

Interview with Mario Bognanno

**Interviewed by Professor Clarke A. Chambers
University of Minnesota**

**Interviewed on August 26, 1997
University of Minnesota Campus**

Mario Bognanno - MB
Clarke A. Chambers - CAC

CAC: This is Clarke Chambers. I'm picking up the oral history project. I stopped doing tapes about a year and a half ago; though, I've been doing lots of editing and transcribing of tapes. This is the third phase of the program and it's concerned with picking up the last eight, ten years, the years that Mr. [Nils] Hasselmo was president of the University of Minnesota. I'm interviewing Mario Bognanno, known affectionately to all of us as Mike Bognanno, who was chief of staff. We'll talk about that. That was a new position, a new definition.

M: Right.

CAC: It is August 26, 1997, and the interview is being conducted in my office in the Social Science Tower, Room 1152.

Mike, we won't spend a lot of time on your autobiography; but, I think it's important for listeners down the line to know what your educational background was, how you got into industrial relations, and, then, was this dispute resolution a new thing in your career or was that there when you started in the Graduate School?

M: No, it's new. It's post-Graduate School.

CAC: Let's do that and, then, that leads us logically into your career.

NB: Sir, the autobiography in brief is that I did my undergraduate work, Clarke, in two parts. The first two years of my undergraduate studies were done at Loras College in Dubuque, Iowa, which in those days was about a 600, 700 person school. Today, I think it has 2,000

undergraduates. It's a small liberal arts school about a hundred years old or so. I did two years there and then transferred to Georgetown University. I did a sophomore, junior, and senior year at Georgetown in the School of Foreign Service.

CAC: Ah.

MB: I graduated from Foreign Service School.

CAC: That's why you went there?

MB: I worked for a congressman.

CAC: Good grief. From Iowa?

MB: From Iowa . . . Neil Smith, Fifth District of Iowa. I was on his patronage in my pre-twenty-one years. I worked in the House of Representative folding room, which is the mail room. I worked for Fishbait Miller as a doorkeeper.

CAC: Who is Fishbait Miller?

MB: Don't you remember Fishbait Miller?

CAC: No.

MB: Fishbait Miller—this was now during the 1950s—was the fellow who sort of organized the agenda and use of the House of Representatives. He was the chief of staff, if you will, of the speaker of the house.

CAC: Was it *fish or cut bait*?

MB: He worked for Sam Rayburn. I can recall as an undergraduate seating Jacqueline Kennedy and a number of her folks in the diplomatic gallery on an occasion when [President Charles] De Gaulle addressed a joint session of the House and the Senate. This had to be in 1961 or 1962, something like that; it was awhile ago. Then, when I turned twenty-one, I became a member of the United States Capitol Police Force and I was a police officer for a couple of years.

CAC: Mike, you have a checkered career.

MB: Oh, it's awful. My wife and I were married as undergraduates at Georgetown, had a baby, and, then, from there moved to the University of Iowa, where I got my Ph.D. in economics.

CAC: So, the Foreign Service thing last. You knew by that time you didn't want to become a diplomat?

MB: No. What happened, Clarke, is as I turned twenty-one, I discovered that I had a congenital disease called keratoconus and I was losing my vision in both eyes.

CAC: Oh, boy.

MB: You may remember a few years ago that I used to wear those coke bottles spectacles.

CAC: Yes.

MB: This was pre-corneal transplant time; so, I was in trouble physically. We had been accepted to Johns Hopkins University's masters in foreign affairs program and I was scheduled to go to Bologna. Peggy got pregnant with number two. Somebody at the Hopkins private eye clinic diagnosed my case as keratoconus, predicted blindness as being imminent, and suggested that the University of Iowa's ophthalmology program was the place to head. So, we went to Iowa.

CAC: You chose Iowa because of an eye doctor?

MB: Because of an eye doctor.

CAC: Wow.

MB: They had a fantastic ophthalmology department . . . a fellow by the name of Dr. Eldon Brailey developed the suture for [unclear] transplants, the solution that the donor's eye was stored in, and so forth.

CAC: Good heavens.

MB: This guy was unbelievable. He even put together the ham radio connection with the highway department to bring the donor's eye from the funeral home or from the hospital to the University of Iowa hospital.

CAC: His therapy for you was good enough to arrest this disease?

MB: I was under his care for a number of years. We were at Iowa for seven years between 1962 and 1970. After getting my Ph.D., I was on the faculty at Iowa in the Economics Department in 1969 and 1970. Then, I came here to the University of Minnesota in 1970. I had cornea transplants in 1968 and 1969, one in each eye . . . really a rare procedure.

CAC: It worked.

MB: It worked and, now, what you see is a man who just has finished his second round of bilateral cornea transplants.

CAC: Good grief. [gasp]

MB: I had one three years ago and I did this one six months ago in my right eye. I have fifteen sutures in this eye right now . . .

CAC: Right now.

MB: . . . holding it in. I see you with great clarity through my sutures. [laughter]

CAC: I won't hit you in the jaw so it will be all right and you won't get a jar from me.

MB: As a doctoral student, my Ph.D. work was actually in money and banking. Economic development was a first love and, then, money and banking. Then, from there, I went into human resources and human capital analysis, health economics, this type of thing.

CAC: I see.

MB: I was recruited here by George Seltzer, and [C.] Art Williams, and Herb Heneman.

CAC: That was a good team.

MB: A good team . . . Jim Simler at the time, too. I came up here to really teach labor economics and, in the process, discovered that you couldn't last long in a Department of Industrial Relations without knowing something about labor relations, a topic of which I knew nothing. I'd never taken a course in it. Basically, my students suffered as I learned for about the first three or four years.

CAC: That's the best teaching when you're on the cutting edge of learning yourself.

MB: That's right. It was great teaching really. I became interested first in conflict theory.

CAC: Was that new, at that time, in the early 1970s?

MB: It was fairly new. Yes, it was very new.

CAC: Where did that come from?

MB: Yale.

CAC: What does that mean? What sparked it? It seems to me that conflict resolution would have been around in labor for a long time.

MB: It was at an institutional level. At an analytical level, it was new. It came out of the world war. There were people at Yale University doing a lot of work on it: Ken Boulding, who, I think, in the early 1960s was at the University of Colorado and a number of folks of this type. The institutional aspects of conflict resolution, the laws governing it, the methods, the schedule and so forth . . . that was harder to learn actually than the analytical aspects of it. It wasn't really until 1973, when I first became director of the IR [Industrial Relations] Center that I became a neutral labor arbitrator.

CAC: You practice outside the university?

MB: I practice outside the university. Presently, for example, I am the umpire for Alcoa Corporation United Steel Workers of America. What that implies is that I go to their various sites around the United States two days a month and I hear their disputes and, then, I convene an executive board, a union-wing person and a management-wing person. We hand down majority decisions that are binding on the company and on the union. I've done that for twenty some years. I teach it. It's very enjoyable. I also use some of this experience. I am the author of the University of Minnesota's new All-University Grievance Policy.

CAC: We'll come to that later. This background led logically in that direction.

MB: I did that and, of course, if you're a neutral in anything, you get used to sort of walking on egg shells.

CAC: [laughter]

MB: That made me a natural for this chief of staff position with Hasselmo. [laughter]

CAC: I'm going to delay coming to the chief of staff just a moment because you mention C. Arthur Williams, Herb Heneman, and George Seltzer. I can't imagine three more different, even contradictory, persons than those three.

MB: Right.

CAC: You come into this. Say something about Industrial Relations when you come into it at the University of Minnesota.

MB: To be quite honest, I knew very little about the field. I had heard of the University of Minnesota's Industrial Relations program; but, I was really sort of a pure economist and not applied at the institutional level. I was estimating labor supply functions and this type of thing as a graduate student. When I arrived, I discovered that this program at the University of Minnesota was one of the oldest in the country. It was actually established in 1945. It is today, I think, the largest graduate program in Industrial Relations. There are 275 graduate students

...

CAC: Heavens. [whistle]

MB: . . . in IR, in our day and our evening program and our doctoral program. Behind the MBA program, it's the second largest program in the Graduate School here at the University of Minnesota.

CAC: Those three fellows had helped establish it?

MB: The real builders were Lloyd Lofquist . . . do you remember Lloyd?

CAC: Oh, heavens, yes. I have an interview with him.

MB: You did?

CAC: Yes.

MB: It was Lloyd . . . and who preceded Herb [Heneman] as director? He went to Stanford and was sort of an economist, statistician type who was in the Business School. [Reference here is to Dale Yoder.] What happened was that the program was sort of a coming together of Economics and Psychology with Lofquist and this predecessor to Heneman. They put the program together. The faculty has always drawn across departments. It's always been interdisciplinary for the last fifty-five years. It's been an interdisciplinary program. There are people on the faculty from History. Hyman had been on it for eons.

CAC: This is Hyman Berman.

MB: Hy Berman, and Simler, and Michael Keane now in the Economics Department here, and then, Marv[in] Dunnette, and Renee Dowas from Psychology.

CAC: Was Herb Heneman "Mr. Outside" in that? I always thought of him as a pretty rough guy, very able, with real contacts outside the university.

MB: He very much was I think the "Mr. Outside" and, then, Tom Mahoney and Bill England were the "Mr. Inside" folks in those early days. Industrial Relations today, actually, has the Business School's insurance programs. Unemployment insurance, worker's compensation . . . all of these are issues that Art Williams championed.

CAC: Of course.

MB: The C. Arthur Williams Insurance chair and all the risk management offerings are through the Industrial Relations program presently in the Business School.

CAC: As I knew Art Williams, he was so prudent, and so well-informed, and so controlled.

MB: Right.

CAC: Herb was out telling funny stories.

MB: Right. You're right. Herb was a mover and shaker type and Arthur and others did the fine-tuning. [laughter]

CAC: I worked with Herb on the AAUP [American Association of University Professors] and he kept us entertained but he also kept things hopping.

