

Interview with Nils Hasselmo

**Interviewed by Professor Clarke A. Chambers
University of Minnesota**

**Interviewed on March 16, 18, and 19, 1998
in Tucson, Arizona**

Nils Hasselmo - NH
Clarke A. Chambers - CAC

CAC: This is Clarke Chambers. I'm picking up, again, the oral history project of the University of Minnesota the past fifty years. This is an unusual one because we're doing it in Tucson, Arizona, where Nils Hasselmo is recovering from the presidency and from surgery. Florence and I, Mrs. Chambers and I happen to be vacationing here so that we have the leisure, without the interruptions of the university phone and so forth, to have a conversation about our common experience and your experience at the University of Minnesota, not only in the presidency but at other places as well. The date is the March 16, 1998, and the interview is being conducted in the little casita in the desert that Florence and I are renting in the western suburbs of Tucson.

Nils, welcome aboard.

NH: Thank you.

CAC: As I suggested, I have approximately 130 of these interviews and with I think all of them—I try not to make the interviews mechanical—it's kind of nice to start with an informal commentary going way back to family, to early education, to what turned you on. I mean you became a scholar in linguistics and how does one get interested in that? It's your story. Why don't you start with family and proceed?

NH: I was born in a little village in western Sweden, right on the Norwegian border, six miles from the border, called Kōla, a spelling that confounds everybody. My father was from Skäne, from southern Sweden, and my mother was from Lapland. They met in Värmland, in this part

of western Sweden. They met because my father took a teaching job and the position as organist in the local state church.

CAC: He taught music?

NH: No, he was a school teacher. They had a position in Sweden that is teaching school and being the organist in the state church. It's a combined position and the title for the position is kantor, k-a-n-t-o-r, which is well-known from other cultural contexts. My mother came there after receiving her teaching degree in mathematics and science in Stockholm. She came there as the governess of the children of the local parson. She had come down from the mining district in Lapland, where my grandfather was a bookkeeper. He sent his daughter to Stockholm to get a degree in mathematics and science in the 1920s, which was quite unusual. They met and they settled down and lived for thirty years in that particular community. My father continued in that particular position and my mother eventually took a position in a nearby town twenty miles away and taught high school there, mathematics and science. My sister and I, after I did some early work, my junior high work, by correspondence in the little village which has only a six grade school . . .

CAC: What was the population of that little village?

NH: I'd say seventy-three.

CAC: Good heavens!

NH: It was small. It was very small.

CAC: So, family really amounted to a great deal?

NH: Yes, it did. The region, the district, had about 2,500 people but they were scattered over a fairly large area so that the village itself had just the church, a post office, and a couple of stores. That was it. Then, of course, there was the minister. Then, there was the local estate. Then, there was the school teacher's family and the local sheriff. That was about it.

CAC: I'm guessing, apart from the schooling, that you must have had a lot of home teaching?

NH: I did. My parents were avid readers. My father played the piano and had a choir and we had music at home all the time. When I hear Chopin, I always conjure up a sunny summer day in my home in western Sweden with my father playing the piano and this wonderful music is wafting out the windows.

CAC: Lovely memories.

NH: As I said, I did my junior high work by correspondence and, then, tested into the regular school in town when my mother took a job there. We had a little apartment where my sister and my mother and I lived. I went through the gymnasium in that little town.

CAC: You say "a little town."

NH: It had about 11,000 people.

CAC: And how far away was it?

NH: About twenty miles.

CAC: Oh, only that?

NH: Yes, but, of course, we didn't have a car and if you took the bus in the morning, it took a couple of hours for it to get to town; so, you had to board in town even though it was only twenty miles away. You just couldn't commute.

CAC: Your gymnasium experience was how long there?

NH: Three years. I did that on the mathematical and science line because they didn't have the classical languages line there, which was the other alternative at the time.

CAC: But, in the meantime, you were learning languages?

NH: Yes. You had to take seven years of English and six years of German and three years of French in order to get into the university. In the humanistic subjects, you also had to have three years of Latin; so, I did those languages before I really entered my university work.

CAC: Then, you test out on these for admissions?

NH: For admission, yes.

CAC: You have standard tests?

NH: Yes, there was a national standardized test that you had to pass.

CAC: Speaking as well as written?

NH: It was both written and oral. Of course, the emphasis on speaking the languages was not what it is today. It was more reading and translating.

CAC: I'm guessing that the tri-lingualism of many Scandinavians was not as well-established that early? Now, everybody speaks English almost, don't they, in Norway and Sweden?

NH: Those who had a university or college education in my parents' generation usually spoke German. My mother, for example, spoke German quite fluently and English was a second language with her and with my father also. Although, they could speak English reasonably well, German was really the first language. After the Second World War, English became the first language. That language, I started that in approximately seventh grade.

CAC: Did you know this early on that the structure of language would become a compelling interest in your intellectual . . . ?

NH: I loved to read. I was an avid reader. I started writing quite early. I wrote adventure stories . . .

CAC: Ahhh.

NH: . . . and messed around quite a bit with writing. My father had many interests and ended up writing a couple of books. He was very interested in the local history. I got drawn into that particular orbit. My mother was very interested in language; although, her first love was mathematics. She was very interested in language and in grammar. I think it was a combination of my parents' humanistic interests and also my mother's interest in mathematics and grammar that eventually got me into linguistics. Although, I went to the university to study literature as my primary subject and it was only when I got there that I discovered that linguistics really was my cup of tea.

CAC: Were there any particular persons in the gymnasium who opened that world for you?

NH: Yes, I had a couple of teachers in Swedish, which would be like English in our curriculum here, who were quite influential in many ways because they really took my writing seriously and they put me through a certain discipline in writing but also encouraged me very much. I did one particular project. I did a study of a couple of novels of the Swedish Nobel Prize winner, Harry [Edmund] Martinson. He didn't win a Nobel Prize until much later . . .

CAC: [laughter] Maybe it was your essay that did it.

NH: Maybe it was. He was my favorite writer and I really became interested in serious literature through this Harry Martinson. I did a study of some of his work in gymnasium and that was the first time that I really began to look at literary criticism and literary analysis and also language as a study. Martinson has a very distinctive prose and poetry which I think also influenced me very much. If I look at an early influence beyond my parents, I think it was that experience through that teacher of Martinson's work as literature and as linguistic—language expression.

CAC: You're describing a secondary—to use that word—educational experience that is much richer than most of the persons I've interviewed who have had American education at that level.

NH: The system at that time was that at seven, you started in first grade. In my case, I had a woman teacher for first and second grade in the two-room schoolhouse where she taught with my father. Then, from third grade through sixth grade, I had my father as a teacher. He taught those four classes in one classroom. That was an interesting enterprise because we did a lot of independent work. I often smile when I see all of these innovative pedagogical methods because my father used most of them back in the 1940s in this little village with workbooks.

CAC: [laughter]

NH: We had a little library and we had to go and use the library and put together little essays on the basis of sets of questions that we received. You drew maps and made diagrams and all of those things quite independently. He divided the four classes so that he taught third and fourth together and fifth and sixth together, which meant that if you were out of cycle, of course, you studied history backwards. You would start in 1800 in third grade and go through the modern era and, then, you would pick up in fourth grade with early history and take it up to about 1800.

CAC: Was it a class in which the older children helped the younger?

NH: There was some monitoring but that full-fledged monitor system was not in effect at that time.

CAC: After gymnasium, then, you go to the university.

NH: I went into the military first.

CAC: Oh. This was a usual obligation of all young men?

NH: That was the usual thing. When you passed your examination from gymnasium, you went into the military.

CAC: For how many years?

NH: The more education you had, the longer you had to serve; so, if you did not have a gymnasium education, you usually served for nine months. If you had a gymnasium education, you served for fifteen. I signed up for twenty-one months because I wanted to pick the place where I wanted to be. In order to do that, you had to sign up for officers' training; so, I did.

CAC: How old were you then?

NH: I was nineteen. I went to Stockholm and I wanted to go to Stockholm and I wanted to be in the Royal Signal Corps so I went to Stockholm and became a radio telegrapher. Then, I went through the officers' training in the Royal Signal Corps. I served in the Palace Guard, as a matter of fact, several times and had, generally, a pretty good time.

CAC: I stood honor guard for Franklin Roosevelt in the Second World War.

NH: I see.

CAC: That's as close as I ever got. I should say there were about ten thousand of us doing that.

NH: [laughter] I used to open the gate for Princess Christina when she and her nurse went for their walk. There I was in my helmet with my machine gun.

CAC: What did you learn from the army? That's nearly two years. What did you learn?

NH: I think it was not the kind of experience that you yearn for at the time. But, I must say in retrospect, that it was very rewarding. First of all, I came to Stockholm. I had access to the Royal Opera, to the Royal Dramatic Theater, to the art museums. I got a wide-range of friends, one in particular who is a life-long friend. We were army buddies and formed a peculiar friendship as you serve under those circumstances.

CAC: It can be very close.

NH: I see him every year. When I go back to Sweden, I always see him and he has been over here to visit me. Of course, you learn a lot of the facts of life because in military training, basic training, you go through a lot of grueling physical and mental training. I think that it was good. It took us out of our childhoods and brought us into an adult world.

CAC: I graduated from Carleton early by accelerating my program and, then, went directly into the service. Boy, I'll tell you, what I learned the first year you're hinting at here. Oof! that was something.

NH: You learn a lot about human nature, too.

CAC: And about yourself.

NH: The closeness . . . We were ten guys who slept in these bunk beds in one barracks. We did everything together and we were dependent on each other. We went through maneuvers. We were out in rain and sleet and camping in the woods of Sweden in the middle of winter and all of those things. You really kind of forged a relationship and became dependent on each other in ways that I think are very useful. Although, I don't wish upon everybody a military

experience, I certainly think that that kind of comradeship, that kind of discipline, frankly, that kind of testing of your physical and mental stamina, is a useful thing.

CAC: Comradeship is a good word.

NH: That's really what you build up under those circumstances.

CAC: Yes.

NH: Then, there were many things that I found utterly appalling.

CAC: Of course.

NH: The military drill and some of the mentality that you found in the military was, I found, very unappealing, I must say.

CAC: What was the expectation after you had performed this service . . . that you would be in a reserve capacity for a number of years?

NH: Yes. You stay in the reserves until you are forty-seven years old.

CAC: For persons like yourself to go away, then, that's cancelled out?

NH: Yes. I went to America so that I never served again. I think that Swedish military preparedness didn't suffer too badly because I left the country.

CAC: [laughter] You went on to the university after this army experience?

NH: I did. The army experience also was helpful because it helped finance my education.

CAC: Ahhh!

NH: You got educational benefits. That was another reason for going the twenty-one months. I financed much of my education in Uppsala with the money I got, kind of a G.I. Bill for serving in the army.

CAC: Your Uppsala experience lasted how long?

NH: I started there in 1952. I started with the study of Scandinavian languages first. That's when I realized that linguistics really was my cup of tea. It was the study of the Indo-European languages and these fascinating, what you might call, family relationships in the European languages and how you could study the historical development and you can actually make deductions concerning what historical stages of languages looked like on the basis of comparative

evidence and on the basis of historical trends. It was especially when I read the French linguist [Ferdinand] de Saussure, who was really the father of linguistic structuralism in many ways, his *Cours de linguistique générale* that came in the Teens sometime . . . It was put together from lectures by de Saussure at the Sorbonne by his students. That became a structuralist bible. De Saussure made certain predictions concerning the Indo-European languages and he predicted that because of what happened historically in Indo-European, there must have been some consonants in the Indo-European languages that were not attested in any of the historical languages. Then, lo and behold! the Polish linguist, [Jerzy] Kurylowicz, discovered that in the inscriptions . . .

CAC: Oh, my! I'll never find that name. How do you spell that? This is for our transcriber.

NH: Clarke, I don't know if I can spell it.

CAC: [laughter]

NH: You better look it up but it's something like K-Y-R-O-L-O-W-I-C-Z or something like that.

CAC: That's close enough. We'll look it up. That gives us a beginning. Thank you.

NH: He analyzed the inscriptions that they had found at Bogazkoy in Turkey, Hittite inscriptions. Lo and behold! he discovered in Hittite a set of consonants that he called laryngals that were exactly what de Saussure had predicted on the basis of his structuralist analysis. That was kind of the thing that told me that I wanted to be a linguist.

CAC: That was cutting edge right while you were there?

NH: Yes.

CAC: Is this scholarship in the 1940s and 1950s?

NH: The scholarship went back earlier but it was scholarship that was coming to the forefront at that point. It was not something that happened just in the 1940s.

CAC: As you know better than I, a revolution in linguists in this country at least and I suspect in France and the United States was really breaking loose in the late 1950s and 1960s, right? Is that approximately correct?

NH: Yes. But, Clarke, probably the primary reason I came to this country . . .

CAC: Ah!

NH: . . . was that I wanted to see what was happening in American linguistics.

CAC: Did you have any exposure to this Chomskyan revolution when you were in Sweden?

NH: No, I came the year before [Noam] Chomsky published his famous *Syntactic Structures*.

CAC: Okay.

NH: I existed in a very conservative linguistic environment where what I told you about de Saussure and Kurylowicz were things that were part almost of an underground linguistics movement in Uppsala because the establishment was very conservative and still oriented towards the tradition called the Neogrammatical tradition, the German jung grammatiker. Herman Paul's book *Prizipien der Sprachgeschichte* from 1880 was still the required handbook which explained language structure in terms of its historical evolution. Structuralism was kind of lurking behind the surface there and there were some rebels in the ranks that some of us students worked with and we began to read some of the American literature in linguistics.

CAC: By yourselves or formal intercourse?

NH: No, by ourselves. We read Leonard Bloomfield . . .

CAC: You were teaching each other?

NH: . . . who wrote this book called *Language* in the 1930s and we read a text book called the *Introduction to Descriptive Linguistics* by a man by the name of Gleason. We read Kenneth Pike and Eugene Nida who were both prominent linguists in America who were also associated with the American Bible Society and bible translation, which influenced linguistics development very much because they confronted the issue of analyzing and putting into writing these languages that were not written and developed some very interesting techniques for doing that. Then, you had Edward Sapir, who came from an anthropological direction with Franz Boas who, of course, revolutionized the study of American Indian languages. So all of this came together and it was a heady, heady intellectual agenda that I wanted to taste; so, that's when I went to America.

CAC: I want to clarify this a bit though. It was you students together who were kind of reading this stuff and informing each other?

NH: Yes.

CAC: More than a formal exposure in courses?

NH: Yes. It was very much.

CAC: There is a subversive quality to good student bodies, isn't there?

NH: Yes. Absolutely, one should not underestimate ever the intellectual ferment among the students themselves.

CAC: Yes.

NH: Uppsala had splendid linguists. It was just that the linguistics had moved on and the splendor of Uppsala linguistics was twenty, thirty, maybe forty years behind. There were a couple of docents there who risked never becoming professors by espousing some of these new doctrines.

CAC: Now, Nils, how did you know where to go in the United States to pick this up?

NH: There were fortuitous circumstances—again, it was my army experience—because a sister of this very good friend I found in the army got a scholarship to Augustana College in Rock Island, Illinois. When I heard about that, I said to myself, "Maybe I can apply for a scholarship to Augustana College in Rock Island, Illinois, and go there and teach Swedish for a year and get a taste of American college life and American linguistics." So, I applied for the scholarship and got the scholarship and went to America in 1956.

CAC: Sometimes this becomes a conversation. I just have to say that I inherited from George Stephenson, the great Swedish immigration historian at Minnesota, when he retired, a graduate student, a blind student, from Augustana.

NH: [James] Iverne Dowie?

CAC: You bet. That was the first Ph.D. that I had to chair. He did essentially that story at Augustana.

NH: Yes. He wrote a book called *Prairie Grass Dividing*.

CAC: Right.

NH: We have many legs, Clarke.

CAC: How long were you at Augustana? Did you know Iverne Dowie?

NH: Oh, yes, very well.

CAC: Isn't that something? His wife was the most remarkable woman.

NH: Yes. She read to him all the time.

CAC: He did that whole dissertation by her reading to him.

NH: Yes. Clarke, I want you to know that when I started writing in English, I read manuscripts to him and he, with his keen ear for the cadences of language, helped me a lot in my trying to master English.

CAC: Nils, last fall or last summer, sometime in there, I had a long distanced phone call from Dowie. I saw him through the Ph.D. and didn't do anything for him at all, very little, because George Stephenson had done that. I think that he was very ill and he was calling some people whom he respected and wanted to thank. There was no other reason for that telephone call. We talked for about twelve or fifteen minutes about his dissertation and his experience with George Stephenson. Isn't that a remarkable thing?

NH: Yes, it is.

CAC: I couldn't figure out at first why he was calling but that was my deduction.

NH: I have not had contact with him for a number of years now.

CAC: His wife was still living. We talked about her. Gosh!

NH: I read a lot of Stephenson, too, when I started getting into American Swedish. I read a lot of Stephenson's work, his aspects of Swedish religious life. He helped put immigration history on the map in this country, I understand.

CAC: You bet he did . . . he and [Theodore] Blegen together.

NH: Then, at the same time, he broke out of this philopietistic church history writing that had existed earlier in the Swedish immigrant circles.

CAC: Oh, he was a towering fellow. The textbooks, the workbooks, say that the interviewer should never do what I'm doing . . . intercede with little stories of his own; but my gracious! I had no idea you knew Dowie.

NH: Yes.

CAC: How long were you at Augustana?

NH: I went there in August of 1956 and I stayed until July of 1957. I stayed for almost a year. I had finished up my first basic degree just before I left. Then, when I came to Uppsala, I went for the licentiate degree which was still in existence at that particular time, which was really like the course work component of a doctoral degree but it was separate from . . . We actually did a preliminary dissertation, too, preliminary to the doctor's degree. Going to Augustana, of course, changed my life in many ways. I remember that January evening in 1956 when if I didn't go to the mailbox in the snow storm that evening and mail the letter, it wasn't going to get in on time

for my application for the scholarship. I sat there debating—I can still remember—whether to go out in the miserable weather and mail this letter. Of course, I put on my jacket and went down and mailed the letter and the rest is history. If I hadn't mailed that letter, I would have been a school teacher in western Sweden or something like that.

CAC: [laughter] I doubt that. Another important thing happened to you at Augustana.

NH: Yes, it did. The last thing my mother said when the train left the station in Charlotttenberg, on the Norwegian border—I went to Oslo to catch the Oslofjord to go to America—was, "Nils, don't you dare come home with one of those American girls."

CAC: [laughter]

NH: When I got off the boat in Göteborg the next July, the first thing my mother said was, "There's a bunch of letters waiting for you from one Patricia Tillberg in Moline, Illinois. Who is she?" [laughter]

CAC: [laughter]

NH: The following year, Pat came over at Easter and met my parents and we got engaged and, then, Augustana offered me a position; so, in the fall of 1958, I went back to America to assume an assistant professorship in Swedish at Augustana and marry Patricia, which I did. That also was an opportunity for me to get more deeply into American linguistics. At Augustana, I had taken a course . . .

CAC: Just a minute. Pat was studying what at Augustana?

NH: Pat had graduated and was the alumni director at Augustana.

CAC: Ohhh.

NH: She went on for her master's degree at Syracuse in guidance and counseling and, then, came back to Augustana. She worked at Gustavus Adolphus for a year as assistant dean and, then, went to Augustana as the alumni director. I was a somewhat older aged college student and she was a young alumni director. I associated as much with the junior faculty at Augustana as I did with the college students. I did teach Swedish while I was taking courses and they let me take any courses I wanted; so, I took courses in the rise of American realism under an excellent teacher by the name of Henriette Naeseth and I took courses in American political science. I took courses in philosophy and I took courses in American descriptive linguistics; so, I finally got my taste of descriptive linguistics.

CAC: But, then, you went back to Sweden?

NH: Then, I went back to Sweden in 1957 and began my study for the licentiate degree in Scandinavian languages.

CAC: And Pat with you?

NH: No, we were not married then. She stayed back in America and we did not know whether we were ever going to get together again. Then, she came over and we got engaged at Easter in 1958. Then, I went back to America. I really rushed my course work for the licentiate degree. It was supposed to take two years but I did it by September of 1958 under strong incentives because I wanted to wrap it up before I went to America. Then, I went to Augustana and taught there for a year and during that year, I applied for scholarships to Harvard, Yale, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Berkeley. Eventually, I accepted a scholarship at Harvard, partly because an outstanding American linguist by the name of Einar Haugen, who had written a book about the Norwegian language in America [*The Norwegian Language in America*, 1953].

CAC: Oh, of course.

NH: . . . had just then moved from Wisconsin to Harvard. He provided a teaching fellowship for me at Harvard and I went to Harvard and studied with Einar Haugen. I wrote a dissertation about the Swedish language in Worcester, Massachusetts. Then, I went back to Augustana and taught there for a couple of years as professor of Swedish. I applied for a grant to the National Science Foundation for work on American Swedish. I got such a grant and I spent a year in Uppsala doing some work and, then, came back to this country and, eventually, wrote a book about the Swedish language in America and a number of articles on that subject.

CAC: You didn't get as far as Minnesota in those days?

NH: Yes, I did.

CAC: Oh, you did?

NH: I came up to Minnesota in 1962 the first time. I did reconnaissance work for people from the dialect archives at Uppsala. There was a growing interest, partly because of Einar Haugen's book about the Norwegian language in America, also in the other immigrant languages. Haugen's book came, I think, in 1953. It's a really excellent description of the Norwegian language in America. The dialect archives in Uppsala sent over their chief field worker and an engineer and they travelled all over the country in a bus full of electronic equipment. Over three years, they recorded some 600 Swedish immigrants. I did the early reconnaissance work for them; so, I went to Center City, and Lindstrom, and Almelund, and I went to Litchfield, and Dassel, and all of those Swedish communities and identified informants for them. Then, they came and interviewed them.

CAC: Lindstrom is about as Swedish as you could get of these places.

NH: Yes. The first time I went to Lindstrom, I walked into the Rainbow Cafe and I sat down and had a cup of coffee and next to me, there were two farmers in their sixties who were sitting there talking the most wonderful southern Swedish dialect you can imagine.

CAC: [laughter]

NH: They were born in Lindstrom and their parents had been born in Lindstrom and their grandparents, of course, all came from southern Sweden; so, I knew I had struck gold. I developed some wonderful friendships with people at the grass roots in Lindstrom and Center City. That's, I think, when I really fell in love with Minnesota was when I saw that marvelous grass roots culture of Minnesota.

CAC: Oh! you see how rich the autobiography can become. In the meantime, you're working on your degree at Harvard?

NH: This was after I had gotten my degree. I went to Harvard in 1959 and finished my degree in 1961 because I had done some work in Sweden that helped me accelerate it a little bit. Then, I went back to Augustana in 1961 and stayed there until 1963. I went to Sweden for a year and, then, Einar Haugen had left Wisconsin and they hadn't filled his position; so, they invited me a visiting professor at Wisconsin in 1964. I spent a year teaching at Wisconsin, 1964-65. Those were good days because . . .

CAC: Oh, bull market.

NH: . . . I had job offers from Wisconsin, Texas, Minnesota, and Washington and I picked Minnesota. That's when I came to Minnesota in 1965 as a member of the Scandinavian Languages and Literature faculty.

CAC: We can't go on with this forever because we have to get to the University of Minnesota but this is a very engaging kind of background. At Harvard, to what degree did the linguistic revolution influence you? MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology] is just a . . .

NH: Clarke, again, here I ended up in Uppsala when this neogrammarian tradition was just being superseded by structuralism and American descriptive linguistics and I ended up at Harvard just as the American structuralist descriptive linguistics tradition was being challenged by the Chomskyian revolution that we were just beginning to feel at that point.

CAC: He's just down the river and across the river.

NH: I'll tell you, I often think about Kuhn and his paradigm shift because I just ended up on the edge of the old paradigm and just barely managed to make the transition to the new paradigm while I was still a Ph.D. student. That was a very interesting situation. Chomsky was a strong presence down at MIT.

CAC: I'll bet.

NH: That transition is to me as good an example of Kuhn's paradigm shift as can find because it was literally a revolution. Interestingly enough, Chomsky studied with a man by the name of Zellig S. Harris at the University of Pennsylvania. Zellig S. Harris had driven, as far as one could possibly go, the approach of what they called discovery procedures, which was a basic methodological approach. I read Zellig S. Harris and I kept telling myself that this is the end of something and it's not going to go any farther. And sure enough, Chomsky totally broke the mold and just started over.

CAC: People like yourself had to be pretty nimble.

NH: We did have to be pretty nimble. In my book about American Swedish, I managed to incorporate a little bit of the new thinking into the analysis of the language. It worked out all right but it was a tremendous change.

CAC: In some fields, this happened faster. I was thinking of the transformation in the late 1950s and 1960s at the same time for microbiology to molecular biology.

NH: Yes.

CAC: Oh, boy, did that move fast.

NH: These are fascinating. Right now, I'm as interested in the history of linguistics as any aspect of linguistics because, first of all, it's interesting as an intellectual history in itself but it's also interesting in the context of what's happening in adjoining fields. There's this tantalizing interplay among the various disciplines. You saw this in the nineteenth century. All of the metaphors used in historical linguistics were biological. There were families of languages. There were daughter languages and mother languages and it was kind of the growth of language almost as an organism. Then, structuralism . . . it was influenced by physics and new thinking in physics where every entity has its value only as part of an integrated structure. Then, Chomsky came and, of course, has had a profound influence on aspects of the social sciences.

CAC: Nils, you should give up all this administrative business and go back and do that.

NH: I know it. Clarke, there are many times when I ask myself, "Why did I give up all this excitement?"

CAC: It's obvious that you are very engaged.

NH: I had a very wonderful scholarly life and I still don't quite know how I let myself slip into, first, faculty governance and, then, administration.

CAC: [laughter] I'm going to ask you a question now bearing on this. I hadn't thought of it ahead of time. I have a sense that college and university administrators, at different levels—deans, vice presidents, provosts, and so forth—have tended the last twenty-five years to reflect more of the social sciences and the sciences. Is that an accurate perception? I'm thinking of your grounding in the humanities, literature, and language, and linguistics. There can't be many like yourself.

NH: I feel that I straddled the humanities and the social sciences. In my own work, I have been probably more a social scientist than a humanist; although, I've done some work in immigrant literature, for example. But, really, the methodology of linguistics, of course, is a deductive methodology.

CAC: That means that it provides a solid intellectual basis for the kinds of things administrators have to do?

NH: I must admit that there are aspects of linguistics, there are ways of thinking, there are ways of systematizing in linguistics, and categorizing and so forth, that I find useful when I think about administrative problems. It's almost as if the decision-making process is almost like a grammar . . . that you generate a decision on the basis of certain principles that you try to apply and, then, data that you plug into that set of principles and you come out with a solution. I don't necessarily systematize that but I think that my administrative thinking has been influenced by the linguistic methodology. Frankly, I think the reason I continued with linguistics more than literature was the stringency of the underlying theory and the methodology of linguistics that did have an appeal to me and, maybe, it's my mother's interest in mathematics that is reflected in that.

CAC: To repeat my question, with your peers at other universities and good colleges, the heavily social scientific and scientific backgrounds would predominate the last twenty-five, thirty, forty years?

NH: I would say so. Although, you find that, if you look at the presidents of the AAU [Association of American Universities] universities—which I'm especially interested in now because I'm becoming president of the AAU as of July 1st—you find that the president of Harvard, Rudenstein, is a specialist in medieval poetry and you have Frances Lawrence at Rutgers who is a specialist in French literature; so, there are a few humanists. Then, you have Berdahl, the chancellor at Berkeley who is a Minnesota graduate in German history.

CAC: Right.

NH: It may be a fairly social science oriented history; although, I think he is more intellectual history. Otherwise, you have chemists. You have physicists. You have now a number of lawyers becoming university presidents . . .

CAC: Ahhh.

NH: . . . which we have at Minnesota now. Political scientists . . . I would say that the humanists are in the minority but given the number of faculty positions in the various fields, it may not be all that disproportionate.

CAC: I see.

NH: I think there are many fewer people in the humanities than in the sciences and social sciences taken together.

CAC: I want to come back to this when we come to the Arts College. We're almost out of tape so I'm going to flip us over.

[End of Tape 1, Side 1]

[Tape 1, Side 2]

CAC: Now, we're on the second side of this wonderful tape and we've just come to Minnesota and the Department of Scandinavian Language Studies . . . what was it called?

NH: Scandinavian Languages and Literature. I actually was hired by something that was called the Center for Northwest European Language and Area Studies, which had been instituted in the mid 1960s with federal National Defense Education Act [NDEA] money. I was hired as the linguist in that center.

CAC: I see. What kind of a real assignment did you have then?

NH: It meant that I taught Old Norse language and literature, a wonderful course where you can introduce the students to that world of early medieval Iceland and that magnificent literature that the Icelanders—bless them—sat in the Twelfth and Thirteen Centuries and wrote down. Fortunately, the Christian tradition in Iceland did not require the destruction of the wonderful pagan tradition that went before it.

CAC: [laughter]

NH: Rather the clerics sat in the monasteries in Iceland and wrote hundreds of those sagas that come out of the oral tradition. Of course, they created literature on their own as well. Introducing the students to that literature and to the language, which represents the earliest stages of the Scandinavian languages, the North Germanic branch of the Germanic languages, is really quite interesting.

CAC: The chief or the commanding figure certainly must have been Alrik Gustafson?

NH: Very prominent.

CAC: Say something about him.

NH: The other courses I taught, let me say, were also history and structure of the Scandinavian languages and, then, I also occasionally would teach courses with a more literary orientation.

Alrik Gustafson was the dominant figure and one of the dominant figures in Scandinavian languages and literature in this country. He and Einar Haugen were really the two most prominent scholars at that particular time. They belonged to a generation that, with people like Walter Johnson who was at the University of Washington at Seattle, Eric Walgren at UCLA [University of California-Los Angeles], Assar Janzen from Sweden at Berkeley . . .

CAC: Spell that, please.

NH: J-A-N-Z-E-N and A-S-S-A-R, a very unusual first name, Assar Janzen. Then Gösta Franzen, G-Ö-S-T-A F-R-A-N-Z-E-N, at Chicago. That group really was the first group of Scandinavianists in this country, extensively home-grown, that you can say were real scholars, linguistic and literary scholars. Before that the Scandinavian departments, of course like Minnesota, were introduced by political pressure. The department in Minnesota was established in 1883, not because of a profound intellectual urge on the part of the faculty of the University of Minnesota to have Scandinavian studies but because there were enough Swedish and Norwegian legislators in the legislature . . .

CAC: [laughter]

NH: . . . that got this bill, I think, on March 5, 1883, passed that said the state university shall teach the Scandinavian languages and literatures, the ancient Scandinavian—so-called—included and the professor of Scandinavian languages and literatures shall have the same salary as other faculty members in the university. Clarke, I used to carry a copy of that bill in my desk drawer for a number years when retrenchments were coming.

CAC: [laughter]

NH: That's how Scandinavian was established. Then, it became a place where Scandinavians were placed in the position and there was a dearth of qualified people. There were some quite respectable people who occupied the position but they were not really what you would call, in modern terms, productive scholars. So, it was really the generation of Alrik Gustafson that established Scandinavian Languages and Literature really as a legitimate scholarly discipline. Alrik Gustafson did that by just absolutely alienating himself from the immigrant background from which he came.

CAC: Ahhh.

NH: He just absolutely rejected immigrant culture and he sought his friends among the intellectuals in Sweden. He became a good friend of Pär [Fabian] Lagerkvist, the Swedish Nobel Prize winner, and had really quite interesting contacts in Sweden. He spent extensive time in Sweden. He devoted himself, his scholarship, mostly to [August] Strindberg, by all accounts the most prominent Swedish writer ever, who was part of the modern break through in Scandinavian literature. He even, I think, in his manners and looks, emulated Strindberg to some extent.

CAC: And in his house . . . he had that damned house. The walls were painted in Strindbergian deep colors.

NH: And his office at the university was painted in this red after Strindberg's famous novel, the *Red Room*; although, some people called that Mike Hopkins red, after one of the people at the university, the wonderful maintenance people there. Alrik was a colorful figure.

CAC: He'd been around a long time, long enough to really establish it.

NH: He came to Minnesota, I think, in 1938 or so. He came there from Cornell but, originally, he had been a professor at Augustana College. Alrik's relationship to Augustana was very complicated and unfortunate. He ended up marrying the wife of a music professor at Augustana and, of course, caused an enormous scandal by doing that, which was still reverberating when I came to Augustana in the 1950s and people still talk about it in the 1990s. Alrik emulated Strindberg in a number of respects.

CAC: The regents' professor of medicine bought his house when he retired and was at Harvard for two years. When our house burned on Carter [Avenue, St. Paul]—we had a terrible fire in the summer of 1963—and Paul Quie was on leave so we went to Strindberg's house. It was the damned darkest house, Nils. One of the bedrooms was deep pumpkin brown. You couldn't get enough light in that room. Dear little Robert was trying to read in the room and he said, "I need a stronger bulb." [laughter] That house just soaked up light.

NH: You visited Alrik and Cleyonne in their home then?

CAC: We lived a whole year in it.

NH: Oh, I see. This must have been Alrik and Cleyonne's old house then?

CAC: Yes.

NH: They moved down on Oliver Avenue later on.

CAC: I see.

NH: I never saw the earlier house but the later house was furnished in the same style. Your description fits it perfectly.

CAC: As a matter of fact, it was so damned dark, I threw myself down the steps and sprained my knee terribly and had to go around on crutches. It was so damned dark.

NH: We have in the university special collections an Alrik Gustafson's Room that has some artifacts from their home, which gives you a little bit of the Swedish flavor of their home, which was very much . . .

CAC: I hope the rest of you Swedes aren't as dark!

NH: . . . a Gustafson kind of Swedish home style.

CAC: What did you find otherwise when you came to Minnesota? What kind of a university and what kind of a department and program? Then, you begin very early to be interested or recruited for all-college kinds of committees, etcetera.

NH: Clarke, the first five years, I taught Old Norse and history of the Scandinavian languages and, then, I devoted myself to my research.

CAC: Good!

NH: I was a true faculty member and I had no administrative responsibilities whatsoever—nor did I want any. I continued my field work, mostly out in Chisago County. Then, all of a sudden, Alrik Gustafson, in 1970, had a stroke. John Turnbull, who was associate dean of CLA [College of Liberal Arts], called me up and said, "Nils, now you are head of the department and the center." So, there I was, all of a sudden, a department head, department chair, and a center director. I tried to pick up the pieces as best I could. That's how I got into administration the first time . . . by accident. In 1973, Frank Sorauf became dean of CLA and, then, he came to me and said, "Nils, I want you to take John Turnbull's position." I thought hard about that and Frank tried to convince me that it was my destiny. I resisted but finally succumbed to this Soraufian eloquence.

CAC: You didn't have much experience and much exposure. How did he recognize that?

NH: I don't know why he picked me. Since he was out of the social sciences, I think he wanted somebody from the humanities. That came as lightning out of the blue sky. I still don't quite know why I did it except it was Frank's personality. I really liked Frank and I really had a wonderful respect for Frank. It turned out to be a very exciting five years. I said to Frank then, "Okay, I will do it but I'm going to quit September 1, 1978"—which I did. I didn't know that Frank was going to decide to quit the same day.

CAC: He may have quit because you quit.

NH: No, I don't think so. No. I saw that as strictly a time-limited . . .

CAC: Legend would have it, Nils—legends are sometimes accurate—that Frank, indeed, was looking for a humanist but he was looking for a humanist with some sense. A lot of people who were your friends and colleagues said, "That's the quality that Nils has."

NH: Anyway, it was an exciting five years and I continued to teach and I continued to do some research. Then, I went back to faculty status in 1978 and I got drawn into the faculty governance system. For some reason, I was elected to the senate. I participated in the senate and, in 1979, they appointed the so-called Watson Committee to review the functioning of Central Administration and the faculty governance at the University of Minnesota, as we had done periodically. I served on that committee and I drafted the portion that had to do with strategic planning. Then, when Bob Stein decided to go to the Law School, Peter Magrath called me up and said, "Nils, why don't you come over and do it?" So, I became vice-president for Administration and Planning starting January 1st.

CAC: We're going to pick up that story. I want to back up to the five years in the Arts College. Say something about the style, the rhythm, the mode of administration with Sorauf and you those five years because it was the beginning of retrenchment, for one thing.

NH: Yes.

CAC: There were a lot of other things, too. What came in those five years and what can you say more about Frank?

NH: I have a lot of respect for [E.W.] "Easy" Ziebarth and for John Turnbull. They were really wonderful towards me certainly.

CAC: They were golden years. They had money.

NH: Yes, money was rolling in. I think you're right that the Sorauf years were really the harbinger of what was going to come. Frank, of course, by personality also was being a very determined person and I think he set a college agenda that was more distinctive than it had been earlier. Frank had some battles royal with some of the departments when it came to departmental control versus college control. I remember his dealing with departments like English, for example, that had established extraordinarily complex constitutions. Frank just made it clear that, yes, it's fine to have a constitution but the college constitution and the college rules and regulations and the college's priorities take precedence over departmentally imposed constitutions and so forth. Frank had an enormously strong sense of quality and he fought some really tough battles on tenure decisions, for example. In retrospect, I think that Frank left a very important legacy of setting aspirations. He also was willing to tackle departments that were not really

devoting themselves to teaching as they should and insisted that undergraduate teaching was a very major responsibility. Again, I think he had some interaction with the Economics Department about how faculty effort was going to be distributed with regard to teaching. I had a lot of respect for Frank.

CAC: How did the two of you relate?

NH: I succeeded John Turnbull and was associate dean and executive officer, as it was called, which meant that I dealt with a lot of the budgetary aspects. We had a Temporary Allocations Committee that provided funding for the various units. I worked closely with, what you might call, the sector associate deans, John Howe and Virginia Fredericks who were deans for social sciences and humanities and arts and humanities, at that time. I also had direct responsibility for the professional schools. I worked a lot with the School of Journalism and to some extent with Statistics.

CAC: Social Work?

NH: Social Work, that's right. We were involved in hiring and in budget making. We also had some of the early retrenchments; although, they started in 1971 when I was appointed to John Turnbull's first Retrenchment and Reallocation Committee.

CAC: When did you become chair of Scandinavian?

NH: In 1970 and, then, John Turnbull pulled me into this committee in 1971.

