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The undersigned, acting as a Committee
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THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

GRADUATE SCHOOL

Report

of

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Master of Arts.

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Master of Arts.

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Date July 17, 1922.

A Study of Motivation in Social Control

A Thesis

submitted to the Graduate Faculty

of the

University of Minnesota

by

Hugh Sevier Carter

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

MASTER OF ARTS.

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A Study of Motivation in Social Control

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INTRODUCTION

The problem of motivation in social control has been a matter of speculation for many centuries, but it has been the type of speculation in which imagination entered in maximum degree and the careful check-up of data, together with the attempt to secure more data as a base for further legitimate speculations, entered in minimum degree. Important progress has been made on the problem in recent years though there is still the widest divergence of opinion among those dealing with it. From the standpoint of social psychology there are several well defined currents of theory within the field and the more important of these will be considered in a later section of this thesis. From the psychological standpoint there are also great differences in the theories held by the various schools. The attempt will be made herein to set forth the basis of conduct in the original nature of man, the method by which this original nature is modified together with some of the factors through which it is modified, and a discussion of what may be called with Woodworth---- for want of a better term---the dynamic nature of human behavior.

Under the term motivation are included two concepts which at first blush seem entirely distinct. First, there is the psychological problem of 'drive', or 'facilitation', or 'libido', or 'original springs of action' or 'hungers', or 'instincts'; the terms vary greatly as do the explanation of the terms, but the core of the problem is the attempt to explain why there is a tendency in the organism to one type of activity rather than another and why with similar external stimuli the organism acts with such varying degrees of "pep", or with varying degrees of balking and blocking. Again the term motivation includes the idea of 'motives' as used in popular parlance, as

the statement that a person acted from altruistic motives. This latter is, of course, simply an oversimplification of a complex situation; seizing one part of a cause and making it the ultimate and absolute cause. It would be difficult to draw the line between these two concepts as there is a gradual shading from one into the other, and no attempt is made herein to draw such a line.

Social control, according to Ross, "Is concerned with that domination which is intended and which fulfills a function in the life of society." It deals with the domination of society over the individual.¹ In the sociological sense every social problem could be regarded from the viewpoint of social control, but its central and generally accepted concern is with original human nature and the environmental pressures which give it its final shape.²

The problem of this thesis, then, is to set up a consistent theory of motivation in social control on the basis of contact with the important literature of the subject. This theory will not be elaborated in an exhaustive manner, but it is hoped to block out a plan which could be followed in a more extensive treatise. The thesis will also set forth the views held by social psychologists which form important currents of thought at the present time regarding the problem of motivation.

1. E. A. Ross, Social Control, A survey of the Foundation of Order, Preface.
2. R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess; Introduction to Sociology, pp 785-787.

The Basis of Unlearned Conduct in the Individual

The original and unlearned basis of action in the individual is to be found in the implicit and explicit types of responses that the organism gives under appropriate stimuli before these types of responses have had the chance to be overlaid by learned modifications. In this chapter an attempt will be made to state just what this original human nature is as a basis for the discussion of what it may become through the play of various environmental factors upon it. It is outside the province of this thesis to go into detail regarding the neuro-physiological basis of activity. It is assumed that the more important unlearned responses have developed because of their survival value to the organism and the species at some time during their developments. With a radically changed type of environment in which to make adjustments the individual today finds himself with unlearned patterns of behavior that are not only useless but often harmful. Yet this need not blind one to the realization of the fact that the primary source, historically considered, of unlearned responses is to be found in their serviceability.

It is obviously true that the individual does not act from day to day upon the same dead level of conduct as might be expected were the reflex arcs of the nervous system acting undisturbed within the organism. "The main facts which can be obtained by observation seem to center around the following: (1) The human being seems at times to work at a higher level of energy than at other times; (2) at times the individual works with a persistency far beyond that ordinarily displayed; (3) the individual seems totally unable to accomplish his daily duties, execute his stable habits; we speak of

him as being excited, flighty, or else depressed." Evidently the "organic tone changes from time to time, . . .the individual displays an increase or decrease in emotional tone."¹ Laboratory studies have shown the close correlation existing between emotions and secretions of the ductless glands, and these point to the possibility of a close correlation existing between the secretions of these glands and the amount of "drive" or the lack of it which exists in the individual organism at a particular time. This evidence must be briefly considered in its bearing on the problem of motivation.

Regarding implicit responses (emotions) Watson has found in his laboratory studies upon human infants three unlearned patterns; fear, rage and love.² The physiological basis of fear and rage has been studied in some detail in the Harvard laboratories by Cannon and others.³ Working with cats, dogs, rabbits and guinea-pigs he has shown the results upon an organism of arousing fear or rage and some of the important bodily changes that take place. This work in so far as it is pertinent may be summarized briefly.

In certain specific situations the adrenal glands, which are closely attached to the kidneys, are stimulated to make

1. Watson, *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, p 182.
2. "An emotion is an hereditary pattern-reaction involving profound changes of the bodily mechanism, as a whole, but particularly of the visceral and glandular system." Watson, *ibid* p 195.*
3. See W. B. Cannon; *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage*.

more than their normal secretion of adrenin into the blood. This in turn is an important factor if not the determining factor in bringing about changes in the organism which under certain primitive conditions would make survival through struggle or flight far more possible. The digestive process is stopped almost entirely. Cannon showed this by his work with Rontgen Rays, indicating that there was no movement of the stomach or small intestines in situations normally producing fear or rage. Both the regular churning movements of the stomach and the kneading movements of the small intestines are stopped during fear or rage. The work of Pavlov and others is cited showing that the secretion of gastric juice and the flow of saliva is greatly retarded during emotional stress.⁴ "In other words, at times of pain and excitement sympathetic discharges, probably aided by adrenal secretions simultaneously liberated, will drive the blood out of the vegetative organs of the interior, which serve the routine needs of the body, into the skeletal muscles which have to meet by extra action the urgent demands of a struggle or escape." The heart is stimulated at such times to greater activity as is the central nervous system while the bronchioles of the lungs are apparently made to relax allowing greater rapidity in the circulation of air through the lungs in the process of oxidizing the blood. Cannon made tests with strips of intestinal muscle which is often sensitive to adrenin in the ratio of 1 to 2,000,000. Using the threshold of stimulation as a measure of irritability he showed that the injection of adrenin (1: 100,000)

4. The experiment of Bickel and Sasaki is cited. a dog produced 66.7 cubic centimeters of gastric juice in 20 minutes, the first five minutes being occupied in sham feeding, the food being removed through an opening in the esophagus before reaching the stomach. At another time the dog though hungry, produced only 9c.c. of gastric juice when a cat was brought near him.

increased the irritability of the muscle 46 percent while the nerve-muscle action is bettered 75 percent. Normal rest, it is stated, requires 15 minutes to two hours, depending on the type of work, to restore the muscle. Increasing flow of blood, sweeping away the results of oxidization, is shown partly to account for the remarkable recovery of irritability. However, experiments with amyl nitrite which failed to give results at all comparable indicate that the recovery is due primarily to adrenin. Cannon concludes that what rest will do for a muscle only after hours adrenin will do in five minutes.⁶ The liver is indirectly stimulated to pour out sugar into the blood which is its best source for quick oxidation. This is shown by glycosuria, or sugar in the urine, which does not occur except when the normal amount of sugar in the blood is exceeded. After great emotional stress, as after final examinations, a high percentage of the subjects show glycosurea. The direct relation of the adrenal glands is indicated as Cannon states that glycosuria cannot be induced when the adrenal glands are removed.⁷ Apparently adrenin causes the blood to clot more quickly which would obviously aid the organism in mortal combat. Splanchnic nerve stimulation increases the rapidity of blood clotting while in the absence of the adrenals this hastening is not present. Anger, for example, causes the blood to clot more rapidly in cats.⁸

Cannon's general position is well indicated in the following quotation. "According to the argument here presented the strong emotions, as fear and anger, are rightly interpreted as the concomitants of bodily changes which may be of utmost service in subsequent

6. Ibid. p 133

7. Ibid. p 79

8. Ibid. p 178f

action. These bodily changes are so much like those which occur in pain and fierce struggle that, the emotions may be considered as foreshadowing the suffering and intensity of actual strife. On this general basis, therefore, the bodily alterations attending violent emotional states would, as organic preparations for fighting and possible injury, naturally involve the effects which pain itself would produce. An increased blood sugar, increased adrenin, an adapted circulation and rapid clothing would all be favorable to the preservation of the organism that could best produce them."⁹

Discussing Cannon's work, Woodworth states in his Dynamic Psychology:¹⁰ "The significance of these discoveries for the psychology of the emotions is evidently very great. The bodily changes that accompany emotion are now seen to be much more than merely incidental. At least in the cases of fear and anger, they are of extreme importance as a preparation for the overt action which is likely to follow; and the same can be said of the pleasurable state of appetite for food. Whether the conscious emotion consists entirely of sensations of these internal changes, cannot be said; but it is quite likely to be that in part, since organic sensations must result from the internal changes described. Cannon mentions the feeling of great strength that attends the bodily state of readiness for great exertion; and it is not unlikely that this feeling is a complex of organic sensations. In part, then, it is rather probable that an emotion is the way the body feels when it is prepared for a certain reaction."

9. Ibid. p 211f

10. p 54.

Cannon's work may need to be revised as to detail. Watson states, for example, that his conclusions regarding the hastening of blood clotting have not been entirely confirmed.¹¹ Moreover certain parts of his work may wander somewhat afield from the problem of motivation here under consideration yet it is summarized as clearly indicating the scientific and experimental approach through which progress is to be made in the study of any phase of human behavior.

Information bearing on the action of other ductless glands upon the organism is summarized by Watson.¹² These glands produce autacoids which are substances released in the circulatory fluid "to produce effect upon other organs similar to those produced by drugs." Very little is known directly regarding the autacoids other than adrenin, as they have not definitely been isolated. Much has been learned, however, through the extirpation of these glands or through their overactivity, as in pathological conditions. Not only do they facilitate or inhibit the development and functioning of the nervous system and larger organs of the body but there is a complicated system by which the autacid from one gland inhibits or facilitates, as the case may be, the action of another of the endocrine glands. The two lobes of the thyroid with the four parathyroids are removed, the animal usually dies within a few days or at most in a few weeks. "At first only the loss of appetite indicates that anything is wrong. After this the reflexes become exalted, "and later cramp-like contractions occur and eventually convulsive fits." This may be accompanied by a rise in temperature and rapid gasping respiration. For this reason, "It is assumed that the parathyroids yield an autacid of a restraining type which tends to prevent overexertion or discharge of nerve cells." There

11. Op. cit. p 221

12. Op. cit. pp 182-193

is also some evidence that a second autacoid is produced which facilitates the development of the skeletal bones. Removal of the thyroid gland, on the other hand, can be carried out without causing death though there is a general arrest in physical development including the cells in the cerebral cortex, a general lowering of organic tone, and many other physiological changes. Too much of the thyroid autacoid, as tested by administering thyroid extract, will produce "a lowering of blood-pressure, rapid pulse, with some irregularity, nervous excitability, flushing of the skin, increased perspiration and increase of nitrogen metabolism." The autacoid, therefore, "seems directly to increase the excitability of nerve cells. It is probable that more than one autacoid is secreted, since some of the results seem to show that it restrains the activity of certain other organs, such as the pituitary gland." When the thyroid is removed the pituitary body develops to more than its normal size and the amount of its secretions is greatly increased. Again, "In the young thyrodec-tomized subject the generative glands are but imperfectly and slowly developed, sexual infatilisism being the rule." The adrenals are effected by the thyroid "acting as a direct stimulus to the suprarenal capsules, causing them to yield adrenin to the blood in larger quantities."

The pituitary body is a small gland which lies at the base of the brain just posterior to the optic chiasma and is divided into an anterior and posterior lobe. "When extracts from the posterior lobe are injected into the circulation, the heart rate is slowed and the blood-pressure raised, but the effects are less marked than in the case of adrenin. These extracts seem to exercise a

stimulating effect upon the involuntary muscles of the body; the intestine, bladder and uterus are made to contract directly." When the gland is over active gigantism results; when the secretion is diminished there is obesity and sexual infantilism.

