Minutes[*]

Senate Committee on Finance and Planning
Tuesday, November 30, 2004
2:30 – 4:15
238A Morrill Hall

Present: Charles Campbell (chair), Kendal Beer, Rose Blixt, David Chapman, Arthur Erdman, Daniel Feeney, Scott Fine, Steve Fitzgerald, Thomas Klein, Joseph Konstan, Michael Korth, Cleon Melsa, Kathleen O'Brien, Richard Pfutzenreuter, Terry Roe, Charles Speaks, Kate VandenBosch, Susan Van Voorhis, Warren Warwick

Absent: Calvin Alexander, Seth Haskell, Joshua Jacobsen, Lincoln Kallsen, Ian McMillan, Diane Parker, Thomas Stinson, Alfred Sullivan, Michael Volna

Guests: Julie Tonneson (Office of Budget and Finance)

[In these minutes: the budget model]

<u>The Budget Model</u>

Professor Campbell convened the meeting at 2:30 and noted that the sole agenda item was the University's budget model.

Professor Feeney began by commenting that everyone on the Committee knows of the view of the Academic Health Center Finance and Planning Committee, whose recommendations were brought to this Committee earlier. He suggested there is an issue the Committee should discuss: Does it want high or low levels of incentives to generate and conserve revenue? If it favors high levels, it should gravitate toward the model suggested by the AHC Finance and Planning Committee, which essentially calls for almost full attribution of costs and revenues to the colleges. Does the Committee favor strong central management of resources or strong central oversight of resource management? There is controversy on this Committee about that issue, and some on the Committee may have seen a draft summary of a meeting that took place on a Saturday morning earlier this month that raised a number of questions about a model based on the AHC Finance and Planning suggestion. There is also some confusion about the budget model and the strategic planning process; the point is, he said, that the budget model should support the strategic plan.

Professor Speaks responded that he favored incentives to conserve and spend money wisely and to generate the maximum amount of revenue. His question is whether those incentives derive from a budget model or from leadership by the President, Provost, and Senior Vice President for the Health Sciences. The Saturday meeting, he said, consisted of faculty governance leaders from three colleges and there has NOT been any official summary prepared. The meeting was a conversation to obtain views and reactions to the budget model discussions and to help formulate and crystallize questions that need to be addressed. He and Professor Campbell prepared a set of questions from the meeting that they believe the budget model working group should address.

---

[*] These minutes reflect discussion and debate at a meeting of a committee of the University of Minnesota Senate or Twin Cities Campus Assembly; none of the comments, conclusions, or actions reported in these minutes represents the views of, nor are they binding on, the Senate or Assembly, the Administration, or the Board of Regents.

Professor Erdman said that with respect to the two options Professor Feeney outlined, at one level it does not matter which budget model is selected; what is important is that administrators can plan, will know the rules, and that the system is transparent.

Ms. Blixt recalled that Vice President Pfutzenreuter had said the working group would present information to President Bruininks in mid-November. Was that done? What was the result? Ms. Tonneson said the President did review the four options the working group was considering; the President concluded the working group should not spend time pursing the model that would have centralized revenues or develop a plan based on mission activities, but that it should continue to examine the other two (make a few changes in the current model or move toward a fully-allocated cost and revenue model).

Professor Konstan said he had two reactions. At this point, the position he advocates is probably lost, but he wished to be on the record about his views. He said Professor Feeney has one point correct: Does the Committee favor a model that has more or less entrepreneurship. What has not been asked is whether the incentives in the model will be for quality rather than money. There is a tradeoff, he said: Does an excellent college that has few options for generating revenues have the opportunity to spend money?

Professor Konstan said he had prepared an amateur Talmudic analysis of the budget proposals about why he does not believe in full attribution of revenues and costs.

1. Either the base conditions will be the same under the new model, or they will change (a tautology)—either units will be made whole under a new model or they will not.

There will be a transition from the current model to the new model. That transition will presumably involve assessing the costs and allocating the revenues for each unit. In the unlikely situation that the unit's newly allocated revenue matches its newly attributed costs, everything is stable. In the more likely situation where these are in imbalance, the base conditions could conceivably be equalized by increasing or reducing central allocations of state funds. If a unit's net increase in "internal revenue" (revenue minus attributes costs) is greater than its current subsidy, then presumably that unit will see a net budget increase at the start (it is unknown whether such cases exist, and cannot be known until the formulas are established).