CAC: As I recall, the first retrenchment was May 1971 because I had succeed Stuart Hoyt as chair after an interim of about three months and the first call I had in May—I just know this—was from "Easy's" office. I'm sure it was from Turnbull saying, "You have to retrench." I forget what the percentage was, a small number. At that point, I didn't even know what the budget was. I'd never seen the budget. One of the first things I did as chair was open the budget up for the whole department so that wouldn't happen again.

NH: Yes. John had us go through every department in the College of Liberal Arts to decide about how we were going to retrench. There was also a reallocation process.

CAC: It became R&R [Retrenchment and Reallocation].

NH: The School of Cross-Disciplinary Studies—remember, Marcia Eaton was head for awhile—was one of the initiatives that were funded out of retrenched money at that particular time.

CAC: I chaired the Advisory Committee that [unclear]. Sorauf comes in in 1973, the fall of 1973, and you with him?

NH: Yes.

CAC: That's when we really began, within the college, a formal system of retrenchment and reallocation, I'm guessing.

NH: Yes. I have a feeling that Frank also was responsible for really tightening up the promotion and tenure process and that it may have been at that point that the college committee on promotion and tenure was established, or at least it, I think, became more active during Frank's years because Frank—I got drawn into these tenure evaluations, too—spent a lot of time on the quality control through the promotion and tenure process.

CAC: I think that committee was created in 1971 or 1972.

NH: Yes, that could well be that it was created at that time.

CAC: Because of the retrenchment.

NH: Yes. I have a little bit of difficulty separating what happened as Frank came in and what had actually happened when the climate changed.

CAC: Did you carry over in your administrative career things that you had learned with Frank?

NH: I think the main thing that I learned from Frank was that ultimately what counts in an institution, in a university, is the quality of the intellectual activity that goes on in the university and that the quality of the research, the quality of the teaching, is directly dependent on the quality of the faculty members that you recruit and that that is the central concern always.

CAC: So, recruitment, tenure and promotion are the keys?

NH: Absolutely the heart and also that you have sometimes to take a little bit of strife in order to make sure that certain principles are upheld and Frank was willing to do that.

CAC: At what political cost? It's my observation—to intervene again—that Frank didn't tolerate fools easily . . .

NH: No.

CAC: . . . and he was very quick with lots of people and he must have ruffled lots of folks.

NH: He did. Frank was by temperament rather hot-tempered and somewhat impatient. I remember we used to have lunch every Wednesday and Frank used to come to these lunches and his standard comment was, "You just won't believe this," and he had discovered some new outrage. [laughter]

CAC: [laughter] Which he delighted in, I'm sure.

NH: I used to joke with Frank and say, "Frank, you and I are like Gustavus Adolphus and Axel Oxenstierna, his chancellor . . . that Gustavus Adolphus was quite hot-tempered and Oxenstierna was more quiet. Gustavus, at one point, said to Axel Oxenstierna, "Axel, if I weren't here to warm you up, you would have frozen into ice by this time." Oxenstierna responded, "But, Your Majesty, if I hadn't been here, you would have burned up a long time ago."

CAC: [laughter]

NH: I quoted that to Frank. Quality and that the heart of the university, of course, is its intellectual agenda . . . Frank made it absolutely unambiguously clear that those were the driving forces and everything has to be traced back to those forces.

CAC: Why do you think Frank never went on? He took five years of that and boy! he never tinkered with it again. He had invitations.

NH: Sure, Frank could have gone on. I think he was sought for presidencies and Frank would have made an excellent president if he could just have . . .

CAC: Have you with him. [laughter]

NH: [laughter] No.

CAC: But, somebody like you.

NH: I think Frank may have decided that temperamentally he preferred to be a scholar and, of course, he was such an outstanding scholar and did so much wonderful scholarship. I don't know exactly what his motivations were but it may be that by personality, Frank took things a little bit too much to heart to want to have that kind of life.

CAC: He was very quick. We were very close friends and colleagues. I remember when I was chairman and he was dean, at some point, I used "data" in the singular. I said, "Data was" or something and oh, Jesus! did he snap at me fast. [laughter]

NH: That's one thing I learned from Frank, too, was that don't be sloppy with your language because he was just like a hawk if you . . .

CAC: But, don't criticize people publicly. How about that?

NH: Of course, I, being an immigrant and English being my second language, would make boobos from time to time and Frank was a taskmaster also in language—very useful.

CAC: Also, it began to recognize—to come back to the point you made earlier—that this was going to be retrenchment and reallocation. Right?

NH: Yes.

CAC: It wasn't his invention. The university was going that way.

NH: It was a new era. Frank, I must say, very early understood that retrenchment and reallocation could not be just kind of coping with a financial crisis that was going to go away next year, that this was something for the long term and that you had to set priorities for the college and for the university. You couldn't just operate in this ad hoc way. That is something that the University of Minnesota and other universities have had difficulty wrenching themselves out of. There's always been this mentality that—although, we've had a string of financial crises going back to the early 1970s—if we just kind of cut the TA [teaching assistant] budget and the travel budget, things are going to be better next year. If they'd be better next year, they'd be worse again the following year.

CAC: Many departments still operate that way.

NH: Yes. That's been a major, major struggle and it was a major struggle in my administration, too.

CAC: How soon did you and Frank recognize the long run on that very point, do you think?

NH: I think Frank came in with that conviction.

CAC: I see. And you saw it with him?

NH: I learned from Frank.

CAC: As budget officer, you had to.

NH: Yes, I did. My experience at Arizona was very important also because Arizona was a university that, in the 1950s, had started thinking strategically about making strategic investments and building quality in selected areas. President Harvill at Arizona would hire faculty members close to retirement, who were leaders in their fields. He would invite them to come to the University of Arizona and would say, "I'll give you three assistant professorships. Go out and recruit the best young assistant professors in the country." That's when George Simpson came and built biological sciences at Arizona. That's when Larry Gould came down and helped build geology. That's when Emil Hauray built anthropology at the University of Arizona. Strategic investment in intellectual leaders who could then surround themselves with strong intellectual faculty members . . . it's like the Chemical Engineering Department in Minnesota. Neal Amundson did that. I think they did it in some other departments: Political Science and so forth.

CAC: I never understood how they got away with it once Affirmative Action came in.

NH: I think it can be done and it has been done with Affirmative Action because there, clearly, are outstanding people who are women and minorities. What Affirmative Action did was to have us look more systematically and with the expectation that we could find outstanding women and minorities.

CAC: But, Neal Amundson . . . I have him on tape saying, "We were a great department because we never had a search." Neal just went around and found these young men, like Ken Keller. He just got them to come.

NH: Absolutely. That was the way it was done and what has to be done under Affirmative Action is to do the same thing but be mindful of the fact that there are outstanding women and minorities that have to be brought in as well.

CAC: Affirmative Action began in these years, too, in the mid 1970s? Correct?

NH: Yes, it did. Searches started being more rigorous at that particular time and there were rules and regulations and check lists for the conduct of searches. That started coming at this particular time; although, I didn't run into it in a major way until I became vice-president for Administration and Planning and had to handle the Rajender consent decree, which was an absolute nightmare.

CAC: We'll come to that. You enter the vice-presidency because you were visible for this other work you were doing on the Senate Committee and so forth.

NH: And the Watson Committee where we did write something about strategic planning.

CAC: What was the date of the Watson Committee?

NH: The Watson Committee was in 1979, I think, or it might even have started in 1978. I had gone back to the faculty ranks and was prepared to just be a faculty member and live happily ever after when Peter Magrath invited me to become vice-president for Administration and Planning, which I, then, decided to do because of the strategic planning aspect.

CAC: That's a good place then to say more. You pick up the narrative there, then.

NH: This is where Peter Magrath made a major contribution. Although, strategic planning had started—Frank certainly did strategic thinking about the Arts College . . .

CAC: Did Gerry Shepherd?

NH: And Gerry Shepherd certainly did, too. It was not that it was an explicit process called strategic planning.

CAC: Yes, of course.

NH: Gerry Shepherd was a tremendous academic vice-president and he certainly had a strategic sense and made strategic decisions. But, I think that the process in the sense of pulling together a number of constituencies to sit down and kind of talk through in an explicit way, what are the strengths, and weaknesses, and threats, and opportunities that faced the institution at this particular time, especially at an institutional level? I think that that really was introduced by Peter Magrath in the late 1970s and Bob Stein was the one who, then, laid the foundation for that strategic planning process.

CAC: I have other people who have commented that Magrath, publicly, was very slow in picking this necessity up and clarifying it.

NH: I think it depends on perspective because when I came in, there was a strategic planning process in place with a Strategic Planning Council. There had been committees. For example, John Turner chaired one of those planning committees. With John's incredible energy, he dug into this and they went through many aspects of the university at that particular time and began to really clarify the agenda. It's true that the Planning Council, in my perspective, never really worked quite the way it should have and that what came out of the planning process and the Strategic Planning Council did not inform decision making as explicitly as it should. That is true that I sometimes had to really sit down with Peter to convince him that some of these things had to be considered in the process. I would say, generally, that the strategic planning process has been useful; but, it has only been a foundation and a source on which it's been possible to draw in decision making. That certainly was true in my administration, too.

CAC: How long were you in this position?

NH: I started January 1, 1980. Then, I left for Arizona in September of 1983; so, I was in there for about three and a half years.

CAC: These are the latter years of Magrath.

NH: That's right. He left the year after I had gone to Arizona. I devoted a good deal of time to strategic planning and we did environmental scanning.

CAC: What's environmental scanning?

NH: It's to look at the environment, the factors in the environment that affect the university: the economic situation, expectations you have of state funding, federal support, federal financial aid, the potential for private fund raising, issues and educational needs in society that should be met

by undergraduate/graduate degrees . . . the whole set of environmental factors that should influence the university's decisions. Let me say again here that I think the planning process was useful and has been useful as kind of a foundation for decision making; but, it certainly has never in a systematic way led to such decisions. The decision making has been a separate strand and was in my administration, too. I, personally, decided that certain things had to be done being aware of what the planning process had brought forward and being informed by that. For example, closing Waseca . . . I don't think we could have closed Waseca. Closing Waseca was something that had been discussed for a number of years and the planning process and the analysis had given me something on which I could stand and I could say, "Yes, we should close Waseca. This is a proposition we should put forward."

CAC: We'll pick that up in more detail later. I'm still trying to maintain a kind of chronology here. I'm going to make a statement—you can criticize it because it may be wrong—that President Magrath was unwilling or unable to make those crisp decisions that were coming out of the process and that this was one of the reasons that there grew a kind of discomfort with his administration. That's what I pick up from many places. Can you comment and clarify that? Is that reasonably accurate or is it wrong?

NH: I think that if you look at the historical perspective and the kind of crispness that came with Commitment to Focus, that certainly is true. I think the foundation in planning was there for making those decisions but for various reasons, they were not made.

CAC: What are those various reasons?

NH: Here's where the external environment and the pressure . . . the pressure wasn't strong enough. The necessity wasn't quite strong enough; although, there were certainly, during the [Governor Al] Quie Administration and retrenchments, compelling reasons why the university needed to retrench and reallocate. We had some severe retrenchments at that particular time. I don't know whether it was Peter's personality, his unwillingness to make those decisions, or whether the pressures were not . . . There was still enough slack and leeway to get by so to speak. This gets me back to this evolution from the ad hoc coping with financial difficulties, then getting into a mode of cutting and saying, "We have to cut ourselves out of trouble." Then, of course, you run up against the fact that you can't cut yourself out of trouble because you begin to undermine the enterprise. That's when you get to the third stage where we tried to get to in my administration which is when you had to make the strategic investment in order to generate the resources that you need. You had to decentralize decision making so that you could create incentives for greater efficiency in the way you offer courses. It's a balance between, so to speak, setting general programmatic directions and, then, providing incentives for effective implementation of those directives. You have really three quite distinct stages, I think, in our history of retrenchment and reallocation. Magrath was caught, I think, at a stage where we were still in the coping mode and it was still possible, because we hadn't gone through so many retrenchments, to make those marginal decisions and get by. Then, Ken [Keller] came with Commitment to Focus and that set an entirely new set of aspirations.

CAC: Before we get to Keller . . . You were in Arizona during the Keller Administration?

NH: Yes, I was.

CAC: So, you saw it from a distance. Did you observe in your vice-presidential role in administration the role of the Board of Regents? We haven't talked about them yet at that time. Do you think that they were also unwilling as Magrath to clarify and move and make more explicit . . . I'm not saying it should have been done.

NH: I worked to some extent with the Board of Regents at the time. I don't think the Board of Regents at that point . . . they were more in the mode of lashing out at the governor and the legislature for not giving this university enough money rather than looking aggressively, internally, at redistribution of funds.

CAC: So, this long run planning that you're talking about in different stages had barely reached Magrath and he was unwilling . . . he didn't grasp it explicitly and the Board of Regents, you're suggesting now, were even less willing or less informed or whatever? They were more traditional?

NH: I don't remember that the board put particular pressure on for making those kinds of hard decisions. It was more a matter of arguing that the state must provide more funding and we cannot sustain these cuts. The thinking was clearly not yet in the kind of more profound reform and change of the university that came later on.

CAC: But, you say without boasting, that your own perception—although you were not president; you were vice-president—was a bit ahead of the curve in that regard in the early 1980s?

NH: My role as vice-president for Administration and Planning was, of course, to try to insert the planning process and the findings from the planning process and the kind of decisions that the planning process would drive into the central discussion. I remember that there was a group called the Budget Executive in existence at that time. It was chaired by the academic vice-president. Ken was academic vice-president for most of this period. It was Ken and Don Brown and, later on, Fred Bowen, the Finance vice-president and, then, Lyle French, who were the Budget Executive. I got myself appointed to the Budget Executive as Planning vice-president because I wanted to try to make sure that the planning perspective was there when the Budget Executive made their decisions.

CAC: Sure.

NH: Frankly, the decisions were driven very much by that Budget Executive and Peter did not directly drive. Although, he took on and had to take responsibility for the decisions, they really came from the Budget Executive, which was a very powerful triumvirate.

CAC: So, that group was ahead of the curve?

NH: There was a lot of discussion there. Clarke, there are some examples here where Peter really went against the grain. For example, the proposal to build a new hospital . . . it was an enormous project and Peter, at one point, just absolutely dug in his heels and said, "No, this is not going to fly. There are too many beds. It's got to be down scaled." Peter took a lot of heat from the Health Sciences at that time because he scaled down that hospital project—and wisely so. That's one example where I say that Peter really stepped forth and took a stand that was difficult but it was necessary and appropriate and, I think, came out of planning.

CAC: It came out of planning and he got the regents to go along with that?

NH: He got the regents to go along with it. I remember that and it was an intense moment.

CAC: You begin to learn yourself about intensity, particularly in this position, more so than when you were . . .

NH: I realized too that being vice-president for Administration and Planning . . . inevitably you were sitting there with an agenda and proposal and all of this but you didn't have any power to implement them. I realized that being academic vice-president really was the ideal job; so, when they came and invited me down for an interview at the University of Arizona, I went down here and decided to take the job.

CAC: Okay. It's the ideal job, Nils . . .

NH: [laughter]

CAC: . . . but I hear from many places that the vice-presidency as defined traditionally at Minnesota after Gerry Shepherd, didn't work.

NH: Yes.

CAC: There were good persons in it occasionally or less good persons but that it was something structural in that office that they couldn't do what you're talking about.

NH: Yes.

CAC: Go on. You're saying "Yes," to me; so, now go ahead.

NH: Clarke, we need to come back to other things in my time as vice-president for Administration and Planning though.

CAC: Okay.

NH: The agenda was dominated very much by the Rajender consent decree, which was an extraordinarily contentious issue.

[End of Tape 1, Side 2]

[Tape 2, Side 1]

CAC: We're on a clean tape and we're in the clean vice-presidency. [laughter]

NH: Clarke, I wanted to pick up . . . I took the job of vice-president for Administration and Planning because I was interested in strategic planning; but, I probably did, over all, maybe ten percent, fifteen percent, strategic planning and the rest was taken up by the things that Peter told me, "By the way, you're also going to be responsible for police, personnel, intercollegiate athletics, and Rajender consent decree." That consent decree was accepted by the Board of Regents, I think something like a week or two after I became vice-president. There had been a terrible trial under Judge [Miles] Lord where some members of the university staff had made deeply incriminating statements that resulted in a case where the university's chances of reaching an acceptable verdict before Judge Lord was becoming very shaky. The Board of Regents were being subpoenaed by Judge Lord to appear before him.

CAC: Can you give a few for instances on that? Where did the difficulty come from and why was it . . . ?

NH: The then director of Affirmative Action, Lillian Williams, made some statements before Judge Lord that really cast the university in a very negative light. My opinion also is that, yes, the university had culpability and there were things that needed to be straightened out; but, it was aggravated by, I think, some statements that were made especially by her as Affirmative Action director. Then, of course, Judge Lord was pursuing his own agenda.

CAC: Did you have to testify?

NH: No, I became vice-president just as the regents accepted the consent decree, which stopped the proceedings and it was put under three special masters appointed by the court. The board, as I understand it, had been subpoenaed, or members of the board had been subpoenaed, by Judge Lord to come and testify in court. It was becoming a circus. Then, the board accepted this consent decree which established a panel of three special masters, paid for by the university, that were going to review all of these cases of women who wanted to file complaints about salary. A large number of complaints were filed under the consent decree.

CAC: And promotion and tenure?

NH: And promotion and tenure, just general discrimination against women. I have no doubt in historical perspective but that there had been such discrimination. Rajender became just the

match and powder keg. Then, the university was quite unprepared to handle anything of that nature. The university at that time had one university attorney, Joel Tierney.

CAC: And he was interested, chiefly, in real estate. [laughter]

NH: Yes, that's right. They, then, hired outside lawyers to assist in dealing with the consent decree. It was a very difficult few months before we worked out an arrangement with the special masters. We worked out a procedure whereby women faculty members could file their complaints and they could, in an orderly fashion, be brought before the special masters and adjudication could take place. I got sucked into this, of course, being totally inexperienced in such matters. Fortunately, we had Tom Tinkham as an outside lawyer coming in to help administer that particular process. Eventually, we got it under control and we began to deal with those cases. I negotiated some of those settlements myself. I negotiated the settlement with Phyllis Kahn, for example. It became very expensive. Even when we thought we had a pretty good case, it was very expensive to go to court and win that case. The university got into a mode of settling cases. Usually, there were some things, at least procedurally, that were not very good. You know the university's propensity for messing up its complex procedures. Then, we realized that we could not get by with the legal staff we had and rely on outside counsel; so, then, the decision was made to strengthen our legal staff. A search committee was appointed and Steve Dunham was then . . .

CAC: This would have been in the early 1980s, after the consent decree?

NH: Yes, after the consent decree. Steve came in and with Steve, real order was brought into the whole process. It played itself out over ten years.

CAC: When did Pat Mullen come into the . . . ?

NH: Pat Mullen, I think, had worked with Lillian Williams and when Lillian Williams died of cancer—very sadly—I think Pat took over as Affirmative Action director.

CAC: Did you work with Lillian?

NH: I worked with Lillian and with Pat.

CAC: Who were the other key players in the legal office particularly after Steven Dunham came in, the other major players now?

NH: Tom Tinkham was hired by the university really to be the legal counsel that dealt with the university's perspective on this process with the special masters. Then, the special masters, Vi Kanitz, Leonard Lindquist, and one more special master, set up these hearings where they heard cases, which were then filed by women.

CAC: But, you had to kind of run . . . ?

NH: I had a kind of administrative responsibility for coordinating it and making sure that we set up a process that was satisfactory with the help of Tom Tinkham particularly. Then, when Steven Dunham came in. He essentially took over managing that particular process from the perspective of the university and we started building more of a legal staff, which eventually led to the staff of a dozen people, which we have today. Pat Mullen and Lillian Williams were involved to some extent. The special master process was itself a special defined process that we conducted. Then, in the public relations arena, there were faculty members such as Pat Faunce particularly who made very strong accusatory statements in the press and the university was caught in a very difficult situation trying to do the right thing under this process that had been established but being constantly beaten over the head with how impossible it was. Over ten years, I think it did good things for women at the University of Minnesota. I think in historical perspective it was a positive thing. It was done awkwardly and with a lot of contentiousness that maybe was necessary because this was a major culture change but that certainly was difficult at the time and very time consuming.

CAC: How did Central Administration find the funding to do this? It came to be very expensive.

NH: Yes, it did. It cost millions of dollars. It was worked into the budget. The university had insurance so that insurance paid some major amounts of the costs of the process.

CAC: I'm guessing that the heavier costs were in legal counsel?

NH: Yes, legal fees and vastly expanded costs of the general counsel's office. That budget multiplied at that time.

CAC: In some of the cases, the settlements involved paying the lawyer's fees for . . .

NH: For both sides. The university paid for the special masters, which was very expensive. It paid the settlement and it paid legal costs when the faculty members and the university settled. It was a very costly way of doing it. Only a portion went to actually adjusting women's salaries. A lot of money went to the process—and that was unfortunate.

CAC: To say nothing—you hinted at it a moment ago—of the time and nervous energy that had to be invested in it as well on all sides.

NH: Yes, it was very unfortunate. It really was. You can look back and you can say that in the settlement with Rajender . . . I think there was an offer at one point to President [Malcolm] Moos to settle the Rajender case for \$5,000 and it was rejected. There were people in the Chemistry Department who descended on the president and talked him out of doing it. Later, there were some problems with that particular case.

CAC: That was a loser from the beginning.

NH: It was. It was one of those instances where, in retrospect, the university could have had the opportunity to do what needed to be done in a much more positive fashion; but, it took that very serious conflict and great legal expense to get there. Culture change comes hard sometimes.

CAC: You're hinting—maybe I'm reading too much into it—that faster and more prophetic leadership by late Moos or early Magrath might have lessened the burden.

NH: There certainly was an opportunity that wasn't seized. How often that happens in history.

CAC: You say fifty percent of your time . . .

NH: That was during the first years.

CAC: I understand. Then, you also pick up Women's Athletics and that's not an unrelated subject. Say something about that.

NH: Women's Athletics was also in a formative stage at that particular time. I'm delighted now seventeen, eighteen years later to see that it is such a resounding success.

CAC: Right.

NH: Minnesota had separate men's and women's departments, which we shared only with Iowa, at the time, in the Big Ten. That was an issue and, of course, the leadership in the Women's Athletics was an issue and Title IX was an issue of how much money the university should pump into Women's Athletics. Here, I must say, that I think the university has all along had a positive agenda. Yes, Women's Athletics has to be built. I went to the legislature the first time when we asked for a special legislative appropriation for Women's Athletics, which now amounts to some \$2.6 million a year. Minnesota was one of the few states that allocated money to build women's athletics. To that extent, the university was assisted by the state in building Women's Athletics. The only question has really been how fast do you expand and how fast do you move in Women's Athletics.

CAC: And what's the relationship with Men's Athletics.

NH: And what's the relationship with Men's Athletics. I think, on balance, although it has caused problems in the Big Ten and so forth that we have separate departments, it has been a useful mechanism because it has given women a degree of autonomy. It has given women an opportunity to exercise leadership in athletics to an extent that is simply not possible within the confines of a male department. If you have a male oriented culture in the university . . . it is male oriented in spades in the Men's Athletic Department.

CAC: When you were there, Mr. [Paul] Giel was director?

NH: Yes, he was director of Men's Athletics and, of course, an enormously popular person around the state of Minnesota. The department was really run by Bob Geary who was his second in command and who, then, was killed, I think during Ken Keller's era, in a air disaster in Nevada. Bob ran the department.

CAC: And Paul Giel was Mr. Outside?

NH: Paul Giel was Mr. Outside and did a lot of public relations for the university and also some fund raising. But, Bob Geary really ran the department. I think things started going awry when Geary died and Paul did not get an inside person to run the department. I think that's what got him into the trouble where Dick Sauer then had to fire him.

I had difficulties with Women's Athletics. I ended having to fire the director of Women's Intercollegiate Athletics, Lillian Barfield, who had many strengths but was an extraordinarily contentious person. She just had bad relations in just about every direction.

CAC: Including with her coaches?

NH: With her coaches. It was simply not a well-run operation. Then, we hired Merrily Baker. She was a wonderful asset . . . Merrily Baker, wonderful Merrily Baker. We hired her and she came in and changed the atmosphere in the department. Then, we also set up a special counseling program both in Men's and Women's Athletics, especially in Men's Athletics, for academic counseling that has grown to be really a major asset. Today, that's flourishing and is a model in the country.

CAC: Good.

NH: We set that up at that particular time to try to come to grips with some of the problems of academic performance in athletics.

CAC: I was on the selection committee as Mr. Male Token when we selected Merrily Baker. That was an interesting experience for me at a very low level. I was the only man on the committee and I did a lot of listening. Merrily was swell.

NH: I'm afraid I was responsible for that committee, Clarke, and I'm glad I had the wisdom to put you on it.

CAC: [laughter] I contributed nothing but an ear.

NH: Merrily did well. She, later on, went to the NCAA [National Collegiate Athletic Association] and, then, she was athletic director at Michigan State. I think her fate there, the

way she was driven out of the university at Michigan State, is an indication of how hard it is for women to function in the male dominated environment of general intercollegiate athletics.

CAC: Is it true that Iowa and Minnesota are the only two major universities that have it separate still?

NH: There are one or two others. We were hoping it would become a national trend but it didn't. Merrily Baker had been involved in this abortive national attempt to form a separate Women's Intercollegiate Athletic Association, separate from the NCAA, which failed just before Merrily came to Minnesota. So, you have here a kind of different model for women's athletics nationally, separate but equal, which failed. Minnesota and Iowa are two of the remnants within the universities with that particular structure. At the same time, of course, women's athletics has really taken hold and has grown and developed significantly, even under a merged system.

CAC: Let me ask a larger cultural question then. Then, maybe we should break for lunch pretty soon. In regards to the culture of sports, particularly as they have changed, I think the last fifty years, and how important winning teams are for the general stature of the university and its appropriations in the legislature . . . there's that whole cluster of things.

NH: Yes. It's a strange American phenomenon that big time athletics has become associated with major educational institutions. That's, of course, not the case anywhere else in the world where sports organizations are quite separate from universities. It has its advantages, Clarke, because athletics connects the general public with universities in certain ways that sometimes can lead to a broadened interest. I have a good example of that. The man and woman who just endowed the professorship in New Testament and Christian Studies at the University of Minnesota were people who were very deeply involved with athletics and who had primarily associated with the university in connection with athletics but they have taken enough interest to provide a chair in religious studies. Is it worth the cost? If I founded a new university, I wouldn't dream of having intercollegiate athletics in its present form. I would like to have very strong athletic programs but programs that probably did not have special athletic scholarships, more of an Ivy League model where young men and women can do high quality athletics but do it without this horribly commercialized dimension that we have run into.

CAC: You find that to be so . . . horribly commercialized?

NH: Yes, there's very strong pressure. Here's where you have a little bit of societal hypocrisy because society tends to pick on the university for being so commercially oriented. At the same time, society has left it to universities, such as Minnesota, to find \$15 million or \$16 million a year to finance all of these operations so that they can go to football games, and basketball games, and baseball games. There isn't a penny of state money in Men's Athletics. It's all generated by Men's Athletics, plus helping finance Women's Athletics. The social agenda in Women's Athletics is financed by Men's Athletics. I'm a little bit impatient with this hypocrisy that, on the one hand, people want all of this but, at the other hand, they don't want you to be

greedy. At the same time, athletics has to generate those funds. That's why we try to negotiate television contracts and all of that. The Big Ten really has about as good an environment in intercollegiate athletics as you'll find anywhere because there's revenue sharing and that means that when Michigan goes to the Rose Bowl, Minnesota gets several hundred thousand dollars out of it. When Minnesota goes to the Final Four, the other teams, other schools, get money from the Final Four. That revenue sharing has, I think, been healthy because it has put less premium on winning at all costs. It's a complicated situation and it's a constant struggle to maintain the academic qualifications when the outside incentives for sports achievement is so . . .

CAC: Some studies would suggest that the academic performance of women athletes is far better than the academic performance of men.

NH: It has been so far. Over all, athletes have a better academic record than non-athletes in the university. If you take away some football players, some basketball players, and some hockey players, you find really quite substantial academic achievement.

CAC: Wrestling and gymnastics, for example?

NH: Golf, tennis, yes. This, again, is where generalization is very dangerous because you have pockets of problems. You need outstanding athletes because these are the commercial and nationally known sports and you have to admit students at risk and you get problems when you do that. Our athletic directors, I must say, have been quite effective in striking the balance between the absolute need for academic performance and the need to be financially successful. Both [McKinley] "Mac" Boston and now Mark Dienhart, too, have limited the number of at risk students that they will allow to be recruited into any program in order to try to minimize this problem.

CAC: You had to appear before the legislature frequently to represent the university. Did a winning major team create a better climate and generate more money for legislative appropriation?

NH: Clarke, there's a common assumption that a successful athletic team really helps in the legislature and helps with private fund raising. I have no evidence whatsoever that it does. I don't think it affects legislative appropriations. I don't think it affects private fund raising—very much at least. At the real margin, maybe it does. What it does is to create a general sense of goodwill and enthusiasm. Going to the Final Four last year . . . the whole state was dressed in gold and maroon. There was this wave of enthusiasm; but, Clarke, I have not felt that it has translated into any very meaningful support for the university.

CAC: On the downside, occasionally, a scandal like the basketball scandal that Keller had, can be a terrible downer.

NH: It certainly can. It certainly can. Persistent poor performance, the lack of success for our football team has been a drag; but, again, we have been enormously successful in private fund raising at the University of Minnesota at the time when we've had our worst record in football in history.

CAC: [laughter] It's coming to be one of the worst for a long time.

NH: It's a common perception that athletic success is just all important to legislative appropriations and private fund raising. I have not found it so.

CAC: Good. I've asked that question of many people who have lobbied at the university, not only at the highest level but at every other level, and that's a general consensus.

Are there more things in the vice-presidency for Administration we should cover before we break now?

NH: Personnel and the police department. The police department . . . I didn't get involved in a lot of issues there; although, there were occasional morale problems in the police department and the police union. The chief would spar from time to time. It's one of those situations where you have a sub-culture within the university and that police culture is rather distinctive from some of the others. We have many of those sub-cultures.

CAC: You say "many sub-cultures." Where would you locate others?

NH: First of all, we have the civil service culture. We have the trades cultures, the facilities management. We have the academic, professional culture. We have, of course, several faculty cultures, and we have the extension agent culture, and we have the athletic culture. You have many of these sub-cultures within the university.

CAC: Now, as vice-president and, then, as president, you had to relate in some way to all of these sub-cultures?

NH: Yes. As president, you have to try to relate to all of them. I should say about personnel that we began to realize—as, of course, administrators have realized over the years—that the university was woefully inadequate in its management systems and processes and that with the growing demand for accountability, the growing demand for dealing with multiple sources of funding, and the growing demand to put all of this before the Board of Regents, we simply were not set up to manage effectively. I certainly began to feel that as we dealt with personnel issues. For example, one year the legislature appropriated money so late that we could not give salary increases July 1st but we could give them by October 1st or something like that. The personnel system was totally incapable of dealing effectively with that. You may recall it.

CAC: Yes.

NH: People couldn't understand and I never could fully understand why it would take six months for the university simply to get the salary increase into the paychecks. It was simply that the management system was so woefully primitive.

CAC: This relates to the introduction of computers as a technology of management.

NH: That opened major possibilities for much more effective management.

CAC: When you were vice-president, were we computerized then in any major way?

NH: Yes, we had computers. We had these room fulls of machines.

CAC: Did they do payroll?

NH: Yes, they did payroll by computer. We had administrative computing as well as academic computing at that time. People like [Frank] Verbrugge and Peter Patton were beginning to provide application in the sciences but also in social sciences and even in the humanities at that particular time. Peter Patton was working with concordances, for example, that greatly helped the work of philologists and literary scholars. Minnesota was reasonably well-positioned at the time, given the state of computing. I'm talking not just about administrative computing in the personnel system. It was just that the whole personnel management system was simply incapable of the kind of quick response that began to be necessary.

CAC: Were you able to address that at all?

NH: We just began, Clarke. When I went to Arizona, we had just begun some of those things, including a proposal to go to bi-weekly payroll, which, a couple of years ago, finally came about under very contentious circumstances. So what we started nibbling at when I was the vice-president, I saw being brought to completion when I was president.

CAC: I was part of a small radical caucus of free-standing individuals who tried to get the university to think—this would have been in the 1980s, I'm sure—of annual salaries spread out over twelve months instead of nine months.

NH: We did get that option introduced a couple years ago.

CAC: Yes, finally did. I was told—I was kind of fronting for this group—"No, administratively, we can't do that. No, we can't set up that."

NH: The concern was that we would pay people for work not yet completed. It turned out that it could be done.

CAC: Finally, and about three years before I retired—I was through teaching winter; I came to Arizona or other places—I said, “I want to do my work fall, spring, and summer.” I’d put in the full ten weeks. I wouldn’t be teaching summer school.

NH: A “J” appointment, right?

CAC: Yes. They said, “We can’t do that unless we pay you year around, twelve months.” I said, “That’s too bad but if that’s what you have to do, that’s all right with me.”

NH: [laughter] I think that “J” appointment came about as an experiment in Geography while I was vice-president where we allowed Geography to incorporate evening school and summer teaching into the full load and, then, they hired an additional couple of faculty members because they could incorporate those.

CAC: My understanding is that Geography is the only one that ever got away with that. Did it happen elsewhere?

NH: We started it with Geography when I was vice-president.

CAC: I don’t think it ever went anywhere.

NH: No, I think it stayed there as a successful option. [laughter]

CAC: It’s a good idea.

Are there other things with the vice-presidency now that we want to address or is this a good point to break?

NH: I think this is a good time to break now.

CAC: Then, we can think about where we want to go next.

[break in the interview]

CAC: Here we are again. We’ve broken for a nice lunch of fresh vegetable soup.

NH: A wonderful lunch. Thank you.

CAC: Now, we have new levels of energy. We talked about many things at lunch, most of them not bearing on the interview. A couple things did come up and, perhaps, we could just clean that up and move you to the University of Arizona. One thing that you had suggested that you wanted to comment on at least briefly is the history and the development of area studies with Minnesota as a case example and, then, how ethnic studies fit into that. I was suggesting that

although the ethnic studies programs at Minnesota came in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it was from 1973 to 1978 with you and Frank [Sorauf] that they really got established; so, there's kind of an inside story on that, too. With that as an introduction, let's catch up on that and, then, we'll move quickly to Arizona.

NH: Area studies clearly grew out of a need during the Second World War for American government to have expertise on the various world areas where they got involved in war-like activities.

CAC: Fighting.

NH: This led to the National Defense Education Act and, probably, that was under the pressure of the Cold War that had arisen as well. Area studies became a wave in the 1950s and early 1960s and many world areas were emphasized, including the North European area of Scandinavia with Finland. That's how the center became established. Area studies had one fundamental flaw and that was that there was no coherent methodology. Area studies was to provide expertise on a particular world area but it was expertise that was still fragmented. There were experts in history, experts in political science, sociology, economics, languages, literature, and culture and it never developed a methodology that in any way that really began to integrate those particular fields, at least not at any more sophisticated intellectual level. I think it was still very useful because it did build competence in various disciplines and since scholars can operate not only in their primary dimension, which I think has to be disciplinary, but in secondary and tertiary dimensions as well, this area studies environment provided an opportunity for scholars in different disciplines who were focusing on the same geographical area and culture to come together and have enriching experiences. I saw this myself because I had the good fortune when I was doing my research on the Swedish language in America to become associated with a group of historians and demographers in Sweden who were studying, from the perspective of intellectual history, church history, demographics, and economic history, the Swedish immigration to the United States, both in terms of background factors in Sweden and in terms of settlement and cultural self-maintenance in this country. I found that perspective quite enriching; although, I didn't work these things into a theoretical framework for my own study. I think the area studies was a good idea.

CAC: Excuse me. It also brought in an awful lot of federal money to the social sciences and humanities.

NH: It was a major source of funding and that's one way that the Cold War became a bonanza for the universities and, I think generally, we've seen over the last forty years that the Cold War made it possible to form a political coalition in Congress that provided lots of funding for the universities under what one might even consider false pretenses; although, it strengthened . . .

CAC: Oh! not false pretenses certainly.

NH: Not false pretenses but I think that the politics was a little bit different than the intellectual agenda that was pursued. I think the intellectual agenda made the funding well worth it but in terms of strictly looking at our defense strategy, I don't think that it probably was justified.

CAC: Sure.

NH: That's the way the coalition tended to be defended in Congress. Of course, we've been grasping for some such political, unifying element that we could use at this time in order to provide funding for the universities from the federal government. Economic development has been the most promising possibility; although, it hasn't quite caught on with the intensity of the Cold War.

CAC: It would be fun to have someone do research on the number of graduate students who supported themselves with NDEA area studies' fellowships for their entire career. Whatever they did later, area studies or not, it was their access to higher education.

NH: Yes. It was, in a way, a G.I. Bill at the doctoral level.

CAC: Right.

NH: I think it sent a lot of very good scholars into various disciplines who may not have had the opportunity if it hadn't been for the National Defense Education Act. So, I think it was useful. It also points up the difficulty of having a consistent, continuing national strategy because the federal government invested heavily in area studies at one time and, then, in the late 1960s with the emphasis on ethnic self-assertion and self-maintenance, all of a sudden, the funding started shifting into ethnic studies.

CAC: Not from the same source.

NH: Not from the same sources but the federal government stopped funding area studies to a considerable extent . . .

CAC: I see.

NH: . . . and began to fund projects in ethnic studies.

CAC: African-American, Chicano, American Indian.

NH: Yes, that's right and really general ethnic studies so immigrant studies generally benefitted from this as well.

CAC: How did that money flow in, through what national agency?

NH: It probably came primarily through the Department of Education and it came to a considerable extent in terms of preparation of teaching materials. I know in the Scandinavian area, for example, that there were projects on preparing teaching materials on the Scandinavian immigration that were funded by federal funds and that were done, for example, at Gustavus Adolphus College. You had a shift in emphasis at that particular time. Today, we are struggling with trying to forge a strategy that will sell with the federal government in order to garner support for international studies in various forms. There have been proposals for a National Institute of International Studies and none of those ideas have really caught hold so that the federal investment, at this point, in international studies is fairly tenuous. I've seen a firsthand example of this because I have a nephew who just got his Ph.D. in Russian history at North Carolina and has done very well but he has had trouble finding a job because they have curtailed Russian history. I can't believe that Russian history is not going to continue to be an important field in the future; although, right now, the direct, strategic value of such studies when the Cold War is over is not apparent. I think this is where this jerkiness in the federal funding policy is a problem. It creates a resource and, then, it doesn't use the resource.