MB: I first began working with Art as an assistant professor without tenure on AAUP matters back in the early 1970s—I think, it was 1972 or 1973—with our very first attempt at organizing the University of Minnesota Twin Cities campus faculty. I, in fact, chaired the AAUP's collective bargaining committee. Paul Murphy from the History Department was the president of the AAUP at that point in time. So, C. Arthur, and Paul, and Leo[nid] Hurwicz . . . that's when I first came to know some of these fellows. It was quite a learning experience.

CAC: The AAUP, at its best in the 1960s and 1970s, did have that function.

MB: Yes. The AAUP really did sort of represent the received economic profile of faculty and it would represent that profile to the administration and to the Board of Regents and it meant something in those days.

CAC: Yes. Seeing we're on that subject—that's my impression; I was president in the mid 1960s with Dan Cooperman, a different outfit then—what happened to it in the 1980s and 1990s? It seems to me it kind of fell from influence.

MB: In the 1970s, the AAUP sort of stepped forward as an alternate choice to a Minnesota Federation of Teachers group that was trying to organize the faculty. When that choice came onto the scene, the union movement seemed to have lost its pizzazz and the "no union" option on the ballot prevailed.

CAC: Yes.

MB: There was another election—I think it was in 1978—about four or five years later and the AAUP again participated in this particular way and it divided the vote. This caused interest to dissipate and the union effort failed. For some reason, it was after that second election that the AAUP just were seen to fall away from the scene. I'm not certain whether or not . . . I think, to a great extent, those union elections exhaust people, exhaust leadership and you quite frankly don't have the time and the inclination to work in these social organizations, these professional organizations after this is done. The AAUP resurfaced again, as you know, this year with the union election. It surfaced as sort of *the* champion of the union option; but, it surfaced in a strange way. There was this independent faculty organization that came on board that actually

received certification as the applicant in the election process. Then, the AAUP surfaced—this is the [V.] Rama Murthy organization—and the two then came together. I think the surviving organization of the merger was the AAUP; but, this time it was a bona fide labor organization in the sense that it was aggressively out campaigning for union membership and for union recognition. In those two earlier exposures, the AAUP wasn't sort of an enthusiastic player.

CAC: My sense is that with many faculty, there's kind of an ambivalence about the AAUP when it moves toward a labor model rather than a professional model. That's just a classical . . .

MB: It is classical. There's always the argument that academics are elitists. As long as you're talking about high-minded matters like the quality of the student body, and the quality of the curriculum, and this type of thing . . . any organization that champions those class of issues are considered to be worthy our affiliation. Issues such as wages, conditions of employment, and the thought that you would strike as professionals . . . organizations that champion those class of issues tend to drive away academics.

CAC: Yes.

MB: I think that's a part of it. I really do. I think there is a measure of elitism in all of this.

CAC: It's an authentic ambivalence that many of my colleagues exhibited. I'm going to pick up this dispute resolution. That becomes a field for your scholarly focus and also your outside the university work in the 1970s and 1980s?

MB: Yes, that's true.

CAC: Say something, then, about the basic—I hate to say philosophical—procedural insight of this dispute resolution movement because it's going to bear on the university later.

MB: Just to take a sweep at this at sort of the 20,000 foot level . . .

CAC: That's fine. That's what I'm looking for.

MB: Actually, labor and management differences have been with us since the beginning of time. Labor management conflicts are easy to observe and they're relatively easy to research. Once those conflicts began to be channeled by institutions, such as the National Labor Relations Act and institutions that are nested within the terms of collective bargaining contracts like grievance arbitration procedures, it became even easier to study conflict resolution. People in the industrial relations business for the last sixty years or even beyond, quite frankly before that, have been interested in what are the processes that generate issues? What then are the strategies that govern how these issues are danced out in a bargaining environment? At what rate do people concede? What are the determinants of a decision to lock out the labor force or to strike the employer? So, people in conflict resolution began to study this whole exchange of information process, the

use of threat in that process, and the use of sanctions to extract concession and compromise from my recalcitrant opponent in the process. It became very instructive and some of this labor management conflict business became instructive in matters of war when parties are in conflict and in matters of negotiations that go all the way from the negotiation of a NAFTA [North American Free-Trade Agreement] to the negotiation of a divorce settlement.

CAC: Or the Near East or the Balkans?

MB: Or the Near East or the Balkans.

CAC: The basic principles are similar?

MB: That's right. The principles are all there. Conflict resolution, that expression, that way to term this process and these differences and how they're resolved, actually, is a term that came into favor in the early 1980s when people did begin to take a more general view at conflicts and how they're resolved. The matter of conflict resolution became, for example, a topic in business schools outside of labor relations. There are intra-organizational conflicts between the marketing department and the finance department in a corporation.

CAC: Sure.

MB: We began to see it with combinations in Sociology with Dan Cooperman, for example—he serves on many of our committees—the sociological perspective of conflict as it relates to large group conflicts . . . one social enclave holding to a value that conflicts with the values held by another social enclave, this type of thing. We saw it at the Law School. The Humphrey Institute now is the home for a master's degree in conflict resolution.

CAC: I see.

MB: Basically, conflict resolution now, Clarke, really means mediation as a tool. It doesn't focus at all on negotiation as the tool or on the use of sanctions as a healthy way to prod bargaining parties to concede to reach settlements. Conflict resolution, as it's used today in public [unclear] does not relate, for example, to arbitration. Negotiations and arbitration are more technical, more complex processes. Mediation now is used in the courts; so, if you and I were to sue one another, I'm sure somewhere along the line, either the judge in our case or the attorneys in the matter, would suggest mediation to us. There are now, and there weren't twenty years ago, a passel of people in the phone book who sell their services as mediators.

CAC: I'm going to ask you one more question because I think this does relate to the role that you played in the Hasselmo Administration. What tactics, what devices does that person who comes in to help resolve differences . . . what tools do you have?

MB: First of all, mediation is sort of *the* process because an arbitrator usually has final authority as a judge. No one really has final authority in resolving conflicts around this university if you want to resolve it through compromise. Basically, what the mediator does is to separate the parties, learn from them what the issues are to insure that the two people are conflicting for the same reason, and that they understand one another's position. What the mediator, then, does do is remind each of the parties in separate caucus as to the consequences of a failed resolution to the problem, and, then, he or she works with both sides at coming up with alternative ideas for resolving the matter, ideas that you may not want to present to your opposite party in a negotiating setting for fear that they would reject it, leaving you, then, with a face loss or with the option of walking out, which you may not wish to do because there are costs to break downs in these discussions. You're likely to tell a third party what it is that would be acceptable and instruct the third party to put it up as his own trial balloon. If that trial balloon seems to gain favor from the opposite side, then, the mediator sees intersection of interests here that are mutually acceptable and comes up with the settlement to which both buy into.

CAC: That's somewhat the process that you had to use on some occasions as chief of staff for Mr. Hasselmo?

MB: The Board of Regents, about six weeks ago, had a little going away party for Gene Allen, and Phil Shively, and Marvin Marshak, and myself. It was a fun event over at the Weisman Museum. We had a little luncheon. In the course of that discussion, we each sort of took the floor and commented about one another. Marshak was commenting on our, then, newly resolved tenure issue. Marshak said, "One thing I learned from Bognanno throughout all of this tenure discussion is keep them at the table. Don't ever let people walk away from the table." If you sit there, and talk, and talk, and talk, and you do it long enough, and if each repeats their respective positions often enough, they'll come to believe that what it is that they're saying is, in fact, true. If one of the parties has some lead way, they will concede and an agreement will result. So, that was it. Part of the message was that this administration wanted to make sure that faculty was at the table every other week, or whatever it was, that we met. The first thing we would do on the agenda, before we got into the substance of the agenda, was schedule the next meeting.

CAC: Ah!

MB: The same with the Board of Regents in discussing these matters with regents. There was never a meeting at which . . . we didn't want to put a period after anything. It was always dot, dot, dot . . . to be continued.

CAC: [laughter]

MB: That was a big part, I think, of the resolution of the tenure matter. It had to do with sort of testing one another's limits of resolution. What are the resistance points of each side?

CAC: Did you sit with both parties?

MB: In the end, when we wrapped this up, we sat opposite both parties.

CAC: You were a third . . . ?

MB: We knew . . . the administration and Nils Hasselmo knew exactly what he wanted out of a tenure code. What we had to do was to sell the reasonableness of this to both the faculty and to the regents—and to the public.

CAC: So, it's a three-pointed triangle?

MB: This was a three-way bargain. At various parts throughout all of this, the administration and the faculty stood side-by-side. For example, the key to the solution of the tenure problem, the reason this university is still one of the top thirty research universities in America, the reason this university does not have a faculty union on the Twin Cities campus, I think, is because of Sullivan I.

CAC: Yes.

MB: Sullivan III is currently our tenure code.

CAC: Describe to posterity when you refer to Sullivan I . . . Sullivan's a member of the Law School?

MB: [E. Thomas] Sullivan is the dean of the College of Law. We had an enormous tenure issue surface and there were many reasons for this. In fiscal years 1991-1992, 1993-1994, and fiscal year 1995-1996, the University of Minnesota's biennial appropriations were lean. These were years, between 1991 and 1996, when there were, actually, two freezes in faculty salary. These were years during which, if faculty were to receive raises, the monies had to be generated internally through reductions and the freed up monies were reallocated to salary. These were years when there was faculty attrition. The stock of faculty between 1990 and 1996 or so actually fell by something like two hundred and sixty faculty. There was net attrition among the faculty. In these years between 1990 and 1996, there was an incredible amount of turnover in the vice-president of Academic Affairs office . . .

CAC: Oh, my, yes.

MB: . . . and on, and on, and on. There was a lot of turnover. There was a thought that we needed flexibility. The university needed flexibility in managing its costs so that we could handle what was thought to be an incredible fiscal roller coaster. In the mid 1960s, there was a real concern that research monies would not be forthcoming as they had previously been because of the interest in balancing the budget, the end of the Cold War, and on and on. There

was a real concern as to how it is that tenured faculty, who were supported on the basis of research funding, could be maintained under the employment terms of tenure in the absence of those funds. So, this flexibility encompassed all of this. Flexibility also came to mean a restructuring of the university's academic programs, closing degree programs, creating new degree programs, merging degree programs that had faculty consequences. It also meant closing departments, colleges, and campuses where and in which there were, again, faculty consequences. That's sort of the economic background to tenure.