1a. If the base conditions are the same, then by definition no unit is harmed or helped. Central will retain the same amount of funding (including recaptured cost money).

1b. If the base conditions are not the same, there are by definition losers. Any unit that wins (i.e., has a total increase in budget due to the model change) means an offsetting loser either in another unit or in central discretionary funds.

In either case, the amount of discretionary funding available to the President to "steer the ship" is the same or less. The only way to generate new funds for this person, apart from state allocations, would be to increase the "compact tax" or some other fee that would hurt each unit (perhaps unequally, perhaps equally).

2. Either legislative allocations will keep up with cost increases, or they won't.

Increased costs are real--both within the units and in central administration. The only question is where the funds come from to cover those increases. They may come equally (or disproportionately) from the state allocation, or they may come from tuition and unit-generated revenue.

2a. If the state keeps up with its fair share of the cost of running the University, then the President will retain an ability to steer the ship through allocation of state funds to different units. In this case, one could argue that this budget model (full attribution of revenues and costs) will work well. Indeed, though, we believe that any model proposed works well when state allocations increase.

2b. If the state continues to under-contribute, either through small increases or cuts to the budget, then the President's ability to steer the ship is severely compromised. Either the President must reallocate central funds to cover central administrative costs (decreasing the amount available for investing and steering), or the President must increase the proportional taxes on units (for central administration/services) and will be under significant pressure to use what remains of state funds to help units coping with increased taxes remain whole. Note that the President has certain easy choices here—it is easy to keep units that are financially "self-sufficient" afloat, since they can increase revenue through tuition or ICR recovery. What is hard is deciding to subsidize important units that are not financially self-sufficient. As the state allocation shrinks, such units are harder and harder to support under this model. This problem does not exist under a shared-revenue model, since revenue is partially designated for University-wide use.

3. Either central service units are aware of unit contributions and can tailor their services to match, or not.

A key question is whether the libraries, facilities management, registrar, and other service units will be aware of how the cost allocation formula leads to differential revenue from each unit.

3a. If they are unaware or not allowed to tailor their services, then there will be a continued model of encouraging units to consume as much as they can for the measured cost. Units will continue to pressure the library for greater acquisitions, subscriptions, and services. Research support services will be used with abandon. No real conservation will occur.

3b. If they are aware and can tailor their services, we will have a very different model of operation. Units will be encouraged to conserve, or to increase their allocation to the level of desired services. Questions such as "should there be a special library for xxx" will be based on the metric and cost allocation. Before long, I believe that units will be smart enough to start negotiating at a more detailed level to match support with cost allocation, and we will have to abandon the simple accounting (headcount, square footage) and revert to either custom negotiations or more complex measurements. Either one undermines the simplicity of the system.

Fundamentally, I still believe that moving to a "near-ETOB (every tub on its own bottom)" model of running a university makes little sense. I understand that certain units have been

> disadvantaged by the current budget model, and indeed by current budgetary decisions. Others would be disadvantaged by any new model. Except for providing incentives for conservation, this is a zero-sum game. And thus, the question is who is "steering" this game. If we believe that the University's academic leadership—specifically the President—should steer, then we need to give him the resources to do so, and acknowledge that a consequence may be that certain units legitimately feel that they are being used to subsidize others.

Mr. Klein said this is complex and that whatever the institution adopts must be something that can be understood throughout the organization and be communicated across the layers and levels. The key question on what the Committee believes should be adopted depends on what the most important one or two behaviors one wants to provide incentives for. If the Committee believes it is a top priority to allow the President to steer the ship, the model should provide that incentive. If the top priority is to distribute overhead expenses and identify who buys what from whom in order to improve cost control, then cost control should be rewarded. When the incentives don't match the goals one gets into gaming the system. A question that should be asked about the budget model is "what actions will lead to the University being one of the top three public research universities in the country?" If it is quality of the faculty, then the model should provide incentives for the recruitment and support of the best faculty.

Professor Konstan said he agreed with the point about the faculty. He said he worries that full attribution of costs and revenues would not allow the President to steer the ship. Any unit can figure out what model will be best for it and then argue that the model it likes does what is best for the University. He said he was not sure there was any objective way to measure what budget model is best for the University. Mr. Klein responded that there need not be agreement on that point and this Committee will not reach agreement. But those who must make the decision can gain insights from this discussion; this is the consultative process and the administration can hear views about what are the 1-2-3 most important factors to the success of the University in carrying out its mission.

