

# National Minorities in East Central Europe and the Balkans in Historical Perspective

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A description of even a part of the enormous number of historical trials, agonies and claims of the various national minorities in east central Europe and the Balkans would fill many volumes. Therefore I will not attempt to enumerate the history of all the national minorities; what I shall try to do here is to look at the fundamental historical causes of the problems of national minorities and then look at several individual cases which exemplify different types of problems. My hope is that by understanding the underlying causes of the problems, one might better see what measures could be taken to end them, and not just take short term steps to alleviate some of the symptoms.

My basic premise is that in order to throw light on the problems of national minorities one must really understand the fundamental nature and workings of nationalism, the movement and ideology which lies at the basis of contemporary problems of the national minorities. And in order to understand the dynamics of nationalism one must examine it, in turn, in its historical context.<sup>(1)</sup> Historians who view the current intensity of nationalism and of nationalist rivalry have a chilling sense of *déjà vu*. Those who have studied nationalism in its many past and present manifestations are awed by its immense power and by the religious fervor with which it grips its adherents. Historians speak of

political nationalism as dating primarily from the end of the eighteenth century. The concept of a nation had been used much earlier, of course, primarily in attempts by rulers to legitimize the seizure of territory and centralize their rule. Nationalism, to a great degree, was an outgrowth of *étatisme*, and bears a very strong resemblance to it in that nationalism also involves ideas of strong centralization. However, with the end of the old order in France and the need to legitimize the revolutionary régime, the concept of a nation acquired new meaning. The idea arose out of Enlightenment ideology that nations themselves were products of "natural law." As Carnot, one of the major leaders of the revolutionary forces in 1793, wrote, "Actually the nations are among themselves in the political order what individuals are among themselves in the social order."<sup>(2)</sup> In order to consolidate power behind the revolution the French government promoted the idea of nationalism and also sent teachers of the French language throughout the country so that the country would be linguistically united as well and all citizens would be able to understand the revolutionary proclamations.<sup>(3)</sup> In subsequent years the idea of nationalism was taken up by the opponents of France, particularly in the German states and the Habsburg lands, with the major motivation being to unite against the revolutionary French nation. The arguments of such men as Fichte and Herder called for a study of the historical and spiritual nature of the nation, *Das Volk*, with the purpose of unifying the people and consolidating their strength vis-à-vis other nations. While we shall not go deeply into the subject here, it is important to note that nationalism evolved at the same time as idealist philosophy, romanticism, and racism, and all of these had a profound influence on nationalist ideology and ideas of inherent national character. Thus nationalism was imbued from the beginning with ideas of mystical and legendary qualities adhering to different people.

Historians speak of cultural and political nationalism as developing in the eighteenth century, and of economic nationalism emerging in the nineteenth century. There is a paradox involved in studying nationalism which it is important to view at the outset. On the one hand, nationalism has become such a major -- if not the major -- factor in modern history, that it is important to note that the concept itself is rather new in historical terms. We have become so accustomed to it as an enormous power in modern political life, that we tend to forget that it is indeed an artificial construct. On the other hand, nationalism has become such an *elemental* force in the human psyche that it cannot be lightly disregarded as either artificial or irrational. Nationalism appears to flow from deep psychic and cultural needs in human beings, and it is probably no coincidence that nationalist ideology grew up concurrently with the decline of theology and the dominance of the church. In a modernizing world, the ideology of nationalism could offer the certainty of status and place which had earlier been offered by the cultural universal aspects of religious certainty and of tribal, clan, or community cohesion. At the same time it offered political leaders a legitimizing ideology to replace the idea of divine rule and to mobilize vast numbers of people in support of the state. Already in the 1930s the inveterate scholar of nationalism, Hans Kohn, in his study of nationalism in the Soviet Union, discussed the religious qualities of nationalism, and what he saw as nationalism serving, as it were, as a functional equivalent of religion in the modern secular world.<sup>(4)</sup> On a more fundamental basis, psychologists speak of the individual's need, particularly in

unstable circumstances, for "external identifiers," of which nationalism is certainly one of the most important.<sup>(5)</sup>

