Privileged Moves: Migration, Race and Veteran Status
in Post-World War II America

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The idea for this project grew out of conversations with John Adams when I worked with him on the comparative metropolitan analysis project. The project used aggregate census data at low levels of geography to assess change in urban America between the 1960 and 1970 censuses. I am grateful for these conversations. They were my introduction to the power of the census to reveal change in social patterns over time; being return migrants ourselves, many of them centered on the urban impact of increased levels of internal population movement that followed World War II, especially among men who had served in that war.

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Dedication

To Elizabeth and Sarah
and their beloved "Grandma Teenie"

Abstract

Internal migration—the redistribution of a country's people—is the spatial response of a population to demographic, economic, and social change. Sometimes change is so swift and intense in all these areas that it reshapes the national landscape. World War II was one of these galvanizing periods. During this major restructuring of the U.S. economy, black migration reached a historic high, white migration increased substantially following a half-century of decline, and second generation immigrants moved beyond the industrial core. By examining differences in these migration patterns, this study adds to our understanding of the social dynamics of the post-war period and fills the gap between two bodies of scholarly literature that could—but have not yet—been in conversation.

One body of research locates origins of contemporary economic behavior and social inclusion in the World War II era. Some authors focus on the G.I. Bill and civic inclusion, others on the post-war clash of racial and ethnic groups in specific communities. This research largely ignores migration, analyzing populations where they are found after the war. Similarly, despite renewed scholarly interest in the migration of racial and ethnic groups in the United States, virtually no attention has been paid to the post-World War II period or to veteran status as a selective factor.

To draw these scholarly threads together, I traced the evolution of veteran status as a predictor of internal migration *prior* to World War II. I then explored the influence of veteran status on post-war migration of three populations: whites with native-born parents, whites with foreign-born parents, and blacks. Using census microdata from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), I tracked migration levels and destinations to evaluate the extent to which each group was incorporated into the post-war economic and social order. Higher rates of internal migration were found for veterans but veteran status did not trump existing social hierarchies. Veteran gain to migration varied relative to the group's place in the pre-war social order. Thus social distance between whites with native-born and foreign-born parents was reduced in the post-war years, while that between whites and blacks increased.

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Introduction

Internal migration—the redistribution of a country's people—is the spatial response of a population to demographic, economic, and social change. Sometimes change is so swift and intense in all these areas that it reshapes the national landscape. World War II was one of these galvanizing periods. During this major restructuring of the U.S. economy, black migration reached a historic high, white migration increased substantially following a half-century of decline, and second generation immigrants moved beyond the industrial core. By examining differences in these migration patterns, this study adds to our understanding of the social dynamics of the post-war period and fills the gap between two bodies of scholarly literature that could—but have not yet—been in conversation.

One body of research locates origins of contemporary economic behavior and social inclusion in the World War II era. Some authors focus on the G.I. Bill and civic inclusion, others on the post-war clash of racial and ethnic groups in specific communities. This research largely ignores migration, analyzing populations where they are found after the war. Similarly, despite renewed scholarly interest in the migration of racial and ethnic groups in the United States, virtually no attention has been paid to the post-World War II period or to veteran status as a selective factor.

To draw these scholarly threads together, I traced the evolution of veteran status as a predictor of internal migration *prior* to World War II. I then explored the influence of veteran status on post-war migration of three populations: whites with native-born parents, whites with foreign-born parents, and blacks.

In a period of volatile economic and social change time, migration—the equilibrating response to change—itself becomes a precipitator of change. Where one group moves out in search of economic opportunity; another group—also motivated by the lure of economic gain—moves in to take the homes and jobs left behind by the out-migrants. One group moves to new government jobs for which discrimination in hiring has been declared illegal, only to find that their new communities have welcomed them by passing—or enforcing—discriminatory housing codes.

The volume, direction and composition of the migration streams, then, become transforming agents in both the places that send, as well as those that receive, the people who choose to move. Not all migration is voluntary, of course; the history of American settlement and expansion includes many examples of migration coerced by government or local social pressure: the importation of slaves from Africa, the outmigration of British Loyalists following the American Revolution, the removal of Native Americans from their homelands, the Mormon resettlement to Utah, the expulsion of Mexican workers in the 1930s, and the relocation of those of Japanese ancestry during World War II. Soldiers, too, move to places not of their own choosing.

Places—and the people, themselves—are redefined by who moves in and who moves out of each area, especially in periods of high migration volume. The resources, education and family structure of those who move and those who "stay put" all contribute to the redefinition of both origins and destinations.

The American economy was transformed in the dozen years from the beginning of the New Deal to the end of the War in the Pacific. Farm productivity increased dramatically, responding to changes in agricultural methods and machinery. American industrial capacity, fueled by an explosion of technological advances, expanded to meet the needs of a world at war.

The war, itself, moved people. Mobilization for war production on the home front relocated a significant proportion of the work force to new defense and war-related production plants. In some areas, these movements represented the final settlement of the depression-induced migration of the 1930s, when tens of thousands of Americans moved in search of work. So great was the volume of internal migration during this period that the United States Census Bureau added a question on to the 1940 census to better measure and understand this unplanned population redistribution.[1] Within two years of the 1940 census, soldiers were added to the migration stream—moving first to a new town or state for training and then being shipped overseas for active duty. By war's end, a large proportion of the American people—especially the young men—had experienced a significant period of migration.

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[1] The "residence five years ago" question asks if people lived in the same house in the earlier reference year, five or one years ago. For those who lived in a different house, a follow-up question asks where the earlier residence was located. Together the answers capture both residential mobility (for those who moved within the county) and migration (for those whose move crosses a county or state boundary).

Migration did not end with the war, however. Overall migration rates continued to rise in the post-war years. War production facilities were reconverted to peacetime purposes or closed. The new communities that had mushroomed to provide housing for tens of thousands of war production workers also had to be demobilized. Soldiers returned to the states and were quartered for months on either coast while awaiting their discharge from service. Japanese Americans forcibly removed from their homes on the Pacific coast were finally free to leave their encampments. The migrants who had moved for purposes of war had to decide whether to stay where the war had planted them, return home to their old lives or try their chances at life in yet another new location. In a roiling period such as this, we should expect migration to show significant shifts in age patterns and regional distributions.

As demographers worked on understanding and planning for massive movement of the labor force, other policymakers launched a plan to bring American industry and agriculture out of war without a return to economic collapse. The impact of internal migration had to be considered in any plan, as did the return of millions of soldiers who would return home and look for work. It was unemployment more than migration, then, that policymakers had in mind when they drafted the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944—the “GI Bill.” With the experience of New Deal intervention programs and the political pressure of the American Legion, policymakers saw in the Readjustment Act an opportunity to use benefits to young veterans to help the American economy, itself, readjust to war’s end.

Benefits to soldiers have been used as a recruitment tool to entice young men into military service since before the United States was an independent nation. World War II was no exception. In its original incarnation, the “readjustment act” promised to return veterans to the economic status they would have had if their lives had not been interrupted by military service. But several major forces at work between the two wars converged on this piece of legislation to produce a dramatically different benefit program.

Several of these grew directly from America's experience with the first Great War and the Great Depression. Although World War I was a victory for the nations allied against the Kaiser, demobilization and industrial reconversion caused major economic problems for both the victors and the defeated. Following the overhaul of America's productive capacity to meet the needs of war, the reconversion of to a peacetime economy was rapid and poorly planned. The post-war boom led to inflation and collapsing farm markets; urban unemployment and the massive social dislocations of the Great Depression quickly followed. Although this explanation oversimplifies the economic complexity of the time, in the minds of most Americans there was a direct connection between the aftermath of the Great War and the Great Depression which followed. They feared that a second massive economic crisis would follow World War II.

As with Great Britain, many Americans who had served in lower-level positions in government, industry or the military during World War I had moved into key positions in the 1930s. They had learned much about what worked and what did not in a war that required the national and international coordination of manpower and resources to meet both home-front and battle-front goals. This experience informed many of the New Deal policies and programs, adding further to the reservoir of knowledge about managing large-scale social and economic outcomes. As planning for World War II began, this group was better equipped to deal with the needs of the post-war economy than had been their predecessors. The GI Bill did, indeed, meet the recruiter's needs for enlistment incentives; but from the outset, it was intended to play a significant role in America's "readjustment" following the war as well.

The final GI Bill for veterans of World War II constituted a massive investment by the government in the social welfare and human capital potential of America's young men. There were subsequent GI Bills for the veterans of Korea and Vietnam but none had the range of benefits nor had such an impact on American life as did this charter program. The GI Bill not only resolved the reemployment problem of returning veterans, as intended. It also helped stabilize the economy in the crucial first year after demobilization of factories and field units. Its benefits were felt in every state and in every type of place—farm, town, city and suburb. The country's direct investment in veterans also increased the benefits and reduced the risks for a wide variety of economic decisions—including the decision to move.

The constellation of political, economic and demographic forces at play between World War I and World War II converged in mid-century to construct a new, more positive identity for American veterans, endowing them with powerful political support. This political lobby captured a package of social welfare benefits for veterans that New Deal planners had intended for society at large. The benefits of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 were intended to preempt massive rates of unemployment and to build high levels of domestic consumer demand. The GI Bill was a politically feasible way of putting money into what was expected to be a depressed post-war economy.

The policy had profound unintended consequences, however. In one piece of legislation, the federal government gave World War II veterans a long-term competitive advantage over non-veterans and those who did not or could not take full advantage of them. The government's investment in World War II veterans allowed them the opportunity to maximize their potential in the restructured post-war economy. Evidence of the efficiency of the government investment should be found in higher rates of migration among veterans than non-veterans and greater returns to migration for them as well.

Attitudes of Americans toward military service had changed significantly by 1940. Since the end of the previous war, veteran interest groups, especially the American Legion, had built a powerful constituency and learned how to mobilize it. Members of Congress and their constituents had learned terrible lessons about the economic consequences of a badly managed post-war reconversion and were determined not to repeat the lesson. In 1917, America had not been prepared for the scale or complexity of a major international conflict. Government, private industry and civic groups struggled to find the administrative and legal framework to get the job done. Mobilization for military service and war production for World War I was more successful than the post-war reconversion.

In several key areas, the experiences of World War II were dramatically different than any previous war—for those serving on the home front as well as in the military. American servicemen served longer and farther from home than the American soldiers that came before them. Soldiers had better training, better equipment, and more reliable food supplies than in prior wars. The domestic economy was completely reorganized to ensure that the Allied forces had everything they needed to win this war. Through radios and movie newsreels, the American people were more closely tied to the advances—and setbacks—experienced by the World War II military than ever before. As a result, the average serviceman came home with higher status than any previous generation of soldier. Unlike servicemen from other wars, this higher status was accorded them not just in their home community but anywhere in the nation. A look at 1940s family photo albums across America shows young grooms in military dress browns or whites. Even if the young man had no overseas experience, the uniform replaced the dress suit or the tuxedo because of what it said about who he was. No matter what his origins, any man wearing the uniform of the United States military was granted entrée.

After World War II, these soldiers moved home and moved on to better lives than they would otherwise have had because of the support given them by their Uncle Sam. To some of these veterans, military service had opened the doors to full citizenship for the first time, despite the fact that their parents or grandparents a decade or so earlier had been considered threatening outsiders, not fit for citizenship or full political inclusion. This path from the barracks to Main Street was not unique to veterans of World War II. Since the American Revolution, groups outside the mainstream of contemporary American society have used the military as a vehicle for laying claim to inclusion as full citizens. Increased social acceptance and economic status extended from the veterans to their larger ethnic communities. Many veterans were children of immigrant groups deemed "unassimilable" by the American Legion



Figure 1. American Troops of the 28th Infantry Division March Down the Champs Elysees, Paris, in the "Victory Parade," Poinsett, August 29, 2944. Photo courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration (Locator number: 111-SC-193785), Washington, DC.

and others following World War I. When World War II veterans came home, however, they were honored as heroes beyond their ethnic communities and their veteran status made them welcome in American Legion clubs across the country. By 1950 these immigrant children had moved out of ethnic enclaves into the new "all-American" suburban communities.

If veteran sons of white immigrants were moving into the mainstream, they moved on roads blocked to black veterans by the still-rigid social barriers of race. As with Japanese-, Mexican- and Native Americans, the post-war period brought increased status for black veterans within their own community but not the nation-wide open-armed "welcome home" afforded white veterans.

The story told here centers on national veteran status and a privileged identity that was not accorded to all who wore the uniform. America at census time in 1950 was a very different place than it was in 1940. More than a quarter of the population was living outside their state of birth—a figure believed to be a historic high. The population turnover had been so high in the decade—and still so unsettled in 1945—

that the census bureau was forced to change the reference year on the prior residence/ migration questions from "five years ago" to "one year ago." When the results for the 1950 census were tallied, more than 6 percent of the population had moved in the previous 12 months.

Where they moved … where they were allowed to move … is an index of how far society itself had moved since the last war. There is a deep human story to be told in all migration. But the story told by the migration of the World War II generation—of whom so much was asked and to whom so much was given—reveals how willing American was as a society to accept the sons of all our residents into full citizenship. This was especially important for the children of those immigrants who came here at the turn of the century and constituted the largest wave of *foreign* in-migrants in our nation's history. It was equally important to the children of blacks born in the South whose northward migration to safety and jobs in northern cities constituted the largest wave of *internal* in-migrants to the nation's history. Would these adult children of foreign-born and Southern-born newcomers be incorporated into the new post-war economic and social order? Or would they continue to be marginalized on the outside of the expanding economy as they were before Pearl Harbor? The youth who came of age in World War II enlisted or offered to serve in roughly the same proportions, regardless of the birthplace of their parents. How uniformly did American society treat those who fought in the years that followed the war? Where did they come from? Where did they move? And what difference did it make for America?

Chapter 1 explores the place of World War II migration in the larger patterns of American migration history. It examines the theories that have emerged in the last 100 years to explain migration and its selectivity, then explores the process by which this new social endowment—veteran status—interacts with previously identified selectivity characteristics to increase the propensity to migrate in the post-World War II era. Migration is a dynamic process that privileges those with a certain set of personal characteristics; education, life-course status, and a tolerance for risk have been shown to increase selection into migration. Successful migration also requires an information network to evaluate the prospects for staying put or moving on. There are costs and benefits, risks and rewards, to either decision. Critical to this cost/benefit evaluation is the level of support one can expect from friends, family or institutions in the destination community.

The migrant must be able to provide some answer to several basic questions: "Will someone help me find a job and a place to live?" "Will I have a social community for friendship and support?" "Will I be welcome?" Finally, if migration seems the best option, it becomes feasible only if sufficient travel resources, skills and support can be mustered to the task.

Virtually every theoretical framework that can be applied to migration selection is predictive of increased rates of migration for the World War II generation of veterans. To these can be added one characteristic not previously explored by migration theorists for this generation—that of a powerful, newly vested social status which, for some in this era, was transportable to virtually any community in America. For the World War II veteran, there was a ready answer to the most difficult of all questions facing the potential migrant: "Who am I once I move?"

Against this theoretical background, Chapter 2 examines the migration patterns of World War II veterans in detail. The focus of this analysis is the birth cohort that was most likely to migrate and most likely to be engaged in military service—those aged 20 to 29 at war's end in 1945. As the theoretical literature reveals, there are many different data sources with which to analyze migration patterns but none is as powerful as the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) built at the Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota.[2] Much like an electron microscope allows medical researchers to look from one level of a cell to the next to see how it functions, the IPUMS allows social scientists to move between the levels of social and spatial organization contained in the census—household, family, or individual; nation, region or state; metropolitan area, town or farm. In addition, the

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[2] Data used are from the most recent release of the IPUMS data., accessible to researchers over the web: Steven Ruggles, Matthew Sobek, Trent Alexander, Catherine A. Fitch, Ronald Goeken, Patricia Kelly Hall, Miriam King, and Chad Ronnander. *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0 [Machine-readable database]*. Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Population Center [producer and distributor], 2008. http://usa.ipums.org/usa/

IPUMS invites the researcher to investigate change over time in these social and spatial relationships. Analysis of these data show that on average the World War II veterans did, indeed, migrate at higher rates and at an earlier age than did non-veteran members of their cohort and at higher rates than other cohorts in the past.

The results also reveal differences in the role veteran status played in the migration patterns of whites and blacks, as well as those with native-born or foreign-born parents. The new veteran status exerted the greatest influence over the greatest generation, but it did not work evenly for all groups.

The evolution of this new status over the course of American military history is examined in Chapter 3. The construction of white, male veteran privilege is tracked in three mutually reinforcing developments: (1) the evolution of military recruitment and service from a local to a national base; (2) the growth of national veterans organizations—rooted in local communities and protective of segregationist mores; and (3) the extension of federal veteran benefit programs from those alleviating dependency for the sick and aged to "G.I. Bill" which invested in youth and increased human capital. Beginning with the colonial roots of militia service, this chapter reveals a history of divided military-service opportunities, different service experiences, and differential access to veteran benefits based on your place of birth or the color of your skin or—in the first half of U.S. history—the side on which you fought. The history of recruitment for military service and the benefits offered as inducements reveals a trend of ever widening military if not political enfranchisement. Despite the fact that wars are being waged on a continental or national scale, military service remains a local obligation of white, male citizenship from the Revolutionary War through most of the Civil War. In the more recent past, the government has put renewed emphasis on the use of National Guard troops to provide military personnel for the wars in the Mideast. The United States has, thus, returned full-circle to reliance on a locally-situated military force with its reciprocal identity of local and national obligation.

Whether drawn from a local militia or a national draft lottery, military service is *allowed* to newcomers and outsiders, but it is *required* only of those the community deems to have full citizenship within it. Immigrants, migrants and other outside groups, such as blacks, have always seen military service as a way to claim citizenship. But it was not until the first successful *national* draft in World War I that the citizenship claim imbedded in the draft could be extended beyond the local community to the wider nation.

From the American Revolution through World War II, veterans' organizations have used this national political influence to expand direct economic benefits for their members. To justify the specialized treatment these benefits imply, veterans' organizations refined a rhetoric of patriotism, obligation and service through which they constructed a special class of citizen. This construction of the citizen patriot served the dual purpose of endowing veterans with a privileged citizenship status that entitled them to special treatment while simultaneously denying others similar benefits by virtue of failing to meet the new citizenship standard.

Building on organizational principles field-tested by the Grand Army of the Republic and other Civil War veterans' organizations, the American Legion engineered a new construction of patriotism and citizenship in the United States with veterans enshrined as the exemplars of the patriotic American.

The Legion's hand is found in the restrictions on immigration in the 1920s, the examinations and ceremonies for naturalization, the explosion of flag worship and memorial parades, in social clubs for veterans and baseball for American boys. Over two decades they built a social and political network that won for veterans of World War II the most significant set of economic benefits ever offered to American veterans: "the G.I. Bill." The new social status constructed for veterans by the American Legion, combined with the human capital investment granted by the G.I. Bill, worked together to magnify existing migration selection factors.

These new forces did not act in a social vacuum. Veteran status was powerful but it did not trump all existing social hierarchies. While the prospects for all veterans were improved over non-veterans in their cohort, the magnitude of the social and economic gain each subgroup received was relative to their place in the pre-war social hierarchy. The gap between some groups narrowed while the gap between others expanded in the post-war years.

The impact of the G.I. Bill investment in some veterans—and the exclusion of others who served—are subjects of a historiographical growth industry.[3] An enormous new middle class emerged from this generation. Their consumption levels would power the American economy for more than a generation, starting with the explosion in housing construction and home ownership. The demand for housing was so great that it could only be met through the construction of thousands of new communities, mostly on land outside existing municipal boundaries. The result was the creation of new, uniquely homogeneous communities of people roughly the same age and in the same stage in the life cycle, where families had two parents and one wage-earner. Families in these communities shared new schools and a new life style which would become the new standard against which American culture would measure success.

Chapter 4 looks at the places migrants left and the places they settled to explore the impact on the American landscape of these millions of individual migration decisions. Of particular importance is the resettlement of veterans and non-veterans of the three study populations in the new suburbs of American metropolitan areas. If migrants and non-migrants move to the same places, then the government's investment in benefits to those veterans has an even spatial distribution. Veterans in this era moved with a uniquely generous endowment of transportable human capital investments paid for by their Uncle Sam. Non-veterans may have had other endowments, but in this period at least, virtually none came from the government. Most of the children of the Baby Boom are born to the generation that came of age during this war. Where they decided—or were allowed—to move determined where the next generation would be born and in what type of communities they would live.

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[3] Suzanne Mettler, *Soldiers to Citizens: The G.I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Mettler. "Bringing the State Back in to Civic Engagement: Policy Feedback Effects of the G.I Bill for World War II Veterans," *American Political Science Review 96* (June 2002), 351-365; Gretchen Ritter, "Of War and Virtue: Gender, American Citizenship and Veterans' Benefits after World War II," *Comparative Social Research 20* (2001), 201-226; Stephen R. Ortiz, "'Soldier-Citizens': The Veterans of Foreign Wars and Veteran Political Activism from the Bonus March to the GI Bill," Ph.D. diss., University of Florida, Gainesville, 2004; Kathleen Jill Frydl, "The G.I. Bill." Ph.D. diss., The University of Chicago, 2000; David H. Onkst, "'First a Negro … Incidentally a Veteran': Black World War Two Veterans and the G.I. Bill of Rights in the Deep South, 1944-1948," *Journal of Social History 31* (1998), 517-543; Hilary Herbold, "Never a Level Playing Field: Blacks and the GI Bill," *The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education* (Winter 1994/95), 104-108; Margot Canaday, "Building a Straight State: Sexuality and Social Citizenship under the 1944 G.I. Bill, *The Journal of American History 90* (December 2003), 935-957; Mary Ann O'Donnell, "The G.I. Bill of Rights of 1944 and the Creation of America's Modern Middle Class Society." Ph.D. diss., St. John's University, New York, 2002; Sarah E. Turner and John Bound, "Closing the Gap or Widening the Divide: The Effects of the G.I. Bill and World War II on the Educational Outcomes of Black Americans," *Journal of Economic History 63* (2003), 145-177; and Anastasia Mann, "All for One, but Most for Some: Veteran Politics and the Shaping of the Welfare State During the World War II Era." Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 2003.

Finally, Chapter 5 situates the findings on veteran status and veteran migration in the larger research conversation on "the greatest generation." The migration patterns of veterans in the post-World War II era convey a spatial picture of the social change taking place during this period. Migration levels and destinations reveal the extent to which each group was incorporated into the post-war economic and social order. Higher rates of internal migration were found for veterans but veteran status did not trump existing social hierarchies. Veteran gain to migration varied relative to the group's place in the pre-war social order. In America's urban areas, white veterans gathered in new suburban communities. Interstate migrants from non-metropolitan areas are seen moving directly from rural areas to the suburbs, bypassing the city completely. Black interstate migrants, on the other hand, moved from rural areas to central cities. Thus the social and physical distance between whites with native-born and foreign-born parents was reduced in the post-war years, while that between whites and blacks increased. The migration patterns presented in this study are a window into the spatial workings of the larger social processes—described by Mettler, Cohen, Sugrue, and others—that privileged veterans over non-veterans, and welcomed second-generation foreign stock whites into the white majority while excluding blacks—even black veterans—from full social and civic inclusion. [4]

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[4] See Mettler, *Bringing the State Back In*, 2002; Mettler, Soldiers to Citizens, 2005; and Thomas J. Sugrue. *The Origin of the Urban Crisis.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005; and Lizabeth Cohen, "From Town Center to Shopping Center: The Reconfiguration of Community Marketplaces in Postwar America,' *The American Historical Review 101* (October 1996), 1050-1081.

Chapter 1.

Veteran Status, Race and Ethnicity in American Internal Migration: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives

Migration has been one of the great forces of American history. The movement west of land-hungry settlers as new territories came into United States political jurisdictions, the labor-seeking movement off the farm and into the cities as the nation's economy industrialized, the twentieth century movement of blacks out of the rural South to jobs in the urban North—these were the major migration streams prior to World War II.

Writing his observations on American life in the early part of the nineteenth century, Alexis deTocqueville devoted an entire chapter in *Democracy in America* to "Why the Americans Are So Restless in the Midst of Their Prosperity." He attributed this restlessness to a lack of inherited social status in a land of such great material abundance. Americans moved so much, he asserted, because they believed that if they worked hard they could take advantage of opportunities wherever they occurred.[1]

deTocqueville was observing the beginnings of the first great migration stream in United States history, the expansion and settlement of the West. By 1850, just 20 years after deTocqueville wrote, every state that had been in the Union by 1800 had experienced net outmigration.

Historical Patterns of Internal Migration in the United States

For some observers, however, population movement was necessary but not desirable. Settlement was the goal, not constant movement. Migration was interpreted as a temporary problem, one which would be eliminated once the frontier was settled. Commenting on the high number of internal migrants in America, the Superintendent of the Census of 1850 predicted we would lose this "unfavorable trait in our national character." Once the plains had been settled and the cheap land was gone we would settle down and "the inhabitants of each state would become comparatively stationary."[2]

While Americans were conscious of an increasing amount of migratory behavior, they had no way to accurately measure its national magnitude prior to 1850. In that year, the census bureau added a state of birth question to the decennial census; birthplace data have been collected in every census since then. New York introduced an innovation in its state census enumeration in 1855 when respondents were asked how long they had lived in their community. But it would be nearly 90 years before the U.S. census would try to collect similar data that would allow demographers to get a better fix on internal migration nationally.

By 1900 it was clear that Americans had not lost "this unfavorable trait in our national character." Americans were not only moving west. They were moving everywhere.

> Facilities for transportation to all parts of the Union are so great that the inhabitants of one section are able to migrate to another, even at great distance, with comparatively small expenditure, inconvenience, or delay. In consequence many persons change their place of abode so freely that in every state reside natives of practically every other state of the Union.[3]

The Census Bureau's 1909 publication, *A Century of Population Growth: From the First Census of the United States to the Twelfth, 1790-1909*, included a chapter on interstate migration. It was merely three pages long and covered only three time periods—1790, 1890 and 1900—but it represents one of the first attempts to document interstate migration over time.

Internal migration came under more serious study in the 1930s as demographers and policy makers became alarmed by the tremendous movement caused by the agricultural depression of the 1920s and general economic collapse of

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[1] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America, vol. II* (New York, 1944), esp. 136.

[2] Joseph Kennedy, *Report of the Superintendent of the Census for December 1, 1852* (Washington, 1853), 15, quoted by Everett S. lee, "Migration in Relation to Education, Intellect, and Social Structure," *Population Index, 36* (Oct.-Dec. 1970), 437-44, esp. 437.

[3] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *A Century of Population Growth: From the First Census of the United States to the Twelfth, 1790-1900* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1909; reprinted in 1966 by Johnson Reprint Corporation), 125.

the 1930s. Thornthwaite's *Internal Migration in the United States* (1934) analyzed movement patterns from 1870 through 1930, tying them to changes in agriculture, industry, and transportation.[4] Other researchers shared Thornthwaite's concern about the paucity of data with which to study the problem.[5]

In response to these concerns, the Census Bureau added a question about "residence five years ago" to the 1940 enumeration, framing the responses and follow-up questions in such a way that both residential mobility as well as intra-state and interstate migration could be measured.

Although state of birth and age were collected beginning with the 1850 census, like many other variables in the early censuses, they were not cross-tabulated with age until the 1950 census.[6] As a result, all analyses of historical migration were limited to statements about state net migration and regional shifts in population distribution.[7] Social historians turned to city directories or census enumeration forms for local communities to examine the connections between geographic mobility and social mobility. These researchers documented high rates of population turnover in the nineteenth-century communities they studied, often contradicting gross net migration figures for the same times and places.[8]

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[4] C. Warren Thornthwaite, *Internal Migration in the United States* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1934). Noting the effect of modern technology on migration tendencies, Thornthwaite observed that "...the automobile has destroyed all respect for distance" (1934, 3).

[5] In a preface to Thornthwaite's *Internal Migration*, Carter Goodrich, Professor of Economics and Director of the Study for Population Redistribution, issued a direct call to the Census Bureau to add questions about residence at the prior census to subsequent enumerations.

[6] Steven Ruggles, "Historical Demography from the Census: Applications of the American Census Microdata Files,' in David S. Reher and Roger Schofield, eds., *Old and New Methods in Historical Demography* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); U.S. Bureau of the Census, *United States Census of Population: 1960. Subject Reports. Lifetime and Recent Migration, Final Report PC(2)-D* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963).

[7] Conrad Taeuber and Irene B. Taeuber, *The Changing Population of the United States* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958); Donald J. Bogue, *The Population of the United States (*Glencoe, IL: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959); Ralph Thomlinson, *Population Dynamics: Causes and Consequences of World Demographic Change* (New York: Random House, 1965).

[8] James Malin, "The Turnover of Farm Population in Kansas," *Kansas Historical Quarterly 4* (Nov. 1935), 339-372; Merle E. Curti, *The Making of an American Community: A Case Study of Democracy in a Frontier Community* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1959); Stephan Thernstrom, *The Other Bostonians: Poverty and Progress in the American metropolis, 1880-1970* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973).

For the last half of the twentieth century there is an abundance of data that researchers can use to analyze internal migration in the United States.[9] Because of this wealth of data about internal migration since 1940, there has been a tendency to focus on this most recent era in U.S. history and to assume—contrary to the work of social historians—that estimates of migration in the 19th century were inflated, either because of methodological problems or because the communities they were drawn from were seen as anomalous. Americans have always been a relatively mobile people, the story goes, but never more so than since World War II.

The most exhaustive long-run quantitative historical analysis of internal migration in the United States was done by Eldridge and Thomas (1964) using published census tabulations from 1870 through 1950. They produced age-specific net migration tables for each state by using a meticulous residual methods analysis to overcome limitations of the census data.[10] It was a monumental effort that mapped net migration using every possible combination of sending and receiving state over an 80-year time span. This was the last work to take a new look at such a long sweep in the history of internal migration in the U.S. and one of the last to rely solely on published census tabulations to assess internal migration.

There are several problems with analyses of this kind, even analyses as meticulously done as those of Eldridge and Thomas: (1) the calculations are highly vulnerable to under-enumeration and other errors in the census; (2) net migration rates can mask the true volume of movement since high rates of in- and out-migration can cancel each other out in any state or region;[11] and—as a corollary to the second problem— (3) it is difficult to make useful observations about national patterns, since net internal migration for the nation as a whole is zero.

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[9] Data are available from the Current Population Survey, the American Housing Survey, the Survey of Income and Program participation, the University of Michigan's Panel Study on Income Dynamics as well as others such as Continuous Work History Sample.

[10] Hope T. Eldridge and Dorothy Swaine Thomas, *Population Redistribution and Economic Growth, 1870-1950. III Demographic Analyses and Interrelations* (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1957). Eldridge and Thomas estimated intercensal change in the native-born population of each age group in each state attributable to mortality. They then estimated net migration as the difference between the expected and actual population of each age group at the end of the period. This detail calculations required is more noteworthy because it was done before the existence of digital spreadsheets.

The creation of public use samples from the historical censuses offered hope that some of these problems might yet be answered for the years prior to 1940.[12] But differences in sampling densities, coding schemes and comparability remained major obstacles to research across the entire time series.

Of the three major types of sources for national data on internal migration—national household surveys, administrative records data sets and the decennial census—none meets all of the criteria for a complete demographic data set for internal migration. Published census data can give information on volume and direction of migration streams but can say little about the characteristics of individuals moving. Community or linking studies can focus on individuals but present methodological problems of their own.[13] Despite its limitations, census data contain the most complete universe and most extensive demographic and geographic disaggregation. They also include military personnel and college students, two of the most mobile groups of Americans. And the multiple census years available allow us to include that most intriguing of variables—change over time.

Figure 1-1 gives a snapshot of the nation's internal migration history for the past 150 years.[14] Measured as a percentage of those aged 50 to 59 who reside outside their place of birth, overall internal migration rates for whites reached a peak in the nineteenth century. This age cohort is used because they would have the longest span of time available to them to move out of their birth state. Since the goal is to measure the same migration process over more than a century of migration experience, analysis

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[11] Thernstrom. *The Other Bostonian,* 1973, 10-16.

[12] Ruggles, "Historical Demography from the Census," 1993.

[13] Stephan Thernstrom and Peter Knights, "Men in Motion: Some Data and Speculations About Urban Population Mobility in 19th Century America," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History 1* (1971), 7-35; Thernstrom, *The Other Bostonian,* 1973; Donald H. Parkerson, "How Mobile Were Nineteenth-Century Americans?" *Historical Methods 15* (1982), 99-110; Avery Guest, "Notes from the National panel Study: Linkage and Migration in the Late Nineteenth Century," *Historical Methods 20* (1987), 63-77.

[14] To compensate for the changing geographic distribution of the population over 140 years, the analyses were standardized by the regional distribution of birthplaces of the population in 1850. This resulted in some small loss of cases but was necessary to keep the larger states of the West from having a disproportionately large influence over time. For this analysis, there is some additional small loss of interstate migrants caused by West Virginia. Admitted to the Union in 1863, West Virginia first appeared in the census in 1870. Individuals born before 1863 in the new state of West Virginia would have reported Virginia for a birthplace. West Virginia has been recoded to Virginia to avoid losing the entire state in the geographic standardization.

of this age group avoids confusing the twentieth century phenomenon of retirement migration with the more general process.

The cohort born in 1825—and migrating, on average, in 1850 at age 25—had a lifetime-migration rate of more than 46 percent when they reached age 55. The low point of this trend line occurred for those born in 1885; migrating, on average, in 1920, the interstate migration rate for this cohort drops to a low of 30 percent.

Figure 1-1. Percent Living Outside State of Birth at Age 55, 1850 to 1990



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation. This graph was originally published in Patricia Kelly Hall and Steven Ruggles, "'Restless in the Midst of Their Migration'", *Journal of American History, Vol. 91* (2004), pp. 829-846. Copyright (c) Organization of American Historians. All rights reserved. Excerpt reprinted with permission.

Following a relatively flat period of virtually no change, the migration rate once again began a sharp turn upward with the cohort born in 1915—and migrating in 1940.

While the trend was still climbing for those born in 1935, the rate still had not reached the historically record peak migration measured in the nineteenth century.[15]

The pattern is u-shaped with a peak in the middle of the nineteenth century followed by a trough and subsequent return to high levels from 1970 on—but never returning to its highest level in 1850. The most rapid rate of change across the whole series is from 1970 to 1980, but overall lifetime migration rates for these age groups were higher in the 19th century than at anytime in the 20th.

Migration patterns clearly varied by race over time; blacks showed significantly higher lifetime migration than whites for those born from 1875 on—and migrating in the twentieth century. Though not shown here, the trends for females have closely paralleled those for males among whites and blacks, especially with the expansion of female employment opportunities.[16]

Figure 1-1 shows a clear upturn in twentieth century migration rates for whites beginning in 1940 with the cohort born in 1915. Black migration, which began in earnest at beginning of the twentieth century, also showed a marked increase in 1940. This burst of migration activity coincided with the mobilization of the American economy and expansion of industrial capacity in preparation for World War II.