CAC: To what degree had the Ford Foundation picked up this slack in the 1970s and 1980s? Did that come in to help area studies?

NH: Yes, the Ford Foundation did do some very important work and there were other foundations as well; but, it did not, of course, begin to have the impact of the federal funding at this particular time. I think that area studies were in trouble even before the federal funding ceased because of the fact that there was not an intellectual foundation for area studies and, then, comparative studies have, in some sense, replaced area studies. You have comparative studies within political science, for example, or you have it in comparison of educational systems. Those comparative studies are, I think, intellectually quite fruitful. You see a wave right now of interesting studies having to do with higher education in different cultures and how higher education is changing in a comparative perspective, which I find quite interesting.

CAC: Let me try this, briefly. A lot of these conversations are unplanned and this part is. I think your description of area studies—of course, it's accurate—reflects other conversations I've had that there are free-standing departments and it isn't really interdepartmental and methodological but you have an area of study. I wonder if the efforts the last five, seven, eight years to get an area study, so to speak, in the biological sciences is not something of a parallel development, except there, there really is an inter-exchange of method. It's around the common problems of biology and genetics and molecular science.

NH: That certainly is my impression, Clarke. You have to have, in order to develop a methodology, a problem oriented approach and, then, you can do it in a comparative perspective. You have to focus on specific questions for which you seek answers. In biological sciences, I have the feeling that what has happened there is that molecular biology has begun to lay such a strong foundation for a coherent view of the biological sciences . . .

CAC: It's a core discipline.

NH: Yes. You still wrestle and our recent reorganization at the University of Minnesota reflects the fact that you still deal with a molecular level and you deal with the organismic, you deal with a cellular level, and you deal with a behavioral level. The way those three get tied together . . . it's a long way to go before they can be a coherent, integrated system of explanation.

CAC: I did a second interview with [W. Phillips] Shively. The earlier one is really about political science and, then, it was four years later when I debriefed him on the provostal. I had a sense that that movement in the biological sciences had engaged his attention very deeply and along the lines that we're suggesting here. But, it hadn't occurred to me that, in the one case, it really did stay free-standing in a disciplinary or methodological sense and in the biological sciences, it was real opportunity for an exchange of methods and techniques.

NH: I developed an interest in the reorganization of the biological sciences because we made a major reorganization of the biological sciences at the University of Arizona.

CAC: Ah!

NH: We took the leap from botany and zoology to molecular, cellular, organismic, behavioral biology. Minnesota hadn't gone through a major reorganization. The College of Biological Sciences was established some thirty years ago. Even that organization had its flaws. What we're doing now is to, first of all, avoid duplication. We don't need two or three biochemistry departments. An integration in those terms is necessary. Also, for example, neuro-science will be established as a separate department. Here is an inter-disciplinary field that has now emerged as a major discipline with its own integrated methodology.

CAC: And so fast. Talk about changing perceptions, paradigms . . . good grief.

NH: Yes. You certainly do have parallels among different clusters of disciplines when it comes to the theoretical developments.

CAC: But, that same excitement never took place in the area studies, except for individual persons.

NH: It never really did. One could conceive, certainly, of an area studies methodology that would be based on some kind of theory of culture . . .

[End of Tape 2, Side 1]

[Tape 2, Side 2]

CAC: We've flipped to the second side.

I'm not going to beat this to death; but, I'm just going to recall that I had a story from Gerhardt Weiss who—speaking of the NDEA and its promotion of German—that [Meredith] Met Wilson had very early in his career, in the early 1960s, had gone over to the German Department and he just wanted to be walked through what they were doing and what equipment they were doing and he said, "Have you got any laboratory?" They had some but it wasn't . . . He said, "We'll get money." Within a month, Gerhardt said, they were up to speed and all that money was invested and the German Department took off with a new kind of teaching.

NH: I chaired a committee at one stage—I think it must have been in the early 1970s—on the organization of the language departments. This has been an ongoing issue because there are many commonalities when it comes to teaching introductory language and you need language laboratory facilities and you need strong training of language teachers in language pedagogy. This has tended to be fragmented among many small language departments. There's also the split between languages and literature, which has been detrimental, I think, for many, many years. This question keeps coming up, "Can we separate the language component of foreign languages and literatures from the literature component?" There's a model called the Cornell Model which came about during the Second World War when linguistics became the core of a large department at Cornell that taught linguistics and foreign languages and the literatures of the various major cultural areas were separate entities from the language component. We looked very seriously at that particular model but did not adopt that model. There's great resistance among the literature folks to separating the language education from the language and literature departments. Partly, it's a bread and butter issue because that's where you have the large numbers of students. That's where you can support your TAs.

CAC: Senior scholars don't want to teach those courses.

NH: And the senior scholars don't want to teach those courses. That's an unsolved problem. I think, frankly, that we need to look to having language teaching institutes where students are under some kind of emersion program with strong residencies in the areas where the languages are spoken. We have to construct programs like that if we are going to provide substantial language competency for our students. The way we are frittering away these experiences now with even five hours a week . . . if you're going to learn a foreign language, it's simply not enough. It's not intense enough to produce meaningful mastery. I saw this when I taught Swedish literature in the original. I had only students who had spent a year in Sweden and they came back with a language knowledge that was sufficient for them to really dig into the cultural meat of that literature in the original. It was an entirely different experience from the students who had just sat through first and second year Swedish and, then, tried to deal with real text.

CAC: One thing I regret and resent in my education was the bad language I had. I had enough to get by the exams for the graduate degree and barely that. My daughter is so fluent in Spanish and Portuguese, just superb.

Let's move to Arizona.

NH: All right.

CAC: Mr. [Henry] Koffler knew you because your tenure at Minnesota overlapped briefly?

NH: I was associate dean while he was academic vice-president.

CAC: So, he knew of you.

NH: He knew about me, yes.

CAC: It was an open search in that sense?

NH: There was a search. The chair of the search committee called me up in March of 1983 and asked if I would be interested in coming down for an interview, which I did. I saw the desert for the first time and I thought it was a very interesting and charming environment. Then, when they made me an offer of the academic vice-presidency at Arizona, after some soul searching, I accepted. I think it was a very smart move because I had been at Minnesota for eighteen years at that time. I found the change of scenery, intellectual and in other respects, very interesting and stimulating.

CAC: The vice-presidency for Administration was a dead end in the long run?

NH: It really was. An indication of that is the fact that it was abolished after I left.

CAC: [laughter] All right. How was your job defined here? Was it similar to what the academic vice-presidency would be in Minnesota?

NH: It was; although, the University of Arizona is smaller and has only one campus. As provost, I had twelve deans reporting to me and that meant that I could meet almost on a bi-weekly basis with each dean. We had breakfast over at the Plaza Cafe and went through the agenda for that particular college. I think one of the problems at Minnesota is simply that the span of responsibility for the academic vice-president is too wide and the efforts at decentralization and delegation have not been successful. Here, I'm very partial and I will get back to that when we talk about the provostal system because I think that held the key to a solution. I'm sorry that it didn't last in its full-fledged form longer than it did. Arizona was an interesting experience because the dynamics of change are so evident at the University of Arizona. In the 1950s,—they told me—the playboys and playgirls who couldn't get into the University of Colorado went to Arizona. It seems to have been a bastion of mediocrity. Today, the University of Arizona is a really outstanding research and Land-Grant university. I think it became that by systematic, strategic decision making, not necessarily strategic planning but making strategic decisions area by area, they were going to build intellectual excellence.

CAC: This was Mr. Koffler's doing, primarily?

NH: This started in the 1950s with then President Harvill. He was the one who recruited people like George Wilson in the biological sciences, Larry Gould in the geo-sciences, and in other fields and, then, gave them three assistant professorships and said, "Go and get the best young scholars in the country." They did. They created new cores for key disciplines through those people, senior scholars, close to retirement, who came here and became the catalyst for those developments. It seems to have succeeded in most instances that I'm aware of. You can still see it at the university and you certainly could see it when I was provost because you had these very prominently ranked departments in geo-sciences, in some of the biological sciences, in Southwestern archaeology for obvious reasons, and, of course, in astronomy. They built a leading optical sciences center. That originally was a backup for the astronomy enterprise. They also branched out then. They recruited excellent philosophers from the University of Illinois at Chicago and when I was here, the philosophy department here was eleventh ranked in the country. They did it in some other areas as well. It points to the necessity of building excellence one scholar at a time and giving them the opportunity to exercise intellectual leadership and literally build the department. We did that when I was here in cognitive science, for example. A group of faculty members got together and formulated a program in cognitive science, one of the emerging interdisciplinary fields. There were some excellent people in philosophy and linguistics, a rather mediocre psychology department; but we, then, could hire some excellent cognitive psychologists because we could say that we are hiring half a dozen people in cognitive sciences and you know so and so in philosophy and so and so in linguistics. We could never have started rebuilding that psychology department . . .

CAC: By itself?

NH: . . . by itself if it hadn't been in the context of cognitive science. It's taken off and has done very well. We did the same thing in some aspects of biological sciences. For example, we established a center for insect science that brought together specialists in invertebrate biology in a cluster that involved several departments but focusing on an insect science center. I think that's the way it has to be done. When you look at the history of Minnesota, whether deliberately or fortuitously, I think that is the way excellence has been built at Minnesota, too. Chemical Engineering has been built because a Neal Amundson came and had an ability to surround himself with outstanding scholars and you've seen it in other disciplines as well. I convened a group earlier in my presidency because I was intrigued by this dynamic. I convened people from a number of outstanding departments in the university. We sat around a table for a few hours and tried to identify, why did this happen? We inevitably came back to the name of a particular person who came in, was the catalyst, and was able, then, to surround himself. Sometimes, the program rose to prominence and, then, one or two senior scholars retired and it slipped back into mediocrity. Sometimes, they were able to instill a culture of excellence that the next generation would pick up and continue and, clearly, Chemical Engineering has maintained that kind of a culture.

CAC: Could you give another for instance out of Minnesota's experience on the positive side?

NH: I think Political Science did something of the same.

CAC: Who would the key man be there?

NH: From my perspective, Charles McLaughlin was the grand old man . . .

CAC: You bet.

NH: . . . at that particular time. His predecessor, Professor [Bill] Anderson . . . I don't know whether he started it but McLaughlin seemed to me to be the catalyst. He brought in people like Frank Sorauf and some of the others.

CAC: Turner and Holt.

NH: Yes, that's right . . . took responsibility not only for being outstanding scholars but they took strong responsibility both for graduate and undergraduate teaching, in the way Frank Sorauf would teach, for example, introductory undergraduate courses, even as a regents' professor exemplified the kind culture that was established and is necessary in order to achieve true and lasting excellence. When I wanted to make presentations about excellent undergraduate teaching for the Board of Regents, I would invite people from some of our top ranked research departments: Chemical Engineering, Political Science, Geography. I think, more often than not, those departments had some of the best undergraduate teaching as well as being outstanding scholarly and graduate departments. That's the dynamic I saw at Arizona and that I have seen historically at Minnesota and that, to some extent, we've been trying to emulate. I can come back to that when we get to my own administration.

CAC: Please do. Do you think that would be true at other high-level, high-quality universities? Did they either consciously or by chance move in the same way to build?

NH: I don't think there's any other way. It's very hard to build quality in this kind of global sense. It's really got to be done piecemeal, almost individual by individual, department by department.

CAC: Do you have any counter illustrations at Minnesota?

NH: Where it failed?

CAC: Yes. [pause] Obviously, that's a hard question because you're quiet.

NH: Yes, it is hard.

CAC: I think Anthropology. You had Ad[amson] Hoebel and when he left, that was the end.

NH: Yes. I've thought about that earlier. I wonder what happened there. With his work in the anthropology of law, for example, he was, clearly, a national leader.

CAC: Oh! international.

NH: What happened? English might be an example, too, where it somehow did not have a succession that led to the preservation of what was a cultural excellence. Now, there are disciplinary dynamics. As we mentioned over lunch, in the discipline of English, of course, you've had these ideological disputes with deconstructionalism and so forth that have kind of ripped the profession apart.

CAC: And feminism ripped it badly.

NH: Yes.

CAC: And creatively.

NH: It can also make it very difficult, then, to build the department because you get torn among these particular specialities. To get them to live together amicably—as I think you were able to do in history—people coming from different methodological perspectives is very admirable but, sometimes, that is simply not possible. Then, you can build a department that has one particular ideological slant; but, how long is that going to last when that particular ideology falls out of fashion?

CAC: Disciplines change so quickly now. These ideological things come and go very quickly.

NH: The Linguistics Department at Minnesota, when it was founded some thirty years ago, tried to spread itself too thin across the various schools of linguistic thought and they lost their distinctiveness and never developed a critical mass in what became the dominant trend in linguistics. They put their money on several horses and none of them really were successful.

CAC: But, there's not going to be a guarantee that these things are going to survive.

NH: It's a gamble.

CAC: I was thinking of Hoebel. Another example would be [Herbert] Feigl.

NH: Could be, yes.

CAC: As long as Feigl was there and, then, May Brodbeck . . . you have good people after that but it, somehow, just falls away.

NH: A good example of more recent building of excellency in the humanities is what happened in the German Department. I credit Gerhardt Weiss with having brought that department up where it was ranked, I think, eleventh in the country in this last NRC [National Research Council] rating. It was by hiring outstanding younger scholars, who I think cut across methodological boundaries that could have been detrimental; but, they were able to do it.

CAC: What else did you take away from the Arizona experience that was useful?

NH: We were very concerned about undergraduate education. My first programmatic initiative, what we called the undergraduate initiative at Minnesota, probably was to some extent inspired by my experience at Arizona where we confronted some very serious problems when it came to the quality of undergraduate education. We started trying to do something about it. For example, we invested quite heavily in undergraduate mathematics where we had just a horrendous backlog of students who couldn't get through the required introductory courses in mathematics and were just absolutely stymied in their careers. They were trying different things and farming out the education of those students to Pima Community College. Nothing worked. We had a group of excellent mathematics teachers in the mathematics department here. We invested very heavily in them and they, practically overnight, established what, from my perspective, was one of the finest introductory mathematics teaching programs in the country with the use of computers, with homework that was done on computer, and where the grading would be done very efficiently. There was immediate feedback to the students. We got rid of the backlog of students who couldn't pass mathematics. I credit the leadership of that mathematics department very much. We had similar problems in English composition, which tends to be another one of those bottlenecks in undergraduate education.

Then, we also tried to focus attention on quality undergraduate teaching. We declared something we called the Year of the Undergraduate, where we really went all out to focus on undergraduate education, excellence in undergraduate teaching, and on the way the undergraduate experience could benefit from the environment of the research university.

CAC: That was something you could bring home, too.

NH: That was something that influenced my thinking about what needed to be done at Minnesota. Clearly, both at Arizona and at the University of Minnesota, undergraduate education was an Achilles heel in the efforts to achieve true institutional excellence. It's almost a paradox that, in order to be a major leading research and graduate institution, you have to have quality undergraduate education. Otherwise, you get surrounded by an aura of mediocrity because the undergraduate experience is seen as defused, amorphous . . .

CAC: It's denigrated.

NH: Yes, it is. After all, we send 9,000 undergraduates into the world every year and if they go away disgruntled . . . Let me say, many undergraduates went away from Minnesota with a

wonderful education and wonderful experiences—I shouldn't generalize here—but, we also had some real problems when it came to the coherence of the Liberal Education Committee. The Chambers Committee—bless it—I think made a major contribution in laying out guidelines that have been implemented over the years, most recently by investing very heavily in writing across the curriculum and in providing introductory courses in psychology and biology especially, which were reformed at Minnesota under the undergraduate initiative and with some central investment and I think, also began to really change the undergraduate experience because if that introductory course in those large enrollment courses is not an interesting and stimulating intellectual environment, then, the student's entire experience is going to be colored by that.

CAC: This is to jump ahead a bit but that's fine. Chronology is not all that big a deal. How was that instituted, this undergraduate initiative at Minnesota? There had been a Liberal Studies Council, had there not, for a long time? How did you energize that, Nils?

NH: Clarke, to me, this is a prime example of where a lot of planning and thinking and committee work, including the work of your own committee, had laid a foundation on which we could draw. In this case, I literally sat down with Bob Kvavik and said, "We're going to have an undergraduate initiative and I want you to write it." We did it in about six weeks and credit Bob Kvavik with doing an outstanding job of pulling together the six major points of that undergraduate initiative. Lots of people said, "You've got to establish a committee that is going to review these things and come forward with a proposal." If we had done that, Clarke, it would have taken us two or three years and we would not have known anymore than we already knew because there was plenty of work that was lying, to some extent, unused. It was a matter of focusing and getting it done, investing in it.

CAC: Wasn't there a re-energizing under John Howe of that council? Did that bear on what you're talking about now or is that a separate kind of subject?

NH: There were many factors. The curriculum reform in the College of Liberal Arts was a major factor and John Howe, of course, chaired a follow up effort to your . . .

CAC: That's what I'm thinking. Was that when you were president?

NH: Yes. That was very important because we had the curriculum reform we needed. That came out of the work of your committee and the work of John Howe's committee, which established what they called the Differentiated Core Curriculum where you have the disciplinary concerns in columns and, then, you have cross-cutting themes, such as the environment, ethics in society, international experience, and so forth. I think that's an excellent curriculum that gave us a foundation, plus setting in motion a process whereby we could evaluate the courses that were going to be recognized for fulfilling those requirements. I think that is a very important part of the process, that everything just doesn't get dumped into these categories but that you construct courses that serve those particular purposes. So, the curricular component, which was a major component of the undergraduate initiative was there for the taking.

CAC: Good.

NH: It needed context and that's what we gave it. We also emphasized a lot the . . .

CAC: You gave it visibility.

NH: We gave it visibility but we also started looking at the logistics. We started looking at, How do we recruit students? How do we admit students? How do we advise students? How do we orient students about the university? How do we provide students a residential experience? How do we tie the residential experience to their curricular experience? How do we tie the students into the research experience? We built on the undergraduate research opportunities program, which was a very important program which has been expanded and is one of the finest in the country, I think—thanks to very dedicated faculty leadership. We started looking at internship experiences. All of those things fit in. Then also, something that was very important was the emphasis on preparation requirements. That started with the Keller Administration. Andy Collins, in the Institute of Child Development, chaired a committee that recommended new entrance requirements and, in 1991, we implemented those new entrance requirements. That had a profound effect on the way students prepared for a solid undergraduate experience. We worked with the high schools so that high schools provided the kinds of courses that we said would be required: four years of English, three years of mathematics and science, and two years of foreign language, a couple of years of social studies as well. In 1986, seventeen percent of the admitted freshman had fulfilled those requirements. Ten years later, over eighty percent had . . .

CAC: All colleges?

NH: Yes . . . fulfilled all of those requirements. It was just a dramatic change in the preparation of the students.

CAC: Had there been comparable preparations in the Institute of Technology and the College of Education and others, for example . . . the Arts College?

NH: The Institute of Technology had tended to have higher admission standards than the other colleges. But, this was across the board now that we went from seventeen percent of the students having that kind of preparation to over eighty percent. I think that was maybe the most important part of the undergraduate initiative because that, then, started improving the graduation rate. We got rid of this oversized senior class with all of these ungraduated students who were sitting around. We graduated them and, as a result, we could start admitting more freshman. Interestingly enough, the applications skyrocketed . . .

CAC: Ah!

NH: . . . especially the applications to honors programs, a tremendous increase.

CAC: Because high school advisors and teachers got wind of this and they knew what was going on? How do these students know all of this?

NH: One individual . . . Wayne Sigler came in as admissions director . . . one individual. This is where Marvalene Hughes started a change in the whole recruitment and admissions process and give her credit for that. She recruited Wayne Sigler. Wayne Sigler changed our entire approach to recruitment and admissions. He was out beating the bushes and I never got, in the last few years as president, a complaint that my son or daughter was an honors graduate in this high school and we never heard from the University of Minnesota. People would write to me and say, "Thank you for all the information you've provided for my son and daughter. They went to Harvard and Cornell instead . . .

CAC: [laughter]

NH: . . . but, we thank you for letting us hear from the University of Minnesota." Wayne Sigler really changed that culture and created an enthusiasm about recruitment and about coming to the university.

CAC: Who identified him? How did you find him to do this?

NH: He had been at the University of Houston before that. It was a regular search and, miraculously, he emerged as a leading candidate. We hired him and he has done a wonderful job.

CAC: I should remind the readers of the transcript or persons who are listening to the tape that Mr. Hasselmo was a distinguished member of the Chambers Committee back in 1979-1980 when the Arts College did what you were suggesting. Thinking back on that experience, Nils, I think it worked because—Fred [Lukermann] let me choose the committee; it was a good committee—it was a small committee. It was really a working task force.

NH: Clarke, I think there's an important point here and that is that, sometimes, it looks as if a lot of work that is being done by committees like this or in strategic planning doesn't pay off but it can pay off at some later point.

CAC: That's a good point.

NH: It can become the very foundation on which you can build some very important initiatives. We could not have done the undergraduate initiative, at least not as quickly and effectively as we did, if it hadn't been for all of that groundwork that was laid there. Clearly, the whole curricular aspect of it had to be through faculty initiative. We could deal with the logistics without going through a lot of committee work but we could not deal, of course, with the curriculum. Thanks to your committee and John Howe's committee, we had the curricular foundation on which we could build.

Then, I started these president's forums on teaching where I, personally, invited about eighty faculty members to come to listen—not to outside experts—to their own colleagues talking about their teaching.

CAC: Ahhh, good.

NH: I found those forums some of the most inspiring meetings I had been to because here were both senior and junior faculty members who were truly engaged in their teaching and eager to share and came not only with good pedagogy but came with an enthusiasm that was simply contagious. Now, the faculty was, of course, skeptical that it was still only verbiage until we started putting money in. We put over \$10 million in reallocated dollars into the undergraduate initiative. We had a program on what we called the top forty courses where we looked at the courses that taught the largest number of undergraduates and we made special funding available to those courses. Some of them were fundamentally reorganized or strengthened through instructional technology and so forth, thanks to that initiative.

CAC: Did Kvavik continue to ride on this or did someone else? Who oversaw this thing? You're talking about an initiative that had five or six different elements.

NH: Bob was the one who wrote the undergraduate initiative.

CAC: Then, who followed? Who oversaw it?

NH: We reorganized so that we took recruitment and admissions of students out of Student Affairs and put it under Academic Affairs and we put it under Bob Kvavik. Bob, again, deserves credit for having really ridden herd on that enterprise. It was Anne Hopkins as vice-president of Arts, Sciences, and Engineering who really had over all oversight for the undergraduate initiative and did a very good job of doing that.

CAC: Of rather short tenure . . . she wasn't there very long.

NH: Yes, she was only there for two or three years. Then, Phil Shively took over and Phil did an outstanding job with the undergraduate initiative. I think one of the strengths of having the vice-president for Arts and Sciences and the provost for Arts, Sciences, and Engineering was that you had somebody that you could assign *supra-college* oversight of an undergraduate initiative. If you have that under the academic vice-president, that vice-president has too many irons in the fire to be able to supervise it. If you let it devolve to individual deans, you don't get the comprehensive overview of and oversight of the different components of such an initiative. I think that's where Anne Hopkins and Phil Shively made a truly major contribution. Anne and Phil gave reports to the Board of Regents and one important thing was that those reports were good reports, positive reports, where we could show significant improvement in graduation rates. We could show improvement in preparation, the number of students having fulfilled the preparation requirements. It created a general sense of achievement and progress. I think that

was important, too. I even went to the legislature sometimes and they started quoting back to me some of the statistics from the undergraduate initiative and, then, I knew that we had engaged them in an important way. When the minority leader in the House, who had usually been something of a curmudgeon, pulled out our statistics and started quoting back to me, "We've gone from twenty-three percent to forty percent of the undergraduate courses being taught by full professors. I really like this." Creating momentum was important as well as getting it done.

CAC: Nils, what you're really talking about is changing a culture and we all know how extraordinarily difficult that is.

NH: It is.

CAC: As you describe this program, it has many different elements.

NH: It does.

CAC: But, it has an overarching supervision or leadership.

NH: That's right. That's what Central Administration has to do.

CAC: Ah!

NH: Again, we couldn't possibly have done it if it hadn't been for the fact that there had been all of this groundwork laid. That's where I see committee work, strategic planning, reports and so forth, at least sometimes, having a tremendous effect; although, it may not look at the time as if it really does start something.

CAC: A comparable story to that, of course, is Commitment to Focus.

NH: Yes.

CAC: Ken Keller did that in five or six weeks because it had all been done.

NH: Yes.

CAC: But, it had never been brought together in one kind of initiative.

NH: Clarke, there are days when I think, "To heck with planning . . ."

CAC: [laughter]

NH: . . . except that you need that intellectual exercise as a foundation for decision making. The best decisions are often fairly ad hoc when you sit up and say, "This is what we're going to

do," and then you try to drive it through with all the power you have. Commitment to Focus, that idea, of course, has permeated the culture ever since. I hope that the undergraduate initiative will continue to have a cultural effect. There are other aspects of things that we started—the reform changes in the Academic Health Center, for example—were simply forced upon us by scandals and problems.

CAC: We'll come to that.

NH: Some of the changes we made, painful as they were, have created a very positive culture change in the Academic Health Center. I think it's a much healthier center today than it was because we went through that particular process.

CAC: We'll reserve that and come back to it because that has many details, I know.

[break in the interview]

CAC: Once in awhile, we pause to see strategically where we're going to go next. Nils suggested that the continuity from Keller to Sauer and, then, his coming to Minnesota would be a good interim period of years to talk about. Go ahead.

NH: Clarke, first of all, I want to say that—this really ties in with what I said about the undergraduate initiative—what is done is very dependent on what goes before; although, sometimes, the links are not very visible and very clear. Just as the undergraduate initiative grew in one sense organically—although, I helped push it and give it its over all shape—it drew very heavily on what had gone before.

The same with my entire administration. It drew very heavily on what had gone before, partly going back to the strategic planning process that goes back to the late 1970s and Peter Magrath and the work that people like John Turner and others did in really analyzing our situation. Also Commitment to Focus . . . I was determined that the idea of Commitment to Focus was not going to die; although, as you may recall, even the term "focus" was in ill repute in Minnesota when I became president.

CAC: [laughter] I'm sure it reached your ears . . . Commitment to Fuck Us.

NH: Yes, it certainly did. I was asked about this when I was interviewed by the Board of Regents and I told them that I subscribed to Commitment to Focus because I didn't want to become president under false pretenses. I did not, in any way, want to imply that I was repudiating what I thought was a splendid idea and a splendid achievement on the part of Ken Keller. The fact that he had to leave under miserable circumstances had nothing to do with the soundness of the ideas that he had put on the table.

CAC: The board was receptive to that expression?

NH: The board at least did not penalize me for it. [laughter] I realized also that it probably wasn't a good idea to simply say, "We are now going to revive Commitment to Focus;" although, I did tell my administration, "We are now going to do Commitment to Focus with a vengeance." That was when we decided to close Waseca. I realized that we couldn't touch Veterinary Medicine and Dentistry because that had been a miserable . . . I don't know how to characterize it.

CAC: A political disaster!

NH: Yes, political disaster but ideas that were put on the table probably without having gone through the final, careful analysis of what and how it should be done. In a way, I made the same mistake in regard to General College. We did not approach that in the right way. Maybe we can come back to that when we talk about General College. Let me go back to the general situation when I became president. I took over after Dick Sauer. Dick Sauer had done a very good job in beginning to clear the agenda and reconnecting with the legislature.

CAC: He claims that's the chief thing he did, just cleared the desk of all of that nonsense.

NH: He did. Did he tell you what he left behind when he left?

CAC: Go ahead.

NH: The first day I walked into the office as president of the University of Minnesota—I had met with Dick a number of times while he was still interim president—I found my desk . . . Remember that it was one of those little scribe's, old fashioned desk that looked like something Cratchit in the Christmas Carol would sit at and write. That was in the wake of the desk debacle. By the way, I had to deal with the desk issue, too, so I brought into the office a desk made by my Swedish carpenter grandfather.

CAC: [laughter]

NH: I thought that in Minnesota nobody's going to get after me for having a desk made by my Swedish carpenter grandfather. On the desk were a number of little yellow slips and on every slip, there was, "Problem," and an issue identified. Then, at the bottom of the slip, it said, "Nils, this little sucker is for you."

CAC: [laughter]

NH: That was the legacy from Dick Sauer.

CAC: How many little stickers were there?

NH: I still have them at home. It's kind of amusing to go through them . . .

CAC: They'll go to archives.

NH: . . . some of them were right on the mark. Of course, a number of the problems I encountered not even Dick Sauer could anticipate.

CAC: Sure.

NH: I decided that, first of all, we had to reconnect with constituencies across the state and we had to show accountability. We had to show that this was not a university that was running wild in profligate spending. To some extent, we did have real problems. They were not of Ken Keller's making. They were simply something systemic and something that was faced by similar institutions across the country. But, we had to reconnect with constituencies and show that we were accountable not only in financial terms but also in programmatic terms, what the university provided for the state. That's when we established something called the grade report. We issued a statement that listed problems and we checked off what we had done in response to some of those particular issues.

CAC: This was for your own use or for public relations?

NH: This was for public use and especially for the Board of Regents. We reported at every board meeting in terms of that grade report.

CAC: Good for you.

NH: I had inherited two documents that came just as I took over. One was the so-called Spencer Report. Governor [Rudy] Perpich had appointed a blue ribbon committee chaired by Ed Spencer . . .

[End of Tape 2, Side 2]

[Tape 3, Side 1]

CAC: The times goes by. It's still March 16 but we're on side five. We're doing our work very well.

NH: For a, supposedly, not very talkative Swede, I've talked an awful lot, haven't I?

CAC: [laughter] The Scots are supposed to be taciturn, too, but we seem to be doing pretty well. What we have now is your coming into office. You'd spoken of your reception when you were interviewed. Let me just linger on that a moment. Do you have a sense how the regents

saw your strengths and came to choose you? Many of us had hoped that they would. Do you have any sense of that political situation?

NH: As you'll remember, I was elected on a vote of seven to five, so it was not exactly a landslide.

CAC: No, I didn't remember that. How do you account for that?

NH: Bob Stein was a very strong candidate.

CAC: Ahhh.

NH: He had five votes and it was rather contentious; although, when the vote came out seven to five for me, then of course, they converted it into a unanimous vote. Frankly, some of the people who had voted against me on the selection became some of my staunchest supporters later on; so, there was not a lingering problem. The board was, in one sense I think, shell-shocked by what had happened to Ken.

CAC: And to their own role in that?

NH: To their own role. It, clearly, was a very complicated situation where some regents were talking to the legislature and were really kind of setting legislators up to accuse the university of various things. I think that was a very unfortunate situation.

CAC: You knew that when you were being considered?

NH: I knew that when I became president.

CAC: Sauer knew it?

NH: Yes. Dick Sauer's work was very important because he had definitely begun to kind of reestablish whatever had been lost in the turmoil of Ken's resignation. By the way, I think, Ken was treated grossly unfairly and that what happened at Eastcliff, yes, there probably some mistakes but they were more a matter of the inadequacies of the university's financial accounting system. I suffer from that, too. Certainly, the accusation that there was a slush fund was grossly unfair because what had happened with Ken and David Lilly—bless him—had changed the university's investment strategy. Instead of sitting there and earning practically no interest, they had invested university funds much more aggressively and they had made significant monies on interest from those funds. They reported it to the board but, of course, it was hidden in reports that nobody knew about. The board, clearly, was not aware of the fact that these rather large amounts had accumulated in interest income and that they were being allocated by the president and the vice-presidents for very good strategic purposes. That was the creation of the first systematic strategic investment fund . . .

CAC: Ahhh.

NH: . . . a very important development, which we followed up on, the so-called SIP money that we invested over my administration.

CAC: I don't know what that is.

NH: That means Strategic Investment Pool . . . a critical ingredient in our strategy. It really started with that interest income that Ken and David Lilly accrued through more prudent and aggressive investment of university resources. By the way, that's a major contribution, I think by David Lilly, that both the Foundation and the university changed its investment strategy from playing it absolutely safe at minimum interest rates to going to a mixed strategy where you were taking some risks but where the over all investments were quite secure.

CAC: As an historian, I would add they did it on a good market.

NH: They did it on a good market and, of course, good luck is the best of all possible assets.

CAC: Right.

NH: In the transition, my basic strategy was to come in and do Commitment to Focus but . . .

CAC: But not call it that.

NH: . . . not call it that. Do . . . don't tell. That's what we tried to do. After that initial phase of building rapport with constituencies—I spent a lot of time just travelling around the state making community visits, meeting with key constituencies in many areas—we started setting about what became the restructuring and reallocation program of 1991, when we identified \$58 million in retrenchments and reallocation for a five-year period. That's when we, on the negative side, decided to close Waseca.

CAC: That early, 1991, you made that decision?

NH: That's right, 1991. We closed down Waseca. We closed down Dental Hygiene in Duluth. We closed down several centers . . . the Mineral Resources Research Center. We merged some departments, including my own department with German and so forth. That \$58 million retrenchment and reallocation program in 1991 was the first real step toward strategic investment. Of course, we did that then not knowing that the legislature was going to get into such financial trouble. We were hoping that the money we clawed loose could be reinvested, which we did. We started in 1991 on investment, for example, in Biomedical Engineering. We started an investment in the undergraduate initiative. We gave money to CLA, the Institute of Technology, and some other areas, including the Business School, which were areas where we were making

strategic moves. Then, we also asked the colleges to do a certain amount of internal reallocation of their own resources within the confines of the college. We tried to balance the negative of taking money away with a clearly defined agenda for positive investment. That worked reasonably well and we got by with the closing of Waseca—although, those were fairly hot and troubled moments.

CAC: I know they were. Could you say something about the internal politics of Morrill Hall, what kind of opposition there was to it, and the same thing would be true of the Board of Regents. This must have been controversial in both places. How does the president handle that kind of situation?

NH: The idea of closing Waseca really, again, came out of earlier strategic planning; although, nobody had recommended closing Waseca. The committee that had recommended the closing of Veterinary Medicine and Dentistry had indicated that the university, in order to make decisive strategic investment, needed to also curtail its expenses in some major programmatic areas. I don't think Veterinary Medicine and Dentistry were good choices and certainly turned out politically not to be good choices. Waseca had been under question for some time. It seemed to be an appropriate target because, clearly, its programs had been duplicated by the technical colleges. When they started a swine production program fourteen miles away from Waseca in a technical college in Mankato, it seemed to me that the Higher Education Coordinating Board was not taking responsibility for avoiding program duplication. In a way, they should have closed down the technical college program, not us closing down Waseca. We felt, at that point, that let's the university takes the initiative and close a campus and then hope that the rest of higher education will follow suit because Minnesota had more campuses per capita than any of the surrounding states. We had twice as many campuses as Wisconsin, Iowa, and Illinois, for example, per capita. We needed to reduce the number of educational facilities if we were going to be cost effective.

CAC: Excuse me. That doesn't seem plausible to me when I think of the number of campuses the University of Wisconsin has.

NH: We have sixty-four campuses in Minnesota and a population of 4.3 million.

CAC: Oh, but not of the University of Minnesota.?

NH: No, no, no.

CAC: I'm sorry, I was misunderstanding you.

NH: The entire public university system . . . sixty-four campuses. The reason we felt that Waseca should be closed was that Waseca kept having enrollment problems. We gave Waseca an opportunity to come forward with a plan for a viable future and, after several months of negotiations and haggling over that, we finally decided that it really wasn't a viable proposition

and that we were sinking some \$5 million a year into Waseca that could well be spent more effectively elsewhere.

CAC: This kind of a discussion within Morrill Hall . . . what officers were engaged in this in a major way?

NH: It was a decision that was really made by Gus Donhowe, Len Kuhi, and me. Then, at a very early stage, we pulled into the discussion, Chuck Casey who was chairman of the Board of Regents and who was the regent from the First Congressional District. Waseca was located in his district. If there's one courageous person in Minnesota, it is Chuck Casey. We presented the case to Chuck and he said, "Yes, I will support you"—and he did. That was the key. He hung in there. He hung in there and he was the one who made reluctant members of the Board of Regents come around and say, "We're going to support this."

CAC: Opposition within the Board of Regents would be based on what kinds of principles?

NH: General populism and the general sense that access is everything and that we ought to have open facilities everywhere so that everybody can come to the University of Minnesota, not a particularly viable strategy, but a general reluctance ever to close down anything.

CAC: And deeply felt.

NH: And deeply, deeply felt emotionally.

CAC: My old student, Wendell [Wendy] Anderson, certainly was one.

NH: He speaks eloquently to that proposition and at the heart of it is something very valuable, which is a firm belief that there has to be educational opportunity for everybody. It's just that in practical terms, you have to say, "Everybody should have the opportunity but that opportunity doesn't have to be at the University of Minnesota in duplicated programs." It doesn't mean that you can have that opportunity unless you are prepared for that opportunity. It's simply those provisos where you end up in dispute. As far as the philosophy is concerned, I think it's an admirable and wonderful part of Minnesota culture. What happened at Waseca also was the context because it wasn't just a negative decision but it was a positive investment decision. That meant that we got strong faculty support. The faculty leadership supported that reallocation and restructuring plan very strongly. I met with the regents' professors. They supported it very strongly. We were able to balance the positive with the negative in a way that, I think, created credibility. Chuck Casey was the key to selling the Board of Regents and overcoming the reluctance that some of them had.

CAC: What was the regential vote on it finally?

NH: I think it was, in the end, unanimous.

CAC: Even Wendy?

NH: I can't be absolutely sure. David Roe and Wendy were the ones who were the most reluctant and I think for these philosophical reasons. I think, in the end, they voted for the package, too; but, I can't be absolutely sure. Anybody who writes about that should check the vote.

CAC: Was there any opposition within Morrill Hall to this on any ground?

NH: No, there was just a sense that this is never going to fly politically.

CAC: But, that had to be someone else's responsibility to make that judgment?

NH: That was my responsibility ultimately to make the final decision.

CAC: Of course.

NH: I decided that if we were serious about restructuring and making strategic investments, we had to have test cases like this one. Gus Donhowe was also a very important force here. Gus was a very important member of my administration. I don't know if you remember but a search for a finance vice-president had just ended in January when I became president. I interviewed the three finalists and none of them seemed to be what we needed; so, I went to Gus Donhowe who had been a member of the search committee and I said, "Gus, like a good Norwegian here, I have got a deal for you."