Nationalism also spread throughout Eastern Europe at the end of the eighteenth century, but in examining this region it is vital to look at two fundamental differences between Eastern and Western Europe. In the first place, and probably most important, while nationalism in much of Western Europe developed within the framework of Enlightenment ideals, such as freedom of the individual within society, in Eastern Europe the cry for national freedom did not entail a call for political democracy at all; national freedom meant freedom for the nation, not the individual. Put in another way, in Western Europe nationalism became part and parcel of the bourgeoisie's ideology, while for the most part in Eastern Europe, with several exceptions, it was part of the ideology of the nobility, and it was the battle cry for their own liberty. Secondly, the scattering and intermingling of various ethnic groups was so much greater in Central and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe that, as one scholar has correctly noted, in Western Europe nationalism had a centripetal effect while in Eastern Europe it had a centrifugal effect. In the eighteenth century in Central and Eastern Europe nationalism emerged in a struggle within the Ottoman, Habsburg and Romanov dynasties. Following the same general pattern, the movements emphasized culture, with much attention to developing a consciousness of the group's history, literature, folktales, and language.<sup>(6)</sup> Throughout most of the nineteenth century the power of the empires was so great that most of the movements were in a very poor position to promote full scale independence, but rather argued for cultural, linguistic or limited political autonomy. Partly because of the limited power and also because of a fear of being swallowed up in the large empires, the importance of language and linguistic rights became -- and remains to this day -- one of the most essential elements in nationalist thinking. It was Count Istvan Széchenyi who expressed the common idea that "The Nation lives in its language."<sup>(7)</sup> At the same time, in order to hold back the power of minority nationalities, repression of national languages became a major weapon.

The importance of language was part of the program of preserving the national entity and "awakening" the ideal of nationhood which was seen as long asleep under the domination of others. Those who promoted the new nationalist ideas called themselves "Awakeners," because they saw themselves as awakening the people from a long sleep to once again be conscious of their nationalities. Upon reflection the term "awakeners" can be viewed to belie the depths of nationalist belief among the population at large. The term reveals the degree to which it was only the intellectuals and elites who were profoundly conscious of concepts of nationality, as well as underscoring the degree to which the new nationalism was in fact in great part an artificial construct. From the late eighteenth through the nineteenth centuries Czechs and Slovaks, Serbs and Croats, Greeks and Albanians and Poles and Rumanians and other nationalities sought to discover their historic past and construct unifying languages where none had existed before. Czechs, Slovaks, Rumanians, Russians, Croats and Serbs reconstituted their languages, either by adopting a local dialect as a national language (Serbo-Croatian, Slovak), or by deleting foreign words and adding neologisms (Russians), or by adding Latin words, as did the Rumanians, to prove their ancient Roman origins.<sup>(8)</sup> Great efforts were made to trace both

the roots of national character and historical origins. At times the efforts to define national character and national uniqueness reached unparalleled heights of chauvinism, as witnessed by a not untypical poem of the age.<sup>(9)</sup>

My father is Serb, my mother is Serb.  
All my ancestors were Serb.  
The heaven is blue, Serbia's color.  
God who lives in heaven is a Serb too.

The finding of the past was sometimes difficult and was often tailored to suit the political and geographic needs of the present. Father Paisii in Bulgaria attempted to prove the descent of modern Bulgarians from the sons of Noah, while both Lithuanians and Rumanians claimed Roman origins. Hungarians and Rumanians argued over the ethnicity of the original settlers in Transylvania, while both Croats and Serbs claimed their descent from the original Illyrians.<sup>(10)</sup> The ultimate purpose of such endeavors was to demonstrate that a given nationality was the first in the area and therefore had a rightful historical claim to the area. Languages became vital in proving and maintaining the actual existence of the various nations.