Professor Speaks said that Vice President Pfutzenreuter had described models in place at the University of Michigan and the University of California at Berkeley, presumably institutions with which the University compares itself. How are they working, he asked? Ms. Tonneson said she did not know about Berkeley. Michigan is about half-way to an allocated cost model. They calculate for each college the total tuition and ICR and subtract internal taxes (of which there are several) and come up with a general fund allocation that the provost gives to the college. Tuition and ICR funds go to central administration and are transferred later. It is a strong-provost model, where the provost makes decisions with the deans. The provost has control of the state funds. They also allocate facilities costs, financial aid, library costs, but not ALL central costs; the remainder of central costs is funded with state funds or internal taxes. It is a hybrid system that they like very much and it fits their provost. Professor Campbell said that whether they like it or not depends on who one talks to; his counterparts at Michigan in Physics do not like it and tell him the system makes them do things they would not otherwise do.

Professor Roe said one needs to divide up the problem. Tenured and tenure-track faculty are a high proportion of costs and are stable over the short run (2-3 years). So one must allocate money to cover operating costs. Over the longer run, the question is about the number of faculty who should be in this or that college. Then, the question of resource allocation can be focused more easily into two parts, one is the short run (2-3 yrs) where emphasis can be placed on the efficient use of resources not related to faculty salary and mostly within colleges, the other in the longer run which relates to the efficient allocation of faculty resources among colleges. That in turn raises the question of whether funds for tenured and tenure-track faculty should be held centrally.

Professor Feeney said that from the AHC Finance and Planning Committee perspective, the proposal is to allocate costs and revenues and create incentives; state funds are to be used to subsidize colleges that cannot make it on their own—but that is then a conscious decision to subsidize. The AHC is often the canary in the mine, he said; CLA's revenues are now more than 70% from tuition and the old paradigm that state funds pay for the bulk of the college is not valid any more. So it is necessary to identify a way to allocate state funds. Many find the taxes objectionable because the money goes to things they do not understand and they are not sure the money is used for common goods. And to the comment that there will be gaming of the system, everyone does that now.

One model that provides the President discretion over the allocation of state funds, Professor Speaks observed. Of the $540 million per year in state funds, how much of that is really discretionary, if a large percentage is committed to faculty and staff salaries? Vice President Pfutzenreuter said he did not know, but the President would have discretionary authority over the entire amount. If 85% of the non-sponsored CLA budget is for salaries and fringe benefits, Professor Speaks inquired, in what sense does the President have authority? He could direct a college to raise tuition or cut expenses, for example, and not give the state funds to the college, Mr. Pfutzenreuter explained. Professor Speaks said he found this point very interesting. He said he has been concerned that if all is going well and there are discretionary funds, the President allocates them as he thinks best; if a unit loses some portion of its funding, the President can direct it to make up the money from other sources. The President can do that now, Mr. Pfutzenreuter pointed out. So the President can use his discretion to help a unit that lost revenue or take revenues from a unit and tell it to raise tuition, Professor Speaks asked? He can indeed do that now, Mr. Pfutzenreuter affirmed.

Does this mean each college could charge different rates of tuition, Ms. Van Voorhis asked? It does not, Mr. Pfutzenreuter said; none of the budget models being considered envision any change in how tuition is set.

Professor Speaks said that philosophically he could accept the proposition that the budget model should lead to increased efficiencies in the Office of Budget and Finance and in the colleges. He recalled that Provost Sullivan has said the budget model must support the strategic positioning process. He said he needed help understanding which of the budget model options would do what Provost Sullivan said is required. If Provost Sullivan is correct, that the budget model must support and enhance the strategic plan and academic mission, but if the University has not reached any conclusions about the strategic plan, how can anyone select a budget model? Ms. Tonneson said that Senior Vice President Cerra is working on a description of the link between the budget model and strategic planning; he is trying to answer that question. Professor Speaks said he did not know what the final strategic planning or positioning would be but he wagered that it will look very much like what was presented to the Board of Regents in November in terms of framing concepts and vision. It would be reasonable to ask what effect the various budget models would have on what was presented to the Board.