CAC: I'm going to intervene with a question right there. I have the sense—I may be mistaken; I'm saying this is one of perceptions—that what you're noting was particularly delicate, ticklish, in the Health Sciences where a certain number of tenured persons were on soft monies. If those were to disappear . . . I'm thinking of the role that I think Dr. [William] Brody as provost played in triggering the crisis itself. Is that an inaccurate perception on my part?

MB: No. In, for example, the Academic Health Center—I think the School of Public Health—if I'm not mistaken, seventeen percent of the School of Public Health's operating budget comes from state money, O & M [Operations and Management] monies.

CAC: Just seventeen?

MB: Only seventeen. That's sort of the order of magnitude, thirteen to seventeen percent, that was the percent of the Medical School's budgets that were on O & M. You're right. What came to be known as the Academic Health Center, which was a collection, I believe, of eight colleges, really did seem to be at the vanguard of concern when it came to this question of loss of federal funds.

CAC: That was an authentic concern?

MB: Yes.

CAC: The problems you're describing earlier were more acute in that area of the university?

MB: They were more acute in the Academic Health Center—no question about it—and particularly in the Medical School. The acuteness became even more severe when it became evident that the change from fee-for-service medicine . . .

CAC: Yes.

MB: . . . to managed care medicine. When that change occurred and our patient load and average daily census and average length of stay statistics in the University of Minnesota Hospital and Clinic began to fall and we began to see monthly operating deficits in the order of magnitude of \$1 million, they began drawing down on all of their reserves so that they were slowly sort of eating into their reserve base. That was also about this point in time, Clarke. For those two

reasons, source of funding and the change in the medical market place, really made it more acute in the Academic Health Center area.

CAC: This has led some to say that Dr. Brody is the one who pulled the trigger on the dispute with contacts in the legislature and in the Board of Regents. Can you comment on that?

MB: I can. Let me put a couple of pieces in place.

CAC: Okay.

MB: First of all, you had all of this change that began really with fiscal year 1991. We had the need for flexibility, the shortage of funding, and so forth generally.

CAC: That's the larger context.

MB: There was a larger context. Secondly, there was a change in the leadership of the Board of Regents in fiscal year 1994, which took on a character of a board that was more hands-on in terms of the operation of the university, the day-to-day executive administration of the university. The board became threateningly close to becoming the administration. In fact, in fiscal year 1995, the then chair of the Board of Regents, reorganized the office of the Board of Regents, bringing in a new executive secretary of the Board of Regents, and a new staff, and put in a budget that was significant for the first time. The board's role shifted. That's item number two.

CAC: Excuse me. Is this an ad hominem development, the chance of . . . I assume you're referring to Jean Keffeler in this instance?

MB: Yes.

CAC: Then, it's carried on by Tom Reagan?

MB: To some extent.

CAC: Is this attributed to their personality character experience or what was happening? Is there any systemic problem?

MB: Yes, obviously, I think the personality has to fit . . .

CAC: It always has some bearing.

MB: It has some bearing. We had these larger economic issues. We had the state facing the prospect of deficits at the state level. We had a lot of turnover in the administration. We had the presentation of a provostial system which brought in a new provost for the Academic Health Center. This is going back to your question.

CAC: Yes.

MB: So, we a number of new players on the scene . . . the needs of the Academic Health Center and the Academic Health Center's analysis of the problem. The fact that you had a problem statement and a problem solution that looked fairly similar between that provost, the new chairman of the Board of Regents, and people in the legislature—Becky Kelso, for example—and people in the governor's office brought together a combination of forces. You now have this political alliance that cut across matters of the university, matters of administration, regent relationships, matters of the university, and external relationships in the legislature and the governor. You have this alliance that occurred, financial concerns, and so forth that caused board leadership to, then, really begin in 1994-1995 to challenge tenure. It's a complicated mosaic.

CAC: Now, at that time, Central Administration was aware of the factors that you're talking about? They understood it at the moment?

MB: Central Administration understood the factors. In fact, there were people in Central Administration, for example in the vice-president for Academic Affairs office, in the, then, vice-president for Finance and Operations, Bob Erickson, and, perhaps, even Mel George, acting vice-president for institutional relations . . . all of these people, in various ways, seemed to also believe that tenure innovation was necessary as part of the solution of the financial problem. It's not as though you had an administration that was rallying tightly around the president's flag. In fact, in 1994-1995, there was interest on the part of some internal to the university as well as in the governor's office, principally, and on the board that wanted to see the president step down at the end of fiscal year 1995 rather than the end of fiscal year 1997. There was an incredible amount of tug-o-war taking place between these various forces.

CAC: And the tenure issue was one among several issues that some members of the board wished to accelerate the retirement of Mr. Hasselmo?

MB: Let me list, just for purposes of posterity all the side issues related during the tenure period. Let me tell you the other issues . . .

CAC: All right.

MB: . . . that tended to make putting together the coalitions needed for solution very difficult. The set of complicating side issues was this whole question of whether the president ought to resign or not. You remember that was played out in the newspapers.

CAC: Yes.

MB: That issue led to a divided Board of Regents. It led to a new leadership on the board. As you recall, Tom ended up succeeding Jean. Jean Keffeler had expected to succeed herself. I believe she expected to serve two terms as chair, two two-year terms. She ended up serving one

two-year term. So, we had a divided board. We had the John Najarian matter that was out there. This was extremely divisive in the sense that people held very deep feelings. The faculty, as you know, rallied around the president in his management of this issue, the argument being that there's no one among us that stands above the rule. We're all subject. We are all governed by the same set of rules. President Hasselmo actually decided that case on that basis. We had during this whole tenure discussion the matter of focus. President Hasselmo was trying to move the University of Minnesota out of the two-year academic degree program environment and was trying very hard . . . this is the closing of Waseca.

CAC: And General College [GC]?

MB: And General College. It's the General College piece . . . he gave focus to what is a research university, what our academic mission was, identified not only the operating problems with General College but identified the point that it did not fit our mission. That became a matter that complicated the General College issue. I think from the standpoint of the . . . president reports to the board. They're his boss, like it or lump it. That's what they're elected for. Read the constitution. Our originating charter lays it out that way.

CAC: You bet.

MB: This GC issue was very much a complicating issue. We had two other complications going on.

CAC: I'm going to pause on this. That is because a certain number of the board saw the move against General College as a kind of elitism against the citizen's access to the university, right?

MB: That's right.

CAC: [Wendell] Wendy Anderson would be one of those?

MB: Wendy would be one. In fact, on GC, I think there was a vote taken. I can't state the issue on which the regents voted; but, if my recollection is correct, Stan[ley] Sahlstrom was the only one who supported the president on General College. Eleven others voted against the president.

CAC: I see.

MB: It wasn't really a GC up/down issue; but, it was an indicator of your mood on that issue. It became so politically hot that only Stanley stood with the president.

CAC: We have to flip the tape.

[End of Tape 1, Side 1]

[Tape 1, Side 2]

CAC: We're talking about the complicating issues as they fit together. The background is economic. The largest context is economic, retrenchment, reallocation, all of that. Then, there are these specific things. You're pointing to the ALG [Antilymphocyte Globulin], the Najarian problem, the General College . . . so let's pick it up at that point.

MB: A divided Board of Regents . . . the two other major complicating factors with respect to tenure was the threat of the legislature and the governor intervening. The legislature might pass some law that would create a problem. Then, of course, we had the faculty unionization enterprise that was beginning.

CAC: Which was a response to the tenure issue?

MB: Which was a response to the tenure issue. All of these forces were out there. When you engaged a regent, for example, you had to make sure that the regent understood what deck of cards was being played at that point in time. If you would engage a regent who had a real problem with the administration's perspective on GC . . . by the way, that meant a real problem with the faculty's perception on GC. It made conflict resolution more challenging because the regents had sore spots all over them. In discussing the tenure item, you had to be careful to avoid those spots.

CAC: Sure.

MB: As a result, the process, I think, was longer than it necessarily had to be. Let me say this, Clarke, on tenure. The president did not want the issue to surface. He had so many other issues on his plate at the time that he did not want this to come forward. I think he also believed that the regents would use this as an issue to not only change the university but as a platform for reelection as a regent, as a platform for reputation among regents around the country, as a means to garner political favor in the legislature and in the governor's mansion, and so forth. His concern was that this could produce a lot of adverse affects for the University of Minnesota. Nils did agree to it. The regents passed a resolution that said we're going to look at tenure. So, the administration, rather than to be insubordinate, agreed to doing this. But, out of the box on this issue, President Hasselmo made it very clear that layoffs were not part of this, were not necessary to the resolution of the university's overall economic problems, and that layoffs would, in fact, if it were nested within our new tenure code, a revised tenure code, really move us to the fringe of the academic marketplace among major universities. He also believed that tenure was a matter that ought to be system-wide and not departmentally based.

CAC: Yes.

MB: Those were threshold problems. That whole layoff, system-wide issue was sort of the issue that took a year to resolve. The regents attitudes change in part but, also, the makeup of the

board changed dramatically. The leadership and the way the tenure issue was controlled within the framework of the board structure changed. It moved, for example, out of faculty staff and student affairs and into the Committee of the Whole.

CAC: I see.

MB: There were a lot of shifts that took place that were all, I think, very important in terms of resolving the issue. Here's what Nils had on his plate as areas of reform in the tenure code that he believed were reasonable—we ended up with them, by the way— . . .

CAC: Yes.