The concept of who exactly comprised the nation itself evolved. In Poland, Hungary, Croatia and among the boyars of Wallachia and Moldavia the initial idea of the nation, for example the "Natio Hungarica," meant the nobility alone. In some instances the idea was held that the nobility was descended from a separate race of people. Concepts of nationality came to change and eventually varied from area to area. In both historical Poland and Hungary there were vast numbers of people who were neither ethnic Poles nor ethnic Magyars. Thus, as the intellectuals discussed Polish nationality, the concept evolved in the nineteenth century from pertaining to the nobility alone to all those who had lived under the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In its later evolution, with the coming of the Polish Republic following the first world war, the ideas of the National Democrats (*Narodowa Demokracja* or ENDEKS) took precedence, so that to be Polish came to mean to be only of Polish ethnicity and Roman Catholic as well. In Hungary, a wider view of nationhood developed in which the Magyar nobility expanded the idea of nationhood not only to include all Magyars, but because of their minority position in the country, for a time welcomed all nationalities to become magyarized.<sup>(11)</sup>

In the course of the nineteenth century there was hardly an ethnic group in Europe that was not affected by the wave of nationalist feelings. In many cases the wave arose in reaction to the claims of the larger or dominant nationalities. Such was the case of the smaller groups within the Habsburg lands in reaction to German or Magyar nationalism. And such was the case, for example, of the Jews, spread throughout the region, when Theodore Herzl patterned the Zionist movement on the other nationalist movements within Europe. One should mention in this connection that a vital and complicating factor in the increase of nationalist rivalries was that of religion. In cases where ethnic

differences also included religious differences, such became a basic part of the rhetoric of national enmity. As the movements grew there were efforts to find allies. One such effort was the rise of the pan-German and pan-Slavic movements and the Illyrian (South Slav) movements. Another was the attempt by various nationalities to find allies among the great powers. This is reflected in a verse that was added to the nationalist song "Hej Slovane" at the Prague fair in 1891.<sup>(12)</sup>

Zije, zije, duch slovanský, na vzdor roste, kvete!  
Rus je s námi; kdo proti nám, toho Francouz smete!

It lives, it lives, the Slav spirit, defiantly it grows  
and flowers!  
The Russian is with us, the Frenchmen will sweep  
away whoever is against us!

There were attempts, as well, to hold various nationalities together in order to counter the strength of potential enemies. Already in mid-nineteenth century the Czech historian and nationalist Frantisek Palacký argued for a continued federation of central European nations within the framework of the Habsburg monarchy, with the elemental rationale that if the small nations were to pursue their own independent paths they would fall prey to the larger states on their borders. Similar ideas were raised by the Hungarian revolutionary leader, Lajos Kossuth, among others, and were to be raised periodically in the twentieth century, particularly in the interwar period and during the period of Soviet hegemony over the region following the Second World War.

In the formative years of nationalist movements, when the possibilities of actual independence were not great, the conflicting claims of historical precedence or extravagant descriptions of large empires in the past could do little harm, but in the latter part of the nineteenth century, and particularly in the early twentieth century, when actual borders came to be drawn, the rival claims to the same territory became virulent. The great watershed was the first world war, when the Habsburg and Romanov empires dissolved, and the Ottoman empire was buried once and for all. As new nations were founded three vital questions arose. The first was the question of borders which would be agreeable to various nations. In the course of the nationalist movements of the nineteenth century, the emphasis on the past had often created rival claims to the same territory by two or more ethnic groups. No sooner was the war over than these theoretical claims took on an urgent reality. Germans and Poles took up arms to fight over Silesia, Poles and Lithuanians over Vilnius (Wilno, Vilna), and Czechs and Poles over the Duchy of Tesin (Cieszyn, Teschen), and the Hungarians and Rumanians over Transylvania, to mention but a few of the conflicts which to this day have not been settled to the satisfaction of all parties. The fundamental problem in all claims to territorial rights based on historical precedence was not only the difficulty in proving such precedence, but the fact that occupation of the territories had often changed over the centuries and if any past occupiers of a territory claimed it, others could do so as well. A prime example was Silesia, where Polish nobles held sway in the middle ages, but put themselves under Bohemian suzerainty by the thirteenth century, and then the land became Habsburg

territory until Friedrich the Great captured upper Silesia from the Habsburgs. Under such circumstances rival Polish, Czech and German claims of historical rights arose. By that time the population was ethnically quite diverse. Who in such circumstances had the right to rule?

