But above all there was the effect, especially on the western regions of the U.S.S.R. and on some of the Soviet satellites, of the election of the Cardinal-Archbishop of Cracow, Karol Wojtyla, as Pope in 1979.

The election of Pope John Paul II caused a great deal of justified apprehension among the Soviet leadership, but they could scarcely have realized its full significance.⁽⁵³⁾ It introduced a surge of enthusiasm and spiritual energy among Catholic and other dissidents in the Soviet Union. It awakened "amongst Christians in Eastern Europe a sense of their dignity, responsibilities and potential strength."⁽⁵⁴⁾ We may not know exactly how influential for the people of Lithuania, western Belarus, and West Ukraine--

all well within range of Polish television--were the Pope's visits to Poland, the televised broadcasts of his visits and other activities, and the increased attention which Vatican radio paid to the plight of Catholics within the U.S.S.R. after John Paul II's election. But it is certain that Ukrainian Catholic activists became more insistent in their demands for the legalization of their Church. To further this cause, "The Initiative Group to Defend the Rights of Believers and the Church" was formed in September 1982 and sent an open declaration to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist party, demanding legalization. And when leaders such as Iosyf Terelya were arrested, others came forward to take their place. Terelya exemplified the link between religion and nationalism, for he stressed the role of the Church in the rebirth of the Ukrainian nation; he also provided another link with other activists, for he denounced the Soviets' war in Afghanistan.⁽⁵⁵⁾

By the mid-1980s the religious landscape was changing. Acts of repression against targeted individuals continued, but the authorities were clearly confronting a rising volume of activity, and each "victory" emboldened the religious activists to undertake yet more visible protest. By 1988, when the manifestations around the celebration of the Millennium of Christianity were fully underway, there was little the Kremlin could do to suppress the Ukrainian Catholic Church in western Ukraine, or religious activities in general.

Marshall S. Shatz noted in 1980 that dissidents had been "isolated in their own society" and could not "force any major liberalization" in that society.⁽⁵⁶⁾ Religious activism did, however, provide secular dissidents with a mass base that could be mobilized to agitate, in increasingly bold fashion, against the regime. Religious dissent was making common cause with political and nationalist dissent. In some respects, in Ukraine and in Lithuania, the latter came to ride the mass wave of religious discontent. To say this is not to deny that some civil rights activists, in Ukraine, Lithuania and Moscow, had a very genuine concern with religious freedom.⁽⁵⁷⁾ Nevertheless, it does appear that in Ukraine some former political prisoners of conscience, and others who had been harassed but not imprisoned, coopted the mass activism of the religious, both Catholics and Orthodox, in West Ukraine. Some were elected to the first Ukrainian parliament in 1990, others went on to become Ukrainian diplomats or popular figures inside the country, despite the fact that they had had little to do originally with the Ukrainian Catholic Church or its tribulations and quest for legalization.

The religious question thus contributed to the fall of the Soviet empire. It did so in combination with other events, including the increasing manifestations of the Soviet Union's economic weakness, the dislocations attendant upon Gorbachev's attempts to reinvigorate the Communist Party and the government apparatus, the decline of morale within the Communist Party, and the growing boldness of civil rights activists. However, in the final stages of the Soviet Union's disintegration the lead was taken by those republics and regions where nationalist sentiment, for decades linked to and nurtured by religious faith and activism, was strongest.

After the momentous year of 1988, the villages and towns of West Ukraine sensed that the leadership of the Soviet Union was changing. It did not take long for Ukrainian

Catholics to make use of what appeared to be freedom to practice their religion. Demands for the registration of parishes increased, and a few more churches passed into their possession.⁽⁵⁸⁾ Church leaders in the diaspora encouraged their followers to pray for the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, and appealed to them to send prayer books, chalices and other church articles to their co-religionists. Acting on an agreement between Canada and the U.S.S.R., a society was formed specifically to send religious articles to Ukraine.⁽⁵⁹⁾ The Synod of diaspora Ukrainian Catholic Hierarchs' meeting on April 12, 1989, created a special commission to disseminate Ukrainian religious literature.⁽⁶⁰⁾

The greater assertiveness of Ukrainian Catholics in Ukraine in 1989, their public religious celebrations and their reclaiming of property which had belonged to their Church prior to 1945, was a matter of pride for Ukrainian Catholics in North America. At the same time, it was of great concern to the Ukrainian Soviet state authorities and to the Russian Orthodox Church. In the minds of the latter, both the parishioners and the churches and other property which they had acquired at the expense of Ukrainian Catholics were theirs; the Ukrainian Catholic Church had been liquidated as far as they were concerned; they had looked after the buildings and the care of souls since 1946. In the minds of Ukrainian Catholics, such churches and property, together with their congregations, had been illegally acquired by the Russian Orthodox Church and/or the state, and should be returned to the Ukrainian Catholic Church. The issue of property rights admitted no brotherly Christian love.⁽⁶¹⁾

The case of a church in Nestoriv raion in March 1989 was not untypical. It was used by the Russian Orthodox Church, whose local adherents, suspecting something was afoot, had changed the locks during the night. Ukrainian Catholics, emboldened by the presence of Ivan Hel, head of the Committee for the Defense of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, tore off the locks and held a service for 300 people in it.⁽⁶²⁾ Not all confrontations were necessarily violent; in fact, a lot of transfers of religious edifices were effected peacefully. Throughout West Ukraine prayer meetings and memorial services, although still illegal, were held, showing that fear of the authorities was subsiding. The memorial services usually managed to neatly blend nationalist and religious symbolism--thus memorial services were held for the victims of Stalinism, of the famine, of Chornobyl, for Mykhailo Hrushevsky, and for the martyred Bishop Mykola Charnetsky.⁽⁶³⁾ The authorities responded with frequent detentions, arrests and beatings of organizers of illegal meetings and of priests.⁽⁶⁴⁾ The Ukrainian security forces carefully monitored both the campaigns for election to the All-Union Congress of Deputies and religious activities in the spring of 1989.⁽⁶⁵⁾ The detention of a priest on April 9 while celebrating a liturgy for Ukrainian Catholics prompted Cardinal Lubachivsky to declare "there is no glasnost for the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Ukraine."⁽⁶⁶⁾

Arrests and harassment by the KGB and militia, and vigilant monitoring of Ukrainian Catholic religious activities was augmented by other actions inimical to Ukrainian Catholic interests. Russian Orthodox and Polish Catholic missionaries were given facilities to work among the people of West Ukraine. More churches were given back to religious congregations, but not to Ukrainian Catholics. The Ukrainian Echo reported that

"the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church is being encouraged by the Soviet government to occupy churches once held by Catholics, then closed in the 1940s."⁽⁶⁷⁾ Even renowned formerly-Catholic pilgrimage sites like Zarvanytsia were now given to the Russian Orthodox Church. This governmental strategy hurt not only the Ukrainian Catholics but also the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Neither had as yet been legalized, despite petitions to the Supreme Soviet asking for this. While the central authorities could bask in the glow of their reputation as reformers and tolerators of religious freedom, such activities were provoking open hostility between the churches themselves.⁽⁶⁸⁾