Two of the great waves of migration in this country have been rural to urban and central city to suburb—moves that are as likely to be intra-state as interstate with the latter almost exclusively intra-state. Figures 1-2 and 1-3 show the changing patterns of migration destinations for whites and blacks from 1850 through 2000. Each figure shows the types of places interstate migrants settled as captured in the

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[15] Data used to construct this figure are U.S. census data drawn from the IPUMS (Integrated Public Use Micodata Series). Since the size of states increased as western territories joined the United States, the population at risk of migration varies over time. In the early period, most native born persons were born in the small states on the eastern seaboard where the probability that a move would take one outside the state boundaries were high. Those born in the larger, western states, have a lower probability that a move of the same distance will be to a different state. To compensate for this, the data have been standardized by the distribution of birthplaces in the 19th century.

[16] Patricia Kelly Hall and Steven Ruggles, "Moving Through Time: Internal Migration Patterns of Americans, 1850-1990," paper presented at the Social Science History Association Meetings (Fort Worth, TX, November 12, 1999).

Figure 1-2. Interstate Migration Destinations for Whites aged 55, 1850-2000



Source: Author’s tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author’s variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0,* 2008. See bibliography for full citation. This graph was originally published in Patricia Kelly Hall and Steven Ruggles, "’Restless in the Midst of Their Migration’", Jo*urnal of American History, Vol. 91* (2004), 829-846. Copyright (c) Organization of American Historians. All rights reserved. Excerpt reprinted with permission.

Figure 1-3. Interstate Migration Destinations for Blacks at age 55, 1850-2000



Source: Author’s tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author’s variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0, 2008. See bibliography for full citation. This graph was originally published in Patricia Kelly Hall and Steven Ruggles, "’Restless in the Midst of Their Migration’", Journal of American History, Vol. 91 (2004), 829-846. Copyright (c) Organization of American Historians. All rights reserved. Excerpt reprinted with permission.

census. The top line of each graph corresponds to the migration rates for each group shown on Figure 1-1. These two figures break down those moves by type of destination. The shift in types of places interstate migrants chose over time reflects the changing structure of opportunity facing each group. For whites, the opening of new lands for settlement shows clearly, along with the importance of rural villages and towns in the nineteenth century. City-ward migration for whites increased from 1930 through 1960 but it did not remain a destination of choice. From 1940 to the present, white interstate migrants were more likely to move to the suburbs than they were to all other types of place combined. Since the migration reflected here is lifetime migration measured as residence outside the state of birth, the increase in city-ward migration reflects the movement of people rather than the extension of city boundaries to incorporate settlements on their fringe.

For blacks, the pattern was dramatically different. Here, too, the nineteenth century preference for farm destination is revealed, but the meaning of farm residence was different than for whites. For black migrants, farm residence was more likely to involve farm tenancy or farm worker status than it was individual or family farm ownership. The preference for farm residence was never as high as that of whites in the nineteenth century and the proportion of rural non-farm migration designation was nearly as high as farm. The growth of urban migration for blacks begins much earlierthan for whites as a whole. Improved transportation combined with the demand for labor in the expanding Northern industrial economy—particularly with mobilization for World War I—pulled many blacks northward to the city. Through most of this history, segregation and discrimination in American housing and mortgage lending were legal, severely limiting options for black settlement. The graph shows the erosion of legal racial discrimination brought about by the Fair Housing Act of 1968, but it is not until the 1972 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act made redlining and discriminatory lending practices illegal, that blacks' share of suburban residence increased.

Change in the Peak Age of Migration

Who is moving is as important in migration policy as how many are moving. Figures 1-4 and 1-5 show that the age pattern of migration was also undergoing significant change. The peak age of migration fell dramatically during the middle of the twentieth century, beginning in 1940, and became more concentrated in the younger age groups.[17]

Figure 1-4 shows the percentage migrating in the previous decade, by age, from 1850 through 1920. In all four decades shown, the peak migration age group was 25 to 29, with the lowest age-specific migration rates occurring from 1910 to 1920—in the decade of World War I. By contrast, Figure 1-5 shows that the World War II decade (1940 to 1950) was the last period in which the highest age-specific migration rates were among the 25 to 29 year old group. For those age 25 to 29 in 1950 who had moved out of their state of birth in the previous decade, the age-specific migration rate equals those of the same age group in the 1850-1860 period; this suggests a return to the overall high rates of internal migration shown in the nineteenth century.

Migration between 1950 and 1960 shows the consolidation of this trend but with increasing levels of migration concentrated at earlier ages. Here the age of peak migration was among the 20 to 24 year old group, at rates 50 percent higher than those of any time in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries. Post-World War II migration rates for ages 30 and older were highest overall for migration occurring between the 1940 and 1950 and between 1950 and 1960.

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[17] First, I calculated the region-standardized proportion of whites residing outside of their state of birth by age for every available census year. I then estimated the net percentage of persons migrating out of their state of birth in that decade and cohort to be the difference between the percentage migrating at that cohort at time *t* minus the percentage of that cohort migrating at *t-10*. To obtain period estimates of net outmigration (*M*) in each decade, I then standardized by age:

$$M_t = \sum_r (m_{ta} - m_{t-10,a-10}) \cdot P_a$$

where m_{ta} is region-standardized proportion migrant at time t and age a; m_{rta} is the proportion migrant in region r at time t and age a; and P_a is the proportion of the standard population at age *a*. The standard population is the U.S. free population in 1850. The method ignores emigration, but this should not cause any significant error.

Figure 1-4. Age Pattern of Migration, 1850-1920



Figure Source: This figure is originally from Patricia Kelly Hall and Steven Ruggles. 1999. "Moving Through Time: Internal Migration Patterns of Americans, 1850-1990." Data Source: Steven Ruggles, Matthew Sobek, Trent Alexander, Catherine A. Fitch, Ronald Goeken, Patricia Kelly Hall, Miriam King, and Chad Ronnander. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0 [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Population Center [producer and distributor], 2008.

Figure 1-5. Age Pattern of Migration, 1950-1990



Figure Source: This figure is originally from Patricia Kelly Hall and Steven Ruggles, 1999. "Moving Through Time: Internal Migration Patterns of Americans, 1850-1990." Data Source: Steven Ruggles, Matthew Sobek, Trent Alexander, Catherine A. Fitch, Ronald Goeken, Patricia Kelly Hall, Miriam, King, and Chad Ronnander. *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series Version 4.0.* [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Population Center [producer and distributor], 2008.

When using data that allow control for changes in the age structure over time, the picture of lifetime interstate migration for mature native-born adults in the U.S. over the last 140 years is more varied and interesting than that presented by looking at generalized migration rates. Different subgroups have experienced quite different rates of interstate migration over time. Analysis for the two major racial subgroups shows that since 1910 blacks have had dramatically higher migration rates than have whites, challenging—at least for interstate migration—Lee's selectivity "rule" that whites move more than blacks.[18]

The lifetime-migration rates shown in Figure 1-1 also suggest that Americans were more mobile than some scholars have argued. Goldstein suggested that fewer than 25 percent of the total population actually moved. He used city directories in Norristown, Pennsylvania and Copenhagen, Denmark, to identify a group of highly mobile individuals in each community who moved multiple times while most inhabitants made few or no moves. From these findings he concluded that repeat movers accounted for most of the movement.[19] The migration patterns shown in Figure 1-1 must be viewed as a lower bound estimate of internal migration because several types of migration are not captured in the data: moves within states, foreign-born residents, return migrants and repeat migrants. Nevertheless, the figure shows rates of lifetime migration that were never lower than 30 percent and well above that for much of the time series. Contrary to Long's findings, Figure 1-1 also shows that rates of interstate migration have not declined in recent years and continue to increase for both whites and blacks. [20]

Migration Theory: Explaining the Patterns

Migration is a complex phenomenon. It can be a conservative retreat from change that is unwanted or it can be a proactive initiative to seek out and capitalize on that change. It is both stimulus and response to economic, social and demographic change in a society.[21] Theories about migration are equally complex, reflecting the disciplines and time period from which they arise. Most migration theory has focused on the causes of migration, but no theorist has yet specifically incorporated the movement of soldiers or veterans in a long-term evaluation or explanation of migration patterns. Nevertheless, each approach has something to contribute to an understanding of how veteran status works to influence internal migration.

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[18] Everett S. Lee, "A Theory of Migration," *Demography 3* (1966), 47-57.

[19] Sidney Goldstein, "Repeated Migration as a Factor in High Mobility Rates," *American Sociological Review 19* (1954), 233-249; Goldstein, *Patterns of Mobility, 1910-15: The Norristown Study* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1958); Goldstein, "The Extent of Repeated Migration: An Analysis Based on the Danish Population Register," *American Statistical Association Journal 59* (1964), 1121-32.

[20] Larry H. Long and Lynne R. Heltman, "Migration and Income Differences Between Black and White Men in the North," *American Journal of Sociology 80* (1975), 1391-1409.

[21] Calvin Goldscheider, ed., *Migration, Population Structure, and Redistribution Policies* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992).

General Theories of Migration: Ravenstein and Lee

The first person to attempt to characterize the nature of the migration process was E. G. Ravenstein. Ravenstein's observation's about the migration behavior of persons in the 1881 British census were formulated in his first "laws" published in an 1885 article.[22] Ravenstein made the following observations about the migration behaviors:

- Most migrants move only short distances, only as far as is required to find a more suitable house or job or meet some specific personal or family need.
- Long-distance moves are to large centers of commerce, where housing and employment opportunities are more abundantly available, making the journey worth the time and money.
- Most migration is "by stages" and produces "currents of migration", meaning that what might appear to be a long journey is really a series of smaller journeys—from farm to village, village to rural town, from town to major city; not every migrant follows the current to its final destination.
- Migration currents run in stream and counter-stream, with some people being attracted to the places others have just left.
- There are differences in urban and rural propensities to migrate with rural residents being more likely to migrate than urban; again, this is related to the relative level of opportunity individuals find in each area of origin and destination.
- Short-distance migrations are dominated by female movers, long-distance moves by male migrants.
- As technology expands, migration increases.
- Among the various motives for migration, the economic motive is dominant.

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[22] E. G. Ravenstein, "The Birthplace of the People and the Laws of Migration," *The Geographical Magazine, Vol. 3* (1876), 173-177, 201-206, 229-233; Ravenstein, "The Laws of Migration," *Journal of the Statistical Society of London, Vol. 48* (June, 1885), 167-235; Ravenstein, *The Laws of Migration," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol. 51* (June, 1889), 241-305.

The first six laws were explicitly outlined in the 1885 article but the last two are implicit in his analysis. Ravenstein understood that he was observing the influences of industrialization on English population redistribution. In an 1889 article he expanded his analysis to include census data from 20 other countries. The migration laws he identified were consistent with all countries undergoing industrialization and urbanization. Ravenstein's work forms the basis for all migration theory and, although written more than 100 years ago when the data and the methods for analysis were less accessible, most contemporary migration theory falls within the parameters he outlined in 1885.

Everett S. Lee (1966) provided the next major analytical framework for evaluating migration.[23] Lee identified four groups of factors influencing migration behavior:

- Factors associated with the area of origin act either to hold a resident in place or "push" the individual to seek opportunity elsewhere. These factors contribute only to the decision to leave or not.

- Factors associated with the area of destination act in two ways: they either attract migrants who have already decided to leave—affecting only the decision of where to migrate; or they actually "pull" migrants toward that location—thus influencing both the decision to migrate as well as the decision on where to relocate.

- Intervening obstacles are barriers, such as distance or lack of skills, which must be surmounted for migration to occur.

- Personal factors are the individual characteristics that influence a person's propensity to migrate.

Lee identified several ways in which personal characteristics influence migration. First, migration is a selective process and people respond differently to the positive and negative factors. "Pull" factors tend to yield positively-selected migrants—that is, those with the highest levels of a characteristic, such as skills or training—while "push" factors yield negatively-selected migrants—those with the lowest levels of a characteristic. Taken together, then, migration selection is bimodal, with the characteristics of migrants tending to be intermediate between those of origin and those of destination. Lee also suggested that the degree of positive selection of migrant characteristics increases with the difficulty of the intervening obstacles separating origin and destination; as the number or size of the barriers to migration increase, only those persons with the most competitive characteristics can succeed. Lee observed that the heightened propensity to migrate at certain stages of the life cycle was an important element in the selection of migrants, for example moving out as a "right of passage."

The majority of soldiers mustering out of the military after World War II, had already experienced one significant right of passage—their participation in a world war. Many of them would also be returning to set up households of their own for the first time. In addition, selectivity for occupation-specific migration will privilege those with the new skills and training needed in a restructured industrial economy. Training provided by the military in skills like airplane mechanics would provide just such a migratory edge over those who lacked the skill or resources to acquire training on their own.

Lee's observations about the factors influencing the volume of migration constitute another major contribution to the theoretical literature. He suggested that the volume of migration is related directly to the diversity of regions, the diversity of people, and the difficulty of surmounting intervening obstacles. Fluctuations in the economy matter, too, but Lee stresses that their real contribution is in the different impact these fluctuations have on areas of origin and destination. Finally, Lee suggests that if left unchecked both the volume and rate of migration will increase over time. This follows first from the fact that in a modern industrial society, Lee assumes that diversity within regions and among people also increases over time. Secondly, improvements in technology will reduce or eliminate many of the intervening obstacles to migration.

Ravenstein's and Lee's works are general in nature, adaptable to many situations. Much of remaining theoretical work on migration of interest here falls within one of two disciplinary frameworks: economic or socio-demographic.

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[23] Lee, "A Theory of Migration," 1966.

Migration for Economic Gain:

Economic studies, which seek to measure the gains to migration, fall into two general analytical frameworks: the labor-mobility model and the human-capital model. Most labor-mobility research is based on classical wage theory, which asserts that wage differentials are the driving force for internal migration. The resulting flow of income-maximizing workers will eventually bring labor supply and demand into equilibrium. The volume of migration is directly related to the size of the wage differential. All the classic economic model assumptions apply here: all persons are utility maximizers in a leisure-and-income, two-good market; knowledge of employment opportunities is perfect; workers are many in number and homogeneous in skills and tastes; and there are no barriers—social or economic—to mobility.

Much of the literature on the economic explanations for migration is devoted to testing the validity of these assumptions of labor mobility. These studies attend more to the characteristics of firms and employers than to the workers who are migrating.

After surveying the literature testing the validity of these assumptions, Michael Greenwood concludes that if money-wage differentials, narrowly defined, are the criterion, Hicks' contention that this is the chief reason for migration has not been confirmed. If, however, "wages" is interpreted to mean real wage differentials net of cost-of-living differences and psychic costs such as access to family and friends, the wage theory of migration has more applicability.[24]

These theories have a particular resonance for economic circumstances and migration in the United States in the years between World War I and II. Indeed, Hicks published the classic *Theory of Wages* in 1932. As the economy worsened and unanticipated millions of people began moving to find work, social scientists of all disciplines—but especially economists—responded with in-depth analyses and recommendations. One of the largest projects was the Study of Population Redistribution launched in 1934 by the Industrial Research Department of the

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[24] Michael J. Greenwood, "Research on Internal Migration in the United States: A Survey," *Journal of Economic Literature 13* (June, 1975), 397-433; Greenwood, "An Analysis of the Determinants of

Wharton School of Finance and Commerce at the University of Pennsylvania. In two years they produced detailed population redistribution bulletins by industry and a massive report on the project's overall assessment of the location industries and regions of economic potential as well as the concentration of available labor. As with the later Eldridge and Thomas studies, however, the Wharton team lacked individual level microdata that would allow them to incorporate age into their analyses.[25]

There were two major criticisms of the classic wage theory of migration, one theoretical and one evidentiary. The theoretical problem is that the decision to migrate is assumed to have a cost/benefit evaluation based on current costs of migration and immediate wage differentials. While costs are immediate, the gains to be realized from wage differentials can be realized over an extended period of time. Equally troubling, real wage differentials were observed to persist in the United States despite a prolonged period of dramatic internal migration. A partial explanation may lie in the "perverse" nature of labor mobility, namely that movement of workers across geographic space often coincides with a movement across occupations and industries. Wage theory is implicitly focused on the causes of migration which, if rooted in regional variations in the price of labor, leave fewer options for policy intervention.

The alternative explanation involves a shift of the theoretical model from wage theory to human capital investment.[26] In this framework, migration—like education and training—is considered an investment in human capital with the personal and social benefits accruing over the individual's entire working lifetime. The decision to migrate hinges on an evaluation of the net gain from higher lifetime returns rather than immediate wage gains. Human-capital analysis puts more emphasis on the characteristics of the individual, particularly age, education and skill or occupational level. The human capital investment theory has tremendous appeal for analysis of

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Geographic Labor Mobility in the United States," *Reviews of Economic Statistics 51* (May, 1969), 189-194; J.R. Hicks, *The Theory of Wages* (London: Macmillan, 1932).

[25] Carter Goodrich, *Migration and Economic Opportunity, The Report of the Study of Population Distribution* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1936).

[26] Gary S. Becker, "Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis," *Journal of Political Economy 70 Supplement, Part 2* (Oct., 1962), 9-49; Becker, *Human Capital, Second Edition* (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1975); Larry A. Sjaastad, "The Costs and Returns of Human Migration," *Journal of Political Economy VXX* (1962), 80-93.

veteran migration in the post-World War II; the dramatic change in veteran benefits for the G.I. Bill came precisely with its shift away from mere dependency-averting benefits to direct investment in the human capital potential of young veterans.

Migration Selection Characteristics:

Social structures place differential constraints on individuals depending on personal characteristics, such as position in the life cycle, socio-economic status, kinship patterns, and minority group participation. Different stages of family development have been found to influence migration primarily through the age of the family head and the composition of the family. The distinction between residential mobility and migration is critical here since many changes in family life cycle, such as setting up an independent household or getting married, trigger change in residence but not a move to a new community.[27] Residential mobility usually involves moves of very short distances, does not involve change of occupation but may involve changing one or more social institutions, such as school or church. The focus of this study is interstate migration—long-distance moves that involve a change of community and, presumably, a change in job. Some life cycle events that result in change of residence may actually act as a deterrent to long-distance migration. Lee theorizes that dependents serve as a barrier to migration. Long found that until age 35, women with no children in their household moved more than those living with children.[28] Using data from the Current Population Survey Long also found that, with the exception of those age 20 to 24, men with a spouse present were less likely to have migrated in the previous 12 months.

Lowry suggests that out-migration from an area—the decision to migrate, itself—is associated with life-cycle factors while economic opportunity factors are associated with the decision of where to migrate. Following Richard Easterlin's theoretical work relating economic opportunity to the relative size of succeeding generations, Bramhall and Bryce found high correlation between out-migration from states that had very high cohort size while in-migration was more closely correlated with change in the employment structure.[29]

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[27] J. B. Lansing and E. Mueller, *The Geographic Mobility of Labor* (Ann Arbor, MI: Survey Research Center, 1967); Larry H. Long, "Migration Differentials by Education and Occupation: Trends and Variations," *Demography 10* (1973), 243-258.

Another demographic influence on the propensity of individuals to migrate is their previous migration history. Since migration is selective of the most mobile people in a community, previous migrants are the most likely to move again all else equal. This is of special interest to this study of veteran migration. Psychic costs—the money and non-money costs of overcoming distance, information and isolation barriers—are assumed to be reduced for those who have successfully migrated in the past. In addition, Swartz suggests that increased education may reduce the psychic costs of distance in migration, presumably because the information barriers are reduced; on average, more education leads to the consumption of more information and with increased information about a prospective location, the uncertainty costs associated with migration are reduced.[30]

Tilly and Brown suggest that kinship and friendship are powerful influences on internal migration.[31] However, the impact of these networks is influenced by the age and race of the migrants. Migration through kinship auspices is most common among the young and decreases with age until around 40 when it again begins to increase. They also found that more white than non-white workers use these networks, a finding at odds with other research on kinship. However, Tilly and Brown control for occupation status, finding blue-collar workers more likely than white-collar workers to migrate under kinship or friendship auspices. While the results are not conclusive, it

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[28] Lee, "A Theory of Migration," 1966; Larry H. Long, "The Influence of Number and Ages of Children on Residential Mobility,' *Demography 10* (1973), 243-258.

[29] I. S. Lowry, Migration and *Metropolitan Growth: Two Analytical Models* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1966); Richard Easterlin, *Birth and Fortune: The Impact of Numbers on Personal Welfare, Second Edition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980); D. F. Bramhall and H. J. Bryce, "Interstate Migration of Labor-Force Age Population," *Industrial Labor Relations Review 22* (1969); 576-583.

[30] Ann R. Miller, "A Note on the Role of Distance in Migration: Costs of Mobility Versus Intervening Opportunities," *Journal of Regional Science* (Dec. 1972), 396-405; A. Schwartz, "Interpreting the Effect of Distance on Migration," *Journal of Political Economy 81* (Sept./Oct. 1973), 1153-69; Lansing and Mueller, *Geographic Mobility of Labor*, 1967; R. A.Fabricant, "An Expectational Model of Migration," *Journal of Regional Science 10* (April 1967), 13-24; Greenwood, "Analysis of Determinants," 1969.

[31] Charles Tilly and C. Harold Brown, "On Uprooting, Kinship, and the Auspices of Migration," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology 8* (1968), 139-64.

may be that what others identified as race effects may, in fact, be occupational effects.[32]

Race and Ethnicity as Migration Selection Characteristics

The question of how race influences migration by kinship/friendship auspices highlights the two theoretical frameworks used to understand the observed race differentials in migration. The "assimilationist perspective" suggests that the observed differences in migration rates among races are explained by compositional differences in the two groups. Werner Sollors identifies the central conflict in American history as being the tension between "descent" and "consent"—between those parts of identity determined by blood relationships and those resulting from voluntary associations.**[33]** As these groups come to resemble one another more on these factors, the in-migration rates will converge. Kathleen Conzen reinforces this view with an analysis of social incorporation that requires time to transpire. The ethnic enclaves formed by all immigrant groups are an essential step toward eventual incorporation in the larger society; before they can move out, they have to feel that they belong somewhere. Movement out of these enclaves is a joint process of reaching out by the foreign stock population and acceptance by the majority culture.**[34]** Other researchers, arguing from the "minority group status-effect perspective," show that even controlling for social, economic and demographic effects—as in the Tilly and Brown study—migration rates are still different among racial groups.[35]

Much of the theoretical and analytical research on migration deals with either the causes of migration or the effects of migration on the individual. Relatively few studies deal with the impact of migration on society and communities or incorporate public policy decisions into their frameworks. The human-capital model was the first approach to incorporate a role for public policy in migration theory. Prior to Becker and Sjaastad, relatively little work had been done on the influence of public policy on internal migration. Two policy areas that have generated considerable research in the last fifteen years are migration and welfare reform, and migration and immigration policies. As early as 1973, Goldstein and Moses suggested that the role of local, state and federal policies needed to be incorporated into theory and analysis of migration and urbanization.[36] Nevertheless, except for the areas of welfare and immigration, analysis of the public returns to migration or the role of public policy in leveraging migration have been largely ignored.

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[32] Lansing and Mueller, *Geographic Mobility of Labor*, 1967.

[33] Werner Sollors, *Beyond Ethnicity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 6.

[34] Kathleen Neils Conzen, et al, "Ethnic Patterns in American Cities: Historiographical Trends," in *Swedes in America*, Ulf Beijbom, ed. (Vaxjo, Sweden, 1993), 16-33; Conzen, The Invention of Ethnicity: A Perspective from the U.S.A., *Journal of American Ethnic History 12* (Fall, 1992), 3-63.

[35] A. H. Richmond, "Sociology of Migration in Industrial and Post-Industrial Societies," in J.A. Jackson, ed., *Migration, Sociological Studies 2* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969) 238-81.

Immigration: Migration *into* the United States

The internal migration take-off in the nineteenth century was fueled by the continuous expansion westward of the settlement boundaries of the United States—new land was the draw. deTocqueville made his grand tour of America in the 1820s during one of these big sweeps west. The land that drew Americans west also attracted immigrants from other countries. Shortly thereafter, migration to the United States from Europe began to pick up speed for the first major wave of immigration.

Figure 1-6 shows the distribution of the U.S. population by nativity and race from 1900 to 1970. For the first third of the twentieth century, between 35 and 40 percent of the total population was of foreign stock—either foreign born or the native-born children of foreign-born parents. The percentage black foreign-born or children of black foreign-born were consistently low, reflecting a very different immigration history. Native-born whites of native-born parents and all other races constitute the remaining share of the population.

To understand the degree to which immigration influenced American social, economic and political life during this period, it is important to remember that immigrant families were not evenly distributed on the landscape. The vast tracts of cheap public land were gone when these immigrants arrived. As a group, this wave of immigrants was poorer and less educated than the first big influx of the foreign born, which occurred earlier in the nineteenth century.[37] These newcomers were labor-seeking, not land-seeking, immigrants; as a result they were not distributed across the country but tended to cluster in industrial cities near their ports of embarkation.

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[36] Reynolds Farley, *The New American Reality: Who We Are, How We Got Here, Where We are Going* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1996); William H. Frey, "Immigration, Domestic Migration, and Demographic Balkanization in America: New Evidence for the 1990s," *Population and Development Review 22* (Dec., 1996), 741-763; Douglas S. Massey, Andrew B. Gross and Kumiko Shibuya, "Migration, Segregation, and the Geographic Concentration of Poverty," *American Sociological Review 59* (June 1994), 425-445; G. S. Goldstein and L. N. Moses, "A Survey of Urban Economics," *Journal of Economic Literature 11* (June 1973), 471-515.

Figure 1-6. Race and Nativity of U.S. Population, 1900-1970



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

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[37] For a long assessment of immigration to the United States—written during the period of immigration leading into World War II—see Marcus Lee Hansen, *The Immigrant in American History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940); and Hansen, *The Atlantic Migration, 1607-1860* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940). For immigration perspectives that incorporate the larger immigrant population, see Leonard Dinnerstein, Roger L. Nichols, and David M. Reimbers, *Natives and Strangers: Ethnic Groups and the Building of America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); Ronald Takaki, *A Different Mirror: A History of Multicultural America* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1993). For a more nuanced look at the contest for racial status among native whites, native blacks and immigrants, see David R. Roediger, *Working Toward Whiteness: How America's Immigrants Became White; The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs* (New York: Basic Books, 2005).

The dramatic decline in the number of foreign born was caused by the disruptions of World War I and the restrictive immigration policies imposed in the 1920s. Between 1924 and 1964, when immigration restrictions were eased, immigration slowed to a trickle. The quota system privileged countries that dominated immigration streams in the nineteenth century and these places were not facing the same set of push forces as they had. There was still demand for visas to enter the Untied States, but the few permits allotted to all other countries were used quickly while those for preferred countries—especially the big three of England, Ireland and Germany—went unused.[38]

Between World War I and World War II, the United States had relatively little new immigration. No longer able to meet labor needs from the pool of immigrants who had come from across the seas, employers in all sectors would have to look to their local labor or to in-migrants from across the state line.

Figure 1-7 revisits the black and white lifetime migration pattern shown in Figure 1-1 for the 1900 to 1970 period. This time, however, the white population has been divided among the foreign born, native born of foreign-born parents, and native born of native-born parents. Given the small numbers of foreign-born blacks and their children shown in Figure 1-7, only the migration rates for native-born blacks are shown.

Although native-born whites show similar patterns of lifetime interstate migration in 1900 and through 1910—regardless of where their parents were born—those with foreign-born parents are significantly lower than for whites with native-born parents. White adult children of native-born parents exhibit a consistent but slowing reduction in migration propensity until 1930. The Depression accelerates the rate reduction but in 1940, migration for this group begins a fairly rapid rise until 1960. Although migration rates for white adults with native-born parents began to rise in 1940—before the onset of World War II—migration for those with foreign-born parents didn't begin to accelerate until after the war. As in the earlier graph, these

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[38] Dinnerstein, et al., *Natives and Stranger,* 1979; Takaki, *Different Mirror*, 1993.

Figure 1-7. World War II Migration in Historical Context: Lifetime Migration of the Native Born, 1900 to 1970

(native-born males age 50 to 59)



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

migration turnarounds come long after the 1910 census showed that black migration rates were on the rise.

Government's Role in Migration

What role, if any, has government policy played in generating or steering these movements of the American people? For most of our history, government's influence on leveraging migration has been at the aggregate level by adding new territory and securing the peace for settlers in the new communities. Specific policies tied to population resettlement were often aimed at meeting national goals. For example, both the Homestead Act and the Veterans Land Grants of the Civil War were intended to quickly settle new territories that the United States wanted to secure against foreign encroachment. The focus was on settling the land rather than resettling the population. Even with veteran settlement programs, more land ended in the control of politicians and speculators than unemployed veterans.[39]

War is another way in which government policies leverage migration. Wars produce migrants, beginning with the soldiers themselves. But America had been engaged in wars before and veterans have returned home without exhibiting the same migratory response. What was different?

Veteran Status as a Migration Endowment

Veteran status is bestowed on anyone who serves in the armed forces and received a discharge other than dishonorable.[40] I suggest that military service and veteran status in this period operates to increase migration in five separate ways for those who served in World War II, each with differential outcomes depending on the degree to which a group can maximize their participation in each.

Military service in World War II was a galvanizing experience from the moment news came that bombs had destroyed Pearl Harbor. The scale of the enterprise both in territory of service and numbers of enlistees was like nothing before or since. The complete conversion of the economy to maximize war production output while still meeting domestic needs constantly put soldiers' needs first in the minds of those at home. At every turn there were messages warning people to conserve or do with less so there would be enough for the soldiers. The extent of news coverage was unprecedented: mass distribution of major daily newspapers, radios in most homes, newsreels in every movie theater, the gravelly voice of Edward R. Murrow broadcasting in the blitz.[41] It was intense for both those who served at home and on the home front. For the young men who fought there was danger and horror but there was something else—a new sense of shared purpose in company mostly with people they might never have met had they stayed at home. They were treated as heroes in small villages and in exotic and romantic cities like London, Paris and Rome. The military experience showed them that they could move, make friends, do worthwhile work and be honored for it. They might yearn for home but the experience taught them that they could be successful at making their home in a new place if the situation was right. Economic migration theorists would categorize this as reducing the psychic costs of moving; with World War II the military did just that for 70 percent of the age cohort most likely to migrate.

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[39] John D. Black and Charles D. Hyson, "Postwar Soldier Settlement," *Quarterly Journal of Economics 59* (Nov. 1944), 1-35; Daniel T. Lichter and Glenn V. Fuguitt, "Demographic Response to Transportation Innovation: The Case of the Interstate Highway," *Social Forces 59* (Dec. 1980), 492-512; James W. Oberly, *Sixty Million Acres: American Veterans and the Public Lands before the Civil War* (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1990).

[40] There were three categories of military discharge: honorable, dishonorable and "other than dishonorable." There detailed protocols that spelled out the level of military and veteran benefits holders of each type of discharge were entitled to. Flexibility was also allowed local administrators in determining the application of these criteria. For complete details on the official rules for granting benefits by discharge type, see U.S. President's Commission on Veterans' Pensions, *Discharge Requirements for Veterans Benefits: A Report on Veterans' Benefits in the United States, Staff Report No. XI*I (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Sept. 12, 1956). For an analysis of the impact of the political use of "other than honorable" discharges for homosexuals, see Margot Canaday, "Building a Straight State: Sexuality and Social Citizenship under the 1944 G.I. Bill," *The Journal of American History* (Dec. 2003), 935-957.

A second way in which military service, itself, contributed to boosting the probability of migration for servicemen is the increased number of people who received specialized training for jobs that would be in demand in the post-war economy, especially in new industries such as aviation. Without using any benefits of veteran post-war training, many men found their human capital improved because of training received while serving in the military.[42]

Veteran benefits—for those who are able to access them—added immediate financial resources to reduce or eliminate direct migration costs. Government-sponsored resettlement officers served as *ombudsmen* to run administrative interference for former GIs. If they lived too far from the resettlement offices provided by the Veterans Bureau, federal government reconversion programs set up smaller local offices to provide the same readjustment and reemployment services.

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[41] For a general description of the impact of the war on ordinary life, see Richard Polenberg, *War and Society: The United States, 1941-1945* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1972).

[42] See Figure 3-8 here; also "Table Ed82-119 Selected Characteristics of the armed forces," in *Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition, Volume Five: Governance and International Relations,* eds. Susan Carter, et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 5.363-364.

Veterans' organizations—especially the American Legion—provided a nationwide social network with local chapters in virtually every community. National and statewide veteran newspapers maintained solidarity among the vets but, more importantly for migration, kept the members alert to education, employment and housing options available to them in their area.

Finally, the enlistment and war bond recruitment propaganda carried out *during* the war combined with the aggressively political and ultra patriotic campaigns of the American Legion *before* the war to endow the veteran with a powerful new standing in the nation's social hierarchy at all levels. In Washington, DC, Washington Square, or Washington County, the World War II veteran became the living symbol of the ideal American patriot. From his days playing or watching "Legion ball" at the local ballpark, every veteran knew that wherever he lived the local chapter would invite him to march in the parades on all the patriotic holidays.[43] They would be asked to carry guns and flags in school and civic ceremonies throughout the year. Especially in the cold war, anti-communist atmosphere of the 1950s, no one question their patriotism. They would be welcome anywhere they moved because of their service and their new status. And because the enlistment and service rates were so high, they would find friends who shared their experiences no matter where they moved.

Why would this be important at this period in our history? The answer is somewhere in the weave of demographic and economic change. In the midst of change, migration is the adjustment mechanism. Fewer jobs in the post-war economy would be in rural areas so rural-to-urban migration was inevitable. During the war, regional concentrations of industry had been redistributed, pushing some workers to move from one region of the country to another. Reduced immigration since 1924 meant that expanding industries would be enticing native born workers from other parts of the country.

During this time, social networks were shifting from communities of ancestry—whether of immigrant enclave or family farms—to communities of association (education, workplace, civic—and veteran).[44] One's ability to negotiate increasingly large institutions depended less on old community and ethnic ties and more on new identities—union locals, college fraternities, VFW and American Legion posts. Whole new communities were being formed based not on group migrations of kin and community groups but on individual decisions bound together by shared economic and social interests. Suburbs revealed a new homogeneity, based less on homeland and language than on income, family size, and automobile ownership.[45]

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[43] William Pencak, *For God & Country the Ameican legion, 1919-1941* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1989).

For the veteran, there was a ready answer to the most difficult questions facing the potential migrant: "Who am I once I move?" and "Will I be welcome?"

It has been shown that white native-born children of foreign-born parents were less likely to migrate in the post-war period that were either whites with native-born parents or blacks. The question remains whether the veteran status of these groups influenced their propensity to migrate. Figure 1-8 shows the percentage veteran for these three groups as well as for the white foreign-born population. The low rates of military service for the foreign born is more reflective of the static nature of the foreign-born population than their willingness to serve. With migration restrictions between 1924 and 1965—and the shift in the 1965 legislation privileging the influx of mothers, wives and sisters—the foreign born population at risk for military service barely grows through most of this period. In contrast, there is a relatively steady replenishment of the other groups.