This problem relates strongly to the second basic question provoked by the founding of the new nations. This question had to do with what to do with enclaves of other nationalities who were included in the new state, but whose own national majority was in a different and often contiguous state. For with the drawing of new frontiers, in each case pockets of other nationalities were included within the borders of the new states. The new Polish state was built upon a territory in which approximately seventy percent of the population was ethnically Polish, while the rest of the population, left over from the non-ethnic and diverse Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, consisted of Ukrainians, Jews, Germans and others (Table I).

**Table I**

<b>Polish Population by Ethnicity (1921)</b>		
<b>Nationality:</b>	<b>Number:</b>	<b>Percentage:</b>
Polish	18,814,239	69.2
Ukrainian-Ruthenia	3,898,451	14.3
Belorussian	1,060,154	3.9
Jewish	2,110,448	7.8
German	1,059,154	3.9
Lithuanian	68,627	0.3
Russian	36,239	0.1
Czech	30,638	0.1
Other	29,153	0.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>27,176,717</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source:** Joseph Rutkowski, *East-Central Europe Between the Two World Wars* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1974), p. 36. The percentage listed as Polish is misleading, because a number of people of other nationalities listed themselves as Polish. (In terms of religion, for example, the Jews appear as 10.5 percent of the total population. *Loc. cit.*)

Czechoslovakia was comprised of only some sixty-five percent Czechs and Slovaks. (See Table 2) With the signing of the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, historic Hungary lost almost two thirds of its territory and one-third of its population. Over three million Magyars were left on the other side of the borders. (See Table 3) Rumania, now including Transylvania, also became a multi-ethnic state with a great number of Hungarians (See Table 4). In Bulgaria, over ten percent of the population was Turkish.<sup>(13)</sup> Without going into detail in all of the cases, it becomes clear that in such circumstances, which were repeated throughout east-central Europe and the Balkans, solutions to the problem of drawing borders were extremely difficult.

**Table II**

<b>Czechoslovak Population by Ethnicity (1921)</b>		
<b>Mother Tongue:</b>	<b>Number:</b>	<b>Percentage:</b>
Czechoslovak	8,768,937	65.51
German	3,120,566	23.36
Magyar	742,431	5.57
Ukrainian/Ruthenian	461,849	3.45
Hebrew and Yiddish	180,855	1.35
Polish	75,853	0.57

Source: Rothchild, *East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars*, p. 89.

**Table III**

<b>Hungarian Population and Losses after World War I.</b>			
<b>Historic Hungary (Without Croatia-Slavonia)</b>	<b>Area (sq. km.)</b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>Magyars (Eugenicist)</b>
	282,870	18,264,533	9,944,627
<b>Lost to:</b>			
Austria	4,020	201,518	26,153
Czechoslovakia	61,233	3,517,568	1,066,685
Poland	389	23,562	230
Rumania	103,893	5,257,467	1,661,805
Yugoslavia	20,251	1,309,295	452,265
Italy	21	49,306	6,403
<b>Total Losses</b>	<b>189,907</b>	<b>10,640,416</b>	<b>3,213,637</b>
<b>Residual Hungary</b>	<b>92,963</b>	<b>7,615,117</b>	<b>6,730,990</b>

Source: After 1910 data. Rothchild, *East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars*, p. 155.