CAC: [laughter]

NH: "I'll give you a job where you have twice as much to do and you'll have half the salary you now have. I want you to come and be finance vice-president at the University of Minnesota." Gus said, "Nils, I think that's a wonderful deal and I accept." I did that without a search committee so I had to do another search a year later to confirm Gus' appointment.

CAC: He came in as an interim?

NH: He came in as an interim and I had to do one of those unfortunate searches where I went through a national search and Gus, clearly, came as the top candidate again. I hate those searches. That's why I was able, later on, to get a provision that, under certain circumstances, the president could make appointments without a search because I would rather take the heat for making an appointment without a search than to go through a spurious search.

CAC: Had you known Gus before?

NH: I knew about Gus.

CAC: But, you'd never met him?

NH: I had never met him before. We had lunch and really I liked what I saw and the feedback from . . .

CAC: He came recommended to you by lots of folks?

NH: He did; he came with wonderful credentials. Clarke, there's a little known fact here that it may be that Commitment to Focus really originated with Gus Donhowe. He was Perpich's finance commissioner.

CAC: I tried to smoke that out and I can't do it.

NH: I have seen a document that tells about Gus Donhowe and Rudy Perpich coming over to the university . . .

CAC: Oh, yes.

NH: . . . and meeting with Ken Keller and saying, "If you will focus this university, we will give you strong state support." I don't know whether that's apocryphal or not; but, it has, certainly, the ring of truth to me. I've heard it repeated several times.

CAC: If you have time and visit Minnesota, read Ken Keller's . . . he has that story in detail.

NH: Okay. Ken, obviously, knows this much better than I do and I have it only by hearsay.

CAC: I'd heard it ten times in these interviews. I think the idea was very forcefully from Donhowe—this is my judgment as an historian on Perpich—and that Keller had to do it. There's no question about that.

NH: Ken, of course, conceptualized that in a splendid way so Ken's contribution under any interpretation is a very major one.

CAC: You bet.

NH: I did not know Gus' role when I hired him as finance vice-president. He had the combination of financial management skills having been finance commissioner, having been a vice-president at Pillsbury, being the president of Fairview Health System at the time; so, clearly, he had that technical competence but he also had an awful lot of political savvy. It was just a delight to send Gus over to the legislature to talk to them.

CAC: Nils, how long did you have him before he died?

NH: He died in January 1991. That was a terrible . . .

CAC: He was with you for two years?

NH: He was with me for about two years.

CAC: So many people have spoken of what a loss that was to the university . . .

NH: An incredible loss.

CAC: . . . and to your administration.

NH: It was a terrible loss. Not only did we lose that unusual insight that Gus had but we lost momentum. This was really a bad January because it was also the January when I had to go down to the Waseca campus and announce that I was recommending to the board that it would be closed. There were 2,000 protestors there with barricades of farm equipment that Chuck Casey and I had to walk through. Chuck Casey—bless him—went down there with me to confront those angry constituencies. Boy! that was an act of courage.

CAC: What was Chuck Casey's career occupation?

NH: He was a veterinarian from a small town outside of Rochester. I don't remember that there was active opposition to closing Waseca in the Central Administration. Obviously, there was vociferous opposition from the Waseca community and from a spectrum of representatives of the agricultural interests because this was seen as striking and hurting agriculture. We compiled a set of information about Waseca that we kept repeating over and over again. We set up a process for phasing out the operation and we made a very strong up-front commitment that we were going to place all tenured faculty members within the University of Minnesota and that we were going to try to place other faculty members and staff members within the University of Minnesota if we could. We did place everybody who was tenured and we placed a number of staff members who moved into very useful positions that were vacant around the university. Unfortunately, there has been scuttlebutt around, including in the legislature, that we didn't save a penny at Waseca because we had to accommodate all the tenured faculty members. That is absolutely inaccurate, even if you assume that the positions that we filled by moving people from Waseca, that they were add-ons to the budget—which they were not—we would save several million dollars by the closing. The fact that we placed practically everybody in really productive positions, many of which were vacant anyway, makes it likely that we may have saved \$4 million or \$5 million on an annual basis by closing down Waseca. I was called before legislative committees. It was very interesting. They would kind of beat up on me in the committee and, then, almost inevitably afterwards, some legislator would pull me into his office and say, [whispered] "Nils, you're doing the right thing."

CAC" [laughter]

NH: I did have some support in the legislature, too. This had been Gus' point that we could build credibility with the legislature by making a decision like this because it shows that we can make a hard-headed decision.

Now, maybe I should get back to the transition, again, because I started talking about the governor's blue ribbon commission that was chaired by Ed Spencer.

CAC: That was the governor's commission?

NH: When Ken resigned, Governor Perpich appointed a blue ribbon committee, chaired by Ed Spencer to review the financial management of the university. That committee, then, made some recommendations.

CAC: For the record, say something very briefly about Mr. Spencer and his position in the community.

NH: Ed Spencer is a former CEO [chief executive officer] of Honeywell and has been very active. He was chairman of the board of the Ford Foundation, at one time, at the national level and very active in a number of corporate and civic organizations.

CAC: So, he brought enormous prestige.

NH: Enormous prestige.

CAC: And experience.

NH: And experience. Interestingly enough, both Gus Donhowe and Jean Keffeler served on that committee—of later fame. That blue ribbon commission's report was pretty hard-hitting when it came to the changes in financial management that needed to be undertaken. The first time I met with Governor Perpich, he sat and practically beat me over the head with the blue ribbon commission's report, which had come out in December 1988, just a week or two before I took office. So, that became my bible for infrastructure reform and, actually, they had already started the so-called CUFS system.

CAC: Explain that.

NH: This is the basic computerized financial management system. It's been a mixed blessing, it turned out. It was a direct result of recommendations from the Spencer Commission and, actually, they had already started in the finance part of the university to move towards that system before I became president so that the response to the Spencer report was very quick, maybe a little bit too hasty because it turned out that the CUFS system . . .

CAC: This is C-U-F?

NH: C-U-F-S . . . U-F-S stands for University Financial System. I don't know what "C" stands for.

CAC: Coordinated, how about that?

NH: Maybe. [laughter] That report became a blueprint for reform of financial management. We pursued that agenda in principle.

CAC: After the governor hit you over the head with it, then, you talked with Mr. Spencer, I would assume, to find out how really it was going to go?

NH: I did meet with Ed Spencer and I have gotten to know him quite well over the years and have had many conversations with him. He has been one of the citizens who has taken a very strong interest in the university, being extremely critical of the management of the university but also very supportive of the university in terms of its importance to society. We have a number of people—I would like to talk about that a little bit later—that I rather systematically started drawing on in the corporate community for expertise. Win Wallin came in to help with the reform of the Academic Health Center. Chuck Denny came in and led what was a major overhaul of the personnel system, which is still being implemented . . . and others as well.

CAC: I see.

NH: That report was very important in infrastructure reform. Of course, Gus had been on the commission; so, having Gus in charge of the reform effort was very, very important. That's why losing him in January 1991 was such a horrendous loss in practical as well, of course, in personal terms . . . just tragic. By the way, I was on a tour with presidents from the private colleges in Minnesota, down in Santiago, Chile, when they sent me a message that Gus had died when he was out cross-country skiing. I rushed home immediately then. It was very sad, that whole thing.

There was another report, a legislative auditor's report, about physical facility management that came out in the fall of 1988. That also was very critical of the university's physical facility management. That report also led to major infrastructure reform. The Physical Plant operation was thoroughly restructured, primarily under the leadership of Sue Markham who was hired by Gus Donhowe and, I think, did an excellent job in beginning to change the culture of management of physical facilities because that was another Achilles heel.

CAC: This includes management of space, assignment of space?

NH: Yes, it does. It also includes long-range planning for physical facilities. It includes construction management. It includes the management of the janitorial service and maintenance in general. We were accused, among other things, for having excessive costs per square foot and, to some extent, that was due to the fact the University of Minnesota pays union wages that

are above the market and above the market that many other comparable universities pay. But, it was also due to inefficiencies in our management structure.

CAC: Nils,—as a professor . . . all those years, you were that and I'm speaking now as a professor—Physical Plant, physical facilities . . . we were just scared to death of them and they never did what we needed. It was just a mess. Everybody knew it.

NH: Yes.

CAC: It must be the most difficult thing. Again, I'm thinking of my interview with Met Wilson. He said, "If you're a smart president, there's one thing you won't do and that's touch physical facilities . . . any university in the country."

NH: I touched it, Clarke, and we tried major reforms. We also cut staffing in physical facilities. In that first round of retrenchment and reallocation of \$58 million, \$13 million came out of central operations in retrenchments.

CAC: Including that?

NH: Yes. Now, if you look at the longer term picture, we've also had to make enormous investments in deferred maintenance . . .

CAC: Ohhh.

NH: . . . because one of the things that came with an improved physical facility management operation was the fact that we began to get a handle on just how much deferred maintenance there was. Eventually, it totalled something like \$1 billion in deferred maintenance. That was not because of a recent development. It was simply because there had been no accurate estimates of what the deferred maintenance really amounted to.

CAC: For forty years.

NH: Yes, I know.

CAC: As president, when you're coming into Minnesota, did you have to learn those things? I'm sure the details, you had to know. Did you know what a serious problem that was?

NH: No, I did not know the . . .

CAC: You must have been surprised by some things.

NH: Clarke, I had the same feeling about physical facilities as you had, that you hardly dared have them come in and do an estimate because there were going to be two guys coming in and

the estimate was going to cost more than the work ought to cost. I'm not sure that after eight and a half years as president . . . we made major reforms in physical facilities but have we solved the problem? No, partly because of retrenchment; but, it's very difficult to get a physical plant operation that really acts in what faculty and staff consider efficient and effective ways.

CAC: It's a real problem of accountability?

NH: I still heard complaints at the time I was leaving as president that Physical Plant was not performing well. We have this army of janitors who go and, presumably, clean the place and it's very hard, apparently, to ride herd on the quality of what they do. Some do an excellent job and others, apparently, do not. When it comes to the cost of repairs and things like that, we at least instituted a system where you could go out for alternative bids so you were not confined to the in-house operation. You should hear my wife on this subject. When it comes to improvements at Eastcliff, she was ringing her hands over how difficult and cumbersome it sometimes would be to get something done. It was a bureaucratic culture that was very hard to break . . . good people trying to do a good job but within a system that simply had not ever rewarded initiative but had punished mistakes. To change that whole personnel culture towards one of initiative and reward for initiative and tolerance of occasional mistakes if it's somebody who honestly tries to do a good job . . . very hard to get that culture.

CAC: I'm sure of that, yes.

NH: These were heavily on the agenda, Clarke, when I came in: physical facilities and financial management—my two special specialties. [laughter]

CAC: Right, your two strengths. You had Gus to help you with the one.

NH: I did . . . with both of them because Gus supervised the physical facilities area, too. That lack of continuity when Gus died was very detrimental and it may have been a problem as far as the changes in the Surgery Department are concerned, too. I think Gus may have been on to something there; but, when he died, that awareness kind of passed and it was a while before we picked it up again.

CAC: I'm guessing now . . . you had similar difficulties in the vice-president's office, that Len Kuhi, for whatever reason, didn't work out so you lost continuity and momentum there.

NH: To some extent, we did; although, I'm not sure that . . . among the vice-presidents, Gus was very much in the driver's seat. Gus took a comprehensive view and Gus was really the one who was pushing for various agendas. I would turn to Gus when I wanted things done. Academic Affairs . . . Len Kuhi is a splendid person and came with what we thought was good experience at Berkeley. He did some good things when he took action, for example, in the case of the Computer Science Department when there was some real nonsense going on there. I give him a lot of credit for that. He moved in and said, "Stop this nonsense." Len did some good things

but did not develop the kind of momentum and leadership and lost credibility. Even members of the search committee came to me and said, "Nils, we made a mistake." That was very unfortunate that I had to ask Len to leave because he was a good person and had many fine qualities but just did not seem to be able to drive the agenda that needed to be driven at that time. Then, I asked [Ettore] Jim Infante to come in and Jim, of course, brought a lot of energy to the position and stayed in there for about five years; so, that's about the longest tenure of an academic vice-president for some time. There are structural difficulties with that job that I tried to remedy through the provostal system.

CAC: Would that lead logically to that now? Shall we talk about that now or later? I think it leads . . . I've wanted to ask you the question and I've hinted at it several times . . . that office, it seems to me, after Gerry Shepherd was not doable?

NH: No. The other subject that I want to get back to though is the effects of the financial crisis of the state.

CAC: Okay.

NH: When Governor [Arne] Carlson became governor, he identified immediately a \$1 billion shortfall in state finances. This meant that over a couple of legislative sessions—although, we had a really positive reception at the legislature—we lost money, or at least we did not gain anything, and we lost to inflation so that some of the money that came out of retrenchment had to go to simply covering lack of funding from the legislature. We, then, had to pile on top of that restructuring and reallocation of 1991 those \$58 million considerable further retrenchments. In the end, Clarke, we retrenched something like \$132 million, about twenty-five percent of the university's state funding . . . retrenched and reallocated or lost to the legislature.

CAC: While we're on this subject, can you sketch in with approximate accuracy—the figures aren't before you—when the decline in the legislative appropriation as a significant proportion of the total operating budget occurs? What is that line?

NH: It's been very gradual.

CAC: It's a decremental line? When does it set in and why?

NH: It's a product of two circumstances. It's a product of the legislature appropriating a declining proportion of state revenues to the university and to higher education in general.

CAC: Because of the competition of welfare, and health, and prisons?

NH: Yes. Health care, old age care, prisons to some extent . . . those competing interests . . . a declining percentage, a significant decline, in the percent of state revenues going into higher education generally.

CAC: Including the state college system?

NH: Yes, that's right. Generally, we have fared better than they have in the appropriation process. But, it's also due to the fact that the university has been very successful in generating sponsored research funding and private support.

CAC: I see.

NH: So, when you look at the total budget, it's the growth in those areas as well as a decline in the state funding that has reduced the state proportion.

CAC: But, it is dramatic over a twenty-five year period.

NH: It is.

CAC: It's something like forty-five percent to twenty-two.

NH: Yes, something like that.

CAC: That's helpful. I interrupted you; I apologize.

NH: I want to get back to the retrenchment and reallocation strategy that we followed after the 1991 retrenchment and reallocation and, also, about the University 2000 and why we started calling what we were doing something after my having tried assiduously not to call it anything but just do it.

CAC: Oh, hell, it was the millennium.

NH: It was a very deliberate strategy not to give them a target to shoot at but just go ahead and try to do it; but, by 1993, the pressure to call it something and to have a vision, an explicit vision, became so strong that we really had to put something on the table.

Let me talk about the academic vice-presidents a little bit first. I had a feeling that Gerry Shepherd had worked very admirably; but, I had the feeling that the span of responsibility was not nearly as much as what it was twenty years later where you've added all of these federal regulations that have been imposed on the university when it comes to management of research funding, when it comes to Affirmative Action, and, generally, the complexities of the personnel system, the promotion and tenure review process and . . .

CAC: [gasp]

NH: . . . facilities and equipment and investment in research projects that can help generate indirect cost recovery and relationships with the Higher Education Coordinating Board and

relationships with the other higher education systems, both public and private in the state, and some work in the national dimension with federal relations . . . just a tremendously complex agenda and, then, to be responsible in the Twin Cities—I think we have something like eighteen deans in the Twin Cities—as the executive directly for all of those eighteen deans and to coordinate their activities.

CAC: Including agriculture and health, empires unto themselves.

NH: That's right. That's where—even under Gerry Shepherd, the vice-president—Health Sciences was established with Lyle French and that, I think, was absolutely necessary because you had not only half a dozen major colleges but you had a hospital operation with a budget that, in my time, was about \$350 million a year. All these complicated relationships with the federal government and with the practitioner community . . . certainly that vice-presidency was necessary.

CAC: So, it's a job that couldn't be done . . . came to be that?

NH: Yes. The relationship with the Health Sciences vice-president to the academic vice-president was not very clear cut. There was not a clear line of authority between the two. That, at times, caused a little bit of a juggling for power.

CAC: The metaphor that I've heard from many people is "Grand Canyon of Washington Avenue."

NH: Well, that certainly is true. I think it was also an administrative problem that the relationship was not clear between the academic vice-president and the Health Sciences vice-president. Then, Agriculture claimed their own vice-president and when I became president, I had a vice-president for Health Sciences and a vice-president for Agriculture, Forestry, and Home Economics and, then, we had a vice-president for Arts, Sciences, and Engineering, which Ken had introduced. Then, we had some free-floating professional schools; but, all of those three vice-presidents had relationships with the academic vice-president that were not very clear when it came to authority and accountability. Whenever a crisis struck, it very quickly got into the academic vice-president's office or into my office. When the problems in the Medical School arose, the Health Sciences vice-president should have been the one dealing with those problems and issues; but, that structure kind of crumbled and things devolved into, then, Jim Infante's and my offices very much. I think the job was, essentially, undoable. It was too much direct executive responsibility, vis-à-vis the operating units, in spite of the vice-presidents that were there because they did not have clear authority. Then, you had Affirmative Action. You had all these kind of management operations that also reported to the academic vice-president. That's why I decided that we need an academic vice-president to be the chief academic officer and to ride herd on policies and some of these central operations but be a staff officer to the president on those kinds of issues. Then, you define the university into six major operating units, each with its own provost, or in the case of the outstate campuses, chancellors. We also had the problem of the three coordinate campuses, which, at times, reported into the academic vice-

president's office. So, I set up a system with three chancellors in Crookston, Morris, and Duluth and a provost for Health Sciences, a provost for Arts, Sciences, and Engineering, and a provost for professional studies, which broke us out of the special interest vice-president for Agriculture, which I felt was not really in the best interest of the university. That's the structure that I started operating with. From my perspective, it worked fine. Then, I assigned to the provost for Arts, Sciences, and Engineering responsibility for the undergraduate curriculum and to the provost for professional studies, the responsibility for the outreach agenda. Of course, the Health Sciences provost . . .

CAC: In part, because of the two individuals who were there?

NH: They had that kind of qualification but I think it was the nature of the job, too. Most of undergraduate education was under Arts, Sciences, and Engineering and many of the more traditional outreach activities were under the provost for professional studies. Even as we expanded outreach, it was likely to come, primarily, out of the professional schools. So, it seemed to me that it made sense without really . . .

CAC: Including Agriculture and Forestry in the professional schools?

NH: . . . adding to the administration.

[End of Tape 3, Side 1]

[Tape 3, Side 2]

CAC: We're talking about the provostal system that you introduced and it bears upon the systemic difficulty of running the academic vice-president's office.

NH: First of all, you have a very large operation and when I compare the University of Arizona and the University of Minnesota, Arizona is about half the size. To be academic vice-president at Arizona was a very good job and it had a manageable span. That probably was the limit. I had twelve deans reporting to me. I had no outstate campuses. At Minnesota, I think, it's simply too broad a span. Then, you have the issue of the three coordinate campuses and how you relate those to the Central Administration. Since we already had an academic vice-president and, then, three other sector vice-presidents, what I did was really not that radical. I simply changed the authority and accountability relationships between the academic vice-president and the three existing vice-presidents, which I called provosts. I had them report directly to the president and I gave them clear executive authority and accountability for their major segments of the university and I incorporated with Agriculture, Forestry, and Home Economics the set of free-floating professional schools. That's what I did. I did not add an administrator because there were already three vice-presidents there. Then, I cast the senior vice-president for Academic Affairs in a very important and strong staff role, being in charge of strategic planning, being in charge of relations with other systems, being in charge of Affirmative Action and that whole

spectrum of overriding functions within the university, and still having the research vice-president and dean of the Graduate School report to the senior vice-president, having the Student Affairs vice-president report to that senior vice-president. I felt that this was a rationalization. It's very interesting, Gerry Shepherd sent me a copy of the letter that he, and Lloyd Lofquist, and Fred Lukermann had prepared when the Shepherd Administration left. What I did was very much in the spirit of what they had proposed twenty years earlier.

CAC: [laughter]

NH: I think that Gerry Shepherd knew the university as well as anybody and already, at that time, saw the need for this kind of structure.

CAC: That document must be in university archives somewhere.

NH: I have a copy of it and Gerry Shepherd obviously has a copy of it. Have you interviewed Gerry?

NH: Oh, yes, in the first round.

NH: He may not have talked about that?

CAC: No, I think he did not—which would have been my shortcoming.

NH: I'm sorry that it was dismantled, especially without my successor trying out the system. But, there were issues there because, remember, I had such difficulty getting Phil Shively appointed as provost. There was strong resistance on the Board of Regents because he did not have—quote—management skills. Phil went out and recruited Ted Davis as dean of the Institute of Technology, [Steven] Rosenstone as dean of CLA, and did a splendid job with the undergraduate initiative. He took a terrible beating on General College; but, there, too, he was right on and it was his recommendation that we should close down the operation. Students who came in through General College . . . eleven percent of the students graduate after five years and it was a miserable failure in terms of what we wanted to achieve. I think it was a good appointment; but, that was lurking there with the Board of Regents and some of the regents may have taken the opportunity to get rid of . . .

CAC: Whereas, [C. Eugene] Allen had a career as dean and vice-president? He had administrative experience?

NH: Yes, Gene certainly did. There, I think, maybe some parts of the production agricultural lobby got Gene because he was not popular with them; although, I think Gene did a terrific job for agriculture but he was not seen as partisan as they expected him to be.

CAC: Then, you lost the provost to the Health Sciences, whatever that post was called, when this fellow from Johns Hopkins came and, then, went back?

NH: Yes. That's a chapter maybe we can get into. That's a long chapter. The whole Health Sciences deserves a chapter of its own.

CAC: I think we should reserve that, yes. While we're talking about administration, let me just conclude—you may have some other things you want to say—that I gather from several sources, but particularly from [Mario] Mike Bognanno, that when he came in, that position was defined in a different way, to be a real chief of staff.

NH: When I became president, I recruited Kathy O'Brien, who had come out of her experience as chair of the Minneapolis city council and as an historian who just didn't finish her dissertation, I guess. I needed, at that point, somebody in my office who could coordinate my outreach to many constituencies. Kathy turned out to be an excellent person for that. This was very early in my presidency. Remember, I spent a lot of time just building rapport with constituencies. Kathy organized that and, of course, she has worked for the historical society so she knew practically every community in Minnesota. She could recite by heart most of the history of the communities we went to and she knew community people; so, she orchestrated over fifty community visits that I made around the state to try to help build rapport for the university. She was not an internal person but she worked well with university relations and with some of the other outreach functions. She was very much in the outreach mode. Then, when she left to take this city manager job at Minneapolis, I hired Mario Bognanno. At that time, the internal relations and faculty relations were very, very important. Mario came in with much more of an internal function as chief of staff; but, both Kathy and Mario had responsibility for the office staff and the office staff reported to them rather than directly to me. Mario and I . . . that's a whole chapter, too.

CAC: You never got a different person to do the outreach as Kathy O'Brien had been doing?

NH: We did outreach through the vice-president for institutional relations. Rick Heydinger was in that job for awhile. Then, I held it vacant for a couple of years for financial reasons. Then, I got Tom Swain, who did a terrific job for us.

CAC: Oh! he was just swell.

NH: I relied more and more on institutional relations, Tom Swain especially, for dealing with the outreach function and I continued the community visits and I met with a variety of business groups and rotary clubs and so forth around the state with Tom helping to orchestrate that outreach function.

CAC: Mario, then, knew from the beginning that it was going to be a chief of staff—in an army sense—position? He had to keep track of lots of persons doing portfolios?

NH: Yes, he did.

CAC: Including this project?

NH: Yes, that's right. Agendas and circumstances define roles. I didn't change the job description from Kathy O'Brien to Mario Bognanno. It was simply that the agenda changed.

CAC: I see.

NH: And the personalities changed and the kind of familiarity with constituencies changed. Then, the tenure debacle came and Mario had to get engaged very heavily in those relationships. But, he also rode herd on projects such as this project, the history project, and did a great job. He was tremendous in tracking. He used to come into my office and had thirty things on the list that he was monitoring. That's, of course, a constant problem, with this wealth of things that descend on the office, to be sure that you not only nudge something in the right direction but that you don't lose it and find three months later that it's stuck. Sometimes, that happens anyway.

CAC: Sure. I think we're going to talk later about the president's office in that grander global sense.

NH: Let's do that.

CAC: I think this is a good breaking point, Nils, today. We have your suggestions here and we can pick them up. Some of the downsides are still to come.

NH: Yes.

CAC: So, I'm glad we had this happy day together. [laughter]

NH: Yes. We need to talk about the tenure issue. We need to talk about General College.

CAC: And the health thing.

NH: The Health Sciences. The Health Sciences had many downsides and difficulties but the outcome, I think, was positive and I'm pleased by what I see happening there. I think that this very difficult merger of the hospital with Fairview was a painful but necessary step in the right direction. We'll talk about that.

[break in the interview]

CAC: This is Clarke Chambers, again. It is Wednesday, March 18. We took Tuesday off to recover from all the recording we did on Monday.

NH: We had St. Patrick's Day off.

CAC: We are continuing the conversation in the same place, the little casita in Tucson which Mrs. Chambers and I have been renting this winter. Nils, I had backed up this particular tape to kind of get a running start and I think that it might be wise, at this point—we talked about retrenchment and reassignment of monies; we talked about the closing of Waseca; we've been talking about your coming with the Spencer report and its implications and so forth—before going into the more general concerns of the university's mixed economy, where its funds come from which is technical but very, very important, why don't we just say a thing about the capital improvements, the buildings that were initiated and seen through during your administration? There were a number and one particularly in my mind. The Weisman Museum must have been controversial and wonderful.

NH: If I want to pick things that were really highlights and morale builders during the eight and a half years that I was president, I would place the construction and the success of the Weisman Art Museum very high on that list. I was delighted that we got a building that also caused discussion and even controversy. I can't think of anything worse than an art museum building that nobody paid any attention to; so, I think the building in itself, which I happen to like, even love, was a tremendous asset to the university. It's a very interesting story. You've probably heard quoted the statements by, I think it was, President Northrop who quoted the need for an art museum at the University of Minnesota and it was more than half a century ago. It finally came to fruition through the wonderful sustained, concerted efforts of Gerry Shepherd and Lyndel King and, then, through the generosity of Frederick Weisman, who fortuitously was reconnected with the University of Minnesota which he had attended very early in his life. It is an interesting story how that happened and I don't know if you've heard it?

CAC: Please. Let's put it on tape.

NH: There is a man by the name of Billy Weisman, a local business entrepreneur, who was a member of the Weisman board. Apparently, Frederick Weisman—he passed away a couple of years ago—owned the Toyota franchise for North America.

CAC: For North America! [whistle]

NH: Yes, he made enormous amounts of money. He was born and grew up in Minneapolis, attended the University of Minnesota a couple of years, early in his life. Then, the family, apparently, moved to California. Frederick has had this continuing attachment to Minnesota. He came and landed in his private jet, at one point, in Minneapolis just for a visit with some friends and, apparently, was in the practice of looking any Weisman in the telephone directory whenever he visited communities. He looked up Weisman and, here, was Billy Weisman; so, he called up Billy Weisman and said, "Come out and talk to me." Billy Weisman went out to the airport. They are not related at all.

CAC: They hadn't know each other before?

NH: Never. Billy Weisman happened to be the name of Frederick's father. As they connected, it turned out that somebody, at some point, had given this Billy Weisman an old safe. That turned out to be the safe that had belonged to Frederick Weisman's father; so, it's a set of coincidences that are absolutely marvelous. If anybody is interested in this story, they should pursue this with Lyndel King, who has many more details than I do. Frederick got interested through Billy Weisman in the art museum. I invited Frederick to have lunch at Eastcliff.

CAC: How on earth did they ever get to you or the university from what you've described?

NH: Billy brought it back to the board and to Lyndel. I think it was then that Lyndel contacted me and said, "We have a prospect."

CAC: But he was never recruited? This is just really out of the blue?

NH: It was one of the wonderful fortuitous developments that you find in fund raising from time to time. Bob Odegard, who was the one who provided such fine leadership for the Foundation, has a wonderful statement about fund raising. He says, "Nils, it's just an endless series of frustrations interrupted only by an occasional fortuitous windfall." [laughter]

CAC: [laughter]

NH: Lyndel brought it to my attention and I invited Frederick Weisman and his companion, later his wife who happened to be from St. Paul, to Eastcliff. At that luncheon, I asked Frederick for \$5 million for the art museum. He didn't blanch and he said, "I'll think about it." Then, I went out to Beverly Hills to his home and we signed off on a contract that amounts to about \$4.5 million. That took us over the hump when it came to the museum. Let me say here that Ken Keller had already allocated, I think it was, \$4 million towards the art museum during his administration. We needed about \$12 million. Frederick, then, got us up to about \$8.5 million and that inspired local donors. We got eighty percent of the money needed, which we require in order to go ahead with privately funded projects, and we went ahead.

CAC: That's where Gerry Shepherd came in to head the committee that raised the money, that extra \$4 million?

NH: Gerry, of course, was there and for maybe two or three decades, Gerry kept the flame alive. I served on Gerry's committee on the teaching museum twenty or twenty-five years earlier and I was so delighted to be there and help with the consummation of this project, which Gerry, more than anybody else, had kept alive. Lyndel King's leadership was very important, too. She is a tremendous enthusiast, firebrand, and determined as can be. We were able to get the money. Since this was all private money, we did not have to go through the state architects selection board.

CAC: Ahhh!

NH: So, we appointed a committee, chaired by Penny Winton. The committee came back and recommended to me the architect, Frank Gehry, which I happily accepted. I was the one who had told Frank Gehry, "Don't build another brick lump," which he subsequently put on a T-shirt and distributed in connection with events at Weisman.

CAC: [laughter] At this point, you're hiring an architect by his reputation? You have no idea of plans? There was no competition?

NH: No. He came and we met and immediately became really good personal friends. I visited Frank Gehry out in his studios, his enormous warehouse where he has studios and projects from all over the world, out in California. Frank came and talked to us and introduced these concepts. Eventually, this structure on the shores of the Mississippi arose. There are many different statements by Frank that I remember from my contact with him. At one time, he said, "Nils, I realized that, in order to get full exposure for this beautiful river, I had to tilt the windows down the river. Once, I realized that, anybody would have come up with the rest of the design."

CAC: Unlikely.

NH: Another time, he said, "Nils, I wanted something that, when people come driving across the Washington Avenue Bridge and they look up and they see the university, they will see this art museum and, then, they will say, 'My god! what is that?'" I think he achieved that. Then, there's the third version and that is when he described the design. He takes a sheet of paper and crumples this paper and rolls it into a ball and, then, he lays it on the table and it slowly unfolds into something that looks like the Weisman Art Museum.

CAC: [laughter]

NH: That whole process of construction of that art museum was an enormously interesting and rewarding process. Then, it turned out, predictably, that half of mankind likes it and half of mankind hates it, which is quite appropriate for an art museum, I think. There's no lukewarm reaction to that art museum.

CAC: I include both reactions in my own self.

NH: Yes.

CAC: I think the side facing the campus is so inviting, this wonderful potato chip or corn chip
...

NH: The screen?

CAC: . . . the screen . . .

NH: That was a whole funding project in itself, Clarke. There is a whole story about that one.

CAC: It seems to me as you approach it from the mall, it's very inviting to students and others would be invited to enter, to go in.

NH: Those big windows . . . 10,000 students pass by and they look into this art museum through those windows.

CAC: On the other hand, my office was on the West Bank facing the tin can side of the building and . . .

NH: You had the reflection of the western side.

CAC: . . . particularly at four o'clock in the afternoon, it was just blinding—but, it was exciting. I would go to the window and see it change everyday. It was fun.

NH: Yes. That's the remarkable thing about the building. I drove everyday past the building and depending on the light, it had an entirely different character. Have you seen the postcards which shows the museum in different lights?

CAC: We have those and have sent them to friends, right.

NH: The interior, everybody seems to love the interior.

CAC: Oh! it's so useable, yes.

NH: It really achieved national, if not international, visibility. As a matter of fact, I was in Hong Kong and I opened the Hong Kong newspaper, at one point, and there was a big full-page spread about Frank Gehry; so, I think we really hit upon something there. The interior, everybody seems to like and I think it's just splendid both for exhibiting this fine collection that the university has, especially of early Twentieth Century American art: Marsden Hartley, Alfred Maurer, and other artists. Our art museum has some of the finest collections of those early Twentieth Century American artists in the country. They have been hidden up in the recesses of Northrop and, now finally, we can begin to exhibit this on a permanent basis.

CAC: The security was terrible and the access to the public worse.

NH: Yes.

CAC: This was a great coup.

NH: This is a tremendous asset. I should mention that there was strong cooperation, I would say, from facilities management because the construction of that parking facility under the art museum became a very important part of the total financing and without that contribution, we could not have built this kind of museum. There were many who, in the end, collaborated to make this possible.

CAC: Anybody interested in this . . . there must be a trail of paper that Lyndel King, and you, and Gerry Shepherd . . .

NH: Yes, there's a good deal of archival materials, I think, about this, including the correspondence.

CAC: It would be worth a book all in itself.

NH: I think it would be. I think it would be worth a little book about the history of the art museum, going back to 1934 or whenever it was. There are some statements by the then president of the university about the need for an art museum. It took until the early 1990s for it to be completed.

CAC: Met Wilson wanted to have it on the west campus.

NH: Yes.

CAC: He worked very hard for it but it just never took off.

NH: That knoll where it was built had been discussed many times as a location for some facility; but, it is absolutely ideal for the art museum because, first of all, it takes advantage of the beautiful river gorge, which the university has tended to turn its back on. As I said, 10,000 students pass by the art museum everyday. That's what we wanted it to be . . . accessible. Of course, it has turned out to be not only an art museum but a center for activities.

CAC: All kinds of workshops and seminars.

NH: I have seen the schedule for events at the Weisman and they are two or three deep: departmental meetings, faculty gatherings, staff gatherings, award ceremonies. I've used it very often for award and recognition ceremonies. Then, they have these student events: Funk at the Fred.

CAC: Say something about that.

NH: It was a student dance in this wonderful environment of the art museum. You can sense, I think, that I consider this just a wonderful asset to the campus as an inspiration.

CAC: Right. Is there a parallel story with the Ted Mann Theater?

NH: Yes, there is. I should mention also that the *New York Times* wrote that the Weisman was one of the three or four finest art facilities in the country. To get that kind of recognition for a Midwestern university in the *New York Times* is quite unusual.

The Ted Mann, yes, another very exciting project that goes back some time. The need for a concert hall in connection with the Ferguson Hall, the Music School, had been known for a long time. It came to fruition through the generosity of Ted Mann.

CAC: How was that approach made? How do people find that person who is going to do this?

NH: Ted Mann had good friends in Minnesota; although, he also lived out in Beverly Hills. Pat and I really moved in the Beverly Hills environment for awhile, both with Frederick Weisman and Ted Mann. We visited both of them repeatedly out in Beverly Hills. He came back regularly. He liked to go for long walks with Judge [Earl R.] Larson, who was a good friend of his.

CAC: An old friend of the university, Judge Larson. Wasn't he a graduate of the university?

NH: Yes, indeed. I don't know how the original contact was made. It was really the then director of the School of Music, Karen [Wolff]. She went to Oberlin. I think that it was during her time as director of the School of Music that this contact was made. I don't know the specific circumstances. When I came in, there were already negotiations with Ted Mann underway and he had already indicated that he was going to make a commitment. Ted Mann is a person who demands absolute perfection. Ted used to come every three months to campus for discussions and we would meet with Ted and we would go through in detail exactly what was happening. He was riding herd on developments in that concert hall.

CAC: Good for him.

NH: Fortunately, he also was very receptive when we said, "We can do it this way but if we do it this way, it's going to cost another \$200,000. It really is the right way to do it." Ted invariably said, "We're going to do it the right way," and he came through with additional funding.

CAC: Were there any public funds in the Mann Concert Hall?

NH: Yes, and there's another hero in addition to Ted Mann, maybe less visible, and that's Sandy Bemis.

CAC: Ah!

NH: Sandy Bemis was on the advisory committee for the School of Music and spent endless hours in the legislature helping get the legislative appropriation that also was necessary. The Weisman was built entirely with private money. The Ted Mann Concert Hall was built and named after Ted Mann because he made a sizable contribution; but, we also needed a sizable appropriation from the legislature to make it possible. Sandy Bemis was the one who really got us that appropriation. He was there literally day and night with the legislative committee and it got to be almost a joke that Sandy just wouldn't go home.

CAC: [laughter]

NH: They would meet till midnight or two o'clock in the morning and Sandy was still there. Finally, apparently, the chairman of the committee said, "Mr. Bemis, what can we do here? We really feel sorry that you have to sit around here all the time." Finally, at midnight, in the wee hours one day, they said, "Okay, Mr. Bemis, we're going to make this appropriation so you can go home." [laughter] This may be apocryphal but that's the way it's been relayed to me; but Sandy Bemis played a major role in getting that funding.

CAC: Think of the number of things that Sandy has touched in the region over many years.

NH: Yes, I know.

CAC: My gracious! not only at the university but he was a partner for Carleton and other places.

NH: Clarke, one of the remarkable things about the University of Minnesota is that I could tell you dozens of stories like the Sandy Bemis story of private citizens who have dedicated themselves to the university and who have been major factors when it comes to achieving major things at the university. We have an unusual, I think, array of community supporters who are not just talking. Some of them can be very critical of the university but will come in and do remarkable things.

CAC: How do you explain that?

NH: Clarke, I have sensed in Minnesota an unusual community spirit and a cohesiveness and, frankly, a good deal of social pressure for people who join that community to become civic minded. I saw this, for example, when I served on the United Way Board, when Pillsbury was bought and they brought in somebody from England, from Grand Met, to run that company . . . the way he was initiated, if not pressured, into participation in the United Way and in the local community support. I saw it when [John] Grundhofer came in as president of First Bank.

CAC: So, they are socialized quickly

NH: They are socialized quickly, and effectively, and mercilessly, I think. You have community who have, frankly, some of the leading families in Minnesota: the Daytons, the Pillsburys. You

can go down the line of some of those families who have played a major role and they have infused a spirit of civic responsibility and commitment to education, and culture, and the general welfare of the community that, I think, is unusual. Certainly, I have not seen anything like it anywhere. Corporate giving, the Five Percent Club and all of those things . . . I think some of those originated in Minnesota. I certainly have, in a very personal way, individual by individual, seen this at work. That's one reason why fund raising for the University of Minnesota has been so successful. We have not done well comparatively with other Big Ten institutions when it comes to raising money from alumni—although, that's getting better. That's been an area that we have targeted because it was really lying fallow for many years. But, we have led the pack in corporate giving and giving from non-alumni.