The key fact of this graph is that although their group migration rates differ, whites with foreign-born parents show virtually the same proportion serving in the military during World War II as those with native-born parents. The pattern for blacks has the same shape as for native-born whites. The gap between races reflects the differential treatment of whites and blacks in recruitment and enlistment, outlined

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[44] Sollors, *Beyond Ethnicity*, 1986; Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., "Biography of a Nation of Joiners," *The American Historical Review, Vol. 50* (Oct. 1944), 1-25.

[45] Two quite different overviews of suburban demographic and social change are found in Barry Schwartz, *The Changing Face of the Suburbs* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), and Lisa McGirr, *Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.

Figure 1-8. Percent Veteran by Race and Nativity, 1900 to 1970



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

more fully in Chapter 3. The question of whether there are different migration outcomes for racial and ethnic veteran groups will be explored in Chapter 2.

If veteran benefits and veteran status did operate to increase the propensity to migrate, the effects for the World War II post-war settlement patterns should be staggering. Figure 1-9 shows the percentage veteran by birth year for males born between 1825 and 1970. This is a retrospective look back at enlistments using information captured, on average, 45 years after birth. The sheer magnitude of the increase in enlistment for World War II is apparent, as is the age selectivity of military service. The peak birth years for service in World War II were between 1915 and 1927, making the veterans age 18 to 30 at war's end. Between 50 and 80 percent of

Figure 1-9. Percent Veteran by Birth Year, 1815 to 1975



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

men born between these years served in this war. On average these men spent three years in the armed forces, half of it served overseas.

As migration theory would predict, these are the ages most highly selective for migration and they had already been moved around quite a bit by the war. Even a modest increase in the migration rate of a group this large will have profound consequences for the pattern of settlement in the nation.

The Immediate Context of World War II Migration

The principal factors that set the stage for the new veteran-led post-war migration were: (1) America's experience with World War I and its demobilization; (2) the emergence of powerful, proactive veterans' organizations following World

War I; (3) the trauma and dislocation of the Great Depression, followed by the proactive economic intervention of the New Deal, (4) the continuing pace of rural-to-urban migration, and (5) the early and massive involvement of the U.S. in war production for World War II.

World War I was America's first "Great War" of the twentieth century. The war effort engaged about 40 percent of American young men in military service. War production accounted for 25 percent of the nation's industrial capacity. After the Armistice, the American experience with demobilization was a disaster. Policy makers had little experience with war on this scale and seriously underestimated the task. Little planning was done for demobilization or for veteran readjustment. As a result, the labor supply was seriously disrupted, the economy experienced dangerous levels of inflation and morale among mustering-out soldiers was very low.[46]

World War II was an even more extensive war: on average, 70 percent of young men served in the military; half of our industrial capacity shifted to war production. Elated with military victory and the long-awaited return of the men, the country was nonetheless apprehensive about America's economic future, fearing a repeat of the post-World War I financial problems and the Great Depression that followed. Figure 1-10 shows why Americans were worried. The male unemployment rate reached a peak of 25 percent in 1933. This rate fell with the interventionist programs of the First New Deal but rose again with its collapse in 1937. At no time during the 1930s was the unemployment rate less than 10 percent; on average it was above 15 percent. Not until mobilization began for war production on the home front did unemployment rates begin a steady, prolonged drop. They did not return to their pre-Depression levels until well into the war.[47]

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[46] Frank Alexander Ross and Andrew G. Truxal, "Primary and Secondary Aspects of Interstate Migrations," *American Journal of Sociology 37* (Nov. 1931), 435-444; Richard Severo and Lewis Milfordd, *The Wages of War: When America's Soldiers Came Home from Valley Forge to Vietnam* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989).

[47] William Haber and Emmett Welch, "The Labor Force During Reconversion: Estimated Changes in Employment and Labor Force Distribution During the Transition Period," The Review of Economic Statistics 26 (Nov. 1944), 194-205; Charles D. Stewart, "The Redistribution of the Labor Force," in Seymour E. Harris, ed., *Economic Reconstruction* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1945); Jack Stokes Ballard, Jack Stokes, *The Shock of Peace: Military and Economic Demobilization after World War II* (Washington: University Press of America, 1983); John Modell and Duane Steffey, "Waging War and

Figure 1-10. Unemployment and Armed Forces Service, 1929-1956



Figure Source: This figure is Patricia Kelly Hall and Steven Ruggles. 1999. "Moving Through Time: Internal Migration Patterns of Americans, 1850-1990." Data Source: Steven Ruggles, Matthew Sobek, Trent Alexander, Catherine A. Fitch, Ronald Goeken, Patricia Kelly Hall, Miriam King, and Chad Ronnander. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0 [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Population Center [producer and distributor], 2008.

Marriage: Military Service and Family Formation, 1940-1950," *Journal of Family History 13* (1988), 195-218. Lewis A. Erenberg and Susan E. Hirsch, eds., *The War in American Culture: Society and Consciousness During World War II* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996).

Painful experiences with unemployment in the 1930s were followed by a massive drain of young males into the military. At its peak, more than 17 percent of the American labor force of all ages were in the Armed Forces. From 1946 on, unemployment and military service figures moved almost in perfect opposition to each other, at significantly lower levels than in the 1930s and 1940s. But planners and the general public did not see this part of the graph. They only knew what they had observed in the past.[48]

Complicating the picture further, the 1940 census had revealed tremendous population pressures building in rural America: there were two to three times as many young farm men coming of age on farms as there were farmers retiring. Military service and war production jobs had easily absorbed every able-bodied worker in the country. But what about after the war? With war-time improvements in agricultural mechanization, new crops and chemical fertilizers, record output of agricultural production was possible with significantly lower levels of farm labor. Farm size was increasing; except in one or two states, public lands were no longer available and the price of farm land already in production was rising rapidly. Policy makers worried about a repeat of Depression-era agricultural unemployment.[49] City soldiers were also at economic risk. The war had transformed industry as it had agriculture. Production was more efficient. Women had entered the paid labor force in record numbers during the war and taken over many jobs. Even if women could be persuaded to give up these jobs, Americans feared that with the war over, demand for industrial production would collapse and force workers out of their jobs once again.

Public opinion surveys at the time revealed widespread apprehension about the economic outlook following the end of the war.[50] Against this background, policymakers had to devise a plan to bring 12 million young men back home to rejoin a civilian labor force in an economy that was itself being decommissioned.

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[48] Jacob L. Mosak, "Forecasting Postwar Demand," in Seymour E. Harris, ed., *Economic Reconstruction* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1945); Seymour E. Harris, ed., "Introduction", *Economic Reconstruction,* 1945.

[49] Stewart, "Redistribution of the Labor Force," 1945.

[50] "The Quarter's Polls," *Public Opinion Quarterly10* (Fall, 1946), 400-444, esp. 423; Ross and Truxal, "Aspects of Migration," 1931.

Chapter 2.

Privileged Moves: World War II Veteran Status and the Internal Migration Patterns of White and Black Americans

World War II Era Migration in Historical Perspective

The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of veteran status on the internal migration patterns those who came of age during World War II. To fully understand the significance of change in these migration patterns, however, resettlement in this time period must be examined in the longer history of internal migration that has been a distinguishing feature of the American population. The history of twentieth-century change in American lifetime migration—in the percentage of the population living outside their state of birth—for the three population subgroups in this study is shown in Figure 2-1. The three study groups are white native-born males with native- born parents, white males with foreign-born parents, and black males with native born parents. Native-born blacks with foreign parents constitute a minute portion of the population in this period and have been excluded from the analysis.[1] The migration of persons age 50 to 59 was chosen to give the greatest number of people time to move for economic opportunity without including those who may have moved for retirement in the later period.

For whites, the peak of lifetime migration was in the nineteenth century. From its peak in 1900, white migration declined until 1940, then began a steady rise. Whites with foreign-born parents started the period with slightly higher lifetime-migration rates than native-stock whites. The decrease in their level of interstate migration was steeper and longer than for native-stock whites; when migration rates picked up again in 1950, the increase for those with foreign-born parents was more rapid than for those with native-born parents. The different migration patterns for the

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[1] For brevity, the terms “native stock” and “foreign stock” will be used interchangeably with “native born parents” and “foreign born parents.” Since the common use of the term “foreign stock” includes both foreign-born as well as their native born children, the reader is reminded that this study deals only with native born men. The term “second generation” will also be used to describe those with foreign born parents.

Figure 2-1. World War II Migration in Historical Context: Lifetime Migration of the Native Born, 1900 to 1970

(native-born males age 50 to 59)



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

two groups of whites reflect group differences in settlement history as well as the location and timing of economic opportunity available to them. Despite these differences, however, the overall patterns have the same shape.

The pattern for blacks was markedly different from that of the white groups. Black migration in 1900 was roughly 10 percent lower than that of whites and reached its lowest point for the period in 1910—thirty years before native-stock whites and 40 years before those with foreign-born parents. Migration for blacks increased steadily through 1920 and 1930, then accelerated through 1960 with a slight decline in 1970. The rate of increase in migration for blacks from 1930 through 1960 was steeper and more prolonged than for either group of whites throughout the entire period.

The history of change in American migration rates shown in Figure 2-1 was drawn from two census questions that have been asked about individuals since the 1850 census: "where do you live now" and "where were you born." Prior to 1850, the household was the unit of enumeration in the census and information about individual moves in national level data was unavailable.[2]

The strength of these census data is their availability for the entire time series. The weakness is that it is impossible to know the precise time when individuals moved out of the state of birth. Beginning in 1940, the census added questions on "residence five years ago" to the enumeration forms. These data have been collected in every census but one since 1940; the exception is 1950. For this census only, the reference period was abbreviated to one year because of the dislocations—assumed to be temporary—of the post-war resettlement. Figure 2-2 and 2-3 report the responses to these questions for the core population under study—native born males age 25 and over not currently serving in the Armed Forces.[3]

The top half of Figure 2-2 shows the percentage of those who lived in a different house at census enumeration than that occupied on April 1st of the earlier reference year. For 1950 the reference year was 1949; for all other years, the reference was five years prior to the census. The first observation from this figure is the sustained high level of resettlement in this period. Throughout the 40-year time span from 1935 to 1970, males 25 and over moved at least once in the reference period at rates between 60 and 80 percent. These numbers must be seen as a lower-bound estimate of the actual level of movement since it is possible that people moved more than once since the reference period; what's more, moves made between the prior census and the reference year are completely unreported. Clearly American men were moving at significantly high rates. In 1940 and 1950, black men reported change

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[2] While it is the only measure of migration at the individual level available over the entire time series, lifetime migration understates actual migration rates, especially for chronic migrants. See "Underestimation" in Appendix 1. Data and Methods.

[3] Those currently serving in the military will become veterans when they leave military service; until then they are not considered veterans and would have been included with other nonveterans. However, their residence is not determined by individual or household decision-making but by the assignment of the branch of service to which they are bound. This is the reasoning for also excluding others in group quarters whose state and place of residence are externally determined, such as those residing in prisons.

Figure 2-2. Residence Change and Within-County Movers by Race and Nativity, 1940 to 1970

(native-born males age 25 and over not currently in the Armed Forces)



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

of residences at higher rates than either group of whites. The 1960 black and second-generation white rates converged, due primarily to the decrease in black movement; by 1970, the children of the foreign-born had surpassed blacks by about 5 percent in movement.

While the level of movement remained high, the bottom graph of Figure 2-2 reveals that the distance moved increased over the time period. The proportion of those who moved from one house to another within the same county drops over the time series. By 1970 about a third fewer whites of both groups moved within county than did so in 1940. Over the whole period, black in-county movement was consistently higher than either group of whites, suggesting less opportunity to move outside the county than for either white group.

For all three populations, however, the trend for within-county change of residence was downward during the period, indicating that residential moves crossed either county or state political boundaries. According to the United States Census Bureau, a person who changes residence without crossing a political boundary is considered a "mover." Those who change political jurisdictions in their move are defined as "migrants." The within-county moves reported in the bottom half of Figure 2-2 represent only a portion of those changes of residence captured in the top half of that figure.[4] The rest are internal migrants and, according to the Census Bureau's definition, are classified by the level of political boundary crossed as either between counties in the same state or between states.

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[4] Although the questions about where a person lived in the reference year were asked only of those who indicated they lived in a different house, I calculated the percentages shown in the graphs with both movers and non-movers in the denominator. Calculated in this manner, the percentages reflect the impact on society levels of movers and migrants, rather than limiting the reference just to those who moved. While the levels shrink with the larger denominator I used, the patterns remain relatively constant. See Appendix Figure A-1 for an example of the same data calculated with the two denominators.

Figure 2-3 shows the percentage of persons who were inter-county and interstate migrants for each group. These are persons whose change of residence over the reference period included a move across a political boundary and thus were classified as migrants under the definition used by the United States Census Bureau.[5] For white native-stock males, migration between counties trended steadily upward across the time series, keeping in mind that the 1950 data measured migration in a single year rather than five.[6] This group also crossed county boundaries at rates significantly higher than foreign-stock males until 1970, by which time the gap between the white groups had closed.

Blacks began the time series with inter-county migration rates roughly 40 percent lower than native-stock whites but significantly higher than foreign-stock males. As early as 1950 they were surpassed by foreign-stock whites; by 1970, black migration across county lines was little more than a third that of either group of whites. The bottom panel in Figure 2-3 shows migration across state lines. For most migrants, these constituted the longest-distance moves.[7]

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[5] The size and shape of counties and states varies across the country and influences the probability that a move of a certain distance will cross a political boundary. The probability of migration is greater in places with small area or narrow boundaries, such as those on the eastern seaboard. Since county of residence is unavailable for modern census microdata, it is difficult to adjust for in descriptive analysis.

[6] The 1950 data for these responses cannot simply be multiplied by five on the assumption that rates experienced from 1949 to 1950 represent 20 percent of the five-year rate. Were that true, the inter-county and interstate migration rates of white native-stock males for the five-year period ending in 1950 would be closer to 45 percent. This figure more closely approximates the total moves during the period for demobilized soldiers and war production workers. When the census question was designed, the possibility of individual level analysis was not yet contemplated and the only way to collect data comparable to that of 1940 was to constrain the reference year.

[7] It is possible to move between counties and still be in the same metropolitan area. It is possible that a move across the street puts the mover in another city and another county. It is similarly possible to change one's residence from one state to another without changing job or office location. In both these situations, an inter-county or interstate move is more like that within the county, where the move represents residential change. During the period under study, this was most common in the Northeast Region.

Figure 2-3. Recent Migrants by Race and Nativity, 1940 to 1970

(native-born males age 25 and over not currently in the Armed Forces)



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

For 1940, the high rates of residential resettlement captured moves of hope as well as moves of disappointment. Movements which occurred near the reference year—1935—were weighted heavily to the downsizing and household consolidation which resulted from the Depression. The end-of-decade movement captured opportunity in new war production industries which began in earnest in the spring of 1939.[8]

Moves for war-production jobs in new industrial centers are included in the interstate migration patterns in the bottom graph in Figure 2-3. Migration for all three groups increased across the time series, reflecting the social and economic change underway in the post-Depression and post-World War II period. Here, again, the higher migration rate for native stock whites is most pronounced. If interstate migration throughout this period represents increased opportunities for young adult men, whites with native-born parents were benefiting most from this opportunity. In 1940 and 1950, the interstate migration of white men with foreign-born parents was about half that of the other white group. Although still five percentage points behind in 1960, foreign-stock whites had begun to close the gap; by 1970 there was less than a three point difference between the two groups of whites.

Except for a brief advantage over foreign-stock whites in 1940, blacks are shown to have had the lowest recent interstate migration rates of the three groups. Their migration increased but at dramatically lower rates than native-stock whites over the entire time series; by 1970, the gap with foreign-stock whites had increased. This widening migration gap was caused by two factors: the increased rate of interstate migration among the foreign-stock whites and the decreasing rate of migration among blacks.

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[8] Although America was not officially at war until after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, full-scale industrial war production began two years earlier. On January 12, 1939, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt used his annual message to Congress—and his role as Commander-in-Chief—to ask Congress for immediate emergency appropriations to expand the military and to start developing arms and material necessary for the defense of the United States. The emergency appropriations request was followed in 1940 by the Destroyers for Bases program and the Lend Lease Act of March 11, 1941, both of which traded war supplies to Canada and Europe in exchange for bases and other desirable assets.

For blacks, a *decreasing* rate of recent interstate migration contradicts the pattern of *increasing* lifetime-migration shown for the period in Figure 2. Recent migration patterns for all three groups could look quite different from lifetime-migration patterns and not necessarily be inconsistent. Lifetime-migration measures can only show who was living outside their state of birth in a given census year. They cannot reveal whether the person moved at 18 to go to college or to the military, at 25 to take a job, or at 55 to be near adult children. They cannot distinguish any of these voluntary migrations from the involuntary migration of children who followed their parent's choices. Similarly, the graphs in Figures 2-2 and 2-3 reflect recent voluntary migration decisions of adults but do not tell us the lifetime migration picture for these respondents. Non-mover on the recent migration questions could also be lifetime migrants if they lived in the same house in both the census year and reference year but that house was not in the state of birth. Similarly, recent interstate migrants could be returning to their state of birth; they would then simultaneously be recent interstate migrants but a not migrants on the lifetime-migration measure.

Both the recent migration information available in census data since 1940, as well as the lifetime-migration measure constructed from state of residence and state of birth data, give researchers a useful profile of American population movements. Each measure has its limitations.[9] The advantage of the recent migration microdata is that it is possible to eliminate potentially confounding problems in the data. For example, Figures 2-2 and 2-3 present a good overall picture of the differential rates of movement and migration among the three groups for post-military, post-college adult males in this period. As with Figure 2-1, however, it is impossible to draw too fine a conclusion from these figures because of two significant problems with the population under study. A broad age group of 25 and over can have a very different composition from one census to another.

First, in each census year, a new group of persons who were age 15 to 24 in the previous census move into the study population; at the other end of the age spectrum, some unknown number of persons die. Second, the foreign-stock population during this time period was severely constrained by the immigration restrictions of the 1920s. Both the number and the percentage of immigrants in the population were at their peak prior to World War I. Immigration was severely constrained until 1964, first by the disruption of the Great War and then by the harsh immigration restrictions of the 1920s. Not until the new immigration act of 1964 did foreign in-migration begin to return to the same sustained level as that of the first decade of the twentieth century. Each population group shown in the graphs is influenced by differential and changing fertility rates as well as their own mortality rates. The implication of these conditions for the graphs shown here is that the proportion of the foreign-stock native born in the overall 25 and older population was shrinking from one census year to the next.

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[9] See the Appendix 1. Data and Methods for a discussion of limitations of migration measures using individual-level census data.

Finally, a measure of recent interstate migration with an age category as broad as 25 and older has all the same problems of migration timing as the lifetime measure. It is impossible to know at what age the migration took place. Since the purpose of this study is to assess the rates and impact of migration on young men who came of age in World War II—not simply the overall resettlement of the population—it is necessary to narrow the population under study.

The Twentieth Century Shift in Age of Migration

As with all demographic processes, migration is selective of age. Migration theory suggests that very young adults move at the highest rates. Using IPUMS census data from 1900 to 1970, I analyzed the lifetime migration rates for each study population by 10-year age groups. The results are shown in Figure 2-4.

The darkest line in each figure represents migration for those age 50 to 59 in the census year—the same measure as shown in Figure 2-1. Lines above this represent older age groups; those below capture younger age lifetime migration. The historical patterns for the three groups are quite different.

For all three groups, the 10-year age groups which contribute most to overall lifetime migration were those age 20 to 29 and age 30 to 39. Though the two white groups have generally the same pattern, foreign-stock whites showed more migration in the later age group. Both groups of whites showed a decrease in older-age

Figure 2-4. Lifetime Migration by 10-Year Age Groups, 1900 to 1970

(native-born males)



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See "Appendix 1. Data and Methods" for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

migration over the time series; the change was most pronounced among elderly foreign-stock whites who started the century with significantly higher lifetime migration at older ages than did those with native-born parents. In contrast to the increase in retirement resettlement since 1970, these figures show little migration among whites after age 59, compared to the high rates for both groups shown at the turn of the century.

Among blacks, lifetime-migration patterns were dramatically different from those of whites. The wider bands of old-age migration mirror the higher levels of late life migration found among foreign-stock whites; the overall level of late-life migration, however was more similar to native-stock whites. In all 10-year groups, working-age blacks had higher levels of lifetime migration than whites.

Changing lifetime migration patterns for the very young after 1940 were found in each of the study groups, indicating the increased interstate migration of families with young children. Although the rates of child migration rise after 1940, they do not surpass pre-World War II levels until 1960.

The arrows on each figure indicate the two 10-year age groups that contribute the most to overall lifetime migration rates for that subpopulation. Despite the limitations of the lifetime-migration measure, these graphs of national data confirm the age selectivity findings of previous researchers who used more detailed local level data. These age patterns also confirm the generalizability of age selectivity over time and across subpopulations.

With the flexibility of IPUMS census microdata to include specific age groups in analysis, I was able to focus on these peak migration years between age 20 and 39, and capture most of the self-initiated migration for this cohort.

Age Selectivity of Military Service

Like migration, military service is selective of the young. The previous figures show that if one were going to migrate between states, in the post-World War II period it was most likely to occur between ages 20 and 40. This was also true of both military service and veteran status. Those who serve in the military until retirement will not become veterans until later in life. For the majority of people, however, the window of opportunity for military service is relatively brief. If a person did not serve in the military before age 30, odds are against that person entering service and becoming a veteran at older ages.

In addition to selectivity on age, military service is conditional on history and politics. During periods of peace when demand for military personnel is low, fewer people in a population are at risk for becoming soldiers. As will be shown in Chapter 3, the experience and long-term consequences of military service and veteran status were also dependent on historic circumstances.

Figure 2-5 shows the dramatic increase in men with veteran status that resulted from military service in World War II. Figure 2-6 breaks this figure down for the

Figure 2-5. Percent Veteran by Birth Year, 1815 to 1977



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

three study groups in the recent period. Since the population under analysis for Figure 2-6 includes all males age 25 and over, after 1940 the World War I and prior service veterans are included with the World War II veterans. Nevertheless, the increase in the proportion of veterans in the adult male population was unlike any previous period in American history. The number of veterans declined between 1930 and 1940 for many of the same reasons the foreign stock population declined: between World War I and the 1940 census, three cohorts of men under 24 had entered the population under study but who were not subject to the draft or to war-time recruitment messages. Some young men did enter military service in times of peace, of course, but relatively few compared to the numbers who volunteered or were drafted during the war.

Figure 2-6. Percent Veteran by Race and Nativity, 1930 to 1970



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

From 1940 on the percentage veteran in each subgroup rose through the entire period, with the most dramatic rise coming in the 1950 census—the first to measure service in World War II. For whites from both nativity groups, the participation rates were virtually the same following World War II. In 1940, foreign stock whites reported higher veteran participation rates than native-stock whites. This could be an artifact of higher military service participation in World War I or of increased levels of post-war enlistment in the armed forces. The study group covers too broad an age category to know with any certainty.

By 1950, nearly 40 percent of all native-born white men age 25 and over were veterans of military service. This number approached 50 percent by 1960, bolstered by the continued need for military service for the Korean Conflict in the intervening decade; the Vietnam War had added another 5 percent veteran share by 1970. Though starting at a substantially lower level, the increase in the percentage veteran for native-born blacks showed a pattern similar to whites: the steepest increase came with service in World War II, followed by slowing of growth in the veteran population in each subsequent decade. The slope of the curve for blacks and whites was equally steep between 1940 and 1950 marking similar rates of increase in participation for both groups in that decade. However, the slope of the curve for blacks in subsequent decades was lower than that for either white group, indicating a lower rate of increase in veteran participation.

Since the patterns shown here for black and white native-stock groups included older men—potentially fathers of the younger generation, the veteran participation pattern for foreign-born whites is shown for reference. To the extent that these patterns capture the participation rate of the fathers of younger veterans, the foreign-born pattern suggests that native-born men with foreign-born fathers participated in military service at significantly higher rates than did their fathers' generation.

The figure clearly shows the increase in the proportion of veterans in the adult population that resulted from service in World War II. In all communities, veterans formed a more substantial proportion of the male population than ever before in American history. The figure shows the increase in veteran status—and the military service that qualified them for the title—but does reveal when the men were discharged and entered veteran status.

Figure 2-7 reveals the extent to which military service, like migration, was selective of age in World War II. Using the age structure of migration findings previously shown, this figure plots the percentage veteran of those in the two 10-year age groups shown to make the greatest contribution to lifetime migration for the three groups. Men who were 20 to 29 in 1945 at the end of World War II would have been 25 to 34 at the time of the 1950 census; those 30 to 39 at war's end would have been 35 to 44 in 1950. The top panel shows the percentage veteran of those men who were 25-34 in each census year from 1930 to 1970; the bottom graph reports the same information for those 35 to 44. Just as 20 to 29 year olds were shown to contribute the most to lifetime-interstate migration, these time-lagged figures show that they are also most likely to have completed military service. All three subgroups showed the highest participation rates for service in World War II. In 1950, 72 percent of foreign-stock whites and 70 percent of native-stock white men age 25 to 34 were veterans. For black men, the 1950 census showed that half of this cohort was veteran. Native-stock whites and blacks of this age group declined in veteran share from 1950 onward. Foreign-stock whites appear to have increased their percentage slightly.

The bottom panel of Figure 2-7 shows increases for the 35 to 44 year age group in 1960, significantly higher than 1950. Since this figure reports age group and not cohort data, the big 1960 bump in veteran status among the older group simply represents the 10-year aging of the younger—and highly veteran—age group.

Cohort Analysis of Pre-World War II Veteran Migration

It makes sense to narrow the analysis of veteran migration from all men who were at risk for veteran service to that subset that has been shown to be most likely both to migrate and to serve in the military. Although the census did not regularly collect information on veteran status until 1930, they did include a question in the 1910 census in an effort to gauge the on-going costs of benefits to Civil War veterans and their dependents. Using the information from this 1910 question and the veteran-status question included from 1930 onward, it is possible to take a retrospective look at lifetime migration for those who came of age in the Civil War and World War I.

For the Civil War there is just one census snapshot. Figure 4-8 shows the lifetime migration of those men who were age 65 to 84 in 1910, in other words, those who would have been age 20 to 39 in 1865 at the end of the Civil War. The columns represent the percentage living outside their state of birth for nonveterans and union veterans for native-born men in the three race and ethnicity groups under study: whites with native-born parents, whites with foreign-born parents, and blacks with native-born parents. For native stock whites, the percentage migrant for confederate veterans is also included.[10]

Those men who served in the Union military in the first half of their lives were more likely to be living outside their state of birth in the last half. This appears to hold for all three race and nativity groups. Foreign-stock veterans showed a larger gain to migration status than native-stock whites; blacks serving in the Union military have the highest gain to veteran status of all three groups. Confederate-veteran status is reported only for native-stock whites who are shown to have no increase in migration over non-veterans. This could be due to financial constraints on ability to move or perceived limitations on choice of destinations. Regional migration patterns are imbedded in this graph but there were too few cases to analyze at that level.[11]

Figure 2-8 suggests that blacks had higher migration gain from veteran status than any other group shown, both in absolute as well as relative terms. Of all three groups, nonveteran blacks have the lowest level of residence outside the birth state. Black-veteran migration was 14 percent higher than nonveteran, making it the highest

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[10] There are a handful of cases of confederate veterans for both the foreign-stock white and black groups but they are too few to report here. See Appendix Table A-5 for these case counts.

[11] There is, however, an alternate explanation; it is possible that Confederate veterans would be shown to move outside of their state of birth at higher rates than non-veterans if we could get the appropriate reference group of non-veterans. These data represent two treatment groups—Union veterans and Confederate veterans. The most appropriate technique would be to compare them to two reference groups, an analysis not possible using census data. Although most Civil War veterans reported which side of the war they fought on; there is no similar question for nonveterans. Since migration rates in this period were at the highest in United States history, it would only complicate the findings in a different direction to assign nonveterans to either the Union or Confederate cause based on their state of birth.

Figure 2-7. Percent Veteran of Most Migrant Age Groups, 1930 to 1970 *

(native-born males, of this age in the census year, not currently in the Armed Forces)



* Veteran status not available in 1920.

Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

absolute as well as relative migration gain to veteran status. However, here again, since it is not possible to know when people migrated, it is just as likely that black Union veterans migrated away from their state of birth *before* as *after* military service.

Despite the lack of information about the timing of migration, there is nothing in these results to suggest that the hypothesis is false: of those surviving to 1910, Civil War veterans are shown to have higher rates of lifetime migration than nonveterans.

Figure 2-8. Civil War Era Lifetime Migrants in the 1910 Census

(native-born males age 20 to 39 in 1865; age 65 to 84 in 1910)



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

Figure 2-9. World War I Era Lifetime Migrants, 1930 to 1970

(native-born males age 20 to 39 in 1918)



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

A similar analysis for the World War I cohort is shown in Figure 2-9. As with the previous Civil War case, this figure reports lifetime migration results for those who were 20 to 39 in 1918 at the end of the Great War. Although still a retrospective look at veteran migration, the gap here between the end of the war and the assessment of migration status is considerably shorter. What's more, since information on recent veteran status is available continuously form 1930 on, it is possible to follow this 20 to 39 year old age group for the entire time series.[12]

The three-part figure shows the percentage migrant for each race and nativity group for five censuses from 1930 to 1970. The solid column on the left shows the percentage living outside of the state of birth for the nonveteran portion of that group. The patterned column on the right shows the percentage interstate migrant for that group's veteran population.[13] Since the figure tracks just one twenty-year age cohort, the group ages 10 years from one census to the next. Using a cohort method of analysis resolves some of the problem of having different groups moving into and out of the study population from one census to the next.

This cohort of men was born between 1879 and 1898. They were at the ages most likely to volunteer or be drafted for World War I and were at the most migration-prone ages at the end of the war. The figure shows that for all groups, migration increased slightly from one census year to the next but these increases were modest, confirming that for most people the move out of the state of birth happened in the earlier years.

The figure also shows that in all census years and for all three subpopulations, veterans were more likely to live outside of their state of birth than nonveterans. Moreover, this migration gain to veteran status does not appear to be a one-time, post-service advantage; in each subsequent census year, veteran status provides a boost to the propensity to move to another state.

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[12] From 1930 on, the census questionnaire ascertained specific period of service, making it possible to separate World War I veterans from those of prior and subsequent wars.

[13] This pattern of solid colors and patterns will be followed for all subsequent column graphs. From this point on, all three groups will be condensed in one graph. The nonveterans remain to the left of the respective veteran group and the order, from the left, will be (1) white, native born parents, (2) white, foreign born parents, and (3) black, native born parents. When scanned from left to right, the tops of the columns of each type present the same information as a line graph.

For this cohort that came of age in World War I, blacks consistently had higher lifetime interstate-migration rates than either native-stock or foreign-stock whites. Native-stock whites followed closely behind with foreign-stock whites showing significantly lower interstate migration, even among veterans. The size of this World War I group of foreign-stock whites was substantially smaller than that of World War II. The parents of this cohort would have already been in the United States before 1898. Even though some of the parents arrived in the 1890s, all of them were here before the great flood of immigration that poured into the United States between 1890 and 1916. The children born to this great wave of immigrants would not be of age for military service until World War II. The size of this World War I cohort of native-born with foreign-born parents was larger than that for the Civil War but was much smaller than the "second generation" that came after them and served in World War II.

World War II Era
Cohort Migration Patterns

Because military service rates were so much higher for World War II than for any previous war, it is possible to narrow the age range under analysis and still maintain statistical significance. By limiting the group to those age 20 to 29 at the end of the war—the single 10-year age group most likely to serve and to move—it is possible to achieve better control on the timing of migration. The 10-year World War II cohort under study was born between 1916 and 1925. This was the largest group of native-born whites with foreign-born parents of age for military service than in any previous period.

Figure 2-10 shows the lifetime migration rates for the World War II cohort that was age 20 to 29 in 1945. The general pattern was similar to that for World War I veterans, with blacks showing overall higher rates of lifetime migration at each age, followed by native-stock whites; foreign-stock whites continued to show the lowest levels of residence outside the state of birth. Veterans of all groups experienced a higher level of migration than nonveterans. Except for blacks, migration in 1950 was not at the same level as the initial measurement for the post-World War I cohort. This might be a significant indicator were it not for the fact that the time available to move was longer for the World War I cohort at the first data point. Veteran status for this cohort was first identified in 1930, twelve years after the end of World War I. The first data point for the World War II cohort was 1950, when most of them had been out of the military less than five years. The lower migration rate is a function of less time at risk for migrating, not of lower propensities to migrate than World War I veterans. The large size of this cohort also allows analysis of migration patterns by region. Figure 4-11 reports the same information as the previous figure but the results are broken down by region of residence. As one would suspect, the earlier figure

Figure 2-10. World War II Era Cohort Lifetime Migrants, 1950 to 1970

(native-born males age 20 to 29 in 1945 not currently in the Armed Forces)



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

masks tremendous regional variation in migration. Everywhere except the South, blacks migrated at significantly higher rates than whites of either group; when looked at regionally, black gains to lifetime migration from veteran status appear to disappear—except in the South. Migration gains for veteran status persisted for whites of native-stock parents in all regions except the West. In the South, foreign-stock whites moved more and had a bigger gain to migration from veteran status than elsewhere but this may simply have been a function of the small number of foreign-stock whites in the region. Nevertheless, the South is the one region where foreign-stock whites had both a higher rate of migration than their native-stock counterparts as well as significant gain to veteran status.

In the 25 years following World War II, white and black Americans lived in communities with starkly different settlement histories depending on their region of residence. In the Northeast and Midwest, 68 to 84 percent of black men were from outside the state compared to only 18 to 33 percent of white men. White native- and foreign-stock neighbors shared a more similar lifetime migration experience with one another than they did with blacks. Foreign-stock whites might have had parents from another country but they themselves moved between states at about the same rate as their white neighbors with native-born parents. The large number of black interstate migrants made them a visible group of newly-arrived outsiders.

The patterns in the other two regions are different in their level of migration but produce results that are more homogeneous in their in-migration patterns. While blacks in the West had higher migration rates, they shared this experience with whites because of the region's overall high interstate migration. In the West, only native whites with foreign-born parents show higher rates of migration among veterans. If in the West all groups shared in a common experience of interstate migration, in the South all groups shared in a pattern of relative non-migration. The propensity to live outside the state of birth appears to increase in rate for Southern residents over the time series and veterans here had the most gain for all groups.

Figure 2-11. World War II Era Cohort Lifetime Migrants by Region, 1950 to 1970

(native-born males age 20 to 29 in 1945 not currently in the Armed Forces)



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

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The difference between the gain to veteran status for all groups shown in Figure 2-9 and its relative absence in the regional breakdowns in Figure 2-11 was influenced by three factors: (1) the differences in opportunity available to each group in each region; (2) the migration and military-service patterns of residents of each region, and (3) the timing of migration.