Vice President O'Brien commented that strategic planning documents are out for comment and that a lot of people have sent comments. The Regents will adopt a resolution in March and the statement will likely have some reference to being among the top three public research universities in the country. She said she believes the internal budget model is a process that is informed by the institution's goals and objectives; the model does not make decisions but it does structure the decisions. The internal budget model is only one component of decision-making.

Mr. Pfutzenreuter said that if the visions and aspirations are specific enough that they call for emphasizing undergraduate education in CLA, for example, one can ask if the budget model hurts or supports that vision. But if the vision is to be among the top three publics in the country, it is difficult to say if the budget model supports the vision. One must look at the budget model as a process. Vice President O'Brien agreed. She said the budget model can provide incentives for or discourage change. She has been charged by the President and Board of Regents to instill a culture of productivity, compliance, and quality improvement on the service side of the institution. This includes transparency in service and support unit activities as they address faculty, staff, and student needs; the budget model can provide incentives for change.

This suggests the budget model should have transparency as an attribute, Mr. Klein said, especially where the costs of services are attributed to units. That will make the process easy to understand and promote change.

If the University says it will be one of the top three public institutions, Mr. Klein said he would argue that there are two actions for which incentives must be provided. For support units, efficiency of services may be the most important incentive. For academic units, the caliber of the faculty is among the most important considerations, so he would ask what model would provide the stronger opportunity to pay faculty salaries and invest in things important for faculty success. Again, he said, there must be transparency in the information so people can understand what is expected.

Professor Speaks said he was not speaking in favor of or against any particular budget model, but is trying to identify questions that need to be answered in order to further the academic mission of the University. Those questions must be answered before one can make a rational evaluation of budget models, including questions about attributed costs and the bases of evaluation. Until those issues are wrestled with, and algorithms set, he said he could not figure out what the best budget model would be. If there is a way to evaluate the goals relative to the model, he would like to know about it. Vice President Pfutzenreuter agreed with Professor Speaks's point.

As soon as one knows the algorithms the gaming will start, Professor Konstan predicted. With respect to accountability, that will come down to who sets the budget. If a unit head receives a bill for a service, that does not create any accountability; if the unit head objects, he or she can complain to the President or Vice President O'Brien—which he or she can do today as well. Or the system could be set up so the unit can go to the market: If they are paying Facilities Management or some other unit too much, they can contract with an outside vendor. If they believe the librarian is being paid too much, they would hire their own librarian. The dean, however, does not have the option to withhold funds for services.

Professor Konstan also said that time is an important issue. Whatever reduces the amount of time that faculty, department heads, and deans must spend thinking about the budget model will make this a better university. The central administration (and the Michigan system) can focus on academic priorities. He repeated his point that there is nothing in the budget models about quality. More money for faculty would allow the University to attract higher-quality faculty, but none of the models address the issue of quality of programs and incentives for world-class programs to remain that good. If the answer is that program quality is protected and enhanced by decisions by the president and provost to allocate funds, then the more money they have to allocate, the more incentives they have to provide.

One factor that should be considered in all the models, Professor Erdman said, is the burden on departments and overhead. Some could create more, some less, and this burden must be kept in mind. His department, he said, has fewer people who are doing more work. If the system adds burdens to departments, it could collapse from its own weight.

Ms. Van Voorhis asked when the attributed costs would be developed. Mr. Pfutzenreuter said that no one has decided on a budget model, and both of the ones the President is interested in have attributed costs. They need to do more work on attributed costs but have not yet started. Ms. Van Voorhis commented that if she had to provide an accounting for all her costs, she would need to hire an accountant; Mr. Pfutzenreuter said that she would not bill colleges but that she would, as is true today, need to provide her budget to the administration. How would a unit like hers obtain money for something like new carpeting, she asked? By coming to the administration, just as they do at present, Mr. Pfutzenreuter told her.

If salaries are about 80% of total costs in academic units, Professor Roe said, they are fixed in the short term. So one is talking about 20% of the budget. One must think about management and transaction costs as they pertain to this 20%. He said he liked the report from the AHC Finance and Planning Committee and its thinking about incentives, but one must bear in mind this only affects about 20% of the budget. Across the entire University, compensation accounts for 60-65% of costs, Ms. Tonneson said, but agreed that it is about 80% in academic units. That is because academic unit budgets do not include attributed costs, Vice President O'Brien observed.