CAC: Since 1970?

NH: Since, the early 1960s when the Foundation was founded by people like George Piercy. I think that Luella Goldberg's father was involved in it also.

CAC: I get a sense it didn't really take off until Odegard was hired and, then, given a green signal to go.

NH: Absolutely, Bob Odegard, in many ways, led the development of the Foundation, with the help of people like George Piercy, Marvin Borman, Russ Bennett, Curt Carlson, and many that I am not naming here.

CAC: And Governor Elmer Andersen, I am told.

NH: Yes, Governor Elmer Andersen was very important when he was chairman of the Board of Regents.

CAC: Particularly for the contacts he had.

NH: This generosity with money and with lending their expertise to the university is a tremendous asset for the university.

CAC: It's your experience and observation elsewhere that, although that happens elsewhere, there's something specially to be cherished in the Minnesota tradition of that sort?

NH: I have personally never seen anything like it anywhere.

CAC: Not at Arizona?

NH: I hear from others that this is unusual. Arizona had a group of strong supporters also but did not have that kind of corporate leadership. Minnesota, I think, benefits also by the fact that so many major corporations have their international headquarters in Minneapolis and St. Paul.

CAC: Yes.

NH: That corporate community has been extremely important and generous to the university—and critical. They've also issued some very strong challenges to the university to put its act in order and to manage more effectively.

CAC: This would come from individuals or would there be a caucus of persons of that concern?

NH: Both. The Spencer Commission was an organized effort that laid out a series of very harsh criticisms about the way the university was managed. But, they've also been willing to, then, pitch in. That's why I could have a Win Wallin come in and spend practically a year helping to reorganize the Academic Health Center and a Chuck Denny who came in and spent untold hours helping to lay out a plan for reforming our personnel system that is just now beginning to have its effect.

CAC: What is Chuck Denny's corporate background?

NH: He was CEO of something called ADC Communications. Ken Dayton, to mention another individual who personally took such an interest . . . not only did he chair the first Regents' Selection Advisory Council where he went out and recruited potential regents from across the state but he served, for example on the committee I appointed to look at the future of Northrop Auditorium. We established a process for providing master plans for all of our campuses. Ken Dayton spent endless hours—so did Judy Dayton, by the way—in assisting us in planning both a general master plan for the Twin Cities campus and specifically the Northrop project. The Gateway Project grew out of some of those discussions as well.

CAC: In the Mann Performing Arts Center, were you able to choose your own architect as with the art museum?

NH: That went through the regular architect selection process and we had a local firm, Hammel, Green, and Abrahamson, which is a very able firm that had done much good work for the university. They designed and built the concert hall, which is, I think, an acoustical masterpiece.

CAC: There you are! The acoustics have been recognized everywhere.

NH: It was not by happenstance. It was done with the most scientific approach to acoustics imaginable.

CAC: You had elbow room to do the thing right in that sense, acoustically?

NH: Yes, absolutely. Ted Mann, of course, was there the whole time making sure that it was to his liking. We spent many, many hours with Ted. He was a real taskmaster. He would come in with his camel hair overcoat slung over his shoulders . . .

CAC: [laughter]

NH: . . . a dashing figure out of Beverly Hills and the Hollywood environment and come in there and be willing to sit down and go through . . . there was no detail too small for Ted to take an interest in and with a wonderful sense of quality. Then, for the dedication, he came back and brought Rhonda Fleming. He's married to Rhonda Fleming.

CAC: Oh, I didn't know that.

NH: He brought her to the dedication and also Carol Channing. Carol Channing came to the dedication and we had her for dinner at Eastcliff. We had a good time with Carol Channing. She happens to be married to a man who went to the University of Minnesota.

CAC: Nils, you had a pretty good time.

NH: I had a wonderful time, Clarke.

CAC: [laughter]

NH: The network that is, in one way or another, associated with the university is absolutely incredible.

CAC: It's the elite of the region.

[End of Tape 3, Side 2]

[Tape 4, Side 1]

CAC: You wanted to add something about the conversations with Mr. Weisman.

NH: I should say, too, that some of the major donors and members of the corporate community that you work with are people who, of course, are where they are because they are extraordinarily bright and dedicated.

CAC: And aggressive.

NH: Aggressive to the point of being compulsive people. Negotiating a contract with some of them can be a rather formidable task. We spent many, many hours with Frederick Weisman. As a matter of fact, there have been some issues . . . when Frederick died, we got into negotiations with the foundation and, unfortunately, since there's an enormous wealth that Frederick has, obviously, there are lots of people who are stepping in and making claims; so, we have had some difficulty with some of the Frederick Weisman Foundation staff, which I hope can be, eventually, resolved. I wanted to mention, Clarke, when I went out to visit with

Frederick Weisman to get him to sign the final contract—which he did, at the time—at his house out in what is called Carroll Wood in Beverly Hills . . . It's a magnificent house and he would point up the gully and said, "That's where Barbra Streisand lives and Clint Eastwood lives down there. John Wayne used to live across the gully here." It's a house which Frederick has filled, in his very idiosyncratic way, with the most magnificent modern art you can imagine. You name it: [Frank] Stella, [Roy] Lichtenstein . . . they're all there; but, very idiosyncratically displayed and with a good sense of humor. Frederick loved—he did this twice with me—to take me upstairs and we were walking down this little hallway and the door to the bathroom was open. You get a little bit startled when you see two naked people in the bathroom. You figure you've stumbled into some guests that Frederick has upstairs. It turns out to be two Duane Hansen sculptures that are very lifelike, a couple coming out of the shower.

CAC: [laughter]

NH: Frederick, of course, has staged all of this just to take you by surprise. What was so charming was that not only was he a fine collector that has an outstanding collection of modern art—by the way, his first wife was the daughter of Norton Simon, who has this magnificent museum in California—but Frederick takes personal, intense delight in every piece that he has. That was part of the charm of his extremely idiosyncratic way of displaying art.

CAC: There are other buildings that didn't have quite that sex appeal.

NH: No.

CAC: You initiated the project—which was a difficult one to get by the legislature—a library access and archives building.

NH: Clarke, again, so many of these projects have their roots that go decades back. If it hadn't been for the persistence of people . . . here's where planning pays off but, sometimes, much later, unfortunately. Nevertheless—this is a point I made earlier here—it may seem that all the committee work and reports and plans don't lead anywhere; but, it becomes the fertile soil out of which some pretty beautiful flowers can grow. I think the archives project is a good example of that. You and Rudy Vecoli and a succession of library directors and others had worked on providing some kind of archives facility and, finally, we were able to get it.

CAC: We started with Moos . . . that early.

NH: Yes. I was fortunate enough to be there when it came to fruition.

CAC: You had the good chance of having John Howe as acting director of libraries.

NH: John did a good job and [Thomas] Shaughnessy did a good job. I must say, also, that it was the fact that a coalition of sorts was formed concerning the future of libraries in Minnesota in the light of the new information technology that is coming forward, a coalition under the leadership of our university librarian Shaughnessy, that was able to convince the legislature that this had to be established as kind of the heart, the core facility, in the state in solving a state-wide library problem, information access problem. Some of the legislators had this idea that next year the book was going to be obsolete because it was all going to be on computers . . .

CAC: That was a view that the governor shared.

NH: . . . and that you didn't need to build libraries anymore because there weren't going to be any books in the future—an absurd view of what was going to happen.

CAC: That it would all be electronic.

NH: Fortunately, in the end, we were able to get across this notion that you still needed a major central library facility and, then, a distribution network so that people could get access to these resources through that technology. It was a combination of consolidation of a library system using new information technology and, then, the very intense lobbying by the advisory committee and Rudy Vecoli for the Immigration History Research Center, for example.

CAC: And the YMCA [Young Men's Christian Association].

NH: Yes, the YMCA libraries that you brought to the university. It was that configuration that, in the end, carried the day. Any one of those functions probably would not have been successful but the coalition, so to speak, worked.

CAC: With the legislature, the technological side of it carried a larger weight, do you think?

NH: Frankly, some of the legislators who were arguing that we didn't need any more libraries because we weren't going to have any books were the ones who did not even have a computer in their own office. They thought information technology was going to solve everything and it was going to make all of the more traditional distribution methods obsolete. They really, I don't think, understood at all the implications of that information technology and the revolution.

CAC: I inquire just because I saw this whole escapade from a mezzanine level. I didn't have access to what senators and legislators were really thinking and we had only the liaison of the lobbyist to inform our supporting committee. From that viewpoint, it seemed to us that the archives part of it—it is to include eight or nine major archives with enormous importance—may have played a lesser role finally in the decision of the legislature than the sex appeal of the technology.

NH: Yes. It's always hard to reconstruct in retrospect. Let me say here that there were also some leaders in the legislature, both in the Senate and the House side, who, I think, understood the issues very well and they have often really done well by the university . . . people like Roger Moe. I can't say enough good things about Roger and the way he supported the university in so many different ways and really understood the issues.

CAC: I think we should come back to that as a major part of our conversation.

NH: Yes, we should do that. Lyn[den] Carlson, LeRoy Stumpf . . . there are a number of people who, in the end, were able to usually help us and who understood the real issues.

CAC: To what degree did you have to be involved in lobbying for a particular project of that sort with the legislature?

NH: I had a couple of roles. One was, of course, to present the request.

CAC: Yes.

NH: One of my main roles was to hang tough on the priorities because we were constantly being asked by the legislature to change our priorities and to do this or to do that. We had to be absolutely stubborn and pigheaded about the priorities we had established because if we started changing those priorities, the whole thing started falling apart. That was really my responsibility. Sometimes, it was very unpleasant.

CAC: You had to fight within the university as well?

NH: I had to and I had to say, "No," to things like the funding for the Mechanical Engineering building because we didn't have it on our request. The governor wanted it and the legislature eventually appropriated money to it. Then, we had a heck of a time going out to raise private money to match what the legislature had given us. It was not that we didn't need the facility; but, there were other things that were more urgent at that particular time.

CAC: In this case, a shifting of priority came from the legislature and from the governor's office?

NH: It did. We were told all the time by the governor and the legislature to set priorities. "What are your priorities?" We set priorities and, then, we got into the political process and, all of a sudden, they started changing the priorities. I must say that we got better at really hanging tough on the priorities we had established. Of course, you get the problem, then, of constituencies that are very supportive of the university but have a special interest, like the Mechanical Engineering building lobby which was very effective and very important to us. The High Tech Council . . . the Architecture building lobby that supported the Architecture building . . . they, then, started going to the governor and the legislature and putting pressure on this.

You, then, really get tempted because they come and put these things on the platter for you and say, "You can have this particular project." I think my main and most difficult role was sometimes just to be pigheaded.

CAC: [laughter] And you think it was perceived in that way internally and externally?

NH: The people whose priorities I hung tough on, of course, were delighted. The constituencies who wanted their buildings reinserted into a priority order that we had painstakingly established were not very pleased.

CAC: Internally, how do you resist that? It really requires diplomacy of a very high level.

NH: We established a process and we have a very good process for evaluating and reviewing projects. That committee had hearings and looked at every aspect of the . . .

CAC: This is a joint administrative faculty committee?

NH: Yes, it is. It's an administrative group but with lots of input from faculty, an opportunity for chancellors of the outstate campuses and for vice-presidents and deans to make their case. Eventually, we hone a priority order. We have a five-year capital development plan that lays out the longer agenda and out of that plan, we select, for the biennial facilities request, those projects that are the top ranked ones. Of course, the legislature decides where the cutoff is. We asked for considerably more than we thought we could get by historical record and usually we got about \$100 million. We did very well on facilities actually.

We had one major problem and that was deferred maintenance. As I mentioned earlier, one of the things that facilities management reform led to was the identification of what eventually turned out to \$1 billion worth of deferred maintenance. Of course, that had developed over a half a century or more. Again, the legislature voiced great interest in deferred maintenance and actually beat up on us because we hadn't dealt with deferred maintenance fifty years ago. That's water over the dam. When we came to the legislature and asked for funding for deferred maintenance, they weren't very interested because deferred maintenance had no special lobby out there that we could marshal to go in and talk to the legislature.

CAC: It's not very exciting either unless you're on campus.

NH: That's where the priority setting through the committee process through the president and through the Board of Regents became the mainstay for getting funding for deferred maintenance. Then, you worked against all the various constituencies that wanted new facilities. That was a tricky balance sometimes. We made some headway on deferred maintenance, primarily because we reallocated our own resources for deferred maintenance. Then, we asked the legislature for money for the new facilities because that's the way it played itself out politically. At one point, it was perceived by the faculty leadership that we allocated so much money to deferred

maintenance that one faculty leader said that she was going to turn herself into a building so that she could get funded . . .

CAC: [laughter]

NH: . . . while we were being really accused of not paying enough attention to deferred maintenance. Those are the interplays that you see, Clarke, behind the scenes in the more political environment. We were very fortunate because we got not only the art museum, the Ted Mann Concert Hall, we got the Basic Sciences building built, a \$65 million topnotch research facility.

CAC: That's the one right next to the Coffman Union, in that corner?

NH: That's right. Again, it was a project that had been planned for quite some time. People in the Medical School, not least Professor David Hamilton, spent enormous amounts of time planning that facility. Martin Sabo—bless him—the representative from Minneapolis, got us \$10 million in federal money for that Basic Sciences building. That helped in the legislature; although, in the end, we needed some \$55 million to make the full project possible, which we were able to get. So, we did very well in facilities in the last decade. We built a new Ecology building in St. Paul. We have built a new beautiful office and classroom building up in Duluth. We built a new student center in Morris and we had the \$41 million construction and remodelling project for athletic facilities where there's not a single penny of legislative money. It's all financed by income earned by Men's Intercollegiate Athletics. We built a new hockey arena, remodelled Williams Arena, and remodelled the old hockey arena to what is now called the Women's Pavilion, which was an enormous shot in the arm for Women's Athletics. That was \$41 million that we financed ourselves in new construction and remodelling of athletic facilities.

CAC: When had the decision been made to tear down the old Memorial Stadium? Was that before your . . . ?

NH: That decision goes way back. The decision to move to the domed stadium was made sometime in the early 1980s and, then, the dynamic that led to the tearing down of Memorial Stadium was on its way.

CAC: That was during Magrath's Administration?

NH: Yes. Over and over again, there was resistance to it. I had a phone call early in my presidency from a man who said, "Mr. President, we should play football in Memorial Stadium." I said, "That's very nice; but, there is a new diving and swim stadium, a new nautitorium, a beautiful topnotch facility that has been built in the middle of the old football field. What do we do about that?" He thought for awhile and he said, "Mr. President, why don't you use it for swimming and diving for two or three years and, then, tear it down and, then, we'll play football in old Memorial Stadium."

CAC: [laughter] There is a real nostalgia for Memorial Stadium.

NH: There is. People don't remember that attendance was miserable. It would have required a very major infusion of funding. There was an opportunity apparently—it was before my time as president—and it goes way back, I think to the 1970s, when the decision was made to build the Metrodome. There was an opportunity at that time to have Memorial Stadium become the domed stadium through a major construction and remodeling project. People tell me that that was scuttled by one prominent sports writer leaking the plan at a strategic moment and that politically absolutely scuttled it. Again, this is nothing but scuttlebutt, Clarke; so, anyone looking at this better look at the facts.

CAC: All right. Are there other buildings that are really important to your eight and a half years that you want to talk about?

NH: The School of Management building.

CAC: Ohhh, yes.

NH: That was a key element in the decision to strengthen and revitalize the Business School. That was one of the early strategic decisions in my administration that came at about the same time as the undergraduate initiative. The undergraduate initiative, the Biomedical Engineering initiative and the Business School were three of the early ideas that we started developing. We were recruiting a new dean for the Business School. We eventually recruited David Kidwell, who came and did an outstanding job both in reforming curriculum and especially reconnecting with the business community. He and other candidates for the job made it clear that without a new facility, we were never going to move that Business School. Curt Carlson, with his original \$25 million donation to the Business School, had given the school an opportunity to move forward in its ranking and in its quality. Curt, by the way, has provided an additional \$10 million for that building; so, he has contributed some \$35 million to the university. Some of that money has gone to other purposes but the bulk has gone to the Carlson School. I finally became convinced, too, that we needed a new facility if the Business School was going to move forward. We made the strategic decision that, given the strength of the business community in Minnesota, we needed to have a really outstanding business school.

CAC: By that time is it the School of Management?

NH: The name had been changed to the Carlson School of Management. It was ridiculous that the business community was looking to the Kellogg School at Northwestern or to Wharton or even to minor competitors of ours for executive education and, also, when it came to hiring new graduates. The Business School had many strengths and many good things had been done under David Lilly and others in that school. We were really building on a foundation of strength. Some of the Ph.D. programs in the Business School were topnotch and management information systems had been ranked regularly second in the country; so, there was a good deal of strength

but is needed a new facility. It needed a reorientation of the MBA curriculum and it needed a reorientation and integration of executive education. That's what David Kidwell was hired to do and has really done. That's where the building project became a major issue and I moved that up in the priority scheme so that it got into a fundable position.

CAC: That's mixed funds also, public and private?

NH: It was driven by the fact that we needed to raise \$20 million from the business community. Unless we put that School of Management at a top-ranked place with the legislature for the \$25 million we needed from the legislature, we were not going to be able to create the dynamics that would lead to its construction. We moved it up on the priority order and, then, hung tough, both about where it was going to belong in the priority order and the amount that we needed from the legislature. Here, Governor Carlson really was a great help because he was determined that we were going to get that funding and he just refused to accept any cut in that budget; so, give him a lot of credit for eventually getting it through the legislature. Of course, we also had here this community that stepped forward. The fund raising campaign was headed by Bill Hodder from the Donaldson Company and Mike Bonsignore, the CEO of Honeywell. They made sure that we got the \$20 million . . . \$10 million of that \$20 was from Curt Carlson; so, it was really \$10 million that was raised in addition.

CAC: Some of the buildings are mixed public and private almost half and half roughly, as you're describing them. Some, notably the Weisman, are entirely private.

NH: Apart from the parking service money.

CAC: And some are entirely public, as the library archives building.

NH: That's right. You have to look at your opportunities. The university is a mixed economy when it comes to facility construction as well as when it comes to programmatic development. You have to look at a mixture of what you can hope to get as basic investment capital from the state and, then, if you can piggyback that on private support. Sometimes, we have gone to the legislature because we have had private support and we've used that as an incentive to get legislative money. Sometimes, we've had legislative money and we've used that as an incentive to get private money. Then, occasionally, we can get federal money, as we did in the case of the Basic Sciences building through Martin Sabo.

CAC: We can't build every building on our tape; but, we have a much better picture . . .

NH: Clarke, I want to emphasize here that the master planning that we did may have been, in the long run, as important as the constructions of the new facilities because we now have master plans for all of our campuses that really look way into the future as to, what are going to be the programmatic needs that have to be met? How do they relate to the community? What are the traffic patterns going to be? Where do you have green space? How do you concentrate teaching

space in such a way that you can create a more integrated teaching environment? How can you place research facilities more in the periphery of the campus? You can do that without, in any way, interfering with their particular function. How do you provide sports facilities? How do you provide the residential facilities? We did build the first new residence halls in at least a quarter of a century, too. One was directly sponsored by the university: Roy Wilkins Hall, which is a beautiful dormitory over by Dinky Town. Then, we had the good fortune of having a relationship with Jim Cargill, who is a business man who has taken a keen interest in providing good residential facilities at the university. He has built now three privately financed, topnotch residential facilities in connection with the general residential complex down where Frontier and the other older halls are. That has also made it possible for us to go to less than fifty percent of the incoming freshmen to over seventy percent of the incoming freshmen living on campus.

CAC: How do you account for that? For so long, it wasn't the lack of dormitory facilities, I'm guessing, but that a majority of our students preferred or were they driven to live at home or in rented apartments? What is that story?

NH: I think there's a change in attitudes among the incoming freshmen. You're right, in the 1960s and 1970s, they wanted to live in their apartments elsewhere. There's a change in attitude among the students.

CAC: Where do you think that change of attitude came from?

NH: I don't know.

CAC: I certainly don't.

NH: It is coupled, in the case of the University of Minnesota, with much more actively recruiting students and using residential programs like Residential College and that residential environment as a way of attracting the students to the university. I think that being a resident student has become part of our recruitment culture in a way that it didn't used to be. I think it's also the programming that is provided in the residence halls, not least through Residential College, that has led to a change and the upgrading of residential facilities.

CAC: Of course, it makes a difference, doesn't it, that the University of Minnesota is in the major metropolitan area; whereas, [University of Illinois] Champaign-Urbana . . . ?

NH: At Champaign-Urbana, you practically have to live in a dormitory because you don't have much of a private market there.

CAC: Or even at [University of Wisconsin] Madison?

NH: That's right. I think this is an important part of the building of quality in undergraduate education is that you have more of a residential environment.

CAC: That was really new in the 1990s, wasn't it?

NH: It was and we were surprised ourselves by the extent to which students were swarming into the dormitories. We also made a commitment. We went out and guaranteed every incoming freshman that we would provide dormitory space for them.

CAC: And you had to make good?

NH: Then, we had to make good. That's why we ended up having forty of them in a hotel for awhile. [laughter]

CAC: Right. [laughter] Are there other things on this general subject that we should cover?

NH: I suppose I should say something about the blessed steam plant.

CAC: Oh, boy! All right.

NH: I don't know what to say. As a matter of fact, that started before I became president, the realization that the steam plant was not going to be capable of providing necessary steam to the university much longer and that we needed to do something. Especially under Gus Donhowe, very broad-based investigation was undertaken of options. Could we simply look to outside suppliers to provide the steam that was needed or did we have to build our own plant? Should we go to the legislature and ask for the horrendous amount that we needed to build the steam plant or should we try to do it ourselves? We decided to try to do it ourselves because we knew that if we put \$100 million or \$200 million for a steam plant on the legislative agenda, we were going to kill every other project. We decided to try to do it on our own by building into the cost structure of the university payment for this facility over whatever lifetime it has. We, originally, recommended a gas-fired facility and went to the Board of Regents and the board rejected that proposal and, under the leadership of Regent Jean Keffeler, undertook a very thorough review of options and decided that fuel flexibility, which involved significant use of coal although not exclusively, was the preferred option. Eventually, we negotiated a contract with Foster Wheeler concerning a plant that had fuel flexibility, which meant that it could be all gas-fired if we so decided, or it could be all coal-fired, or we could use oil, or we could use wood chips, a variety of things. Of course, it became a major political football.

CAC: Yes, it sure did.

NH: It had to do with the environmental issue because it got mischaracterized as a coal-fired plant, when it was clear that gas was, under any circumstance, going to be a very major element in that plant. It really was not feasible, under any circumstances, to just lock yourself into just gas because we would be total prey to the gas market at whatever time and you could also not be guaranteed that you would have continuous supply. You needed to have a facility that could burn alternative fuel under any circumstances. It became a major issue. It went through the

various approval stages and passed all of those approval stages; but, whenever official approval had been given and we were ready to move forward, there was always some kind of political end run headed by people like Phyllis Kahn and others—who, I think, were dedicated to environment issues. Although, I had originally recommended a gas-fired facility, I felt that the alternative that came about, after the board very thoroughly reviewed many, many options, was a reasonable alternative and that it certainly constituted a major improvement over what we had.

CAC: This was a difficult sell?

NH: It was a very difficult sell. It's also a case where I think horrendous amounts of misinformation were circulated. It was very hard to get through with the basic facts. Then, of course, it had to do with the location on the river. Fortunately, the riverfront is being fixed up by the city of Minneapolis. That's very welcome because despoiling that beautiful riverfront was absolutely a horrendous development. Building the plant, the way it now is, is a way of preserving the plant because it's an historical landmark and it has to be preserved anyway. It can't be torn down. The question was, How do you then preserve it? That became a major cost factor. Preserving it as a plant is one way of preserving it.

CAC: This must have taken a toll on your time, and energy, and wit, Nils?

NH: Clarke, one of the main problems is that you get political sideshows that become practically the entire show. The Board of Regents, too . . . I don't think there was any issue the board members individually and collectively spent more time on than the steam plant. Even tenure and the issues in the Medical School probably didn't take quite as much time as the steam plant.

CAC: [laughter] I see. How did you learn, as a nice human, being to handle those kinds of absurd tensions, and arguments, and frustrations?

NH: You made your arguments and you tried to be as persuasive as you could. Of course, I had many people that I relied on. In the case of the steam plant, the finance vice-president—first, Gus Donhowe and, then, Bob Erickson and, then, Joanne Jackson—played a major role in dealing with that issue. Sue Markham, who was head of Facilities Management, and the people who succeeded her and others, including legal staff, spent enormous amounts of time on these issues, and Donna Peterson, as the lobbyist, with the legislature. While it was an enormous distraction, it was less so probably for me as president than it was for a lot of other people who had, on a daily basis, to deal with the issues involved; but, I spent a fair amount of time on it, too. It was certainly one of those things where I said, "Why do we have to do this?" especially, when it was so much political skulduggery, it seemed that seemed to me unnecessary. You have a whole system of safe guards. You have EPA [Environmental Pollution Agency] and you have various approvals that have to given where scientific data are put forward. We had three different rounds of consultants who came in to evaluate this particular project. When it works itself through all of those steps in the process, you would think that it should be in the clear; but, there was constantly end running . . . constantly being thrown back. The governor got into the act and was

going to try to change this project at a certain stage, too, and I could see nothing but political motivation for doing it because what was being proposed was financially totally impossible.

CAC: I guess I'm repeating a question, which is a personal one and has larger implications for the role that a president has to play with so many agenda items that seem clear and, yet, get muddled . . . how do you handle it personally? Here you are a nice, Swedish linguist.

NH: [laughter]

CAC: One must have to make enormous psychological, personal adjustments, moral adjustments, emotional adjustments. How do you do that?

NH: First of all, you have to have a certain basic commitment and feel that there are issues that are worth pursuing and that you have to pay the cost of trying to pursue those things. I had some projects and some developments in the university that I felt were very worthwhile doing: the undergraduate initiative, the reform of the Academic Health Center, the Biomedical Engineering enterprise, building the Carlson School, helping the wonderful Extension Service do its work. All of those things were inspiring and challenging tasks that I felt were eminently worthwhile. If I could make a contribution to that, I couldn't think of anything I would rather do. Then, you have to make up your mind that you're going to take the blows and the political stuff that you get subjected to. Then, you go home and every night, I'd pick up a book. I would read linguistics, and I would read Swedish literature, and I would have some intellectually refreshing moments. Clarke, what also sustained me was the fact that I worked with an extraordinary number of wonderful people. I am not being just nice and Pollyanna-ish about it. I have never seen a group of people that were more dedicated, and energetic, and generous. I talk both about people inside the university—faculty, administrators, and students—and community people. I was greatly buoyed in my spirits, regularly, by the relationship and the opportunity to work with those people. You were one of them and the history book project and meeting with your group and discussing the history of the university. Discussing that project, I found. very interesting.

CAC: There weren't the major frustrations there.

NH: No.

CAC: Rumor has it that Mr. Infante came, regularly, to work at four a.m. in the morning.

NH: Jim is a an enormous work horse. Jim was one of those enormously dedicated people who just gave blood, sweat, and tears to further the agenda of the university. I can describe nothing but idealistic reasons to him for doing that.

CAC: He must have an awfully good metabolism system.

NH: I tried to get Jim to delegate. My only criticism of Jim was that he should have delegated some things. I found it practically impossible to convince him that he ought to delegate and that others could do some of these things. Jim had a very keen mind. Jim usually could do things better than anybody else. He, obviously, felt so himself; so, he did it—a very constructive force.

CAC: The subject will come up at some time and it seems logical now. Describe your family. You had three children at home when were president?

NH: No, the boys had already graduated from college and were married and establishing their own families. Our daughter went to college while I was president.

CAC: She went to Gustavus.

NH: When she graduated, she moved back in and started teaching in Minneapolis. She lived with us from 1993 to 1997; so, she was with us for a significant portion of time.

CAC: It put a certain burden on Pat, your wife, and, I would guess, even on your daughter, the schedule you had to have, the kinds of controversies that were there.

NH: Yes, it did. Our daughter loved the Eastcliff environment and she revelled in Eastcliff. We were very pleased that she got married at a time so we could have the wedding at Eastcliff and it turned out to be just a splendid event where we had tents in the backyard of Eastcliff and had all of their friends and relatives there for the occasion. Anna, I think, by and large, enjoyed it. She was very annoyed when I was being criticized.

CAC: Oh!

NH: She got very distressed and defensive on my behalf. Pat and I work very much as partners. We had events practically every day where we represented the university jointly and Pat was working practically full time for the university as well. Clarke, I would encourage you to interview Pat and she's quite willing to do that.

CAC: Good!

NH: I think that's an important case history of the presidential spouse and the demands that are placed on a spouse, especially one who is willing to enter into those kinds of responsibilities. Now, you see women who are separating their own professional careers from being a presidential spouse. An amazing number of spouses of the AAU presidents, for example—that group of sixty-two—really work as partners with their spouses. Of course, most of them are male presidents with female spouses; although, there are two or three female presidents with male spouses who also enter into the life of the university in different ways. Pat worked very hard, first of all, as hostess at Eastcliff, hosting between 4,000 and 4,500 people every year.

CAC: To say nothing . . . she had to be there for you.

NH: She was always there for me and criticizing me and telling me I was all wrong and telling me, sometimes, that I was right and that I should hang in there and do what I had set about to do.

CAC: [laughter]

NH: I discussed a lot of issues with Pat and got good advise from her.

CAC: I will interview her. We'll do that before I leave.

NH: Please, do. She played a major role in general public relations and, especially, in fund raising and, personally, had major role in raising an endowment of about \$700,000 for Eastcliff for its maintenance.

[End of Tape 4, Side 1]

[Tape 4, Side 2]

CAC: As you know, sometimes, we depart from a skeleton outline. Sometimes, that's very enriching. I think this last half hour has been very interesting. Let's return to some basic, strategic considerations of university budgeting for example, the mixed funding that has to be kept track of. One has to, I'm sure, seek to increase each of the elements that's going into it. With that introduction, go ahead. [laughter]

NH: Clarke, it is a development that has taken place over decades, of course, that public universities have become increasingly dependent on sources other than direct state appropriations.

CAC: That's true across the board for state universities?

NH: It is true across the board. It's interesting, a couple of my colleagues, here at the University of Arizona, Larry Leslie and Sheila Slaughter, have just published a book called *Academic Capitalism[: Politics, Policies, and the Entrepreneurial University]*. It is about the public university as an entrepreneurial institution garnering funds from a variety of sources for its programmatic developments, doing it not only for North America but, also, looking at Great Britain and Australia because you find similar developments elsewhere; although, given the traditions and cultures of Great Britain and Australia, you get, of course, developments that are different than they are in the U.S. They also looked at Canada. That is certainly a fact of life and it's one that has affected the management of universities, I think very profoundly. It also raises very important issues with regard to university relationships to society. To put it as succinctly as I can, the legislature and the state of Minnesota still acts as if they provided every

penny of funding for *their* university when, in effect, they provide about twenty-eight percent of the total funding for the university's operation.

CAC: As recently as twenty-five years ago, it would have been forty-six percent?

NH: It was up in the forties, yes. It's a gradual development. This isn't radically new but we certainly drifted in the direction of less and less state investment and more and more dependence on alternative sources of funding.

CAC: These senators and legislators on the Appropriations Committee must see that statistically in front of them but you're saying it's difficult to make conclusions from that?

NH: Collectively, there are individual legislators who are quite aware of it and who are actually trying to help us get the kind of autonomy and independence we need in order to function as an entrepreneurial organization. The problem is, are we going to be able to operate in such a way that we can generate these other types of sources or are we going to be ruled and regulated and bureaucratized in ways that will make it very difficult, if not impossible, to operate effectively in that environment? The University of Minnesota has the great advantage of having constitutional autonomy, guaranteed by the constitution of the state of Minnesota.

CAC: That's not true of other Big Ten . . . ?

NH: That is not true of most other public universities. They have a certain degree of autonomy but not to that degree. I think this is a treasure that we should cherish and preserve because it does give us protection. The legislature cannot tell the university how to spend its money. They have introduced a certain number of legislative specials and the university, has over the years, played that game, too. When they knew that it was something that was really marketable, they would go and ask for a legislative special for it. That is a way for the legislature to be able to regulate the way the university spends the money. They have done that, especially in agriculture, where the Extension Service and other parts of agriculture, or what used to be looked upon as agriculture, are funded directly by legislative specials rather than as part of a lump sum budget. When I was president, we received about \$450 million—maybe it went up to about \$500,000—in state appropriations of a total budget of \$1.8 billion annual budget. Out of that about \$80 million was legislative specials and the rest was a lump sum. That lump sum, the Board of Regents, on my recommendation, would determine how it would be appropriated within the university and the legislature could not dictate how those monies were going to be spent; although, they can try through legislation and try, from time to time, to influence the university.

There have been a number of constitutional issues that have been fought over the years. For example, when the university accepted selecting architects through the state Architecture Selection Board, that was one of those constitutional battles. They arise from time to time. The University of Minnesota does have an unusual degree of autonomy and we really should cherish that. That's why, I think, we have been successful in raising private money. We've been successful in many of those relationships.

CAC: There's also a source of money in the research dimension of the university's mission from government and private foundations.

NH: Yes, the university faculty has been very successful in acquiring sponsored research funding. We are regularly ranked in the top ten or fifteen universities in the country in the amount of sponsored research funding that we have been able to garner.

CAC: Could you estimate what percent of the budget, in the 1990s, for example, came from such sources?

NH: Yes, well over \$300 million a year came from such sources.

CAC: I see.

NH: That would be, maybe, about twenty percent of the budget.

CAC: Just a bit less than the legislature was providing?

NH: Yes. Yes.

CAC: Funds coming through the Minnesota Foundation would consist of what approximate amount?

NH: All private and corporate contributions amounted to \$120 million or \$130 million per year. Then, you had the pay-out there from the endowment, which we brought up to over \$1 billion.

CAC: Ah!

NH: I was talking about new money coming in on an annual basis . . .

CAC: All right.

NH: . . . rather than the pay-out. I can't tell you exactly what the pay-out is but with 240 endowed chairs and professorships, it's a significant amount that would come into the university budget on an annual basis from those endowment funds.

CAC: That particular project began in the mid 1980s?

NH: That's right. During the Keller Administration, the so-called Minnesota Campaign was launched and raised \$365 million.

CAC: Which, I think, was billed then as a larger sum than any public . . .

NH: It was one of the larger at the time. I don't know if it was the largest public university campaign or not but it, certainly, was a very major initiative and dramatically changed our fund raising ability because it about doubled the annual private giving. The interesting thing is that after a little dip right after the campaign, we went back and raised more money per year than we did during the campaign.

CAC: Now, I think we're on the eve of another major drive ?

NH: We started about three years ago planning and initiating a new major campaign for the year 2001. It will be a \$1 billion campaign. For the last two or three years, we've already counted money that has flowed into the coffers of the university towards that campaign; so, it's well underway. Those campaigns don't go public until you have raised maybe two-thirds or three-fourths of the money. It's well underway; but, it probably won't be announce until 1999, in time for the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary in 2001. I suspect that that may have the same effect, that it will double again the annual giving because that's what the Minnesota Campaign did.

CAC: I need to remind persons listening to this tape that a major part of that increased availability of funds was a wiser investment of these funds beginning with Lilly and . . .

NH: A major contribution by David Lilly, I think.

CAC: That accounts for a lot of cash that's available that wasn't before with more conservative investments.

NH: It does. The Foundation and the university have ranked in the top twenty-five percent in investment results in American higher education and, sometimes, has ranked in the top one percent. It's been absolute top performance. Roger Paschke . . . the name Roger Paschke . . .

CAC: I hoped that you would . . .

NH: Both for the university and the Foundation, Roger Paschke was just a wonderful resource.

CAC: Say a bit more about him. He was the investment counselor for . . . ?

NH: He was associate vice-president in the office of the senior vice-president for Finance and Operations.

CAC: When does he come aboard and start this?

NH: He was there when I became president. He had been in these administrative roles probably for the last twenty-five years or so.

CAC: Do you think that Lilly gave him the green light and set it loose then? Paschke's talents were there.

NH: Lilly certainly has great admiration for Roger and considered Roger Paschke a major factor in the success of the investment strategy. When Roger was being wooed by others . . . Here, you have somebody who could probably have gone to an investment banking company and made millions. He stayed at the University of Minnesota—from that perspective, at an absolutely paltry salary—out of dedication.

CAC: You knew him personally. What was the source of that kind of dedication internally?

NH: He kind of grew up in the university. I think he went to the university. He started working at the university. That was almost family to him. We have a lot of people in the university who really look upon the university not just as a place of employment but as extended family and have a profound dedication to the university, for which they are willing to make significant financial sacrifices.

CAC: How old a man is Roger Paschke? Is he still with us?

NH: Roger is one of these timeless people. No, he finally did leave a couple of years ago and went with an investment company in Bermuda. He's probably making big bucks now.

CAC: Good.

NH: He was a major factor in that. Interestingly enough, I served on the Walker [Art Center] Board for awhile. The Walker used Roger as an adviser on their investment strategy and they had nothing but praise for what he did. Clarke, again, we had the advantage of this local community. When you look at the investment committee of the University of Minnesota Foundation, you have people like Mike Winton and Vern Heath. You have people, who themselves, have been extraordinarily successful investors. You had Duane Kullberg awhile chairing the Foundation and he was the CEO of Arthur Anderson International. The kind of financial expertise that you can draw on, especially through the Foundation, in addition to Roger has made for that success. It's not coincidental; although, the market, of course, has been gloriously strong.

CAC: Yes, yes.

NH: It is skill and that kind of community expertise that the university has been able to benefit from.

CAC: Listeners or readers of the transcript, at this point, might be referred to an interview with Vernon Heath.

NH: Okay.

CAC: I found him— I wasn't prepared for this at all—such an unassuming and modest person. I had a hard time getting him to tell these stories.

NH: Vern has been just a wonderful source for good.

CAC: Yes.

NH: Vern is also one of those examples of a graduate of the University, the Institute of Technology, who went out and formed a company with the help of research done at the University of Minnesota, hiring Minnesota graduates and building a billion dollar corporation.

CAC: Yes, he tells this story; but, he tells it so modestly that it just slips by. It's wonderful.