The lifetime-migration rates shown in the previous two figures are convenient for comparison with migration and veteran patterns across the entire census time series. But with the World War II cohort, it is possible to look at migration behavior within a known period of time. Following the massive movements of people during the Dustbowl and the Depression, policy-makers and social scientists sought a way to monitor population movements more closely than was possible with state of birth/state of residence measures. Starting in 1940, questions were added to the census to determine who moved since a recent reference year and, if they moved, where did they move—within the same county, to a different county in the same state, or to another state.

Figures 2-12 and 2-13 show the recent movement and migration history for the World War II cohort. The top panel reports the percentage of each group living in a different house than in the reference year. For 1960 and 1970, the reference was census day five years earlier. For the 1950 census, the reference date would have been in the spring of 1945, when millions of military personnel were still waiting to be mustered out and war production industries had not yet been fully demobilized. This reference date would have given an anomalous picture of voluntary American resettlement. To remedy this, the Census Bureau shifted the reference date to 1949. The result, however, is that for the 1950 census year, the responses represent only one year in which people could move, rather than five.

The top panel of Figure 2-12 shows the percentage of the three subgroups living in a different house. The low figures for 1950 reflect both the one-year period in which movement was measured but also the shortage of housing options available. America entered World War II with a huge pent-up demand for additional housing units. The Depression had reduced the ability of people to move and the war had

Figure 2-12. World War II Era Cohort Recent Movers, 1950 to 1970

(native-born males age 20 to 29 in 1945 not currently in the Armed Forces)



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

severely limited the supply of materials and labor available to the domestic construction industry. By 1960, the construction industry was better able to meet the demand.

In 1950, both white and black native-stock nonveterans had changed houses at about the same rate; foreign-stock nonveterans were about 5 percent less likely to live in a different house. For both white groups, however, veterans moved at a higher rate than nonveterans, while black veterans receive the merest bump in residential change. As the groups aged, black migration surpassed that of whites, and foreign-stock men moved less than native-stock whites. Veteran status for whites with native-born parents continued to give a boost to mobility regardless of the age the veteran moved.

The bottom panel of figure 2-12 shows the percentage of each group that moved within the county. The denominator in all these graphs—the reference group—is all members of the group whether they moved or not. A comparison of the level of each group in the two graphs shows that most people who changed houses stayed within the county. In all years, blacks moved within the county at higher rates than either white group; the gap did not appear to close over the time series. Native-stock whites moved within county at higher rates than those of foreign-stock whites but the gap had almost disappeared by 1970.

Again following the U.S. Census Bureau's definition of internal migrant, the two graphs in Figure 2-13 report the recent migration history for the World War II era cohort. The top panel shows the percentage inter-county (within the same state) moves for each group while the bottom panel shows the percentage who moved between states.

Here the racial pattern was reversed from the previous graph on movers. Except in 1950, blacks moved between counties and between states at lower rates than either white group. The relationship of the two white groups was the same, with native-stock men moving at higher rates than foreign-stock men. Both within state and between states, white veterans consistently migrated at higher rates than their nonveteran counterparts, with significant differences in 1950 and 1960. White veterans with native-born parents were shown to have the highest gain to migration.

Figure 2-13. World War II Era Cohort Recent Migrants, 1950 to 1970

(native-born males age 20 to 29 in 1945 not currently in the Armed Forces)



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

Veteran status had no consistent pattern for black inter-county migration but did give a consistent boost to interstate migration.

As has already been shown with lifetime migration, tremendous regional variation is masked by national numbers. Figure 2-14 shows the regional patterns of within-county moves for the three study groups. Blacks in all years and in all regions had the highest rates of within-county moves; veteran status for blacks had inconsistent influence on local moves. Among whites, foreign-stock veterans showed the highest levels of movement within the county from 1950 on in all regions except the South. In the Midwest, there were too few cases of nonveteran foreign-stock whites in the cohort to report.

Larger regional differences were found in the patterns of the two migration measures than in patterns of intra-county moves. Inter-county migration patterns for the World War II era cohort are reported by region in Figure 2-15. Except in the South, blacks had the lowest rates of migration within the state. Black veterans had higher rates of inter-county migration in all regions except the Midwest. Among whites, foreign-stock men had the largest migration gain from veteran status in all regions except the West.

Figure 2-16 reveals dramatic regional differences in recent interstate migration among the three study populations. In the Midwest, blacks did not show higher interstate migration rates than whites until 1970. Veteran status here did not affect migration in a consistent way for any group. In all other regions, however, white veterans of both nativity groups had higher recent interstate migration than their nonveteran counterparts. There were too few cases of nonveteran blacks in the West in 1950 to report; for all other groups, however, the region showed high migration rates. In the West and in the South, white veterans had significantly higher interstate migration rates than nonveterans.

Figure 2-14. Regional Patterns of World War II Cohort Within-County Moves, 1950 to 1970

(native-born males age 20 to 29 in 1945 not currently in the Armed Forces)



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

Figure 2-15. Regional Patterns of World War II Cohort Inter-County Migration, 1950 to 1970

(native-born males age 20 to 29 in 1945 not currently in the Armed Forces)



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

Figure 2-16. Regional Patterns of World War II Cohort Recent Interstate Migration, 1950 to 1970

(native-born males age 20 to 29 in 1945 not currently in the Armed Forces)



Source: Author’s tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author’s variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

Military Service, Migration and Selection Bias

Migration patterns presented in the preceding figures provide evidence for the hypothesis that in the post-World War II era, veterans were more likely to migrate than nonveterans. In a time of rapid economic change, migration is the means by which the location of employees is most quickly matched to that of new industries and new employers. Migration is selective of youth, education and skill, resources to move, and access to information about opportunities. These traits are all characteristic of the veterans of World War II but it is possible that selection bias, rather than the special status of veteran, explains the differences in migration.

If only the smartest and healthiest young men were selected for military service, then the population of veterans and nonveterans would not be random from the outset. Under this most extreme case of selection bias, the veteran population would contain only those people most likely to migrate—regardless of their veteran status—while the nonveteran population would have only those without migration potential. In this case, variation in the migration outcomes for the two groups should then be attributed solely to their selection for military service. Nothing that happened post-selection—not their armed forces experience and training; not their educational, employment or health benefits; not their special social status—would further affect their propensity to migrate following the war.

Selection bias almost never exists in the extreme case just described. Doubtless there was some selection bias operating; this was, after all, a war fought with soldiers who were drafted as well as those who volunteered for military service. The "draft"—the unofficial name for the Selective Service—was responsible for the enlistment of two-thirds of the military personnel who served in World War II. By definition, the Selective Service Act of 1940 was "selective" of those who met certain criteria, including age and health characteristics.

However, there are several reasons why the workings of the Selective Service program may have resulted in minimal selection bias vis-à-vis interstate migration. First, the Selective Service system was designed to draw the entire labor supply of the country under the control of the War Manpower Commission. War production workers were as critical as soldiers and not all manpower could be replaced by women and old men. Skills and training readiness were important in these workers as well as in the military recruits. Those in critical war industries, as defined by the War Manpower Commission, were exempted from military service. Second, many young men did not serve in the military because they were disqualified for health reasons which kept them from being soldiers but not from being interstate migrants. Flat feet, heart murmurs, a limp or bad eyes kept people from the armed forces but did not necessarily keep them from looking for opportunity in another state. Finally, throughout World War II, the Selective Service Act was administered locally by more than 6,400 draft boards. In such a decentralized system, selections were surely influenced by local customs, local social hierarchies, and local racial and ethnic prejudices. As with the earliest mustering requirements for the American Revolution and the Civil War, numbers of troops and workers were specified but not who would make up the rosters.

There are two areas in which it is most likely that selection bias operated but not necessarily to privilege enlistees over non-enlistees. First, since food production was critical for both domestic and military need, farmers were included in the list of exempt occupations and it was easier for young men on farms to claim need. However, all else equal, farmers are less likely to migrate than non-farmers; but since a young farmer could join the military, the direction of bias is unclear. Secondly, as with women, military service for blacks was targeted to a specified quota of their proportion in the population. If those black men who served were the most able of the population, selection bias would operate as expected. However, a strong case can be made that bias also could have worked in the opposite direction. It is possible that the most skilled and best educated blacks with access to national employment networks through black organizations such as the National Organization for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), could have responded to the desegregation of war production jobs and won an exemption from military service.

Testing the Significance of Veteran Status on the Probability of Migration

Although it is impossible to eliminate selection bias, it is possible to isolate the impact of veteran status on migration by controlling for individual characteristics that influence migration. Although descriptive in nature, the previous graphs of different rates of migration and veteran status have been a basic way of controlling for the influence of race and nativity on these behaviors. However, the graphs do not capture other important demographic differences among the three groups across time, such as marital status and relative proportion of the groups in the overall population. As migration theory has shown, different individual and household characteristics also influence a person's probability of being an internal migrant. But the graphs are already complex and it would be difficult visually to keep track of any additional factors.

Regression analysis is one statistical tool used to control for the influence of several independent variables that act simultaneously on one outcome variable. The model of migration underlying explanations for historic migration patterns like those in Figures 2-1 and 2-4 is essentially a human-capital investment model. In this framework, migration—like education and training—is considered an investment in human capital with the personal and social benefits accruing over the individual's entire working lifetime. The decision to migrate hinges on an evaluation of the net lifetime gains relative to costs expected from moving or staying put. Human-capital analysis emphasizes income-generating characteristics of the individual, particularly age, education and skill, or occupational level. It is especially important to control for these characteristics when measuring the role of veteran status since these could have been acquired or enhanced both through military service and subsequent use of educational veterans benefits. Demographic characteristics—race, nativity, age, sex, and marital status—have also been identified as influencing the decision to migrate.

To isolate the contribution of veteran status on migration behavior, other demographic and human capital characteristics known to be determinants of migration were included in a logistic regression of native born migrant behavior. Two analyses were conducted. In the first regression the *dependent variable* is "lifetime migrant," calculated as the probability that a person will reside outside their state of birth in a given census year relative to the probability that an individual in the reference group will reside outside his state of birth. The advantage of the lifetime-migration measure is that it can be calculated for the entire time series, allowing the results of one year to be compared with other historical research. The disadvantage of the lifetime measure is that it is not possible to know whether the individuals under study moved themselves or were simply part of a family migration as children. To address this question, a second regression analysis included "recent interstate migration" as the *dependent variable* and used data from the previous residence questions added to the census since 1940.

The independent variables in the both models were *personal characteristics* identified in the literature to be determinants of migration. Because the purpose of the regression was to identify the differential impact of veteran status on three race/nativity subpopulations, the regression was run on each population separately; this made it unnecessary to include race and parental birthplace as independent variables. Similarly, sex was not included as an independent variable since the study was limited to males. The remaining characteristics included as *independent variables* are:

- VETERAN STATUS: two categories: no (reference), yes
- BIRTH REGION (constructed from state of birth): four categories[14]
    - Northeast (reference), Midwest, South, West
    - Geographic control for the variation in ease of migrating out of some states; e.g., Rhode Island is very small with relatively high density while Texas is very large and has relatively low density even in urban areas
    - Geographic control for variation in distributions of white native stock, white foreign stock, and black subpopulations
- EDUCATION: three categories
    - Elementary or less (reference)
    - Secondary
    - College

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[14] Alaska and Hawaii were excluded from the study. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods.

- OCCUPATION: five categories
    - Laborers
    - Mechanics
    - Clerical
    - Managerial
    - Professional
    - All other occupations (reference)
    - The categories were selected to capture occupations for which (1) military service provided training and experience while a soldier (mechanics); (2) veteran benefits provided formal education (professional); or (3) veteran preference gave competitive advantage over nonveterans (clerical and managerial).
    - Occupation also serves as a control for differences in the ability to finance transportation and moving expenses.
- HOUSEHOLD HEAD: two categories: no (reference), yes
- MARITAL STATUS[15]: two categories: not married (reference), married
- CHILDREN: two categories: none (reference), one or more
- AGE (in 1960): two categories
    - 35 to 39 (reference)
    - 30 to 44
    - Limiting the study group to those who were 20 to 29 at the end of the war provides some control on age features. Some additional control is necessary for differential time spent at risk for years of experience. The use of two five year age groups does this without introducing spurious significance introduced by the linear relationship of age in single years.

All variables in the regression are categorical and were set in the regression as individual dummy variables with values of 1 if the condition exists for that case and 0 if it was absent. The reference group for interpretation of results of the binary logistic regression possessed those characteristics *least predictive* of the behavior measured—in this case, interstate migration. The reference group for these two models, then, was men who:

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[15] Since this variable is intended to capture possible limitations to an individual's decision to migrate, only those who were married with a spouse present are coded "yes."

- were not veterans
- were living in the Northeast
- had an elementary education or less
- were included in "other occupations"
- were not head of household
- were not married with spouse present
- had no children, and
- were age 35 to 39 in 1960.

Sample data from the census of 1960 were used for the regression analyses for two reasons. First, the 1950 census has two serious weaknesses for this analysis. It measured recent migration over the previous one year rather than the standard five. This reduced the number of moves captured in the 1950 data and complicated analysis of this variable over the time series. In addition, the question on veteran status—the critical variable—was asked of a smaller subset of the adult male population than other questions. This further reduced the number of cases available in any analysis including veteran status. In 1960, however, the veteran question was asked of a larger proportion of the adult male population. Second, when the 1970 census was conducted, the study population was 45 to 54 years old and outside the peak migration ages. In 1960, however, these men were 35 to 44 years of age—one of the two age groups shown to generate the largest share of lifetime migration.

Figure 2-17 shows the changing age pattern of lifetime migration from 1900 to 1970. It reports the same information as the earlier 10-year age group migration graph (Figure 2-4) but tracks the changes by age group. This allows a clearer picture of importance of youth migration from 1950 onward. The first observation is that age patterns of migration were quite different for blacks and for whites. In the first half of the twentieth century, white interstate-migration continued in the later years of life, especially for those with foreign-born parents. From 1940 through 1970, migration past age 40 had slowed considerably. For native-stock whites, lifetime migration in 1900 for those age 60 to 69 was 46 percent, an increase of more than 10 percent over those age 30 to 39. Lifetime migration for the older group dropped to 38 percent in 1940, edging up gradually to just over 40 percent in 1970. However, in 1970 lifetime migration of the 30-39 year olds was itself approaching 40 percent, indicating the shift

Figure 2-17. Age Pattern of Migration in 10-year Groups, 1900 to 1970

(native born males)



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

to more migration at younger ages. For foreign stock whites, the same pattern applied but with a more dramatic drop in older age migration through the century and a lower migration saturation age than their native stock counterparts.

For blacks, the age patterns show the same reduction in older age migration from 1900 to 1930, although the 1900 high was considerably lower than for either group of whites. However, migration of those over 20 rose earlier than whites and continued to increase through 1970.

The salient feature of the graph for this regression analysis is its confirmation that after World War II, interstate migration for all three study groups had peaked at about age 40. Conveniently, the World War II cohort of interest was age 35 to 44 in 1960, with an average age of 40.

Results for the binary logistic regressions on the probability of living outside of the state of birth are shown as odds ratios in Table 2-1. Since the interpretation of logistic coefficients is not intuitive, results are usually displayed as odds ratios.[16] Only the odds ratios are shown here. The means, standard deviations, and number of cases for means testing of lifetime migration and the independent variables are shown in Appendix Tables A-6 to A-8.

Holding other key characteristics constant, white native-stock veterans were 33 percent more likely to be living outside their state of birth than their nonveteran counterparts. Veteran status was similarly important to black lifetime migration, with a 36 percent increase in probability of migration for black veterans than nonveterans. Foreign-stock whites appeared not to get a boost in lifetime migration from veteran status. However, foreign-stock whites had more gain from college education and higher ranked occupations than whites with native-born parents; thus, it is possible that the bulk of the benefit of veteran status were captured by education and occupation measures. For black veterans, among the non-laboring occupations only the clerical managers category was statistically significant, no doubt due to the low

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[16] An odds ratio of 1 is interpreted to mean that, controlling for all other characteristics, there is no difference in the odds of a person with this characteristic being a migrant than there is for someone in the reference group. A value of .5 means that half the time the behavior will be the same. Values above 1 are read as the "percent more likely" that a person will be a migrant than someone in the reference group.

Table 2-1. Probability of Living Outside State of Birth in 1960

(native-born males age 20 to 29 in 1945)

	White Native Born Parents		White Foreign Born Parents		Black Native Born Parents	
Veteran Status						
Not a veteran (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00	
Veteran	1.33	***	1.05		1.36	***
Birth Region						
Northeast (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00	
Midwest	1.37	***	1.20	***	1.63	***
South	1.55	***	1.77	***	4.12	***
West	1.43	***	1.00		1.48	
Education						
Elementary or less (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00	
Secondary	1.19	***	1.04		1.55	***
College	1.91	***	1.67	***	1.81	***
Occupation						
Other (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00	
Laborers	1.10	**	0.89		0.77	***
Mechanics	1.25	***	1.12	*	1.12	
Clerical	1.02		1.08		1.39	**
Managers	1.29	***	1.32	***	1.34	*
Professional	1.47	***	1.52	***	0.84	
Household head						
Not household head (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00	
Household head	2.23	***	2.33	***	1.51	***
Marital Status						
Not married (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00	
Married	0.86	***	0.94		0.97	
Children						
No children (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00	
One or more children	0.77	***	0.82	***	0.64	***
Age Group						
35 to 39 (reference	1.00		1.00		1.00	
40 to 44	1.10	***	1.14	***	1.12	**
Constant	0.14	***	0.14	***	0.17	***
Nagelkerke R-squared	0.052		0.047		0.079	
Number of Cases	69,478		24,044		9,076	

Significance level: * indicates $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

Table 2-2. Probability of Interstate Migration between 1955 and 1960

(native-born males age 20 to 29 in 1945)

	White Native Born Parents		White Foreign Born Parents		Black Native Born Parents	
Veteran Status						
Not a veteran (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00	
Veteran	1.31	***	1.03		1.13	
Birth Region						
Northeast (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00	
Midwest	1.09	**	1.14	**	0.60	
South	1.26	***	1.34	***	1.06	
West	1.14	**	0.94		1.08	
Education						
Elementary or less (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00	
Secondary	1.10	*	1.16	*	1.21	
College	1.98	***	2.45	***	1.32	
Occupation						
Other (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00	
Laborers	1.10		0.96		1.27	*
Mechanics	1.10	**	1.05		0.98	
Clerical	0.91		1.02		1.16	
Managers	1.43	***	1.69	***	1.19	
Professional	1.47	***	1.79	***	2.79	***
Marital Status						
Not married (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00	
Married	0.94		1.26	**	0.89	
Children						
No children (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00	
One or more children	0.78	***	0.77	***	0.67	**
Age Group						
35 to 39 (reference	1.00		1.00		1.00	
40 to 44	0.83	***	0.84	***	0.74	**
Constant	0.07	***	0.04	***	0.05	***
Nagelkerke R-squared	0.036		0.051		0.024	
Number of Cases	69,027		23,913		8,989	

Significance level: * indicates $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

number of cases in these occupations. For those who did hold these occupations, however, the boost to migration was slightly higher than for either white group. The other significant finding for blacks in this table was birth region. All else equal, blacks in this World War II age cohort who were born in the South were four times more likely to live outside their state of birth than blacks born in the Northeast.

Regression results for recent interstate migration between 1955 and 1960, shown in Table 2-2, show a slightly different picture. Whites with native-born parents were the only group for which veteran status increased the probability of living in a different state. The probability of migration for foreign-stock white veterans remained insignificant. For blacks, veteran status no longer had an effect. The only variable to show power and significance in influencing black interstate migration was the professional occupation category. College education failed in significance because of low case counts. The picture for foreign-stock whites was similar. Recent migration was heavily increased by boosts in education and occupational rank.

Summary of Findings:

Analysis of native born adult males in sample census data from 1900 to 1970 has shown that:

- WHITE LIFETIME MIGRATION: In 1900, whites with foreign-born parents had slightly higher lifetime migration rates than whites with native-born parents; the rate for both groups for those aged 50 to 59 was about 42 percent. After 1900, however, foreign-stock whites experienced a faster rate of decline in interstate migration than native-stock whites. The decline in lifetime migration was also found to continue for a decade longer for foreign-stock whites and to reach a lower level before starting back upward in 1950. While native-stock white migration appeared to have leveled off in 1970, foreign-stock white migration remained on the rise.
- BLACK LIFETIME MIGRATION: Despite the lags and level, the overall shape of the migration pattern for the two white groups was similar and contrasted sharply with that for blacks. Black lifetime-interstate migration

started at a lower point in 1900 than either white group. However, black migration began to move upward in 1910 and accelerated in 1930—a decade before native-stock whites and twenty years before those with foreign-born parents. Black migration leveled off in 1960 at a level 10 percent above whites with native-born parents and 16 percent above foreign-stock whites.

- RECENT MIGRATION: The picture for recent interstate migration was quite different. For those age 25 and over not in the armed forces, blacks *moved* in the previous five years at higher rates than whites; however, black within-county moves were also higher than for either white group. After World War II, black *migration* was significantly lower than that of either white group—both for inter-county and interstate migration.
- VETERAN PARTICIPATION: Whites over age 25 with foreign-born parents were found to have roughly the same proportion of veterans as those with native- born parents. Although participation by blacks in military service during World War II was capped, the black-veteran share rose at roughly the same proportion as whites.
- AGE SELECTIVITY: The age-selectivity of military service and migration were shown to coincide, with highest migration and veteran percentages in the 25 to 34 year old group, followed by those aged 35 to 44. In addition, by the middle of the twentieth century, age patterns of migration had shifted. Older-age migration was waning and younger migration—including that of young children—was contributing more to overall lifetime migration. Although the levels of interstate migration differed for the three study groups, most people who were likely to move from their state of birth did so by age 40.
- CIVIL WAR ERA LIFETIME MIGRATION: Among those men age 65 to 84 in 1910 (age 20 to 39 at the end of the Civil War), veterans were found to have significantly higher rates of lifetime migration than nonveterans for all three study populations. Black veterans had the largest gain to migration from veteran status of the three groups. Foreign-stock whites had highest overall veteran status gain to migration; nonveterans from this group had higher

lifetime migration rates than either group of native-stock whites. However, this may be an artifact of the relatively small number of cases in this group compared to native-stock whites and blacks.

- WORLD WAR I ERA LIFETIME MIGRATION: Among those who were age 20 to 39 in 1918 at the close of World War I, veterans of all three study groups had higher rates of lifetime migration for veterans than for nonveterans. Foreign stock whites lagged behind native stock whites by 8 to 10 percentage points for the entire period 1930 to 1970 and revealed a smaller migration gain to veteran status than those with native-born parents. Matching the overall lifetime migration patterns, black interstate migration started the period at higher rates than native-stock whites and showed an early and large gain to veteran status.
- WORLD WAR II ERA LIFETIME MIGRATION: Among those who aged 20 to 29 at the close of World War II, the relative levels of lifetime migration mirrored those of the 50 to 59 year olds: blacks moved at significantly higher rates than either group of whites; native-stock whites moved at slightly higher rates than those with foreign-born parents. All three veteran groups of this young cohort had higher lifetime migration rates than nonveterans. Although the gain was positive in some years, blacks showed the largest early gain while native-stock whites had the largest gain in 1970. Veterans with foreign-born parents had no migration gain in 1950 and very small gains thereafter.
- WORLD WAR II ERA REGIONAL PATTERNS TO LIFETIME MIGRATION: Veteran gains to lifetime migration shifted considerably when analyzed on the regional level. For native-stock whites, veteran gains persisted in all regions but were of most consequence in the Midwest and the South. For foreign-stock whites, there were significant gains to migration in the South and only very slight gains to veteran status in the West. For blacks, veteran gains to lifetime-migration status virtually disappeared at the regional level; only in the South did veterans show larger migration rates than nonveterans. In the Northeast and the Midwest, blacks overall were 2 to 2-1/2 times as likely to be

living outside their state of birth as either white group. In the West, migration rates were highest for blacks but generally high for all three groups. In the South, migration rates were generally low for all groups and lowest for blacks.

- WORLD WAR II ERA RECENT MIGRATION: Among those age 20 to 29 in 1945, veterans of all three groups were more likely to live in a different house and more likely to move within the same county as their nonveteran counterparts. Blacks were more likely to move within the same county than whites of either group. Among those who migrated between counties in the same state, both white groups showed a gain to migration from veteran status in all three periods; blacks had less inter-county migration than whites and showed no gain from veteran status until 1970. Black veterans did show more interstate migration in all three periods than nonveterans but the gain was significantly less than for either white group. Overall black interstate migration was less than for either white group. Foreign-stock whites showed lower rates of interstate migration throughout the period. The gap was closing for nonveterans but remained high for veterans, with white native-stock veterans showing dramatically higher rates of interstate migration than other groups.
- WORLD WAR II ERA REGIONAL PATTERNS TO RECENT MIGRATION: Regional analysis of recent migration for this cohort showed a striking difference in the distribution of migrants and regional differences in the gains to migration from veteran status. However, overall the gain was to whites with native-born parents; with but one exception, native-stock whites consistently had gains to migration from veteran status—regardless of region, age at migration or type of migration. Whites with foreign-born parents generally showed gains to migration from veteran status but not as uniformly as those of native-stock men. For blacks, veteran status did not appear to play a consistent role in migration.
- REGRESSION RESULTS, WORLD WAR II ERA LIFETIME MIGRATION: Results of binary logistic regression to isolate the influence of veteran status on *lifetime migration* for each study group showed that, all else held equal, white

veterans with native-born parents were 33 percent more likely to live outside their birth state than nonveterans. White veterans with foreign-born parents were *not* more likely than nonveterans to be lifetime migrants. Black veterans were 36 percent more likely to live outside birth state than nonveterans.

- REGRESSION RESULTS, WORLD WAR II ERA RECENT INTERSTATE MIGRATION: Binary logistic regression using the same independent variables but changing the dependent variable to *recent interstate migration* were also run for each study group. Results for whites stayed essentially the same: native-stock veterans were found to be 31 percent more likely to migrate between states than nonveterans; foreign-stock veterans showed no increase in their probability to migrate. The influence of veteran status on migration for blacks was no longer statistically significant.

The influence of veteran status has been shown to be a consistent positive influence on migration for whites with native born parents regardless of the type of migration measured, the age of the migration, or the region of residence. With regression analysis, veteran status persists as a positive selector of migration even when controlling for other characteristics theory and literature suggest could otherwise capture the influence of human capital benefits from the G.I. Bill. Veteran influence for blacks and whites with foreign-born parents is less clear, varying by type of migration and region of residence. In the descriptive statistics, foreign-stock veterans generally showed more gain to migration than nonveterans; this gain virtually disappeared in the regression analysis, though it may have been captured by education and occupation variables. For black veterans, the descriptive graphs showed generally showing less gain to veteran status, a finding that was generally supported by the two regression analyses.

What—other than bias in the selection of persons into the veteran pool—would account for the persistent boost to the probability of migration shown to derive from veteran status? The answer may lie in the redefinition of the meaning of veteran identity constructed between the two World Wars.

Chapter 3.

Military Service, Veterans' Organizations and the Construction of White Veteran Privilege

The United States military services constitute one of the oldest institutions in the nation. The history of military service and our treatment of veterans over time reveal the process by which Americans came to see themselves as part of this new political organization called a nation. From our infancy, the American military—however diversely it was configured at the moment—was the visible embodiment of the group of people organized into the United States of America. As Joseph Ellis explains, George Washington understood that throughout the Revolutionary War, the army *was* the nation—the only physical embodiment of the nascent republic. The Continental Army was at once the symbol and the reality of the independent nation.

> If it remained intact as an effective fighting force, the American Revolution remained alive. The British army could occupy Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, and it did. The British navy could blockade and bombard American seaports with impunity, and it did. The Continental Congress could be driven from one location to another like a covey of pigeons, and it was. But as long as Washington held the Continental Army together, the British could not win the war, which in turn meant they that would eventually lose it.[1]

The army's role in the war for independence was critical to the country's strategic purposes but it also crucial to building a national identity—in both direct and indirect ways. Civilian soldiers of the local militias and the Continental Army were the first group of ordinary Americans to have a context for extending citizenship claims from their local community to a nation. Service in the Revolutionary War gave ordinary Americans their first notion of a shared community of interests beyond their county boundary. As the realistic and practical Washington understood, without shared interest, the experiment in self-governance could not survive.

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[1] Joseph J. Ellis, *Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000, p. 130-131.

War itself, by putting one people in opposition to another in competition for resources, territory or ideology, challenges assumptions about who a people are. The process of war, like that of migration, changes both sides: those who stay and those who leave, the places left and the places sought.

In the history of military service in America, we can see for each period the outlines of whom the contemporary society thought worthy of full membership in the society. We can also see the conflicts over sharing this national identity with people who are different and who do *not* share citizenship in our local communities. We see how the obligations of competing social roles are reconciled with outcomes that are not even for all participants. Over time, military service changed in character and shifted its center from local communities to colonies and states, to regional social structures, and—finally—to a national system. Each shift reveals the nature of the process by which ordinary Americans came to understand membership in communities beyond their home locale. This can be read in the patterns of recruitment and service experienced during war and the benefits society was willing to bestow on those who had served but were unwilling to extend to others within society.

Local Defense, Community Militia, Citizen Obligation

Defense was largely a local matter prior to the Revolution, with militia units drawn from towns and countryside representing a cross-section of the population. The community-based nature of defense personnel was the outgrowth of colonial status. In theory, defense of the colony was the obligation of the British Crown and the colonial government; in reality, however, communities in each colony could rely only on their local militias for defense from Indian attacks. British troops were most likely to appear when the wars of feuding European nations spilled over onto North American territories.

Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski describe the colonial origins of the American military tradition in *For the Common Defense*.[2] It was an accepted fact of early American life that all able-bodied male members of the community of the appropriate age—ranging from 16 to 60—were obliged to muster for the local militia. Each colony exempted from service those community members with certain occupations deemed critical to the community. Those not considered members of the community—such as vagrants, newcomers, and often blacks—were excluded from the obligation to serve, though they service might be purchased in time of need. When attacks from native tribes threatened, mustering out and training days were convened with regular frequency and all were expected to participate. As Indian attacks became less frequent, so, too, did the training.

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[2] Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski. *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America*, Revised and Expanded. New York: The Free Press, a Division of Macmillan, Inc., 1994.

Certain characteristics of organization were fairly standard across the colonies. Most important was the basic understanding that militia service was grounded in a contractual agreement. In matters of local defense, it was implicit that once the immediate threat had passed, militiamen would return home and resume their other obligations. Militiamen understood that this primary contract obligation was *local* defense. As Whisker suggests, they insisted that no government could *oblige* them to serve beyond their local colony; few served beyond their region.[3] At the local level, the choice of who would answer these calls was always "selective." Of those obliged to serve, the community selected the men who were most fit to fight but also most able to be spared from obligations on the home front. Recruitment became more difficult the longer a war lasted or the farther from home it was waged. When communities could no longer agree on who would meet the call, various schemes of lottery and draft were used to ensure the fair distribution of the service obligation.

These first, early recruitment-by-lottery schemes were confined to local and state governments and were used when communities found it difficult to fill their enlistment quotas. The basic nature of the draft roll—the "enrolling" of everyone in the community obliged to serve—along with any constraints on the ability or feasibility of that person's providing service—persisted into the modern draft language**.**

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[3] James Whisker, *Rise and Decline of the American Militia System* (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1999); on p. 99, Whisker references *The Colonial Laws of Massachusetts Reprinted from the Edition of 1660, with Supplements to 1672, Containing also the Body of Liberties of 1641*, ed. W. H. Whitmore, Boston, State of Mass., c. 1860, p. 35, as the earliest legal reference to the boundaries of militia obligation.

The contractual nature of militia service is in contrast to the standard method of building the British Army, where conscription for life was common. Military service in Great Britain was an occupational niche, either imposed by class or conscription. In the colonies, militia service was an obligation of community membership, the natural consequence of full membership in the group. Kettner suggests that although Americans' understanding of citizenship and identity were not yet fully formed in this period, the process was built on a shared understanding that loyalty and obligation were matters of choice on the part of the free individual.[4] The experience of loyalty and obligation is contested by different groups even at the local level since North America even at that time was more demographically diverse than England. As Smith describes, an array of peoples occupied the colonies in overlapping territories: three broad cultural groups of Native Americans; Dutch, Danish, Norwegian, Swedish and British colonists; Dutch Jews escaping from Brazil after the Portuguese victory, German Mennonites and Protestants, French Huguenots; Irish, Welsh and Scottish émigrés, both free and indentured; and—slaves from Africa.[5] Of all these peoples, the two groups whose history of laws and obligations were least recognized or understood were Native Americans and African slaves. Identity was an easier concept to maintain hold of when the public sphere was confined to the local community.

Race and Ethnicity in the Early History of American Military Service

The local sense of identity carried over from the colonial past was transformed in the American Revolution into a construction of racial and gender identity that would be used to marginalize outsiders. Gregory Knouff shows the origins of this process in his social history of the Revolutionary War experience of Pennsylvania's local militia. The "localist white male nation" that existed prior to the war meant that American militiamen's notion of "community" were "complex interstices of class, regional, racial, ethnic, religious and gender identities."[6] Property-holding alone would no longer be sufficient for citizenship in a community. The question of who would defend the community and the new nation became bound up in the larger question of who was and who was not fit for citizenship in a white, male nation.

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[4] James H. Kettner, *The Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williams, VA, 1978.

[5] Rogers M. Smith, *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997).

Military service and veteran benefits flow from, as well as enhance, the identity of individual soldiers as citizens of their communities. Even before the existence of the United States as a nation, citizenship both required obligations as well as granted rights and privileges to those who could claim the status. Military service has always been seen as one of these obligations. The opposite logic has also been applied: those who are not required to fulfill the obligations of citizenship are less than full citizens. Full citizens of a community are required to care for themselves and contribute to the maintenance of the welfare of those members of their community who cannot care for themselves. Community mores and laws were in place to ensure that members of the community did all they could to meet these dual obligations.

Immigrants and blacks have a long history of using military service as a ladder to citizenship. By serving in the military and defending a community, they hoped to be proven worthy of citizenship by demonstrating that they could be trusted to fulfill the obligations of citizens. Reports of citizens purchasing a "substitute" who would fulfill the buyer's military service obligation often overlook the important role this played in moving individuals from outside the community into citizenship status.[7]

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[6] Gregory T. Knouff, *The Soldiers' Revolution: Pennsylvanians in Arms and the Forging of Early American Identity*, University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004, quote p. xiii-xiv.

[7] For complementary views on obligation and the early development of citizenship in America, see Linda K. Kerber, *No Constitutional Right to be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1998; Rogers M. Smith, *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997; and James H. Kettner, *The Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williams, VA, 1978. For specific application of these concepts to military service in the American Revolution, see Gregory T. Knouff, *The Soldiers' Revolution: Pennsylvanians in Arms and the Forging of Early American Identity,* University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004.