Other glands secreting autacoids include the pineal gland, sexual glands and the pancreas. The pineal gland, located on the posterior aspect of the brain stem is believed to secrete an inhibitory autacoid as any disturbance of its functions in the child will result in rapid development of the reproductive organs together with increased growth of the skeleton. Experiments on the sexual glands indicate that they control the development of the secondary sex characters through autacoids from the ovaries and testes. This may be shown by transplantation. "There is some evidence to show that these autacoids have a significant role to play in the control of other glands." Evidence shows that an internal secretion into the blood stream from the pancreas inhibits the too rapid conversion of glycogen into sugar.

The original situations which bring fear responses in the human infant seem to be the sudden withdrawal of support or loud strident sounds. "The responses are a sudden catching of the breath, clutching randomly with the hands, (the grasping reflex invariably appearing when the child is dropped), sudden closing of the eye-lids, puckering of the lips, crying. In regard to the age at which fear responses first appear, we can state with some sureness that the above mentioned group of reactions appears at birth."¹³ Rage is produced by hampering the infants movements. "If the face or head is held, crying results, quickly

13. Watson, Op. Cit. p 200.

followed by screaming. The body stiffens and fairly well-coordinated slashing or striking movements of the hands and arms result; the feet and legs are drawn up and down; the breath is held until the face is flushed. These reactions continue until the irritating situation is relieved, and sometimes do not cease then."¹⁴

No such important physiological studies as those of Cannon have been made with love, using this word as does Watson as being practically identical with sex in the Freudian sense. Probably the word love will meet with less resistance than sex though it is more likely to be misunderstood. Says Watson, "The original situation which calls out the observable love responses seems to be the stroking or manipulation of some erogenous zone, tickling, shaking, gentle rocking, patting and turning upon the stomach across the attendant's knee. The response varies. If the infant is crying, crying ceases, a smile appears, attempts at gurgling, cooing and finally, in slightly older children, extension of the arms, which we should class as a forerunner of the embrace in adults."¹⁵ The immense volume of literature that has grown up in the field of Psychoanalysis deals mainly with love after it has been greatly modified through social contacts and will be considered in more detail later.

Turning to the explicit side of unlearned human conduct one finds the greatest variety and conflict of opinions among psychologist. (It may be stated that, of course, any division of behavior into implicit and explicit types must be simply for convenience in discussion. There is no clear line where one ends and the other begins for always the entire organism in action is dealt with, not some segment of it). There are, for example, innumerable lists of instincts and

14. Watson Op. Cit. p 200.

15. Op. Cit. p 201.

the attempt is made to explain most if not all of human behavior through the drive of highly organized instinctive sets for which the organism finds outlet. Several difficulties are apparent in this position. The experimental work upon human subjects that can be relied upon is so scarce as to make a satisfactory statistical check up of instincts impossible, while at the present time the word instinct is used in different senses by various writers. Moreover unlearned responses are overlaid so quickly by learned responses in the human infant that to discover just what is "instinctive" has grave obstacles. However, writers agree that the word instinct includes an inherited mode of response. If this be true there must be a definite correlation between the inherited structural changes and behavior. The instinct must be a set or pattern within the organism which gives it greater readiness to respond in a definite and specific manner to be appropriate stimuli than to respond in any other way. To Woodworth, for example, "Instinct is native behavior." Also, "In terms of the nervous system, an instinct is the activity of a team of neurones, so organized, and so connected with muscles and sense organs, as to arouse certain motor reactions in response to certain sensory stimuli."¹⁶ However, if the most elaborate experiments could be carried out upon human infants there would still be a large sphere of native behavior unexplored as the instinctive types of conduct go through a maturing process after birth. The transformations of the sex instincts at puberty are sufficient illustration of this. The problem of unraveling what is native from what has been acquired appears almost insuperable.

16. R. S. Woodworth, Psychology, A Study of Mental Life, p 105-107.

It has been suggested that the universality of types of conduct may serve as a guide to determine what conduct, is native and what is acquired. Thus Woodworth states: "The criterion of universality, in the light of these facts, come down to this: that when all individuals having the same descent show a trait in common, that trait is to be regarded as belonging to their native constitution - unless evidence can be brought forward to the contrary."¹⁷ To the student of society the fallacy of this position must be obvious. Among human beings where conduct is so predominantly upon a learned basis; where inertia tradition, custom, folkways, "the cake of custom", are so oppressive and yet such subtle social controls as to bring into line all but the most daring and energetic individuals, the burden of proof would seem to rest squarely upon the one who would prove any particular behavior trait as native. Moreover the great variety and color in the existing list of instincts should give the scientist pause before proceeding upon such doubtful ground. The fact that the daring individual who defies custom does exist would seem to be no argument against this contention for it is, unfortunately, very easy to set forth as universal that which is only customary.

The question arises whether it is possible abstractly to set forth the normal and typical social environment in which original human nature is to unfold. This is a fundamental question in considering the problem of motivation, for if such normal environment may be set up, theoretically, then it would seem that for society at large it is the merest quibbling to discuss whether a certain trait or interest in the adult is an inherited instinct or is largely the overlaying of instinctive behavior with such a mass of learned elements that in final

17. Ibid. p 98.

outcome the trait bears only a distant cousin's relation to the inherited pattern of response. If a typical and normal environment can be postulated then it is unimportant in the practical formulation of a theory of social control whether we think of self-abasement as an instinct, something structurally existing in the organism without training, or think of self-abasement as having certain roots in unlearned patterns of response, such as fear, but being mainly composed of learned elements. Social control would need to take cognizance of it if it were always an identical somewhat. But is the self-abasement of the frail man before the bully and of a scientist before the work of a great contemporary identical? Few would content in such an instance that they are identical yet calling a certain group of behavior responses that vaguely resemble each other an instinct has a highly confusing effect. It is easy to personify, to make anthropomorphic, the conception of instinct.

However, if we can have original human nature unfolding in a normal environment in such a manner as to produce in the vast majority of people certain fixed and identical interests then it is of small consequences from our present point of view what they are called. It is here contended that such a normal environment cannot be postulated and, therefore, it is unscientific to group distinct types of behavior having certain superficial resemblances together under a single name. Both the modern environment and the human organism are too complex to make possible such treatment.

Regarding the actual environment as it exists today it is obvious in what vastly different worlds people live during the formative period of life. The contrast between city and country; the


difference in economic conditions as reflected in hovel or palace home, whether first child or last for example - all these environmental differences, to mention only a few of the more obvious ones, would seem to make the postulation of a normal environment impossible and to give point to the contention that an instinct cannot be thought of as an identical force or essence in different individuals. We shall return later to a consideration of this problem in some detail.

The Modification of Unlearned Conduct

One of the most fundamental and probably the earliest methods by which original human nature becomes modified is through the operation of the conditioned reflex. The work of the Russian physiologist Pavlov together with extensive experiments by Bechterew, Watson, Lashley and others show the ease with which unlearned behavior is modified by the conditioned reflex. This for the sociologist points to the danger of attempting to put down just what the native behavior sets are.

Pavlov found when a bell was sounded at the same time that food was offered to a dog, and this repeated many times, the bell could be rung alone and the secretion of the salivary glands would take place in response to it. The response, however, is influenced by many factors and is, therefore, more subject to variation than is the original reflex. Pavlov states; "In the psychic form, on the other hand, qualities unessential or merely incidental play an important role. The optic and olfactory properties influence the result, although, dissociated from the particular objects, these qualities have no secretory influence of themselves. Even conditions altogether collateral to the stimulus, such as the room and furniture of the room in which the animal is placed, the vessel containing the food, the presence of the attendant who ordinarily feeds the animal, the sound of his approach, produce an effect. It is not surprising that the marked feature of a result dependent upon so many factors is a considerable degree of fickleness and inconstancy. The psychological effect in comparison with the physiological is dependent

It is possible that this series could be lengthened indefinitely on the basis of the conditioned reflex. Again, regarding a particular food and the reflex flow of saliva, it has been suggested that the following conditioned reflexes are often pyramided, as it were, one upon another.



Certain general characteristics of the conditioned reflex point to its importance as a motivating agent in Social Control.³

1. Persistence. "After the reflex has once been thoroughly established it carries over from one day's experiments to the next for an indefinite period. Sometimes a single punishment at the beginning of a day's work is necessary to cause the reflex to make its appearance. We are not able to state over how long a period the unexercised reflex will persist. In one case we trained one subject thoroughly in May to the bell, then did not test him again until October. The reflex did not appear on the first ringing of the bell alone, but after the first administration of the combined Stimuli (at which the subject disrupted the apparatus although the induction shock was very weak) the conditional reflex

1. I.P.Pavlov, "The Work of the Digestive Glands" second English edition, p 94.

2. Psychology p 501

3. See Watson, J.B. "The Place of the Conditioned Reflex in Psychology", Psychol.Rev. March 1916 p 89-116; also his "Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist" p- 34f

appeared regularly to the bell alone."⁴

2. Reinforcement and Inhibition. Fatigue shows its effect quickly.

If the stimulus of the sound of a bell to which a withdrawal movement of the finger has been built up through the electric shock, be given every five seconds the response of the subject is normal. If, however, the stimuli be presented every two seconds the reflex will soon cease, to reappear after a short rest or when the interval between the stimuli is again lengthened. When the reflex begins to weaken it can be reinforced by presenting visual or tactual stimuli at the same time that the auditory stimulus is given.

3. The first response is sharp and diffused, but the individual learns gradually to localize the action.

The importance of the conditioned reflex to the problem of motivation is indicated by Lashley in a note to his study of the salivary reflex and its use to Psychology.⁵ "The two latter phenomena"(i.e., its total disappearance with continued excitation without reinforcement by the unconditioned stimulus, and the possibility of using a thoroughly established conditioned reflex as the foundation for the formation of others) "furnish the clue to the nature of the role of interest and motive in complex human learning. A loss of interest clearly corresponds to the fatigue of the conditioned reflex, which seems to be the more fundamental of the two."

It is not the purpose of this thesis to treat in detail the learning process, but rather to emphasize a general point of view regarding the ease of modifying unlearned responses in the human infant and setting up activity on the conditioned reflex level, and also certain

4. *ibid.* p 97.

5. *Psychol. Rev.* 1916, 23, p 416.

hints--for little more can be given from reliable data--regarding the motivating forces operating in learned behavior. The learning process, though the attachment on detachment of original stimulus and response, or the building up of serial responses, or a consideration of the curve of learning with its sharp rises and its plateaus, would carry the discussion far afield. Studies in the conditioned reflex, however, show clearly the difficulty of unraveling what is learned from what is unlearned in the human infant and point to the fallacy of the instinctivists. A brief consideration of the more important factors in the environment which effect the individual in modern society will make this point clear.

Attention has been given in this section to the individual organism as an individual with the outside world coming in only incidentally; obviously any treatment of the learning process for utilization in social control must consider environmental pressures that play upon the organism and mold it into its many diverse shapes. For social psychology is "fundamentally the science of social control through the organization and manipulation of the psycho-social environment."⁶ Through the physical and biological environment the organism is modified by such factors as temperature, germ diseases, disorders caused by parasites--these things are obvious. Not so generally recognized in the extent of its operation is the psycho-social environment which consists "of all those associated activities of men, in actual process or hypothecated in fiction or theory, which are apprehended in the consciousness or the subconsciousness of people and which are products of the psychical processes of the actors." In fact, "all the multitudinous

6. Bernard: The significance of the environment as a social factor. Publications of the Am. Sociological Society, vol. 16, 1922. Pp 84-120. The quotations following are drawn from this source.

sources, which have so multiplied in recent times as to surpass by far in volume and influence all other sources put together, except daily talk and random interchange of opinions and which constitute a vast magazine from which men extract their opinions, imbibe their attitudes and draw the data for their constructive thinking, in so far as they are trained for this process, go to make up the surpassing richness of the psycho-social environment."