As debates went on about how much freedom of religion to allow and yet how to control it, especially in areas where religion was strongly associated with nationalism, like West Ukraine and Lithuania, people in Ukraine increasingly took matters into their own hands. To make their point in Moscow, delegations of Ukrainian Catholic clergy and laity demonstrated and held prayer meetings and news conferences in the streets of Moscow, demanding the legalization of their Church.⁽⁶⁹⁾ This aroused the ire of Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev.⁽⁷⁰⁾ In a letter to Moscow News he repeated the old party line about the "overwhelming" support given by Greek Catholics to the decisions of the 1946 L'viv Synod. According to Filaret, it was not "Stalin's repressions, which we all condemn" but the artificiality and outdatedness of the Ukrainian Catholic Church which had caused it to reunite joyfully with the Russian Orthodox Church. Now "an insignificant group of Uniates" and their nationalist backers from abroad wanted to alienate "thousands of parishes and millions of believers from the Russian Orthodox Church." They were secessionists, not partisans of religious freedom. They "are not subjected to any repressive measures. They can profess their faith, consider the Pope their pastor and pray in [Roman] Catholic churches on Ukrainian territory. No one is preventing them from attending Orthodox churches either."⁽⁷¹⁾ Moscow News paired the text of Metropolitan Filaret's letter with a column detailing the errors contained in Filaret's arguments, calling for the return of St. George's Cathedral in L'viv to its real owners, advising the Russian Orthodox Church to reclaim from the state St. Sophia's Cathedral in Kiev and other shrines in Ukraine, and concluding with the comment that "the Orthodox Church will find it hard to explain why it so persistently supported Stalin's repressive measures against the followers of the Uniate Church."⁽⁷²⁾

Filaret's letter has been cited at some length because it exemplified the consistent attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church: the decisions of the 1946 pseudo-Synod were valid, the Ukrainian Catholic Church did not exist, its few remnants were nationalist troublemakers abetted by foreign interests hoping to break up the Soviet Union; they were not really motivated by religious faith, for if they were they would attend Roman Catholic or Orthodox churches.

Demonstrations in Moscow, whether to coincide with the opening of the Congress of People's Deputies in May 1989 or the World Council of Churches' meeting in July, were only one part of the story.⁽⁷³⁾ Throughout the spring and summer of 1989 there were nationalist demonstrations in many parts of Ukraine, by Orthodox as well as Catholics. On the anniversary of the reburial in Ukraine of the Ukrainian poet and national hero

Taras Shevchenko, in Kiev on May 22, 1989, the people sang religious songs and waved Ukrainian flags.⁽⁷⁴⁾ The police backed off when the crowd threatened to expand their demonstration into the villages. In West Ukraine there were demonstrations for the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, requiem masses held quite openly though still illegally, and the conversion of some parishes from Orthodoxy to Ukrainian Catholicism. By late summer the call for the legalization of the Church had been taken up by the Ukrainian democratic movements Rukh and Memorial.⁽⁷⁵⁾ The biggest pro-legalization manifestation came on September 17, 1989, when between 150,000 and 200,000 Ukrainians held an orderly Divine Liturgy and procession in L'viv, and dispatched telegrams to Gorbachev and the Pope. Many believe that these events, particularly the last, were the turning point in Gorbachev's decision about the Ukrainian Catholic Church.⁽⁷⁶⁾ This was no small group of fanatics but a mass movement of a hitherto-suppressed Church.⁽⁷⁷⁾

That the hierarchy of the diaspora Ukrainian Catholic Church was becoming concerned and annoyed at the delays both in Moscow and in Rome, and at their own exclusion from discussions on ecumenism, became public knowledge in October. At their September Synod in Rome, they informed Cardinal Willebrands, head of the Vatican Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity, that they were aware of "a reluctance to permit our Greek Catholic Church to take an active role in this work of ecumenism." Why was it, they asked pointedly, that they had to learn of "ecumenical initiatives from Rome through Russian Orthodox Church channels before the Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy was informed?" It must have been tongue-in-cheek when they added that, "(A)s a result, a certain lack of confidence in the policies of the Secretariat has developed."⁽⁷⁸⁾ Requests were made that the Vatican include Ukrainian Catholic representatives in ecumenical work, and that the Secretary of State meet with the Ukrainian Catholic Synod.

Pressure on Gorbachev to legalize the Ukrainian Catholic Church also increased in the fall of 1989, not only from Ukraine but also from the U.S. Congress and from prominent Soviet Ukrainians, and--probably in muted form--through "pastoral conversations" between Vatican and Russian Orthodox Church representatives in mid-November.⁽⁷⁹⁾ An announcement was made in the press that this would probably come after Gorbachev's meeting in Rome with the Pope in December. But Gorbachev was also subjected to contrary pressures principally from the Russian Orthodox Church, on whose behalf Filaret had already drawn attention to the "Nationalist elements in Ukraine ... trying to use the Uniate church to estrange Ukrainians from Russians, their half-brothers."⁽⁸⁰⁾

Preparations in the Vatican were along lines similar to earlier years. The Cardinal Secretary of State orchestrated Pope John Paul II's policy. He was the same man who, in 1963, had been charged with the mission to establish ties with the Soviets. Then, and again in 1989, rapprochement and an improvement in religious conditions for all had been the objective. In pursuit of this rapprochement and of the great goal of Christian Unity, it was Vatican policy not to make demands, such as the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, which were likely to be deemed "provocative."⁽⁸¹⁾

Still, something clearly had to be achieved by the Vatican; the Pope himself was not disinterested. But given the consistency of the Curia's policy towards Ukrainian Catholics, it was perhaps just as well that Gorbachev had come fully prepared. A document of the Ukrainian government providing a legal status for Ukrainian Catholics--but not for their Church as such--ostensibly dated November 20, was released on the day of the meeting between the Pope and the Soviet leader, December 1, 1989. On December 2, the Head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church announced that Ukrainian Catholics could now officially register their congregations, and he called on the faithful to do this peacefully.⁽⁸²⁾ However, this did not mean that the beleaguered Church would in short order spring to life; among other things, the Church itself had not been legitimized as a juridical body. So the battle for existence was far from over.

Certainly Ukrainian Catholics attempted to make speedy use of the official registration procedure to legalize their individual congregations. Before the end of 1989 it was reported that between 600 and 650 Ukrainian Catholic congregations had applied to register, that 300 churches were functioning and that 200 Russian Orthodox priests wanted to become Ukrainian Catholic priests.⁽⁸³⁾ By mid-January 1990, some 600 churches were claimed to be functioning as Ukrainian Catholic ones, and 700 congregations to be applying for registration; 350 priests had gone over to the Ukrainian Catholic Church. There was no longer a single Russian Orthodox church in the city of Ivano-Frankivsk (Stanyislaviv). The cathedrals there and in L'viv were closed to prevent harm coming to them from the claims of rival religious groups.⁽⁸⁴⁾

With such massive changes, there was, as expected, considerable discord and, in some cases, violence. The Russian Orthodox Church predicted great violence even in December 1989, and claimed that "rabid Ukrainian Catholics [were] throwing others out of churches."⁽⁸⁵⁾ This statement was later retracted, but an image had already been conjured up. In fact, violence was sporadic and localized, as for example when Ukrainian Catholic lay leader, Ivan Hel, was hijacked together with a priest, and severely beaten while en route to a prayer meeting in Mostyska.⁽⁸⁶⁾

On January 23, 1990, the first legitimate Ukrainian Catholic Synod held in Ukraine since World War II opened in L'viv. It declared the 1946 Synod invalid and uncanonical, and proclaimed that the Church was ready to function as a full legal entity. The Synod called on the U.S.S.R. to rehabilitate the Church, to compensate it for its losses, and to return its property, including the library and archives of Metropolitan Sheptytsky.⁽⁸⁷⁾ In early February, evidently in an attempt to harness and control nationalist sentiment, the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church announced the formation of "autonomous" Ukrainian and Byelorussian Orthodox Churches. This set the stage for even more ambiguity for the Ukrainian population.