Many of those without standing in the majority communities—immigrant and black men alike—served in the national branches of service and wore the colors if not the full uniform of the national military. When they enlisted, immigrants continued to serve with native-born white units. Blacks, however, seldom served in integrated units after the Revolutionary War, and were strictly segregated in the Civil War. Status boundaries were more permeable to immigrants but both groups consciously saw military service as a way to claim citizenship in the broader community following the war.

If the army was the nation, it would be a white men's nation. In 1775, Washington was strongly opposed to the enlistment of blacks, either free or slave, into the Continental Army. According to Greene and others, this failure to admit black troops almost cost the Patriots the war. The British saw blacks as possible leverage in the war and accepted runaways into their service. In 1775, Lord Dunsmore issued a proclamation inviting blacks to join the British troops in return for their freedom. With enlistments down, Washington reversed his position on black military service and wrote to Congress asking them to allow the enlistment of free blacks.[8]

Two clauses of the black-slave military service law indicate their status in the larger society. Since a slave was considered property, the law stipulated that the owner would be reimbursed for the loss of the slave's services. Secondly, since he was not considered part of the local community—and thus entitled to care—the state government agreed to provide for him should he become sick or disabled. While the black soldier would be freed after the war, it would be difficult for him to overcome these social legacies.

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[8] For the most recent assessment of black participation in the military and ideological struggle of the American Revolution, see Gary B. Nash, *The Forgotten Fifth: African Americans in the Age of Revolution*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press [published as part of The Nathan I. Huggins Lectures], 2006. Histories of black military service in America predate the Civil War, and were an active part of the discourse on the role of military service to citizenship claims in the black community. Black abolitionist William Cooper Nell wrote two of these histories in the 1850s: *Services of Colored Americans in the Wars of 1776 and 1812*, published in 1851; and, *Colored Patriots of the American Revolution, With Sketches of Several Distinguished Colored Persons: To Which is Added a Brief Survey of the Condition and Prospects of Colored Americans, 1855*. During the Civil War, Nell excerpted many of these stories in the abolitionist newspaper, *The Liberator.* Other treatments of black military histories have appeared on the eve of major military or political engagements. See, for example, W. B. Hartgrove, "The Negro Soldier in the American Revolution, *The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 1*, No. 2 (April 1916), pp. 110-131; L. P. Jackson, "Virginia Negro Soldiers and Seamen in the American Revolution," *The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 27,* No. 3 (July 1942), pp. 247-287; Benjamin Quarles, *The Negro in the American Revolution*, Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, VA; Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1961. In 1984, two hundred years after the Revolutionary War ended, Robert Ewell Greene wrote *Black Courage, 1775-1783: Documentation of Black Participation in the American Revolution,* which was published in Washington DC by the National Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution—an acknowledgement by one of America's most conservative organizations that blacks, too, could rightfully ay claim to original American citizenship.

In all colonies, states responded to the need for more troops by grudgingly allowing blacks to serve—if not officially. In the state of Virginia, it was illegal to enlist slaves in the fight. However, the Virginia law of 1783 gave all blacks who had served in the "late war" their freedom. Since only blacks already free were legally eligible for service, Peter Maslowski suggests the law was tacit acknowledgement that black slaves were serving in the Patriot cause.[9] Walker's explanation of the law's origin is that too many masters had gone back on their promise to free their slaves who served and war veterans were petitioning the Virginia legislature.[10]

Early Veteran Benefits and Community Status

Many veteran benefits are contingencies protecting the soldier's family against economic hardship if he should be killed or disabled in military service. These benefits can also be seen as relieving financial strain on local communities. For most of America's history, the obligation for providing assistance to the poor was vested in the local community where people resided—and, thus, the location of their citizenship status. Laws against idleness or vagrancy reflected moral values, to be sure, but they also were a practical way for the community to ensure itself against the expense associated with care for the poor and sick within their ranks. Veteran pensions to disabled soldiers or their widows and children relieved the veteran's home community from the financial responsibility of maintaining sick or destitute veterans.

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[9] Peter Maslowski, "National Policy Toward the Use of Black Troops in the Revolution," in Paul Finkelman, ed. *Slavery, Revolutionary America, and the New Nation*, New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc. 1989, Vol. 4, Articles on American Slavery, pp. 379-395.

[10] James W. St. George Walker. Walker is one of several scholars who analyze the choices and outcomes for blacks—slave and free—who opted to fight on the size of the British. He suggests that the growing body of research on black Loyalists confounds what had been a straight-forward assertion by liberal scholars that blacks only motive for fighting in the American Revolution was for freedom and / or citizenship in an independent American nation. For assessments of black Lloyalist settlements in Canada, see Harvey Amani Whitfield, *Blacks on the Border: The Black Refugees of British North America, 1815-1860*, Burlington, VT: University of Vermont Press, 2006. For the later settlements of blacks who followed them, see Sharon A. Roger Hepburn. *Crossing the Border: A Free Black Community in Canada*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007.

It is important to understand the relationship between the fighting soldier and his local community, for it was lodged in a nest of interwoven social obligations and citizenship claims. Early military benefits directly addressed this system of mutual obligation of citizen and community, providing assurance to those who would answer the call for common defense that their other obligations—to provide for their own care and that of their families—would still be met if they were disabled. Maintenance of social status was imbedded in this bargain. Communities were responsible for everyone they admitted to group membership but individuals were obliged to work to provide for themselves lest they be an undue burden on the rest of society. Vagrancy laws were meant to ensure that those in the community take up suitable work if they are able and to provide legal recourse to prevent migrants who could not find work from settling permanently. Migrants were part of a broad category of "others"—people outside the community. Although they might be willing to serve in a local militiaman's place, they were under no obligation to aid in common defense or fulfill any other obligation expected of citizens. With no obligation to serve, the community in turn had no obligation to come to the aid of outsiders in their time of need. Local mores protected the disabled from starvation but one's status in the community was lowered if a person could not meet his obligation to work and kin could not provide.

To be disabled by military service and have to fall back on community poor relief for support would entail a fall in status for the prospective recruit. While pension benefits might be paid by the local community, as many of these early programs were, the payment would not carry with it the same loss of status that accompanied the descent to ordinary pauperism. The right to an official pension for injury in defense of the community was the vehicle for maintaining one's status.

Through the first half of the nineteenth century, the veteran pension system was contested in Congress by various groups of servicemen and their families. These contests shifted with the politics of the particular war and service period, as well as with the expanding territory of the nation. But the general structure remained the same. These national veteran benefit programs were democratized and expanded at a rate roughly parallel to the extension of the franchise.

While it is easy to see purely political motives in this parallel movement—which there undoubtedly were—it is also true that the relationship between obligation and entitlement was the way in which citizens of this era understood social roles. Benefits did not come first; they came as a reward for obligations properly met. The benefits to widows and orphans can be seen through this same lens. The addition of a new social role with its incumbent obligations does not absolve one of previous role obligations. Soldiers and seamen had obligations to their dependents. Through the colonial era and the Revolutionary War, putting obligation to community over obligation to family with militia service invoked the mutual obligation of the community to care for the soldier's family in case of death or disability.

Over time, Americans' experience with the implicit obligation/community-responsibility contract among members of a local community was logically extended to a similar relationship with the broader national community. Petitions to Congress for pensions became commonplace in the midst of the economic recession that followed the end of the War of 1812. Where veterans might have sought help from their local communities, many of these communities were, themselves, too stressed to provide much assistance. In a time of generalized local need, veterans were the only members of the national community who could make a claim for assistance against the national government.

Laura Jensen traces the political development of the pension and land-warrant benefits for Revolutionary War veterans and argues that these programs became a convenient way for an emerging national government to use entitlements to build a national political constituency.[11] She makes a persuasive argument that the beginning of the national American social welfare system predates Civil War Pension programs.[12] While this is an important contribution, Jensen bypasses the more important difference between the Revolutionary and Civil War pensions, which is the race-inclusive but transitory nature of the citizenship claims on which these first entitlements were made. The origins of the United States military pension programs were in the mutual contractual obligation of military service in the British colonial past. Blacks used their participation in military service to claim freedom in a white society. The service of blacks, both free and slave, was needed and generally rewarded. Slaves were freed; pensions and land warrants were claimed and granted, often with the assistance of the white soldiers and officers with whom blacks served. Like native-born and immigrant white soldiers, blacks had participated in the "common defense" at a national level. They had a claim on this new national citizenship.

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[11] Laura Jensen, *Patriots, Settlers, and the Origins of American Social Policy*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

[12] The classic work around which all later arguments center is Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States*, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press

But this claim was not to last. By 1792, blacks were again prohibited by law from serving in the military. Over the next thirty years, civic and political gains made by free blacks over the previous years would be eroded by local and state laws while the national government stood by. Blacks who served in the Patriot armed forces during the American Revolution shared with whites in a common experience and a common claim to national citizenship. They often served side by side in integrated units—a condition that would not generally be repeated until the Korean conflict. The American Revolution presented an opportunity for the country to use the shared military experience to incorporate racial pluralism in its national identity. It was a path the country chose not to take.

Nineteenth Century Military Service, Migration and National Expansion

As new territories were added and settlement moved farther west, American military forts provided protection for settlers and trappers, a place for trading goods and forming wagon trains farther west, and an identity as part of a nation—albeit one still centered on the east coast. The presence of the military posts on the American frontier was important to the national government as a warning to would-be

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of Harvard University Press, 1992; see also Skocpol, "America's First Social Security System: The Expansion of Benefits for Civil War Veterans," *Political Science Quarterly 108* (1993), 86-116.

encroachers from Europe and elsewhere. The United States was a nation and had an army to prove it. The military was a part of the country's identity as a nation, especially for those Americans living outside the original thirteen states. Whatever their country of origin, those who lived in the new territory relied on the protection and services provided by the Army of the United States of America. The country had interests only a trained and disciplined military could provide; the armed forces were becoming part of who Americans were as a nation.

Though wars were waged on a continental or national scale, for much of the nation's history military service remained a local citizenship obligation. Through the Civil War, recruitment continued to be conducted almost exclusively by local call. Although a national military service draft was declared by the respective Congress for both the Union and Confederate armies, most soldiers fighting on either side were recruited to join local units and many wore colors specific to the local unit.

National Defense, the National Draft, and a New Citizenship Status for Veterans

One measure of the reach of war into a nation is the sheer number of people who fought in it. The numbers give an indication of how many families and communities shared in the military experience for that conflict. Likewise, where they fight—close to home, far away, or across an ocean—indicated the depth of the experience for those who served and those who supported them. These indices, together with the number of dead and wounded, allow a comparative picture of the long-term impact of war on society.

Table 3-1 presents the record of military service in major conflicts in the United States from the American Revolution through the Persian Gulf War. The table shows the number who served in each war along with the number of those wounded and killed while in service. The numbers reflect the relative impact each of these wars had on the demography of the American population. Numbers for the Revolutionary War are estimates. Military service was not organized at the federal level and there was no national office responsible for military record-keeping when the Revolution began. The number here is the midpoint of the range of reliable estimates, which vary

Table 3-1. United States Military Personnel and Casualties, by Period of Conflict: 1771-1991

	Number who served this period		Deaths: number and as a percent of number served	Non-fatal wounds: number and as a percent of number served (1)
1775-1783	217,000	(2)	4,435	6,188
Revolutionary War			2.04	2.85
1812-1815	286,730	(3)	2,260	4,505
War of 1812			0.79	1.57
1846-1848	78,718	(3)	1,733	4,152
Mexican War			2.20	5.27
1861-1865	2,213,363	(3)	140,414	281,881
Civil War (Union only)			6.34	12.74
1898-1898	306,760		385	1,662
Spanish-American War			0.13	0.54
1917-1918	4,734,991		53,402	204,002
World war I			1.13	4.31
1941-1946	16,112,566		291,557	671,846
World War II			1.81	4.17
1950-1953	5,720,000		33,741	103,284
Korean Conflict			0.59	1.81
1964-1973	8,744,000		47,415	153,303
Vietnam Conflict			0.54	1.75
1990-1991	2,225,000		147	467
Persian Gulf War			0.01	0.02

(1) Casualties in Korea are for the actual combat zone; all others are total casualties.

(2) There is no reliable number; this is the midpoint of the range estimated by the Department of Defense (184,000 to 250,000).

(3) Numbers reported by the U.S. Commissioner of Pensions in the annual report for fiscal year 1903.

Sources:

U.S. Department of Defense, Directorate for Information, Operations, and Reports Internet site, "Principal Wars in Which the United States participated, U.S. Military Personnel Serving and Casualties," "Deaths by Casualty Type within Service," and "Worldwide U.S. Active Duty Military Deaths, Selected Military Operations," accessed April 15 and June 2, 2004, and as reported in *Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present, Millenial Edition, Volume Five, Part E. Governance and International Relations.* Data were taken from "Table Ed1-5 Military personnel and casualties, by war and branch of service: 1775-1991," 5035.

from 184,000 to 250,000. Service numbers in the war of 1812 with Britain are at about the same level as the war for independence. The military experience was different, however, in part because the length of the war was much shorter. Rates of death and injury were roughly half those of the previous war.

All previous rates were swamped by the enormity of the Civil War. The table shows more than 10 times the number participating in service in this war than in the revolutionary war.[13] Similar numbers are reported for Confederate service and casualties, bringing the total number of combatants over the 4 million number. The US population was much smaller in 1861 than now; even so, the number of people engaged in this war—fought completely on American soil—is staggering. The percentage of those fighting who died or were wounded marks this war as unique in U.S. history. Not all deaths were war wounds; many died of dysentery and infection. Nevertheless, the experience of this war would have a profound economic and psychic impact on the country, one on which the Grand Army of the Republic and other veterans' organizations would capitalize.

The Great War in Europe was America's first experience fighting a war without direct territorial or independence goals for itself. Although the numbers who served in this war were about the same as the combined numbers for North and South in the Civil War, the experience of this war for the soldiers and for the home front was completely new. The national military draft was used for the first time during this war. The numbers called and numbers served were high—returning to the numbers of the Civil War. In addition, most young men left home to train together with recruits from other places. Many were deployed overseas for extended periods. While the casualty rate shown never came close to that of the Civil War, the rates are calculated on a base of all who were in service, not those who served in Europe. World War I was a brutal war for those who saw action and for those who waited for news here at home. At home and in France, Americans lived through this experience together. In the years following the war, the American Legion would mine this shared experience to build a new constituency of American servicemen and their families.

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[13] Only records of union soldiers were maintained by official United States government offices.

All prior service numbers are dwarfed by those of World War II. More than 16 million people served in America's armed forces during this five year war—twice as many as served in Vietnam in a nine-year war. While death rates were lower than in most previous wars, the sheer number of dead and wounded left an imprint on America not seen since the Civil War. While no war is easy, America's military participation in World War II was on a scale not seen before or since.

From Local to National Recruitment

Through most of its history, the United States has met its military needs through volunteer enlistments. Calls for necessary enlistments went through states to local communities. At the most local level, the choice of who would be sent to answer these calls was always "selective." Of those obliged to serve, the community selected the men who were most fit to fight but also most able to be spared from obligations on the home front. Recruitment became more difficult the longer a war lasted or the farther from home it was waged. When communities could no longer agree on who would meet the call, various schemes of lottery and draft were used to ensure the fair distribution of the service obligation.

The basic nature of the draft roll—the "enrolling" of every free white male citizen of the community eligible for service described earlier, persisted into the modern draft language**.** The first national draft for military service originated late in the Civil War when state and local call-ups failed to produce sufficient personnel. Though technically two "national" draft systems were in place, neither was very efficient at generating recruits, as enforcement mechanisms and enlistment practices persisted in local arenas. However, the precedent for a national enlistment mechanism to meet national obligations was established, as were the grounds for benefit legislation after the war. The national draft for military service was halted after the end of the Civil War. Military personnel needs for the next fifty years were handled through volunteer enlistment.

The draft was suspended following World War I and reintroduced in World War II; it was not continuous between the two wars and was again suspended soon


Filed July 8th 1861.
VOLUNTEERING DOWN DIXIE.

Figure 3-1. "Volunteering Down Dixie." July, 1861, Satire of Confederate Military Recruitment Practices. Note the emphasis on "uniform" military attire for the white recruits drilling in the left background; contrast this with the random articles of military garb worn by the two shoeless black recruits on the right. Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, Locator number: PC/US – 1861.A000, no. 19, Washington, DC., published in Bernard F. Reilly, American Political Prints, 1766-1876, Boston: G.K. Hall.

after end of war in the Pacific in 1945. In 1951, President Truman asked for the reinstatement of the draft at the onset of the Korean Conflict. Although there were changes in the level of call-ups from draft rolls over the years, the draft remained in operation, even in peacetime, until 1973 when America returned to an all-volunteer military.

The call to military service—whether voluntary or as the result of the draft—has a different impact on people when they are undergoing life cycle or migration change that challenges personnel identity: the transition to adulthood, the transition from one country to another, or from one set of social hierarchies to another.

In the twentieth century, increasingly more of the young military enlistees were spending their military service in residence in the South. Figure 3-2 shows the regional change in armed forces residence from 1900 to 1970.

Figure 3-2. Residence of Males in the Armed Forces by Region, 1900 to 1970

(males age 18 to 67 serving in the Armed Forces on census reference day)



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

Training to Fight, Training to Earn

The military experience changed over time in another significant way. From the Revolution through the Spanish-American war, most of those who served were in the Army and most of the work required of them was "point and shoot," or "dig and lift"–tasks most enlistees already knew how to do. Military training was more concerned with the organization of troops than with teaching recruits new skills. Men learned how to march, follow orders, set up camp and work together in stressful situations, but most enlistees served in the army and came into military service with the basic skills for the job. In the Revolutionary War, most men even brought their own guns to battle and knew well enough how to clean and care for them.

Over time, the nature of military engagements changed, accompanied by change in the type of service and skills required to meet the military's needs. The increase in specialization is shown in Figure 3-3 which shows change in the distribution of occupations in the armed forces from 1862 through 1955, from the Civil War through the Korean Conflict. Differences in classification exist from one reporting period to the next but the general outlines are clear. In the Civil War the largest share of military personnel served as operators and laborers. World War I relied on laborers for tasks such as digging the maze of trenches that characterized this

Figure 3-3. Distribution of Occupations in the Armed Forces by Major Military Engagment, 1862-1955



Source. Data for this figure are from "Table Ed82-119 Selected characteristics of the armed forces," in *Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present, Millenial Edition, Volume Five: Governance and International Relations,* eds. Susan Carter, et al. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 5.363-364; original data are from The President's Commission on Veterans Pensions, *Veterans' Benefits in the United States, volume 1; Staff Report number 4, "Veterans in our Society*," House Committee Print 261, 84th Congress, 2nd session; and revised estimates prepared by the U.S. Department of Defense.

war. But Figure 3-3 also shows a marked shift toward more technical and skilled occupations in military service, a trend that continues through the rest of the twentieth century. Some enlistees come into service with these skills but most do not; they are trained by the military and, while in service, gain valuable practical experience with these new skills. Many soldiers are better trained for skilled employment after service than at enlistment.

Narrowing the Field: Race and Ethnicity in American Military Service Through World War I

Immigrants and blacks have a long history of using military service as a ladder to citizenship. By serving in the military and defending a community, they hoped to prove themselves worthy of citizenship by fulfilling the obligations of citizens. Reports of citizens purchasing a "substitute" who would fulfill the buyer's military service obligation often overlook the important role this played in moving individuals into citizenship status.

Many of those without standing in the majority communities—immigrant and black men alike—served in the national branches of service and wore the colors if not the full uniform of the national military. When they enlisted, immigrants continued to serve with native-born whites units. Blacks, however, seldom served in integrated units after the Revolutionary War, and were strictly segregated in the Civil War. Status boundaries were more permeable to immigrants but both groups consciously saw military service as a way to claim citizenship in the broader community following the war.

Exclusion from truly uniform military service in an integrated force meant that the experiences of the soldiers—and the meaning that society gave to their service—were easily marginalized. During the time when military service was an important vehicle for constructing national citizenship identity, groups excluded from the obligation and benefits of military service could only be seen by society at large as not fit for that citizenship.

For those men excluded from the military *obligation*, however, the experience of military service at the margins of major wars helped create a shared identity of group difference out of the shared injustice of exclusion. Having proven themselves in military service, blacks and immigrants reinforced their own belief that they were deserving of inclusion. Service in war contributed to post-war organizing for better treatment and better jobs. Irish immigrants, for example, translated their experience in war into a post-war claim on police and firefighter jobs.

That there is a direct connection in American society between military service and citizenship status is found in the naturalization laws of the United States. Following the American Revolution, persons not residing or born in one of the states as of 1790 were not considered citizens. To become a "naturalized citizen," immigrants had to live in the United States for 14 years; original proposals for residency had ranged as high as 20 years. However, for every major war fought by the United States, immigrants were offered the opportunity to bypass some or all of this waiting period by serving in the armed forces. Service was no guarantee of equal treatment and survival was uncertain. But immigrants understood that this opportunity was available to them. The path to citizenship for blacks in the nineteenth century was much more difficult.

The History of Veterans' Organizations, National Citizenship and Veteran Entitlements

At certain periods of American history, veterans have had a more dramatic influence on public life because of their service and because of their sheer numbers. National veterans' organizations have played major roles in increasing and prolonging this prominence, leveraging the political potential of their membership rolls to gain benefits from the community. The second—and perhaps most profound influence—of these organizations has been their role as translators of the meaning of the war experience for American society. Along the way, they have redefined what it means to be an American for a large portion of the population, prescribing by direct and indirect means who is, and who is not, fit for full American citizenship.

The earliest known organization of veterans in the United States was the Order of Cincinnatus, formed in 1783 by former officers of the Continental Army in the last days of the Revolutionary War. Like all subsequent veterans' organizations, The

Order of Cincinnatus was formed out of an ongoing sense of obligation to the nation and to the soldiers with whom members had served. They are the earliest form of what Arthur Schlesinger has called the "American activity" of forming voluntary associations.[14] However, unlike most voluntary organizations of the mid-nineteenth century, veterans' organizations exist not only to do good works for their communities—in the sense that deTocqueville meant—but also to capture specific resources from the larger community for its members.

The earliest claims to special benefits arose from this call to arms in response to an immediate threat to the nation. Following these full-scale defense wars, the large number of servicemen resulted in problems that could not be addressed by ordinary social systems. Veterans' voluntary associations were mobilized to put political pressure on local, state and national government to force attention to the needs of former soldiers. Pressure from veterans of the Revolutionary War and the difficulty of managing the backlog of pension requests and payments led Congress to establish the Commission of Pensions in 1833, the first institution addressing only the needs of veterans and their families.

Civil War Veterans' Organizations: Patriotism, Rights and Racism

Veterans' organizations that emerged from the Civil War would affect American society in profound and persistent ways. The size of the armed forces, both Union and Confederate, was one factor. If all these veterans did after the war was contest for elevated status and special benefits denied other citizens—as their predecessors from earlier wars had—the influence would have been powerful enough. But this group had a more profound and long-lasting impact on American society. First, in the North, The Grand Army of the Republic (GAR) becomes almost an immediate political force, intervening in unprecedented ways at the federal level to secure new benefits for their members and demanding special treatment for veterans as a class. Second, activities of veterans' organizations in the South—and the North's acceptance of them in the name of national unity—merges race with veteran service in a new set of national standards for citizenship status. The ultimate resolution of America's national war with itself was the reincorporation of a nation of white veterans—North and South—as heroic citizens of the highest patriotic status, all at the exclusion of blacks. Civil War veterans' organizations were instrumental to the success of this process of white reconciliation and black exclusion.

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[14] Like migration, deTocqueville viewed voluntary associations as one of the distinguishing characteristics of Americans. The classic work on voluntary associations is Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., "Biography of a Nation of Joiners," 1944. Schlesinger argues that tradition of forming voluntary associations in America emerged from the organizational roots of religion among the earliest colonists. Left to their own devices for governance as well as spiritual guidance, the voluntary association of individuals took on more power here than in Europe. In the mid-eighteenth century, voluntary associations began to form for a variety of purposes. The emergence of this American activity is best exemplified by the life of Benjamin Franklin who, among other things, launched a voluntary fire department and a public lending library that were successful as well as a speculative land partnership that was not. One of the earliest studies of voluntary organizations in America, was W. S. Harwood, "Secret Societies in the United States," *North American Review*, Vol. 164, Issue 485 (April 1897): 617-624, available online at Cornell University digital library collection, "The Making of America": http://cdl.library.cornell.edu/moa/index.html.

The influence of this narrative on society could have this power only because of the immense scale of the Civil War. More than two million men served in the Union Army; estimates for Confederate Army service range in proportionately high numbers. Many veteran associations from previous wars were still in operation around the country, both North and South, to serve as models on which the new organizations would build.

The Grand Army of the Republic: Local Patriotism, National Benefits

The Grand Army of the Republic (GAR) was the first veterans association to operate on a national level. Founded in 1866 with the merger of several smaller veterans' organizations, the GAR was typical of non-religious voluntary associations of the period in all respects but one—its commitment to securing benefits for its own members from state and federal government. Veterans were close to 8 percent of the total population of the United States at the end of the Civil War, a percentage not surpassed until the close of World War II. Like veterans groups of the twentieth century, the organization of such a large segment of the population into a national organization commanded attention from political office holders.

The national organization's primary activity was to lobby Congress and state legislatures to liberalize pension benefits for Civil War veterans and their dependents. Like previous veterans, they believed that their service to the national defense entitled them to special treatment from the national government. Smaller claims were made by some departments to the state legislatures for similar benefits. By the time Civil War soldiers were demobilized, the United States had an established history of paying pensions to war veterans. With its well-organized political strength, the GAR expanded pension benefits and moved on to incorporate other benefits—such as preferential hiring of veterans for civil service jobs—that would add additional economic protection for their members.

Membership in the GAR was theoretically open to anyone who had served honorably in the Union armed forces. As with any voluntary association, however, a certain amount of self-selection operated. Dues, uniforms and donations expected of



Figure 3-4. Second Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, 1895. Minnesota Veterans at dedication of monument to Second Minnesota for service to the Union Army at Snodgrass Ridge, Chicamauga, Tennessee, July 18, 1895. Photo used with permission, Minnesota Historical Society, Photographer: Schmdling, Photo Location: E425.2, p.26.

members for philanthropic and political causes kept out the very poor. This may account for the generally low rate of participation of immigrant veterans.

The national influence of veteran service on American society in the immediate post-war period was limited by the fact that roughly half of Americans fought against, not for, the Union Army. The result was that federal benefits won by veteran organization for service to the Union were paid for by all the states but distributed to veterans on only one side of the fight. Pension and medical benefits to former Confederate soldiers were left to the states where veterans resided, giving taxpayers there a double burden. Aside from national encampments of veterans,



Figure 3-5. GAR Armory, Litchfield, Minnesota. Once used for militia drills and ceremonial events for the local GAR post, this building is still used today as a city museum. Although not all armories were this substantial, thousands of GAR posts in large and small communities in the nineteenth century were at the center of civic life. Photo used with permission, Minnesota Historical Society, Photographer: St. Paul Dispatch & Pioneer Press, undated; Photo Location: MM5.9 LT8 p4.

which over time came to include those of the Confederate armed forces, the GAR had little on-going national activity. The early influence of the group was at the local and state level where members used their veteran citizenship status to promote patriotism and monitor textbooks in local schools. Chapters raised funds to build memorials to heroic service in local cemeteries or at battle sites significant to the community's regiments. Some were active in raising money for college scholarships to children of members but there was little educational activity at the national level.

The Grand Army of the Republic, like the Union military itself, was almost totally segregated; separate posts were established for black and white veterans. Despite the fact that more than 215,000 blacks served with distinction in the Union Army, the national organization did nothing on behalf of black veteran rights; national encampments did not even include black veterans. In later years, reunions of Civil War veterans would conclude with former white soldiers from both North and South posing together for group pictures; black veterans are not acknowledged.

Southern Veterans' Organizations: Reconciliation and Racism

The South had experienced two very different periods of active membership in the GAR. The first followed immediately after the end of the Civil War when blacks and federal employees supporting Radical Reconstruction formed posts in border states and a few states farther South. These posts irritated Southern Confederate locals and were short-lived, collapsing with the rise of the Ku Klux Klan. In border states like Tennessee, a second period of GAR activity came in the 1880s when former Confederate and Union soldiers worked toward reconciliation.[15] Joint reunions were held and the survivors of the two forces often marched together in patriotic parades. The cost of this reconciliation was the further marginalization of blacks from the majority community and further increase in racist activities. Membership of black veterans in these GAR posts proved too divisive; most chapters had no black members.

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[15] For an example of the contemporary Southern recounting of this narrative, see "The Tennessee Encyclopedia of History and Culture," Tennessee Historical Society, Nashville, Tennessee; available online at http://tennesseeencyclopedia.net

In *Race and Reunion*, David Blight makes a powerful argument for the role of confederate veterans' organizations in the simultaneous construction of white reconciliation and Jim Crow racism.[16] The narrative that emerges from veterans of this war—the compromise story that allowed the South to live in the Union and reconcile with the North—is one of a heroic and bloody struggle over honest differences about the role of state and federal government. Slavery was an incidental issue. For the North there was victory, for the South a valiant "Lost Cause" of states' rights. But both sides fought nobly and the heroes of each side could be honored for their bravery and their service.

In the public patriotic rituals that evolved to celebrate the reconciliation, it is the heroism and nobility of the soldiers that is celebrated, not the cause for which the war was fought. Although there is evidence that black communities commemorate the heroism of white soldiers who fought for their freedom, the contributions of black soldiers are not commemorated outside their communities. For reconciliation to succeed, blacks were written out of the story. As Blight recounts, the Southern Historical Society (SHS), formed in 1869, was given its mission by former Confederate General Jubal Early: "burn the Unionist and emancipationist narratives out of Southern and national memory."

Like the Grand Army of the Republic in the North, veterans' organizations in the South worked to secure benefits and pensions for Confederate veterans from state legislatures and local communities. Like veterans in the North, Southern organizations sponsor patriotic parades and commemorations. But in the South this patriotic activity centers on Jubal Early's mission to the SHS. The United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC)—the women's auxiliary of the United Confederate Veterans (UVC)—devote most of their attention to schools and libraries to ensure that only the "proper" interpretation of the war is taught. White supremacy becomes the theme of this narrative, the victory of "whiteness" salvaged from the loss of the war.

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[16] See David W. Blight, *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Meemory*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001. Blight uses letters, newspaper articles, and journals from black and white Civil War soldiers and post-war leaders to trace the evolution of the war's different meaning for black and white veterans—and the larger communities in which they lived.

The historical committee of the UVC carries this theme in articles in the *Confederate Veteran*.

Although blacks were legally freed from slavery by actions of the federal government in this war, citizens of neither North nor South agreed on the place of black residents in American society. As former confederate states were allowed back into the republic, white national solidarity was rebuilt on the new narrative of the war's meaning. Beginning with veterans' organizations and spreading through the larger society, national white solidarity was reconstructed around the legitimacy of state and local laws that maintained the social hierarchy of the ante-bellum South.

Jim Crow is born out of this reconciliation—the states' rights victory for the South, accepted by the North where black settlement is still a small part of the population and immigration was meeting its labor needs. Federal law freed black slaves and gave them theoretical rights but local Black Codes—effectively unchallenged by the national government—severely constrained the ability of blacks to move within or out of the South. Under the guise of protecting Southern womanhood, one of the newest voluntary associations—the Ku Klux Klan—intimidated blacks with lynching and other violence. All these methods were designed to keep blacks in their place in the social hierarchy. Prior to emancipation, black status could be attributed to slavery; after the Civil War, their low position in society became a function of their race. Prior to the war, it was possible for a slave to be freed and escape his low status; after the war, it was impossible for a black man to escape the color of his skin.

Not everyone returned to his old place in society. Millions of enlisted men who fought on either side found their social status had risen in their local communities. For white veterans, their service in the heroic struggle elevated their positions in the community, at least on the local level. Black veterans, too, took pride in their service and were honored for their contribution in their own communities. But the black community's war narrative centered on emancipation, not on white heroism. As the white narrative moved further away from the reason for the war and focused on the heroism and sacrifice of white soldiers for their "cause," black leaders could see the history of the war being rewritten and tried to fight it. Frederick Douglass used every opportunity to retell the war through the lens of emancipation, reminding black and white audiences alike that a principle was contested in the 1860s—in the war and in society.[17]

In 1890, the GAR still had 409,000 active members—almost half of all surviving Union veterans, most of them native born. For fifty years, the GAR had worked to promote patriotic pride in the heroism of the soldiers who fought for the Union. They succeeded in wielding more political power on Congress than any veterans group or voluntary association before them. In the nation as in Congress, they had established the right of veterans—honorably discharged American-born men who fought for their nation—to claim benefits and privileges unavailable to ordinary Americans.

In 1903, more than 80,000 of the 240,000 surviving Confederate soldiers belonged to the United Confederate Veterans.[18] As late as 1910, there were still 100,000 men and women in the UVC and the UDC.[19] They had succeeded in rewriting the history of the Civil War for themselves, one that celebrated the heroic defense of the "Lost Cause" by white men in Confederate uniforms. With the acquiescence of veterans' organizations in the North and women in the South, whites at the turn of the century were united in a common understanding that patriotic American citizenship held native-born white men in the highest status.

Veterans of the Civil War are responsible for the existence of the Memorial Day holiday. Originally called "Decoration Day," its first official celebration was in Waterloo, Iowa, on May 5, 1866, when townspeople organized by the local GAR post decorated veterans' graves. One of the visitors was General John A. Logan. Two years later, General Logan became the Commander-in-Chief of the GAR and declared

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[17] See David W. Blight, "'For Something beyond the Battlefield': Frederick Douglass and the Struggle for the Memory of the Civil War," *The Journal of American History, Vol. 75*, No. 4 (Mar., 1989), pp. 1156-1178.

[18] See Pencak, *For God and Country,* 1989. As already noted, official Confederate numbers are not readily available because official numbers for Civil War veterans are maintained only for the Union military. The 1910 Census of Population question on veteran status reported for both Union and Confederate forces but the government does not collect information about veterans' organizations.

[19] Blight, *Race and Reunion.* 2001.



Figure 3-6 "Decoration Day" Parade in North Branch, Minnesota, c. 1887. The parade to the cemetery is led by a saber-wielding former officer with a sash. The ritual of memorializing war dead in May by decorating their graves was begun by the Grand Army of the Republic following the Civil War. The name was changed to Memorial Day in a compromise with Confederate veterans who were reluctant to participate in ceremonies that celebrated Union war heroes. Photographer unknown; photo used with permission of the Minnesota Historical Society, Location: GT4.4 r15.

May 30, 1868 to be national "Decoration Day."[20] While people in the South commemorated their war dead, they generally refused to commemorate Decoration Day since it was seen as a Union veteran remembrance. However, in the spirit of reconciliation, the GAR proposed changing the name to "Memorial Day" in 1882 and people in the South began to share in observance of the holiday.