MB: . . . that he believed the board, in vast majority, would find comfort in, that the governor and the editorial pages, the public would find comfort in, and that it would leave the university as a major player among research universities. Those were items such as: a code that makes it clear that the chairman of a department makes teaching assignments; a code that provides for the post-tenure review of faculty, an opportunity for remedial enterprise that the faculty member is flagging, and discipline, ultimately, if the faculty member's performance does not improve; a provision that makes it clear that tenure attaches to the regular aspect of your salary as opposed to the variable aspect of salary . . . variable being summer schoolteaching; research grants . . . this issue that you and I were discussing earlier; administrative argumentation; extension augmentations; and so forth. So, we have a code now that makes clear that tenure does not squeeze all of the university's ability to regulate costs because now, it's only those costs that are secured that are protected by the tenure code.

CAC: Base line salary.

MB: Base line salary; that's it. The tenure code expanded somewhat, for example, into egregious behaviors like sexual harassment . . . just cause for termination. What it also did was provided—Nils wanted this, too—colleges and the faculties in those colleges to enjoy the choice of probation period, the duration of the probation period . . . ought it be a six-year probation or seven-year decision, or ought it be a nine years, ten years decision? The code was liberalized to give colleges this flexibility. Did you know that?

CAC: Yes, I knew that. Even before this, in my early round of interviews, there were a number of senior professors who said this six-year, seventh year, really it's a six-year code was cruel and counter productive, that it wasn't working. I was picking this out three or four years ago in interviews.

MB: The new code now has it in. It's up to a college now to determine whether or not it wishes to have a ten-year up or out as opposed to seven.

CAC: Right.

MB: Let me just say this: I think it was in 1995 that Kelso was holding some hearings. She was chairman of the Higher Ed Committee of the House. At one of these legislative hearings, Nils gave a speech—this was early on—and it contradicted, of course, the comments and views of regents.

CAC: Some regents.

MB: Some regents, not all regents. Basically, he gave a speech indicating where he was on this whole question of laying off a tenured faculty member because of a program closure as opposed to a reassignment and so forth. He also, then, went on and laid out all of his ideas, some of which I have just enumerated here, for revising the code. That was in 1995. In 1997, we ended up with a tenure code that had virtually everything that he had talked about in 1995 in it.

CAC: This was a public statement to a state legislative committee?

MB: A legislative committee and I think we ended up putting that on the Web and sending it to the faculty senate and to any number of people. As I have implied to you, process and how it was managed was very much a part of all of this. There were some real management issues that were flagging. The key though was in 1996 when Sullivan I was adopted.

CAC: Adopted by the academic senate?

MB: No, no, the senate did not adopt it.

CAC: Okay.

MB: What happened was there was a log jam of sorts. There was a majority of the regents that wanted an alternative to the Morris tenure code, the Morris campus. Though some did not, there was a majority that did. The question became one of what would that alternative be? There wasn't an alternative out there. The regents' consultants produced this Morris pact and, of course, the administration rallied against this. Nils sent a letter to the board pleading . . . a confidential letter that three or four days later became a public letter but initially, it was meant for their eyes only. It was a letter that begged that the board not even consider this Morris proposal. When the board did view favorably this issue, it became clear—it wasn't on the basis of a vote—that the board was acting in very strange and peculiar ways in their management of the issue at that time. I think board members were all over the place. The majority of the board membership did not understand what was going on. They didn't know the issues. There was just a little group of three or four regents who were managing this.

CAC: It was this small group that hired the consultants that came in with this counter proposal on tenure?

MB: That's right. That's correct.

CAC: Is that part of your information? Do you know how they did that, why they would select a group that came in without understanding what the issue was . . . the consultants they chose?

MB: The vice-president for Academic Affairs office was also a part in all of this. That office had lost some of its influence because of the creation of the provostial system.

CAC: Okay.

MB: There were a number of huge initiatives that were going forward now. We were talking about biological reorganization. We were talking about selling the hospital. We were talking about a number of things. You had provosts now who were working very closely with faculty and coming to really know . . . the whole question of [unclear] control was shifted, you see, with the provostial system. By that I mean that the campus was divided up into thirds; so, now the executive administrative officer over that third could really come to know the budgets of the colleges that reported to that particular provostial system, the people, the kind of research and have a feel for the strength of programs. With a senior v.p. for Academic Affairs, there was no way that this person had the physical capacity to know about the colleges and departments as did this provostial system.

CAC: I'm going to back up a minute. These are all complicated inter-relations and we have to untangle them in some way.

MB: Right.

CAC: I'm trying to do it to help posterity along in that. The three provostial posts were created before you became chief of staff?

MB: No. When I came on board, that was *the* agenda item, at that point.

CAC: You were right up to speed on that? You had to be.

MB: Oh, yes. I came up with the name "Professional Studies." We hadn't named that area. [laughter]

CAC: All right. You were describing, a moment ago, twelve seconds ago, the rationale for having those three posts: to get closer to the faculty and really understand; whereas, the single provost and vice-president could not physically, however clever that person was?

MB: That's right. The deans were, by the way, clamoring for change because they were lined up in a queue that would circle Morrill Hall trying to get into that office.

CAC: Where did the idea come from of establishing the provost system?

MB: When Jean [Keffeler] was elected chairman of the Board of Regents, I think she felt that there was a need to make organizational change. She gave her okay to hiring MacKenzie as the outside consulting group.

CAC: But, before that, she was one of the proponents of a provostial system?

MB: She was a proponent of reorganization and of hiring MacKenzie. MacKenzie came up with the provostial system; so, I do think she supported it.

CAC: I'm sorry. Who's MacKenzie?

MB: MacKenzie & Company is a large consulting organization [unclear] from out of Chicago. They're the ones who came up with this idea.

CAC: But, Nils bought aboard very quickly?

MB: Nils did buy it. There was a lot of fine-tuning that had to be done within that framework.

CAC: Sure, what groups would fall under which . . .

MB: There was an enormous amount of division within the administration on the subject. The vice-president for Academic Affairs and the vice-president for finance did not want to see this happen.

CAC: Because it did distribute authority?

MB: This was 1994-1995. Then, the tenure thing began to perk as this . . .

CAC: Then, the provosts would come into position in 1995?

MB: The provosts came in in 1995. The provosts came in, with the exception of the provost for the Academic Health Center, as strong supporters of the president in driving change through U-2000, in consolidating, making sense out of it, etcetera, etcetera. By the way, I should tell you, in the whole tenure dispute, the process of resolving the tenure issue, it was the provosts, Frank Cerra, Gene Allen, Phil Shively—not Bill Brody but Cerra at this point because there was a turnover— . . .

CAC: Brody had left by then.

MB: Brody had left. The solution to the tenure problem were those three folks. Marvin Marshak had now succeeded [Ettore "Jim"] Infante, Bognanno, and Hasselmo. That's the group that brought this administration on board around a solution to this problem. I do think that part

of the problem of getting the administration together as a group for the purpose of solving the tenure problem in 1995 because we had the provostial reorganization thing unfolding.

CAC: That had to be entirely new procedures for those posts because there was no precedent on which they could build, no tradition?

MB: Look, Clarke, I will beg you that we spent 10,000 person-hours . . .

CAC: [laughter]

MB: . . . putting together either fourteen or eighteen documents called "Roles, Responsibilities, and Functions of . . ."

CAC: Any historian can find these documents?

MB: You can find those documents.

CAC: Okay.

MB: I would say they probably stand about nine, ten inches thick.

CAC: [laughter] These are documents moving toward the definition of the provostial . . .

MB: Roles, responsibilities of vice-presidents vis-à-vis provosts . . . yes. There was an enormous enterprise. This was all going on . . . [laughter]

CAC: Whose¹ writing these damned things?

MB: Jim Infante, senior vice-president for Academic Affairs, and Bob Erickson, senior vice-president for Finance and Operation, co-chaired the committee that was writing these. Then, once the provosts were actually recruited and hired, which was also going on in this period . . . [laughter] Some board members, of course, opposed some of those provostial selections. As the three provosts were being hired, they then would join this committee, [unclear] they came on board. Bill Brody was the first provost hired. Bill really did bring the action to the two senior vice-presidents in terms of wanting the roles, responsibilities, and powers of that whole Academic Health Center clarified, delineated. He was very, very aggressive.

CAC: That was not inappropriate?

MB: No, it was not.

CAC: If you're going to have these positions, you want to know what their powers are.

MB: History must show that Bill has this checkered reputation—some people argue that he, of course, was the gasoline on the fire that someone else set in the whole tenure environment—but, Bill also played some very positive roles within this university in that he really did help to shape and give substantive meaning to the whole provostial system, which established incumbent senior vice-presidents thought would never work. Also, it was actually Bill who stumbled on the Fairview solution to the hospital problem. If you can sit back and think about the courage it would take to propose selling your hospital to a private sector provider and all of the work that that would entail . . . and Bill did that. I think you have to give him credit for that.

CAC: Then, he got out from the implementation by leaving. He wasn't here very long.

MB: No. Basically, all he did was he put in the—if you can envision a set of blueprints for a new house—footprint, the first blueprint. He didn't do the footing footprint, the electrical and the wiring ,and all the rest of the blueprints that go into the production of this house. [laughter]

Let me get back to my earlier point. My earlier point was this whole Sullivan I and that was the solution.

CAC: Again, for posterity, this was a set of protocols that the then dean of the Law School compiled and gave his name to? Is that right?

MB: He gave his name to it.

CAC: Then, who drafted it?

MB: Let me say this, the content of Sullivan I was the content of the presentation President Hasselmo made to the Kelso Committee a year earlier.

CAC: Okay, but Nils couldn't have made this up out of whole cloth.

MB: No.

CAC: He must have had . . .

MB: There was a small group consisting of four people: two faculty leaders, the president, and myself.

CAC: Who were the two faculty leaders?

MB: I don't know that I should put that on tape.

CAC: Okay, that's all right.

MB: I'll let them disclose themselves.

CAC: Sure.

MB: After the Morris meeting, we got together. It was decided that the only way that we could save this issue and the long-term future of this university was for somebody to take the bull by the horns and come up with a proposal that would have some viability. This group worked together with Dean Sullivan and Dean Sullivan, then, presented this as his . . .

CAC: But, Hasselmo was very close in contact with the whole development of that committee?

MB: Yes. But, what I want to do on this is I want to put a qualifier in the oral record here.