In anticipation of difficulties over the "normalization" of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the Soviet Union, the Vatican and the Russian Orthodox Church agreed in January 1990 to strike a commission to try and resolve property issues.⁽⁸⁸⁾ This "Quadripartite Commission" consisted of two representatives each of the Vatican, the Ukrainian Catholic Church, the Russian Orthodox Church and the "autonomous" Ukrainian

Orthodox Church. It began its activities in March, but in Kiev, and not, as had been anticipated, in L'viv.⁽⁸⁹⁾ Its beginnings did not augur well for its future work, for the Ukrainian Catholic representatives were suddenly summoned to Kiev and given tickets for the train that night. The thorny issue of the future of L'viv's St. George's Cathedral almost derailed the commission at the outset. Nevertheless, rules were formulated about how church properties were to be allocated: if there was an evident majority of a given confession in a community, the church would belong to that confession. If the majority was not evident, "a free and secret vote," supervised by the commission, would be held. Despite this eminently sensible solution, the commission did not complete its work. On March 13, the Ukrainian Catholic Archbishop of L'viv, Volodymyr Sterniuk, walked out of its deliberations, claiming that the Russian Orthodox Church was issuing disinformation through the Russian-language press and that it was not ready to recognize the Greek Catholic Church as a Church but only as a group of Greek Catholics. On March 17 Archbishop Sterniuk issued a 14 point statement listing the issues that were crucial for the Ukrainian Catholic Church.⁽⁹⁰⁾ Clearly, he felt that the Vatican representatives on the Quadripartite Commission had not been responsive enough to the needs of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, and too accommodating to the Russian Orthodox Church's viewpoints. This was confirmed by a Vatican statement that the Archbishop was "taking a harder line than the Vatican."⁽⁹¹⁾

Sterniuk had judged correctly the likely effect of his "hard line" in L'viv itself. One of his demands was that St. George's Cathedral--the most visible symbol of the Church--be returned to the Ukrainian Catholic Church. This was discussed by the L'viv city council, which had some administrative authority over such issues, on April 6, 1990, and the council voted in favor of such a return. The Russian Orthodox Church representatives were told to begin moving their possessions to another church. Although Orthodox procrastination resulted in delays and the Cathedral was not in fact handed over until August, the direction of Church events in L'viv was clearly established. Naturally enough, the Russian Orthodox Church was most dissatisfied at this turn of events, against which it protested vigorously. Its most venomous utterances were directed at who it regarded as the usurpers: Bishop Ireney of Ivano-Frankivsk, of the newly-formed Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), was reported to have said "(y)ou Ukrainian Catholics will be chased like dogs."⁽⁹²⁾ Still, Easter in L'viv was celebrated in grand traditional style, even if not in St. George's, with the blessing of thousands of Easter baskets and midnight services in other churches. Meanwhile intemperate language continued. Bishop Ionafan, Secretary of the Synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) and Assistant to Metropolitan Filaret, referred to the tensions over St. George's and other properties, and the failure of the Quadripartite Commission, as a "spiritual Chernobyl" and compared West Ukraine to another Northern Ireland.⁽⁹³⁾ In response, Bishop Pavlo Vasylyk, the Ukrainian Catholic Auxiliary Bishop of Ivano-Frankivsk, said that "the work of the commission was not only senseless but in some ways absurd, because it was impossible for the persecuted to dialogue with the persecutors."⁽⁹⁴⁾ Plainly, the two sides had nothing useful to say to each other.

Archbishop Sterniuk, the senior Ukrainian Catholic prelate in Ukraine itself, was critical of both the Holy See and the Russian Orthodox Church. The Vatican, he let it be known,

"seems willing to give away our churches," while the Russian Orthodox Church "was not ready to recognize the Ukrainian Catholic Church as a Church" and refused to recognize the Ukrainian Catholic bishops as official because they had not been appointed by the Pope.⁽⁹⁵⁾ Unheeded by the Vatican, Archbishop Sterniuk was described by one writer as a "marginalized Lvivite."⁽⁹⁶⁾ However, he was supported in his tough stand by the L'viv city council and by Rukh leaders who "voiced their complete distrust of the Russian Orthodox Church, and incomprehension of the Vatican's intentions with regard to the Quadripartite commission."⁽⁹⁷⁾

By this time, May 1990, 800 registration applications for Ukrainian Catholic churches had been made and only seven had been granted. Matters in Ukraine settled down somewhat in June, and the first meeting of the homeland Ukrainian Catholic bishops with the Pope took place in Rome. Both John Paul II and the bishops appeared to share the sentiment that the Ukrainian Catholic Church was "a bridge to unity" with the Orthodox Church.⁽⁹⁸⁾ But the Ukrainian bishops went further and, no doubt encouraged by Cardinal Lubachivsky, put forward the claim that their Church should be recognized by Rome as a "sister church" and not merely as a "particular church."⁽⁹⁹⁾

In the next few months, both concepts were to be tested. In August, St. George's Cathedral was handed back to the Ukrainian Catholics, who triumphantly celebrated its return.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾ Manifestations of this triumphalism continued into the fall, with the expected effect on Catholic-Orthodox relations. A huge rally, called "Ukrainian Youth for Christ," reenacting one staged by Sheptytsky in 1933, was an opportunity for the resurgent Church to exercise its attraction for the young. The event extended over a whole week, September 6-12, 1990, and attracted thousands of people of all ages. On September 8, 40,000 people filled the L'viv soccer stadium, despite heavy rain. Workshops, talks at educational institutions, and musical programs involving smaller numbers, but in total affecting many thousands, were held in and around L'viv. Aided by charismatic diaspora clergy like Peter Galadza and Andriy Chirovsky of Canada, a week of fully experiencing "spiritual life and the Ukrainian Christian tradition" was topped off with a Christian rock concert. The city of L'viv as a whole appeared to be energized in a dramatic way during this week.⁽¹⁰¹⁾ A jarring note was interjected by the Moscow Patriarchate, which announced on September 14 that it was breaking off talks with the Vatican and with Ukrainian Catholics because "it was impossible to hold discussions with the Catholics."⁽¹⁰²⁾ Before the year ended, the new Soviet law on religion was adopted by the Supreme Soviet, and Ukrainian Catholic seminary education was begun. In the L'viv diocese alone, 250 seminarians were learning "to build the life of the Church," with Andrew Krawchuk from Ottawa and others helping to get this endeavor off the ground.⁽¹⁰³⁾ By late October their number had jumped to 325. Without books, bibles, or teachers of their own, this was an extremely ambitious project, as everyone involved with it at the time confessed.