Memorial Day soon joined the Fourth of July as a day for patriotic celebrations. Parades through main streets on May 30th ended with speeches and prayers in local cemeteries. These rituals solidified the symbolic status of veterans in

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[20] See the www.jalc.edu/johnlogan.html at the John A. Logan College website, for a biography of General Logan.



Figure 3-7 Children at Memorial Day Observance, c. 1895. These children become part of the World War I generation. The fathers of most founders of the American Legion, the most powerful veterans' organization in the twentieth century, were veterans of the Civil War and active members of the Grand Army of the Republic. Photographer: Truman Ward Ingersoll; photo used with permission of the Minnesota Historical Society, Location: GT4.4 p2.



Figure 3-8 Black GAR Veterans' Parade, New York City, May 30, 1912. Barred from participation in segregated white GAR posts, black Union veterans founded separate organizations which provided special social status for their members. Photo courtesy of the Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, Locator number: LC-USZ62-132913, Washington, DC.

American society. Where July 4th celebrated the independence of all Americans, Memorial Day commemorated the particular service of one privileged group of patriotic Americans—a class of citizens increasingly constructed by the majority culture as white and native born.

The History of National Citizenship Claims to Veteran Benefits

The offer to American soldiers by the Continental Congress of land for military service set a pattern that has been followed since then. When the United States has needed to enlist citizens to fight in the country's wars, it has matched a patriotic call to defend the nation with benefits that both appeal to the enlistee and serve a larger national purpose. In answering the call, soldiers have been rewarded by their community with a higher claim to local and national citizenship status. As veteran status was enhanced and wars expanded in numbers served and duration and place of service, it became more feasible for government to serve additional political purposes by expanding economic benefits to veterans. With each expansion of benefits, veterans have been privileged with access to economic and social advantage over those who did not—or were not allowed to—serve in the military.

One indication that the expansion of veteran benefits might be more related to citizenship claims than just a play for political patronage is found in the lag between time of service and passage of legislation enabling benefits to be paid for that service in the pre-Civil War period:

- Revolutionary War: 35 years (war ended, 1783; pension approved, 1818)
- War of 1812: 59 years (war ended, 1815; service pension approved, 1871)
- Mexican War: 39 years (war ended, 1848; service pension approved, 1887)

This pattern was broken with the Civil War when Congress passed the first pension act for Union soldiers in 1862, shortly after the opening of the war. As in earlier wars, this benefit is intended as a recruitment incentive for enlistment. But it is a benefit that has come to be accepted by both Congress and enlistees alike as the mutual obligation of citizenship.

The original pension was for soldiers disabled by their military service—again protecting the soldier's ability to meet obligations to family if harmed by fulfilling his obligation to the nation. Pensions for able veterans were added over time along with a new innovation—benefits for mothers and sisters of veterans. Like the "Uncle Sam" character, which first comes into common usage during the Civil War, the federal government now stepped in to assume a kinship role by taking care of the veterans' extended family in time of need.

Figure 3-9 shows change in the level of federal expenditures (in current dollars) for non-pension veterans benefits from the 1868 through 1928; estimates of

Figure 3-9. Federal Expenditures for Veteran Non-Pension Benefits, 1868 to 1928



Source. Data for this figure are from "Table Ed324-336 Expenditures of the Veterans Administration, by period of service," in *Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present, Millenial Edition, Volume Five: Governance and International Relations*, eds. Susan Carter, et al. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 5.418-420.

the value of land warrants is also excluded. Though some payments to veterans of previous wars straggle throughout the period, most of these dollars go to veterans of the Civil War and World War I. The expenditures reflect both the needs of the soldiers who served in these periods, the political persuasiveness of the veteran constituencies for each group, as well as the willingness of Congress—and the public—to appropriate funds to aid one group in society. Levels of non-pension dollars are relatively low and steady until 1919 when the immediate rehabilitation needs of wounded and maimed soldiers are incorporated in the spending totals. But the increase in spending and types of expenditure reflects the growing power of the American Legion in benefits for those who served in battle.

Veterans Claim Preference in Hiring

Veterans' preference for hiring into government jobs dates informally from the Revolutionary War. Government positions were few, however, especially at the federal level, and no organization of veterans tried to formalize the practice. The 1865 veterans preference act was the first time Congress officially gave former soldiers differential access to available federal jobs. Although the Civil War was still being waged, Union forces had already suffered so many casualties that the preference act was passed to give preference to disabled soldiers honorably discharged because of their injuries—provided they were qualified for the job.[21]

One of the first actions by the Grand Army of the Republic for new benefits on behalf of veterans came with modifications to the hiring preference for federal jobs given to disabled veterans by Congress in 1865. Although most political spoilage jobs prior to the were at the state and local level where elected officials most needed support, the sheer number of injured Union soldiers in need of work, prompted Congress to act in the last year of the war to . Within a few years, however, the GAR was using its new-found political strength to make significant modifications in the original legislation. Together, these changes indicate the privileged status the GAR sought—and were granted—for veterans and their families and the special status they claim in social welfare legislation. In 1876—under pressure from the GAR in a political election year—widows and orphans of veterans were made eligible for veterans' preference. Of equal significance was the introduction of the first Reduction in Force (RIF) protection which ensured that veterans would be the last to lose jobs if government personnel were downsized.[22]

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[21] For the larger history of this legislation, see Paul P. Van Riper, *History of the United States Civil Service*, Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson, 1958; and the United States Office of Personnel Management, "A Brief History of Veterans Preference," in *VetGuide*, available online at www.opm.gov/veterans/html/vghist.asp. For a "new institutionalism" analysis of the history of the civil service system—and the reversal of bureaucratic politics within it, see Ronald N. Johnson and Gary D. Libecap, *The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy: The Economics and Politics of Institutional Change*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

Public political displeasure with the growth of government and the spoils system following the Civil War led to a reorganization of systems for job distribution and resource allocation. Senator Charles Sumner was the first person to introduce legislation requiring competitive exams for government jobs but the legislation was not enacted until 1871 with the Jenckes Civil Service Bill. This was the first comprehensive merit system in the United States but it put veteran preference in an uncertain position. Having passed the merit system, Congress thereafter failed to provide funding for the Civil Service Advisory Board which had worked hard to apply the merit system to minor positions; senior positions remained part of the spoils system.

In 1881, the newly formed New York Civil Service Reform Association persuaded Senator George H. Pendleton from Ohio to introduce their bill. After much campaigning on the part of new reform organizations across the country, the Pendleton Act became law in 1883. Although veteran preference was included in the original legislation introduced by Pendleton, the problem of the examination remained. By 1888, however, the GAR had provided protection for veteran preference by insisting that veterans be given a 10-point bonus on the exam; in effect, the minimum score required of veterans to be eligible was now only 60 points while non-veterans had to have a score of 70. This allowed veterans a double advantage; they had preference on jobs with those of equal score and they now had a 10-point advantage on merit as well. By the election of 1888, disabled veterans had absolute preference over everyone else eligible for the position.

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[22] For a discussion of the earliest civil service legislation and reform, see H. Eliot Kaplan, "Accomplishments of the Civil Service Reform Movement," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 189: Improved Personnel in Government Service*, (January 1937), p. 142-147; and Ari Hoogenboom, *Outlawing the Spoils: A History of the Civil Service Reform Movement, 1865-1883*, Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1961.

Although few positions were officially covered under the Civil Service Act in the original Pendleton Act of 1883, a succession of one-term presidents meant that each administration sought to protect political appointments by transferring the positions into the civil service. Each successive party in office—and each successive "reform" of the civil service system—added more jobs to the list governed by the merit system. By 1892, 80 percent of federal jobs fell under its rules. In addition, states and municipalities also adopted these rules, giving veterans preference in job access and job security in their own communities.[23] After the demobilization of four million soldiers following World War I, the National Civil Service Reform League tried to eliminate veterans preference on the grounds that veterans would swamp the system and destroy all merit principles. These attempts were thwarted by the American Legion, which pledged to support the merit system, but argued that veterans preference was not a contradiction of the merit system since the soldiers' experience in war made them better workers. In 1921, 28.9 percent of all new appointments were going to veterans; by 1923 this figure had risen to 34.12 percent.

The largest number of newly available federal jobs following the end of World War I was for the enumeration of the 1920 census. The American Legion wasted no time. The Census Act of 1919 gave veterans preference in hiring for the conduct of the decennial census the following year. This legislation was followed quickly by the Deficiency Act of 1919 which extended preference to federal employment to all veterans with honorable discharges, as well as the widows and wives of disabled veterans.

These early veterans' programs set the precedent for the public expectation that recipients of federal social welfare transfers would be morally upright, patriotic Americans who were "deserving" of public care, a sentiment that the American

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[23] H. Eliot Kaplan, "Accomplishments of the Civil Service Reform Movement," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 189: Improved Personnel in Government Service*, (January 1937), p. 142-147.

Legion would use to nurture and manipulate veteran benefits in the years between World War I and II.

In 1924 Congress established a standing committee for Veterans Affairs. Thirteen of the first 21 members of the new committee had served in the American Expeditionary Forces. It was, as one congressmen said, "a legislative committee which ex-servicemen will have perfect confidence in."[24] Because the Veterans Bureau was a new federal agency, its positions were subject to veteran preference provisions for federal civil service. When it opened, more than half of its personnel were veterans; by 1925, more than one-fourth of all federal employees were veterans. In 1930 the Veterans Bureau was merged with other agencies, including the Commissioner of Pensions, established in 1833—into the Veterans Administration. Three years later, the proportion of veterans in the federal civil service rose to two-thirds.

The Legion was successful in getting approval for the Adjusted Compensation package—more commonly known as "the Bonus"—over the vetoes of presidents Harding and Coolidge, and the opposition of Secretary of the Treasurer Andrew Mellon and the national Chamber of Commerce. Veterans programs took a 25 percent cut under the depression-driven federal Economy Act of 1933. But well before the economy had turned around, the Legion was able to push programs to the top of the political recovery agenda. By 1934 most of the cuts had been restored and in 1936—again over a presidential veto—the Legion succeeded in passing legislation for the immediate payment of the World War I bonus. In the same year, Congress approved the Legion's proposal to allow access to veterans hospitals for treatment for non-combat related illness and injury—again over a presidential veto.

It is a testament to the political power of the American Legion that it could institutionalize social welfare benefits for one group of citizens in an era when such programs were widely criticized as immoral and subversive of capitalist—as opposed to communist—principles. Part of this strength came from the sheer number of veterans who became members. But its base extended even further, thanks to the grass-roots civic programs the Legion launched.

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[24] William Pencak, *For God & Country, 1989.*

The American Legion:
Defining the Veteran as the "Patriotic American"

The Legion's first main street campaign was education for citizenship, modeled after the education activities of the Grand Army of the Republic following the Civil War. In the social and political turmoil that followed that war, the GAR had stepped in to establish citizenship and patriotism programs, especially in states like Nebraska that had experienced a generation of hostilities before the war. In the earlier era, GAR members launched a program to remind and teach new citizens—whether immigrants or newly freed blacks—what was required to be a good citizen.[25] After the challenges to authority and governance witnessed in World War I and the Russian Revolution, the American Legion was determined to once again lay down the standards for the model patriotic American citizen.

The American Legion was fiercely anti-communist, anti-radical, and, in many ways, blindly loyal to what the leadership believed to be traditional American values. The programs they instituted were designed to perpetuate these values where they found them and to create them where they did not already exist. It is tempting to see their actions as paranoid but it was fairly easy for a typical American to perceive real threats in the country at the end of World War I. As William Penzak points out:

> "an average middle-class American in 1919 and 1920 could find much evidence that the radical forces which had made a revolution in Russia and were battling demobilized veterans throughout Central Europe constituted at least a potential threat to the United States."[26]

American immigrants and their children were more than 35 percent of the total population. More than 90 percent of the American Communist Party at the time could not speak English. In February of 1919, a general strike led by the International Workers of the World had virtually shut down the city of Seattle. This was the environment in America when the AEF officers sat down in Paris a month later to draw up plans for the new veterans organization called the American Legion, just as the Third Communist International was being created.

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[25] H. L. Chaillaux, "The American Legion's Interest in Education," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 182* (November 1935), 116-119.

[26] Pencak, *For God and Country*, 1989, 13.

It is no surprise, then, that in the turbulent decades between World Wars, the American Legion censored textbooks, blocked people they believed to be Communists from having their names on the ballot, and forced teachers to take loyalty oaths or lose their jobs. It was not just their military experience that prompted local leaders to deputize Legionnaires to protect law and order during periods of labor unrest. These coercive measures were effective for enforcing conditions the Legion believed necessary to preserve a strong and patriotic America. But the Legion's greatest and most pervasive influence came through the many positive incentives it offered to America communities and their citizens.

At its first convention in November, 1919, members passed a resolution urging states to pass laws requiring American history and civics be required for high school graduation—a recommendation that was followed by many states. Working with the National Education Association, Legion officers established a nationwide "American Education Week" in schools across the country. Officers of local Legion posts took the lead in implementing a citizenship and patriotism curriculum in America schools. Legion members became strong advocates for maintaining funds for local schools when the economic pressures of the Depression prompted many to suggest reductions. Schools also became centers of adult education, especially for aliens. Along with a special curriculum for instilling "proper respect" for the American flag, the Legion printed and distributed copies of the Flag Code pamphlet to schools—more than 250,000 copies in 1935 alone.

The elevation of the veteran in the local community is implicit in the new patriotic folkways revived and expanded by the American Legion. Symbolic worship of the flag in government offices, schools and at cemeteries celebrates the American nation and invites participants to remember the benefits of citizenship. But the highest status within that nation—the honor of carrying the flag, of teaching others proper care



Figure 3-10. American Legion National Convention, Detroit, Michigan, 1931. Photo used by permission, Minnesota Historical Society, Location: U3.1 r11.

and respect for the flag—is reserved for the veteran who served the nation in time of war. Local communities were reminded of veterans' service at every patriotic holiday. Parade rituals consisted of those who marched and those who stood on the street and cheered; deference to the veteran champion was built into these rituals.

Membership in a local Legion post brought the veteran access to this status within the local community. Recruitment advertising made extensive use of dramatic pictures of historic military events in American history. One of the unchallenged myths of American culture up to Vietnam was the belief that all wars fought by the United States were noble "crusades"—wars of liberation and freedom, not waged for personal gain or national greed, but fought in fulfillment of some larger destiny. The soldier fought to protect individual liberty—for Americans or for others—and thus earned respect and status well above those who did not serve or who served in peace time. The more often these messages were reinforced in the community, the more impervious the new status was to erosion. And since the rituals essentially were the same across the country, the status was transportable wherever the veteran moved.



Figure 3-11a. Minneapolis Honeywell American Legion Band entering Lakewood Cemetery, Minneapolis, Minnesota, c. 1945. Organizations and companies of all sizes had enough members in the American Legion to sponsor a band, all with special uniforms. Photo used by permission of the Minnesota Historical Society, Location: U3.1 p14.



Figure 3-11b. Memorial Day Observance, Rice School, St. Paul, Minnesota, May 23, 1952. The Legion provided flags for school rituals such as this. Photographer: St. Paul Dispatch & Pioneer Press; used by permission of the Minnesota Historical Society, Location: GT4.4 p9.

Guarding against the "Un-American"

At the state and local level, in both legislative bodies, veterans' benefits bills usually passed unanimously. Legislators might fight over language or provisions but when the vote came, none wanted to be on record opposing benefits to patriotic veterans. Perhaps the most convincing evidence of the far-reaching political power of the American Legion's constituency is found in the FBI's relationship with the Legion as an instrument of surveillance on the "un-American activity" of ordinary Americans. FBI Director Herbert Hoover convinced Attorney General Robert Jackson to accept the American Legion's proposal to put Legionnaires in the country's 11,000 posts to work investigating "subversive activities" in their area and reporting their findings to local law enforcement. Jackson was reluctant because he worried that self-initiated snooping by untrained investigators would lead to mass hysteria, as witnessed in the repressive days of World War I. He agreed under pressure from Hoover and only when the proposal was reduced in scale. "Un-American activities," suspected sabotage, and "all other matters related in any manner to the national defense," was the language Director Hoover used to describe the Legion's portfolio.[27]

The pervasiveness of Legion power and political influence is clearly seen in the American Legion Contract Program which, lasted from 1940—when America was not yet formally part of the war—through 1966. The program expanded from the original approved by Attorney General Jackson, although the FBI Director did not feel it necessary to inform either the Attorney General or the various presidents because it was portrayed as an education program. The program was carried on against the better judgment of Attorney General Jackson and many senior field officers of the FBI because it was believed the Legion was too powerful to stop. They would conduct these activities under an official program funded by the FBI or they would do it on their own. No one wanted the Legion conducting surveillance without at least minimal oversight. However, in turn, the relationship between the American Legion and the FBI during this period was an important factor in the FBI's ability to establish its own independent political base, relatively free from Congressional or Executive oversight through the Cold War.

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[27] Memorandum FBI Director to Attorney General, 18 November 1940, FBI 66-9330-1, quoted in Athan Theoharis, "The FBI and the American Legion Contract Program, 1940-1966," *Political Science Quarterly 100* (Summer 1985), 271-286; quote on p. 274.

The American Legion effectively fought to keep social benefits from being extended to non-veteran groups, and, if they were, to ensure that the level of support was below that of veterans. In this they were successful; it was the inevitable result of the twenty-year political education campaign for Americanism and patriotic citizenship. Social welfare programs for able-bodied people was seen as socialist, Bolshevik, un-American. Social spending for citizen soldiers who had brought freedom to Europe once already in the century was a good investment in America.

The American Legion could have used its extensive political power to help improve social welfare benefits for all Americans at a time when industrialization and the ever-increasing economies of scale of business and industry were lining up against the interests of individual American men and women. There is at least the possibility that this could have been done under the philosophical umbrella of corporate welfare without challenging the larger capitalist economic structure. But the economic and social chaos the founding AEF officers witnessed in the aftermath of the Great War and the Russian Revolution made this impossible. They assigned blame for this chaos to undisciplined social radicals who opposed the principles on which they believed America was founded, principles that were their inheritance from the Grand Army of the Republic and the United Confederate Veterans.

The veterans organization these officers built back home were a legion of loyal, patriotic, and civic-minded Americans. They were determined to be the ones to define what constituted the American way of life and the model of American citizenship: loyal, patriotic, and grateful for the liberties soldiers had won for them. They would combat any and all threats to their vision of the American way—public disorder and chaos, dissent of any kind, and challenge to the traditional economic and social order. Many of their civic programs were aimed at the immigrants and their children who constituted more than a third of the total population of the United States during the 1930s.

The Legion used their political power to stop the inflow of "unassimilable" immigrants with their radical political notions, from nations not representative of "the

American people." Those already here would be welcome to the extent that they abandoned their traditional social communities and became "one of us." The Legion provided educational opportunities, rites and rituals to help them learn what it meant to be an American; they even wrote the citizenship exam and naturalization ceremony that were the gateways to citizenship. Immigrant communities were encouraged to participate in the community parades and graveside rituals to commemorate soldiers and veterans on patriotic holidays. Those who refused to assimilate would be under constant threat of being labeled "un-American" and a danger to the nation.

Immigrants who would not assimilate were a threat to the political order. Blacks who stepped out of "their place" were a threat to the economic and social order. William Pencak argues that one reason for the American Legion's support of a delay in paying the World War I bonus was the wish on the part of Southern Legionnaires not to see large amounts of money in the hands of black veterans for fear it would disrupt the labor force and economy of the South.[28] This delay cost the Legion members in the short run but gained them added Southern strength in the long run.

While the Legion never formally adopted a discriminatory or segregationist program, the national organization also never challenged segregationist policies of state organizations and posts in the South. For example, the national organization allowed local practice to govern the participation of blacks on Legion-sponsored athletic teams; wherever teams from the South competed, black players were not allowed on teams—either in local or in championship events.

The real importance of this repeated acquiescence by national veterans to Southern racism lies ahead, in the post-World War II period. Most communities outside the South had no experience with significant minority populations. In the name of order and personnel efficiency, American armed forces adopted Southern Jim Crow rules for social organization when stationing American troops in England and other places where large numbers of Allied troops were billeted for extended periods of time. By imposing Southern segregationist and discriminatory practices on public facilities overseas, the American military modeled for all Americans GIs what the proper relationship should be between blacks and whites. Through this civic filter constructed between the World Wars by the American Legion—national arbiter of all things patriotic and properly American—the implication for civilian life was clear: black Americans were as unfit for national citizenship as they were for national American Legion baseball tournaments.

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[28] Pencak, *For God and Country*, 1989, 198-199.

The "G.I. Bill": Economic Stimulus and Economic Triumph of the American Legion

Bit by bit the nation had built up a package of benefits for its new veterans. Defense planners counted on these benefits to help build enlistments, as they had in earlier wars. From the earliest days of World War II, soldiers were promised post-service benefits as a means of encouraging higher enlistments and to ward off lingering political problems with veterans of the Great War. Enlisting soldiers were guaranteed the right to return to their old jobs after the war and promised bonus civil service points if they wanted a new job in state or federal government. They were promised disability pensions if they returned from the war wounded and life insurance and survivor benefits if they failed to return at all. Homestead lands were scarce but what little public land remained was made available to returning veterans. Generous as these benefits were, they were nothing of the magnitude of what was yet to come. Planners knew that the economic future of this group of veterans—and of the country—was no longer in settling land but in the new and scientific industries.

The Postwar Manpower Committee report to President Roosevelt in 1943 contained dire warnings about the consequences of heading into the economic reconversion without an extensive plan that would avoid the disastrous post-World War I demobilization. In the face of the anti-socialist/anti-communist challenges to New Deal programs of the 1930s, fed in part by the rhetoric of the American Legion, planners had to craft a reconversion plan that would both be effective and politically feasible. To move troops home from the front lines without finding them on the bread lines within the year would require program on a massive scale. To maintain demand for the manufacturing output of the expanded industrial sector would require creation of a new consumer market at home. It would all require a large infusion of money in ways that the public would endorse. Meanwhile, the American Legion had ideas of its own about what was the proper package of benefits for veterans in the post-war world.

The American Legion was the newest of the veterans' organizations but it had quickly gained the most political power. Virtually every member of Congress who was a veteran was a member of the Legion. The Legion had watched with alarm as liberal policy planners in the New Deal launched social welfare programs to remedy the problems of the Great Depression. They supported the Civilian Conservation Corps program, in part because it was a work program but primarily because the Legion used its political power to be sure the jobs went mostly to veterans. They were not against the government using its power to help the American economy; they were simply opposed to government money being spent on people they deemed "un-American." Given the economic problems that had followed the end of World War I, the leaders of the American Legion understood that the government would have to take interventionist measures to prevent a repeat performance. They understood that an economic stimulus program would have to be part of any post-war reconversion plan. They were simply determined that federal dollars would go only go to those who were "worthy".

The American Legion drafted the legislation that became the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944—the "G.I.Bill." It was the most sweeping package of benefits any group of military personnel has been given for service in any war. No veterans since then have received such generous benefits. The original legislation contained six titles, five of them providing direct services to veterans (health care; education; home, farm and business loans; employment services; and unemployment compensation), with the sixth setting up the administrative structure[29] The first section of the law, Title I, addressed the concerns raised by veterans' organizations over treatment of veterans of World War I, beginning with health and disability services. Construction funds of $500 million were allocated to build new hospitals and clinics to serve veterans. To ensure that these facilities were built promptly, despite war-time restrictions on domestic consumption of goods, the Veterans Administration was declared to be "an essential war agency, entitled, second only to the War and Navy Departments, to priorities in personnel, equipment, supplies, and material." Similar privileges were extended to veterans health facilities constructed with state funds. Title I also guaranteed that soldiers would not be discharged without receiving at least a portion of their back wages. Each of these provisions redressed a specific grievance of the American Legion in the treatment of World War I veterans.

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[29] Public Law No. 346, Seventy-Eighth Congress, June 22, 1944; as described in U.S. Congress House Committee on World War Veterans' Legislation. *Veterans' Legislation: Historical Statement of the Laws Enacted and Veterans Reglations Promulgated Relating to Veterans and Their Dependents.* Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1945, pp. 168-171.

Benefit programs under the G.I. Bill were expanded from their original legislative intent. Qualifying service dates were extended back to September 16, 1940 and service eligibility was lowered to just 90 days. The original intent of the bill was to ensure that those whose military service had interrupted their education would be supported while they resumed their education. However, anyone 25 years old or younger at discharge was automatically deemed to have had his education disrupted. Veterans had two years from the date of discharge to begin to claim these educational benefits. The language of the original legislation provided for only one year of education but this was quickly extended to four. Virtually all types of education or training were covered under Title II of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act. The costs of tuition, books and fees—as well as a living allowance—were paid directly to the institution; living allowances were adjusted upward if the veteran had dependents.

Loans to veterans for the purchase or repair of homes and farms were guaranteed under Title III. These loans could also be used to pay delinquent taxes on a personal residence or to finance a small business. The interest rates were set by statute at 4 percent—low by today's standards but sufficiently high by the standards of the day to ensure a profit for the private lenders who actually wrote the loans. This ensured that there would be sufficient supply of loan funds for veterans to borrow. Provisions of Title III also ensured that veterans were not excluded from also receiving benefits under the Bankhead-Homes Farm Tenant Act. Title IV established a special Veterans Employment Service operated through the existing United States Employment Service. Since the Depression, this agency was charged with finding jobs for Americans who wanted to work. By establishing a separate employment service, the Legion ensured that veterans would not have to compete with non-veterans looking for work. Finally, Title V established a program to pay unemployed veterans a living stipend of $20 a week for up to 52 weeks, excluding those in school (and receiving educational living allowances) but including self-designated self-employed persons.[30]

Figure 3-12 shows federal veteran-benefit expenditures from 1920 through 1970. What *was* the huge peak of World War I veteran expenditures in Figure 3-9 is

Figure 3-12. Federal Expenditures for Veteran Readjustment Programs, Medical and Residential expenses, 1920 to 1970



Source. Data for this figure are from "Table Ed324-336 Expenditures of the Veterans Administration, by period of service," in Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present, Millenial Edition, Volume Five: Governance and International Relations, eds. Susan Carter, et al. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 5.418-420.

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[30] U.S. Congress. House. Committee on World War Veterans' Legislation. *Veterans Legislation: Historical Statement of the Laws Enacted and Veterans Regulations Promulgated Relating to Veterans and Their Dependents,* with a Complete Statement Regarding Expenditures for Hospital and Domiciliary Construction (Washington, DC: GPO, 1945); Prentice-Hall, Inc. *G.I. Loan Decisions of the Veterans Administration* [published for use with the Prentice-Hall Bank Service] (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946); Bennett, *When Dreams Came True*, 1992.

now dwarfed by the expenditures for World War II returnees. Given the four-fold increase in number of people serving and three-fold increase in enlistment time and time served overseas, one would expect the expenditures for these veterans to be higher. But the cost is more than a reflection of the increased scale of troop strength. Returning soldiers got needed health care and life insurance, like their World War I colleagues.

They received rehabilitative services to return them to the work force. These were the first demands made by the American Legion in helping draft the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944. But the Legion wanted more benefits to reflect the new status constructed for veterans between the two wars. World War II veterans were given a whole new category of individual benefits which would—in the newly restructured post-war economy—give them a competitive edge over those who had not served. That the delivery of these benefits might exclude significant portions of the population because of race was not a concern.

Figure 3-13 shows the long-term usage of the loan guarantee benefit as measured in the number of guaranteed loans to veterans from 1944 to 1976. In the immediate post- war years when the pent up demand for housing caused by the Depression and war mobilization was at its peak, veterans made good use of the home loan benefit. The program made it possible for a veteran to buy a home with nothing down and a buy-down of the prevailing interest rate. In many cases, veterans could get a loan for more than the appraised value of the property on the understanding that sweat equity and price inflation would balance the loan to value ratio within a short time.

Home-buying veterans benefited from the evolution in the mortgage finance industry that began in the New Deal. With the FHA, farm home-loan programs and other policy experiments in the 1930s, financial institutions offered mortgage instruments that did not require the large down payments and short repayment terms of home loans at the turn of the century. Nevertheless, the home-loan guarantee program sent a message to both the veteran and the financial community that home ownership by young veterans was good for America.

Loans for farms and business purposes do not reflect the same level of consumption as home loans, however. Many were used as vehicles for refinancing pre-war debt carried over from the Depression into a more favorable interest rate. When the limits of the World War II GI Bill expired, these loans were not available to veterans of subsequent wars.

Figure 3-13. Guaranteed or Insured Loans for Veterans, 1944 to 1976



Total estimated for 1944-1946.
Source.Source. Data for this figure are from Historical Statistics, "Table Ed453-462 Guaranteed or insured loans for veterans," in *Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present, Millenial Edition, Volume Five: Governance and International Relations* , eds. Susan Carter, et al. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 5-346. Original data for 1944-1959 and 1996-1999 provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA); data for 1960-1970 are from VA, *Trend Data 1960-1984* , U.S. Office of Information Management and Statistics, 1985, pp. 35, 37; data for 1971-1995 are from VA, *Trend Data 1971-1995* , pp. 29, 30, VA Internet site, accessed June 30, 2001.

Many veterans returned to civilian life with the skills and experience required by the post-war economy because of training provided them by the military during their enlistment. For many—airplane and truck mechanics, pilots, draftsmen and other technical occupations—this was enough to land them a better job. But for millions of others, the G.I. Bill offered them a chance at formal education.

As Figure 3-12 showed, much of the immediate post-war veteran spending was for education. Figure 3-14 shows the number of veterans who used their veteran benefits to enroll in training programs from 1945 through 1990. In 1946 more than

1.6 million veterans were enrolled in college, a million in other type of formal institutional setting; an additional million veterans in that year received on the job or on the farm training. The lower numbers for the Korean Conflict reflect the lower number of enlistees eligible for the program. The numbers for enrollment in the Post-Korea and Vietnam era programs surpass those of World War II for college attendees but not for other types of training. This may show the success of the military's recruitment incentives; since World War II, the existence of government funding for college attendance has been used as a recruitment tool.

Figure 3-14. Veterans Enrolled in G.I. Bill Training Programs, 1945-1990



Source. Data for this table were provided by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs and accessed in Table Ed467-482 Veterans participating in training programs under GI Bills, by legislation and type of training: 1945-1997, in Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present, Millenial Edition, Volume Five: Governance and International Relations, eds. Susan Carter, et al. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

From this look at the number of enrollees, the significance of the World War II benefits seem less important than those of programs for veterans thirty years later—certainly this is true for those choosing military service as a way of financing higher education. Most enlistees who entered the military for World War II service did not see it as a path to a degree. If we look at World War II college enrollees as a percentage of total annual college attendance, as shown in Figure 3-15, we get a different perspective on the impact of GI Bill education benefits since World War II.

At the peak in 1947, veterans constituted more than 70 percent of all college enrollment. When the program ended in 1954, veterans were still 18 percent of the college attendance. For these veterans, all tuition and books were paid; many also received a living allowance. Veterans attending college under this program received more aid than private colleges offered students with full academic scholarships.

Figure 3-15. Veteran Enrollee Share of Total College Enrollment, 1945 to 1990



Source. Data on veteran enrollment were taken from *Historical Statistics,* "Table Ed467-482 Veterans participating in training programs under GI Bills." Data for total enrollment are from Historical Statistics, "Table Bc523-536 Enrollment in institutions of higher education." *Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present, Millenial Edition, Volume Five: Governance and International Relations*, eds. Susan Carter, et al. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Original veteran data provided by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. Total enrollment data originally available in U.S. Office of Education, *Education for Victory,* volume 3, number 6 (1944).

Additional benefits were granted veterans following passage of the original Servicemen's Readjustment Act, such as the first rights to purchase surplus war material at discount prices. Compared to the initial GI Bill benefits, these were small add-ons but it demonstrates the nation's continuing post-war willingness to give veterans first rights to America's resources. This unprecedented access to America's economic resources was given to a young and unsettled subgroup of the population at a time of tremendous social and economic change. With the GI Bill, the government simultaneously pumped money into the economy while investing directly in its labor force—in its skill level, its health, its stability and its well-being. What it didn't do was tell the soldiers where to use these benefits. The next move was left up to the them. Armed with a package of benefits they could use anywhere in the country, American GIs were able to move wherever they saw the best opportunity to build their futures.

Soldiers came home and moved on to new places and new lives, many taking advantage of their Uncle Sam's largesse. Workers who spent the war on farms and in essential war production facilities also faced a new life.

Migration theory suggests that in times of expanding economic opportunity, "pull" factors will encourage the movement of those best able to fully capture available economic opportunity in the new location. These individuals could probably survive and thrive in the current location but they possess characteristics that make it possible for them to do better somewhere else. In times of economic stress, the reverse is true. Social, economic and demographic "push" factors favor the out-migration of those members of a community least able or willing to tough it out where they are. In either case, communities of origin and destination can either help or hinder the out-migrant from leaving and the in-migrant from resettling successfully. It follows, then, that we can read change in the American social hierarchy in the changing patterns of those who move—those encouraged or allowed to exit and enter.

In this post-WWII period, the additional confounding factor was the role of government programs. For the first time, one group of society—veterans—are showered with government benefits that directly enhance their individual human capital endowments.

Public expenditures on one group within society would not be politically feasible if the people, in general, did not agree with singling out that group for special favor. Public policy privileged veteran migration by investing in their human capital endowments, thus enhancing the migration-selection criteria of a group that migration theory suggests was already pre-disposed to higher migration propensities: young males with marketable skills and education who had already had several migration experiences in their young lives, who returned home with a new social status that was, like their benefits, transportable anywhere in the United States.

Migrants and veterans—these groups constitute two big slices of the post-World War II American population. Members of both groups were poised to capitalize on new economic opportunities. New veteran identify meant greater inclusion for some; more separation for others. In this new post-war economy, who moved and where? And what difference did it make for America?

Chapter 4.

Racial and Ethnic Differences in Destinations of Migrants and Veterans in Post-World War II America

This chapter analyzes the region and type of place chosen—or not chosen—by migrants and veterans in each subpopulation in the 25 years following World War II. The regional migration patterns shown in Chapter 2 suggest the power of veteran status on migration selection as well as the variation in the "pulling power" of economic opportunity in different regions in this period. But the impact of these migration patterns on the country, the region, and the specific places people make residence depends on the relative size of the veteran and non-veteran populations in each area.

Starting first with the larger areas, Figure 4-1 shows the change in the percentage veteran of native-born men age 25 and over by region from 1910 to 1970. The figure shows that white men served in the military at about the same rate from one region to another. The exception was the West, where the slightly higher veteran participation could have been an artifact of a younger-age population in the West or of more in-migration of veterans—or both. The level of veteran membership for blacks, however, varied greatly depending on their region of residence. For the Northeast and Midwest, black veteran rates were about the same as white, showing only a slightly lower level than whites in those regions. In the West, black rates of veteran membership were significantly higher than in other region, surpassing white rates in 1950. The South had the lowest level of black veterans, significantly lower than black veteran rates in any other region and markedly different from the participation rate among whites.