What incentives are there for the other 80% in the long term to encourage behavior with respect to quality, Mr. Klein asked? What provides incentives to make the right decisions? That is the point that Professor Speaks is pounding on, Professor Roe pointed out. The question has not been answered. The point is that there is not enough information at the level of the dean to make decisions; this is about allocating dollars across colleges. The budget model does not do that, people do, Professor Korth maintained; the budget model provides a structure. They have already seen that central administration can manipulate the model to do what it needs and wants to do—and it has made good and necessary decisions—but the current model has flexibility in it. What is missing is understanding, and it is not clear why that could not be provided.

The budget model does not solve everything, Professor Konstan said, but there are radical things one could shift on the cost or revenue side. One could decide that the budget follows faculty lines so units are not starved for support if they do well. One could decide the same thing about students. Deans and the administration could decide on enrollment; given X number of slots, "stuff" would follow to the college. Attribution does this to some extent, but not on the faculty side; one could create a link there as well. To focus on quality rather than quantity means there must be sufficient support assured.

Professor Erdman said he agreed with Professor Korth that the system depends on the wisdom of the person making the decision. Perhaps the model does not matter as long as it is transparent—"and we can all go home." Professor Speaks said he understood that Senior Vice President Cerra has said the current model must go. What led to that conclusion? Frustration with the increasing taxes and fees, Mr. Pfutzenreuter said, and frustration about what happened to the money and where it can go.

Mr. Pfutzenreuter agreed that the timing of the strategic positioning discussions is frustrating. If they knew that the goal is to be one of the top three public universities, they could then look to see, for example, if the full attribution of debt and operating costs to research facilities would have an impact on achieving that goal. Has the University turned its back on the Florida study that said the University is one of the top three public universities, Professor Speaks asked?

Professor Campbell said he was concerned about how the "test drive" will be conducted. Ms. Tonneson said the President has asked for a timeline and consultation, which are in process. They are trying to determine, between the two models still on the table, what items of analysis must be completed. The discussions have been kept at a high level thus far so that units are not all asking "what happens to me?" But there will be a test drive, Professor Campbell asked? It is their responsibility to do so, Ms. Tonneson said.

This suggests the potential for a tug of war between units so they can see if they will come out ahead or behind financially in a new model, Mr. Klein said. If all the units advocate their own positions, one can predict that there will be a draw in the tug of war with no clear cut solution that all units agree on. That means the decision should be at a level that is not tied to any of the units—the decision on the budget model should be pushed up to a small group of financial experts and senior University leaders who can select the model they think is best for the overall University. He agreed with Professor Erdman: put your money on the one model we think is best, live with it, and go home. People can then grade the system chosen on its transparency; if it is transparent, that will get at efficiencies and not take a lot of time to figure out.

Professor Speaks said that if, under a new system, there are no winners and losers, and nothing is changed, this is not worth the effort. There must be a desirable outcome. Professor VandenBosch agreed and said that is why strategic planning must come first so that people know what will not be supported in the future. The effect may not be immediate, but there will be an effect on decisions about units. If the budget model decision can be delayed, Professor Speaks commented, there is a chance that it and the strategic planning process could be made to work together. Professor Korth, however, said that strategic planning could take place separately from the budget model discussion; he said he did not see the link between the two. The budget model is flexible and will allow different strategic positions, Ms. Tonneson said. The communication from Senior Vice President Cerra will try to show what will change year to year and what will not.

What if Professor Korth is right and the problem is not the budget model but the difficulties of decision-making, Mr. Klein inquired? The budget model can perhaps enhance decision-making, but what if the problem is that the University is not good at making decisions? Maybe when it is are "stuck between two crummy financial choices," it finds it hard to make a decision and take action. Maybe that's the real issue? To make a decision means there are instruments to manipulate, Professor Roe said, and the instrument is typically money. To make a decision means there must be a lever, and that is the link between the budget model and strategic planning. What levers does central administration have, Professor Campbell asked? State funds, the compact tax (which can be adjusted year to year), and setting the central budgets, Ms. Tonneson said.