Among other religious developments was the decision in October 1990 by the leadership of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church to return to Ukraine from its exile. This further complicated the religious picture in Ukraine. On October 28, Patriarch Alexey of Moscow, having granted autonomy to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under

Filaret (though subordinate to the Moscow Patriarch), attempted to enter St. Sophia Cathedral in Kiev with Filaret for the latter's formal installation. Crowds of people from the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Catholic Church blocked their entry. In the ensuing scuffle, some deputies were injured by the militia, and the world was reminded yet again of the immaturity of the cultural, religious and political leadership of Ukraine and the volatility of feeling about religion there.⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ By year's end, the Ukrainian Catholic Church had registered as a religious community in Kiev, although it did not yet have a church there--though the Roman Catholics had received a church for their use in Kiev. New seminaries were being planned in West Ukraine for the rising number of seminarians, and the Sheptytsky Clinic was opened in Kiev, helped by the Children of Chernobyl Relief Fund and other Ukrainian medical associations.⁽¹⁰⁵⁾

Glasnost and the collapse of Communism, together with the rise of democratic and nationalist movements in West Ukraine, had enabled the Ukrainian Catholic Church to emerge from the catacombs. Regrettably, much of the recorded history of the Church in Ukraine from 1991 to 1994 concerns not its pastoral care or theological education but its organizational and jurisdictional development and problems. In January 1991 Pope John Paul II confirmed the positions of all ten of its clandestine bishops, appointed a Ukrainian Catholic bishop to the diocese of Peremyshl in Poland (though subordinate to the Roman Catholic Cardinal Archbishop of Warsaw), and also named five Latin rite bishops for Ukraine. Cardinal Lubachivsky, as de facto head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, professed his great joy at all these appointments, though the appointment of so many Roman Catholic bishops for Ukraine was to cause some anguish among Ukrainian Catholics, seeming as it does, to indicate Vatican interest in circumscribing their territorial role.⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ The last extraterritorial Synod of the Ukrainian Catholic Church was held in Rome in February and decided that Cardinal Lubachivsky should assume his function as Major-Archbishop of L'viv in that city on March 30.⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ The Code of Canons for the Oriental Churches, approved by Latin bishops, was published and was due to go into effect in October.

Commitment to the Ukrainian Catholic Church continued to grow in West Ukraine: by May 1991 there were 946 seminarians, despite the "dire shortage of qualified teaching personnel." Cardinal Lubachivsky made a grand tour of Ukraine, although his visit was clearly unwelcome to the Orthodox, and demonstrators prevented his visit to St. Sophia's Cathedral in Kiev and other places. Meanwhile Archbishop Sterniuk (who remained a titular Archbishop) tactfully went on a visit to North America. While in Canada he made no secret of the deficiencies of the Church, speaking about its lack of rights and the continuing hostility between the Churches that were fostered by the Ukrainian Religious Affairs officials. Many Ukrainians seized the opportunity of the Pope's visit to Peremyshl in June to travel there. But property questions reared their ugly head here too, for despite the Pontiff's intervention Polish demonstrators prevented the transfer to Ukrainian Catholics of their prospective Cathedral. The fact that the Ukrainian Catholic bishop of Peremyshl was placed under Polish Roman Catholic supervision, the failure of the Pope to recognize Cardinal Lubachivsky as Patriarch, and territorial jurisdictional questions, all kept the Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy disgruntled. Not much happier was Patriarch Mstyslav of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, who also felt the strong

opposition of the Russian (now "Ukrainian") Orthodox Church. Indeed, as Ukraine edged towards independence, it seemed more and more as if Leonid Krawchuk and his government supported a national Ukrainian Orthodox Church--specifically that of Patriarch Filaret.⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ By the end of the year the Ukrainian Catholic Church felt insulted by the place of worship which the Kiev city council had allocated to it--a mere bell-tower.

1992 began with diplomatic relations being established between Ukraine and the Vatican. Tolerance and religious pluralism within Ukraine appeared to be developing. All the Churches were legalized, and it seemed that the spiritual life of Ukrainians could now be tended in peace. The property question, which now affected others besides the Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches, did not go away, but it seemed to subside. It was in some ways a false dawn. In the Orthodox Church a struggle began between Metropolitan/Patriarch Filaret of Kiev, who wanted to free himself from Moscow's tutelage, and the Moscow Patriarchate, which retaliated by demoting Filaret to the status of monk. Not long afterwards, Filaret convinced Metropolitan Antoniý of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church to unite with his flock to form a new Church.⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ Further details need not concern us here, but the upshot was that before long Ukraine had three Orthodox Churches: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Moscow Patriarchate; the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Kiev Patriarchate; and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. They were all in competition with each other and with Ukrainian Catholics for church property and adherents; the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Moscow Patriarchate remained the largest, but it has been suggested that the unedifying sight of so much squabbling among the Orthodox greatly facilitated the upsurge in the numbers of adherents of various types of Protestantism.

In the Catholic fold matters moved somewhat more smoothly, but here too there were some intradenominational problems. Early in the year the Ukrainian Catholic Church held its first Synod on Ukrainian territory, with 28 bishops from Ukraine and the diaspora attending. They were upset by the refusal of the Transcarpathian bishops to attend, by the continued subjection of Peremyshl to Warsaw, and by lack of progress on the Patriarchate. The West Ukrainian hierarchy noted that the code of canons for the Eastern Churches had been prepared without input from them, numerically the largest of the Eastern Churches (although the diaspora clergy and nuns had participated in its formulation). The Vatican was unwilling to give them as much autonomy as they felt was their due. There remained a critical shortage of priests. However, on the positive side of the ledger, hundreds of young men were seeking to become priests. There were now two functioning seminaries, in L'viv and Rudno, and funds provided by the U.S. Conference of Bishops had extended seminary education opportunities and allowed more differentiation in seminary training.⁽¹¹⁰⁾ Some men were able to go abroad for part of their education.

Among the faithful much enthusiasm was aroused by the reburial in L'viv of the remains of Cardinal Slipyj, whose heroic defiance of Soviet might was well-remembered. More than one million people paid homage to him during the week-long lying-in-state in St. George's Cathedral.

In 1993 the Ukrainian government gave a grant to two major Ukrainian Catholic educational institutions, the Holy Ghost Seminary in L'viv and the Basilian Philosophical and Theological Institute in Krekhiv.⁽¹¹¹⁾ Also, in January the Ukrainian Catholic Church proceeded to build what it deemed to be the necessary infrastructure to qualify for the status of Patriarchate.⁽¹¹²⁾ Disputes in the Toronto diocese had implications for the Ukrainian Catholic Church and its autonomy: was the retirement age of 75 for bishops valid for an Eastern rite Church? Did Rome have the authority to name a new bishop there who was not a candidate put forward by the Synod? The arguments in Toronto eventually spilled over into other directions, with Bishop Michael Hrynchysyn, the (Canadian) Exarch of France and the Benelux countries, telling Torontonians that among the urgent problems to be faced by Ukrainian Catholics was a need for vision and perspective, and an understanding of the Pope's thinking on accommodation with the Russian Orthodox Church.⁽¹¹³⁾ Many lay persons in North America no doubt would have agreed with the columnist in the Ukrainian Weekly (March 21, 1993) who called upon the Vatican to preserve its moral authority by appointing a Patriarch and telling "Moscow that the Ukrainian Catholic Church is 'not an East/West bargaining chip.'"