Regional Distribution of Veterans and Migrants

To assess the extent to which interstate migration influenced these residence patterns, I calculated the percentage veteran by race and migration status for each

Figure 4-1. Percent Veteran by Region of Residence, 1910 to 1970

(native-born males age 25 and over not currently in the Armed Forces)



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation

Figure 4-2. Percent Veteran by Lifetime Migration Status, Race and Region, 1910 to 1970

(native-born males age 25 and over not currently in the Armed Forces)

migrant = solid line; nonmigrant = dotted line



Source: Author’s tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author’s variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation

region. The results are shown in Figure 4-2. The higher levels of veteran membership in the West do not appear to be the result of increased levels of migration since there were higher percentages of veterans in the non-migrant than the migrant group for both white and black men. In all other regions, whites showed higher levels of veteran participation among interstate migrants than non-migrants, although the migration differential was slight. For blacks, the expected positive relationship between migration and veteran status held only in the South; in all regions, higher levels of veteran status were shown for non-migrants than for migrants. Compared to whites, the veteran membership gap between migrants and non-migrants was considerably wider.

To some extent, these results may derive more from the Southern pattern of black military service than from the influence of veteran status on migration. If black military service was low in the South and blacks out-migration from the South was high—as it was following World War II—then few Southern black out-migrants were at risk of being veteran. These non-veteran migrants then contributed disproportionately to the migration-veteran relationship in destination regions.

Figure 4-3 restates the information in the migration-by-age group rates shown in Chapter 2 by swapping units measured and categories on the two axes; the figures report the change over time in percentage lifetime migration by veteran status for each region. The result shows the degree of resettlement in each region for these subpopulations. The first observation is that the patterns for each region over time generally reflect the lifetime migration patterns by race shown in earlier national graphs. What is striking, however, is that blacks and whites had very different experiences of settlement—or resettlement—depending on their region of residence.

In the South, both populations shared relatively low rates of interstate migration and, for both races, there were more migrants among the veteran groups than among nonveterans. Both groups also shared a relatively similar resettlement experience in the West, but here that shared experience was one of *high* levels of interstate migration. For both groups, the years following World War II showed no increase in migration among veterans; here it is nonveterans that had modestly higher rates of migration until 1970. The picture is quite different, however, in the Northeast and Midwest. In these regions, blacks and whites had very different settlement experiences with whites being mostly settled non-migrants and blacks being overwhelmingly in-migrants. Veteran status, too, works in opposite directions in these regions; blacks have no gain to migration from veteran status while whites do show at least a modest gain.

Figure 4-3. Percent Lifetime Migrant by Veteran Status, Race and Region, 1910 to 1970

(native-born males age 25 and over not currently in the Armed Forces)

nonveteran = solid line; veteran = dotted line



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

Distribution of Veterans and Migrants by Type of Place

Since differential rates of population growth among regions attributable to migration are related to changes over time in the opportunities available, it is useful to keep in mind that for most of the nineteenth century, internal migration in the United States was land-seeking. Among white migrants, both native- and foreign-born, the lure of cheap land spread them fairly evenly over the rural landscape from one region to another wherever there was land available. By 1900, the land was essentially all taken. In contrast to this national array of migration destinations available to whites, black migration during this period was confined mostly to the South.

Black out-migration from the South began to increase at the turn of the twentieth century and was directed first to the Northeast and Midwest. Like the masses of immigrants arriving in the United States at the same time, most blacks moved to cities for jobs in the expanding industrial sector. Unlike earlier migrants and immigrants, blacks and the new foreign born did not distribute themselves evenly within the states and regions they occupied but concentrated primarily in cities and larger towns.

Thus the three native-born subpopulations of men in this study—whites with native-born parents, whites with foreign-born parents, and blacks—faced the migration decision from different sets of group origins and settlement histories. These differences, in turn, influenced their evaluation of the relative opportunities facing them if they chose to migrate.

Figures 4-4 and 4-5 show the change in farm and rural nonfarm residence over time for lifetime migrants of the three study populations. Veterans are identified from 1930 onward. In both figures, the three groups show the expected differences in propensity to reside in these rural places. The decreased rate of residence in these places over time indicates the decline in their opportunity value for migrants. Over time, interstate migrants are choosing these places at lower and lower rates. These places are even less attractive to veterans over time than to nonveterans; for all three groups in both places, veterans move to rural places at lower rates than nonveterans for the entire period 1930 to 1970. If there is less opportunity in rural places, veterans appear to have advantage over non-veterans in moving to better outcomes elsewhere.

The upward sloping lines of the graphs in Figures 4-6 and 4-7 indicate places that migrants were finding increasingly attractive. Among whites, lifetime migrants in both groups have chosen suburban residence at increasing rates (Figure 4-6). Those with foreign-born parents began this trend earlier and have higher suburban residence in 1970, while those with native-born parents have a higher suburban residence among

Figure 4-4. Farm Residence of Lifetime Migrants, 1900 to 1970 *

(native-born males not currently in the Armed Forces, age 25 and over))

Nonveteran = solid line; veteran = dotted line



* Veteran Status not available until 1930.

Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

Figure 4-5. Rural Non-Farm Residence of Lifetime Migrants, 1900 to 1970 *

(native-born males not currently in the Armed Forces, age 25 and over))

Nonveteran = solid line; veteran = dotted line



* Veteran Status not available until 1930.

Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation

Figure 4-6. Suburban Residence of Lifetime Migrants, 1900 to 1970 *

(native-born males not currently in the Armed Forces, age 25 and over))

Nonveteran = solid line; veteran = dotted line



* Veteran Status not available until 1930.

Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation

veterans. For blacks, suburban residence is low throughout the period and shows no consistent gain to veteran status.

Central city residence, shown in Figure 4-7, had a different pattern. Among native-stock whites, city residence increased until 1930—with a substantial increase among veterans for this destination—but fell thereafter. City residence increased again in 1960; given the 1950 trough, however, it is also possible that this gain was the result of the expansion of city boundaries in some metropolitan areas. Foreign-stock whites also had a peak of central city residence in 1930. For both groups, veterans by the end of the period were choosing central city residence at the same low rate as nonveterans. Only black migrants showed an increasing preference for central city residence over the entire time period. There is a significant increase in the percent of veterans choosing central city destinations but the gap is shrinking by 1970.

The place of residence descriptive graphs shown here have the same limitation as earlier lifetime migration analyses; it is not possible to know when the people moved or what the impact was of changes in the age structure of any part of the population. For example, given the productivity increases in agriculture and the known age structure of the farm population, it is likely that the decline in farm residence among lifetime migrants was much steeper than shown in the graph for younger men following World War II. Fortunately, the census questions on migration that began in 1940 also contained general place information on migrant origins.

Origins and Destinations of Veteran and Non-Veteran Migrants

Although we do not know the influence of age structure or timing of moves from the previous figures, it is clear that both veteran and nonveteran migrants in this era increasingly were moving out of rural areas. Figure 4-8 shows the percentage of recent inter-county and interstate migrants whose recent moves had their origin in metropolitan areas.

Among both inter-county and interstate migrants, veterans were more likely to have metropolitan origins than non-veterans. Metropolitan dominance for veterans held for all subpopulations in all years in both levels of migration. As expected from

Figure 4-7. Central City Residence of Lifetime Migrants, 1900 to 1970 *

(native-born males not currently in the Armed Forces, age 25 and over))

Nonveteran = solid line; veteran = dotted line



* Veteran Status not available until 1930.

Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

Figure 4-8. Metropolitan Origin of Recent Migrants, 1940 to 1970

(native-born males age 25 and over not currently in the Armed Forces)



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

their settlement history, foreign-stock whites had the highest percentage of metropolitan origin; blacks had the lowest levels in general, although the gap between veterans and nonveterans was widest for blacks.

Native-stock whites had the lowest levels of metropolitan origin. In 1940, on average only 38 percent who moved between counties came from metropolitan areas; the majority—about 62 percent—moved from rural areas of their state. For blacks, about 25 percent came from metro areas and 75 percent from rural areas in the state. Metropolitan origins were more common among interstate migrants but here, too, native-stock whites and blacks lagged behind foreign-stock whites.

For all groups the metropolitan origin levels increased over time but with important differences among groups, especially in the early decades presented. Figures 4-9 and 4-10 assess the differences in metropolitan destinations of recent inter-county and interstate migrants from rural areas. A definite shift can be seen in destination choices among groups after World War II. In 1940, inter-county migrants of all groups selected city or suburban residence at about the same levels, accounting for the differences among groups in settlement patterns and proportion with nonmetropolitan origin. After the war, however, blacks from rural areas in the state moved to the central city and whites of both nativity groups moved to the suburbs. For whites bound for either destination, veterans moved there at higher rates than nonveterans. Black veterans moved to the city at significantly higher rates than nonveterans but were generally outpaced by nonveterans in moves to the suburbs.

These patterns are even more striking for interstate migrants from rural areas, shown in Figure 4-10. While there was variation between native- and foreign-stock whites in inter-county moves, interstate whites who move from rural areas were fairly uniform in their choices: few interstate migrants settled in central cities. Among those who did, foreign stock veterans were less likely to live in a central city than nonveterans. Black interstate migrants were more than twice as likely to live in cities with even larger rates among black veterans. Blacks leaving rural areas for suburbs in a different state were so rare that there are not enough cases to report until 1960.

Figure 4-9. Metropolitan Destinations of Inter-County Migrants From Non-metropolitan Origins, 1940 to 1970

(native-born males age 25 and over not currently in the Armed Forces)



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

Figure 4-10. Metropolitan Destinations of Interstate Migrants From Non-Metropolitan Origins, 1940 to 1970

(native-born males age 25 and over not currently in the Armed Forces)



Source: Author’s tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author’s variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

Central City Destinations of World War II Veteran and Non-Veteran Movers and Migrants

Figure 4-11 shows the metropolitan residence for the cohort for which the most gain to migration from veteran status is expected—those men age 20 to 29 at the end of World War II. The top figure shows the proportion of within-county movers with central city destinations for the three study groups; the bottom panel shows those with suburban destinations. Native-stock white men were least likely of the three groups to live in central cities, although there was some modest increase as the cohort ages. Among foreign-stock whites, central city residence for within-county moves declined. Over time, black central city residence dominates, with veterans showing a higher proportion of central city moves than nonveterans. Whites from both groups showed increasing preference for suburban locations over time, with veterans consistently having a larger share of suburban residence than nonveterans. Blacks, on the other hand, had persistently low rates of suburban residence with very little difference between veterans and nonveterans.

Central city residence for inter-county migrants for this cohort is shown in Figure 4-12. These patterns of recent migration mirror the lifetime patterns shown earlier. Blacks migrated to central cities at increasing rates for both types of migration, with veterans showing a higher propensity for central city residence than nonveterans throughout the period. In 1950, white veterans with native-born parents were more likely than nonveterans to migrate to cities across either county or state lines. White veterans with foreign-born parents, however, were significantly more likely to make inter-county moves within the same state while nonveterans were more likely to move interstate. Black interstate migrants overwhelmingly settled in central cities, with veterans migrating to cities at rates 10 to 15 percent above nonveterans.

Figure 4-11. Metropolitan Destinations of Within-County Movers of the World War II Cohort, 1950 to 1970

(native-born males age 20 to 29 in 1945 not currently in the Armed Forces)



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

Figure 4-12. Central City Destination of Migrants of the World War II Cohort, 1950 to 1970

(native-born males age 20 to 29 in 1945 not currently in the Armed Forces)



Source: Author's tabulations from IPUMS data extract. See Appendix 1. Data and Methods for specific samples, case selections and author's variable transformations. Source Data: Ruggles, Sobek, et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0*, 2008. See bibliography for full citation.

Suburban Destinations of World War II Veteran and Non-Veteran Movers and Migrants

Given the patterns of central city residential choice among the study populations, it is no surprise to find the reciprocal patterns reflected in the selection of suburban residence by inter-county and interstate migrants, as shown in Figure 4-13. Foreign-stock men dominated in both types of migration, followed by whites with native-born parents and, finally, blacks. Here, too, there were too few cases to report for black veterans living in suburbs in 1950. Only in 1960 do we see black inter-county migrants having higher suburban residence among veterans than nonveterans. For interstate migrants, there was a higher percentage of suburban residence among veterans in 1960 and 1970, but the difference between the two was nothing of the magnitude of veteran gain for central city residence. Among whites, there were generally higher levels of suburban residence among veteran groups than nonveterans; the single exception was in 1950, when inter-county foreign stock nonveterans were 18 percent more likely to reside in suburbs than veterans. However, both veteran and nonveteran foreign stock whites showed higher levels than native stock whites or blacks.

Significance of Veteran Status and Migration For Suburban Residence in 1960

In Chapter 2, I used binary logistic regression to assess the influence of veteran status on lifetime and recent interstate migration. The same statistical technique is used here to isolate the influence of veteran status and migration on the selection of suburban residence in the post-World War II era of massive suburban expansion.

The *dependent variable* of this regression is “suburban residence,” calculated as the probability that a person will reside in a metropolitan area outside a central city. Most of the personal characteristics included as independent variables in the earlier models are used again here. I omitted the variable CHILDREN, which merely identified the presence or absence of own children in the household. Because the quality of the school system has been shown to influence choice of metropolitan residence, I substituted SCHOOL BOUND CHILDREN—a more detailed set of

Figure 4-13. Suburban Destinations of World War II Cohort Migrants, 1950 to 1970

(native-born males age 20 to 29 in 1945 not currently in the Armed Forces)



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dichotomous variables which identify school needs of children in the household. In addition, I added RECENT MIGRANT to control for differential levels of recent inter-county and interstate migration among the three subgroups. As before, I regressed the model separately for each group. The *independent variables* retained for this model are

- VETERAN STATUS: two categories: no (reference), yes
- RECENT MIGRANT: three categories
    - Not a recent migrant (reference)
    - Recent inter-county migrant
    - Recent interstate migrant
- BIRTH REGION (constructed from state of birth): four categories[1]
    - Northeast (reference), Midwest, South, West
    - Geographic control for the variation in ease of migrating out of some states; e.g., Rhode Island is very small with relatively high density while Texas is very large and has relatively low density even in urban areas
    - Geographic control for variation in distributions of white native stock, white foreign stock, and black subpopulations
- EDUCATION: three categories
    - Elementary or less (reference)
    - Secondary
    - College
- OCCUPATION: five categories
    - Laborers
    - Mechanics
    - Clerical
    - Managerial
    - Professional
    - All other occupations (reference)
    - The categories were selected to capture occupations for which (1) military service provided training and experience while a soldier (mechanics); (2) veteran benefits provided formal education (Professional); or (3) veteran preference gave competitive advantage over nonveterans (clerical and managerial).

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[1] Alaska and Hawaii have been excluded from the study. See Appendix 1: Data and Methods.

  - Occupation also serves as a control for differences in the ability to finance transportation and moving expenses.
- MARITAL STATUS[2]: two categories: no (reference), yes
- SCHOOL BOUND CHILDREN: four categories
  - No children or youngest over 18 (reference)
  - Youngest child under 5
  - Youngest child 5 to 13
  - Youngest child 14 to 18
- AGE (in 1960): two categories (35-39, 40-44)
  - 35 to 39 (reference)
  - 30 to 44
  - Limiting the study group to those who were age 20 to 29 at the end of the war provides some control on age features. Some additional control is necessary for differential time spent at risk for years of experience. The use of two five-year age groups does this without introducing spurious significance introduced by the linear relationship of age in single years.

All variables in the regression are categorical and have been set in the regression as individual dummy variables with values of 1 if the condition exists for that case and 0 if it is absent. The reference for interpretation of results of the binary logistic regression possess is that group of characteristics *least predictive* of the behavior measured—in this case, suburban residence. The reference group for the suburban residence model is men who:

- were not veterans
- were not recent migrants
- were living in the Northeast
- had an elementary education or less
- were included in "other occupations"
- were not head of household
- were not married
- had no school age children, and
- were age 35 to 39 in 1960.

The same 1960 census sample data used in the earlier regressions were analyzed here.

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[2] Since this variable is intended to capture possible limitations to an individual's decision to migrate, only those who were married with a spouse present are coded "yes."

Results for the binary logistic regressions on the probability of suburban residence in 1960 are shown in Table 4-1.[3] Holding other key characteristics constant, white native-stock veterans are 18 percent more likely to be living outside their state of birth than their nonveteran counterparts. Foreign-stock veterans have only a 10 percent increased probability of suburban residence than nonveterans. Blacks show the highest influence of veteran status on suburban residence; among this group, veterans are 21 percent more likely to live in suburbs than nonveterans. Migration of both types is reported as having more influence for blacks and foreign stock whites than for native whites, as is the presence of school age children. The latter reflects the high levels of metropolitan origins for the two groups.

Summary of Findings:

- REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF VETERANS: Veteran membership among whites was virtually the same for all regions and varied only with the scope of the military draft for the previous major war. The slight increase among whites of the percentage veteran in the West could be the result of a younger age distribution or of increased migration—or both. Among blacks, veteran participation varied considerably by region; while rates in the Northeast and Midwest mirrored those of whites, over the entire time span, blacks had significantly lower levels of veteran membership in the South and exceeded levels of either race in the West.
- REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MIGRANT AND NONMIGRANT VETERANS: In the West, there were higher percentages of veterans in the non-migrant than the migrant group for both white and black men. In all other regions, whites showed higher levels of veteran participation among interstate migrants than non-migrants, although the migration differential was slight. For

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[3] Only the odds ratios are shown here. The means, standard deviations and number of cases for means testing of suburban residence and the independent variables are shown in Appendix Tables A-12 to A-14.

Table 4-1. Probability of Suburban Residence in 1960

(native born males age 20 to 29 in 1945)

	White Native Born Parents		White Foreign Born Parents		Black Native Born Parents	
Veteran Status						
Not a veteran (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00	
Veteran	1.18	***	1.10	**	1.21	**
Recent Migrant						
Not a recent migrant (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00	
Recent inter-county migrant	1.30	***	2.76	***	2.14	***
Recent interstate migrant	1.36	***	1.49	***	1.77	***
Birth Region						
Northeast (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00	
Midwest	0.58	***	0.88	***	0.57	**
South	0.37	***	0.46	***	0.58	***
West	0.67	***	0.90	*	1.00	
Education						
Elementary or less (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00	
Secondary	1.16	***	1.17	***	0.97	
College	1.44	***	1.39	***	0.89	
Occupation						
Other (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00	
Laborers	0.84	***	1.11		1.34	***
Mechanics	1.32	***	1.29	***	1.36	**
Clerical	1.16	***	0.90		0.70	
Managers	1.17	***	1.13	**	1.36	
Professional	1.27	***	1.16	**	0.97	
Marital Status						
Not married (reference)	1.00		1.00		1.00	
Married	1.47		1.35	***	1.20	**
School Bound Children						
No children or youngest over 18	1.00		1.00		1.00	
Youngest child under 5	1.06		1.30	***	1.38	**
Youngest child 5 to 13	1.05		1.28	***	1.17	
Youngest child 14 to 18	1.00		1.14		1.50	**
Age Group						
35 to 39 (reference	1.00		1.00		1.00	
40 to 44	1.00		1.05		1.04	
Constant	0.44	***	0.34	***	0.14	***
Nagelkerke R-square	0.07		0.058		0.028	
Number of Cases	54,891		21,074		7,807	

Significance level: * indicates $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Means, standard deviations and case cases for means testing of lifetime migration and the independent variables are shown in Appendix Tables A-12 to A-14.

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blacks, however, the positive relationship between migration and veteran status held only in the South; in all regions, higher levels of veteran status were shown for black non-migrants than for migrants. Compared to whites, the veteran gap between migrants and non-migrants was considerably wider.

- REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MIGRANTS: Blacks and whites had very different settlement experiences depending on their region of residence. In the South, both populations shared relatively low rates of interstate migration; for both races there were more migrants among veterans than among nonveterans. In the West, both groups shared a similar experience of high levels of interstate migration; in the years following World War II there was no increase in migration among veterans. In the Northeast and Midwest, blacks and whites had very different settlement experiences; among whites, non-migrants were the predominated while blacks had high levels of in-migrants. Veteran status, too, worked in opposite directions in these regions; blacks had no gain to migration from veteran status while whites did show at least a modest gain.
- LIFETIME MIGRATION ORIGINS AND DESTINATIONS: Lifetime interstate migrants in all three study groups showed declining rates of rural residence over time. From 1900 to 1970, farms and other rural places were rapidly losing their attraction to migrants as places of opportunity. For all groups, there were lower levels of rural residence among veterans than among nonveterans. Destinations that did attract interstate migrants were in the metropolitan areas. White lifetime migrants—both native stock and foreign stock—increasingly moved to suburban areas; white veterans had higher suburban residence than nonveterans. Blacks had very low suburban residence and almost no gain to veteran status. Instead, black lifetime migrants moved to central cities, at rates substantially higher than whites and with a larger gain to veteran status.
- RECENT MIGRATION ORIGINS: For all groups, inter-county migrants had higher levels of rural origin than interstate migrants. For both types of migration, blacks had more rural origin migrants than whites, and native stock

whites had more rural out-migrants than foreign stock whites; veterans frequently had higher levels of metropolitan origin than their nonveteran counterparts. Differences in origin between veterans and nonveterans were most pronounced for blacks.

- RECENT MIGRATION COHORT DESTINATIONS: For the World War II cohort, recent migrants showed greater preference for central city destinations than those with inter-county moves. Blacks are significantly more likely to move to city residences and veterans have substantially higher rates than nonveterans. Among whites, veterans do not show the same higher level of city preference over nonveterans; after 1950, white veteran status had little influence on central city residence. The pattern for suburban residence was reversed, with very low rates of suburban residence for blacks; black suburban preference actually declined for the cohort after 1950. White preference for suburban residence rose through the period. Foreign-stock whites moved to suburban residence at higher rates than native stock whites. White veterans in all years had higher suburban residence than nonveterans.
- REGRESSION RESULTS – SUBURBAN RESIDENCE: A binary logistic regression on the probability of suburban residence was run for each study group. Controlling for human capital characteristics, recent migration type and school age children, veterans were found to have a higher probability of living in a suburb than nonveterans. White veterans with native-born parents were 18 percent more likely to live in suburbs than nonveterans and foreign-stock white veterans were 10 percent more likely. Blacks received the most gain from veteran status, with black veterans being 21 percent more likely to live in suburbs than nonveterans. Recent migration and the presence of school age children were also found to have more influence on suburban residence for these two groups than for native-stock whites.

American veterans came home from World War II and then moved on. Veterans moved more than non-veterans; native-born whites—and those children of foreign born new to full-fledged white status—were privileged to move anywhere in the country they chose. In significant proportions, they moved to the suburbs regardless of whether they started from rural or metropolitan origins. This was a new type of metropolitan experience, one with less diversity of race, and age and life-course status than had previously existed.

There is a deep human story to be told in all migration. But the story told by the migration of the World War II generation—of whom so much was asked and to whom so much was given—reveals how willing Americans were as a society to accept the sons of all our residents into full citizenship. This would be especially important for the children of those immigrants who came here at the turn of the century and constituted the largest wave of *foreign* in-migrants in our nation's history. It would be equally important to the children of blacks born in the South whose northward migration to safety and jobs in northern cities constituted the largest wave of *internal* in-migrants to the nation's history. How well do these patterns of migration levels and divergent destinations fit with the current explanations social change during this period?

Chapter 5.

Post-World War II Suburban Charter Communities: Migrant White Veterans in a New Middle Class

The millions of young men who came home from Europe and the Pacific after World War II were a privileged generation. Much of this privilege was accidental. They were born into one of the smallest cohorts in American history. This would have given them a competitive edge in the labor market even if the structure of the American economy had not been transformed by the war.[1] The economy did not stay the same, of course; it *was* transformed by the war. The occupational structure of the United States had changed so much before and after the war that the Census Bureau had to completely revamp the way it classified work for the 1950 census. The generation that came of age during World War II had lived through the Great Depression but mostly as children, spared the worst of the hard choices faced by their parents. They were the first generation to reach adulthood with the understanding that they would not have to be the sole guarantors for the welfare of their parents in old age.

This generation went to war in massive numbers in a protracted foreign war fought for other people's freedom. Many were drafted but many volunteered for service. Unlike soldiers in other conflicts, however, this generation had confidence in the cause. When the war was over, they were brought home to a hero's welcome and the largest set of veterans' benefits in the nation's history. This was not an accident; it was planned. This generation of American soldiers was endowed with privilege through the efforts of post-war reconversion planners and the American Legion.[2]

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[1] Richard A. Easterlin*, Birth and Fortune: The Impact of Numbers of Personal Welfare, 2nd ed*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980.

[2] See Jack Stokes Ballard, *The Shock of Peace: Military and Economic Demobilization after World War II* (Washington: University Press of America, 1983); John D. Black and Charles D. Hyson, "Postwar Soldier Settlement," *Quarterly Journal of Economics 59* (November 1944), 1-35; Seymour E. Harris, ed., *Economic Reconstruction* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1945); R. B. Davis, *Preparing for Ulysses: Politics and Veterans During World War II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); William Pencak, *For God & Country: The American Legion, 1919-1941* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1989).

The policymakers who devised America's post-World War II recovery program knew that a massive financial stimulus would be needed to keep the country from repeating the economic dislocations that followed World War I. They knew that the economy would require a workforce with different skills and education than the labor force had when America entered the war. The American Legion helped ensure that veterans would benefit from both circumstances.

Between 1945 and 1955, the government of the United States invested $33 billion dollars in veteran housing and $14.5 billion on education and training programs—including $5.5 billion for college and professional school programs.


WOLVES
Brigham
87th
Utah
TEXAS
Nevada
Brooklyn
Kansas City
TEXAS
Detroit
Dearborn
Florida
Penna.
New Jersey

Figure 5-1. Veterans Heading Home from LeHavre, France, May 25, 1945. Photo courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration, Locator: 111-SC-207868.

Expenditures for veteran benefits in 1947 alone were $6.3 billion in 1947 dollars—more than was spent on the European Recovery program in the first year.[3]

The combined impact of these benefits is easy to assess. An enormous new middle class emerged from this generation. Their consumption levels would power the American economy for more than a generation, starting with the explosion in housing construction and home ownership. The demand for housing was so great that it could only be met through the construction of thousands of new communities, mostly on land outside existing municipal boundaries. The result was the creation of new, uniquely homogeneous communities of people roughly the same age and in the same stage in the life cycle, where families had two parents and one wage-earner. Families in these communities shared new schools and a new life style which would become the new standard against which American culture would measure success.

But post-war America was still a segregated society. Prior to 1940, white experience of segregation was limited primarily to those living or born in the South. It is understood that young men of the South who came of age during World War II were socialized to a world that was separated by skin color. What is not well understood is the role that World War II military service played in extending this socialization to those from other regions as well. As in all other wars except the American Revolution, blacks and whites served separately. Whites with no experience of segregation prior to World War II lived a Jim Crow lifestyle while in the military. When these young men came home from the war, it was not illogical to accept the residential and institutional separation of people based on the color of their skin.

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[3] Irving H. Siegel and Edgar Weinberg, “Public Expenditures for Veterans’ Assistance, *The Journal of Political Economy 56* (February 1950), 70-74; Howard G. Schaller, “Veterans Transfer Payments and State Per Capita Incomes, 1929, 1939, and 1949,” *The Review of Economics and Statistics 35* (November 1953), 325-332; Michael J. Bennett, *When Dreams Came True: The GI Bill and the Making of Modern America* (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1996); and Irving H. Siegel and F. W. Taylor, “State Bonuses for Veterans,” *The Journal of Political Economy 58* (December 1948), 527-532.



Figure 5-2. Segregated Airmen in World War II. The American armed forces remained segregated throughout World War II. Black servicemen rarely were assigned to technical or professional jobs. Even when they were, as with the these pilots, they served in separate units. Everyone considered white served together regardless of nativity or religion. Photos courtesy of the National Archives & Records Administration (above, Locator: 208-N-38374) and the Library of Congress (below, Local Identifier 208-N-32987).

America has a history of residential segregation by race and ethnicity. For whites, this history ended with World War II. The history of immigrant settlement in the United States is one of racial contest for white status.[4] This contest had been won before World War II began. Most immigrants from Europe were seen as white and, as such, served their military enlistments with other white soldiers. They shared the galvanizing experience that any war brings, but which was especially meaningful for this cohort. They shared the same access to veteran benefits as other whites. When the war ended, second generation immigrant offspring would move as freely as any white person into the metropolitan destination of their choice—central city or suburb. Increasingly their choice was suburban; it was where successful families moved.

If mobility and veteran status were the hallmarks of a new class of Americans, America was willing to grant this citizenship to the children of its most feared immigrants. They had full access to veteran benefits and they move freely after the war. The same was not true for America's second generation black citizens. Black veterans had served as eagerly as whites in World War II but they were routinely denied the same access to full benefits as white veterans. Some of this was the legacy of generations of economic and political disadvantage that resulted in poorer education of blacks at the start of the war. But much of it was due to the racist attitudes of local authorities and the persistence of legal segregation.

In 1945, the only area of American life in which it was illegal to discriminate was in federal employment or in firms with federal contracts. This was the legacy of the 1942 Executive Order, which black civil rights leaders won; they lost on their demand to have the military desegregated at the same time. As a result of legal discrimination and segregation, blacks were not allowed to move wherever they would otherwise have chosen. When blacks migrated out of the South after the war, they were constrained to many fewer location options than white migrants. With but a few exceptions, the new suburban communities which become the standard for American success were closed to blacks.

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[4] There is a rich and growing literature on the contest of immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe for status as white in American society, especially in the field labor history. See David R. Roediger, Towards the Abolition of Whiteness: Essays on Race, Politics, and Working Class History (London and New York: Verso, 1994); Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1998); Eric Arnesen, "Whiteness and the Historians' Imagination," International Labor and Working-Class History 60 (Fall 2001), 3-32; and Roediger, Working Toward Whiteness: How America's Immigrants Became White, The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs (New York: Basic Books, 2005).

What could federal programs intended to benefit all veterans become so disproportionately skewed to one group? And how does this show itself in the spatial redistribution of the population after World War II?

In *Dividing Citizens*, Suzanne Mettler uses case studies to demonstrate the way in which New Deal social programs, such as the Social Security Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act, created a gendered understanding of civic standing and citizenship.[5] In theory, these programs were intended to provide a minimum wage and a system of basic support in times of need on which all Americans could rely. In practice, however, Mettler shows that national programs administered by states and local units of government actually worked to institutionalize pre-existing gender norms and further privilege men over women. During World War II women gained in economic status—and therefore social and civic standing—but these gains were transitory.

The policy theory and rhetoric that implied equal treatment for women also promised a new social position for black Americans. The laws establishing Social Security, for example, were clear that they would not discriminate based on color—*for all jobs covered under the act.* Most of these covered jobs were held by white men. And, as Mettler points out, plans to extend the social welfare safety net to all Americans—as promised by the National Resources Planning Board and other agencies planning post-war reconversion—never materialized. Mettler identifies the GI Bill—used mainly by men—as a principle reason for the failure of a more inclusive social welfare policy after the war.

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[5] Suzanne Mettler, *Dividing Citizens: Gender and Federalism in New Deal Public Policy* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998).

Mettler returns to the role of the GI Bill in *Soldiers to Citizens*.[6] Beginning in 1998, she conducted a mail-in survey of a sample of surviving World War II veterans, using a carefully constructed but admittedly non-random design. She collected information on a wide variety of experiences and attitudes of the veterans toward their military service, their use of G.I. Bill benefits, and the extent of civic involvement following the war. The response was more than 70 percent, yielding a total of 716 completed surveys. She followed up with personal interviews with a further sample of those who responded to the surveys. Among the many projects documenting the "greatest generation" over the last ten years, Mettler's study is the most comprehensive and systematic assessment of World War II veteran experiences.

The findings reported in Soldiers to Citizens about the role of the GI Bill extend the argument Mettler made about the New Deal social welfare programs in Dividing Citizens. Veterans who used their GI Bill benefits felt increased civic standing because of them; they believed that their service to their country had been rewarded and privileged that that their government had invested in their future. Mettler argues that the use of the GI Bill benefits led to higher rates of civic engagement at the community level as well as greater voter turnout and direct political participation.[7]

An alternative explanation is suggested by the findings of the current study. First, civic participation was already on the rise between World Wars I and II, largely organized by the American Legion. While it is true that other civic organizations thrived in this period, none was as large, as well funded or politically connected as the American Legion. What's more, of all the voluntary associations active in this period, only the American Legion made the direct connection between civic involvement, patriotism, and the model citizen. The young men who served in World War II had grown up in this culture of civic patriotism galvanized to military service.

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[6] Suzanne Mettler, *Soldiers to Citizens: The G.I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); see also Mettler. "Bringing the State Back in to Civic Engagement: Policy Feedback Effects of the G.I Bill for World War II Veterans," *American Political Science Review 96* (June 2002), 351-365.

[7] For an earlier treatment of the argument that World War II veteran benefits increased civic status for men, see Gretchen Ritter, "Of War and Virtue: Gender, American Citizenship and Veterans' Benefits after World War II," *Comparative Social Research 20* (2001), 201-226.

The role that was expected of them as adults had been modeled for them their entire lives. In addition, the social status of the veteran had been actively built up by the American Legion in the 25 years prior to World War II; the veterans of this war were the first to experience the benefits of this new status.[8]

Second, in the post-war period of high migration veterans were shown to be more likely to move across county and state lines than non-veterans. Migration—as opposed to residential mobility—is more likely to be accompanied by disruptions in family and social networks. Joining an American Legion post would be a logical way for newcomers to find a social network, as would active participation voluntary civic organizations. Among this generation, especially, higher migration rates would be suggestive of higher levels of civic participation if only as a way of settling in to the new community.



Figure 5-3. Moving Day. Lakewood, California, a suburb of Los Angeles, December 9, 1952. Photographer: J. R. Eyerman. Photo courtesy of Time, Inc., LIFE photo archive hosted by Google, http://images.google.com/hosted/life.

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[8] The Veterans of Foreign War (VFW) was the second largest organization of veterans in the first half of the twentieth century. For a parallel evaluation of the role of the VFW's contribution to the formation of the patriotic veteran, see Stephen R. Ortiz, "'Soldier-Citizens': The Veterans of Foreign Wars and Veteran Political Activism from the Bonus March to the GI Bill." Ph.D. diss., University of Florida, Gainesville, 2004.

Third, as has been shown, veterans—especially white veterans—had a preference for suburban settlement in the post-war period. Suburbs grew faster than central cities and farm and rural non-farm populations were shrinking. Many new suburban communities were established in this time period; even in older suburbs and central cities, the high fertility rates of this cohort led to the establishment of new schools and other service organizations. Given the high rates of military service among this cohort and the increased probability that these veterans would live in new suburban communities, it is a logical conclusion that these men would—of necessity—be more involved in civic life. If it were to happen at all, odds were that these organizations would run largely on veteran volunteerism.