CAC: Okay.

MB: That qualifier is that none of what I'm about to relate be published and be available unless the principles also discuss the matter: namely, President Hasselmo and so forth. All of the players are alive, and well, and kicking, and have futures at this university.

CAC: It was a small group of faculty in Central Administration, including Hasselmo who . . . ?

MB: It was just really the president's office. It wasn't Central Administration.

CAC: Okay.

MB: It was the president's office. At this point in time, I think the senior vice-president for Academic Affairs, Infante, was on his way . . . had already declared that he was leaving.

CAC: That's reasonable.

MB: So, the president was very much aware of the development and so forth of this alternative, which Dean Sullivan represented to the Board of Regents. He represented it as his document. It was folks who thought that there was a set of changes and revisions that were both meaty, would give the university some flexibility, would give credibility to the tenure at the University of Minnesota, and that we could sell to the faculty, to the regents, and so forth. Ultimately, this Sullivan I became a Sullivan II with a change that was made later and, then ultimately, the Sullivan III that applies to the whole university. The basic character of the current tenure code was the Sullivan I code.

CAC: Of these three versions, the Sullivan I is the basic document?

MB: Sullivan I is the basic document.

CAC: Then, it's shifted in a moderate way, modified?

MB: Yes, that's right.

CAC: Which one was never accepted by what body?

MB: Let me just think through this for a second. Sullivan I never did make it to the faculty senate. [pause] Gosh! I wish I had my notes to refer to. It was passed for the Law School and, I think, for Morris. Then, the regents began to take to this Sullivan I approach. Tom Sullivan, as dean now, was very instrumental, I think, in selling the ideas in this new code to the regents and also to the editorial pages of the two newspapers. So, Tom played a meaningful role here. There was another juncture where the code was extended with an amendment of one sort or another and that was Sullivan II. Then, the faculty, after the union election failed . . .

CAC: It was so close.

MB: It was a twenty-six vote margin.

CAC: Right, which really meant a percent and a half or something. It was a 51 - 49½ or something.

MB: Had it rained, the vote could have been different. The faculty senate wanted to have this code now expanded to include the Academic Health Center. As you recall, they weren't included initially and neither was the balance of the Twin Cities . . . Oh! I think Sullivan II extended the code to the Twin Cities campus except for the Health Center. Then, the Health Center and Crookston . . . Crookston was tied up. What I'm giving you is very garbled and the sequence, I've lost. I'd have to reconstruct it.

CAC: That's all right. Whoever listens to this will have to go clarify it with documents.

MB: They're going to have to clarify it. Basically, what happened was that we had a version of Sullivan that was part of the regents' policies on tenure covering part of the campus. That's what I'm calling Sullivan II. Sullivan II then . . . the faculty senate said, "Wait a second. We want to review Sullivan II and, perhaps, amend and change Sullivan II." That was actually what was then resolved in June and July of 1997. What happened there was the senate did pass a number of amendments, some of which were problematic to the administration, some of which were problematic to regents. Then, a committee of three—President Hasselmo, Marvin Marshak, and I—held a half a dozen meetings or so with a group of faculty that Sara Evans chaired. That's the group that had one bargaining session after another bargaining session. We finally agreed on a proposal that the board would agree to. Of course, the faculty had to know that. We had to let the faculty know that. It was at this very latter end of these discussions, Clarke, that we began to be a mediator. When I say "we," I mean Marvin, and myself, and Nils. We began to run back and forth between faculty and between the board and work very closely with Steve

Bosaker and people in the regents' office. There were a number of little details having to do with how we were going to roll it out, who had to say what to whom, an exchange of letters between the chairman of the Board of Regents and between Sara Evans and her committee, and this type of thing.

CAC: Who appointed the Evans committee?

MB: Virginia Gray. She was chairman of the Faculty Consultative Committee [FCC]. Virginia appointed that committee and, then, Nils appointed our committee. In terms of sort of the operating level, Fred Morrison, and Sara, and I would usually sort of preview agendas, preview how we were going to proceed at the next meeting, and that type of thing.

CAC: I should really interview Sara Evans and Virginia Gray, among others?

MB: Yes. Once this group approved—this group of eight in the administration agreed—and once letters were exchanged between all of us and the chairman of the Board of Regents, then, the matter was taken to the faculty senate and the faculty senate voted it up. Then, the final code, what we'll call Sullivan III code that was ultimately approved by the Board of Regents, did have the approval of the faculty senate. So, governance sustained itself. Governance survived all of this. Governance was very much at risk between 1995 and 1997.

CAC: I'm going to back up a bit now. I keep trying to imagine people hearing this and what they need to know.

MB: Right.

CAC: You're describing a position yourself and you weren't exaggerating your own role—I'm not suggesting that—but you were playing a different role than others who had been in a similar but not the same position with President Hasselmo or with other presidents before that. In other words, when you came aboard, you became a chief of staff?

MB: Right.

CAC: That was a new kind of definition.

MB: A brand new title in our classification of titles and a brand new position description. Previously, the position had been called the associate to the president.

CAC: Okay.

MB: That individual did not have voting privileges on the university's executive councils and executive committee. That individual, oftentimes, was not as closely tied to faculty, to the

faculty governance system, and so forth as was I. No, the position was different. It had more powers to it.

CAC: That was on your initiative, primarily?

MB: That was part of the negotiation of . . . When Nils asked me to join him, this was a period of some crisis. U-2000 had not yet been rolled out. We still did not have the critical measures in U-2000. At the time, the legislature was trying to measure the university's performance in terms of inputs, like the number of contact hours that a faculty member spends teaching, instead of outputs. One of the great accomplishments of the Hasselmo Administration was that he flipped that all around. People won't think of that. This was a coup in my judgment. We had this whole U-2000 issue sitting there and what's going to come of it. We had the provostial reorganization sitting here with its internal administrative opposition. We had the Keffeler tenure, the length of the president's term, issue. Myself and many other faculty wanted Nils to continue for two more years through 1997 so that he could resolve tenure. We didn't want tenure to become an issue as part of a presidential search—and it almost did. People were, in fact, bringing Mark Yudof into it—but, Mark stayed out of it—including the gov[ernor] and some of these other folks. We had these big issues out here. There was no academic program faculty compensation. Faculty remuneration had been lagging so that that was an issue. Nils thought that he needed someone who could help not only externally. A lot of his previous associates had been of value in sort of that external connection in the legislature and in political circles. This is were Kathy O'Brien . . .

CAC: She was the first one?

MB: No, what's his name . . . Rick Heydinger had done this.

CAC: But, I mean for Hasselmo?

MB: Yes, she was his first assistant to the president.

CAC: Then, Jeanne Lupton?

MB: Then, Jeannie Lupton came in. She was there for about a year or so and, then, I came in.

CAC: But, the position changes because of all these complications that you're describing?

MB: Because of all of these complications.

CAC: And because you had a better sense of what administratively was required and so did Mr. Hasselmo?

MB: That's right. I had to have some push.

CAC: You had to have more authority?

MB: I had to have some authority. We totally, when the provostial system was over, we totally redid all the executive communication systems; that is, the president meets from time to time with different combinations of executive officers and we put that together. We established, in this position description, that it is the chief of staff who is responsible for the agendas of all those groups and that the chief of staff is more than a secretary but is also a voting member of these organizations.

CAC: Ah.

MB: The chief of staff now had privileges of a vice-president: football tickets, basketball tickets . . .

CAC: [laughter] Oh, wonderful.

MB: In fact, the position description is written at the level of a vice-president. Now, I think, with my successor, it may just be that what they were going to do . . . there is a regents' policy that defines sort of the senior executives and they will probably add that name to that list.

CAC: But, you don't have a replacement in the Yudof Administration as chief of staff? Is there someone doing that?

MB: There is someone there, yes.

CAC: I see.

MB: There is someone there. He brought in his own chief of staff, a woman from Arizona [in fact, Texas].

CAC: But, she comes into the same position you had created with Hasselmo?

MB: Yes, she comes in that same position.

CAC: So, it's not a fall back to the O'Brien/Lupton?

MB: No, it is not. It's a very powerful position. It's a very powerful position.

CAC: And Yudof knows that?

MB: Yudof knows that, yes. It's very powerful. Yudof very much knows it. This person is the president's alter ego. This is the person who puts together the coalitions of faculty, the coalitions of regents needed to get things done. It was an office manager and it was an external thing.

Heydinger and O'Brien—I don't know who did it before—were all sort of legislative lobbyist types. This is really an administrative position. The requirement of the position is that you are absolutely in touch with the president and loyal to the president. I gave Nils just absolute loyalty. We differed very seldom.

CAC: Also candid . . .

MB: Very candid. This worked only because the president was willing to share power. If he wasn't willing to share power with me, then it wouldn't have worked because I did not have a budget other than the president's discretionary budget. What Nils did, Nils made sure that door was always open; so, that in all these deliberations when a delicate period was on us and people wanted to get to the president very quickly, they could call me and I would get the message to the president. If Nils was out or he was not . . . he always made himself available.

CAC: The senior vice-president didn't feel upstaged by this arrangement . . . question mark?

MB: Well, question mark . . . I know the last year or so with Marvin Marshak there were no problems at all when he was serving as acting vice-president. For example, with the history project, you saw how I functioned.

CAC: Yes.

MB: Basically, Nils would say, "All right. You're the project manager. Get it in place. Get it going."

CAC: That's an implementation responsibility.

MB: There was an implementation responsibility. Principally, it's controlling the agenda.

CAC: Yes.

MB: It's driving the president's agenda, driving the vice-presidents' agenda, the provosts' agenda to make sure that they make things happen.

CAC: What kind of access did you have, apart from the president's presence, with members of the Board of Regents.

MB: Very good access.

CAC: I see. So, you really had that, too?

MB: Oh, yes, very good access, very good access. One thing with the position, the way I worked the position—I'm not certain how my successor will do it—was that I tried to stay out of

the president's way. The president was always in the paper. The president was always the focus. I always played things very much . . . there wasn't ego involvement. I think that's an important part to being a chief of staff. You can't try to position yourself so that you're in the headlines. It's the president who's in the headlines. Nils was . . . can you think of a better person to work for? He was absolutely wonderful. We'll get into . . . is this tape going to turn over here in a minute?