What has not been brought up, Professor Feeney said, is that while transparency is seen as desirable, transparency needs to be defined. The University must also address what the legislature thinks transparency is. He recalled a conversation between the Faculty Consultative Committee and Charlie Weaver, Executive Director of the Minnesota Business Partnership; they asked if there was a way to depoliticize the higher education budget, and while there was no answer to the question, it was clear that as funds decline, demands for accountability increase. There is thus an incentive for the University to be transparent. The University must get rid of across-the-board taxes, which are not doing the units any good. One can look at square footage, classroom use, etc., but he said he did not believe that the information needed to make decisions is available. The central administration needs levers but so do the deans; they need to be able to make decisions about the level of services, for example.

Professor Speaks said again he doubted the final strategic planning documents would differ much from what the Board of Regents saw in November. Professor VandenBosch pointed out that the college documents are due on December 1, which will provide an insight into what the colleges say about mission and applying the criteria. There is much that is simultaneous that should be serial, Professor Speaks concluded, and the deans could do a better job if they knew the overall strategic plan.

There has been talk about predictability, Professor Campbell commented, a system that would allow colleges to see three years out. The hope is to make the RULES stable, Ms. Tonneson said, but they cannot provide stability on revenues. But if there are internal taxes, they could be lagged so that colleges could calculate them. But the University will never know about state funding, so it will not be able to make decisions about tuition, so units can't know numbers into the future. Professor Speaks said he agreed entirely, but he was also not so confident that the rules could be fixed, either. If a unit looks out three years and makes assumptions about tuition, enrollment, state funds, etc., and then there is a catastrophe—some major revenue source declines significantly, for example—will the rules then have to be modified? Ms. Tonneson said she did not believe so; the discussion is about process rules (allocation of tuition and bases of attribution of costs).

Professor VandenBosch pointed out that with the budget models, one is talking about attributing costs and revenues to colleges. When one talks about incentives, one is talking about departments. The way colleges deliver money to departments varies with the college, so incentives may have different effects in different colleges. She said she had mixed feelings: She did not want to see micromanagement of the colleges, but the structure has to pass incentives through the colleges to departments. That comes back to decisions made by people, Professor Korth maintained. A lot of what the Committee has heard over the last several years about the desire for transparency is at the college level—people do not know how deans distribute funds. The budget model will not change that. Ms. Tonneson said the working group has talked about this issue but does not want the budget model to apply at the department level. To make it do so would add a lot of complexity. Colleges are accountable for their behavior. If one added comprehensibility and transparency as part of the rules, could the administration intervene if it believed a college was not providing enough information to departments, Mr. Klein asked? One central function could be to play a role in making sure departments have the information they need. Ms. Tonneson said that it could intervene if it had to.

This is the nub of something important, Professor Chapman suggested. Central administration does not want to reach to departments, but the success of the budget process depends on something not under central control. If the deans and department heads do not agree on the budget model, it will not matter what the administration does. And it is in departments that the money for teaching and research resides, Professor Roe added.

Professor Feeney said this was also related to risk management (e.g., not all faculty salaries are on O&M funds). Do they view the levers to manage risk as at the presidential/budget and finance level or in the colleges? Ms. Tonneson said she assumed it would be in the colleges, which is where the funds are. But faculty are tenured at the University level, Professor Roe said, so there is an imbalance. This will tend to induce deans to hold larger savings accounts to cover risk, which are funds withdrawn from productivity. Ms. Tonneson said there has been discussion on this point because it would be possible to have a smaller savings account if the risk were managed centrally.

Professor Campbell said that transparency requires knowledge, such as how much one is charged and how much something costs. But that element of transparency is not in the model because it would complicate it too much. Ms. Tonneson said she did not believe it possible or workable to identify the cost for services for each unit, so they use proxies. In some cases, they can get close to actual costs; in other cases, not. Mr. Klein said it is possible to set up an elaborate costing system down to the lowest level, and that system becomes one of the core competencies of the institution, but it is very burdensome. No universities do anything like that, Ms. Tonneson commented.

Do they see attributed items as possibly having an effect on behavior, Professor Feeney asked? Or will the charges be so amalgamated that units cannot see individual costs (e.g., square footage for classrooms)? If the charges are amalgamated, there will be no change and things will be just as they are now. Ms. Tonneson said they did not expect there would be a lot of incentives to change behavior except in big ticket areas. How the system is set up will make a difference—and in some cases, the University does not WANT units to use less of a service (for example, financial aid and the libraries).

Professor Campbell said that the discussion had run out, thanked everyone for their contributions, and adjourned the meeting at 4:00.

-- Gary Engstrand

University of Minnesota