The savage was largely dominated by instinct but each advance in organized life results in bringing environmental pressures more insistently, at an earlier age, into play in shaping the personality. In fact, "the history of men has been the story of the growth of institutions, with their rich content of tradition and customs, belief and ritual. Suggestion and rational interpretation which have now come to have an immense volume and which are clamped down upon the developing child from the cradle and mold him after their own images, for good or evil." The instinct, both of the type fully active at birth and the type which come to full maturity and integration only years later, and the implicit types of unlearned responses, the emotions, lie at the basis of human behavior as previously indicated; these are modified through such mechanisms as the conditioned reflex which doubtless is always subject to variation through fatigue and a multitude of other factors as indicated by Pavlov in his experiments on the salivary reflex of the dog. Thus such complex conduct as the temporary disgust of a medical student with everything connected with medicine may possibly be accounted for in large measure by the temporary exhaustion of conditioned reflexes stimulated too frequently--as in cramming for an examination--and will be restored to their former strength, with a

corresponding return of interest in medicine, by a short period of rest. The extent to which the adult human personality is the product of the psycho-social environment, however, is frequently neglected. An example of these modifications is to be seen in the manner the native activity trends connected with sex and child care are redirected by the operation of environment. "The fields of activity in which they function socially are now standardized and controlled, as far as the mind of rational and socialized individuals are concerned, long before these delayed instincts appear. In fact, the psycho-social environment embodies a great mass of tradition, public opinion, propaganda, and literature, scientific and other, prescribing how these activity complexes must function. Mere instincts cannot be permitted to overturn this laboriously, often carefully, built-up system of psycho-social environmental controls. Not even the purely vegetative instincts connected with food and respiration are permitted to retain their pristine simplicity, but are disturbed and modified or suppressed by modern cookery and the other arts and mutilations of life. The psycho-social environment masters us all; perhaps not as the philosopher would desire, but certainly in ways which tax the imagination of the ordinary man."

How does it come about that the psycho-social environment actually dominates and shapes the personality of the individual to the extent suggested? In the first place, "dynamic factors in human society, such as the increase of population and its consequent pressure upon the industrial arts, the growth of knowledge and technique, and the utilization of the natural resources and inventive processes in general make necessary new adjustments in society. These new alignments call forth a new set of inventions, including institutional and other more

temporary group organization, directed at first to the satisfaction of man's instinctive needs, but in the course of time becoming ends in themselves." Society is modified so rapidly through the dynamic factors that biological evolution is not able to create new instincts rapidly enough to keep up with the procession; derived values are piled upon one another until social values may run directly counter to instinctive trends thus opening the way to varying degrees of dissociation within the personality because the actual organization of society has gotten too far away from its base in unlearned trends. It thus comes about that modern man has become "largely an artificial, clothes-wearing, idea-imitating, convention-copying, even at times a thinking, animal who turns his instincts to the service of artificially conceived ends in an artificial, but much improved, society." Language mechanisms - which will be referred to again later - enable the individual to build up abstract thinking symbols which in turn make it possible for him to consider the various results of a particular line of activity before any overt activity has taken place. In other words, the individual can allow the habit systems with all their derived values to come into play and direct a course of conduct under a particular stimulus which will run counter to the first impulsive tendency to activity.

The power thus derived from language mechanisms together with the ease of habit forming in the human being enables the psycho-social environment of one generation to be passed on practically intact to the next generation, with certain additions, which in general tend to drive the activities of the individual even farther from the unlearned base of conduct. The environment is constantly being abstracted, concentrated and symbolized, and passed on to the next generation. National

educational systems are means of consolidating and passing on the psycho-social environment.⁷

For most individuals the process of taking over the psycho-social environment is merely a matter of copying. Here are the models of conduct which society approves and disapproves; copying the one it is discovered after many trials, leads in general to greater satisfaction than copying the other. So it comes about that vast areas of the traditional point of view are taken over without question if they bear the stamp of approval of the group of which the individual most vividly feels himself to be a member. "But the more thoughtful, the better informed, types of men take them over reflectively, that is, they in some measure consciously transform their environment as well as adapt to it." It is from this latter group, of course, that the most is to be hoped in solving the problem of adapting the environment rationally to the individual and adjusting the individual to the environment.

7. "The schools transmit the tradition. They standardize our national prejudices and transmit the tradition. They do this necessarily." Park and Burgess Introduction to the Science of Sociology, p 833.

The Dynamic Nature of Human Conduct

Human motivation comes, as indicated, out of organic needs and organic hungers yet so great is the human capacity for learning that the organism is soon operating upon a basis vastly changed through combinations and modifications of these primitive needs. Obviously the different desires of the organism cannot be satisfied at the same time and certain ones can only be satisfied at the sacrifice temporarily of others. In civilized society the developing individual finds that he can best satisfy his primitive desires by carrying through certain activities originally distasteful, but which society approves. Certain habits group themselves together within the personality whose general drift is toward the satisfaction of some powerful primitive hunger, as sex. Other habits will be built up through environmental pressures whose general drift will be in quite another direction, as the desire for the approval of family and friends for one's conduct. Often times these two habit systems will come into conflict with each other and one of them only can find outlet while the other is "suppressed"

The process of forming habits in this manner with the frequent linkage of the group to some organic need or to a strong social taboo may go on indefinitely within the individual. It would then happen that when a group of stimuli are presented any one of several mutually exclusive habit groups might come into play and only one actually break into overt conduct. The above facts combined with the study of abnormal behavior, which represents normal behavior accentuated in certain respects and less emphasized in others, has

led to the formulation of the doctrine of the wish. Where the group of habits is thoroughly consolidated, is held with a strong emotional tone tending toward definite outlet it is termed a complex¹. The wish in the writings of many authors, particularly the psychoanalysts, has been given an almost anthropomorphic meaning which reminds one strangely of the 'instincts' of an older psychology. This is also frequently true regarding concepts of the 'unconscious', 'complexes', 'suppression', the 'censor', 'sublimation', etc. However, the general concept should be of great value in the study of the individual and society because of the dynamic nature of the 'wish' or 'complex' as properly conceived and because of the many phenomena or ordinary observation to which it offers a reasonable explanation. This in turn gives a promising basis for actual experimentation and check-up. It should be emphasized that much of the material in the remainder of this section is speculative. It is presented because it is believed to hold great promise for the further general study of the problem of motivation and its application to Social Control.

According to Holt², "An exact definition of the 'wish' is that it is a course of action which some mechanism of the body is set to carry out, whether it actually does so or does not. All emotions, as well as pleasure and displeasure, are separable from the 'wishes'; and this precludes any thought of a merely hedonistic psychology."

1. See Hart, Psychol of Insanity, pp58-76.
2. Edwin B. Holt, The Freudian Wish and Its Place in Ethics, p3f.

Again, - "We shall do well if we consider this wish to be, as in fact it is, dependent on a motor attitude of the physical body, which goes over into overt action and conduct when the wish is carried into execution.³" Holt stresses the fact that whenever evolution has proceeded to the point where there are two integrated reflexes in the organism, as an avoiding reaction to heat and an approaching reaction to light we have the beginning in crude form of the wish. The complex, on the other hand, involves a large number of consolidated habits with high emotional tone, as a "hobby" The higher we advance in the scale the more important it becomes to study the organism with reference to the external environment and its reaction to this external environment, and the less real insight can be gained by a study that confines itself to what goes on within the organism. Taking as an illustration the complicated conduct of the bee, with its hive building and honey gathering activities, it is possible to explain all this through the operation of several thousand co-operating reflexes. However, the study in detail of the physical make-up of the bee and the operation abstractly of these reflexes, such as its response to the smell of the hive or a particular flower, would not be an adequate explanation of the bee's behavior. Its conduct is obviously to be explained partly in terms of things outside itself. This is what Holt terms the recession of the stimulus.

The importance of this concept of a receding stimulus in considering the behavior of so relatively simple an organism as the bee is doubtless clear; its immense importance in human behavior is evident from the vastly increased number of integrated reflex systems which are thrown into play by the ordinary

3. *ibid.* P 4.

stimuli of the environment. Holt states;⁴"And one could not describe what the animal as a whole is doing in terms of the immediate stimuli; but this can be described only in terms of the environing objects toward which the animal's response is directed. This is precisely the distinction between reflex action and specific response or behavior. As the number of component reflexes involved in response increases, the immediate stimulus itself recedes further and further from view as the significant factor." It has thus come about in the ordinary study of human behavior that for the observer the stimulus has receded so far into the background as to be almost lost to view. In fact it is not uncommon in treatises on human conduct to find that the basis of conduct is sensory stimuli has been entirely neglected. An adequate treatment for Sociological purposes requires that a synthetic view of the individual and of his physical and social environment be taken. To consider the individual apart from organized society, i.e., the individual as an organized personality, is a meaningless abstraction.

Holt indicates that the relation of reflex circuits to each other is fairly simple. The muscles used in locomotion are in antagonistic pairs and so it becomes possible for incoming impulses to stimulate two muscles tending to move a member in opposite directions. If the impulses incoming are equal then they inhibit each other and there is no overt conduct resulting. However, there is an increase in muscle tonus. Says Holt: "If we call the sum of all sense impulses at any moment the 'sensory pattern', we shall practically always find that some portions of this pattern cancel themselves out by interference, in the ways described, while the remaining

4. *ibid.* p 76f.

portions augment one another and produce the individual's overt behavior and conduct."⁵ Insight into the nature of thought is gotten by considering these antagonistic stimulations to muscular activity which increase muscle tonus but do not bring overt activity.

Turning to abnormal behavior we find striking illustration of the manner in which the wish or complex operates, -- vastly complicated of course beyond the antagonistic stimulation of two muscles. Writes Hart:⁶ "One of the simplest examples of its action (i.e., wish fulfillment) is seen in the so-called 'betrothal-delirium', occasionally to be observed in women who have been jilted. All the desires and ambitions which hitherto formed the kernel of the patient's life have suddenly become incompatible with reality. Out of the intense emotional stress engendered by this conflict an attack of insanity develops, characterised by a dream-like delirium in which the frustrated complexes attain an imaginary fulfilment. In this delirium the patient believes that she has been reconciled to her lover, preparations for the wedding are in progress, the bridegroom arrives, the marriage ceremony takes place, and the dream-state is prolonged indefinitely in pictures of a subsequent wedded life, each of which is lived through with all the intensity of reality." Illustrations could be multiplied from abnormal behavior tending in this same direction.

In normal conduct many instances are cited of the way in which the wish operates. Where two systems of habits strive

5. *ibid.* p 68.

6. *The Psychology of Insanity*, p 149.

to break into overt conduct under specific stimuli one system will often be unable to put entirely out of the running the other system and the one inhibited will find a circuitous outlet in an unguarded moment, as in a "slip of the tongue." This is what Freud calls the psychology of errors. None of the errors are chance in the sense that they occur in an arbitrary and unexplainable manner. They are not to be mainly explained through such factors as fatigue. Brill gives the following illustration among many others. A group having danced all evening at a private home expected to be fed a substantial meal by the host, but instead sandwiches and lemonade were served. All were disappointed. It was a Presidential Year and Roosevelt was a candidate; the conversation naturally turned in that direction. One of the guests intended to say to the host: "There is one fine thing about Teddy, he always gives you a square deal." What was actually said was: "There is one fine thing about Teddy, he always gives you a square meal."⁷ Holt gives an illustration from his own experience.⁸ In calling on Mrs. A he had to pass the house of Mrs. B whom he did not like, but whose husband was a friend. Unfortunately Mrs. B was on the verandan and he felt compelled to go in and spend a half hour with her. "When I arose to go I undertook to be amiably untruthful and to say, 'I'm so glad that you were out on the verandah as I was going by.' But my treacherous lips actually brought out, 'I'm so sorry that you were, 'etc. The reader may be skeptical as to the cause of this slip; but Mrs. B was not, and did not invite me to her house for over a year, as served me quite right,"

7. Fundamental Conceptions of Psychoanalysis p 91.

8. Op. Cit. p 36.

Slips of the pen may often indicate the temporary ascendency of a habit system which the individual thinks carefully inhibited at the moment. Again, a mass of illustrations are given, such as the following: Brill discovered that two editions of his volume "Psychoanalysis" had contained the word omission spelled Ommission. This despite the fact that the copy had been read at one time or another by stenographer, compositor, professional proof-reader as well as by himself. His explanation is that the word occurred in connection with an account of the "Wicked Bible" of 1631 in which the statement appeared "Thou shalt commit adultery" instead of "Thou shalt not commit adultery." Brill continues,⁹ "The printer was fined and the Bible confiscated; I added that the publisher had to pay a large sum of money for this 'omission'. The explanation is that as there was a fine in this case for an omission, my publisher gave me unconsciously an additional "m" for good measure, so to say." On the same point Holt declares:¹⁰ "It is well known that an author cannot read his own proof so well as another person can who is less tempted to preoccupation with the contents; and many persons read their own proofs twice, once for the thought and again for the spelling, etc.; because each set of considerations suppresses for the time being the other."