**Table IV**

<b>Rumanian Population by Ethnicity, 1930</b>		
<b>Individual Declaration of Ethnicity:</b>	<b>Number:</b>	<b>Percentage:</b>
<b>Rumanian</b>	<b>12,981,324</b>	<b>71.9</b>
<b>Hungarian</b>	<b>1,425,307</b>	<b>7.9</b>
<b>German</b>	<b>745,421</b>	<b>4.1</b>
<b>Jewish</b>	<b>723,115</b>	<b>4.0</b>
<b>Ukrainian</b>	<b>384,115</b>	<b>3.2</b>
<b>Russian</b>	<b>407,190</b>	<b>2.3</b>
<b>Gypsy</b>	<b>262,301</b>	<b>1.5</b>
<b>Turk and Tatar</b>	<b>175,915</b>	<b>1.0</b>
<b>Japanese</b>	<b>105,790</b>	<b>0.6</b>
<b>Other: (Polish, Greek, Armenian, etc.)</b>	<b>171,940</b>	<b>0.9</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>18,057,026</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: Rothchild, East-Central Europe Between the Two World Wars, p. 284.**

The third question which arose was closely related to the second question. This was the problem of peoples who did not belong to the dominant nationality of the new nation but also did not have an outside homeland of their own which could bring political pressure on their behalf. A prime example in this case would be the case of the Jews and Gypsies. Such groups were considered very little in the intoxicating rush to build the new nationalist states. It is indeed no accident that in his otherwise very useful and classic study of nationalism in eastern Europe Emil Niederhauser does not even mention the Gypsies and devotes less than one page to the Jews. This is typical of the discussions of nationalism in recent years, because such discussions have dominated by the idea of the "national" state as a natural entity, and national rivalries and questions of national minorities have been viewed in terms of the larger players who are nationalities with their own national states behind them.

The essence of the problems of national minorities, then, arises from these three problems: national, or more exactly, nationalist frontiers; enclaves of nationalities left over on one side of the border from contiguous states; and the nationalities scattered and intermingled within the nationalist states. A fourth category might also be mentioned, and that is the confederated state. Here one particular nationality holds power because of its numerical or political strength. Such was the case of the relationship of the Czechs and Slovaks or the Yugoslav state, whose political life tended to be dominated by the majority Serbs throughout its existence.



One more essential element must be included as part of the equation of nationalism and that is the emergence of economic nationalism in the late nineteenth century. Its roots lay in the idea of ending real or perceived dominance by other nationalities and in concepts of protectionism. In some instances, such as the "organic" movement in Poland, the cry was to develop one's own ethnic economy. In its full blown form, in the twentieth century, the idea of economic nationalism became vital in promoting the adherence of the general populace to nationalist minded leaders, and became an important factor in upholding centralized authoritarian rule by such nationalist leaders. In addition, there was a clear tendency to hold back economic development by avoiding cooperation with other national rivals.<sup>(14)</sup>

Throughout the period between the two world wars nationalist consciousness and nationalist rivalries became increasingly intense. Each new state not only had a sizable number of national minorities within its new borders, but was faced with the political problem of protecting members of its own dominant ethnic group caught on the other side of the frontiers when borders were defined. The very fact that the new states were founded on nationalist principles, and that the leaders were now for the most part elected in at least a semi-democratic fashion, meant that politicians were forced to outdo each other in their claims to be ardent nationalists in order to be elected and stay in power. (It should, of course, be noted that while the rhetoric was nationalist, the real political agenda could well be something else, especially the defense of particular individual, class, group or party interests.) Thus in an atmosphere of such nationalism, which became the legitimizing rhetoric of the new states, few leaders could afford to speak of giving in to the national claims of rival nationalist states. The nationalist central authority tended to be self-perpetuating because it obtained and maintained its legitimacy by proclaiming to its people again and again that it was the vital defender of the national purpose and the national traditions. More than any other factor, this use of nationalism as a means of holding power was the driving force for the growth and depth of nationalism in the period since the first world war. A corollary of this virulent nationalism was that the rights of national minorities suffered. This was so not only because extreme nationalist politicians predominated in the parliaments, but because increasingly the ideology of the most extreme nationalists came to the fore in nationalist thinking. While, as we have indicated before, there was an element of cosmopolitanism in early nationalism, i.e., to the degree that various peoples living on the territory of the Poles or Hungarians or Germans, for that matter, were considered to be members of the respective nations. Now the battle cry, to cite one important example noted earlier, was that to be Polish was to be not only ethnically Polish, but also Roman Catholic, which meant, in fact, that at least a third of the population of the Polish state was excluded from this group. It was put forth that the physical law that two bodies could not occupy the same space applied to nationalities as well.