CAC: I think we should call a recess here because we're almost out on this tape.

[End of Tape 2, Side 2]

[Tape 3, Side 1]

CAC: We're on the third side of our tape now. I think probably your definition of the creation of the job of chief of staff is an important administrative development. We've touched upon the background for the provostial positions. Do you have anything more on the tenure issue? I think we've resolved that.

MB: Yes, I think it is resolved.

CAC: Oral history is just to alert people. They'll have to go look at these documents. If the documents are available, that's the way to put it together, right?

MB: Right.

CAC: With the things you were suggesting here . . . excuse me, let's just pause again.

[break in the interview]

CAC: We paused just to see where we could go in our strategy now. On the document you brought in here—which is very helpful—we're now at point number five, what are the hallmarks of the Nils Hasselmo Administration? Just pick it there, then.

MB: I had been chairman of the Faculty Consultative Committee.

CAC: Yes.

MB: I think it was in 1993.

CAC: That's probably one of the reasons you came to his attention for this position?

MB: Oh, absolutely, yes. I knew what the issues were in Central Administration. The FCC in 1993 and 1994 . . .

CAC: This is the Faculty Consultative Committee.

MB: Faculty Consultative Committee . . . we were solidly behind the president on the whole ALG, Najarian business as that unfolded. We very much wanted and embraced the idea of a strategic plan, the U-2000 plan, but we were very frustrated by the pace at which that plan was being put together.

CAC: I see.

MB: Actually, I can remember working very closely with Keffeler on this because Jean was very much interested—she was vice-chair—in getting this strategic plan out for the university. Myself and others on the FCC were critical of the administration, critical of President Hasselmo for the delay in this issue.

CAC: Why do you think it was lagging?

MB: Part of it had to do with the fact that Gus Donhowe died unexpectedly.

CAC: Ah, yes.

MB: Who was the vice-president for Academic Affairs, the astronomer?

CAC: Kuhi.

MB: Yes, Lynn Kuhi.

CAC: He'd been brought in from the outside from Berkeley.

MB: He'd been brought in. This particular agenda item was the responsibility of that vice-president.

CAC: Sure.

MB: Kuhi resigned.

CAC: I assume because he realized he wasn't up to the speed that was required?

MB: The vice-president for Academic Affairs office has always been a black hole.

CAC: [laughter] Go ahead.

MB: It's never really been . . . I think the problem might be that it isn't adequately resourced; but, more than anything, I believe the problem with that office is that it's span of responsibility

is so broad that you can't really do the job unless you create, virtually, a provostial system within it. You needed a provostial system somewhere along the line in order to function. That's sort of what Bob Bruininks, the current vice-president of Academic Affairs, is more or less doing. He has three, now, vice-provosts. Bruininks is now called executive vice-president. Executive vice-president and provost is his title.

CAC: Yes, I understand.

MB: He's bringing in three vice-provosts. Right now, they're conceived as part-time positions. I'm not certain that you can really do what has to be done on a part-time basis; but, that's what Bob is trying to do. The senior vice-president for Academic Affairs is responsible for putting together, virtually, sixty percent of the Board of Regents' agenda, documents, and supporting materials every month.

CAC: Good grief! Ohhh!

MB: That's a huge job. He's responsible for every college on the Twin Cities campus in the old day. You recall that the Bruininks position now does not have the eight colleges that are in the Academic Health Center; but, it has all the other colleges. What Bob Bruininks is doing as executive vice-president is about, I would guesstimate, eighty percent of what Kuhl, and Infante, and Marshak were expected to do because he does not have the colleges now that are in the Academic Health Center.

CAC: I'm going to intervene just a moment. I am guessing that Mr. Kuhl, coming from California, had so much to learn that it was difficult for him to get on top of the job and move things along?

MB: Yes, I agree. I don't think there is a steep learning curve here. I think it's fairly flat and you've got to put in a couple, three years to figure out what's going on. That's one of the problems with this new administration. It is very, very green . . . the Yudof Administration. President, chief of staff, the executive vice-president, and so forth . . . there was a lot of turnover. This group is going to have to be given time to get up to speed.

CAC: Sure.

MB: It is an enormous job with a huge amount of information. What happened was in 1994, 1995, the strategic plan took shape. The strategic plan had benchmarks placed in it and it had critical measures. This really gave the university, I think, and Nils, and his administration the kind of focus that we needed to do what happened then over the course of the past three years in terms of change at the University of Minnesota. One of the larger changes, which I think I mentioned earlier, was the fact that that strategic plan with its critical measures is what caused, I believe, legislators to come to understand that you ought to be measuring the performance of this university in terms of the number of graduates, the research dollars brought in, the number

of years it takes on average for a student to graduate, the percentage of the freshman class that graduates within five years, and this type of thing. It was all output and not input. The U-2000 critical measures is, I think, the instrument that pulled the legislature away from this business of monitoring how many hours a faculty member teaches per week and so forth.

CAC: Good.

MB: This was a big contribution.

CAC: You're aware—I'm going to make a statement and you can challenge it if you wish—that many of the faculty couldn't understand . . . they were not fully aboard because they didn't understand the very significant shift that you're talking about. Is that a fair estimate?

MB: I think so. I think ninety percent of our faculty never did read U-2000. There is a document out there that runs about seventeen pages or so, which is U-2000.

CAC: I have. There's a level of ambiguity in some of the statements that makes it very difficult for faculty, who were doing their business from day-to-day, to understand what the hell is going on.

MB: Right. I don't think these plans come without ambiguity.

CAC: I'm not faulting it.

MB: That's in the nature of the beast.

CAC: Yes.

MB: This plan had that ambiguity.

CAC: Faculty don't live easily with ambiguity?

MB: No.

CAC: Okay. [laughter]

MB: No, they don't. The faculty were on Nils' heels, myself included.

CAC: For not moving fast enough and clearly enough?

MB: So, in 1995, when the tenure issue came on board—this was another complicated issue—I think that some people in viewing Nils and his administration concluded wrongly that the faculty

were not sympathetic with Nils and his administration and where it was going. That, I think, provided partial license to this ouster movement.

CAC: I understand, yes.

MB: People did not understand. When I joined the Hasselmo Administration, I must tell you, I talked to a lot of faculty about whether I should do it, and what we needed, and what the goals were and so forth. I discussed all of this with Nils. I was very, one hundred percent, open with the man. Right from the get-go, we knew that we had a lot of wrapping up to do for this administration to conclude nearly a decade with successes as its hallmark. As of 1995, they weren't all there.

CAC: You bet.

MB: One thing is that this U-2000 was put in place. The legislature began to think about the university and work with us very differently, and that was very big, and we saw this. Not only did they shift from input to output in their orientation in terms of critical measures but that U-2000 set up the 1998-1999 fiscal years that we're currently in now, which were bumper crop years for this university. I think over the two-year period, we received a sixteen percent increase in our appropriations from the state, a big increase in appropriations, because they began to understand what our problems were. They began to focus on science. They wanted cancer. They wanted biomedical engineering. They wanted a good Economics Department.

CAC: Sure.

MB: They wanted a Consortium in Family, Youth, and Children that worked and so forth. U-2000, I think, provided a framework for discussing with the legislature these broad issues, the broad directions, the broad focus, the broad outcomes that we ought to be measured against.

CAC: But there had to be specific outcomes along the way or it remains ambiguous?

MB: Yes, but the specifics are not found in the U-2000 document. The specifics are found in the biennial request, in the college plans, and so forth. That's where the specifics are.

CAC: Good. All right.

MB: Among Hasselmo's hallmarks is, in addition to this sort of big piece of working with the legislature and getting them to think about us in the right way, that Nils was able to also get people to think about the University of Minnesota as a research organization, as something different from the community colleges in MnSCU. This was GC. This was Waseca.

CAC: But, this goes back to [Kenneth] Keller.

MB: Yes.

CAC: Commitment to Focus . . . they changed the name but that part of it, as least.

MB: That's right. But he succeeded. Even though GC is open and running today, it will always forever be a different organization—if it continues to be open. But, look, the genie is out of the bottle there. This may come back—who knows—in different ways. I know President Yudof, our current president, doesn't want to take that issue on. That's not on his agenda at this point and probably for a good reason. I think that faculty, that dean . . . I think people think differently about GC as a result of the fact that it was discussed the way it was.

CAC: Yes. I was referring more largely to the fact of research, the unique contributions of the university derives out of Commitment to Focus. There's no change in that?

MB: There's no change in that. In fact, Hasselmo says this all the time.

CAC: Sure, yes, there's continuity.

MB: What he did was he finished what Ken started in that sense. Now, when you talk with the governor, when you talk with the High-Tech Council, when you talk with medical alley, when you talk to the productivity people in the state of Minnesota, when you talk to Business Partnership . . . these folks now are not talking about whether faculty members teach two or twenty hours in the classroom. They're no longer talking about whether teaching assistants speak English or not. What these people are now talking is what is the latest on milfoil? What is the latest on digital technology. They want us to be among the greats in this area. That whole conversation shift is one of the hallmarks, I think, of the Hasselmo Administration.

CAC: How did Nils come to that, to recognize . . . you rattled off five community groups? How did he come to that himself, do you think?

MB: What it was was is this was all part of dancing out U-2000 in 1995.

CAC: All right.

MB: U-2000 provided the vehicle to cause people to think about this. See, U-2000 isn't a great document from the standpoint of faculty; but, U-2000 wasn't written for faculty only.

CAC: Okay.

MB: It's perceived differently in different communities.

CAC: Sure.