Yet this is precisely what seems again to be happening. It is as if John Paul II, having so significantly assisted the Ukrainian Catholic Church to emerge from the catacombs, has lost interest in it now that it can operate legally. Worse still, he too may now regard it as an obstacle to the successful ecumenical relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church which he clearly cherishes. In any case, Vatican policy again resembles that which prevailed before 1979. During 1993 and 1994, and even though Lubachivsky had revived the Chernihiv-Vyshorod eparchy to be responsible for parishes in east, south and central Ukraine, the Vatican has made it clear that it wishes the Ukrainian Catholic Church of the L'viv archeparchy to confine its concerns to that archeparchy alone--in other words to those areas of Ukraine which were once part of Austrian Galicia. Even that part of the Peremyshl diocese which is now in Poland but was historically linked to L'viv, has not been reattached to it, though the Pope did sever it from Polish jurisdiction by placing it under direct Vatican supervision. The Transcarpathian dioceses, not historically associated with L'viv, were also placed under direct Vatican supervision, even though one of them is on the territory of the Ukrainian republic. Their bishops, and that of Peremyshl, are, however, members of the Synod.

The Vatican has established new eparchies on what was once East Galician territory and is now in Ukraine, but has refused to revive a diocese that had once been in Russian Poland, presumably so as not to place further impediments to the cherished dialogue with Russian Orthodoxy and the pursuit of Christian unity. Vatican policy has made it very difficult indeed for the Ukrainian Catholic Church to minister to its believers in Siberia, Central Asia and other parts of the former Soviet Union to which they were at one time exiled or to which they moved. Either the Vatican fears that Ukrainian Catholic pastoral or missionary activities outside its "traditional" territory will strain relationships with the Orthodox Church[es], or it wishes to restrict the Ukrainian Catholic Church to its "traditional" territory in order to leave the field free for Roman Catholics.⁽¹¹⁴⁾ The recent translation of the Roman liturgy into Ukrainian gives some support to the second hypothesis.

The question of the Ukrainian Catholic Patriarchate remains in limbo--no doubt Orthodox patriarchs would object and thus relations between the Vatican and Orthodoxy would be strained. Also, if Ukrainian Catholics were granted a Patriarchate, their claims to virtual autonomy within the Catholic Church would be strengthened, and this would not be consonant with the policy the Vatican has consistently pursued over the years.⁽¹¹⁵⁾

To bolster its own position vis-à-vis the Vatican, the Ukrainian Catholic Church has also relegated to the background its earlier claim that it serves as a bridge between Catholicism and Orthodoxy. This is a recognition both of the correctness of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's conclusion and of the realities of the present day, when the Ukrainian Catholic Church is still perceived by the Orthodox and some Catholics as an irritant. Rather, the emphasis has shifted to seeking recognition as a "Sister Church" with its implication of equality of status.⁽¹¹⁶⁾ As Cardinal Lubachivsky has argued, if the Vatican cannot recognize the Ukrainian Catholic Church as a sister church, then the Orthodox Churches have little hope of being acknowledged by Rome as equal "sister churches." Bishop Losten of Stamford, U.S.A., and others have added a further refinement: that the Ukrainian Catholic Church as a sister church might be in communion both with Rome and with Constantinople and thereby serve as a real link between East and West along the road to Church unity.⁽¹¹⁷⁾ For those not convinced of the Russian Orthodox Church's real interest in ecumenism, however, there remains the danger of the Church's endeavors to maintain the Soviet Union and, more recently, to restore a political union under Russian and Orthodox hegemony.

The preoccupation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Ukraine with institutional matters has drawn its attention away from other issues. The acute crisis in theological education in Ukraine is perhaps at last being partially overcome, with the expansion of seminary training and the establishment of a theological academy. Foreign, particularly American and Canadian, assistance in these endeavors is still very much needed. More significant still for the long-term revival of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Ukraine are its activities in the field of pastoral care. From the observations of people who travel there often and who concern themselves with the Church's role in social and pastoral life, it would appear that not a great deal of energy or resources are going into that side of its ministry.⁽¹¹⁸⁾ Decades of indifferent or callous attitudes by the authorities to the care of the soul have left the Ukrainian population hurting, and searching for meaning and purpose. Problems such as alcoholism, and a lack of direction and hope among the youth of the country, while not substantially different from those of other post-Soviet countries, have certain nuances particular to Ukraine. Children and grandchildren of West Ukrainians who saw the violence of the Soviet take-over 50 years ago are traumatized in ways that the other peoples of the former Soviet Union, except in the Baltic States, are not. Faced with the failure of communism, some of them carry their triumphalism--whether its basis be nationalistic or religious or both--to extremes. To them extreme right-wing nationalism offers quick answers to their existentialist dilemmas, and a sense of purpose. Others are simply consumerist, caught up with the craze of things now freely available--music, clothes, pornography and other fads from the West. They crave real community, unlike the right-wing nationalists' search for community in bars and clubs, living out fantasies of wealth and coolness, but which ultimately lead nowhere. Families,

children, the sick, the impoverished, the disabled--what is the Church doing about these people, as much the children of God as those who attend churches in the various parishes, whom the Church likes to number in the millions?

One looks long and hard for signs that the Church "as healer" has established a real presence in Ukraine. The Church is absent from the streets and the hospitals. It has been suggested that the closeness of the tie between religion and national identity in West Ukraine in particular has conditioned the dialogue and, in fact, the experience of the Church's revival in the post-Gorbachev era. The Church or churches, tied to the Ukrainian nation, thus appear to have pressing nation-building and state-building functions, which preempt other seemingly-less urgent tasks. There are indeed voices, many in the diaspora but some also in Ukraine, which differ with this view. They look at the youth and the widespread social suffering, and note with regret the distinct absence of the homeland Ukrainian Catholic Church. They have thus taken it upon themselves to establish pastoral care programs to alleviate such suffering. For example, Sister Louisa, from Brazil's SSMI community, was instrumental in starting a local catechetical commission in L'viv, which runs summer courses for catechists, pastoral care workers and educators.⁽¹¹⁹⁾ L'Arche, a community founded by Jean Vanier in France but now world-wide, has recently established some group homes for the mentally handicapped.⁽¹²⁰⁾ Non-Ukrainians from a lay U.S. organization named Miles Jesu have mastered the Ukrainian language, and have been working for the past few years with the young people of Ukraine. Mainstream and cultist Protestant churches come to Ukraine with social activist as well as religious programs, while Catholic and Orthodox Churches alike are failing to take up the pastoral care ministry with any vigor.

The Ukrainian Catholic Church in Ukraine has survived more than forty years of acute repression and emerged triumphant from its trials. The great danger now is that it may not survive its triumph with equal vigor.