Again light is thrown upon the way a large amount of forgetting of names and incidents and the misplacing of articles takes place. We tend to forget more quickly those things which are

9. Ibid. p 95f

10. Op. cit. p 33.

disagreeable and distasteful to us, i.e., we push them "out of mind." They disagree with habit systems which society has indicated as useful and desirable; or they tend to wound our feeling of self-righteousness; or they make difficult the complacent viewing of our own wisdom and importance, - - for these or any other reasons which would make them unwelcome, the name or incident or what not is forgotten. Other habit systems block the way to the overt expression of ideas which would be painful. Several authors cite Charles Darwin's Golden Rule of always writing down immediately any facts or observations which seemed to disagree with his theories for he discovered that otherwise they would quickly be forgotten.

We frequently forget a name that has some painful association for us. Brill gives an illustration from his days as an interne in the Clinic of Psychiatry at Zurich.¹¹ While reading an account of a certain case he was reminded of a similar case which he had treated several years before while at the State Hospital of New York on Long Island. He started to write the patient's name in the margin of the book and was unable to recall it. He began trying for the name through the free association method by which one allows anything related to the matter to come, without regard to logical sequence, into the mind and writes it down. He began with the associations early in the afternoon and continuing them until a later hour in the night without success, he awoke at four in the morning and being unable to dismiss the matter from mind, continued the associations until the name came to him an hour later. What was the situation?

11. Op. cit. pp 51-58.

The patient whom he had treated and whose name he attempted to recall had been arrested for trying to burn down St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York. Brill diagnosed him as a psychic epileptic, though none of the other physicians agreed with him. Subsequent events proved his diagnosis correct, he was congratulated by his associates, and began the preparation of an elaborate report of the case. The superintendent, however, informed him that he proposed to report the case personally to a medical society, thus preventing Dr. Brill from reporting it as he had intended. However, when the time came to read the report, which the younger physician had prepared the superintendent told him to go and read it himself, which he did, discovering to his chagrin upon arrival that the programs were already printed with the superintendent given as the author. The painful situation did not end there however, for, against his wishes, he saw the manuscript taken over by a friend of the superintendent, editor of an obscure medical journal, when he had planned to have it published in a standard journal of neurology or psychiatry. Now when he began to make associations one scene recurred again and again to his mind. In those days on Long Island forest fires were frequent occurrences and the physicians at the hospital were called upon to direct the work of preventing the flames from spreading to any of the buildings. On a particular Friday when a considerable amount of scrub pine was being burning, Dr. Brill was standing with another physician directing part of the work. Occasionally as a rabbit would dart out of the underbrush someone would succeed in shooting it. Continuing he writes, "As I was standing there, the superintendent came up to us, passed some remark or other and then spying a rabbit some distance away asked one of the attendants for his

shot-gun to try his skill, saying: 'let's see if I can get that rabbit.' " All expected the shot to miss, which it did, the rabbit escaping. "He turned to me and declared somewhat uneasily, and by way of explanation, that his fingers slipped, for it was beginning to rain. I seemingly concurred in the observation, but in my heart smiled at his discomfiture." This scene recurred in the morning and with the words, "Let's see if I can get that rabbit," the name came to mind; it was Lapin the French word for rabbit. "Later on when I counted my associations I found that this particular association came up twenty-eight times more than any of the others."

It is probably a common experience to have names with which there is some painful or uncomfortable association refuse to come to mind. The writer has had many experiences of this sort and has finally succeeded in getting the name after a little persistence by the free association method. He has not had the patience, however, as probably few have, to carry out the associations to such length as in the case just cited.

The misplacing of objects illustrates again the general tendency of certain groups of habits to protect the individual from experiences that are painful. Freud, in his General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, gives the instance of a man who having had a disagreement with his wife is unable to find a book which she had given him. This despite a long search for it. After their difficulty was settled he went to his desk and got the book without giving it a thought. Oftentimes the long delay in mailing a letter shows that one part of the individual's personality, i.e., one group of habits, is opposed to having the letter go.

Again in wit and humor we see how a habit system, denied direct outlet, will find a channel of outlet in a more circuitous manner. The sum total of an individual's social habits, -- those which turn outward and seek the approval of a certain portion of society for the individual's line of conduct, these habits are often lumped together and called the Censor, which is almost made a person by certain writers in their zeal to simplify the explanation of human conduct. However, this term like 'instinct' and 'wish' may be useful if used with a realization of its limitation as being simply a group of habits. In wit and humor, then, we see constantly exhibited a manner in which the censor is eluded by more primitive and often anti-social habits. Thus it is not customary for a woman to state at a dinner party her envy and hatred of an acquaintance, but she may through an extravagant compliment in which she has carefully placed a veiled insult give vent to her real feelings. Probably only a small minority of people utilize this method as the danger of "getting caught" is too great with the consequent strong social disapproval, moreover the woman would find it hard to get her own consent, as it were, to such a line of conduct. It is at this point that wit frequently comes to the person's rescue for it is possible oftentimes to give vent to a raw emotion, as hatred, in such a veiled and epigrammatic manner as to bring bursts of laughter from others who have the same secret hatred or ill-will.

An example of this sort occurred to a southern woman of refinement to whom a clerk made a disparaging remark. Said the clerk, "I'd bet a penny you are from the south." "How did you know that?" asked the woman. "Because you said 'you all'", responded

the clerk with vast self-satisfaction. "And I could have told that you are from the north, also", said the woman. "How could you do that?" "Why", she continued, "by your penny bet." The writer has had this story repeated many times to groups of southerners and always has seen it regarded as a bit of choice humor, and received accordingly. The woman's habit system would not allow her to depart from the social conventions of courteous conduct toward those with whom she came in contact while at the same time she longed to squelch the impertinent clerk. The solution came more or less spontaneously in a rejoinder which made both of these possible. She could not tell the man she regarded him as typically stingy and miserly as well as insultingly impertinent, but she could convey the same idea in different words. There is doubtless another source of satisfaction to the southerner in this story besides the mere fact of a dig successfully administered to a northerner, it contains indirectly a statement of superior generosity - a matter of pride exemplified in southern hospitality.

Of course the manner in which a joke is received will depend upon the group of habits desiring outlet in the person hearing it. The story just given would doubtless be considered without point by many people while to the person who still had a smouldering animosity toward the south (a member of the Grand Army of the Republic, perhaps) it would seem mere nonsense. Naturally, however, the more clever the concealment of the real motive is, the wider will be the appeal of the witticism. Holt¹² gives a striking illustration of the widening circle of appeal of an identical

12. Op. cit. p 23f.

criticism of former President Roosevelt.

" 'That 'ere Rosyvelt is a -- -- crazy fool' (corresponding to no censor at all). 'The Old Colonel acts like a brainless bedlamite' (where the reference to a time of extreme popularity, the charm of alliteration, the indirectness of 'acts like, and the somewhat cryptic value of the word 'bedlamite' all conspire to beguile a feeble censor). 'ah, yes! Teddy is unquestionable our headforemost citizen' (affectionate playfulness of the form 'Teddy' and approximation to the encomiastic 'foremost citizen'). 'In the last great Day of Judgment President Roosevelt will undoubtedly take his place somewhere between St. George and St. Vitus'." Few would accept the first form while even admirers of Roosevelt might laugh at the last form. It might be added that this form of wit and humor is not presented as the only kind, but it is doubtless more frequent than ordinarily supposed.

Very much has been made by the Psychoanalysts since Freud's publication of "The Interpretation of Dreams", of the phantasy of sleeping life and the day-dream of waking life as tremendous channels of outlet for those complexes or wishes which the dominant social habits hold strictly in check during the more alert and active periods of life. It is not necessary to go into detail regarding the elaborate and often fantastic theories of the dream and its interpretation with the attempt to link it in almost every case with some sex suppression. Here again, however, it is believed that there is a valuable point of view for the student of motivation and of social control. The elaborations of the unconscious

are believed to be unnecessary, for, as Woodworth states, "Suppressed wishes are usually not so unconscious as he, (Freud) describes them; they are unavowed, unnamed, unanalyzed, but conscious for all that. It is not so much the unconscious wish that finds outlet in dreams and daydreams, as the unsatisfied wish, which may be perfectly conscious."¹³ Neither is it believed that motivation can be simplified into two main drives as the Freudians would do. These two theoretical drives are stated admirably by William A. White, the distinguished Psychiatrist. After discussing unconscious motivation he says:

"At the psychological level we can recognize as this process of development is going on with its conflicts, repressions, and ever increasing realm of the unconscious, two fundamental and controlling groups of desires. The one group which has as its goal self-preservation and of which hunger is the type, and the other group which has as its goal race-preservation and of which the sexual relation is the type. The energy which drives to these two goals may be termed the libido, that component which drives toward the self-preservation goal would then be the nutritive libido and that component which drives towards the race-preservative goal would be the sexual libido. Self-preservation and race-preservation are in fundamental conflict. The first implies race-preservation are in fundamental conflict. The first implies keeping, the second giving. Personal development involves certain sacrifices which the selfish are not equal to and so we see here one of the essential conflicts which lie at the basis of mental life." When one links

13. Op. cit. p 507.

to the theory of these two libidos the consideration that it is the sexual libido which social conventions require most severely to be repressed, while the nutritive libido meets with only slight repressions when compared to it, it is easy to reach the conclusion, in pure theory at least -- however, little experimental data there may be to support the position, that the major source of motivation in social control is to be found in the distortions of the sex drive confined to the unconscious "The more one is occupied with the solution of dreams, the more willing one must become to acknowledge that the majority of the dreams of adults treat of sexual material and give expression to erotic wishes. . . . Let us recognize at once that this fact is not to be wondered at, but that it is in complete harmony with the fundamental assumptions of dream explanation. No other impulse has had to undergo so much suppression from the time of childhood as the sex impulse in its numerous components, from no other impulse have survived so many and such intense unconscious wishes, which now act in the sleeping state in such a manner as to produce dreams."¹⁴

Turning to the consideration of the dream itself, however, it is not difficult to find illustrations of the wish fulfilment mechanism. The child who dreams of bushels of strawberries, the Saint who in sleep views the City of the Blest, the youth who dreams of great distinction and renown, all indicate commonplace dreams of the wish fulfilling type. The fact that several wishes may be involved may complicate the form of the dream. A dream given by Holt shows this clearly. "Herr Pepi, a medical student, was called in the morning when it was time to get up and go to the hospital for

his daily rounds. He roused up, but fell asleep again, and dreamed of himself as lying in one of the beds at the hospital; at the head of the bed was one of the official cards reading - 'Pepi H. Student of Medicine. Age 22 years.' Then in his dream he said to himself: 'Well, since I'm already at the hospital I don't have to get up to go there.' Then he turned over and slept on. This dream, while nonsensical, still clearly expresses the wish of one who wants to lie abed in the morning. But it provided an excuse for lying abed, and this shows that more than this single wish was at work to produce the dream. This other factor was clearly another wish - to be at the hospital as duty required; and this wish, weaker than the first, was strong enough to transfer to the hospital the picture of a comfortable morning nap, but not strong enough to interfere further in the realization of the wish to lie abed."¹⁵

Then why is the dream so often absurd? Probably because of the interference of wishes, as in the case just cited, and because of the facility of the mind for making free associations by which one thing suggests another without regard to logical sequence, and also because of the great amount of symbolism and abbreviation that takes place in the dream."¹⁶

When we turn to the daydream the same general mechanisms are seen to operate, though the individuals critical powers tend to inhibit the more absurd excrescences which would follow through free associations. There is here shown the manner in which implicit (unspoken) language habits may assist the individual in

15. Op. cit. p 6f

16. See Woodworth, Op. cit. p 503f, also Freud. Op. cit. pp 113-137; 260-402.

making a break from the world of reality about him; in other words of starting on the path leading to complete dissociation of personality, - which will be further considered in a later paragraph. The manner of forming implicit language habits, as here accepted, may clarify the discussion to follow. As Watson states the matter: "Our view is that overt language develops under social training. It is thus absorbed into and becomes a part of every total integration of the individual. Hence when he is making adjustment in the absence of other like beings language remains as a part of the process. But there is no stimulus for him to talk aloud when alone; as a matter of fact, talking aloud under such circumstances introduces conflicting stimuli, the auditory stimulus breaking in upon the otherwise silent room. Hence, silent talking takes place which rapidly improves by practice since it is exercised during every waking and certainly during many sleeping moments."¹⁷

Now this habit of implicit language, becoming so thoroughly integrated that the individual carried on with little effort during waking life an almost continuous stream of conversation with himself, is an invaluable aid in short-circuiting the crude overt means of trial and error in the process of problem solving; it also furnishes an easy way of escape when the problem to be solved seems too difficult. Thus the individual meeting with a severe rebuff may turn back within himself, draw back into his shell as it were, and there in the world of phantasy win complete revenge upon his enemies and achieve entire satisfaction for the insult or disappointment he has suffered. In so far as this phantasy serves to drain off the

17. Op. cit. p 323.

excess of emotion and enables the individual to act more rationally in the matter it has its social value; in so far as it acts as a stimulus to induce the individual to linger over the alluring pictures of himself as the paragon of virtue on a triumphal tour in which all his enemies crook the knee, and he wins from the world at large unending affection and renown, the daydream serves as a means of disintegrating the personality and rendering the individual socially impotent.