More important, however, is what is missing from Mettler's analysis of civic enhancement in *Soldiers to Citizens*, and that is the extension of the principle of the elevation of one group of citizens over others that was the key finding of *Dividing Citizens*. Women and blacks did not serve in the same numbers as did white males. But those white women who served were entitled to the same veteran benefits as white males. This was not true for blacks for the same underlying reasons that Mettler identifies as effectively excluding women in *Dividing Citizens.*[9] The GI Bill was a national policy but it was implemented in a system of state and local laws influenced by the social conditioning of both blacks and whites. In theory, blacks were entitled to education and housing benefits. In practice, a smaller proportion of blacks than whites was able to access these benefits. Segregation was legal. Discrimination was legal in housing and all private employment.[10] The result of the privileged treatment of white soldiers and white veterans—both those of foreign-born parents as well as native-born parents—is that more whites were able to move up in the post-war economy than were blacks. Thus, the actual as well as the perceived gap between the two groups widened[11] and this widening difference had a spatial expression.

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[9] The role of state and local governments as a barrier between the federal veterans benefit program and the individual World War II veteran is analyzed in Kathleen Jill Frydl, "The G.I. Bill." Ph.D. diss., The University of Chicago, 2000.

[10] For a discussion of the role of discrimination and segregation in the treatment of black veterans, see David H. Onkst, "'First a Negro … Incidentally a Veteran': Black World War Two Veterans and the G.I. Bill of Rights in the Deep South, 1944-1948," *Journal of Social History 31* (1998), 517-543; and Hilary Herbold, "Never a Level Playing Field: Blacks and the GI Bill," *The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education* (Winter 1994/95), 104-108. Blacks were not the only group systematically excluded from veteran benefits. For a discussion of the use of "other than honorable" discharges to deny benefits to gays and lesbians, see Margot Canaday, "Building a Straight State: Sexuality and Social Citizenship under the 1944 G.I. Bill, *The Journal of American History 90* (December 2003), 935-957.

As Thomas Sugrue shows in his case study of post-war Detroit, the failure of white society to allow blacks to share in these benefits is another form of "resource hoarding." As described by Charles Tilly, historical inequality arises and persists when one power group "hoard political and economic resources … to their own advantage."[12] The failure of black veterans to garner the same benefits from their military service as whites aggravated racial tensions created by resource hoarding in the face of increased black immigration. Detroit, as many other industrial centers, had attracted labor-seeking migrants prior to the war. Black migration increased to these areas as defense plants drew in more workers, especially after the executive order making it illegal to discriminate in government employment or defense contract work. With so many new in-migrants—both black and white—and the existing housing shortage, conflicts arose in many parts of the country.[13]

While most of these metropolitan case studies confront the differential movement of blacks and whites in their communities, none addresses the question of differential treatment of black and white veterans. While they grapple with changing attitudes toward race, none of them make more than passing reference to the new position of the second generation immigrant. The findings of the this study are a first step in filling this gap, demonstrating that the adult children of the foreign-born are being integrated into the suburbs while blacks—despite their new civic status as veterans—were not allowed the same access to these new communities. In 1950, native whites constituted 78.9 percent of the total population and 86.2 percent of suburban residents. Blacks, on the other hand, comprised 10.2 percent of the total population but only 4.5 percent of suburban population. The white foreign born were about equally represented in both groups, with 10.5 percent of the population and 9.1 percent of the suburbs.[14] By 1970, whites comprised at least 90 percent of the suburban ring of major American metropolitan areas.[15]

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[11] The role of the G.I. Bill in creating a new middle class is examined in Mary Ann O'Donnell, "The G.I. Bill of Rights of 1944 and the Creation of America's Modern Middle Class Society." Ph.D. diss., St. John's University, New York, 2002. For an analysis of the impact of differential usage of GI Bill educational benefits on widening the economic outcomes gap between blacks and whites, see Sarah E. Turner and John Bound, "Closing the Gap or Widening the Divide: The Effects of the G.I. Bill and World War II on the Educational Outcomes of Black Americans," *Journal of Economic History 63* (2003), 145-177; and Anastasia Mann, "All for One, but Most for Some: Veteran Politics and the Shaping of the Welfare State During the World War II Era." Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 2003.

[12] Thomas J. Sugrue. The Origin of the Urban Crisis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005, p. xviii. See also Charles Tilly, *Durable Inequality.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.

[13] Other work describing changing racial attitudes and social relationships that accompanied the migration of blacks and southern whites, see Matthew Lassiter. The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South, Princeton: Princeton University press, 2006; Kevin Kruse, *White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005; James N. Gregory, The Southern Diaspora: How Two Great Migrations Transformed Race, Region, and American Poltiics, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005; Lassiter, "The Suburban Origins of 'Color-Blind' Conservatism: Middle-Class Consciousness in the Charlotte Busing Crisis," Journal of Urban History (May 2004), 549-582; and Gregory, "Southernizing the American Working Class: Post-War Episodes of Regional and Class Transformations," *Labor History 39* (May 1998, 235-154).

As Lizabeth Cohen has documented, the new post-war suburbs were the location of a new form of American civic identity—the role of consumer in a protected and segregated marketplace.[16] From the beginning of reconversion planning, policy-makers understood that increased domestic consumption would be an essential component of a smooth economic transition. New housing construction ensured that durable goods such as washing machines and kitchen appliances would be in high demand. Suburban developments at a distance from urban jobs necessitated the purchase of automobiles. All of this was made possible by the expansion of consumer credit.[17] Access to these credit instruments was more difficult for blacks to obtain and, when they could, was at higher interest rates than that for whites.

The new suburban shopping centers and malls operated under different rules of social space than the marketplaces of the central city core. Identified as private property, shopping malls had their own security force which kept out undesirable characters. Public space, traditionally available to all as a forum for dissent and difference, was transformed into private, consumer space designated for a select group. As was shown in the migration patterns, those moving to metropolitan from non-metropolitan areas most often moved directly to the suburbs, bypassing an urban experience and the chance to interact with either foreign-born or black Americans.

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[14] Duncan, Otis Dudley and Albert J. Reiss, Jr. Social Characteristics of Urban and Rural Communities, 1950. New York: Russell & Russell, 1956, p. 122.

[15] Schnore, Leo F., Carolyn D. André, and Harry Sharp, "Black Suburbanization, 1930-1970," Chap. in *The* C*hanging Face of the Suburbs*, ed. Barry Schwartz, 69-94. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1976.

[16] Lizabeth Cohen, "From Town Center to Shopping Center: The Reconfiguration of Community Marketplaces in Postwar America," *The American Historical Review 101* (October 1996), 1050-1081.

[17] Robert P. Shay, "Postwar Changes in Consumer Financial Markets: Major Developments in the Market for Consumer Credit since the End of World War II," *The Journal of Finance 21* (May 1966), 369-381.

"To a great extent in post-war America, geography is destiny. Access to goods and resources—public services, education, and jobs—depends on your place of residence." One can read in the resettlement patterns the "reallocation of political power and public resources to the increasingly privatized, exclusionary world of white suburbia."[18] For the cohort that came of age in World War II, veterans were more likely than non-veterans to change their place of residence through migration. The new veteran status constructed by the American Legion and other veterans organizations prior to World War II worked to the advantage of all three study populations—sons of the white native-born, the white foreign-born, and blacks. All three groups showed higher rates of migration for veterans than for non-veterans. Not all groups had the same freedom of location, however. The migration patterns presented in this study are a window into the spatial workings of the larger social processes—described by Mettler, Cohen, Sugrue, and others—that privileged veterans over non-veterans, and welcomed second-generation foreign stock whites into the white majority while excluding blacks—even black veterans—from full social and civic inclusion.

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[18] Sugrue, *Origins*, p. xxii.

Appendix 1. Data and Methods

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Data Used

This study uses data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) released by the Minnesota Population Center (MPC) at the University of Minnesota.[1] The IPUMS is the largest source of quantitative information on long-term change in the American population. It incorporates the historical public use samples from 1850 to 1930, created by the MPC from microfilm of the original enumeration forms, with the U.S. Census Bureau's Public Use Samples from 1940 to 2000.

Table A-1. Characteristics of IPUMS Samples and Variable Availability

	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970
Sample Construction	MPC	MPC	MPC	MPC	MPC	USCB *	USCB	USCB
Sample Density	1:100	1:70 *	1:100	1:100	1:100	1:100	1:100	1:100
Cases available *	439,204	782,497	536,597	615,154	677,567	960,441	884,137	985,699
Weight	perwt	perwt	perwt	perwt	slwt	slwt	perwt	perwt
Variables Used *								
relate	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
age	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
sex	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
race	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
region	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
statefip	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
farm	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
metro	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	S1,2
bpl	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
migrate 5/1					x	sl	x	x
migtype 5/1					x	sl	x	x
vetstat					sl	sl	x	x
vetcivwr		x						
vet1930				x				
vetwwi					sl	sl	x	x
vetwwii						sl	x	x
marst	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
nchild	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
higrade					x	sl	x	x
gq	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
yngch	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

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[1] Steven Ruggles, Matthew Sobek, Trent Alexander, Catherine A. Fitch, Ronald Goeken, Patricia Kelly Hall, Miriam King, and Chad Ronnander. *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0 [Machine-readable database]*. Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Population Center [producer and distributor], 2008. http://usa.ipums.org/usa/

The IPUMS integrates a total of 48 census samples into one uniformly coded microdata series spanning the period from 1850 through 2000. Data are free to registered users and available through the web. Researchers access the extract system, select the census samples and variables of interest, then download a tailor-made extract for analysis on their local computer. Data extracts for these analyses were downloaded from July to November, 2008; the system revisions made on November 11, 2008, had no significant impact on the samples or variables used. The list of samples and variables used is shown in Appendix Table A-1.

The primary purpose of the census is to measure the size and distribution of the population for purposes of apportioning representation in the Congress. However, from its earliest days, the census has been used to measure other significant changes in the composition and distribution of the population. The issues of concern changed with the economic and political climate of the nation; variables of interest for this study were added to the census enumeration as official interest in that information increased.

For example, from the first census in 1790 the population has been enumerated by race because the distribution of the free black and slave populations was of concern to the new nation. As states were added to the west and the question of extension of slavery troubled the nation, the 1850 census changed to an enumeration of individuals rather than of households and place of birth for each resident was added.[2] Disability questions were expanded after the Civil War; veteran status was added to the 1910 census to ascertain how many Civil War veteran pensioners and dependents were still alive. Mother's and father's birthplace were first asked in the census of 1880, as immigration—and interest in nativity status—increased.

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[2] For an overview of the social and political issues surrounding the census, see Margo A. Conk, "The 1980 Census in Historical Perspective," Chapter 4 in *The Politics of Numbers,* William Alonso and Paul Starr, eds., New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1987; Margo J. Anderson, *The American Census: A Social History*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988; Diana Magnuson, "The Making of a Modern Census: The United States Census of Population, 1790-1940," Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota; and Diana Magnuson, "Who and What Determined the Content of the U.S. Population Schedule Over time," *Historical Methods 28* (Winter 1995), 11-27. For a thorough look at the history of the census through 1890, especially the legislation for supplemental censuses, see Carroll D. Wright, *The History and Growth of the United States Census*, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1900.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the census regularly reported the movement of population westward along with the advance—and eventual disappearance—of the line of the frontier. Migration became of critical importance in the twentieth century during the Great Depression when economic distress prompted one of the largest migrations of poor and unemployed people in the nation's history. In response to a need for better information on the flow of the population, questions on recent movement were added to the census. The migration question, "residence 5 years ago" has been asked consistently since 1940. In 1950 the reference was shortened to one year because of the roiling of the population in 1945 with the demobilization of 15 million military and industrial workers.

Sample Line Weight

Census Bureau personnel were challenged by the competing demands for more information and better budget control. In 1940 and 1950, the solution was to ask additional questions of those individuals whose names fell on certain lines of the enumeration form. These are known as "sample line" questions and are designated with *"sl"* in Table A-1. When both sample line and non-sample line questions are included in an analysis, the variable *"slwt*" is used to control for the lack of responses from those not asked the question. This weighting variable is essential in 1940 when the sample density of sample line questions was not uniform.

Case Selection and Exclusion

Except for preliminary descriptive statistics, analysis for this study is limited to the migration behavior of specific subgroups of the population of the United States. Cases selection was limited to:

- white males and black males with native born parents
- persons living in households, not in group quarters (the *"gq"* variable)
- persons within the continental United States; for consistency, persons living in Alaska or Hawaii at the time of enumeration were excluded because they are not uniformly captured in the census until statehood in 1959.

- where stated in the figures, persons currently in the military are excluded because their place of residence is not determined voluntarily.

These criteria were applied in drawing the study data from the IPUMS website. I excluded other cases as dictated by the particular analysis. For example, individuals not included on the sample line were automatically eliminated by the *slwt* weight when sample line variables were being analyzed. Similarly, a relatively small number of individuals had unknown values for key variables and these cases were eliminated from that analysis. For each variable, the average values on critical variables—such as veteran status, migration status and race—for the omitted cases were compared with those of the included cases; no significant differences were found between the two groups. It is still possible, however, that these exclusions introduced bias to the results for that analysis.

Variable Definitions

I recoded some original census variables for this study. In other cases, I constructed a new variable from existing information in the census. Key data transformations are identified in the variable definitions. Variables with clearly understood meaning are not included in this listing.

State: State of residence for the individual enumerated. *"statefip"* designates a state variable with a specific numbering system for the state of residence that matches the one used for state of birth.

Metro: Identifies whether a person lived in a metropolitan region or not; in some years, residence in or out of the central city is also given for most people .

Birthplace:
- **bpl –** captures state or country of birth; states are coded with *statefip*
- **birth region** – recode of *bpl* into regions

Migration variables:
Identify people who have moved in a specified period of time; movers who cross county or state boundaries are defined by the Census Bureau as migrants.
- **migrate5/1** – residence five years ago (one year ago in 1950)
- **migtype5/1** – metropolitan residence five years ago (one year ago in 1950)
- **migrate** – I constructed a measure of lifetime migration by comparing *statefip* with *bpl* for each native born individual in the data; if the two state codes do not match, that individual is a migrant; if the state codes match, the person is not a migrant. See "Underestimation of Migration."

Veteran:
Identifies persons who have served in the armed forces of the United States and who were not serving at the time of enumeration. Although it is possible to be serving in the military and be a veteran of a previous war, those people are not counted as veterans.

- **vetstat** – IPUMS uniform veteran status variable 1940-2000
- **vetwwi, vetwwii & vetcivwr (1910)** – identifies service in specific wars
- **vet1930** – veteran question on 1930 census
- **vetall** – I constructed this from *vetstat, vetcivwr* and *vet1930* for a uniform variable identifying veterean status from 1910 to 2000.

Education variables:

- **higrade** - captures the highest single grade of school achieved by the individual
- **elementary** – *higrade* recoded to a 2-value variable; 1=elementary is the highest level of education achieved; 0=not the highest level achieved
- **secondary** – *higrade* recoded to a 2-value variable
- **college** – *higrade* recoded to a 2-value variable

Family composition variables:

- **relate** – relationship to household head identifies family and household relationships
- **head** – recode of *relate*; 1=household head; 0=not the household head
- **marst** – marital status recoded to a 2-value variable; 1=married; 0=not married
- **nchild** – number of own children in the household; recoded to 2-value variable; 1=1 or more children; 0=no children
- **yngch** – age of youngest child in the household in single years
- **school bound children**: *yngch* recoded into four 2-value variables:
  youngest child under 5; 1=yes; 0=no
  youngest child 5-13; 1=yes; 0=no
  youngest child 14-18; 1=yes; 0=no
  no children or youngest child over 18; 1=yes; 0=no

Definition of Migration Measures

According to the definitions used by the U.S. Census Bureau, a mover is anyone who changes residence and a migrant is someone who, in the course of that move, crosses a political boundary. Two measures of migration are used in this study:

Lifetime Migration is defined by the variables for state of birth and state of residence. Persons living outside the state of birth when enumerated are defined as being a lifetime migrant. The advantage of this measure of migration is that the political boundaries used to identify migrants are states, making it a compatible variable over the entire time series; before 1940, no prior residence information other than state of birth was available. This limitation results in an under-representation of total internal migration for several reasons: intrastate movers are excluded, return migrants and repeat movers are unidentifiable, and immigrants are excluded since their place of birth is a foreign country leaving no trace of previous residence in the United States.[3]

Recent Migration is derived from the questions on prior place of residence available in the census from 1940 to 2000. The reference year for the 1950 census is census day of the previous year—1949. The reference year for all other censuses is five years ago. In 1950, recent migration questions are on the sample line, limiting the number of cases available for analysis.

The combination of the two variables used to measure lifetime migration plus the variable for recent migration actually yields five classifications for overall migrant history:

- non-migrant: same state for all three variables
- recent migrant: move out of birth *since* reference year
- early migrant: move out of state of birth *prior* to the reference year
- repeat migrant: different state in all three variables
- return migrant: living in state of birth with different state in reference year

As is shown in Table A-2, each measure of migration misses one type of migrant. The *lifetime measure* misclassifies the *return migrant* while the *recent migration* measure misclassifies the *early migrant*. The older the census respondent, the more years available for moving from state to state. For the very footloose, this could happen several times in either reference period—a lifetime or five years. With census data, neither measure can capture all moves in a complex, multiple migration history. For each person enumerated in the census, the data show state of residence t three reference points: at birth, at enumeration, and five/one years prior to enumeration. Multiple moves in a reference period are hidden; all that is known is whether or not one move of each type occurred between those data points.

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[3] Because of these limitations, interstate migration thus defined will yield lower estimates than many official Census Bureau publications from the early periods.

Table A-2. Underestimation with Two Migration Measures

	Example of Residence History and Classification for each Migrant Type				
	Non-migrant	**Recent Migrant**	**Early Migrant**	**Repeat Migrant**	**Return Migrant**
variable					
state of birth	Ohio	Ohio	Ohio	Ohio	Ohio
residence 5 years ago	Ohio	Ohio	Illinois	Illinois	Illinois
state of residence	Ohio	Illinois	Illinois	Iowa	Ohio
migration measure					
Lifetime migration	Non-migrant	Migrant	Migrant	Migrant	**Non-migrant**
Recent migration	Non-migrant	Migrant	**Non Migrant**	Migrant	Migrant

Constructing Uniform Veteran Age Groups

One of the most powerful features of individual level census microdata is that it reports the age for each individual in the year the census was taken. With this information, I calculated the age at enumeration for people who were 20 to 39 in the last year of major wars for which we have veteran information. Since these are the years young men were most likely to migrate (see Figure 3-4), it is possible to take a retrospective look at post-war migration behavior as far back as the Civil War (see Figure 3-7). Table A-3 shows the age at census of this group for the three major wars fought between 1850 and 1950.

Table A-3. Census Age for those 20 to 39 at War's End

Age 20 to 39 in the last year of this war		Age in Census Year					
		1910	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970
Civil War	1865	65 to 84	na	na	na	na	na
WWI	1918	na	32 to 51	42 to 61	52 to 71	62 to 81	72 to 91
WWII	1945	na	na	na	25 to 44	35 to 54	45 to 64

Constructing Age Cohorts

A careful look at the World War II age in census year row in Table A-3 reveals the potential for construction of cohort behavior with census data. The overall behavior of an age group—or "generation," as the term is more commonly used—can then be tracked over time. Individuals cannot be linked and followed with these data, but trends or changes in the behavior of individual "types" of people, or subgroups, can be tracked.

I constructed two cohorts: those who were 20 to 39 in 1918, for the World War I cohort, and those who were 20 to 29 in 1945, for the World War II group. Each analytical measure was run for each census using 10-year age groups defined by the matrix shown in Table A-4.

Table A-4. Age in Census for World War I and World War II Cohorts

Age in Census Year	Census Year				
	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970
32 to 51	**wwi**				
42 to 61		**wwi**			
52 to 71			**wwi**		
62 to 81				**wwi**	
72 to 91					**wwi**

Age in Census Year	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970
25 to 34			**wwii**		
35 to 44				**wwii**	
45 to 54					**wwii**

World War I cohort: age 20-39 in 1918
World War II cohort: 20 to 29 in 1945

Recent Migration Denominator Dilemma

Since 1940, the census enumeration has included a rich set of questions that identifies movers in the recent past from non-movers; for the movers, additional questions were asked which capture the relative distance moved and the type of place of the previous residence. In some years, specific state and metropolitan areas are identified. Migrants are distinguished from movers with the follow-up questions. Put another way, everyone is asked if they lived in the same house but the interesting questions are only asked of those who say they lived in a different house on census day in the reference year. Which raises the question—what number goes in the denominator. This is not a problem with the lifetime migration measure; there are only two pieces of information and it is available for everyone.

"Movers Only Denominator." One could argue that only those who moved are at risk for moving to another state; if you lack the resources to move your belongings across town, for example, you probably can't afford to move to a new state. The "movers only" denominator also has the advantage of smoothing out the reference year variation for measures in the follow-up questions. This makes it much easier to assess change in migration across a time series that includes 1950 and its abbreviated reference period.

But migration decisions may not be made in a sequence as just described, with people deciding first that they want to move and then deciding whether that move should be across town or across the country. The decisions of residential movers are less likely to center on a change in employment and more likely to be a response to life course needs. Social and institutional networks are seldom completely disrupted. For migrants, the situation is reversed. The decision to move from one state to another is a package of residential, family and social network changes usually bundled up in one major choice centered on economic opportunity. Only when the income-generating decision is made does the household make the final choice of central city or suburban residence.

Figure A-1. Recent Interstate Migration with Two Denominators

(native born males age 25 and over not currently in the Armed Forces)



Source: Steven Ruggles, Matthew Sobek, Trent Alexander, Catherine A. Fitch, Ronald Goeken, Patricia Kelly Hall, Miriam King, and Chad Ronnander. *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series:Version 4.0 [Machine-readable database]*. Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Population Center [producer and distributor], 2008. http://usa.ipums.org/usa/ See Table A-1 for specific census samples used.

"Whole Group Denominator." There is a bigger concern for the study of migration, however, than how individuals make the decision. With a "movers only denominator," assessment of the impact of change in inter-county and interstate migration are conditioned on the supply/demand patterns of local housing markets which are unlikely to be influenced by the economic conditions in the state of origin. Using a denominator that includes everyone in the study group is the appropriate measure for analysis of migration that involves multiple economic areas. And, as is shown in Figure A-1, the levels are lower with the "whole group denominator," but the relationship between population subgroups and types of move are roughly the same.

Appendix 2. Data Tables

Table A-5. Civil War Era Cohort in the 1910 IPUMS: Case Counts by Race and Nativity

(native born males age 20 to 39 in 1865)

	Not a veteran	Union veteran	Confederate veteran	Totals
White - Native Born Parents				
Residing in state of birth	5,813	1,012	566	7,391
Residing outside state of birth	5,201	1,089	409	6,699
Total White - Native Born Parents	11,014	2,101	975	14,090
White - Foreign Born Parents				
Residing in state of birth	671	114	10	795
Residing outside state of birth	730	168	17	915
Total White - Foreign Born Parents	1,401	282	27	1,710
Black - Native Born Parents				
Residing in state of birth	1,317	72	19	1,408
Residing outside state of birth	771	81	14	866
Total Black - Native Born Parents	2,088	153	33	2,274

Table A-6. Independent Variables for Lifetime Migration Analysis: Probability of Living Outside State of Birth in 1960

(native born white males with native born parents)

		Native Born White Native Born Parents		
		N	Mean	SD
Veteran Status				
	Not a veteran	18,768	0.30	0.46
	Veteran	50,259	0.38	0.48
Birth Region				
	Northeast	14,203	0.30	0.46
	Midwest	23,752	0.36	0.48
	South	25,825	0.37	0.48
	West	5,247	0.39	0.49
Education				
	Elementary or less	17,845	0.29	0.45
	Secondary	35,367	0.33	0.47
	College	15,815	0.47	0.50
Occupation				
	Other occupations	26,737	0.31	0.46
	Laborers	4,299	0.30	0.46
	Mechanics	16,443	0.36	0.48
	Clerical	4,149	0.34	0.47
	Managers	9,254	0.41	0.49
	Professional	8,145	0.48	0.50
Household Head				
	Not household head	4,568	0.23	0.42
	Household head	64,459	0.36	0.48
Marital Status				
	Not married	6,939	0.32	0.47
	Married	62,088	0.36	0.48
Children				
	No children	13,149	0.36	0.48
	One or more children	55,878	0.35	0.48
Age Group				
	35 to 39	36,190	0.35	0.48
	40 to 44	32,837	0.36	0.48

Table A-7. Independent Variables for Lifetime Migration Analysis: Probability of Living Outside State of Birth in 1960

(native born white males with foreign born parents)

	Native Born White Foreign Born Parents N	Mean	SD
Veteran Status			
Not a veteran	6,199	0.27	0.44
Veteran	17,714	0.29	0.45
Birth Region			
Northeast	13,041	0.27	0.44
Midwest	7,389	0.30	0.46
South	1,421	0.37	0.48
West	2,062	0.27	0.44
Education			
Elementary or less	5,153	0.24	0.43
Secondary	13,468	0.26	0.44
College	5,292	0.40	0.49
Occupation			
Other occupations	9,110	0.25	0.43
Laborers	1,348	0.21	0.41
Mechanics	5,639	0.27	0.44
Clerical	1,752	0.27	0.44
Managers	3,133	0.34	0.47
Professional	2,931	0.41	0.49
Household Head			
Not household head	2,113	0.16	0.37
Household head	21,800	0.30	0.46
Marital Status			
Not married	3,136	0.24	0.42
Married	20,777	0.29	0.45
Children			
No children	5,070	0.27	0.44
One or more children	18,843	0.29	0.45
Age Group			
35 to 39	11,427	0.27	0.45
40 to 44	12,486	0.29	0.46

Table A-8. Independent Variables for Lifetime Migration Analysis: Probability of Living Outside State of Birth in 1960

(native born black males with native born parents)

	Native Born Black Native Born Parents		
	N	Mean	SD
Veteran Status			
Not a veteran	4,274	0.44	0.50
Veteran	4,715	0.53	0.50
Birth Region			
Northeast	481	0.26	0.44
Midwest	586	0.36	0.48
South	7,869	0.51	0.50
West	53	0.36	0.48
Education			
Elementary or less	5,199	0.44	0.50
Secondary	3,083	0.54	0.50
College	707	0.58	0.49
Occupation			
Other occupations	4,443	0.50	0.50
Laborers	2,560	0.42	0.49
Mechanics	1,098	0.53	0.50
Clerical	465	0.60	0.49
Managers	149	0.57	0.50
Professional	274	0.52	0.50
Household Head			
Not household head	1,356	0.44	0.50
Household head	7,633	0.49	0.50
Marital Status			
Not married	1,960	0.48	0.50
Married	7,029	0.49	0.50
Children			
No children	3,320	0.53	0.50
One or more children	5,669	0.46	0.50
Age Group			
35 to 39	4,674	0.48	0.50
40 to 44	4,315	0.50	0.50

Table A-9. Independent Variables for Recent Migration Analysis: Probability of Interstate Migration within the Last Five Years, 1960

(native born white males with native born parents)

	Native Born White Native Born Parents N	 Mean	 SD
Veteran Status			
Not a veteran	17,454	0.09	0.28
Veteran	62,600	0.11	0.31
Birth Region			
Northeast	12,969	0.09	0.28
Midwest	21,606	0.10	0.31
South	23,325	0.12	0.32
West	4,700	0.14	0.35
Education			
Elementary or less	16,611	0.10	0.30
Secondary	32,591	0.09	0.29
College	13,398	0.15	0.36
Occupation			
Other occupations	24,713	0.09	0.29
Laborers	3,968	0.12	0.32
Mechanics	15,105	0.10	0.30
Clerical	3,820	0.09	0.29
Managers	8,108	0.13	0.33
Professional	6,886	0.16	0.37
Marital Status			
Not married	6,196	0.10	0.30
Married	56,404	0.11	0.31
Children			
No children	11,746	0.10	0.31
One or more children	50,854	0.11	0.31
Age Group			
35 to 39	32,450	0.12	0.33
40 to 44	30,150	0.09	0.29

Table A-10. Independent Variables for Recent Migration Analysis: Probability of Interstate Migration within the Last Five Years, 1960

(native born white males with foreign born parents)

	Native Born White Foreign Born Parents N	Mean	SD
Veteran Status			
Not a veteran	5,878	0.06	0.24
Veteran	22,493	0.08	0.27
Birth Region			
Northeast	12,300	0.08	0.27
Midwest	6,924	0.08	0.26
South	1,321	0.07	0.26
West	1,948	0.10	0.30
Education			
Elementary or less	4,963	0.06	0.24
Secondary	12,857	0.07	0.26
College	4,673	0.12	0.33
Occupation			
Other occupations	8,717	0.07	0.25
Laborers	1,297	0.07	0.25
Mechanics	5,386	0.07	0.26
Clerical	1,666	0.06	0.24
Managers	2,851	0.10	0.31
Professional	2,576	0.13	0.34
Marital Status			
Not married	2,965	0.05	0.22
Married	19,528	0.08	0.28
Children			
No children	4,759	0.07	0.25
One or more children	17,734	0.08	0.28
Age Group			
35 to 39	10,667	0.09	0.29
40 to 44	11,826	0.07	0.25

Table A-11. Independent Variables for Recent Migration Analysis: Probability of Interstate Migration within the Last Five Years, 1960

(native born black males with native born parents)

	Native Born Black Native Born parents N	Mean	SD
Veteran Status			
Not a veteran	4,104	0.04	0.19
Veteran	8,589	0.04	0.19
Birth Region			
Northeast	457	0.02	0.15
Midwest	568	0.02	0.15
South	7,514	0.04	0.19
West	50	0.08	0.27
Education			
Elementary or less	4,995	0.04	0.20
Secondary	2,937	0.03	0.17
College	657	0.04	0.21
Occupation			
Other occupations	4,269	0.03	0.17
Laborers	2,438	0.05	0.21
Mechanics	1,056	0.04	0.21
Clerical	442	0.02	0.13
Managers	142	0.02	0.14
Professional	242	0.09	0.29
Marital Status			
Not married	1,849	0.04	0.20
Married	6,740	0.04	0.18
Children			
No children	3,133	0.04	0.20
One or more children	5,456	0.04	0.18
Age Group			
35 to 39	4,436	0.04	0.19
40 to 44	4,153	0.03	0.18

Table A-12. Independent Variables for Analysis of Suburban Residence in 1960

(native born white males with native born parents)

		Native Born White Native Born Parents N	Mean	SD
Veteran Status				
	Not a veteran	14,170	0.32	0.47
	Veteran	40,721	0.39	0.49
Recent Migrant				
	Not a recent migrant	44,507	0.36	0.48
	Recent inter-county migrant	5,430	0.42	0.49
	Recent interstate migrant	4,954	0.44	0.50
Birth Region				
	Northeast	13,051	0.51	0.50
	Midwest	18,583	0.38	0.49
	South	19,543	0.27	0.45
	West	3,714	0.43	0.50
Education				
	Elementary or less	13,140	0.29	0.46
	Secondary	28,643	0.38	0.48
	College	13,108	0.45	0.50
Occupation				
	Other occupations	20,603	0.33	0.47
	Laborers	3,138	0.27	0.45
	Mechanics	13,459	0.40	0.49
	Clerical	3,407	0.39	0.49
	Managers	7,438	0.41	0.49
	Professional	6,846	0.46	0.50
Marital Status				
	Not married	5,523	0.29	0.45
	Married	49,368	0.39	0.49
School Bound Children				
	No children or youngest over 18	11,222	0.33	0.47
	Youngest child under 5	17,208	0.40	0.49
	Youngest child 5 to 13	22,389	0.39	0.49
	Youngest child 14 to 18	4,072	0.35	0.48
Age Group				
	35 to 39	28,936	0.38	0.49
	40 to 44	25,955	0.37	0.48

Table A-13. Independent Variables for Analysis of Suburban Residence in 1960

(native born white males with foreign born parents)

		Native Born White Foreign Born Parents		
		N	Mean	SD
Veteran Status				
	Not a veteran	5,236	0.41	0.49
	Veteran	15,838	0.45	0.50
Recent Migrant				
	Not a recent migrant	18,318	0.41	0.49
	Recent inter-county migrant	1,593	0.67	0.47
	Recent interstate migrant	1,163	0.52	0.50
Birth Region				
	Northeast	12,177	0.46	0.50
	Midwest	6,187	0.43	0.49
	South	1,113	0.28	0.45
	West	1,597	0.44	0.50
Education				
	Elementary or less	4,190	0.37	0.48
	Secondary	12,145	0.44	0.50
	College	4,739	0.50	0.50
Occupation				
	Other occupations	7,846	0.40	0.49
	Laborers	1,142	0.39	0.49
	Mechanics	5,081	0.47	0.50
	Clerical	1,603	0.38	0.49
	Managers	2,770	0.47	0.50
	Professional	2,632	0.50	0.50
Marital Status				
	Not married	2,773	0.32	0.47
	Married	18,301	0.46	0.50
School Bound Children				
	No children or youngest over 18	4,668	0.35	0.48
	Youngest child under 5	6,990	0.47	0.50
	Youngest child 5 to 13	8,170	0.46	0.50
	Youngest child 14 to 18	1,246	0.42	0.49
Age Group				
	35 to 39	10,128	0.44	0.50
	40 to 44	10,946	0.44	0.50

Table A-14. Independent Variables for Analysis of Suburban Residence in 1960

(native born black males with native born parents)

		Native Born Black Native Born Parents		
		N	Mean	SD
Veteran Status				
	Not a veteran	3,632	0.12	0.33
	Veteran	4,175	0.14	0.35
Recent Migrant				
	Not a recent migrant	7,190	0.12	0.33
	Recent inter-county migrant	274	0.24	0.43
	Recent interstate migrant	343	0.20	0.40
Birth Region				
	Northeast	466	0.19	0.39
	Midwest	554	0.12	0.32
	South	6,737	0.13	0.33
	West	50	0.20	0.40
Education				
	Elementary or less	4,377	0.13	0.34
	Secondary	2,788	0.13	0.34
	College	642	0.12	0.33
Occupation				
	Other occupations	3,873	0.12	0.32
	Laborers	2,160	0.15	0.36
	Mechanics	974	0.16	0.37
	Clerical	424	0.09	0.29
	Managers	139	0.16	0.37
	Professional	237	0.13	0.33
Marital Status				
	Not married	1,710	0.10	0.31
	Married	6,097	0.14	0.35
School Bound Children				
	No children or youngest over 18	3,117	0.11	0.31
	Youngest child under 5	2,428	0.15	0.36
	Youngest child 5 to 13	1,801	0.13	0.34
	Youngest child 14 to 18	461	0.16	0.37
Age Group				
	35 to 39	4,085	0.13	0.34
	40 to 44	3,722	0.13	0.34

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