Endnotes

1. For background see Borys A. Gudziak, "How Did They Drift Apart? The Kievan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest." Logos: A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies 34 (1993): 43-66.
2. See, for example, the brief comments by Oleh A. Krawchenko, ibid.: 67-69.
3. Serge Keleher, Passion and Resurrection: The Greek Catholic Church in Soviet Ukraine, 1939-1989 (L'viv: 1993), p. 16.
4. Which ended up with three Catholic Archbishops! Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic and Armenian Catholic.
5. On Sheptytsky generally see Paul R. Magocsi, ed., Morality and Reality: The Life and Times of Andrei Sheptyts'kyi (Edmonton: 1989); on Sheptytsky and Christian unity see

therein the essay by Lubomyr Husar, "Sheptyts'kyi and Ecumenism," pp. 185-200. Sheptytsky's full title was Archbishop of L'viv, Metropolitan of Halych, and Bishop of Kamianets'-Podils'kyi.

6. In October 1939 Sheptytsky also established four Ukrainian Catholic exarchates for the other territory of the Soviet Union, ibid., p. 108. Mukachevo-Uzhorod is now in Ukraine and Preshov in Slovakia.

7. Very recently scholars have begun to refer to it as the "Greco-Catholic Church."

8. Other estimates range as high as 2000 priests, as well as monks and nuns; see Keleher, Passion and Resurrection, p. 61.

9. For an assessment based on the recently-opened Soviet archives see Ivan Bilas, "The Moscow Patriarchate, the Penal Organs of the USSR, and the Destruction of the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church in the 1940s" [in Ukrainian], Logos, 34 (1993): 532-76.

10. Keleher, Passion and Resurrection, pp. 50 and 142. The L'viv Theological Academy's building became the Central Post Office.

11. Keleher, Passion and Resurrection, pp. 80-81, 83, 87 and 93.

12. Josyf Slipyj (1892-1984), Rector of the L'viv Theological Academy, was consecrated Archbishop and Coadjutor for the L'viv Archeparchy, with the right of succession, in December 1939, soon after the first Soviet occupation of West Ukraine. This action was not made public until January 1942. Archbishop-Metropolitan Slipyj was arrested in 1945, and sentenced to prison, hard labor camp and exile. He was deprived of liberty for almost 18 years. For a time, during his Siberian exile, he worked in Maklakovo as a servant and guard in a home for the handicapped. Upon his release in 1963 he went to Rome where he was named a Cardinal by Pope Paul VI in 1965, though it appears that Pope John XXIII had already appointed him a Cardinal in pectore in 1960; see Magocsi, ed., Morality and Reality, pp. 104-05; Keleher, Passion and Resurrection, pp. 75-81, Alexis U. Floridi, S.J., Moscow and the Vatican (Ann Arbor, Mich.: 1986), pp. 172-74, and Jaroslav Pelikan, Confessor between East and West: A Portrait of Ukrainian Cardinal Josyf Slipyj (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 1990), esp. pp. 146-231.

13. Vasyl Velychkowsky (1903-1973), a member of the Redemptorist order, was arrested in 1945 for writing a pamphlet and sentenced to death the following year. The sentence was commuted to ten years imprisonment. His release in 1957 was followed by ten years of exile. He was secretly named a bishop in 1959 and secretly consecrated by Slipyj in the Hotel Moskva in Moscow (!) early in 1963, as Slipyj was awaiting his journey into exile. Bishop Vasyl was titular Bishop of Lutsk, Archbishop ad personam, and Vicar General of L'viv; he was arrested in late 1968 for "illicit religious activities." He was released and expelled from Ukraine in 1972 and died the following year in Winnipeg; Floridi, Moscow and the Vatican, pp. 179-80, Keleher, Passion and Resurrection, p. 80,

and Osyp Zinkevych and Taras R. Lonchyna, eds., Martyrology of the Ukrainian Churches, II, The Ukrainian Catholic Church (Toronto: 1985), pp. 85, 103-04, and 423-38. The sources contain minor discrepancies in dates.

14. Floridi, Moscow and the Vatican, pp. 175-76.

15. Lawrence Martin, Breaking with History (Toronto: 1989), p. 255.

16. Keleher, Passion and Resurrection, pp. 92-98. Keleher interviewed many of the underground clergy after the church emerged into the open.

17. Martin, Breaking, p. 255.

18. Russel Moroziuk, Politicized Ecumenism: Rome, Moscow and the Ukrainian Catholic Church (Montreal: 1984), p. 21.

19. Floridi, Moscow and the Vatican, p. 175; see also Dennis J. Dunn, "Debate on the Vatican's Ostpolitik", Religion in Communist Lands, 10 (1982), 188-89; Philip Walters, "Christians in Eastern Europe: A Decade of Aspirations and Frustrations," ibid., 11 (1983), 6-24, and Hansjakob Stehle, "Papal Diplomacy and the Vatican Apparatus," in Catholicism and Politics in Communist Societies, ed. Pedro Ramos (Durham, N.C.: 1990), p. 346 According to Stehle, the Vatican has pursued its Ostpolitik "cautiously, flexibly and patiently for more than forty years," and he quotes with evident approval Cardinal Secretary of State Casaroli's expression of the Curia's sense of timelessness: "Here, years and decades do not count".

20. Pelikan, Confessor, p. 173.

21. Floridi, Moscow and the Vatican, pp. 173-76.

22. Late in life, Cardinal Slipyj frequently signed himself as "Patriarch," and was addressed as such by many Ukrainian Catholics. On the significance for Slipyj of the title "patriarch" and the implications thereof for the Ukrainian Catholic Church see Pelikan, Confessor, pp. 190-215, and Tataryn, "Papal Primacy," pp. 131-37. See Myroslaw Tataryn, "Papal Primacy, Local Primacy and Episcopal Collegiality," Logos, 34:128-30. On the term "Sister Churches" see also Andriy Chirovsky "Sister Churches': Ecumenical Terminology in Search of Content," ibid., 34:396-421.

23. The tensions between Slipyj and the Vatican apparatus, including various cardinals and at times Pope John Paul II, are documented in ibid., pp. 180-84 and 199-214, Tataryn, "Papal Primacy," pp. 134-36, and Floridi, Moscow and the Vatican, pp. 175-82, 186-93, 200-04, 220, and 244-48. Among Slipyj's staunch supporters, who continued to promote the cause of the Ukrainian Catholic Church after the Cardinal's death, was Werenfried von Straaten and his organization Kirche in Not; Pelikan, Confessor, p. 181.

24. Ibid., pp. 180-81.

25. Roman Solchanyk and Ivan Hvat, "The Catholic Church in the Soviet Union," in Catholicism and Politics in Communist Societies, ed. Pedro Ramos (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990), pp. 76-80. See also ibid., pp. 66-72 for a brief account of the Roman Catholic Church in Lithuania.

26. Ivan Hvat, The Catacomb Ukrainian Catholic Church and Pope John Paul II (Cambridge, Mass.: 1984), p. 268-70 (reprinted from Religion in Communist Lands, II, no. 3).

27. Ibid., loc.cit.

28. An English text is in ibid., unpaginated.

29. It is noteworthy that after the reference in the document's first sentence to "the Ukrainian Catholic Hierarchy", the Church is not again explicitly named.

30. Floridi, Moscow and the Vatican, pp. 245-46.

31. Hvat, The Catacomb ... Church, pp. 269-70.

32. However, the Vatican caused concern to Ukrainian Catholics by downplaying the significance of these acts; their texts, it was stated, had not been approved, and they had no official character.