For those whose imaginations are torpid, and for children, society furnishes many forms of ready-made daydreams, with the ability to escape from reality thus opened to everyone. Many movies are frankly simply the presentation of the fulfilment of a wish held by a large section of society. Thus we see the poor shop girl marry the man of enormous wealth, the youth from the country come to the city and win a fortune and the girl of his choice, the married woman having grown sick of the monotony of her life engages in thrilling adventures with a fascinating Lothario and as a result meets with no evil consequences whatever, the tired business man is shipwrecked on an island in the South Seas where he kills a man eating shark with a short knife - after a desperate struggle - and weds the grateful queen of the island who is a creature of marvelous beauty, and, finally, the old man and the old woman, who in real life have been well-nigh deserted and forgotten, see their children come back and crowd about them to perform acts of the greatest love and devotion.

The same function is also performed for the child by the fairy tale except that the fairy tale is often the symbolic

representation of the more primitive organic hungers with their fulfilment and satisfaction. It is significant that they are generally the product of abnormal individuals. Upon this point Brill declares: "Fairy tales representing essentially an abnormal gratification of the individual's inner strivings and wishes, it is not at all surprising to find that they are invariably products of shut-in, seclusive personalities, persons who never came in normal contact with other people, and who generally led an abnormal existence. Such individuals resorted to the fairy tale as a mode of emotional gratification. Thus Andersen did not see a single child up to the age of eleven or twelve. In fact, when he was placed in contact with children he could not get along with them. He confessed himself that he used to spin phantom children in his brain with whom he constantly played."¹⁸ Since it is the real world in which the child must learn to live and to which he must learn to make adjustments, the frequently pernicious effects of the fairy tale, where seven league boots and fairy godmothers and magic potions are the methods of achieving ones ends, must be apparent. It is not argued that escape from reality is always a curse, but whenever it proceeds to the point of hindering to any extent actual and necessary adjustments or where it unduly stresses primitive organic hungers, as the sex symbolism of many a fairy tale, then the means of escape from reality has a disintegrating effect upon the personality.

Perhaps it might better be spoken of in the case of the young child as hindering the process of personality integration, for the binding together of habit systems into something like

18. Brill, Op.cit. p 300, he discusses the fairy tale and its influence upon the child's later life, pp 296-308

a unified whole is a development that is the result of many years contact with reality; it is not something with which the infant begins life. In fact, it is to be doubted whether the individual exists who has achieved complete integration so that all of his important habit systems co-operate in such a manner as to drive the individual steadily and without blocking or balking toward a clearly perceived goal. The chemist occasionally wishes to throw his test tubes in the sink, and go fishing; the philosopher of calm and undisturbed brow will, under appropriate stimuli, give way to an infantile mode of behavior as in a burst of anger; even the miser will occasionally have impulses toward generosity. In fact, the very nature of the wish with its common manifestations, as in slips of the tongue and pen, forgetting names, misplacing objects, wit and humor, dreams and daydreams, all indicate how a certain amount of dissociation exists in the average individual. This is a matter so important to social theory that it may be considered in some detail.

The best approach to dissociation in normal behavior is through a consideration of its operation in abnormal conduct, in the insane.¹⁹

19. "Insanity should not be used as a medical term at all. It is solely a legal and sociological concept and so used to designate those members of the community who are so far from able to adjust to the ordinary social requirements that the community segregates them (forcibly perhaps) and takes away their rights as citizens. Insanity is a form of social inadequacy which medically may be the result of many varieties of mental disease. Insane, therefore, means nothing more than certifiable." *italics not in text.* William A. White, *Outlines of Psychiatry*, P 26, *note*) *italics not in text.*

In this connection Hart states: "A system of ideas is said to be dissociated when it is divorced from the personality."²⁰ A common example of this is in somnambulism. Professor Janet describes the case of "Irene."²¹

"Irene had nursed her mother through a prolonged illness culminating in death. The circumstances connected with the death were peculiarly painful, and the event produced a profound shock upon the patient's mind. An abnormal mental condition developed, characterised by frequent appearance of symptoms resembling those exhibited by the ordinary sleep-walker. Irene, perhaps engaged at the moment in sewing or in conversation, would suddenly cease her occupation, and would commence to live over again the scene of her mother's death, carrying out every detail with all the power of an accomplished actress. While this drama was in progress she was perfectly unconscious of the actual events happening in her environment, heard nothing that was said to her, and saw nothing, but the imaginary scene in which she was living at the moment." This would end suddenly and the patient would not be able to recall either the activities in which she had just engaged or any of the events connected with her mother's death. In truth she could discuss her mother without the slightest show of emotion. Complete dissociation between two groups of habits had been established within her personality.

Again, in automatic writing the phenomenon of dissociation is illustrated. This is seen particularly in hysteria

20. Op. cit. p 52

21. See Hart, Op. cit. p 28f

which Janet declares to be "a form of mental depression characterized by the retraction of the field of personal consciousness and by the tendency to the dissociation and the emancipation of systems of ideas and of functions which by their synthesis constitute the personality."²² It is often possible while engaging the hysterical patient's attention elsewhere to insert a pencil between his fingers and have him write in answer to whispered questions certain information while apparently his attention is absorbed in something else, as in conversation with a third person. Here the habit systems have lost their connection to such an extent that both of them, under the particularly favorable circumstances of two channels of outlet being available at the same time, are able to function through the verbal and gestural mechanisms simultaneously, each system of habits being unaware that the other is in operation.

Both the hallucination and the delusion show the phenomena of dissociation as they are seen in abnormal behavior.²³ The hallucination, which is "a perception without sensory foundation in the environment", takes many forms, and may be regarded as the severe accentuation of the illusion ("an inexact, or inaccurate, perception") as the "mental process is the same in both hallucination and illusion." There are, for example, the auditory hallucinations where the patient hears voices speaking. "Rarely different voices are heard in the two ears, as in one of my patients who heard Christ talking to her in her right ear and the Devil in her left." These voices may be external or may originate in different parts of the body. There are the visual hallucinations which "occur not infrequently

22. Quoted by White, Op. cit. p 268

23. Based on White, Op. cit. Pp 58-74, from which the sections quoted in this and the following paragraph are drawn.

in the blind", which may vary from flashes of light to highly complex visions. Again there are the hallucinations or organic sensations, the most common of which are "peculiar and often indescribable sensations coming from the internal organs giving rise to such beliefs as: the bones are broken, the brain dried up, an immense tapeworm is coiled up in the lungs, the bowels are stopped up, there is no stomach, and the like." The kinesthetic or motor hallucinations sometimes give rise to the belief that the body had undergone a change of position. "One patient complained that men came to her room nights, carried her away, subjected her to improper and indecent treatment and then brought her back." In the reflex hallucinations "stimulation of the eye may produce sensations of sound, stimulation of the taste bulbs may produce odors, etc."

That false belief which is highly improbable, cannot be corrected by an appeal to reason, and is thoroughly out of harmony with the individual's education and surroundings, is a delusion. Of course, not every false belief is a delusion. Thus, "The sick Fijian lying upon his back and crying for his soul to come back to him is but exemplifying the belief of the race that sickness is due to the soul, or a part of it, leaving the body. Should we find a modern American, who had had the usual public school advantages, acting thus we would be justified in supposing him unbalanced." As with the hallucination there are many types, which will not be discussed in detail. There is the unsystematized delusions "the patient who believes that all the bones in his body are broken, but nevertheless goes about his affairs as usual." In the systematized

delusion, as the delusion of persecution, the patient will regulate his whole life in order to avoid his persecutors. "The food is carefully tasted for poison and perhaps discarded, the bed he sleeps in must be insulated to prevent electric currents being applied to him while he sleeps, the key-hole and all cracks stopped up so that noxious vapors cannot be injected through them. If the patient is asked for an explanation of this conduct he is ready with interminable reasons and appeals to experience while his arguments are woven together with much ingenuity and no little logic."

The most extraordinary manifestation of dissociation is to be found in the so-called cases of multiple personality. While accepting with a grain of salt the extraordinary elaborations into four personalities in one person as set forth by Prince in his study of Miss Beauchamp, remembering that the hysteric is a noted liar, highly desirous of pleasing and highly suggestible; nevertheless many authentic cases point to an actual splitting of the personality. William James reported the now famous case of Ansel Bourne.

"On January 17th, 1887, the Rev. Ansel Bourne, an itinerant preacher, drew a considerable sum of money from a bank in Providence, and then entered a tram car. This was the last incident which he remembered. He did not return home that day, and nothing was heard of him for two months. . . . On the morning of March 14th, however, at Norristown, Pennsylvania, a man calling himself A. J. Brown, who had rented a small shop six weeks previously, stocked it with stationery confectionery, fruit and small articles, and carried on his quiet trade without seeming to anyone unnatural or eccentric, woke up in a fright

and called in the people of the house to tell him where he was. He said that his name was Ansel Bourne, that he knew nothing of shop-keeping, and that the last thing he remembered -- it seemed only yesterday -- was drawing the money from the bank in Providence.' ²⁴

"In 1890 he was induced by William James to submit to hypnotism in order to see whether in his trance state his 'Brown' memories would come back. The experiment was so successful that, as James remarks, 'it proved quite impossible to make him, while in hypnosis, remember any of the facts of his normal life.' ²⁵

The classic example in literature of personality splitting is of course Stevenson's Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. Writes Watson: ²⁶ "If we assume that for one reason or another the more socialized reactions of Dr. Jekyll so come in conflict with one another that inhibition of reaction on that plane occurs, action will take place through the outlets which are not in conflict. If this goes on for a sufficient length of time there seems to be no reason, according to the general principles of habit formation, why the individual should not become organized upon the level of Mr. Hyde. . . . If by the alteration of the individual's environment or by his reeducation, the conflicts in the socialized reaction tendencies of Dr. Jekyll are removed, we may once more see him reacting permanently as Dr. Jekyll."

Returning to a consideration of dissociation in normal behavior, differing of course from abnormal behavior only in degree, we find Holt giving a clear statement of it reduced to its

24. Quoted by Hart, op.cit. p 49.

25. This case is further discussed in "Introduction to the Science of Sociology" by Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, p 472f.

26. Op. cit. p 292

simplest elements.²⁷ In the case of the child reaching for the flame of a candle the usual treatment is for the mother to quickly protect the child by moving the candle out of its reach. After this has been done many times the child learns, not that the flame is hot and dangerous as the fond mother hopes, but it learns that when mother is around it is not pleasant to reach for the flame. "The precautionary response which should be 'associated' with fire is dissociated therefrom, and transferred to something else; in our case to the mother. Take the mother away, and the child knows no caution with regard to fire." As all the responses to the mother become grouped into a loosely consolidated whole - a wish or complex as here used, and the responses to the flame become similarly grouped - there is the beginning of dissociation in the lack of complete coordination between these two groups of habits. Incidentally Holt states that the mother should allow the child to learn on its very first trial that flame is painfully hot.²⁸

27. Holt op.cit. pp 101-133.

28. On the basis of laboratory experiments on some fifteen infants in reaching for the candle. Watson (op. cit. pp 278-281) criticises Holt's position that "a few repetitions of the experience" especially if accompanied by a burn would set up a conditioned reflex of retraction. While Watson did not allow the infants to burn their hands he found that probably 150 trials, extending over some 63 days, beginning with the 157th day, were required to set up a fairly complete coordination of withdrawal movement to the stimulus of a candle flame brought close to the infant. This, however, does not invalidate Holt's contention regarding the dissociation which ordinarily takes place.