Consequently, repression of minority ethnic groups increased throughout this period and culminated in the rise of ultra-nationalism in the guise of fascist movements such as the Iron Guard in Rumania, the Arrow Cross in Hungary and the Ustasi in Croatia. Historians and political scientists have repeatedly pointed out that nationalism becomes an ever more powerful force among the people when there is political or economic instability.

And one sees that in the interwar period, just as we see again at the present time, nationalist feelings increase as political or economic life becomes more uncertain. In the circumstances we have described, where increasingly nationalist leaders came to power, it was nearly impossible for politicians to sit down with one another and compromise. At their backs there were always people with even more fervent nationalist programs willing to take over. In addition, leaders could and did utilize nationalist rhetoric to maintain authoritarian régimes, with nationalism being merely a thin veneer which served to hold off democratic movements.

It is in light of what we have discussed above that one must see the problems of national minorities in order to better understand the individual cases. Magyars in Rumanian territory; Turks and Muslims in general in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia; Jews and Gypsies everywhere. Several brief examples might serve to delineate the types of problems involved in the case of nationalist rivalry and ethnic minorities. In the nineteenth century, as the Ottoman empire broke up, the Greeks, Bulgarians, Turks and Albanians all sought to reestablish rule over some of their ancient territory, and all had members of their ethnic group scattered throughout the Balkans. Thus all felt that they could lay claim to parts of Macedonia in the twentieth century and have thus actually done battle over it; and thus an area such as Western Thrace which contained Turks, Bulgars and Greeks, became the subject of conflict.<sup>(15)</sup> A further and typical example of the complexity of rival claims is that of the Serbs and Albanians to Kossovo. On the one side are the Serbs, who have remembered Kossovo through the centuries in folk tales and folk songs as the place where the great battle had been fought against the Turks in 1389. They revere its anniversary as the Serbian national holiday. On the other side, the majority of the population in the area today are Muslim Albanians, fighting for their rights in the same territory. In this case as in many others, there is little hope of disentangling the antagonism which years of fighting over national rights have engendered, and it is often impossible to judge who is right in their claims.

A similar case based on rival claims is the continuing problem of the rights of Magyars in Rumanian ruled Transylvania. The Hungarians could claim a historic right to Transylvania, but the population was also heavily Rumanian, so that both nations fought for power over it. National minorities, which included Szekelers, Saxons, and Jews as well, became the victims of this battle. In the 1930s both nations vied with each other for Hitler's favor in order to be granted sole sovereignty over the region, and it was primarily because of their desire to have Transylvania that both Hungary and Rumania entered the second world war on the side of Hitler. This is a prime example of the complications which have arisen when nationalities have turned to outside allies to further their aims, as in fact they often have done. If we had time, we could indeed discuss the origins of the first world war in the context of the interplay of the interests of various nationalities with those of larger powers. In a similar manner, the degree to which Croatians or Ukrainians or Baltic nationalities joined with the Nazi powers reflected this same problem. The result was that local ethnic rivalries took on extra-national proportions. In several instances the problems were transformed by harsh measures during and after the second world war. During the war the Jewish and Gypsy population was decimated. After the war the mass expulsion of some eleven million ethnic Germans from east-central Europe did away with

a good part of the German minority question, although the political movement of the expelled (*vertriebene*) Germans continues to this date. At the same time, the movement of the Polish borders westward removed the vast majority of the Ukrainian population from Polish rule.