33. Ibid., pp. 270-78; Floridi, Moscow and the Vatican, pp. 246-47.

34. See, for example, Winnipeg Free Press, Jan. 28, 1989; also Keleher, Passion and Resurrection, p. 104.

35. Ibid., pp. 110-12.

36. Martin, Breaking, p. 259.

37. Ibid., p. 260.

38. An English translation of Casaroli's speech is printed in Origins: NC documentary service, 18 (1988): 100-02. Agostino Cardinal Casaroli, born 1914, was appointed Vatican Secretary of State by Pope John Paul II in 1979, after serving from 1961 to 1979 as Secretary of the Council for the Public Affairs of the Church; Stehle, "Papal Diplomacy," p. 342. He headed the Vatican delegation to the Russian Orthodox celebrations in Moscow of the Millennium of Christianity in Kievan Rus. Casaroli was sometimes called "the Kissinger of the Vatican", Floridi, Moscow and the Vatican, p. 38.

39. Progress (Winnipeg), various issues of February and April 1989.

40. Anatoly Khozanov, "The Collapse of the Soviet Union and Afterwards," Nationalities Papers 22 (1994), p. 160.

41. Personal information, L'viv, November/December 1987.

42. Myrna Kostash, Bloodlines: A Journey into Eastern Europe (Vancouver: 1993), p. 201.

43. And Lithuania.

44. Ukrainian for samizdat, the Russian word for "self-publishing", i.e. uncensored, underground and therefore illegal.

45. Vasyl Marcus, "Religion and Nationalism in Ukraine," in Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics, ed. Pedro Ramos (Durham, N.C.: 1984), p. 77.

46. Ibid., pp. 77-78; Valentyn Moroz, "Chronicle of Resistance," in Report from the Beria Reserve: the protest writings of Valentyn Moroz, ed. John Kolasky (Toronto: 1974), p. 65.

47. Borys Lewitzkyj, Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine 1953-1980 (Edmonton: 1984), pp. 197-98; Marcus, "Religion and Nationalism," pp. 77-79; Julian Birch, "The Nature and Source of Dissidence in Ukraine," and Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "Comments on Julian Birch," in Ukraine in the Seventies, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj (Oakville, Ont.: 1975), pp. 307-10, 318-22, and 331-33; and Lesya Jones and Bohdan Yasen, eds., Dissent in Ukraine: An Underground Journal from Soviet Ukraine (The Ukrainian Herald Issue 6) (Baltimore, 1977).

48. Marcus, "Religion and Nationalism," p. 71. But see also Hvat, The Catacomb ... Church, pp. 280-290.

49. Born in 1907, Volodymyr Sterniuk, a member of the Redemptorist order, was the son of a priest and was himself ordained priest in 1931 after studies in Galicia and Belgium. He was sentenced to five years hard labor in 1947. Released in 1952, Sterniuk was secretly consecrated bishop by Archbishop Velychkowsky in July 1964. He became Archbishop of L'viv and Coadjutor to the Metropolitan, Cardinal Slipyj, in 1983; this fact was not publicly revealed until January 1990. Sterniuk did not have the right of succession to the Metropolitanate, but until Cardinal Lubachivsky arrived from Rome in 1991, he was the highest Ukrainian Catholic cleric in Ukraine itself. (Keleher, Passion and Resurrection, p. 81, 97; Progress, June 17, 1990).

50. Dunn, "Debate," pp. 188-89.

51. Bociurkiw, "Comments," p. 332. For the new militancy of the 1970s see also Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda, Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR (New York: 1989), p. 189.

52. Religion in Communist Lands 9 (1981): 137-39.

53. Hvat, The Catacomb ... Church, pp. 277-78.

54. Philip Walters, "Christians in Eastern Europe: A Decade of Aspirations and Frustrations," Religion in Communist Lands 11 (1983), pp. 18-19.

55. Iosyf M. Terelya was born in 1943, and spent at least five years (1977-82) in psychiatric hospitals--a favorite KGB ploy to dispose of activists. He was chairman of the Initiative Group to Defend the Rights of Believers and the Church, formed in Sept. 9, 1982; for its demand for the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church see Hvat, The Catacomb ... Church, pp. 290-91. Terelya was sentenced to one year in a strict-regime camp in December 1982 on a charge of "parasitism." He was again arrested in February 1985 on a charge of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda", and sentenced in August to seven years in a labor camp. He was released with 41 other dissidents in February 1987. See ibid., pp. 292-94; Andrew Sorokowski, "The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine," Religion in Communist Lands 13 (1985): 292-97; Pedro Ramet, Cross and Commissar: The Politics of Religion in Eastern Europe and the USSR (Bloomington: 1987), p. 151; and Christian Prisoners in the USSR 1983/4, Keston Book No. 11 (Keston College, Engl.: 1983), p. 60.

56. Marshall S. Shatz, Soviet Dissent in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: 1980), pp. 180 and 182.

57. Though for a long time Anatoly Levitin-Krasnov had seemed to be a singular voice among such activists in agitating for the rights of Ukrainian Catholics. Still, he was joined later by others, including Andrei Sakharov.

58. Progress, Apr. 30, 1989.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid., May 21, 1989.

61. The most objective treatment of this contentious issue is to be found in David Little, Ukraine: The Legacy of Intolerance (Washington, D.C.: 1991), pp. 22, 31, 39-51 and 57-65.

62. Ivan Hel, a religious and political dissident, was born in 1937. Beginning in 1965, he was several times arrested and imprisoned. The Committee was a successor to the 1982 Initiative Group (see footnote 59).

63. Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866-1934), the most distinguished of all Ukrainian nationalist historians, was a scholar, political and civic leader, writer and publicist, and national hero. He was president of the first Ukrainian National Republic, 1917-18. Mykola Charnetsky (1884-1959), Apostolic Visitator and Exarch of Volyn, Pidlashia and

Polissia, was arrested in 1945, spent six years in labor camps and was then exiled in Siberia.

64. Keston News Service, nos. 318, 319 and 322, of Feb. 2 and 16, and Mar. 30, 1989, respectively. Fines up to 2000 rubles were levied.

65. Progress, Apr. 30 and June 11, 1989; see also Keston News Service, no. 319, Feb. 16, 1989, pp. 2-3, on the arrest of Stepan Khmara on Jan. 20, as residents of his town were gathered to nominate him as a candidate for the All-Union Congress of Deputies. Khmara, here described as a Ukrainian Catholic Church activist, was sentenced to 15 days imprisonment for organizing an illegal meeting, and the security service attempted to have him certified as a psychiatric case.

66. Ibid., June 11, 1989.

67. Ukrainian Echo, Toronto, Apr. 6, 1989. According to one analysis, of the 3000 Russian Orthodox parishes newly-registered in 1988-89, 2050 were in Ukraine. Of the 10,000 or so Russian Orthodox parishes registered as of the end of 1989, about **thirty per cent** were in West Ukraine; Roman Solchanyk and Ivan Hvat, "The Catholic Church," pp. 89-90.

68. See, for example, the remarks in late 1988 of Konstantin Kharchev, Chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs: Keston News Service, no. 317, Jan. 19, 1989.

69. Keston News Service, no. 319, Feb. 16, 1989; see also Keleher, Passion and Resurrection, p. 131, and footnote 78 below.