Again, the case of a man coming upon mushrooms while walking in the woods and being uncertain whether to eat them or to avoid them as poisonous shows the effect of dissociation upon the personality. "Here, then, I am in front of one object which stimulates in me two antagonistic courses of action -- to sit down and eat, and to walk on, taking care not even to handle. I cannot do both, for they are opposed. And they are, therefore, dissociated, for it is probable that opposition is the one invariable source of dissociation. Whichever course of action I follow, the other is suppressed. But this latter gives evidences of itself, for if I walk on I find myself doing so lingeringly and casting my eyes back from time to time and wondering if these really are the poisonous ones; or if I sit down to eat some of them, I find myself only nibbling, every now and then rejecting a mouthful, and feeling a distinct tonus in my leg muscles urging me to be up and off." Holt maintains that "it is not dissociated paths, but the simultaneous excitations of dissociated (i.e., antagonistic) paths by one stimulus that is harmful." Discriminating information is his solution rather than moral sanctions coming from above, for, "It is not more the question, Shall I, or shall I not, eat this mushroom? than it is the question, Is this mushroom the edible or the poisonous one? And the moral failure is to act as if it were both edible and poisonous at once." Upon this basis, strangely enough, Holt takes his place with many of the ancient philosophers in maintaining the Socratic position that to know the truth is to do it. The modern statement of it is that "we can now see how and why suppressions occur in this world of ours. It is through lack of

knowledge." He also holds the optimistic position that even in this highly artificial civilization of ours the correct mode of behavior should be free from suppressions. For, "Right is that conduct, attained through discrimination of the facts, which fulfills all of a man's wishes at once, suppressing none."

At this point Hart disagrees maintaining a more reasonable if less optimistic view. "This dissociation of the mind into logic-tight compartments is by no means confined to the population of the asylum. It is a common, and perhaps inevitable, occurrence in the psychology of every human being. Our political convictions are notoriously inaccessible to argument, and we preserve the traditional beliefs of our childhood in spite of the contradictory facts constantly presented by our experience. Such phenomena can only be explained by the existence of a certain amount of dissociation, and, though less in degree, it is precisely similar in kind to the dissociation which permits the asylum queen to scrub the ward floor, serenely unconscious of the incongruity between her exalted rank and her menial occupation."²⁹

The importance to the theory of social control of varying degrees of dissociation within human personality is very great. Only a few of the more obvious of these implications will be stated in brief. First of all perhaps it should act as a strong reinforcement to the principle of tolerance for individual differences, which sociology in general has emphasized. Once the concept is clearly grasped that the individual personality is made up of more or less loosely related groups of habits and that these groups of habits are at war with each other oftentimes, so that now one and now the other

29. Op.cit. p 57, italics not in text.

is in the ascendency, it must become evident that consistency in point of view and in behavior need not be expected in the average person. Indeed, as Park states, "We are invariably moved to act by motives of which we are only partially conscious or wholly unaware. Not only is this true, but the accounts we give to ourselves and others of the motives upon which we acted are often wholly fictitious, although they may be given in perfect good faith."³⁰ The individual is what he is, quite obviously, because of what biological heredity made him in the first place, plus all the enormous modifications that have come through contact with his environment. Therefore, to give blame, to allow an intense emotional discharge directed toward the individual who has performed some overt act highly offensive to society, is to take a narrow and highly unscientific view of a particular phenomenon. The criminal, once he has become a criminal, should be treated by an educational method which attempts to bring about the integration of his personality upon a social level of behavior. Instead of this the usual treatment results in bringing about a higher degree of dissociation within the individual delinquent, or such integration of habit systems as may result will be upon a highly anti-social level. The criminal, however, should be the concern of society more deeply before he has become a criminal than afterwards. That is to say, the particular circumstances in the environment which will inevitably produce its quota of anti-social activities must be the concern of society rather than the product of those conditions. Of course society must protect itself from the depredations of the individual member against the group, but it must also realize that the particular individual is largely the product of social neglect.

30. Park and Burgess, Op.cit. p 476.

Moreover, some knowledge of dissociation in its progressive stages should assist society in escaping from its medieval attitude of horror toward insanity. It should enable society to view insanity as it does, as neurasthenia, and due partly to heredity and partly to the environment. Many forms of insanity being recognized as products of the existing highly artificial civilization indicates the obligation of society for the treatment by psychiatrists, rather than mere segregation, of those individuals involved.

Some knowledge of dissociation also has certain large implications for the theory of education. John Dewey states:³¹ "As traditionally conducted, it (education) strikingly exhibits a subordination of the living present to a remote and precarious future. To prepare, to get ready, is its key-note. The actual outcome is lack of adequate preparation, of intelligent adaptation. The professed exaltation of the future turns out in practice a blind following of tradition, a rule of thumb muddling along from day to day; or, as in some of the projects called industrial education, a determined effort on the part of one class of the community to secure its future at the expense of another class." The result of this artificial school world, which the child sees apart from the big world outside, is to furnish an excellent place for dissociation to begin in the individual. Many subjects in the curriculum (too many we believe) furnish vehicles for emotional flights into the realm of phantasy and unreality from which the individual comes back with an

31. Human Nature and Conduct, An Introduction to Social Psychology, p 269f.

effort to the undramatic world of reality. Moreover the docility of the child, which is regarded as a willingness to accept whatever is handed down to it - and this type of docility is assiduously cultivated - makes it easy to cram in much material that the child does not fully appreciate at the time, if it ever does, and, therefore, takes the edge from the naturally eager and inquiring mind. "Education becomes the art of taking advantage of the helplessness of the young; the forming of habits becomes a guarantee for the maintenance of hedges of custom." However, taking advantage of the young is not done without certain coercions through which the student learns that it is better to agree, or pretend to agree, than to stand his ground until convinced he is in error. The obvious result is an hypocrisy, which is a form of dissociation where the overt activity and the actual attitude are separated constantly within the personality. This is typified in the average college freshman who sits with wrinkled brow and nodding head as though in deep thought and profound agreement, while in reality he often does not understand, or if he does understand, he thoroughly disagrees with the ideas presented to him by the instructor. This is a sad commentary upon our system of public school education which has succeeded in creating a class room docility at the expense of turning the eager interests of youth away from the class room and out into such socially profitless activities as discussing foot-ball scores and attending innumerable social functions; school world and real world have been dissociated in the student mind.

32. Dewey, *ibid.* p 64.

William Mc Dougall and The Instinct

One of the important influences in social psychology during the last decade has been the volume by William Mc Dougall, "An Introduction to Social Psychology", first published in 1908. The fourteenth edition appeared in 1921. As regards the problem of motivation in social control McDougall rests it squarely upon a small group of primary instincts whose operation he describes in detail. We are here interested primarily in his concept of the instinct and the way it becomes the fundamental drive in the organized life of society. A brief criticism of his position will be included but the primary criticism will come with the discussion of John Dewey's position on the nature of impulsive or instinctive conduct.

McDougall's views regarding unlearned behavior are set forth in his chapter on "The nature of instincts and their place in the constitution of the human mind." He finds two kinds of "all-important and relatively unchanging tendencies, which form the basis of human character and will. . . (1) The specific tendencies or instincts; (2) The general or non-specific tendencies arising out of the constitution of mind and the nature of mental process in general." Regarding the instincts he follows the great majority of psychologists who use the terms "only to denote certain innate specific tendencies of the mind that are common to all members of any one species, racial characters that have been slowly evolved in the process of adaptation of species to their environment and that can be neither eradicated from the mental constitution of which they are innate elements nor acquired

1. An Introduction to Social Psychology, Fourteenth ed. p 21.

by individuals in the course of their lifetime.² He stresses William James' contention that man has not less but more instincts than do the lower animals and believes that future generations will recognize as the chief advance in psychology made during this generation to be some progress in learning of the full scope and function of the human instincts.³

Regarding the instinct specifically: "In the typical case some sense-impression, or combination of sense-impressions, excites some perfectly definite behavior, some movement or train of movements which is the same in all individuals of the species and on all similar occasions; and in general the behavior so occasioned is of a kind either to promote the welfare of the individual animal or of the community to which he belongs, or to secure the perpetuation of the species."⁴ The instinct is not a reflex or combination of reflexes, "if by reflex action we mean, as is usually meant, a movement caused by a sense-stimulus and resulting from a sequence of merely physical processes in some nervous arc."⁵ Nevertheless, the instinct has its definite basis in inherited neural structures; - it cannot be thought of as excluding "the idea of consciousness" for any definition of instinct to be of practical worth must "insist upon the psychological aspect."⁶ Here the author uses 'consciousness' and 'psychical' as synonymous.

"We may, then, define an instinct as an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor

2. Ibid. pp 23-24.

3. Ibid. pp 24-25.

4. Ibid. pp 26-27.

5. Ibid. pp 29-30.

6. Ibid p 31n

to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action."⁷

The instinct is made up of three parts, "an afferent, a central, and a motor or efferent part, whose activities are the cognitive, the affective, and the conative features respectively of the total instinctive process."⁸ Now the afferent and the efferent parts are subject to modifications throughout the life of the organism while the central part is not subject to change; that is, the method by which the necessary stimulus is received, and the overt response, are subject to changes through learning, while the central nucleus of the instinct -- said to reside probably in the basal ganglia of the brain -- remains unchanged.⁹

The views of the author regarding instincts as the source of motivation is set forth as follows: "We may say, then, that directly or indirectly the instincts are the prime movers of all human activity; by the conative or impulsive force of some instinct (or of some habit derived from an instinct), every train of thought, however, cold and passionless it may seem, is borne along towards its end, and every bodily activity is initiated and sustained. The instinctive impulses determine the ends of all activities and supply the driving power by which all mental activities are sustained; and all the complex intellectual apparatus of the most highly developed mind is but a means toward these ends, is but the instrument by which these impulses seek their satisfactions, while pleasure and pain do but serve

7. Ibid. p 30

8. Ibid. pp 33-34

9. Ibid. pp 34-35

to guide them in their choice of the means.¹⁰ He asserts further that the organism without its instinctive drives would be as useless, as motionless, as a wonderful clockwork whose mainspring had been removed.

What then are the principal instincts of men?

McDougall gives a fairly short list--the exact number varies slightly in certain editions of his work--and with the more important instincts unlearned emotions are integrated. Thus we have the instinct of flight and the emotion of fear, the instinct of repulsion and the emotion of disgust, the instinct of curiosity and emotion of wonder, the instinct of pugnacity and the emotion of anger, the instincts of self-abasement (or self-display), and the emotions of subjection and elation (or negative and positive self-feeling) and the parental instinct and the tender emotion. Also, there are other instincts with less well-defined emotional tendencies which are; the instinct of reproduction, the gregarious instinct, the instinct of acquisition and the instinct of construction. These eleven make the list. Attention is called to the fact that this scheme clearly implies that the emotions of fear, disgust, wonder, anger, subjection and elation are all inherited patterns of response, and out of these inherited emotions the sentiments are woven.

Man is limited in his conduct largely by the feeling of approval or disapproval of his fellow-men, the motive of which is fundamentally egoistic, although in certain cases it is leavened with the altruistic impulse.¹¹ How does an individual advance to a higher plane

10. Ibid. p 45

11. Ibid. pp 215-218.

of conduct than marching between the narrow walls of approval and disapproval, which means largely the following of custom?¹² It is done by absorbing the best of the traditional morality, which has been built up through many generations as a product of exceptional individuals and is/^{maintained}in living form in the sentiments of the elite. It is also crystallized in literature and certain institutions such as the church.¹³ The child forms his abstract sentiments through certain emotional judgments which are molded out of his native emotional equipment under the powerful directing influence of sympathy and suggestion. Literature, and hero-worship of the writer of literature, are also important agents.¹⁴ The sentiments once established become important springs of action in society. "Thus, if we have acquired the sentiment of love of justice and we are credibly informed that any person is in serious danger of suffering injustice, the desire for justice, arising within the abstract sentiment, impels us to efforts to secure justice. The strength of the motive, the intensity of the desire or aversion awakened within the system of the sentiment, depends in such cases upon the strength of the sentiment. In most men the desires and aversions arising from the abstract sentiments are apt to be much inferior in strength to those excited within the concrete sentiments; hence as motives of these two classes are frequently opposed in tendency, the mere possession of moral sentiments does not always suffice to determine a man to action in accordance with them. Hence it is possible for a man to have the most beautiful moral sentiments and yet to act in ways that are not altogether admirable."¹⁵

12. *ibid.* pp 215-218

13. *ibid.* p 225

14. *ibid.* pp 229-230

15. *ibid.* pp 231-232. See the discussion of dissociation in the first section of this thesis for a different point of view.