[break in the interview]

NH: I'm not sure whether Brody actually introduced the topic of tenure. Jean Keffeler, when she was chair, had started raising the question of a review of tenure.

CAC: I see.

NH: Then, when Tom Reagan became chair in June 1995, he declared, when he made his statement as chairman, that he intended to pursue the issue of tenure.

CAC: By what things were they moved?

NH: I don't know what the motivation was except a perception—I don't know whether that was influenced by things that Brody had already said or not—on their part that we couldn't make change without changing tenure.

CAC: For the whole university?

NH: For the whole university. Of course, the evidence against that notion was so obvious that . . .

CAC: All the changes that had been made with tenure.

NH: By that time, we had closed a campus; but, rumors were circulated that we didn't save a penny by closing Waseca because of tenure—which is an outright lie. I don't know who started spreading that kind of information. I encountered that in the legislature and I don't know where it came from.

CAC: It would be a logical deduction because the university—I think quite appropriately—made employment opportunities available to persons from the Waseca campus.

NH: It was a very deliberate decision that when we closed Waseca that, of course, we were going to take care of all the tenured faculty members. We placed non-tenured faculty and, especially, staff members who did not have tenure . . . we placed others within the university as part of what we hoped would be as humane a human resources policy as possible.

CAC: But, it would be easy to deduce from that that, therefore, there were not a large number of costs that were saved.

NH: With a little bit of ill will, you certainly can construe it that way. It seems to me that we presented extensive reports detailing these things—anybody who wanted to could see those reports—including to the Board of Regents. It became, then, an issue in the summer of 1995 and in the early fall of 1995. Tom Reagan, as chairman, drove the issue as chair, I think probably because Jean Keffeler had already introduced it when she was chair. Then, she was chair of the Faculty, Staff, and Student Affairs Committee and that became the committee that really drove the tenure debate. I think one of the problems, from the very beginning, was that the issue got to the regents prematurely. To be sure, we tried to retrieve the issue and I appointed a committee that was co-chaired by Jim Infante, as academic vice-president, and John Adams, as the past chair of the Consultative Committee. We had on that group a mixture of faculty and administrators. I charged them with the responsibility for laying out an agenda for an evaluation and review of the tenure code and for bringing forward, through the appropriate tenure subcommittee of the Faculty, Staff, and Student Affairs Committee of the senate, proposals concerning possible revisions of the tenure code. So, we would have that joint administration, faculty committee lay some of the ground work and, then, insure that it would go through the senate process and come through the senate with recommendations to the Board of Regents. That process started and there were a number of hearings and white papers that were circulated. At the same time as that committee was working, there were every month discussions of tenure in the Faculty, Staff, and Student Affairs Committee. Some of them were very good discussions. We had regents professors like Ron Phillips, for example. I think Ellen Berscheid was there. We had a presentation of the importance of academic freedom presented before the whole board to try to lay the philosophical ground work for consideration of tenure. We hired a consultant from Purdue who was traveling the country talking about tenure. She came in and spoke about tenure and about the kind of issues that were being raised nationally about tenure, again, to try to define an agenda and get the Board of Regents informed about the issues. It seemed every time this issue came up in the Faculty, Staff, and Student Affairs Committee of the Board Regents, there were writings in the newspaper and there were speculations about what was going on. The very fact that every month there was kind of a re-opening of a wound, I think, contributed, to some extent, to the environment in which the tenure issue became very volatile. Then, what happened was that the statements made by Provost Brody, both to the Board of Regents and in the legislature, tended to inflame the situation, especially, in the Academic Health Center. Coupled with the reengineering effort that was being made, it became a very heady,

volatile brew in the Academic Health Center. Things really began to come to a head when John Adams had hearings in the Academic Health Center on behalf of this joint faculty administrative committee about tenure. That's when things really started getting very volatile. Out of the Health Sciences came a group who called themselves the Group of Nineteen. It had members from the Health Sciences but also from other parts of the university. They started challenging the whole process whereby tenure was being evaluated. That led to a very heated senate meeting, then, in the spring of 1996. At that time John Adams stepped aside and the committee that had been appointed was pushed aside. The tenure subcommittee of the senate took over direct responsibility for the issue.

I should also say that, as an aid to the joint faculty administrative committee on tenure that John Adams and Jim Infante co-chaired, some work was being done by legal staff, by Mark Rotenberg, the general counsel of the university, by Fred Morrison, who is, of course, with the Law School, but also was a key member of the faculty governance system and the real author of the tenure code of 1983, I think it was, the last revision of the code and—this turned out to be a big deal—a lawyer from Washington hired by Provost Brody who also became part of a group of lawyers. Actually, there were four of them and I don't remember who the fourth one was. They became known as the Gang of Four and that undermined the credibility of the work that was done by the Adams/Infante committee. That became part of the brew in the senate as well. How that could happen when you had Fred Morrison, who was a member of the faculty governance system as one of the four lawyers, I don't quite understand but it happened. Of course, what the senate then did was simply to skip the step of the joint faculty administration committee and the matter was put directly into the tenure subcommittee of the senate, which was going to take the issue anyway when the joint committee reported.

I also contributed to this in the fall of 1995 because I, at one point, wrote a letter to the Board of Regents' chair where I tried to summarize the issues that had been raised. That letter became kind of a match in the powder keg, too, because it was interpreted as if it was some kind of preconceived agenda for things that were going to be changed; although, it was intended to be simply a statement of, these are the issues that so far have come forward for consideration. That's what led, I think, to some of the early national publicity where a faculty member in the Institute of Technology, Erwin Marquit, sent out a national e-mail that the president of the University of Minnesota and the Board of Regents were going to abolish tenure, not only at Minnesota but nationally. The *Washington Post* picked up this issue and presented Minnesota as a leader in efforts to—quote—deal with tenure at the national level. That, of course, fed back to the campus environment and contributed to what became a very inflamed situation where it was hard to retrieve what we were intending to do.

CAC: It was difficult for any person involved in this to establish any kind of control? It was out of control by then? The senate is involved. The regents are involved. The public is involved. This group of lawyer is involved. You have it all scattered around, don't you?

NH: It was very hard to retrieve at that particular time. I testified in the legislature—I've probably never gotten beaten up like that in a legislative hearing—in the House Education Committee chaired by Becky Kelso. She asked us to come there and talk about tenure. We did and I gave what I consider an impassioned defense of tenure and responded to some very pointed questions where she asked me, for example, "If you close the Veterinary Medicine Department, does it mean, then, that you consider it the university's obligation to accommodate all of the tenured professors in Veterinary Medicine?" I said, "Yes." She found that quite outrageous. Then, there were other hearings. John Adams testified as well. I think we both gave very eloquent defenses of the importance of tenure for the preservation of academic freedom and also for making possible long term investment of faculty effort in teaching and research because it's a lifetime investment that faculty members are making in those activities. There's some responsibility on the part of the institution to provide them with a livelihood while they pursue those things that may or may not pay off. That's the nature of research, that you don't quite know what the outcome is going to be.

When things exploded in the senate, I laid out a series of principles and expectations concerning the revision of the tenure code. It was both an effort to recapitulate what had transpired in the process so far and a statement where I said, "These are my personal expectations as to what we should do in regard to revising the tenure code." I, for example, reaffirmed that tenure should be university-wide, university based. We should not have layoffs for programmatic reasons and so forth, while also endorsing post tenure review and definition of the type of salary that would be guaranteed by tenure. I was very pleased when the senate came forward in June 1996 with a set of recommendations that I found were very much in line with what I had said—not because I had said it but it simply was the reasonable way to go. [laughter]

CAC: Right.

NH: I recommended to the Board of Regents that they adopt what the senate had brought forward. Then, Tom Reagan simply systematically prevented serious discussion of this issue on the Board of Regents . . . did not take a vote on it. He simply said, "We're going to take this under advisement and we're going to think about it." The regents discussed it at a retreat in August 1996, which was attended by some faculty members, and that did not lead to any real resolution as to what should be done.

[End of Tape 5, Side 1]

[Tape 5, Side 2]

CAC: We're picking up the terribly complicated story of the tenure controversy and one almost impossible to entangle because there are so many parties. Your testimony is, obviously, of crucial importance. Let me inquire . . . we've talked about Mr. Reagan and Miss Keffeler. What role did other members of the board play? They just went along with this, did they?

NH: Clarke, there had been participation by members of the board and, especially, of the members of the Faculty, Staff, and Student Subcommittee that Jean Keffeler chaired throughout the year 1995-1996. Some of the board members, I think, had become informed about the issues. The problems that developed in the summer was that the board simply did not deal with the issue. I reported in June and in July . . .

CAC: And they did not because of Keffeler and . . . ?

NH: Regent Reagan, who was chair of the board, seemed not to want to have discussion of the tenure code except in the most perfunctory ways. This was certainly difficult for me because I was hanging out there with these recommendations and I had, actually, negotiated some changes not in the basic tenure recommendations that had come from the senate but in some interpretive language. I had negotiated some changes in that language with the senate leadership and they had gone along with that; so, not only had I recommended the basic senate proposal for tenure but I had also recommended to the board something that I had already negotiated with the faculty leadership. Then, the chairman of the board said that he wanted to consider this and the board had to think about it. He, then, wanted to solicit my participation in making further revisions. I said, "No, I have negotiated this already with the senate and I think we are where we should be." I kind of dug in my heels a little bit, too. The board was, behind the scenes, split. There were four board members who told me, in confidence—I think to some extent it became known to other board members, too—that they supported my position and that of the University Senate.

CAC: But, they were not prepared to speak?

NH: They were not prepared to make an issue of it with the rest of the board. Here's where you get a board where board members don't want to challenge each other. I got the answer from a fifth board member who said, "I agree with you, Nils; but, I'm going to support the chair." It became a matter of, who are you going to support rather than, what is the issue?

CAC: Do you think that's an internal dynamic with the board on many issues?

NH: It certainly was an internal dynamic on that particular issue.

CAC: I don't understand that deference. Why would it exist on a board to that degree?

NH: I think it depends on personalities. Sometimes, you have board members who are much more articulate than other board members, board members who have more experience on a particular issue. I think they can almost intimidate other board members and really challenging them.

CAC: And who are also willing to take the time to invest in this kind of discussion?

NH: And are willing to really take the time to really understand the issue. Sometimes, you have what is almost, to me, blind loyalty because to be loyal to the chair . . . yes, you ought to be loyal to the chair. But, that should not happen if there is a basic issue where you disagree. It's your responsibility to challenge even the chair. There was a certain amount of that going on, too. I think, also, that there were some very inflammatory statements made in various situations that were, at least, seen as inflammatory by board members, where they felt that they were really chastised and challenged by some faculty spokes-people, not necessarily the official leadership. That, I think, may have, at certain points, dig in their heels even more.

There's a further factor. I think the chair was not happy with my recommendation concerning General College and the fact that I'd refused to withdraw that recommendation that General College be placed on the agenda for possible closing. He asked me to withdraw that proposal and I refused to do that. I think that he was not at all happy with me and was not in a mood to accommodate me when it came to the tenure codes; so, it may have been my fault to some extent because of that particular situation.

CAC: Regent [Stan] Sahlstrom, for example, had been in the academic world for a long time.

NH: Regent Sahlstrom was one of those who supported me and the revisions of the tenure code as brought forward and he was the one who most openly did that. He made it known to his colleagues that he was of that persuasion. There were two or three other regents who held the same view but were not quite as willing to be open about doing it. There were a couple of regents who also sought contact directly with the faculty leadership and tried to reach some kind of accommodation there; but, that did not seem to be very successful.

Parallel with this, also further complicating things, was the unionization effort.

CAC: Of course.

NH: That was led by a faculty group that, I think, just wanted unionization. They saw this as an opportunity to unionize the faculty. Of course, the card signing began. After the discussion at the August retreat of the board—which I did not attend because I was leading an alumni group on international travel at the time—apparently, the board chair instructed a lawyer from Washington, that the board had hired as a consultant, to write a revised tenure code, which that lawyer did. That proposal was, then, given to me the day before Labor Day with an indication that it was going to be sent out to the board the following Tuesday. I worked pretty hard over the weekend with Mario Bognanno and the faculty member in the Law School [Dan Farber]—I just blocked on his name—who had been enlisted by Academic Affairs to advise on the revision of the tenure code. We worked very hard and I wrote a letter, then, to the board. I tried to call the board members but they were scattered by the seven winds over the Labor Day weekend; so, I had no option but to write a letter and send it to the board—which I did—confidentially, where I took very strong issue with that revised tenure code and pleaded with them not to go public

with a statement, not to issue it. At the September meeting in Morris, the board had a discussion of tenure and had not yet distributed this particular document but discussed some of the issues in it with the lawyer from Washington who had drafted it—he was there to respond to questions—and Mr. Chait, another consultant, on a conference call. I raised a number of questions, at that point, about the regents' proposal and regents raised questions. The chair of the board also met with some faculty leaders that morning and, apparently, that meeting did not go well . . . whatever happened. In the afternoon, he released his revised tenure code and, at that time, I could not keep my letter opposing it secret so that letter also came out. Of course, the conflict between the president and—quote—the board sprang into full bloom; although, it was really a conflict between the president and the chairman of the board with, at least, four board members supporting my position. By the way, at that point, I also felt that I had to try to explain my position; so, I wrote to the alumni board and the foundation board and laid out my views on this issue because it was becoming such a critical issue for the university.

Then, once that tenure proposal that came directly from the board and its lawyer became public, the unionization effort really was spurred. I called a meeting of the regents' professors at Eastcliff and briefed them on the situation and my position. The regents' professors, led by Ellen Berscheid, issued a statement supporting signing cards for union election. Those cards were signed very quickly.

CAC: Most regents' professors signed that?

NH: I think practically all of them signed it. There were some exceptions but I think most of them have signed it. Then, there were attempts by the board chair again to meet with the faculty leadership to find some resolution. In the midst of that meeting, somebody came in with a message that a restraining order had been issued preventing further discussions; so, that kind of broke down.

CAC: During the election procedure for unionization or not, discussions could not go forward?

NH: There could be no discussions. Then, the various elections under this Byzantine election system took place where the Health Sciences had to vote whether they wanted to participate in the election or not. They voted not to do that, eventually. The Law School filed cards but it turned out that they did not have enough valid signatures to participate; so, they were excluded from the electorate. The Law School . . . that, actually, happened before the election for the Health Sciences; so, we had a little opening because the Law School was not part of the restraining order. That's when the Sullivan proposal came forward through Dean [E. Thomas] Sullivan. That compromise proposal was brought forward by Dean Sullivan at the October board meeting. At that point, I requested, during the meeting, of the chair of the board that Mr. Sullivan would be allowed to speak and he did not want to let him speak. After some considerable haggling, Dean Sullivan was allowed to speak. He, then, presented the Sullivan proposal, which I, then, recommended to the board be adopted as the tenure code for the Law School.

CAC: Ah!

NH: I did that because that was the only way that I could demonstrate that the board was willing to accept a revised tenure code that was along the lines of the Sullivan codes, which contained all of the essential elements of the university proposal. It was adopted for the Law School at that particular time.

CAC: By the regents?

NH: By the regents. But we, then, had the elections and the Health Sciences opted not to participate and Morris opted not to participate in the election and Crookston had a split vote and, I think, ended up in litigation on whether they were or were not going to be included.

CAC: Finally, when authentic votes, the legitimate votes, were counted, it was 52-48, or something like that.

NH: When the final vote was taken, which included the Twin Cities campus minus the Health Sciences and the Law School, there was a very slim margin voting against unionization.

CAC: Do you think that the closeness of that vote, that it came out on that side, persuaded or gave the regents a chance then to back off?

NH: It's very hard for me to see what the reasons were. I can't believe but that more and more board members began to realize that, regardless of what they felt about the tenure code itself, the political situation required some kind of compromise. It may well be that that vote was the best possible outcome because it was a narrow defeat of unionization. I think the regents, by and large, did not want unionization of the faculty.

CAC: You would know that a certain large number of faculty voted for unionization—although, they were a very close minority—not because they wanted the union but tenure was the issue?

NH: Yes, absolutely, no question about it. Then, things continued to be complicated. There was more behind the Sullivan proposal than meets the eye. I participated in discussions in the formulation of the Sullivan proposal and so did some faculty leaders. It was really an administration/faculty/Dean Sullivan compromise that was worked out; although, we couldn't say it at the time. Then, the faculty leadership and the senate leadership decided that they'd be sticklers for procedure and because the Sullivan proposal had not gone through the senate and come forward as a senate recommendation . . .

CAC: Oh, my!

NH: . . . it had to go back into the University Senate and the senate had to come forward with a proposal for a revised tenure code. They came forward with proposals that I was willing to accept with some minor revision. This was Sullivan II and, then, some further revisions. I went to the chair of the board and he said that he would accept only non-substantive revisions to the code that had been adopted for the Law School. So, then, we had another impasse that the chair would approve only non-substantive revisions while the senate was insisting on some things that probably were substantive and certainly were interpreted by the chair as substantive. Then, I had a series of meetings with the faculty leadership to try to negotiate something that they would say was okay and that the chairman would accept as being non-substantive. In May 1997, we finally reached a point where that was possible and I recommended that to the board in June and they accepted the revised code—and that was it.

CAC: Nils, I'm trying to imagine your days and weeks and months because the tenure dispute overlaps with the medical problem and the Najarian *foferah*. I just don't know how you had to do anything else: make a budget, talk to alumni, raise money, and so forth.

NH: They were long days and nights. What I found distressing about the tenure code was that I felt that I had from the beginning—there are faculty leaders who have said this afterward—a consistent position on tenure in defense of academic freedom and all of that. I, in my own view, was totally consistent. But, I got drawn into . . . that letter I sent to the Board of Regents became inflammatory in a way that I found just utterly appalling. In retrospect, it clearly was a mistake to formulate that letter the way it was. It was written for me by somebody else but that's neither here nor there because I signed it and put it before the board as an agenda. That was one step where I think I contributed to super heating the environment and that distressed me very much. Then, I was with the legislature taking a beating for defending tenure. Then, I was being criticized on the other side for not being a defender of tenure. That was hard for me to take.

CAC: Yes.

NH: The physical strain was much easier to take than the mental strain of feeling here that I had a consistent, strongly supported position and, then, at the same time, being cast in a role of some suspicion.

CAC: Do you think that the resolution of the issue, finally, as you reported just a moment ago, helped to regain for you some of that kind of support?

NH: I don't know.

CAC: The faculty backed off pretty fast is my perception.

NH: I think, by that time, everybody was just greatly relieved to be done with it. One theory that has been suggested to me by friends and colleagues is that the reason we were able to

resolve it in June was that neither the chair of the board nor the faculty wanted to have the issue draw over into the new presidency.

CAC: I see.

NH: Someone indicated, too, that they wanted to resolve it while I was still president because they knew where I stood and they didn't know where a new president would stand.

[break in the interview]

NH: The tenure debate, of course, was very divisive. The rumormongering through e-mail was just absolutely incredible. The national publicity . . . there were university senates from distinguished universities that sent resolutions to us in defense of tenure. An impression was created that tenure was really in jeopardy at Minnesota. I don't think, with all of this strife, that a strong tenure code ever really was in jeopardy at the University of Minnesota. It became a power struggle, in the end, rather than a battle about principles. By the way, one of the things we did, too, was to present to the Board of Regents very detailed information about both how we had been able to make change under tenure and about the tremendous turnover of faculty that we had. As it was, 904 faculty had left in the last five years and 234 positions had not been filled and we had reallocated \$132 million, all of this under the existing tenure code. One of the—frankly, face saving—things that happened was that the board instructed me to prepare a statement concerning turnover of faculty, unit by unit, in the university, data we already had presented to the Board of Regents. That demonstrated that we were going to have a tremendous amount of turnover in the faculty and all kinds of leeway for reassigning faculty positions over the next few years, if we wanted to use that discretion as we had done in previous years. That became part of the resolution, that we were instructed to do what we had already done—which we happily did. [laughter]

CAC: [laughter] Nils, does this lead logically into more general comments on the role of the regents and their appointment and so forth?

NH: Yes. Clarke, I am a strong believer in the regential system. I think having lay boards as the governing boards of our major universities is a great asset, a great strength. With all of the problems that we encounter, I think it is part of the reason why universities in American are as healthy as they are. "The board," as I used to say, "is there to protect and connect."

CAC: Ah!

NH: To protect the university against political influence and to connect the university with society and society's needs. I think boards do that in very fundamental ways, even with the obvious flaws that exist in the regential governance system. This has been a national issue and the Association of Governing Boards [AGB], three or four years ago, identified the quality of governing boards, especially in public universities, as one of the major issues facing higher

education because with the demand for change and the increasing complexity of those universities, more and more demands are being placed on the boards for understanding the issues facing universities and understanding how boards should relate to presidents and to the governance systems of universities. The AGB issued a report about the presidency where they lay down some principles and have some interesting observations about the president's role and the president's predicament, given the situation with lay boards in the public universities. Again, by and large, at Minnesota, I think we've had good governing boards, dedicated citizens, who have exercised good judgment. I mentioned Chuck Casey's role in closing out Waseca, for example.

CAC: Yes.

NH: Generally, Chuck Casey was just an excellent chair, a citizen who stepped up to very major responsibilities and exercised them well. Other chairs of the board have made important contributions, too. Jean Keffeler had very high and noble aspirations for the university and, in many ways, I think she and I may have seen eye to eye on what needed to be done for the university as much as any board member; but, we differed in rather fundamental ways about how it could and should be done. Tom Reagan made a fine contribution in the way he could connect and relate to legislators. We worked very well on many issues; but, we did get into serious conflict, especially over the tenure issue and, also to some extent, on the issue of, how can change be driven in the university? This is where I think there was a lack of understanding of how change has to be brought about through participation of the faculty governance system in particular and that you can't lay out long term agendas for exactly what kind of research and what kind of teaching a particular academic unit is going to do. You have to act on faith. You have to provide some general directions, whereby you hire faculty in certain specialties and you provide certain types of facilities, certain types of equipment, certain types of support staff; but, then, you have to let the faculty guide their own scientific, and scholarly, and educational enterprise. You cannot lay that out in detail. I got demands from some board members for, literally, identifying where we were going to be in the year 2005 for everyone of 250 departments in the university—undoable.

CAC: There's a recurring temptation of the regents—that last sentence prompts me to this question—to kind of play a micromanagement role. As a lay person who has never had this experience, I don't understand where that temptation comes from and why some people seize upon it.

NH: I think there are many different things at work here. By and large, the Minnesota board has been devoted to policy issues. I found the board, by and large, quite supportive of what I was trying to do. I interacted enough with the board most of the time—although, I failed miserably two or three times—so that when I came forward with a budget, I had some assurance that it was going to be acceptable, that we were moving in what I thought was the right direction. They supported those budgets. In my eight budgets that I prepared, they approved, with little

dissension, every single budget that I put forward. Some of those were tough, tough budgets with lots of retrenchment and reallocation and unit closings and so forth. Again, the over all impression I want to leave is that it was a good policy board that was supportive of the administration. There were some problems. Sometimes, some board members feel lost when they get to academic program issues and they will seize on the physical plant issues because they feel they really understand it and, sometimes, will dig in and burrow on one such issue because they feel very familiar with it. That becomes their way of making a contribution to the board and making their voice heard. Others may have just a general feeling that they want to lead the management of the university in ways that are simply incompatible with the presidency. That's clearly the conflict that Jean Keffeler and I had.

CAC: Yes.

NH: She wanted a role and a participation that went, from my perspective, way beyond the role of the chair of the board and began to really be like the CEO of the institution and the president became the operation officer to simply implement instructions that came forward from on high. Board activism has increased, I think, in recent years because of the strange phenomenon that society has started questioning the universities beyond what I think is reasonable. Society always must question the universities; but, I think in recent years, we have seen a credibility gap develop that I don't think is justifiable. The universities, by and large, have done a tremendous job in research, and education, and outreach. Society has questioned and board members have been influenced by this and been told, I think, often, "You've got to come grips with this university now. You've got to get the university to put its act together." That has led to board activism that, I think, also is a reason why there has been, perhaps, more micromanagement in recent years universally in universities across the country than in earlier years.

CAC: It would seem to me that—I'm, again, commenting out of ignorance and lack of experience—persons who are ambitious within the Board of Regents to move aggressively to do more real management of the university would see very quickly that they don't have the resources or the time or the talent to do it and would just have to draw back. Is that a naive observation?

NH: Frankly, sometimes, Clarke, I think the problem is that you get board members whose entire life is being a board member.

CAC: That wouldn't be the case with Jean Keffeler. She had all kinds of careers going in her own personal life. Yes?

NH: Others have to judge the motivations there. I think that the nature of the citizen lay board is that you have distinguished citizens who have distinguished themselves in the professions, in business, in civic life, in political life, who, then, as the duty of a citizen, as a civic responsibility, become board members. In some instances, board membership becomes a career enhancement. It becomes even a stepping stone towards a political career.

CAC: I'm trying to think of an example of someone who went on from the regents to be successful in politics and government . . . not many.

NH: There have been efforts made, however.

CAC: I see. All right.

NH: I'm speaking nationally not just about the Minnesota board.

CAC: Yes, of course.

[break in the interview]

CAC: Nils Hasselmo and I have conferred and we are going to reassemble tomorrow morning. As I look at the tape left on the cassette as it whirls around here, we may as well quit with this tape and I'll put in a fresh one tomorrow. This is signing off on side ten of our conversation. We'll pick it up tomorrow morning and we hope to complete an agenda of subjects that we jointly decided to cover.

[End of Tape 5, Side 2]

[Tape 6, Side 1]

CAC: We gather again in this cozy conversational relationship about the history of the University of Minnesota. Now, it is March 19, 1998, Thursday, and we are still conducting our conversation, interview, in the little desert casita that we have rented for the year [winter] in Tucson, Arizona. Mr. Hasselmo has been kind to come join me where the machinery is. We've had a pleasant several days.

Since our meeting yesterday, Nils, I reviewed where we were and the things we had covered and tried to work out a logical sequence for what will probably be a final shot here. It seemed to me that it would be logical to start addressing a few more specific issues and, then, go to the larger environmental, societal context of the university and how it performed and what the internal principles of the university and matters of that sort, which are very important and may include anecdotes in the way of illustration; but, they won't be particular cases as we have done. Yesterday, for example, we covered a lot of difficult material. I think maybe the bridge is the General College issue. You can start with that logically where you know it began.

NH: Clarke, it's been really interesting to recapitulate this history with you. It's been almost as enjoyable as actually being president.

CAC: [laughter] I hope not as painful in places.

NH: [laughter] General College was, obviously, a painful experience, in one sense. At the same time, I think that there's a lesson there. It's a very important issue. First of all, what we noted—here's where Phil Shively, as provost, worked very closely with me on that particular issue—as we were evaluating the situation was that here was a unit that over several decades had played an important role, though it had been a role that had changed from time to time. We found that, with all of the reforms that had taken place in General College already, of students who entered through General College, eleven percent of those students graduated after five years. We said to ourselves, "There's something fundamentally wrong."

CAC: This was the situation in the early 1990s when you came?

NH: Yes, it was and it continued. This was the situation a couple of years ago when we put this issue on the agenda. We simply said, "This is not right. We've got to do something else."

CAC: I'm interrupting just to say that those figures would have been different in the 1940s and 1950s, for example?

NH: I am sure they would have been different.

CAC: Yes.

NH: The second factor was that we were focusing the University of Minnesota and, I think, one of the major contributions of my administration was the fact that we really followed up on Commitment to Focus and began to focus. We cut the undergraduate enrollment by 6,000 students. We did a number of things. General College became more and more of an anomaly. For me, the fact that we were not succeeding was the critical issue. If we had had the same kind of graduation results, or at least two or three times better than we had, maybe, I would have said, "It probably is worth the cost and let's continue." But, eleven percent after five years . . . and of the protected minorities, seven percent graduated after seven years; so, the argument that somehow the General College was a major access point for students of color was simply fallacious. The first numerical goal that we set for ourselves was we are going to increase the participation of students of color in the University of Minnesota from seven and a half percent to ten percent in five years. We said that in 1989 and we did it by 1994. In the entering freshman class, we had gone from some ten percent of the entering freshmen being students of color to sixteen percent of the entering freshmen being students of color.

CAC: Excuse me. This category of color includes African-Americans?

NH: Yes.

CAC: American Indians?

NH: Yes.

CAC: Hispanics?

NH: Yes.

CAC: Asians?

NH: Asians. Let me say now, too, that the increases were primarily Asian-American students. That was kind of a tempered success in that it was concentrated in the one group.

CAC: Many of them out of the Hmong culture?

NH: Hmong, Vietnamese, Cambodians. Of course, that was a reflection also of the fact that Minnesota was getting an Asian population of some size and that they were beginning to get to the point where their children were entering into higher education. That's a moving story. At one of the lunches we had for minority students, I sat with this Hmong student and his truck farmer parents. The father could hardly speak English. They were, obviously, laboring people. Here, was this bright young man who had received a scholarship to the university and was in our program and was going to become a professor of biology . . .

CAC: Oh, my!

NH: . . . and was well on his way to be a professor of molecular biology. It was one of those things that, Clarke, brings home to you what the Land-Grant university really is all about.

CAC: And what America is about. It's the old immigrant story.

NH: Yes. To me, the Land-Grant university represents so much of what is good about America.

CAC: You bet.

NH: General College . . . in a way this, I hope, puts my own philosophy in perspective because my action against General College was not to try to thwart access and prevent deserving students from coming into the university. It was simply that we were failing. We did not succeed in what we set out to do. Secondly, the university seemed to us not to be the right place to do some of the remedial work. We had nineteen community college districts with which we had developed transfer agreements and had joint admission procedures. It was our belief—we worked with Judith Eaton, the chancellor of the *other system* that included the community colleges—and she was willing to work with us, even to provide a community college environment on campus in cooperation with us to try to provide access to the university. Phil Shively recommend to me and I put before the Board of Regents the proposition that we should close General College and we should do things in alternative ways and we should take a three-month period and evaluate whether that proposition was sound. Of course, all hell broke lose. We got these protests and it all got really thrown into a cocked-hat. It's obvious, in retrospect, that we did not lay the

groundwork that we should have. We had discussions with the chair of the board and with several key regents and we thought that we had agreement that we were going to put this on the agenda and we were going to proceed; but, when I brought it forward to the board, there was, at least, a mild panic. They asked me, then, to withdraw my proposal and I felt that it was a well-thought out proposal; so, I refused to do that. They voted 11-1 against going forward with that particular proposal. That was unfortunate.

CAC: That sentiment reflected what point of view?

NH: Clarke, from my perspective what happened was that there was a philosophical commitment on the part of some of the regents that made it just inconceivable that they were going to move against General College, no matter how ineffective General College might have been. It was simply too much of a symbol of openness and opportunity for some of the regents ever to vote against it.

CAC: I'll bet everyone of them had new stories of General College . . . ?

NH: Absolutely. How many times has it been brought out that Norman Borlaug came through General College? Here's a Nobel Prize winner who came through General College. But, Clarke, he came through General College because he couldn't get the courses he needed when he went to high school in Iowa decades ago.

CAC: [laughter] Right.

NH: It's an entirely different situation today . . . nor were there any community colleges or other opportunities to remedy academic deficiencies. There was a philosophical sense against it on the part of the Board of Regents.

CAC: To what degree, if at all, did this nostalgia respond also to the experience of some in the athletic community?

NH: Athletics usually gets overplayed. General College has not been that major a factor in feeding football players to the Athletic Department.

CAC: But is it perceived?

NH: It was perceived that way; but, the reality was that there were, I think, sixteen of one hundred and twenty football players who were, actually, in General College.

CAC: By the 1990s, yes.

NH: That's right. One of our lineman was already in Law School. [laughter]

CAC: [laughter]

NH: We could talk about athletics, too, because it's fraught with misperceptions.

CAC: I'm sure. But, these perceptions carry enormous weight.

NH: Yes, perceptions do. I didn't feel the argument that General College was necessary in order for us to recruit athletes at risk . . . that did not seem to play a role. I think it was also, again, this element of loyalty to the chair. When the chair turned against the proposal, then, others followed suit because they were going to support the chair.

CAC: The chair was from the [Iron] Range?

NH: Yes.

CAC: I think that has a bearing on it, perhaps?

NH: It may. Let me say here, in retrospect, we did not lay the ground work as solidly as we should have. Waseca worked very well and it worked because we laid very careful ground work, step by step. We tried to do the same thing with General College; but, somehow, we, obviously, didn't quite get there. With the chair, Regent Casey in the case of Waseca, that agreement held. In the case of General College, what we thought was an agreement did not hold under the stresses and strains of the protest that came about. Of course, it got into the racial issue, which it was not. I can't think of anybody more committed to the welfare of college students of color than Phil Shively. He got cast in this very unfortunate role of being the one who spearheaded this attack on General College. There was this unfortunate slip up where he was kind of ironically saying something that General College is not a college for dummies. This got twisted about as if he had said, "This is a college for dummies," when he was directly attacking that notion.

CAC: Right.

NH: You know how this plays itself out in the media.

CAC: Phil tells his side of the story on tape.

NH: Yes. I take full responsibility for having brought this to the regents in a way that didn't work. Could we have done it in a way that would have made it work? I think maybe we could have. What, then, happened was that there was follow up and an evaluation is going on of General College; although, I think General College is going to continue as a mechanism. It is a real question of whether General College, under a strategy of focusing its efforts and setting standards that are considerably higher than what we had had at one point, is really an effective mechanism for achieving what we should, especially since we have considerable success in

recruitment, retention, and graduation of minority students outside of General College. There are some fundamental questions there.

CAC: Right. They will continue.

NH: Yes, they will. I think, historically, General College was very important, was a great innovation, and has served an important function over the years; but, history changes. Circumstances change and the university is one part—from my perspective, the flagship part—of higher education in Minnesota, which has plenty of opportunities and for the university, focusing means that the university should do what it can do best and leave to others to fulfill other responsibilities; but, Clarke, that's a very difficult notion. People will agree to it in principle but when they get to the implementation, it is very difficult to get it done. That's why I would say that it's much easier to formulate the vision and aspiration of the university than it is to actually get it done.

CAC: Of course.

NH: I take some pride in the fact that we did get some of these things done. I hope that that can continue; but, that's a painstaking step by step process. You succeed sometimes and you fail and you have to try again.

CAC: These interviews frequently—perhaps, too frequently—become a conversation. When I came to Minnesota in 1951 and was assigned the basic American History Survey with Ernest Osgood, which was a logical assignment for a very junior person, I was advised to go and talk with the folks who are teaching history in General College because they did it differently. I think in the early years, the 1930s, 1940s, 1950s, that there was a pedagogical innovation in many parts of General College that many of the faculty thought about nostalgically. Whether these innovations played a major part in other parts of the university, I don't know. But as a kid, coming to the university, I would have said, "They do things differently there. Some of it's pretty interesting and pretty effective." I think that was part of it, a subliminal . . .

NH: That has been a continuing rationale for having General College, that it is both an additional access point for students at risk and that it is a college that experiments with alternative teaching methods.

CAC: Yes.

NH: I get back to the one basic fact: eleven percent of the students who entered through General College actually ended up, after five years, with a degree. That did not seem to be success. We had this ongoing argument, too: Is graduation the only measure of success? I don't think it is. I think we have undervalued graduation within a reasonable period of time. I think we've undervalued that at the University of Minnesota. That has led to a little bit of a lackadaisical and sloppy culture when it comes to student progress.

CAC: Yes.

NH: That's one issue where I've been pretty hardheaded and certainly have been accused of elitism. I take that accusation lightly because I think that every student is well served by being pushed a little bit and that graduation in four years or five years or six years . . . they ought to graduate as soon as they can and they ought to graduate. Otherwise, they don't get the benefit of their education. This idea that even if they go for a year or two at the university, that will be a valuable experience. If they flunk out after two years or we drop them after two years, I think many of them go away scarred by the experience rather than having benefitted from a partial education. That's a philosophical issue.

CAC: You bet, a philosophical issue with very practical consequences. This may lead logically to some commentary on Affirmative Action. We discussed it earlier in light of the Rajender case. But regarding students and access of minority groups—you spoke of it just a minute ago—why don't we pick up on that briefly?

NH: In 1989, Clarke, Delores Cross had been recruited by Ken Keller, by the previous administration, to head up our Affirmative Action effort. She made a proposal to me in 1989 that we should set a numerical goal for recruitment of students of color into the student body. I accepted a numerical goal and we adopted a numerical goal of going from what was seven and a half percent of the student body being students of color to ten percent by 1994. We did that with some fear and trepidation because it was going to be blatantly clear if we failed. We did reach that particular target through a variety of measures but also because of fortuitous circumstances, primarily the influx of Asian-Americans into Minnesota and a rather extraordinary group of bright students coming out of the Asian-American community into the university. While we succeeded over all with reaching our numerical goal, we did not succeed in moving each group of minority students of color forward to the extent we would have liked. It was primarily in the Asian-American group that we saw this progress. There was some progress because, for example, in the College of Agriculture, through a very creative program that they developed with a pipeline to the Agricultural High School in Chicago, we were able to recruit a number of African-American students into the College of Agriculture. That helped overcome the problem of being the first isolated African-American student in Agriculture. Several came and they came knowing each other and the faculty members in Agriculture knew the faculty members in the high school in Chicago and there was interaction between faculty and staff as well as students. That targeted approach of trying to build some kind of critical mass of minority students in areas where there was none was part of the strategy. Morris did the same. They had a recruitment pipeline to Chicago and recruited a number of African-American students to the Morris campus for that experience. Here again, you had some philosophical differences that emerged because I was arguing that we should build critical mass by whatever means and that these pipelines, these very targeted efforts, going out of state to get students of color, is an effective strategy. I had arguments with members of the Board of Regents who said, "Our responsibility is only to minority students of Minnesota and especially to minority students who are at risk." To me that was a recipe for failure because if you admit minority students who are

all at risk, what kind of environment are you going to create? You need minority students who cover the whole spectrum of ability and preparation just as other students. By having these pockets of students who succeeded, you created an environment which I think is very helpful for the students at risk who we also have to admit. What happened was that other universities came in and recruited away from Minnesota the top scholars among the minority students. We sat there content to simply admit students at risk. We said, "We have to admit the entire spectrum and we have to concentrate on high ability minority students as well as students who do have some educational deficits." We began to move in the right direction.