MB: U-2000, the people in the legislature think is wonderful. The community think it's wonderful. They're not going to make the connection that this wondrous document is the vehicle that caused them to think differently about the university. They're not going to make that connection; but, that's exactly how President Hasselmo used it. Let me say this, what Nils did in a sort of broad stroke was he renewed the University of Minnesota's ability to compete among the top thirty research universities—we had lost this level of competitiveness—in three big ways. Number one: tenure as we know it in the top thirty, is preserved . . . a major battle, major banner point for Nils. Number two: Nils put in a compensation plan in 1990-1991. In Nils' first biennial period, no faculty compensation. In 1992-1993, Nils' second biennial, no faculty compensation. In 1994-1995, no faculty compensation. We had vice-presidents for Academic Affairs in those three biennial periods. The faculty compensation people were afraid to talk about it. Nils' associate to the president and others were afraid to talk about faculty pay. You can't talk about faculty pay. You can't talk about it because, then, they're going to want to know whether you're working twenty hours a week [unclear]. They're already fat cats. They're already elite. The whole image of the university, what we're supposed to do, how we're different from, what our mission is is understood in 1995-1996. It's understood and U-2000 is the fundamental document. It's understood. Now, we go into the biennial presentations for the 1998-1999 biennial, the one we're just now in and last year, and we have, with Marshak as v.p., compensation as our number one priority. I must tell you, people in the Institutional Relations office, our lobbyists, people in Finance and Operations who worked the legislature, all told us in 1995, "No, no salaries. They'll kill us. We'll not get anything. We've got to do buildings." The governor bought salaries. People understood that the faculty . . . if it's the mean salary among assistant, associate, and full, the weighted mean is twenty-eighth among the top thirty, you're not going to compete and you're not going to do the job. So, eight and a half percent this year, eight and a half percent next year, eight and a half percent the year after should bring us to the median. We set that out as an objective. The Board of Regents buy into it. Regent Tom Reagan buys into it. Bryan Neel, the vice-chair of the Board of Regents, and so forth all bought into this. So, tenure, the three-year compensation plan and focus on the University of Minnesota as a research university. Nils started this focus business, by the way, when he came on in his second year here and closed the Waseca campus, which was a major move. We used that, by the way, to argue that you don't need to lay off. We managed to relocate in productive ways tenured faculty on this campus, and the UM-D [University of Minnesota-Duluth], and so forth from that Waseca closing.

The third hallmark on the undergraduate initiative, a major, major initiative . . . Being a great research university does not mean that you snub your nose at undergraduate students and your undergraduate obligation to this state. What Nils managed to do was he managed with a very difficult board to produce critical measures that demand excellence, for example, by the year 2000 having eighty percent of your freshman undergraduate class coming from the top quarter of their high school graduating class. That's a target we may meet next fall, we may meet now this month when the numbers all come in. We may already be there. Nils was the one who put the K through 12 system's feet to the fire when it comes to preparation requirements of students. So, now, something like eighty-seven, eighty-eight percent of our students have got two years

of science, two years of language, three years of math, four years of English, and this type of thing. That's part of the undergraduate initiative. Eight years ago, whatever the reference point is, fifty, sixty percent of our freshman class lived on campus. This fall, something close to seventy-four percent of the freshman class will live on campus. A lot of buildings, a lot of new residential units are on this campus. The average class size has shrunk; I think it's now twenty-six. We have a higher percentage of full professors teaching undergraduate classes than we've had in recent history.

CAC: Now, this is done working through with deans of all the diverse colleges? How is this accomplished . . . the implementation?

MB: This undergraduate initiative . . . You also know, Clarke, that the number of applicants to the Twin City campus has just skyrocketed.

CAC: Yes.

MB: The University of Minnesota never recruited undergraduates. We didn't go out and recruit.

CAC: I know that, yes.

MB: We hired a fellow by the name Wayne Zeigler. Wayne is a football coach type guy. If you work with coaches, these coaches are the best salesmen in the world. They're go, go, gung-ho, high energy, exciting kind of people. That's what this Zeigler is. Zeigler has gone out and he has found us the best and the brightest. We have more merit scholars now than we've ever had in terms of where our freshman recruiting is.

CAC: He works through superintendents, principals, school systems?

MB: Yes. He also works with the admission officers in all the colleges. We have, as part of this undergraduate initiative, made enrolling easier. You can now enroll and you can now register on the Web.

CAC: Yes.

MB: He has managed all of that. We totally reorganized all undergraduate studies.

CAC: How did you get faculty to commit themselves to smaller classes and more senior faculty teaching undergraduate courses? How is that done?

MB: Nils, you recall, came out of Planning and Administration. Remember, he was the vice-president for Planning, or whatever it was called fifteen years ago or twenty years ago. Nils has required that the college plans, now for the last four years, have included, for example, performance statistics with respect to the recruiting of undergraduate students [unclear].

Everyone knows . . . the deans all know that we're collecting numbers on this stuff. When we put these critical measures like years to graduation, the percentage . . . when we started putting those critical measures, they know we're collecting data from that.

CAC: Yes. I appreciate that and it does make it clearer; but, I'm also interested in how you get the senior faculty to go along with the larger commitment to undergraduate instruction because that's also crucial. That's part of this grand plan.

MB: One of the things that we did when this undergraduate initiative took off was we changed the undergraduate course requirements. We set up the Liberal Education Council. You know that whole apparatus that's really centered right here out of CLA [College of Liberal Arts] . . .

CAC: Yes, right.

MB: . . . I think is a part of it. There are just hundreds and hundreds of courses that people have framed for this purpose. I have not been personally engaged in it.

CAC: Okay. But, it has to be done through the colleges, doesn't it, that part of it?

MB: Yes. The provost² really promoted this.

CAC: Ah!

MB: Over the last two years, our provost with their reporting deans have really focused on this level of activity. Our housing people, our facilities people in Academic Affairs and the president's office have worked, for example, with partnerships with, like, Jim Cargill to set up these new lovely residential dorms that are around the campus. The undergraduate initiative comes in many pieces. It has jelled. I fear, if Nils would have left in 1995 for example, you never would have seen this jelling. You would never have seen the success in the biennial budget that we have for this year. You'd never have seen the tenure success that we enjoy.

Another strength of Nils is the capital renewal problem. He gave focus to that. As you know, now Mark Yudof is picking up on that. Mark is sort of continuing that.

CAC: Oh, yes.

MB: He is now talking in terms of huge numbers, \$500 million over the next four years to totally redo the classrooms, the buildings, the technology, the wiring of all of the buildings on the Northrop Mall, jump Washington Street, all the way down to the river . . . a major investment. The legislature is excited about it. The governor is excited about it. I think Nils gave focus to that. He made it clear that if we're going to be players, we've got to do something with our buildings. We have this new beautiful bio-engineering building by the Coffman Memorial Union. We have this new Carlson building that's going up and the music building that

went in, a number of new residential halls, and now the new library access thing that's going to be on the Mississippi [River]. They've probably already done the ground breaking for that.

CAC: Oh, yes, they've dug a couple of shovels.

MB: All of that . . . when you think of Nils, you think about education, the undergraduate initiative. You think about him now building the faculty strength and paying a faculty over the future. You think of him in terms of the physical plant, the building activities that he's done. Then, in the area of fund raising, he's spent an enormous amount of time with the Foundation, and with its governing board, and the chair of that board, and with the Alumni Association. We have more members than ever in the Alumni Association. We have been very successful in our fund raising activities to endowments. For the last two and a half years, we have been planning for a major \$1 million endowment that will be rolled out here in another six months or year.

CAC: A lot of the money is already there. You have some of the money even before you dare announce it?

MB: Yes. We will have a lot of it before we dare announce it. He's bridged, I think, all of the areas. When we think of pay anymore, we think of merit. Remember the old across the board business of ten years ago? Nils [unclear] has been driven by merit. [unclear] and recognition of the University of Minnesota's contribution, it was Nils who was the first president who visited many foreign countries . . . his whole East Asia initiative. We have—I can't tell you—scores now of exchange agreements with emerging countries.

CAC: The payoff on those initiatives are really down the line, aren't they?

MB: In terms of graduate students, in terms of research, and Foundation grants . . .

CAC: Personal grants, right.

MB: I would say the last piece is that when Nils ended his term, his administration was very cooperative and worked closely with the board to bring in a successor president who also came in with as much fanfare as Nils left with. I think that's a responsibility of an administration, to set it up in such a way that you can attract a successor and that you can pass the baton to that successor with recognition and without warfare. Gosh, it's been decades since we've had that kind of transition. I can never remember it quite frankly . . .

CAC: Yes.

MB: . . . since the twenty-seven years I've been here.

CAC: Dick Sauer, who followed Ken Keller, really had to clean up a lot of difficulties. He had no way as an interim president of doing this.

MB: No. That was a big part of it . . . about Nils and what Nils brought to the game that I think were very important. First of all, Nils was willing to let people do their job. This also proved to be a weakness. There was no threat in the way he dealt with people. In many executive officers, there's a measure of threat. I'll give you your bay but if the horse runs in the wrong direction, then, you're going to be penalized. There was never that element of threat in Nils' relationships. Nils was a president who followed an internal compass in decision making. He had a set of values, which were values common to the academy, that he followed. You could see this play out in the way he dealt with undergraduate students, the way he dealt with the tenure issue, the way he dealt with the GC issue, and so forth. He knew the right thing to do and that, oftentimes, meant going up against some very, very powerful people in this state and people on the Board of Regents. Nils was an incredibly good salesman. In the end, with every battle, Nils always made the sales pitch that was the winning pitch. He had that gift. Here was a guy who was really principle-based in his decision making. He probably wasn't pragmatic enough in some instances; but, by and large, if I had to err on pragmatism versus principles, I'd just as soon be able to predict and know the kind of person with whom I'm dealing. I would rather have a principle-based person. Everyone recognizes and heralds his civility.

CAC: Yes.

MB: Yes. I've personally witnessed situations where you had regents and other powerful types wailing, and crying, and wringing their hands and so forth and Nils just would never break. He always had a smile. He always appeared to be attentive. There was always that eye contact. There was no looking at your hands or looking at your feet with Nils.