McDougall discusses the problem of volition in detail. He decided in the typical case of volition, "when in the conflict of two motives the will is thrown on the side of one of them and we make a volitional decision, we in some way add to the energy with which the idea of the one desired ~~and~~ maintains itself in opposition to its rival."¹⁶ This is possible through the building up of the ego. "The idea of the self, of self-consciousness, is able to play its great role in volition only in virtue of the self-regarding sentiment, the system of emotional and conative dispositions that is organized about the idea of the self and is always brought into play to some extent when the idea of the self rises to the focus of consciousness. The conations, the desires and aversions, arising within this self-regarding sentiment are the motive forces which, adding themselves to the weaker ideal motive in the case of moral effort, enable it to win the mastery over some stronger, coarser desire of our primitive animal nature and to banish from consciousness the idea of the end of this desire."¹⁷ And so he defines volition as "the supporting or re-enforcing of a desire or conation by the co-operation of an impulse excited within the system of the self-regarding sentiment."¹⁸

The remainder of the volume sets forth in detail the assumed operation of the instincts which the author has postulated in society. No attempt will be made to summarize this section as it is so obviously speculative. McDougall's great contribution would seem to lie in calling attention to the importance of instinctive bases in human

16. *ibid.* p 252

17. *ibid.* p 254

18. *ibid.* p 255

conduct. As Ellwood states: "In general, however, in sociological literature, there was little adequate explicit recognition of the large part which instincts play in our social life down to the publication of McDougall's 'Social Psychology' in 1908. While many scattered articles and passages had emphasized the importance of instinct in particular phases of the social life, McDougall's work first systematically attempted to show the bearing of instinct upon the social life as a whole and upon the social sciences.¹⁹ Moreover in linking the primary instincts to definite emotional coloring he has emphasized the fact that overt or explicit behavior does not go on without corresponding implicit changes.

McDougall is to be criticised primarily on the ground that he proceeded in elaborate speculations without the backing of laboratory experimental work, and this resulted in setting up as instinctive much that is acquired. This criticism is clearly put by Bernard in the following quotation. "Writers of the McDougall type, who still represent the prevailing method, made the mistake of defining instinct in terms of the functional value of the activity for society instead of in terms of its structure. Now any biologist would know that it is structure which is inherited. It is not possible to inherit an abstraction. The result of the McDougall method of isolating instincts was to bring together the most dissimilar and constantly changing types of activities under one general heading and give them a common name because they possessed a common social or moral value. In this way groups of acts which had no internal structural unity were spoken of as

19. Sociology in its Psychological Aspects. pp 202-203.
 quoted by H. E. Barnes in "Some typical contributions of
 English Sociology to Political Theory", Am. Jour. of
 Sociology, vol 27, May 1922, p 742.

unit characters, and the same act might be included in a number of activity complexes of different social values and functions and, therefore, be regarded as different instincts. The fact is that not instincts, but acquired habit complexes, were being isolated, and even these were not constant in their structural organization, but only in their social value and functioning. Psychologists like Thorndike have realized this and have attempted to break up the habit complexes named original activity processes which constitute them and name them accordingly. This has been successful in part only, but the results so far have uncovered two facts of value to the social psychologist. One is to the effect that the preponderant portion of the great activity complexes, formerly misnamed instincts, are acquired elements received from the psycho-social environment, and the other fact is that the psycho-social environment is more powerful in forming the character and attitudes of the individual than is man's original inherited nature."²⁰

20. L. L. Bernard: "The Significance of Environment as a social Factor", Publications of the Am. Sociological Soc. V 16, 1922. pp 108-109.

William I. Thomas and The Four Wishes

An important contribution to the theory of motivation in social control has been made by Professor William I. Thomas. This theory has been elaborated in the abstract, which we shall briefly consider, and has been given concrete application in the study of a particular group of people, the Polish peasants.¹ He makes certain important suggestions upon the technique to be used in studying the problem of organization of personality, and then lays down certain principles regarding the source and organization of the personality in society.

Regarding technique he points out that much of social control is attempted on the old basis of "'ordering and forbidding' that is, meeting a crisis by an arbitrary act of will decreeing the disappearance of the undesirable or the appearance of the desirable phenomena, and using arbitrary physical action to enforce the decree."² This is exemplified in the magic of primitive people and among the typical legislative efforts of today in democracies. Again, practical common sense is taken oftentimes as a criterion in Sociology and Thomas indicates the enormous amount of error mixed with the few grains of wisdom that appear in this method. Another method is to study such phenomena as will obviously be of some practical value. This involves a limitation of the field of phenomena studied; it involves setting up norms before the study has been made rather than as a result of the investigation, it brings with it the assumption that any group of social

1. The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki.

2. Polish Peasant, etc. vol. 1 p 3.

facts can be treated theoretically and practically in an arbitrary isolation from the rest of the life of the given society, which is of course untrue. "And this lack of real isolation, which characterizes a system of organized activity only at moments of crisis, is a permanent feature of all the artificial abstractly formed groups of facts such as 'prostitution', 'Crime', 'education', 'war', etc. Every single fact included under these generalizations is connected by innumerable ties with an indefinite number of other facts belong to various groups, and these relations give to every fact a different character."³ Another fallacy is to assume identical reactions to identical influences, as in the legal profession where the motives of behavior under given circumstances are assumed to be identical regardless of traditions, habits, temperaments, etc. Again the assumption is often made that if material conditions are correct the desired tendencies will appear. On the other hand, "The normal way of social action would be to develop the tendency and to create the conditions simultaneously, and, if this is impossible, attention should be paid rather to the development of tendencies than to the change of the conditions, because a strong social tendency will always find its expression by modifying the conditions, while the contrary is not true."⁴ Finally, the author indicates that, "there are two fundamental practical problems which have constituted the center of attention of reflective social practice in all times. There are (1) the problem of the dependence of the individual upon social organization and culture, and (2) the problem of the dependence of social organization and culture upon the individual."⁵ He considers these problems especially under the headings of attitudes and values.

3. *ibid.* p 11

4. *ibid.* p 13

5. *ibid.* p 20

These concepts of attitude and value are central to "Thomas' entire theory. Says he,⁶"By social value we understand any datum having an empirical content accessible to the members of some social group and a meaning with regard to which it is or may be an object of activity." Thus such different things as foodstuffs, coins, myths and universities would constitute social values. Their meaning is seen when referred to objective experience; though it is different from the natural thing, for only when the natural thing assumes some meaning does it become a social value. We might even think of such an evanescent thing as a personal idea, if communicated to someone else, as a social value; it has a meaning which may be the object of some individual's activity. The writer calls attention to the special interest for the social theorist attaching to the activities of the disorderly individual because he modifies values. In the case of the anti-social individual we have a destroyer of values; in the social individual, the man of genius, a creator of new values.

Turning to the consideration of attitudes, the writer indicates it is here that the chief distinction lies between psychology and social psychology, for the latter is concerned primarily with a study of attitudes which are as broad as conscious life. "Indeed every manifestation of conscious life, however simple or complex, general or particular, can be treated as an attitude, because every one involves a tendency to action, whether this action is a process of mechanical activity producing physical changes in the material world, or an attempt to influence the attitudes of others by speech and gesture, or a mental activity which does not at the given moment find a social expression, or even a mere process of sensual apperception."⁷ Of course, social

6. *ibid.* p 21

7. *ibid.* p 27

psychology is concerned only with those attitudes which are found with a fair degree of frequency among the social groups and which have some significance in the life organizations of the individuals who develop them. In studying the life of a group it would be a fallacy to assume that those who observe the code of the group have the attitude which would uphold the code, for the very fact that there is a code indicates that there are certain attitudes contrary to it which the group would prevent from breaking into overt conduct.

A frequent error made in considering social causation is to treat either a value or an attitude as a sole cause. On the contrary, a social cause cannot be simple, "but is compound, and must include both an objective and subjective element, a value and an attitude. Otherwise the effect will appear accidental and incalculable, because we shall have to search in every particular case for the reasons why this particular individual or this particular society reacted to the given phenomenon in this way and not in any other way.⁸ Again, the social situation is simply "the set of values and attitudes with which the individual or the group has to deal in a process of activity and with regard to which the activity is planned and its results appreciated."⁹ The springs of action when confronted with any situation then be explained, at least as deeply as the social psychologist wishes to dig, by a statement of what the value or values were to the individual and what his pre-established attitude toward the values involved. "We shall not be forced to ask; 'Why did this value provoke in this case such a reaction?' because the

8. *ibid.* p 38f

9. *ibid.* p 68.

answer will be included in the fact--in the pre-existing attitude to which this value appealed. Our fact will bear its explanation in itself, just as the physical fact of the movement of an elastic body B when struck by another elastic moving body A bears its explanation in itself."¹⁰

Turning to a more specific consideration of the organization of the personality of the individual, we find the author taking his place with most of the psychoanalysts in reducing all motives in the last analysis to sex and food hungers. These he believes become formulated into four primary wishes. He states: "In a study of a particular immigrant group (the poles) I have found that human behavior seems to represent four fundamental types of interests or wishes-- those connected with the desire for new experience, those connected with the desire for mastery, those connected with the desire for recognition, and those connected with the desire for safety or security,--recognizing of course that all forms of behavior can eventually be reduced to the two fundamental appetites, food-hunger and sex-hunger, the one necessary to preserve the life of the individual and the other necessary to preserve the life of the species." These four wishes, sometimes given in a different phraseology among the writers works, are social attitudes which are stated as being determinative of a wide area of human behavior. They are thus to be regarded as springs of action representing a consolidation of unlearned trends and habits. The four wishes are so fundamental to an understanding of Thomas' scheme of motivation in society that they will be considered in some detail, this may best be done by treating them in pairs.

"New Experience" and "Security" may well be treated jointly as they form a natural ambivalence between which the individual

10. *ibid.* p 45

11. *Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education*, Herbert S. Jennings, J.B. Watson, Adolf Meyer, William I. Thomas, p 159

frequently swings, going over it may be from months of meticulous conduct to a wild spree in which the desire for new experience would seek its outlet. "We find, indeed, two universal traits manifested in all individual attitudes, instinctive or intellectual, which form the condition of both development and conservatism." Their simplest rudiments are curiosity and fear." Without curiosity, that is, an interest in new situations in general, the animal would not live; to neglect the new situation might mean either that he was about to be eaten or that he was missing his chance for food. And fear with its contrary tendency to avoid certain experiences for the sake of security is equally essential to life. . . . These two tendencies in every permanent attitude manifest themselves in the rythmical form which conscious life assumes in every line." The desire for food and upon its satisfaction the desire for uninterrupted calm are common examples. "On a higher level these tendencies manifest themselves with regard to much more complex and longer series of facts. The desire for stability extends to a whole period of regular alternations of activity and rest from which new experience; are relatively excluded; the desire for new experience finds its expression in the break of such a whole line of regulated activities." The situation is further complicated for the individual by the existence in society of institutions and norms into which he must fit his desires. "The gradual establishment of a determined relation between these systems which constitute together the social organization of the civilized life of a group, and individual character and life-organization in the course of their progressive formation, is the central problem of the social control of personal evolution. And social control-- which, when applied to personal evolution, may be called 'social education'

manifests itself also in the duality of two opposite tendencies; the tendency to suppress in the course of personal evolution, any attitude or values which are either directly in disharmony with the existing social organization---; and the tendency to develop by adequately influencing personal evolution features of character and schemes of situations required by the existing social system." Since society has gone through a long period of evolution it follows that the fundamental tendencies of the individual are generally at odds with the fundamental tendencies of social control. "Personal evolution is always a struggle between the individual and society-- a struggle for self-expression on the part of the individual, for his subjection on the part of society--and it is in the total course of this struggle that the personality--not as a static essence' but as a dynamic, continually evolving set of activities--manifests and constructs itself."¹²

In this struggle the individual, in order to make adjustments which shall give the largest measure of outlet for his wishes and at the time will have the necessary amount of harmony with the group, is constantly defining and redefining situations as they arise. This is due to his desire for new experience. "Even the mere defence against an aggression disturbing a state of security would be impossible without a latent power making the individual face the new situation instead of running away."¹³ The activity of the individual in forming new schemes is due on the other hand, to the motivation of the desire for security. "Behavior that is not schematized, not generalized, but is or seems to be different from moment to moment and in disaccordance with the justification, provokes a desire for a settlement. Moreover there are always plans to be made for the future requiring a conscious