I had four committees that were very helpful, one committee with community members from each of the major minority . . . communities of color, I should say because American Indians especially resent being called minorities, I think for good reason. We had one for American Indians, an American Indian advisory committee, which was established by statute because the state requires the establishment of such a group. We had one for Asian-Americans, one for Chicano and Latino students, and one for African-American students. A very dedicated group of community members participated in those discussions. It was especially helpful that—I'd had many discussions with the group and met with them regularly—we had them meet with vice-presidents, with deans, with representatives of student personnel, and they got to know personally some of the people who really were making the decisions and in charge of the programs that really were directly affecting the minority students. I thought that was a very productive relationship. I, again, say that Minnesota has a tremendous asset in that kind of community participation and community leadership that came forward. To be sure, we reaped a lot of criticism from those groups; but, that was the intention, that they were really going to be able to tell us the way they saw the issues and, then, we would try to respond. With the help of Dr. Josie Johnson, who spearheaded this effort . . .

CAC: Oh, yes!

NH: . . . we set up an actual protocol where we identified and shared with the groups the questions that they had raised and we had another column that said, "Response initiated." Then, we followed up on every single question trying to record what kind of response had been given and if we could not meet what they were asking us to do, then, we said so, explicitly. That began to clear the air with those groups; otherwise, we tended to go in circles. Issues would come up and, then, we would respond and the next year the issue would come again and nobody quite remembered what the response had been. Here, we had an actual record showing the question and the response. Now, with the turnover we had on the committees, we got a little bit circular anyway; but, at least, it was an effort to move forward. I think that it helped clear the air with some of the community leaders and some of them were extraordinarily pleased, I think, with the action that was taken. Others remained quite critical.

CAC: Was membership on these committees mixed? Were there faculty and P&A [Professional and Administrative]?

NH: There were some members from the university but they were primarily from the community. We had to start somewhere so I appointed the original committees. We told those committees to be self-selecting. They became more and more autonomous so that they had a chair of their own.

CAC: Good.

NH: They had meetings of their own without any university administrators present. Then, they would bring forward sometimes written reports, sometimes simply oral reports for our consideration.

CAC: Let me raise another group that I became aware of really late in my career and that was the community of disabled students. I was told that the disability office at the university, whenever it was founded, was probably one of the most successful of any in the country.

NH: Yes. Sue Kroeger did a terrific job there.

CAC: This is with the blind, the deaf . . . ?

NH: Yes. We made some progress in that regard, too. Every time we built facilities or remodelled we tried to make facilities more accessible for disabled students. That program, unfortunately, was extraordinarily expensive and we moved all too slowly but there was some progress. You see a lot of ramps that have been built around the university now.

CAC: But, it was so much more than ramps. I had students who were not legally blind, in every case, but they had trouble and they'd take their exams elsewhere.

NH: Yes, we provide readers and assistants who would help students who were blind or deaf.

CAC: I had several students who were totally deaf and they assigned a signer and she sat beside me in the front of the class and signed my lecture for these students.

NH: We improved those services. Of course, the Americans with Disability Act required a number of those things; but, I think, by and large, we stayed ahead of that curve. It requires some very major investments. Those were extremely expensive services. The service for a single blind student could amount to many tens of thousands of dollars per year. We made some progress there; but, at the same time, I think we nibbled at the problem. We didn't solve it.

CAC: I'm sure everybody nibbles. I have it through my friends in social work—a lot of these students I had who were disabled were out of the social work major—that Minnesota had one of the best programs anywhere to facilitate the needs of these special students.

NH: A lot of credit also to Sue Kroeger who is herself disabled and who headed that office. Building morale and building a sense of rapport is important. Josie Johnson came up with the idea of a series of events. We had a series of annual events where we invited a number of people from around the university, both students of color and faculty of color and we invited key decision makers, vice-presidents, deans, department chairs, and others to come to this gathering. We had several hundred people come to these gatherings when we gave a report on where we were. We had some very hard-hitting presentations of problems by students. I think one of the effective programs that Dr. Johnson arranged was when she had students presenting the problems and the student who made the presentation was not of the particular color or ethnic group where the problem occurred.

CAC: [laughter] Ah!

NH: A straight student would talk about the problem of a homosexual student. A white student would talk about the problem of black student. Those were moving sessions. Then, we reported back what had happened. If we had successes, we reported successes. If we had failures, we admitted failure. Those were interesting sessions. That was Josie Johnson's idea to do that.

CAC: The gay and lesbian subcultures were . . . ?

NH: They were included in that environment, too. The whole issue of homosexuality was a burning issue. There were strong protests over the ROTC [Reserve Officers Training Corps] for awhile, as you will recall. The university's policy forbade discrimination against homosexuals. The military had a policy where students, while they could participate in ROTC at the university, they could not be commissioned because of the army provisions. Then, there was strong pressure that we should abolish the ROTC on campus because the military did not commission homosexuals. The senate even passed a resolution recommending that we set a deadline for abolishing the ROTC program. That was a real soul searching exercise for me; but, I refused to make that recommendation to the board because, on balance, I felt that we were better being within the system and providing the opportunities that we did for many, many students through the ROTC than if we pushed the ROTC off campus. They were simply going to go somewhere else and we would have no influence whatsoever. Now, we, at least, had an opportunity to keep making our case. By and large, the leaders in the ROTC, the military who were there, were sympathetic to our position and helped try to create an environment that was as undiscriminatory as it could be, given the fact that the military did not allow commissioning of known homosexuals.

CAC: Did the presidents in the Big Ten ever represent this concern to the Department of Defense?

NH: Yes. Then chancellor of the University of Wisconsin, Donna Shalala, now Health and Human Services secretary for the government, and I met with representatives of the military and presented, in the most forceful way we could, the plight of the universities and the plight of the

students, very able students, who were excluded from this particular opportunity. It was one of those situations where we got a sympathetic hearing from the military and we saw some pretty high brass. But, in the end, President [Bill] Clinton made some great promises. There had been a lot of university lobbying and I think that President Clinton, to some extent, responded to university lobbying. Then, he kind of undercut it by coming up with an awful compromise of "Don't ask. Don't tell."

CAC: And that hasn't worked very well.

NH: No, it hasn't. Clarke, I hope that this is one of those instances where we are still making progress. Sometimes, I think we are slipping back into a reactionary era again where, maybe, some of these trends are going to fade. You showed me yesterday the brief where the Minnesota legislature is trying to tie funding for the university to a provision that seems to me to be a step backwards.

CAC: That's for the future.

NH: Yes, it is. The issue is not dead. As you may recall, we had a considerable number of demonstrations for the Board of Regents in regard to that. One retiring student body president actually gave me, as a farewell present, the handcuffs that he had used in handcuffing himself to my chair during a Board of Regents' meeting.

CAC: [laughter]

NH: I still have that as a souvenir.

CAC: I hope he gave you the key to the handcuffs.

NH: I think the key is there, too.

CAC: I hope so!

NH: I haven't used it. The situation of women is an important one. I was first kind of bloodied at the university in administration when I was involved with the Rajender consent decree and the implementation of that consent decree, which was accepted by the board, I think, two weeks before I became a vice-president and I knew nothing about it and it was given to me as one of assignments. The university has faced that issue and, again, we've had significant progress; although, we still have a ways to go to provide a really open and fair evaluation of women. We tried in my administration by recruiting women into key administrative positions. I first hired a Student Affairs vice-president who was a woman, an African-American woman, Marvalene Hughes. Then, I hired a vice-president for Arts, Sciences, and Engineering, Anne Hopkins. I hired Anne Petersen as vice-president for research and dean of the Graduate School. I hired Joanne Jackson as senior vice-president for Finance and Operations. Those were the first four

women vice-presidents in the history of the university and they all did really an outstanding job. I also hired a woman as chancellor at the Duluth campus, which seems to be working quite well. Katherine Martin is doing a fine job in Duluth. We have gotten women into really major positions. We also hired a number of female deans: the first woman dean of CLA, the first woman dean of the Extension Service, and the first woman dean of the College of Pharmacy. So, there has been progress in getting women into major positions. Provost Brody, by the way, was very close to hiring a woman dean of the Medical School. In the end, she said, "No." She had our offer and we thought we were going to be able to entice her to Minnesota. That's progress. It's going to continue to affect the general situation for women in the university.

CAC: It strikes me that that would be a very good example of common principles and strategies working from the top down and from the bottom up. As you know very well, there were a number of departments, not uniformly in all of the colleges, that were ahead of the curve and were recruiting faculty on Affirmative Action grounds before the university itself and Central Administration came to these things. I've found that recorded in a number of my interviews; but, of course, I remember history best that in 1971 we began an Affirmative Action program that was ahead of the colleges . . .

NH: Yes.

CAC: . . . and was very successful in it, very successful

NH: This is the subculture issue. You have so many different subcultures in the university and some of those subcultures have been quite progressive, for example, on the Affirmative Action issue. Others have been just absolutely resistant to any form of change. Then, you have the institutional environment. I think that changing at the top is important, also, because if you're going to deal with those areas, sometimes fairly large pockets of real resistance, it has to come through the university taking action in that direction.

CAC: Yes.

NH: One element that I think was very important was Women's Athletics. We talked a little bit about that earlier. There has been very real progress in Women's Athletics under the leadership of the directors we've had, not least Chris Voeltz. She, of course, became quite controversial because of her advocacy that sometimes was seen to be too aggressive to some people. She certainly came under very serious attack. While we had some disagreements as well, I really decided to throw my full support behind her and I think that worked out well. It was an unseemly attack on her by the media.

[break in the interview]

NH: What I want to say also is that Women's Athletics has been an important factor in attracting, first of all, outstanding students to the university.

CAC: You bet!

NH: Some of those female athletes are just outstanding students. Again, Clarke, community support . . . the kind of women community leaders who have rallied around Women's Athletics has been wonderful to behold. Marilyn Bryant, for example, has spent so much time in support of Women's Athletics. It has engaged them and energized them. They serve as role models for our female students. That has been a good mix. That's one area where Intercollegiate Athletics really has made a contribution to the environment of the university.

CAC: Now, it is interesting that the Women's Athletic programs are attracting a good number of spectators and support.

NH: That's right. It's very interesting to see how the women's basketball team at Arizona gets almost as coverage as their men's basketball team. I hope that the commercialization is not going to be as much of a problem for Women's Athletics as it has been for Men's Athletics.

CAC: Again, we have to leave something to other persons and the future.

NH: Yes.

CAC: We're at the end of this side and I'm going to flip it.

[End of Tape 6, Side 1]

[Tape 6, Side 2]

CAC: While I was turning the tape, you suggested the hiring of McKinley Boston could be part of this story.

NH: I thought I should mention that because it's an interesting case history. We had a vacancy in the directorship for Men's Intercollegiate Athletics. We did a national search and the search committee came up with three candidates. One was a local former coach in the department, Jerry Noyes, an outstanding person, excellent person. One of the other candidates was McKinley Boston, who had been recruited by Murray Warmath . . .

CAC: To play.

NH: Yes . . . in the 1960s, from the Carolinas. I think at that time, there were not too many black athletes playing on northern football teams. I think Murray Warmath, perhaps, wanted both a good football player but I think there was also an Affirmative Action element in it. He became something of a father figure for the outstanding black athletes that he recruited. McKinley came, played at the University of Minnesota and would have played in the Rose Bowl if it hadn't been for the fact that Minnesota had gone to the Rose Bowl earlier in the 1960s and when they tied

for the Big Ten championship with Indiana, Indiana got to go to the Rose Bowl in 1968. McKinley went on and got his doctorate and both taught and was athletic director in other institutions. When he became a candidate at Minnesota, he was athletic director at the University of Rhode Island. It was a major battle, Clarke, in the final appointment process because Jerry Noyes, of course, who was an outstanding person, had an enormous amount of support in the local community.

CAC: Of course.

NH: Then, you had a black athlete that played at Minnesota, who had gone on and gotten his doctorate, and become athletic director in other universities and colleges. I told myself, "Nils, if you're serious about Affirmative Action, you've got to appoint McKinley Boston," and I did. But, I had never probably been under such pressure as I was. The phone was ringing into the wee hours.

CAC: Was Mr. Sid Hartman . . . ?

NH: Mr. Hartman and others, of course, were constantly . . . We had to kind of play hide and seek to be able to meet in private. Rumors were flying wildly. This lobby and community leaders were calling me at midnight trying to convince me that I had to go with Jerry Noyes.

CAC: What was his sport?

NH: Tennis. It was a difficult decision because Jerry Noyes was an excellent person. It was one of those, for me, showdown times. If we were serious Affirmative Action, this was it. I appointed McKinley and he came and did an excellent job as athletic director.

CAC: We all know that Swedes can be stubborn, too.

NH: It took a little stubbornness. McKinley, then, went on and became vice-president for Student Affairs and has aspirations to go on . . .

CAC: You moved him into that position?

NH: Yes, I did. I think that's what has to happen. You talk about Affirmative Action . . . you have all these policies and procedures.

CAC: Oh, yes, and it comes down to individual cases.

NH: And a special decision in a particular situation.

CAC: People who worked with McKinley Boston after his initial appointment, and faculty, supported him. They saw that he was really quality.

NH: He taught in American Studies about sports in America. Clarke, one of those wonderful moments was when Sid Hartman came into my office, at one point, and he said, "Nils, in the case of McKinley Boston, you were right and I was wrong."

CAC: Well! I'm glad we got that on tape!

NH: [laughter]

CAC: I would guess that was one of the few such confessions he made.

NH: McKinley Boston became a very good friend of the governor, too.

CAC: Good, that doesn't hurt.

I want to change the topic now to the relationship of the university with other public and private universities, to the HECB, Higher Education Coordinating Board, and the Twin Cities Educational Partnership. There is a lot of this outreach. Minnesota is rich in its higher education institutions. When you think of the private colleges of Carleton, St. Olaf, Macalester, Gustavus . . . just first-class liberal arts colleges.

NH: I think Minnesota has one of the richest higher education systems in the country when you look at the totality of public and private education and those excellent private colleges are a tremendous asset. By the way, we had very good working relationships with those private colleges. We even have some joint programs where students who want degrees in engineering or architecture, for example, can get such degrees in private colleges in collaboration with the University of Minnesota. They do part of their work at Minnesota. When it comes to graduate education, we recruit a number of our graduates students from the private colleges in Minnesota. That's a major recruitment base.

CAC: And place some of our Ph.D.s?

NH: A study was done a few years ago that indicated that twenty percent of the faculties in the private colleges in Minnesota were University of Minnesota graduates . . . just tremendous placement opportunities and, also, a wonderful recruitment base for the private colleges to get highly qualified faculty members—a great asset.

The system has been over built. The policy that was adopted many years ago that there should be a campus within thirty-five miles of every Minnesotan may have been a good idea at the time; but, in today's society with today's opportunities for transportation, for telecommunication, and so forth, I think that is probably not a cost effective way of providing educational opportunity. There has been some consolidation of community colleges into clusters of colleges to minimize administrative costs. I think the system is clearly over built and that's, of course, why we closed Waseca. It was duplicated by the technical colleges. We had hoped, at that time, that it was

going to spur further consolidation. I gave a speech in Rochester in about 1990 called "The Silent Crisis." It was the overextension of Minnesota public higher education in light of the funding resources available, that we were spreading ourselves too thin. That's been a struggle.

The Higher Education Coordinating Board supported our focusing efforts and they supported closing Waseca. They came to our support a number of times when we were making tough decisions. At the same time, they were largely ignored by the legislature. Here's an agency established by the legislature that then, eventually, was abolished by the legislature. That points up a very fundamental problem: that is, you establish a citizen board that tries to do the right thing when it comes to restructuring of higher education and, then, they run into political interests and the board really can't function very effectively. They were ignored and, eventually, they were abolished. Now, we don't have a Higher Education Coordinating Board. Instead, we have the merger of the state universities, community colleges, and technical colleges. Again, I think the state is looking to efficiencies and cost effectiveness and avoiding some of the political log rolling that goes on by establishing a merged system. I'm just waiting to see whether that is going to happen, whether that system, which does not have constitutional autonomy and is much more susceptible to political pressure, is going to be able to make those critical decisions that we, to some extent, have been able to make because the Board of Regents is a constitutionally independent and protected agency.

CAC: Especially, perhaps, because each of those institutions has a state senator and a state legislator who takes them on.

NH: Exactly. It's a formidable political force if decisions are going to be made by political pork barrel. Bringing home the bacon is to bring it home to the local community college or technical college or state university. That's been one problem for the university. We have so much of our activities concentrated in the Twin Cities, where for Twin Cities legislators bringing home the bacon is not getting money for the university necessarily. I think our coordinate campuses at one time were established, at least partly, as a strategy on the part of the university to broaden its rural base. That was before the one person, one vote rule came about; so, the rural dominance in the legislature at the time was extremely strong. The university clearly built strong political support in the rural area because of the fact that these campuses were established.

CAC: Historically—I wrote an article on it once—the community colleges, then called junior colleges, on the Iron Range in Minnesota were among the earliest in the whole United States and among the very best. Once you get that going in Ely, Virginia, and Hibbing . . . wow! it's hard to disestablish things with that long a tradition.

NH: I know. There was pressure from that area for getting upper division education, pressure on UM-D [University of Minnesota-Duluth]. UM-D has reached out into that region to provide educational opportunities. What we can do and have, to some extent, started doing is to reach those communities with telecommunications. For example, I was up in International Falls, which is totally dominated by the forestry industry. Our College of Natural Resources teaches courses

that have to do with paper science in International Falls by interactive television. They do that in a facility that is located in the Rainy River Community College in International Falls. So, here you have telecommunication outreach by the university through a community college to a specific industrial sector in Minnesota. There are tremendous opportunities there, Clarke, to do this in a cost effective way. For us to send faculty members up there to do locally that kind of education would be extremely expensive, if it could even be done, if you could even get faculty members to do it. Doing it by interactive television from a classroom in St. Paul to a classroom in International Falls works very well. I've sat in those classes myself to see it in operation.

CAC: I'm sure it works with younger teachers. I did several of these for the College of Education. Boy! I think I was too old to adjust to trying to respond to the tiny little television screen in four different sites away from the university. I wasn't nimble enough; but, these young kids are more nimble. I think it will work.

NH: They are moving into a telecommunications oriented world. Clarke, you had this situation in Minnesota: excellent education but can we be cost effective? There clearly has been under funding of a number of aspects of that excellent educational system. Can we somehow, through consolidation, be more cost effective? That's really the issue.

CAC: Cost effective and educationally effective?

NH: Of course. You need a certain kind of investment to be educationally effective and, sometimes, we have not been educationally effective because we've been spreading ourselves too thin.

CAC: What is the Twin Cities Educational Partnership?

NH: That's something that we initiated in 1992, something like that. I invited my colleagues in the community colleges, technical colleges, and state universities and in HECB to a meeting and we decided to form this Twin Cities Educational Partnership. That resulted in the establishment, then, of courses jointly taught by the university and community colleges. We started offering joint degrees. We started with information networking and we did a degree in applied business.

CAC: In partnership with what other institutions?

NH: We started with North Hennepin Community College and with Inver Hills Community College. Those were the two target locations. At this point, it may have gone to other community colleges.

CAC: Not to St. Thomas or to St. Catherine?

NH: No, it involved the community colleges. It was in computer science and in applied business. We have also offered it in construction management and in emergency medical services. It was an effort to avoid duplication. Rather than having institutions that did not have the expertise in computer science, let alone in medical science, that we had . . . to actually draw on the university's resources in a cost effective manner by building on two years in a community college and, then, add two years taught by university faculty on location in the community colleges. Then, we have community participation. Especially in applied business with Inver Hill Community College, local business has entered into this partnership in an advisory capacity. Those programs, I think, have been quite productive and very well received. The placement of the early graduates—for example, in the computer networking program—was very, very good. Interestingly enough, students who have bachelor's degrees already have come back to get these more specialized degrees through this program.

CAC: The Midwest Compact?

NH: This is an effort by the Midwestern states to be cost effective. We invited the Compact to have their office at the University of Minnesota. Jim Infante worked extensively with them and did a very good job in establishing liaison and bringing them here. For example, in travel contracts, we can have a whole group of Midwestern universities in many different states negotiate travel contracts and we can get much better deals because we have a tremendous . . .

CAC: This means Wisconsin, Illinois, Iowa . . . ?

NH: Michigan, Ohio. It involves not only the state universities but other institutions as well. It was initiated really through the legislatures in those states.

CAC: How much did you, as president, have to involve yourself in that kind of detail?

NH: I participated in some meetings and some ceremonies in connection with it; but, Jim Infante really did all the serious work on it.

CAC: Say something about the relationship of your office to national, professional associations of higher education.

NH: First of all, let me say something about the Big Ten because the Big Ten has become much more than an athletic conference and that has developed over a number of years. The so-called CIC, the Consortium for Inter-Institutional Cooperation, which includes the Big Ten and the University of Chicago, has, for a number of years, had an office and had programs and faculty exchange, student exchange . . .

CAC: Particularly at the graduate level, I believe?

NH: Yes . . . trying to, again, be more cost effective, for example, when it comes to less commonly taught languages—something close to my heart—making sure that this whole series of languages are taught somewhere in the Big Ten and that students, then, who need language competence in those languages can have access to those through a student exchange program. There have been initiatives, for example, in library collaboration. Increasingly, there has been collaboration among the Big Ten in federal lobbying. I participated with the other Big Ten presidents in a visit with Senator [Trent] Lott, the Senate majority leader, where we, I think, got access to him because the eleven presidents in the Big Ten . . . it covers a lot of territory when we ask for an audience.

CAC: A lot of prestige.

NH: We made some joint TV [television] programs in connection with athletic events that featured the Big Ten universities as a wonderful educational resource. There's a lot of academic collaboration among the institutions, not only at the presidential level. The Big Ten presidents meet twice a year and, of course, we talk athletics, and TV contracts, and seating at the Rose Bowl and all of that quite a bit; but, we also talk increasingly about academic issues. We have brought in finance vice-presidents in to do certain kinds of financial analysis for the Big Ten. Academic vice-presidents meet regularly on academic issues and, I think, undergraduate deans meet and the liberal arts dean meet. The environment of the Big Ten is becoming a very rich, and wonderful, and important environment for the University of Minnesota.

CAC: You're talking top down. How many departments like history . . . ? We had an annual meeting of department chairs in the Big Ten.

NH: Exactly, it cascades down through the entire institution. I don't really have a full view of all the things that are going on. I think, Clarke, for the future, with the need for collaboration and the need to share responsibility and have institutions specialize, that the Big Ten provides a wonderful context for that. For example, in library planning to make sure that somewhere in the Big Ten, a particular field—like oceanography or Scandinavian Studies—is fully covered. It's going back to the old Farmington Plan that set up a system of specialization for various university libraries.

CAC: I can testify that, even at the autonomous level of the department, when I went, we would talk about the role of the survey courses in our department and how they should be structured when we initiated a program of world history, which was a flip back to what used to be done in the 1920s. It was a very helpful discussion by other chairs of the possibilities and the difficulties of doing that. At the grass roots level, I found those meetings extraordinarily useful.

NH: Clarke, I think that maybe the greatest benefit from these associations, including for the presidents, is simply that you meet with colleagues who are wrestling with the same kind of problems and you always come back with new perspectives and new ideas or, at least, confirmation that there isn't anything you haven't thought of. [laughter]

CAC: [laughter]

NH: I think that the Big Ten is a very important environment.

Nationally, the University of Minnesota has been very active in the [National] Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges [NASULGC]. I did get involved in that organization some years ago and kind of moved through the ranks as chairman of the president's council of that association and, then eventually, became chairman of the board of the national association and found that a very enriching experience. I got to know many of the two hundred presidents in that association. That's an organization that operates at many different levels through the deans of agriculture, the extension directors. A few years ago, an academic affairs council was established within NASULGC where the academic vice-presidents of those universities meet with some regularity. Federal relations officers meet and so forth. I think that's a wonderful national context.

The AAU [American Association of Universities] is the other major context where the University of Minnesota participates. That's about half public and half private.

CAC: This is the organization you're going to in July?

NH: That's where I'm going to be president starting July 1st. That's an organization that has only sixty-two universities as compared to about two hundred in ASULGC. It's a group where membership is by invitation only.

[telephone rings . . . break in the interview]

NH: Minnesota has been a member since 1909, I think. The organization was founded in 1900. It focuses on research and graduate education in particular. It has a council of graduate schools and a federal relations council that deal specifically with federal lobbying and with graduate school issues. Again, it's a very important context. For me, as president, it was extremely rewarding to be able to meet twice a year with those sixty-two presidents from really our peer group. Our peer group is the major state universities and the major private research universities. That's really our constituency. We recruit faculty from major private universities and the major private universities, unfortunately, raid us sometimes for our best faculty.

CAC: Of course.

NH: There's a lot of commonality of interest between the private and the public universities in that sector. I look forward to having an opportunity to work with that association.

CAC: As we proceed through this conversation, there is one portfolio after another that personally or in a way of accountability, you've had to cover—any president has to cover.

NH: Yes. There's almost endless opportunity for involvement being president. Of course, the trick is to try to maintain and drive some kind of central agenda under the impact of constant crises, constant constituency demands, and the need to represent the university in a variety of context. That's also what makes the job so incredibly exciting and interesting. As I said earlier, it was very rewarding to have all of those personal relationships. What sustains you in times of crisis and when you're being criticized and attacked by various constituencies are those relationships and the enormous importance of the agenda that you're trying to help drive.

CAC: Maybe we can move now to the relationship of the university, to the state legislature, and to the governor of the state.

NH: Yes, of course, a critically important relationship. Here's where the university has the problem of being closely associated with the governor and with the legislative leadership without getting overly politicized and drawn into agendas that are not appropriate for the university. That's tricky business. To some extent, I think my administration was able to maintain a good working relationship. I certainly had a good working relationship with Governor Perpich, especially when I hired his former finance commissioner, Gus Donhowe, as my finance vice-president. He called me up the next morning and said, "Nils, good appointment! I just added \$17 million to the university budget."

CAC: [laughter]

NH: Whether he did or not, I don't know. We did reasonably well in that legislative session. With legislative leaders, we've had very good relationships and even in slim times when the finances of the state prevented them from giving us nearly what we were asking for and needed, the reception was always very positive. Sometimes, they were very critical of some of our processes and procedures; but, I always found a very open door and receptivity to arguments and a willingness to listen and discuss things with Roger Moe, the Senate majority leader and with LeRoy Stumpf, who was the head of the Senate Education Committee, and with Phil Carruthers, who became the speaker of the House, and even with Irv Anderson, when he was speaker of the House. Regents like Bill Peterson were very helpful when it came to relationships with somebody like Irv Anderson. I think they had a relationship going way back and Bill Peterson and I would visit with Irv Anderson and having Regent Peterson there was very, very helpful and important.

CAC: Did you use other members of the Board of Regents for that kind of liaison?

NH: Yes, we did. Almost as a side effect of the regents selection reform that took place after Ken Keller's resignation . . . it depoliticized the board in a certain sense, which almost disconnected the board from the legislature. I think earlier, an appointment to the board used to be if not by cronyism, at least, the regents were people who were very closely associated with groups of legislators. That meant that they had a natural access point. I have the feeling—although, I, of course, have a very short historical perspective here—that a number of

the board members did not have particularly effective relationships with the legislature. Some of them did.

CAC: Did Mr. Reagan have connections on the Range?

NH: He certainly has a very strong connection with the Eighth District delegation, which, by and large, has been very supportive of the university—as long as we do right by UM-D. They have been helpful for the university in general. Tom Reagan was very effective in those relationships.

CAC: UM-D has had that going for decades.

NH: Yes. We have treated them fairly. Like in a family where you have one eight hundred pound gorilla like the Twin Cities campus and, then, you have smaller members of the family, it's almost inevitable that they're going to feel a little bit trampled on, at times. We worked very hard to try to be fair to the outstate campuses and, politically, they had much stronger constituency support in the legislature than, frankly, the Twin Cities campus did, which tended to be too big and impersonal for legislators to get that personal engagement in that campus.

CAC: This has been commented upon by so many other persons. There's a loyalty outstate or in greater Minnesota in one way that the legislators in the seven county metropolitan area did not demonstrate, by and large, for the university, which is their constituent.

NH: Some of the people who were most critical of the university and, to some extent, occasionally did real damage to the university were legislators who should have been our staunchest supporters because their districts benefitted more than any other part of the state from the activities of the university.

CAC: That always was a puzzle to me. How do you explain that?

NH: I don't know. The faculty, of course, has made a very concerted effort—I think an effective and important effort—to connect with legislators in districts where there are heavy components of faculty.

CAC: We've tried.

NH: That's been important; but, it has not always played itself out in support in the legislature. I think that the university is so taken for granted and one legislator doesn't see it as his or her special responsibility to the same extent with the Twin Cities campus as they do, for example, with the Morris campus or the Crookston campus or the Duluth campus. It is a problem. I have tried to convene groups of Twin Cities' legislators, especially those that surround the university in order to try to deal explicitly with that particular issue and it's been hard to engage them. This is where the regents in the metropolitan district were helpful, however. Regent Keffeler used to

have annually a gathering for legislators in her district. That was very helpful because she and I could, then, in some detail discuss with those legislators what was on their minds and what we were trying to accomplish. That was helpful. Other regents did similar things . . . Regent [Wendell R.] Anderson, Regent [Hyon T.] Kim, Regent [William R.] Peterson. We also used to have, before the legislature passed this stringent legislation about who could feed them legally, legislative breakfasts that were helpful. After we were reduced to serving only a bagel or something for breakfast, those were not quite as successful.

CAC: [laughter]

NH: We had good relations with the legislature and the legislative leaders, especially, were quite engaged in the university. Lyn Carlson, although, he has strong relations with the state universities, was very helpful and supportive of the university's agenda. I have no complaint about those legislative relations; although, they did not, during those hardship years of the state, give us the money we needed. When they did get money in the last legislative session, in 1997, however, they gave us a 16.4 percent increase in the base budget. Finally, they were able to fund what they really had wanted to do earlier but had been constrained from doing because of the shortage of funding.

CAC: How influential is the governor in these matters, vis-à-vis the university.

NH: Very influential because the governor sets the parameters for the allocation to the university.

CAC: He really does?

NH: The governor's budget becomes a very important document. It doesn't necessarily get enacted by the legislature; but, it lays the foundation for what the legislature is going to do. Very rarely will the legislature give more than what the governor recommends. That's why the governor's recommendations have been critically important.

CAC: In other ways than appropriations, does the governor relate to the university in really significant ways?

NH: The two governors that I worked with, Governor Perpich and Governor Carlson, certainly related to the university. With Governor Perpich, I inherited an agenda that came from the previous administration and from his own blue ribbon commission, the so-called Spencer Commission. We interacted on that particular agenda. He would also call me up, from time to time, when he had some special interests that he wanted to pursue, including establishing endowed professorships for some favorite person that he had in mind.

CAC: I see.

NH: Those never worked very well. [laughter] If you're going to raise \$1 million or \$2 million, you need a very strong commitment and the individuals that were proposed were not necessarily people that would engendered that kind of support from the people who really had the money to provide. With Governor Carlson, I had a much more complicated relationship. I wrote to him when he first became governor and asked for a partnership in trying to frame the university's agenda and his assistance in moving the university forward. I never had any response from him. Of course, that was during the months of enormous turbulence when he first took office. You may recall that he hired and fired staff quite regularly, at that time. I was not able to quite connect with him, at that point. We got into some unfortunate situations of conflict. He vetoed all nineteen legislative specials. I think he must have done that without realizing the implications. That, of course, was an invitation to have nineteen special constituencies descend on him and I think he held me, at least, partly responsible for the political debacle that that involved. I, of course, did not restrain those constituencies. I also said that I thought it was not a wise thing to do to cancel out funding for mathematics for talented youth, and the Extension Service, and a whole series of critically important programs.

CAC: The Center for Urban and Regional Affairs

NH: Yes. That kind of soured our relationship.

CAC: Do you have any sense of why he vetoed those?

NH: I can only conclude that he was poorly advised and they did not understand what was going on.

CAC: Later, in his term, he backed away from the bill, which he had originally signed, to permit the selling of bonds for the library access building.

NH: Yes. There were other instances, too, when I was not pleased with the governor's recommendations. Of course, he made a lot of the financial crisis of the state when he took over. I think he has taken steps to solidify the state's financial situation and I give him a lot of credit for that. I certainly, by virtue of position and inclination, had to be critical of some of the recommendations the governor made. I remember, especially, when Jay Noren, from the other system, and Peter Hutchinson, who was superintendent of the Minneapolis school district, at the time—we had a joint press conference—said some things that were critical of the way the governor had recommended funding for education in general. He took extraordinary exception to that criticism. There were other instances where I went over to the legislature and expressed my displeasure with the governor's recommendation and did get feed back that this was not well received in the governor's office. Our relationship did not work too well. I tried to reconnect with the governor and we were not able to do that. He was extraordinarily interested in athletics, of course.

CAC: Yes.

NH: He attended events. When I met with him in the office, he was always sitting there in his gopher sweater.

CAC: He put it on for you, do you think or did he wear it all the time?

NH: He had it on all the time. He certainly has a strong affection and loyalty to the university. At the same time, he was very critical of the university and, I think, to some extent in legitimate ways because I've been very critical of some of our operations, too. I also think that he did not quite understand the dynamics of the university. It was not a satisfactory relationship. However, on a number of instances, especially when it came to facilities at the university, he was extremely helpful. The Basic Sciences building, the Carlson School . . . I would say that he probably saved full funding for both of those projects by being very tenacious in his support of those. There were two constituencies here that really had a strong effect on him: the old medical establishment and biomedical industry and, of course, the business community that was interested in strengthening the School of Management. Those were very important constituencies for the governor. He was very helpful in that regard.

CAC: One imagines that the Najarian affair didn't sit well with him.

NH: He was very critical of that. I heard that when Dr. Najarian had been acquitted by the jury that there was cheering and jubilation in the governor's office.

[End of Tape 6, Side 2]

[Tape 7, Side 1]

NH: Commitment to Focus had, of course, been very much in the public limelight. I, frankly, decided to try to lie low as far as making a new major plan for the university and to avoid sloganeering. I think I mentioned earlier, here, that when we did present a major reallocation plan in 1991, we simply called it "Restructuring and Reallocation," R&R. I think I also said that Pat convinced me that that was really so dull that people's eyes would glaze over and that's what we were hoping for, that we could go ahead and do all of those things and not really talk about it.

CAC: [laughter]

NH: There's an interesting interplay here between doing and talking about it. By 1993, there was just a strong clamoring for, where is the vision? Where is the plan for what the university is doing?

CAC: Clamor from what sources?

NH: From some board members, from some faculty leaders, and from people outside the university, too. That's when we presented University 2000. I think that one of the problems of University 2000—I think it was a good statement; I've gone back and reread it . . . we laid out some important issues—was that it wasn't new and striking enough. It seemed to be more of the same. This is what you're already doing. Yes, it was what we were already doing. We felt that we were on a track that was important. There were some new elements in University 2000. For example, what we intended as a major strengthening of what we called University College, taking Continuing Education and Extension and making sure that we had a truly effective way of providing educational opportunity through outreach from the university. We had a very strong program to build on. Hal Miller and his people, I think had done a very good job in providing Continuing Education opportunities. The more I, frankly, saw of what had been done already, the more impressed I was. There were new circumstances. Especially, we had to do deal with this issue of having set higher entrance requirements for the main degree-based undergraduate program. We had to provide additional opportunities for students who wanted to position themselves for being admitted into a degree program and not going through General College but coming through Continuing Education, being able to take courses and position themselves when they were not qualified for degree programs or wanted to explore before they committed themselves to the degree program. We needed to provide those opportunities. We also needed a whole variety of opportunities for continuing professional education, certificate programs, a whole spectrum. We needed to use telecommunications and other mechanisms. We had a sound foundation; but, I wanted to really stress that the university needed to tighten up as a scholarly organization with a high quality degree-based undergraduate education and also be a university in the community in a major way through a very effective distribution system. It, unfortunately, played itself out partly because we didn't word it right. It played itself out as if it was going to be two tiers: a quality university for certain students and, then, a second-rate university for others.

CAC: Oh, my.

NH: Especially the minority community became concerned that some minorities were going to be shucked into that other not so demanding university.

CAC: Why was that reading made?

NH: There were statements made by me and Jim Infante that could be taken that way because we coupled the discussion of University College and its clientele with the discussion of the fact that we were tightening entrance requirements for the undergraduate experience.

CAC: I see.

NH: The proposal led to some significant rethinking and University College has continued to develop. However, we adopted, over the last several years, also this decentralized financial management system that we call IMG, Incentives for Managed Growth, and that meant that

colleges started looking at Continuing Education courses as a major source of revenues. They were not willing to enter into the kind of revenue sharing that had existed with Continuing Education. What has happened is that colleges have more and more taken direct responsibility for their own Continuing Education courses and kind of a tension has developed with University College. We intended University College to be the distribution arm for those opportunities, working with the colleges even more intimately than had in the past and, then, to be responsible for things like the Twin Cities Educational Partnership, which is a special set of degree programs which are not directly college-based and, then, do a whole variety of non-credit instruction. I don't know quite how this is going to play itself out; but, that was a major part of University 2000, to strengthen the outreach in the Continuing Education function because the university is an important resource but also in order to off-load, to some extent, the core undergraduate experience that we were trying to refine and focus more clearly.

CAC: May I insert here what I've picked up and what I would know from my own experience? Incentive management in its bureaucratic aspects, its technical aspects, was a very difficult concept for many department chairs who are in office for three years or five or six years, to get them to understand how to negotiate that part of it.

NH: Yes.

CAC: My sense is that, at that level—the university is, after all, a great feudal empire—if you have chairs that don't know how to do this, it makes it very difficult. Is that a true perception?

NH: Absolutely and that was the point. Many units simply were not administratively capable or in the position to do these things. Continuing Education had a lot of experience and a lot of people were very good at marketing those opportunities. The problem, as I saw it, was that Continuing Education had been somewhat too far divorced, in some instances, from the academic home departments. You needed that intimate involvement of the departmental or collegiate faculty in quality control.

CAC: I think they could do that. They couldn't do that incentive management, the financial parts of it.

NH: No. So, there were some problems there. What had happened was that Continuing Education had become more of a free-standing enterprise with its own faculty and really divorced, to some extent, from the departments and we were trying to reconnect Continuing Education with the departments, while making Continuing Education as University College more effective, both with its own independent responsibilities and as a distribution system that the departments and colleges could tap into with appropriate quality control and revenue sharing with the colleges and departments. I think the jury is still out on to what extent we are accomplishing that or not. Tension, I think, has continued between the colleges and departments on the one hand and Continuing Education on the other.