Nationalism has proven to be a dangerous two edged sword. It has surely had its very positive side, in that it has promoted the growth of culture, of literature, music and art; it has provided a sense of well being in an uncertain world; and it has provided unifying strength against national oppression. At the same time nationalism has been the outstanding cause of warfare and hatred in the last century. Nationalism feeds upon itself and grows ever stronger because it must keep growing to stay in power; in so doing it must assert its rights against minority ethnic groups within its domain. Thus, unfortunately, one nationality's freedom and independence can mean the oppression of other nationalities. The fact that politicians use nationalism to attain and maintain power is the very key to the strength of nationalism. It should never be forgotten that the Nazi campaign in Europe, which ended with the death of over fifty million people, was in essence merely an extreme example of nationalist fervor; the nationalist and racist extermination of "inferior" nationalities and national minorities was merely an extension of the nationalist conflicts we have discussed here.

The most appropriate short term answer to the problems of national minorities may be to protect their rights as much as possible, by engendering laws and international agreements guarding such rights, while at the same time promoting compromise on territorial disputes. Yet in the long run even this will do little good if the underlying forces of nationalism are not confronted and dealt with.

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## Appendix

### *Contemporary Nationalities - 1980s<sup>(16)</sup>* (As percent of total population)

Exact data for ethnic minorities are difficult to obtain so that the following data should be seen as very rough estimates, but should suffice to show the general magnitude of the ethnic divisions in various areas.

#### *Albania:*

96 percent of the population are Albanian, divided into two rival groups, the Ghegs in the north and the Tosks in the south.

#### *Bulgaria:*

Bulgarians	90
Turks	9

#### *BALTIC STATES:*

1. *Lithuania:*

Lithuanians		80
Russians	9	
Poles		7
Others		4

(Others primarily include Belorussians and Ukrainians)

2. *Latvia:*

Latvians (Letts)	51	(in 1923 - 73 %)
Russians	41	
Belorussians		4.5
Ukrainians	3.4	
Poles		2.3

3. *Estonians:*

Estonians	61.5	(1940 - 89 %)
Russians	30	
Others		8.5

(Others Ukrainians, Belorussians, Latvians, Jews)

*Czech and Slovak Federal Republic:*

Czechs	64
Slovaks	32
Others	4

(Others include Hungarians, Gypsies, Ukrainians, Poles and Germans.)

*Gypsies:*

According to official national estimates there are a third of a million Gypsies in East Central Europe, but according to the World Association of Gypsies, there is an estimated Gypsy population in the region of 2.61 million people, with populations of 400,000 in Bulgaria, 320,000 in Czechoslovakia, 360,000 in Hungary, 300,000 in Poland, 600,000 in Romania, and 700,000 in Yugoslavia. Approximately 500,000 persons of Gypsy heritage were killed by the Nazi regime.<sup>(17)</sup>

*Hungary:*

Hungarians		89.2
Gypsies		3.6
Germans		2
Slovaks	1.1	
South Slavs		0.8
Jews		0.8
Romanians	0.25	

*Jews:*

There are approximately 250,000 Jews in modern East-Central Europe and the Balkans, as compared with 4,420,000 before the Second World War.<sup>(18)</sup>

*Poland:*

Poles		98
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*Romania: (1948 Census)<sup>(19)</sup>*

Romanians	65.1	
Hungarians		25.7
Germans		5.8
Jews		0.5

*Yugoslavia:*

Serbs		40
Croatians	23	
Slovenes	8	
Macedonians		6
Albanians	6.5	
Montenegrins		2.5
Hungarians		2
Muslims in		
Bosnia and		
Herzegovina		8.9
Others:	3.1	
(Others include Romanians, Turks, and Gypsies)		

*Sources:* David Turnock, *Eastern Europe; An Economic and Political Geography* (New York and London:Routledge, 1989) and *Academic American Encyclopedia* (New York: Grolier, 1991).