70. Filaret, whose secular name is Mykhailo Denysenko, was at this time exarch for Ukraine of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, Archbishop of Kiev, and Metropolitan of Kiev and Halych. Born in 1929, he was named exarch and archbishop in 1965 and metropolitan in 1968.

71. Letter to Moscow News, printed in its July 30, 1989, issue.

72. Ibid., July 30, 1989.

73. Progress, Aug. 20, 1989.

74. Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861), born a serf, was a poet and artist who suffered under Tsarist repression. He has come to be recognized as the preeminent national icon of Ukraine. His poetry expressed most eloquently in the Ukrainian vernacular language his pride in and concern for the Ukrainian people, and the striving of the Ukrainian nation for recognition, independence, and equality with other nations.

75. Ibid., Aug. 27, 1989. Rukh is the short name for the Popular Movement for Reconstruction in Ukraine, a democratically-oriented nationalist movement officially

established in September 1989, but active regionally before this date. Since 1991 it has transformed itself into a political party. Memorial is a movement dedicated to the preservation and recognition of Ukrainian historical monuments, culture, etc. Both movements played major roles in arousing national consciousness among the Ukrainian population in the late Gorbachev era.

76. See Little, Ukraine, p. 84, footnote 22; Bohdan R. Bociurkiw there also notes the increased uncertainty in Ukrainian government circles about the legality of the events of 1946, as more revelations were being published in the Soviet press.

77. For a brief summary of events of 1989 in West Ukraine see also Nayaylo and Swoboda, Soviet Disunion, pp. 331-32.

78. Progress, Oct. 15, 1989.

79. Ibid., Nov. 26 and Dec. 3, 1989.

80. Moscow News, July 30, 1989; Progress, Oct. 20, 1989.

81. Andrew Sorokowski, "A Case Study in Vatican Ostpolitik: The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Philadelphia, November 1994.

82. Progress, Dec. 10, 1989. An English translation of the Ukrainian Council of Religious Affairs Declaration is printed in Keleher, Passion and Resurrection, pp. 290-92.

83. Ukrainian Weekly (Jersey City, N.J.), Dec. 31, 1989.

84. Ibid., Jan. 21, 1990.

85. Ibid., Feb. 11, 1990.

86. Ibid.

87. Ivan Hrechko, chairman of the L'viv chapter of the Commission on Religious Freedom of Rukh, has been quoted as saying, Dec. 13, 1990, in translation, that the demand for total restitution was "a position of principle. Realistically and practically," the Church leaders "always understood that they would not get everything they demanded": Little, Ukraine, p. 97, footnotes 1 and 3.

88. Little, Ukraine, p. 63; on the meeting see also "News from Ukraine," The Ukrainian Review 38 (Spring 1990), p. 39.

89. Keleher, Passion and Resurrection, pp. 166-72; see also Ukrainian Weekly, Jan. 28 and Apr. 1, 1990.

90. An English translation of the text of the March 17, 1990, statement is printed in Keleher, Passion and Resurrection, pp. 293-98.
91. Ukrainian Weekly, Apr. 1, 1990.
92. Ibid., Apr. 15, 1990.
93. Ibid., Apr. 29, 1990.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid., Apr. 22, 1990.
96. Ibid., May 13, 1990.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid., July 8, 1990.
99. On the significance of this distinction see Tataryn, "Papal Primacy," pp. 128-30.
100. Ukrainian Weekly, Aug. 26, 1990.
101. Ibid., Sept. 16 and Oct. 14, 1990. The author, who was conducting historical research in L'viv at the time, personally participated in some of the events, and was able to see others which were covered live by the local television station.
102. Ukrainian Weekly, Sept. 23, 1990; Little, Ukraine, pp. 64-65.
103. Andrew Krawchuk spoke to the students in L'viv and told the author of the enormous enthusiasm and sense of awe expressed by them in the discussions on religious faith which he conducted. See also footnote 106 above.
104. Ukrainian Weekly, Nov. 14, 1990.
105. Ibid., Nov. 28, 1990.
106. Ibid., Jan. 27, 1991.
107. The title of Major-Archbishop had originally been accorded to Cardinal Slipyj in late 1963, evidently as a sop for the papal refusal to grant him the title of patriarch; Floridi calls it "a symbolic gesture," Moscow and the Vatican, p. 175.
108. Leonid Krawchuk, former ideological chief of the Communist Party of Ukraine, became the first democratically elected president of Ukraine on Dec. 1, 1991.

109. Metropolitan Antony of Pereyaslav and Sicheslav took this decision while Metropolitan Mstyslav, the head of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, was out of the country in June 1992. Filaret and Antony decided to unify their churches--though in fact only some of their congregations followed them--after they both refused to acknowledge the appointment of Metropolitan Volodymyr Sobodon to the position of Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Moscow Patriarchate. The new church, headed by Filaret, is named the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Kiev Patriarchate.

110. The L'viv Seminary of the Holy Ghost was founded in September 1990. It, like the one at Rudno, has a five year program. In its third year of operation, 1992-93, it had 330 registered students; in the fall of 1994 it had 300. 60-70 are accepted annually on the basis of careful screening by the faculty. In the two years 1992-94, some 60-70 priests were ordained. In April 1994 Cardinal Lubachivsky stated that around 1,000 men were studying for the priesthood in L'viv, Rudno and other seminaries. The L'viv Theological Academy, closed since 1946, reopened in the fall of 1994.

111. Ukrainian Weekly, Feb. 13, 1993. The amounts of the grants, one million coupons and 250,000 coupons were not large when calculated in U.S. dollars (\$665 and \$165 respectively), but the recognition of these institutions by the Ukrainian government was nevertheless important.

112. Ibid., Jan. 24, 1993.

113. Ibid., Apr. 11, 1993.

114. It is of course difficult to document what the Vatican thinks or fears. Statements by Vatican officials and by Ukrainian Catholic Church leaders and apologists show Vatican unwillingness to accede to the wishes of the Ukrainian Catholic Church on the territorial issue (and on the patriarchate) and suggest that, once again, the Ukrainian Catholic Church is regarded as an impediment to effective ecumenical links with the Russian Orthodox Church; for a discussion see Sorokowski, "Vatican Ostpolitik." The New Year 1995 issue of Time carried a report that Pope John Paul II cherishes the hope of ushering in the new millennium by celebrating holy communion jointly with Patriarch Alexei of Moscow.

115. Some Ukrainian Catholics have maintained that patriarchates are created not from above but from below, through the popular demand of the faithful.

116. See the references cited in footnote 22 above.

117. Bishop Basil Losten of the Stamford Eparchy is also a member of the Ecumenical Commission of the Synod of Ukrainian Catholic Bishops; for his views see Basil Losten "The Roman Primacy and the Church of Kiev", Logos, 34:70-106, esp. pp. 72-73, 76-82, and 102-06.

118. My sources for the statements that follow prefer not to be named at this time.

119. SSMI: Sisters Servants of Mary Immaculate, a Ukrainian Catholic order founded in East Galicia (West Ukraine) in 1893.

120. Jean Vanier founded the Vanier Family Institute in Canada and also L'Arche Internationale, which provides services to mentally disadvantaged persons.