CAC: [laughter]

MB: He was always watching you and you knew that you were the subject of his interest. You had his undivided attention. People saw that as a weakness. Because of his civility, people often don't see him as a strong, courageous kind of leader. This is the most interesting thing I've ever witnessed. I've heard people say this and I've never been able to understand it because this guy has got more guts than ninety-nine percent of humanity. You don't easily require very powerful faculty to play by the rules of grant's management. It's so much easier to walk away from that issue.

CAC: Which many presidents had with the ALG? They knew about this? I'm stating that as a question.

MB: I won't comment on it on record since it's a matter before the courts.

CAC: All right.

MB: This is a guy who made very tough calls on the merits and that's what I respect about Nils so much. As an arbitrator, I like to call things on their merit regardless of the political

consequence. He did this. In the case of General College, the regents and others were just on Nils' heels wanting him to sort of wave the bloody flag. What colleges should be closed? What colleges are your problem colleges? On and on and on . . . and they were whipping Phil Shively to get him to do these things. When Phil and Nils do their analysis, they come up with an identified problem and they articulate the problem . . . political heat results. They all bolt, as do politicians, but Shively and the president stood there. This took courage to do this. To face Becky Kelso and the chairman of the Board of Regents, the vice-chairman of the Board of Regents, and so forth to say, "Here's the way it is on tenure; please, don't issue the Morris version of a tenure code," took a lot of courage. This is a man who months earlier folks were trying to show the door to.

CAC: Do you think Nils was ever tempted to go out the door earlier?

MB: Oh, yes, I think so. I think he was tempted to; but, it's not in his makeup. This is a guy who if there's a suggestion that there might be controversy, that there might be a war of words, Hasselmo is not going to run from that battle. He enjoys it. He enjoys the give and take.

CAC: He must have had months of discouragement [unclear].

MB: Very much so.

CAC: Excuse me.

[break in the interview - the telephone rings]

MB: Nils, of course, had his down moments; but, they were relatively rare. I'll tell you who Nils found tremendous comfort in and that's his wife, Pat. As you know, the spouse, oftentimes, is the one who feels the brunt of some of these . . .

CAC: Sure.

MB: She picks it up in circles that the president doesn't pick them up with. He held the course and the University of Minnesota is so much better off for this.

I think back to conversations with Paul Murphy, and with Ellen Bercheid, and with John Adams and with others back in 1974 and 1975. All of the faculty, then, that I knew, including myself, very much wanted Nils to stay because we were afraid of the future of this university. We were fearful.

CAC: This is when he went to Arizona?

MB: No, this was 1995, when there was some talk . . .

CAC: Oh, I'm sorry. You said 1975.

MB: Did I say 1975? I meant 1995. There was some thought that, perhaps, he wouldn't be renewed or should resign or this type of thing. Nils knew what the faculty wanted. Nils stayed from 1995 to 1997 because the faculty wanted him to.

CAC: The expression of that faculty support was made clear to him personally?

MB: It was very clear to him personally. That's right . . . very clear to him. In fact, my decision to join Nils was premised on the knowledge that he was going to continue, that no one was going to roll over on this. [laughter] That was very important. When I came in, I never saw myself as a continuing administrator. I didn't see myself as part of the bureaucracy. When I made the decision to join Central Administration, I pretty much knew in my own mind that Nils would be there for the three years.

CAC: If I hear you correctly, it was a very rewarding three years for you as well as for the university. You really took hold and had a good time?

MB: I had a ball.

CAC: You feel rewarded?

MB: I feel personally rewarded. The challenges were enormous; but, I really sense a victory in the end. We got bruised on some of our fourth down plays; but, we won the game.

I will tell you an anecdote. When Nils first offered me my position, it was in the form of a letter that called for a three-year appointment. I respectfully requested of him that it be a one-year appointment subject to renewal on a mutual basis. I knew what the challenges were. I knew there was a lot of board politics, a lot of things that had to be sorted out with the local newspapers, and a lot of issues out there. I felt that I might have a role in some of that. My concern was that it might be too hot for me, that I might end up embarrassing the president, making life difficult for him; so, if it were a one-year term, it would be so much easier for me to leave and for him to get rid of me. We left it that way. Nils, therefore, appointed me three times.

CAC: [laughter]

MB: I got an offer at the end of every year . . .

CAC: Bravo.

MB: . . . and at the end of every year, I accepted. It wasn't just one contract, it was three. It's equally great to be on with my other . . . my life as an academic . . .

CAC: You describe a position that was energizing because of the challenges that were there and the support that Mr. Hasselmo was giving to all of these initiatives, etcetera. I think we shouldn't close the record without your saying something of the commitment it meant for you on a daily, weekly, monthly, annual way. You worked pretty damned hard.

MB: Let me say that in describing Nils' qualities as a leader, his laissez-faire, his integrity, his courage, his value-center . . . another aspect to his qualities as a leader is that this guy works his butt off. I have never met a person in my life who puts in the hours that Hasselmo puts in. I think Nils sleeps about four or five hours a night. The University of Minnesota was Nils' and Pat's life for nine years . . . weekends, holidays, and so forth

CAC: Sure.

MB: Nils, I'd guess, put in around an eighty-hour work week. I probably worked a seventy, seventy-five hour work week, easily. I could not do any research. I didn't even entertain the idea of teaching.

CAC: It was hard on family, too, Mike.

MB: Very hard on family. I managed two dissertations through that three-year period. That was about all I could do from the standpoint of non-academic work. Peggy, my wife, was a real trooper in this. She hung in. She got tired of it. I couldn't do seven, or eight, or nine years of this thing. You're right, it was a huge commitment of time. It was a commitment that paid off in terms of the outcomes, in terms of the fanfare that Nils and his administration received as he leaves now. I'll tell you that there's another aspect of the payoff. I was over in Morrill Hall this morning to drop off my mailing address for folks down in Arizona. We now have rented a house down there. I can't tell you what a warm reception I received, not only from Yudof and Tanya Brown, my successor, but also from all of the staff, all the secretaries and the research associates, and so forth that are over there. It was really a pretty comfortable period for me. I made a lot of friends. I certainly understand how a \$2 billion a year organization works. I was in a catbird seat to see that.

CAC: But you don't want to do it again?

MB: I don't, no. I'm just not interested in it at this point. I just came back from Hawaii where I gave a paper. I'm preparing a paper now to give in Paris on September 25th.

CAC: After the year in Arizona, you're planning to come back here?

MB: Come back, yes. This new chief of staff position, by the way, is classified at this vice-presidential level as I suggested. As a result, I qualified for administrative transition leave . . .

CAC: I would hope so.

MB: . . . which is something that an assistant to the president does not qualify for.

CAC: I see.

MB: As a result, I'll be on leave and that's fully paid.

CAC: What will you be doing in Arizona?

MB: I'll be a visiting professor in the economics department, not teaching.

CAC: Oh, I see. Ah.

MB: I'm a visiting professor. I did not take a teaching appointment. My obligation with them is to help them put together a conference for next March and to give a few guest lectures; but, by and large, I have three papers I'm writing and I have four formal presentations that I've already scheduled throughout the course of the year..

CAC: I thought you were going to have to teach and move right into there.

MB: No, I am not teaching. That's one of the administrative transition leave benefits.

CAC: That's good.

MB: It's a super benefit.

CAC: Oh, yes . . . really essential.

MB: Oh, yes.

CAC: There's no way you could go back without getting refueled.

MB: I didn't read a journal for three years.

CAC: Of course not.

MB: I left Morrill Hall on August 1st. I'll bet you I have read forty journal articles since August 1st.

CAC: [laughter]

MB: I'm back at it now.

CAC: These new eyes are working okay?

MB: The left one is working. The right one, I'm not using yet. [laughter] But, that's it!

CAC: That's a good story. Florence and I are hoping to be in Arizona this winter. We always, because of her health and other things, try to get where there's no ice on the sidewalk.

MB: Where do you go?

CAC: We've been in Tucson. We've been in southern New Mexico. We've been in Santa Fe. We've been in Berkeley, in the bay area. We've been in New Zealand. For ten years, we've been going away winters.

MB: Will you be there this winter?

CAC: We're going down in September, next Sunday, to scout out Albuquerque and Tucson and see if we can find a place for three months.

MB: We just contracted yesterday with a realtor . . .

CAC: For a whole year . . . nine months?

MB: . . . for ten months, a nice three bedroom with patio home, right on a golf course. This is the La Paloma Estates.

CAC: I know it.

MB: That's where we're at. We're in the La Paloma area.

CAC: If we get to Arizona, we'll look you up.

MB: Nils will be there. On October 15th, he and Pat are arriving. Henry Koffler is down there. You remember Henry?

CAC: Yes.

MB: Who else?

CAC: We have lots of friends in the area, a lot of retired friends. Bill Martin in Soils is down there. I talked with Nils very briefly before he left office. He said, "I don't think I can do this until next summer," with me.

MB: Right. He's very busy.

CAC: He's busy; but, he has to have more time to reflect.

MB: Yes.

CAC: I should think he'd have to get his . . . I don't know how you can go through nine years of that physically.

MB: I'm, I think, six or seven years younger than Nils. I would drag in at a seven-thirty meeting just sort of watching him to see whether or not there's any signs of fatigue. [laughter] He always looks spry and bubbly.

CAC: This spring when I had to see him about this project again, I thought he looked pretty tired.

MB: Yes, I think towards the end . . . moving out. This whole moving business. It's the change aspect that is difficult. It's not the challenge of day-to-day work. It's sort of the change; that's the hard part. A number of us were at Eastcliff at something for Nils and I was sort of waxing eloquently on what a great guy he is and all this business and was talking about the civility aspect of his character. I was telling the story that I would be in a meeting and Nils is sitting there politely and gentlemanly like, taking this incredible beating from whomever on the other side. Here I am, I am so anxious to engage in a different way that he's got to hold me in my seat or I'll start duck walking around the room and I'll become animated. [laughter]

CAC: [laughter]

[End of Tape 2, Side 1]

[End of the Interview]

Transcribed by:

Hermes Transcribing and Research Service
12617 Fairgreen Avenue, Apple Valley, MN 55124
(612) 953-0730