CAC: Are there other comments you could make on this basic issue that I've raised here of the difficulty of administering this vast institution, sprawling in all these places? Finally, a lot of administration has to be at the local level, and these are transient officers, and they aren't trained or supervised or oriented sufficiently. I don't know how you manage that.

NH: Clarke, I think that's a critically important issue. We come out of a collegial tradition where, especially in the College of Liberal Arts, the chairs were elected for a three-year term. People, essentially out of a sense of responsibility, took their turn and they did not look upon themselves as managers of an instructional unit. They were not about to take some tough managerial stances, vis-à-vis their own faculty, because they were their friends and colleagues. I think that is maybe the strength of the department that you have a collegial environment; but, it's also the weakness, especially when you are in a situation where you truly have to be cost effective and you have to market your products. I hate that terminology but that's exactly what the university has to do. You have to provide instruction that caters to certain identified clienteles and you have to deploy your faculty members as effectively as you can in doing that. It's totally alien to this wonderful collegial environment that both you and I have enjoyed and grown up with.

CAC: You bet.

NH: We had a series of seminars that were facilitated by the Pew Foundation and I enlisted the university in the series of seminars. We discussed a variety of topics and this kept coming up over and over again. We actually wrote a white paper about the department as a basic organizational unit when it came to providing educational opportunity. Exactly, these issues were addressed there. Again, in different parts of the university, we have different cultures.

CAC: Of course.

NH: We have department heads who sometimes run the departments like feudal vassals. Then, we have the very collegial environment in CLA.

CAC: Or if the departments are large enough to have a good secretarial staff, then, there is, very often, a woman who is very experienced and knows her way around the university and that bureaucratic side can be resolved. Other departments don't have that benefit.

NH: I've been a department chair myself so I have wrestled with this predicament and the extraordinary time just spent on basic clerical tasks because you didn't have qualified personnel to do it. This is one reason why I have supported consolidation including my own department. When you have a department of five or six people, you can't afford the staff you need in order to run an effective organization and you have such a limited number of faculty members to draw on for the chairmanship, also, that it becomes onerous. That's why you need larger clusters, which can, then, be supported by professional administrative staff who can take care of all the

technical things—especially, with all the rules of personnel and budget that have been imposed on us.

CAC: Yes.

NH: It's become much more complicated than it was thirty or forty years ago.

CAC: And the constant fear of litigation.

NH: That's right. That's why I think, eventually, we need to have a system of professional administrators that are really departmental administrators by profession and are rewarded and hired to do that and are respected for doing that. Then, you have to have chairs that, at least, have some degree of autonomy from their own faculty so that they can make some of the tough decisions that need to be taken. Some chairs do. For example, in promotion and tenure, we get some tough decisions made at the department level, as well as at the college level and higher level.

CAC: But, then, you get sued.

NH: Yes, you get sued and there are lots of negative rewards for taking that kind of action. Clarke, it's a critical issue. Certainly, in the increasingly complicated distribution environment, it isn't just a matter of providing courses for undergraduates and graduate students in your own department but it's a matter of providing a variety of educational opportunities for a variety of constituencies. That's why we need an effective University College to help administer that under the intellectual supervision of the department.

CAC: So, University 2000 runs into that kind of a managerial problem?

NH: It runs into that and it tried to clarify those relationships. University 2000, then, reaffirmed an agenda of investment in research development. We identified, for example, Biomedical Engineering, which we had done already in 1991 in the restructuring and reallocation proposal, as an area for investment. We also targeted some other areas. CLA, believe it or not, was a recipient of several million dollars in additional permanent funding, even during those difficult retrenchment days, for building on the very strong social science departments that we have. Also, we gave \$1 million in new permanent funding for strengthening languages and literature. I think Steven Rosenstone is really building on that doing some recruitment. U-2000 had a lot of substance; but, it wasn't substance that was different from what we were already doing, to some extent.

CAC: I think this leads logically to some commentary on the university's judicial system at every level . . . the problem of federal regulation versus self-regulation and autonomy. We have commented on some aspects of the litigation burden; but, I think it's more than that. I think you do, too. That's a wandering commentary to invite you to speak to.

NH: Just a few comments. First of all, the courts have come to look upon the university's own judicial system very much as a level in the judicial process.

CAC: Ohhh.

NH: We get cases kicked back to the university if we have not gone through the internal procedure. I think that's positive because it strengthens the autonomy of the university, that, even in the medieval sense, we are jurisdictions of our own. Of course, it places a very heavy burden on the university, then, to have processes that are fair and transparent enough so that people will understand them and that will hold up in court.

CAC: The problem of finding competent persons who are willing to take membership on the judicial committee that has come to be known as just an overwhelming kind of burden?

NH: An incredible time commitment on the part of faculty members who sit on these panels.

CAC: Time and nerve.

NH: Yes. Of course, they take a good deal of unpleasantness as they step into the, sometimes, very complicated and contentious cases. This is where we've been wrestling with, to what extent do we rely on the faculty members themselves in the judicial process to run that process and to what extent do we have to provide legal counsel? We have, for the judicial committee, provided legal counsel that is independent of the general counsel of the university and that serves under the supervision of the chair of the judicial committee.

CAC: These are lawyers off campus?

NH: Lawyers from off campus. This is necessary, I believe, in order to deal with the procedural complexities. Where we get killed in court is that we have missed some step in our own processes and they have been so complicated that it is very hard for a lay person really to handle those things.

CAC: A lay person comes into a two- or three-year term on the judicial committee and they peel off.

NH: They barely begin to learn the basics before that term is up. We've had some unfortunate instances where there have been procedural mistakes that have really hurt us.

CAC: And procedural mistakes that have hurt individual members of the faculty.

NH: Justice hasn't been done, so to speak, because of the mistake, whether it's an injustice against an individual or it's an injustice against the university. It simply has not led to a good decision. Sometimes, the outcome may have been correct; but, nevertheless, the flaws have been

such that as it goes to the court, it leads to major costs, for one thing. The cost of litigation is just enormous.

CAC: And the unwritten cost of faculty time?

NH: Yes. I hope, Clarke, that the university can continue to have its own judicial system here because, I think, that's part of the autonomy of the university. Fortunately, the courts have been very reluctant, for example, to make their own tenure decisions. They usually will kick it back to the university if they get tenure disputes.

CAC: How about other aspects of that, that is, the problem of accountability to funding sources whether it's federal government or private foundations or whatever you have?

NH: Clarke, we've had, over the last few years, major efforts to streamline this judicial process and the grievance process. Mario Bognanno made a major contribution, when he was chair of the Consultative Committee, in helping streamline the grievance process. Of course, impinging on this process are the state and federal rules and regulations that have to do with Affirmative Action, that have to do with the management of research grants. We've had a major project in grants' management where Mark Brenner has been the leader, under Jim Infante, to tighten up the whole process, whereby we apply for federal grants, receive federal grants, manage the federal grants, and report back to the federal government on federal grants, including conflict of interest policies that are partly required by the government. There's been a lot of activity and the Vice-President for Research Mark Brenner and Anne Petersen, before him, worked very extensively in the development of processes and procedures that would be as little of an incumbrance to the faculty as possible and, at the same time, be effective in meeting the increasing demands for accountability, vis-à-vis the government. You have a very complex situation with the federal government. For example, different universities are under different accounting offices. Some universities report to a federal office in Chicago that is, I think, under Health and Human Services. Stanford, when they were in trouble, reported to the office of Naval Research. So, you get different accounting standards being imposed by different agencies of the federal government for the same activities in the university.

CAC: It strikes me that this might be one of your agendas that you will carry with you to Washington, D.C.?

NH: I think it may be because this is a major cost factor. Stanford was in such deep trouble over the indirect cost recovery. They spent, I heard, something like \$35 million in trying to deal with this issue in all of its aspects. In the end, they ended up owing the government \$1 million.

[break in the interview]

NH: We confronted a number of issues that had to do with grants' management and, again, the situation with the Surgery Department was the big issue that received publicity. It had to do, in

that case, with the extraordinary isolation of the Surgery Department and, frankly, their refusal to accept any accountability to the dean of the Medical School, to the Health Sciences vice-president, or to Central Administration. But, it also pointed out flaws in our own system because the university should not have allowed a system that gave the opportunity for that kind of isolation. This new system that we have now introduced will not allow that. Partly, it has to do with new information technology that makes financial information readily available to responsible officers throughout the university administration rather than being the private prerogative of departments. So, technology has had an effect; but, it also has been a major system and culture change to allow insight and oversight of financial management while decentralizing the management, not decentralizing the oversight and the controls on that management.

CAC: Under the reorganization, will this be done under whatever that office was? It kept changing its name . . . Research Patents, and so forth?

NH: In my time, it was called the Office of Research Administration.

CAC: I tried to trace out the number of names. They had fifteen different names over the last twenty-five years.

NH: Yes, it could have.

CAC: Is it that office that will assume . . . ?

NH: That office has been restructured. One of the problems we also had was that advocacy for research and creating incentives for certain types of collaborative research between the university and the private sector was coupled with a control function in the same office. Those were not compatible. My assessment of the office is that it did quite well in the promotional area and in assisting faculty members. The office was often highly regarded by the faculty members.

CAC: I think that's true.

NH: It turned out that under the pressures of the new accountability, the accountability aspect, the control function was not as effective as it should be and that's where we have, now, separated that function out. Mark Brenner and Jim Infante did a lot of work in making sure that that system would work and that we would have systematic education of researchers on grants' management so that they knew what their responsibilities were as well.

CAC: That's a problem that grew exponentially, I'm guessing, in the late 1980s and 1990s?

NH: Yes.

CAC: For all universities?

NH: It did. It really did.

CAC: It imposed a kind of procedure that, again, most faculty are not trained to think about.

NH: Clarke, I think it was an offshoot, to some extent, of the fact that the public and the political leaders started questioning the role of the universities in research. Ever since the Second World War with Vannevar Bush's famous report about the partnership between the federal government and universities in research, it's been taken for granted that that was a very constructive and productive relationship. All of a sudden, there were these questions about whether university research really was worth the price. I think that's what led to questioning, then, why do we charge eighty percent overhead on these research grants as some private universities did. What do those universities use this overhead money for? There was a whole new political environment that started impinging on the universities. Most universities—I think all universities—found themselves in the same pickle as Minnesota, that we had management systems that simply were not up to the new pressures that were placed on those systems.

CAC: This is very technical; but, again, I think we have to raise the issues and if people reading these materials, not only your interview but many others as well, want to carry that through, they've got to go and do research in other kinds of materials.

NH: We have extensive reports on this. Jim Infante and Mark Brenner are major sources on this particular issue. We made presentations to the Board of Regents on all of these issues.

CAC: All oral history can do is identify problems and suggest what some of the lines are and, then, a good scholar will just have to go to other materials.

NH: Yes. Clarke, the point I want to make is—I keep coming back to this point over and over again—culture change, that the external environment changes and the university has to try to respond to the external environment and, also, that the universities are coming out of a way of functioning that simply is not adequate to meet those new demands. It's nobody's fault. It's a change of the times.

CAC: Yes.

NH: It is change of major proportions. That's where we got caught. Much of the smoke and fire that came out of the university in the last few years had to do with our getting caught in old problems and trying to change ingrained systems, sometimes, against the vested interests. That's where you have the root causes really of the troubles, so to speak.

CAC: It changed quickly because the demands for accountability changed quickly.

NH: For the president, it was also this pressure, "Mr. President, why don't you change this thing tomorrow? At least, by Thursday, you ought to have done it."

CAC: Right.

NH: The medical practice plan took eight years to go from initiating the idea that we were going to change to consolidating into a single plan those thirty-four plans.

CAC: It's a long way from that simple village in Sweden to that environment, isn't it?

NH: It is.

CAC: [laughter] It's a long journey.

NH: Of course, with my training in Scandinavian languages and literature, I was well-prepared for all of this technical stuff.

CAC: [laughter]

NH: You learn a lot on the job.

CAC: Maybe the time has come in our conversation to reflect on those larger issues. Now, you're going on to another job which will involve many of these issues at a different level for a coalition of sixty-two different research universities. Reflecting on your eight and half years, your subjective perception, what were the real successes and what were the shortcomings? Much of it is implied in what we've talked about for these days.

NH: It's only eight and a half months since I left office. I think I will still understand better, as time goes on, what actually transpired. I certainly have some general impressions. Of course, you also go by feedback that you receive from others.

I think one of the major tasks when I became president was simply convincing the public and the legislative leaders that the university was not going down in flames, that while there had been this flare up of problems at the university, the university was basically a very sound, and healthy, and strong institution. That's one reason I travelled around the state. I think that my administration made some contribution, in the early years especially, in kind of restoring that sense of proportion, that while the university is wrestling with a number of problems here, it's still doing a lot of good research, and teaching, and outreach. It's a sound and solid organization.

CAC: You carried the flag many places. How was that done logistically? Who made the invitations for you to speak in Mankato or Hibbing or wherever?

NH: I accepted invitations that came from around the state. I was very proactive because it seemed necessary to get out on the hustings and I was certainly told that by everybody. Kathleen O'Brien, who became my first chief of staff, was very effective in scheduling those kinds of events around the state. That was one of her major responsibilities. Since she had worked for

the Historical Society and was familiar with communities almost wherever we went and knew people in those communities, she was very well-suited for the task of establishing those community visits.

CAC: Under whose auspices did you speak then and what variety of venues?

NH: The normal pattern was that I would meet with representatives of the Extension Service, maybe for breakfast or for a longer morning session. The university, of course, has its own Extension personnel in every one of the eighty-seven counties; so, I met with those people. They reported on their work and what was going on in their communities and I had an opportunity to develop a great deal of admiration for the work of the Extension service and the kind of grassroots connection that the university has with the communities through them. Then, I would normally be on the local radio and television. Then, I may have a luncheon speech to the Rotary Club or the Kiwanis Club or an alumni group or just a general audience.

CAC: Were there many active alumni groups within the state of Minnesota?

NH: There are a few and we have established a few more. As a matter of fact, a major development in the Alumni Association has been the establishment of more state chapters, and national chapters, and also international chapters. I visited our chapters in Jakarta and Bangkok, in Tokyo—Vice-President [Walter] Mondale and Mrs. Mondale had a wonderful reception for Japanese alumni, three hundred of them, at the ambassador's house— . . .

CAC: Good grief!

NH: . . . in Taipei, in Beijing, in Chian, in Seoul. We have some outstanding business leaders who are presidents of our alumni chapters in those places, quite an interesting constituency that we've kind of opened up to in the last few years.

CAC: Gerry [Gerald] Fischer was influential in opening that up, I would assume?

NH: Gerry Fischer and Margaret Carlson through the Alumni Association were very important in that. The chapters were under the Alumni Association so Margaret Carlson and her staff were the ones who interacted with the alumni chapters.

CAC: That was a task you had to take on immediately when you came?

NH: Yes. I, frankly, enjoyed that very much. We had, usually, a very good reception and we got written up in the newspapers and reported on television so the university was out there. Rick Heydinger instituted the program called the University in the Community, which brought professionals, especially in social work and other related fields, to communities to interact with their co-professionals. Those sessions were well received. Rick also tried to arrange, with mixed success, bus trips for new faculty members around the state to show them the state. I think that

was an excellent program; but, unfortunately, the arriving faculty were just too overwhelmed by all the things they had to do to participate. A two- or three-day trip around the state for every new faculty member is something I would fervently dream of because that opens your eyes to what Minnesota is really about.

CAC: Right.

NH: Secondly, I think my administration contributed in building on Commitment to Focus by actually going out and starting to do some of the very hard things that had to be done in order to focus and to say, "Focus," is very simple. To actually curtail activities is extremely difficult because we've been in the mode for umpteen years of incremental programming. We have rarely discontinued anything. To start that pruning process, which we did . . . there were two hundred and thirty-four faculty members, over a five-year period, that we did not fill where they were. They were moved.

CAC: When they went elsewhere or retired, the position would go to another place?

NH: That's right. Almost a third of the vacancies that occurred were not filled where they occurred.

CAC: Were they filled within the particular college?

NH: They were filled in other areas, whether they would be within the college or elsewhere, I can't tell you. They were not filled where they occurred and usually not in the same department. We reallocated some \$132 million, which is about twenty-five percent of the state appropriated dollars, the state funding that we received. There was a major move of faculty and resources within the university. Of course, we closed a campus. We consolidated and closed departments and centers. But, the most important restructuring was still inside colleges and inside departments where people were hired in new specialities and there was a general evaluation of the programmatic thrust. I think that was an important step and I hope that this will continue. Of course, the financial crisis of the state, and to some extent the federal government, helped spur that development. I'm concerned that maybe we can't sustain the crisis enough to really sustain that kind of change agenda.

CAC: Now, that the state is in the black and so is the federal government?

NH: Yes.

A third thing that I think we did with some success was to pick up on the Spencer Commission's report that came out in 1988, the governor's blue ribbon commission, on the financial management of the university. We have made some radical changes, not only in the basic financial management and the computerization of financial management but in the financial management culture within the university. It's only a beginning and it has to be sustained and

continued if the university is going to stay out of the kind of problems that we have encountered. We were spurred on in that reform movement by real and perceived scandals that appeared, where sometimes things have been festering for years and skeletons came dropping out of closets with a, sometimes, frightening intensity. Then, the undergraduate initiative, I think, was very important and was part of that focusing. That's a specific example of focusing and probably the most important one we had. The reform of the Academic Health Center, which was a grueling and important task, was something that was done.

What did we not get done? In all of these instances, we really just began things. Things have to be sustained because the changes that were initiated are not carried out overnight. For example, in personnel management with the so-called Denny Committee that took a comprehensive view, with the help of some strong community people, of all our personnel philosophies, policies, practices, and so forth, that has just begun focusing on the training of supervisors and simplifying the recruitment process. For example, Carol Carrier did a very fine job here initiating seminars for new department heads and chairs coming in. I met with those chairs as they were going through a whole series of sessions on what it meant to be a department head and a department chair. Carol, by the way, has been a real innovator in personnel and with the support now of the Denny Committee's report, she is leading an effort to make some additional changes in the personnel system. As I said, these things were beginnings and they have to be sustained.

CAC: Every year, because you have a new cadre of chairs and heads coming in.

NH: Yes.

CAC: And others are leaving.

NH: Clarke, I feel that I did not accomplish and we did not accomplish what we should have with University 2000. It did not become the kind of vision and driving agenda for the university that it should have become. We probably didn't approach it right or there was too much that was already being done that was incorporated into it. Maybe we didn't engage constituencies effectively enough in the discussion. This idea . . . what is the vision of the university kind of kept hovering there. To some extent, that may have had to do with my deliberate decision early in my presidency not to do a lot of talking and visioning but to try to implement what was already there because there was so much. We'd been positioned to do so much and we hadn't been able to do it. I felt that we needed to go and do these things, try to do these things, and not start talking again about major visions. That, clearly, was a lack and I did not engage the faculty and other constituencies effectively enough—in spite of the fact that we had sixty-eight stakeholder meetings around the state formulating University 2000.

CAC: Who are these stakeholders? How were they identified?

NH: We looked at constituencies and we said, "We need to meet with the strong representatives of the agricultural constituency, both production agriculture and agri-business. We need to meet with constituencies from the high-tech community, like the High-Tech Council. We need to meet with representatives of the arts community. We need to meet with representatives in western Minnesota, southern Minnesota, northern Minnesota." Eventually, it turned into sixty-eight groups. As a matter of fact, there's a master's thesis that has been written by Dick Hemmingsen about this process and evaluating it; so, anybody who is interested in the details . . .

CAC: Do these sixty-eight groups still exist?

NH: The approach we used was that we went out and we raised certain very basic questions. We did not come with a very detailed agenda. We let them set the agenda. Then, we had a careful recording of what they raised and suggestions they made. Then, we wrote a report and sent a report back to them and said, "This is what we heard. This is what we are going to do in response."

CAC: There are sixty-eight groups?

NH: Yes.

CAC: That's staggering.

NH: I didn't go to all of them but I went to a number of them.

[End of Tape 7, Side 1]

[Tape 7, Side 2]

CAC: I've not heard, in other interviews, of that particular form of outreach. It does raise a question that arises in my mind from a large number—as I've said before, 120 or 130—of conversations and a frequently expressed concern of how to preserve and extend and make relevant many of the basic disciplines in the humanities and the arts and, in some cases, the social sciences. Over the past ten years, not only of your administration but really since the mid 1970s, so much of the effort, apparently, goes into strengthening of parts of the university that do have a constituency or this group concern. When one looked at the endowed chairs that were raised in the mid 1980s with Lilly and Keller, for example—I think there were 118 or 120 and more were added subsequently—they went disproportionately, I have heard, to the Health Sciences, Applied Engineering, Law, Management, High-Tech, Agriculture, and so forth. Relatively few of them—I know there were some; both Keller and you made efforts to go along that line—went to Classics or to Literature and Language, to Philosophy, to History, and so forth, which many people from the faculty perceive of as the heart of the university: the basic sciences,

the basic arts, the basic humanities, the basic social sciences. I've heard it so often that it must be a serious problem?

NH: It is a problem. The university, both under Keller and me, allocated disproportionately the matching funds to those under-funded areas, to the arts and sciences really. Fund raising has to do with donor interest and you have to match university aspirations with donor interest. Law, business, medicine, agriculture have natural strong constituencies and wealthy constituencies that can make those contributions. It is a problem. That's where you have to, then, compensate with the kind of resources that are under the control of the university. We did that by disproportionately giving matching funds to areas that had difficulty raising private money. Sometimes, that incentive was enough to get it done but sometimes it failed. Even with a very substantial matching opportunity, it was not possible to get the funding.

CAC: I don't know Classics and History are able to attract that kind of money for a match. The university may put it up, as you're suggesting, as you and Keller did; but, then, to try to find donors outside who are interested in history or the classics . . .

NH: History, for example, was fortunate enough to be able to attract an endowment for history scholarships. Your graduates go on to Law School or they go on to all kinds of opportunities and they, sometimes, will have a stronger affiliation to their actual professional school background than they do to their general college background.

CAC: Absolutely.

NH: That continues to be a problem. When it comes to the coordinate campuses, the problem is very difficult.

CAC: More severe.

NH: They tend not to be connected with the business community in the Twin Cities, which is such a major contributor, either. They have been disproportionately lacking such endowed chairs; but, we tried to correct it. Then, we tried through the internal reallocation process to put money into those areas, like CLA, for example, and CLA, with the arts and sciences, did get a disproportionate amount of the reallocated money that we had available to try to compensate for that. Obviously, under this Incentives for Managed Growth, under the decentralized financing system, you have to use the state funding to ensure that units can carry out their mission. That means that the arts and sciences are likely to get a much greater state subsidy than the Law School or the Medical School or other areas where they have much better opportunities to acquire other kinds of funding. There are even public universities that have suggested putting their law schools entirely on non-state funding and just rely on alumni contributions and tuition. This, of course, raises tuition issues.

CAC: Oh, my, yes.

NH: How do you structure tuition in such a way that it becomes a major resource? We have tended towards not wanting to differentiate tuition too much because we don't want to skew recruitment into different fields by tuition rates. We want students to select the fields because they're interested in them rather than because it's cheaper to go to one type of program than another. That is one of the problems with academic capitalism, that the opportunities to generate non-state funds vary greatly from unit to unit.

CAC: Many persons looked, for example, at the ease with which money could be raised for the new building of management, right on the West Bank, and the terrible difficulties we had for basic research, and the archives, and the library materials.

NH: Yes, absolutely. That is a fact of life and you have to, then, try to off-load the need for state funding by using the opportunities. There was \$20 million available because we got \$20 million in private money for the School of Management. That was \$20 million that we didn't have to ask the legislature for.

CAC: [laughter]

NH: And we could get the archives funded. It plays itself out that particular way or, at least, you try to get it to play itself out that way.

CAC: I was reading some of these essays in the Daedalus issue that I went to for the fall of 1997. It's clear that that's just an issue all across the country, trying to find ways, imaginatively, to maintain the effective strength of these departments, these disciplines, that don't have that kind of sex appeal with the constituency.

NH: For example, the Institute of Technology, now, is launching a whole series of practitioner oriented master's degrees. We expect those not only to pay for themselves but to be money makers, that they will cater to industrial and business clientele, where, usually, the companies will pay a fairly high tuition rate for these high quality opportunities for their personnel to get a master's degree in these various disciplines that are very marketable. I think that's something that the university has to try to do, while, at the same time, making sure that it doesn't become a big tail that wags the whole intellectual dog.

CAC: That is a national problem and it's an issue that has accelerated—you know that—the last twenty years.

NH: Yes, it has and it's happening not only in this country but in Canada, Australia, Great Britain, Sweden, too.

Clarke, my vision of the university of the future is to preserve the notion of intellectual community, scholarly community, and have faculty members representing a variety of disciplines, free to interact in new, important inter-disciplinary ways, creating a very stimulating intellectual

environment. There was an interesting study of who wins Nobel Prizes. They found that one factor was that the Nobel Prize winners tended to have been in inter-disciplinary environments where they were challenged by colleagues.

CAC: Ahhh.

NH: They were not living in their own disciplinary cells but they were involved with colleagues from neighboring disciplines and that this cross-fertilization, maybe, gave them that very special edge that led to a Nobel Prize. That's why I think that we need a scholarly community that provides that opportunity for cross-fertilization. Then, I want clustered around that scholarly community of outstanding faculty in these various disciplines and interdisciplinary efforts, graduate students and a sophisticated environment for undergraduates to participate in the intellectual excitement created by that scholarly community.

CAC: Right.

NH: Then, I want a very effective distribution system that can draw on all kinds of personnel, technology, and marketing opportunities to spin off solid, intellectual products for a broad set of constituencies that can benefit from that in technology transfer, in general knowledge transfer, in continuing professional education, and in general enriching liberal education for senior citizens like us and others.

CAC: [laughter]

NH: That's my vision of the university for the future.

CAC: That's such an eloquent statement. I'm very tempted to say, "Let's stop and not talk about anything else." But, I've got one final area that you may want to comment on—we've talked about it between the two of us—that is, the state of Minnesota and the University of Minnesota as a particular institution. Of course, it reflects other research universities and Land-Grant universities; but, there's something special at Minnesota, in the state, in the region, but also in the institution itself. That might be a better place for us to end our reflections.

NH: Clarke, I consider myself, in spite of the trials and tribulations that I have gone through, extraordinarily fortunate to have come to the University of Minnesota and have been allowed to be, for a brief period, the president of that magnificent university. It gave me a deepened feeling and a real love for the state of Minnesota and the University of Minnesota. Now, what is it that is peculiar about that culture? Many things it does have in common with others and, of course, I have worked at two major Land-Grant universities: the University of Arizona and the University of Minnesota. On balance, I'm probably more struck by the similarities and the commonalities between those two universities than I am by differences. Of course, the strength is this relationship and, in many instances, a productive relationship between research, basic research as well as research with application—those distinctions are very tricky to actually

make—and education, and service to society. I think where Minnesota, in my book at least, is unique is that it has an even stronger relationship with its surrounding community and its state than any other university that I know. That's a wonderful asset. I was able to draw, in my presidency, on the generosity of these over 60,000 people who give money to the university every year and have really put the University of Minnesota in the forefront nationally in terms of giving and it goes on and on. The Minnesota Campaign started us in a major way; but, it continued and it escalated. We went from one hundred endowed professorships after that campaign to two hundred and forty. It's a dynamic that is continuing. I have great hopes for this \$1 billion campaign for 2001. That's a very positive thing. The expertise that you can bring to bear through individuals like Win Wallin, Chuck Denny, and others, who may be very critical of the university and the way we operate but, nevertheless, are willing to step in and help. Sometimes, that's complicated because you can open a little bit of a Pandora's box when you invite them right into your family because they are critical. Sometimes, they may have views of how the university should be run that are not quite compatible with your views.

CAC: I hear you saying that the same thing would not happen to the same degree and the same extent at other universities?

NH: I did not see it happening that way at Arizona.

CAC: Or in your conversations with other Big Ten presidents?

NH: I don't see quite that intensity of involvement. The negative is that everybody owns the University of Minnesota and everybody takes a keen interest in everything that goes on at the university. There's this almost love/hate relationship where they love to beat up on the university because, by golly, it's their university and if it isn't doing right by them, they are going to let us know. Maybe it's not totally different but the intensity of both the positive and the ownership relationship . . .

CAC: A matter of degree.

NH: That means also that you're really in a glass bowl. I had difficulty, frankly, adjusting—this may sound strange—to how important I was.

CAC: Ah.

NH: I had to get used to the fact that when I walked into the legislature or I appeared in a community in Minnesota that I was the University of Minnesota. I wasn't Nils Hasselmo. I was the president of the University of Minnesota. That institution was of such central concern to everybody that by reflected glory, I became an 800 pound gorilla.

CAC: Let me interpose. Someone—I don't remember who it was—remembers your staying for the last session of the state legislature, which ran into the night before they adjourned for the

session, and you were there in the lobby to shake hands with legislators and thank them for their support. It was said, "That made an enormous impact." Again, a symbolic act of being there with those people, with that constituency.

NH: Clarke, I consider that quite natural that I should do that; but, I was surprised myself by the impact. Of course, sometimes, it happened that way, too, when I walked into the legislature and I said something critical about the governor, then, I was surprised also at how that could reverberate back to me. What I said, I spoke on behalf of the University of Minnesota. I had a little bit of difficulty adjusting to that kind of environment.

Of course, my Scandinavian co-patriots think that somehow Minnesota is influenced deeply by the arrival of the Scandinavians. I must admit that there is a familiarity both positive and negative in the Minnesota culture that, at least, is similar to Scandinavia. Whether it was caused by the influx of Scandinavian immigrants, I don't know. That's, of course, something that is extremely difficult to sort out. One of those things is a sense of community and social responsibility. Scandinavia has functioned—it has nothing to do with socialism, in recent years—as these integrated, almost extended-family communities for a thousand years. Participating in the civic activity of the community was something you did. It wasn't a choice on your part; you just did that. You were family.

CAC: The current population of Sweden is what?

NH: It's 8.5 million.

CAC: And Norway?

NH: About 5.5 million.

CAC: The population of the state of Minnesota is around five million?

NH: It's 4.5 million, isn't it, now? Minnesota could be a fourth, or fifth, or sixth Scandinavian country in a way. I don't know whether there is a causal relationship here but certainly there's a familiarity.

CAC: An expectation of civic engagement?

NH: Yes. Now, on the negative side, I also find in Minnesota something you find in Scandinavia and that's, don't let anybody kind of stick up above the average here. If anybody sticks up a little bit, then, the temptation is just to put them down to size. Who does he think he is? Who does she think she is? A kind of aversion to pretentiousness that is important but also a little bit of maybe suspicion and envy of success and a great suspicion against ostentatiousness and pretentiousness and there are both positives and negatives in that. I think that Minnesota populism may have an element in common with Scandinavian populism because

those societies have tended to be quite egalitarian and flat societies, over many years. There was never this feudal system with a strict layering. It may have happened around Stockholm and Copenhagen but it did not pervade much of Scandinavia. So, there is this intriguing speculation among Scandinavians about this possible influence; although, there are as many Germans in Minnesota as Scandinavians taken together.

CAC: More, I think.

NH: One shouldn't exaggerate this. The Scandinavians have tended to be unusually visible in Minnesota politics for some reason. I think we've had very few governors who haven't been Swedes and very few senators who haven't been Norwegian. [laughter]

CAC: [laughter]

NH: Although, it's been changing in recent years.

CAC: Does this bear on *Minnesota nice* or is that just a distraction?

NH: *Minnesota nice* is just a cover term for some of these attitudes. It's a characterization of being kind of calm and pleasant on the surface; but, it can also mean that you hide your real emotions and that there may be strong resentments boiling under the surface when people are nice. They have this saying in Scandinavia that Scandinavians go to meetings and as they sit in these meetings, they don't say anything but they have very rich inner lives.

CAC: [laughter]

NH: I think *Minnesota nice*, for people who come from the outside . . . minority people have told me that when they moved to Minnesota, they became almost resentful because they met this what they considered superficial friendliness and niceness but you just did not penetrate into those circles. You just did not get behind the surface and that *Minnesota nice* could be even vicious in some of its manifestations of exclusion and narrow-mindedness and fear of xenophobia, the fear of the foreign and strange. It's a mixed bag but, to me, it's overwhelmingly positive and somewhat Scandinavian in its character.

CAC: The university as an institution . . . does it because of this environment have a different history and a different culture, if not in kind, at least in degree?

NH: The University of Minnesota seems to me on the positive side to have benefitted greatly from the loyalty of Minnesotans to that university. So many of our distinguished scholars are Minnesotans who went away and got their education elsewhere and, then, came back and served as faculty members at the University of Minnesota. Some of them came through the university itself and stayed. I haven't looked at statistics but we may have a disproportionate number of outstanding faculty members who are native Minnesotans and who are there almost of a sense

of loyalty to the state and certainly a strong sense of belonging in the state of Minnesota. I think of you and I think of your daughter [Sarah], who is just returning, to the University of Minnesota.

CAC: Yes.

NH: I think of Bob Holt, John Adams. There are just endless examples of people who have come out of the grassroots of Minnesota and have become very distinguished in their fields but have stayed, sometimes, out of sheer loyalty to the University of Minnesota because they could have gone anywhere in the country. I'm thinking of Will[ard] Hartup, for example, who got his degree at Harvard and came right back to Minnesota, a regents professor. He's a distinguished scholar. He could have gone anywhere. There are just endless numbers of people like that. That's a very positive thing about the University of Minnesota. The negative is that we tend a little bit towards inbreeding and, sometimes, maybe in administration, too, we've had kind of an inbred bureaucracy that has been there and, sometimes, been an obstacle to change. I tried to change that by recruiting systematically some people who came from elsewhere because I felt that we need a different perspective here. We've got to break out of being too myopic and too happy with the way we are doing things. I did that by hiring people as Finance vice-presidents who were not from the academic environment, Gus Donhowe, Bob Erickson, Joanne Jackson. That's the area where I felt that we needed a fresh perspective especially. But, I also hired Anne Petersen, for example, who came from Penn State, and Anne Hopkins, who came from the University of Tennessee. They did bring a fresh perspective. They could say, "This is the way we did it at Tennessee." "This is the way we did it at Penn State." Anne [Petersen] spearheaded an effort to go to other universities to kind of benchmark and see, how are they doing what we are trying to do here?" She wrote some interesting reports about that.

CAC: Maybe, Nils, you and I should have another conversation on tape in two years, after you've had the experience of the AAU . . .

NH: Yes.

CAC: . . . where you will see in deeper detail this comparative concern?

NH: Yes. To me, Clarke, to take on this job at AAU, which I'm sure is going to have its problems, too . . . For one thing, AAU is finally trying to come to grips with its membership issue of explicitly defining its membership and that's going to cause an uproar. Some institutions simply are not qualified to be members of AAU under any reasonable set of criteria.

CAC: Who are currently members?

NH: Yes, who are currently members and who were founding members.

CAC: And a lot of members outside who are not members?

NH: A dozen universities are sitting out there that probably should be members of the AAU. There will be some strife there, too. To me, by far the most stimulating intellectual environment I have ever encountered is the American Research University and, frankly, in its Land-Grant manifestation because of the connectivity with society. That is an incredibly rich intellectual environment with opportunities also to have intellectual activity that is not narcissistic and ivory tower but that reaches into every corner of the state.

CAC: And that defines the University of Minnesota.

NH: That defines the University of Minnesota. That's if not unique, at least it is very special for the university.

[break in the interview]

CAC: Part of this richness—we were just talking off tape for a moment—is the outreach not only of the sciences, and technologies, and medicine, and so forth but the arts.

NH: Clarke, I have been very impressed by the way the faculty of the University of Minnesota connect with so many parts of society in Minnesota. As a matter of fact, I have never been able to find one aspect of life in Minnesota that has not been profoundly influenced by the university and its faculty, not the university necessarily as an institution but by individual faculty members who, as individuals, with the kind of professional competence and perspective they have, have contributed in major ways. It's important when we talk about outreach that we do not think only of technology transfer, important as it is with the strong high-tech industry in Minnesota, agriculture or business, providing opportunities for education for budding businessmen, but that we think about the arts. I've been delighted by—I can't think of a better example of the university fulfilling its Land-Grant mission—Vern Sutton's Opera on the Farm program. I had the wonderful pleasure of participating with Vernon . . .

CAC: Oh, you did? Wonderful.

NH: . . . on some of those events. I was so impressed and enthusiastic by what they were able to do, faculty and students who were going out into these communities, bringing their professional, artistic competence there, working with the church choirs to participate in the performance of Aaron Copland's *Tender Land* and, then, [Gaetano] Donizetti's *Elixir of Love*, both of which take place on farms—in Italy, in one case. [laughter]

CAC: [laughter]

NH: The role of Beth, the young girl, in *Tender Land*, was played by a local Beth in every community.

CAC: Ahhh.

NH: I visited these communities and I saw some of the performances. In one of them, there were 4,000 people lined up on bleachers around this farmyard watching opera. We had a reception afterwards at Eastcliff for the key collaborators in the various communities and the faculty and students from the School of Music. We had never had such a joyous reunion. After working together for a few weeks, they were just bosom friends. Not only was it that the community people were so enthusiastic and appreciative of the fact that the university, through its School of Music, came to their community but the faculty and the students were, I think, greatly inspired by the fact that their art had this audience response at the grassroots level. This was not an audience that was overfed with opera and concerts and theater. This was an audience that was hungering for the real arts. The School of Music and Vern Sutton did it. Then, when I heard that Vern—in return for the services provided by one farm family out in western Minnesota—had gone out and participated in the haying on that farm for a week . . .

CAC: [laughter]

NH: . . . I thought they really had gone the extra mile. I was very glad that I could give him the President's Award that I instituted for unheralded service.

CAC: Right.

NH: Vern certainly deserved that. That's the Land-Grant mission at work.

CAC: Do you know why Vern came to Minnesota? Because he knew down in Texas, where he was in a small college, that the tradition of choral music was all throughout this state. It just wasn't in some elite institution but there were those choral groups all over and he wanted to come and sing.

NH: Yes.

CAC: Minnesota's reputation went down river to Texas.

NH: Yes. I think it was *Good Morning America* or some national television program that had a program segment about Opera on the Farm. I got calls from friends on the east coast who said, "Nils, this is the most wonderful thing I've heard in a long time."

CAC: It was great.

NH: That's the University of Minnesota.

CAC: That's a good point to end on.

[End of Tape 7, Side 2]

[End of the Interview]

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