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### Endnotes

1. For an excellent survey of the various views on the functions of nationalism see Anthony D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).
2. Boyd C. Shafer, *Nationalism: Myth and Reality* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1955), p. 113. The classic study on the origins of nationalism is Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948).
3. Shafer, *Nationalism: Myth and Reality*, p. 123.
4. In discussing the strength of nationalism compared with that of communism, Kohn argued that "this economic fear for his livelihood is not man's only mortal fear. His creaturely fear proceeds from more fundamental depths in the human soul. In modern times the religious conception of the world with its sheltering God had broken down. The individual had become master of himself, and at home amid his natural world and the laws which is observed, but no longer felt assured of the continuance of his existence in any purely transcendental sense. Under the stress of his isolation he sought for association, for permanence, for immortality: for a bond, for 'religion.' Here we have the basis of the significance of nationalism as the religious force of modern times. In community with his compatriots, with whom he forms a living and organic whole, the individual finds companionship on his way and a removal of the limitations of his influence; it is thus in our times that he attains an extension and multiplication of his personality amid the national mass-emotions, as the individual of the past did amid the ecstasies of worship." Hans Kohn, *Nationalism in the Soviet Union* (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1933), pp. 18-19.
5. See Lawrence Kohlberg, *The Psychology of Moral Development: The Nature and Validity of Moral Stages* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984).
6. The best treatments of the history of nationalism in East-Central Europe are: Emil Niederhauser, *The Rise of Nationality in Eastern Europe* (Budapest: Corvina Kiadó, 1981); Peter Sugar and Ivo Lederer, eds., *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969); and Hans Kohn, *Pan Slavism* (New York:

Vintage Books, 1960).

7. Niederhauser, *The Rise of Nationality in Eastern Europe*, p. 45.

8. Cf. Niederhauser, *The Rise of Nationality in Eastern Europe*, p.50 *et passim*. The Rumanians substituted latin for cyrillic script to be more in keeping with their Roman origins. *Ibid.*, p. 275.

9. Hans Kohn, *Pan Slavism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p. 65.

10. See Niederhauser, *The Rise of Nationality in Eastern Europe*, pp. 75-79.

11. For an excellent discussion of the intricate evolution of the concept of Hungarian nationality see Tofik M. Islamov, "From *Natio Hungarica* to Hungarian Nation," in Richard L. Rudolph and David Good, eds., *Nationalism and Empire: The Habsburg Monarchy and the Soviet Union* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).

12. Hans Kohn, *Pan Slavism*, p. 236.

13. Rothschild, *East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars*, p. 328.

14. See Henryk Szlajfer, ed., *Economic Nationalism in East-Central Europe and South America* (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1990) and Richard L. Rudolph, "Reflections on Economic Nationalism in Eastern Europe, 1945-1989," in *Nationalitätenprobleme in Mittel-, Ost- und Südosteuropa nach 1945*, (Schriftenreihe des Österreichischen Ost- und Südosteuropa-Instituts), Vienna, 1992.

15. See Robert Lee Wolff, *The Balkans in Our Time* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1974) and Charles and Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1977).

16. Percentages are approximate. Accurate data are difficult to obtain. Sources: David Turnock, *Eastern Europe; An Economic and Political Geography* (London and New York: Tourledge, 1989) and *Academic American Encyclopedia* (New York, 1991).

17. David Turnock, *Eastern Europe; An Economic and Political Geography*, p. 140.

18. These figures include the Baltic States. Compiled from data in: Lucy S. Dawidowicz, *The War Against the Jews 1933-1945* (New York: Bantam Books, 1981), p. 544 and S. Ettinger, "The Modern Period" in H.H. Ben-Sasson, ed., *A History of the Jewish People* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 1063.

19. David Turnock, *Eastern Europe; An Economic and Political Geography*, p. 136.