12. Vol.111 Polish Peasant, etc. pp 33-36

13. *ibid.* p 50

stabilization of the individual's own activity."¹⁴

When we consider the relation of the individual to the community, especially the self-inclosed and static community, the necessity of the subordination of his interests to those of the group makes possible two other attitudes which are set up. "These fundamental social attitudes are the desire for response, corresponding to the family system in the primary group-organization, and the desire for recognition, corresponding to the traditionally standardized systems of social values upon which the social opinion of the community bases its appreciations. The desire for response is the tendency to obtain a direct positive personal reaction to an action whose object is another individual; the desire for recognition is the tendency to obtain a direct or indirect positive appreciation of any action, whatever may be its object. The desire for response is the common socio-psychological element of all those attitudes by which an individual tends to adapt himself to the attitudes of other individuals--family affection, friendship, sexual love, humility, personal subordination and imitation, flattery, admiring attachment of inferior to superior, etc. Of course, each of the attitudes indicated by these terms is usually more or less compound and contains other elements besides the desire for response." This may vary between the most altruistic and the most egotistic desires. However, "It is clearly an egotistic attitude and yet it contains a minimum of altruistic considerations. Its egotistic side makes it the most general and on the average the strongest of all those attitudes by which harmony is maintained and dissension avoided between the members of a group; it may be qualified, therefore, as representing

14. *ibid.* p 52

the lowest possible, and yet precisely, therefore, in the large mass of mankind, the most efficient positive type of emotional morality."¹⁵

On the other hand, the desire for recognition is a part of the attitudes by which the individual seeks the appreciation of the group for conforming his activities to those the group approves. "It is found more or less connected with other attitudes, in showing-off, pride, honor, feeling of self-righteousness, protection of inferiors, snobbishness, catobinism, vanity, ambition, etc. It is the most common and most elementary, and probably the strongest factor pushing the individual to realize the highest demands, which the group puts upon personal conduct, and, therefore, constitutes probably the primary source of rational morality."¹⁶

Thomas states that "such a stabilization and unification of character on the ground of desires for response and recognition becomes more and more rare with the progress of civilization."¹⁷

For in modern society the members of the group are no longer in immediate touch with each other. Yet the desire for recognition, especially, is one of the fundamental springs of action. We see it "in the desire for ownership, the tendency to control every act of others, dictatorial, consoracious and unbearable behavior--exerted by man more actively and woman more passively, by the latter to the degree of having her own way even by simulation of weakness or sickness--and finally in lust for power, tyranny, political despotism, and in 'ambition', called by Milton "the last infirmity of noble mind"--the one that survives as long as he does."¹⁸

According to the author most personalities tend to be

15. *ibid.* p 56f

16. *ibid.* p 57

17. *ibid.* p 58

18. *Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education*, p 166f

organized into three general classes with an infinite variety of shadings between the main classes or types. These personality types are worked out of the individual temperament and the steadiness with which social pressures are applied. The first two types will be considered jointly, as they represent in a measure ambivalences. "The Philistine is the individual who adapts his activities completely to the prevailing definitions and norms; he chooses security at the cost of new experience and individuality. The Bohemian is unable to fit into any frame, social or personal, because his life is spent in trying to escape definitions and avoid suppressions instead of building up a positive organization of ends and attitudes; he has avoided Philistinism at the cost of character and success, because he had a strong personal tendency to revolt against social pressures or because the pressures were not strong or consistent enough. The Philistine and the Bohemian are produced by the social effort to impose upon the individual a life-organization and to mold his character without regard to his personal tendencies and the line of his spontaneous development, and both are relative failures."¹⁹ The Philistine is the result of the effort of society to suppress all tendencies which society regards as dangerous; the individual becomes entirely self-satisfied, stable and narrow. "If, on the contrary, the suppression is unsuccessful and the rebellious attitudes break out before a sufficiently stable set of contrary attitudes is formed, the individual is unprepared to meet the problems that arise, unable to discriminate or to sublimate, and an inconsistent, non-conformist, Bohemian type develops, which in its highest form as artist, thinker, religious reformer, social revolutionist, may even succeed in

19. Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education, p 179

producing, but whose products will always lack the internal harmony and social importance of the true creative type."²⁰ Under the modern organization of society it is inevitable that the vast majority should drift into one or the other of these two types. For the individual who accepts the entire system as given is inevitably drifting toward hypocrisy and dead routine. He may find himself in entire agreement with a large portion of the system but it is impossible to maintain that the entire system of codes will meet with his predominant aspirations.

"Occupational groups tend more and more to exclude from the sphere of their interests anything that is not directly connected with their 'business', and an individual whose character is formed by a modern professional group is the narrowest type of Philistine the world has ever seen, particularly if the profession itself does not afford much opportunity for development."²¹

An interesting blend of these two types is worked out in modern society through the dissociation of personality, discussed in a previous section of this thesis. As the individual belongs to many different groups each group tries to organize a certain portion of his personality, to develop those attitudes which will be advantageous to the group. However between these different complexes or groups of habits there is no harmony worked out. "An individual of this type is a completely different man in his shop, in his family, with his boon companions, preserving his balance by distributing his interests between different social groups, until it is impossible to understand how such a multiplicity of disconnected, often radically conflicting characters, can co-exist in what seems to be one personality. This is a new style of

20. Polish Peasant, etc. Vol. 111, p 45

21. *ibid.* p 60f

Philistinism--the Philistinism of the dissociated personality, amounting to a sort of stalized Bohemianism."²²

The creative type of personality, on the other hand, is the result of careful discrimination and sublimation on the part of the individual, which can take place only when the social pressures are not too severe and continuous. "The individual spontaneously tries to preserve his temperamental attitudes, and as he can do this only by removing contradictions between attitudes contending for supremacy and by sublimating attitudes that can find no expression in his milieu, and since society never gives him all the ready conventions and the whole hierarchy of sacredness that he needs, he is naturally led to create new discriminations and new valuations, and becomes a creative type simply by fully developing all of his possibilities. The only task of social culture is to prepare him for his creation by teaching him the mechanism of discrimination and sublimation in general, and not interfering with efforts to preserve all that he is able to preserve of his individuality."²³ Lack of too severe direction and supervision is then of fundamental importance in creating the dynamic and productive type of personality, yet the whole stress of modern education comes upon conformity. In fact, "only by a rare concurrence of circumstances individuals who have this high ability of developing without proper educational help happen to be left in peace to pursue their own self-made lines. And it is no wonder that the scarcity of creative individuals has led to the concept of the genius, and high efficiency is still treated as a prodigy."²⁴ However, the turn social evolution has taken in recent times would seem hopeful for developing more personalities of the creative type

22. *ibid.* p 62

23. *ibid.* p 44f

24. *ibid.* p 77

both because of the increase of narrow specialization--leaving a larger and larger area of interests for the individual to follow but without dictation from the group--and because of the sharp rise in the demand for efficiency, even though the efficiency be produced at the cost of conformity.

One of Thomas' central contentions is that personality is not something constant and unchanging, neither is it the product--in a passive sense--of the values and attitudes about it. It is ever being modified by pre-existing social values and it is ever modifying these values. Not status but personal becoming is the problem for the social theorist for the personality manifests itself not in any given moment but only in the course of its total life. He states, however, that the activity of the individual upon the purely reflex and unlearned level is not a concern of the social psychologist for there is nothing conscious or purposeful in it. The individual must first come to a conscious realization of existing social meanings before the social psychologist is interested in interpreting his attitudes.²⁵ He holds that reflection is necessary and that "reflection arises only when there is disappointment, when new experiences cannot be practically assimilated to the old ones."²⁶

Finally, consideration of this author and his position regarding motivation in social control should not be closed without a statement of his views on social complexes. There is not one social complex, he indicates but many and the predominance of a complex is not only limited by time, but by space and is incomplete in its dominance. "Moreover, each of the broad complexes which we designate by the terms 'religion', 'state', 'nationality', 'industry', 'science', 'art', etc.,

25. *ibid.* p 23-24

26. *ibid.* p 26

splits into many smaller ones and specialization and struggle continue between these. The prevalent condition of our civilization in the past and perhaps in the present can thus be characterized as that of a plurality of rival complexes or schemes each regulating in a definite traditional way certain activities and each contending with others for supremacy within a given group. The antagonism between social stability and individual efficiency is under these circumstances further complicated by the conflicting demands put upon the individual by these different complexes, each of which tends to organize personal life exclusively in view of its own purposes."²⁷

Now the problem of the individual in making adjustments to the external world is vastly complicated by the fact that he cannot choose to accept or reject certain parts of different complexes but social usage forces him almost inevitably to choose or reject the complex entire. Herein lies the force of traditional complexes, for while the individual might easily reject certain parts of the complex he dare not reject it altogether. If the individual breaks a single law he is considered a rebel against the whole system of state control and is, technically at least, outlawed from the group. Moreover the group is profoundly distrustful of the innovator who wishes to stay within the group. "There are unnumerable examples of individuals who began creative activity with the firm intention of keeping within the limits of the traditional schematism and ended by rejecting it altogether. The history of morality, of science, of political and social reform, and particularly of religious heresies is full of such biographies."²⁸ Also the group which bears a traditional complex is made up of people the

27. *ibid.* p 69

28. *ibid.* p 73

majority of whom tend to the other extreme, i.e., "to the purely passive acceptance of the formal elements of tradition and the repetition of old activities bordering on habit."²⁹

Now the traditional complex once established a high degree of emotion attaches to it regardless of its intrinsic merit. Eating with a knife causes an emotional outburst in certain groups not because of any danger involved, but solely because tradition has decreed otherwise. This emotional outburst is intended to be painful to the offender and to act as a deterrent to further similar conduct. "The epithets, 'coward', 'traitor', 'thief', 'bastard', 'heretic', 'scab', etc. are brief definitions designed to be felt as painful. . . . In short, any definition, however arbitrary, that is embodied in the habits of the people is regarded as right. It was, for instance, a custom to burn women in India on the death of their husbands, and to strangle them in the Fiji islands, and any widow would demand this privilege although she did not wish it. The contrary behavior would mean social death."³⁰

29. *ibid.* p 73

30. *Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education*,
p 169.

John Dewey and Impulsive Conduct.

John Dewey has not^{gone} into the physiological side of motivation in its application to social control though he has presented a highly illuminating picture of the manner in which conduct is shaped by impulse and habit, or rather by habit and impulse, as he puts habit first.¹ We shall here consider that portion of his treatment which seems to bear most directly on the problem in hand, that is, his point of view regarding motives and motivation, and his arguments concerning instinctive or impulsive behavior. This latter will, incidentally furnish an excellent criticism for certain positions maintained by McDougall and, to a less extent, by Thomas.

First, then, regarding motive which he states to be "that element in the total complex of a man's activity which, if it can be sufficiently stimulated, will result in an act having specified consequences. And part of the process of intensifying (or reducing) certain elements in the total activity and thus regulating actual consequence is to impute these elements to a person as his actuating motives."² Dewey calls attention to the results of allowing normal motives to be suppressed as shown in mental pathologies which require clinical treatment. He states; "The studies of psychiatrists have made clear that impulses driven into pockets distil poison and produce festering sores."³ He also calls attention to the fallacy of simplification by which every act springs from certain conscious motives. "There

1. John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, An Introduction to Social Psychology pp 89-94.
2. *ibid.* p 120
3. *ibid* p 164

is doubtless some sense in saying that every conscious act has an incentive or motive. But this sense is as truistic as that of the not dissimilar saying that every act has a cause. Neither statement throws any light on any particular occurrence. It is at most a maxim which advises us to search for some other fact with which the one in question may be correlated."⁴ He states further that "The whole concept of motives is in truth extra-psychological. It is an outcome of the attempt of men to influence human action, first that of others, then of a man to influence his own behavior. No sensible person thinks of attributing the acts of an animal or an idiot to a motive. We call a biting dog ugly, but we don't look for his motive in biting."⁵

Here we see thrown into sharp relief the distinction between motives and motivation as Dewey uses the term motive, which is the popular sense, and motivation or drive or facilitation as used by the psychologists and biologists. The motive to which Dewey objects, as being a sterile concept for the student of society, is another example of the over-simplification of highly complex human behavior. In other words the motives play upon the surface, as it were, while motivation attempt the difficult task of going behind the conscious mental processes through which the individual consciously determines to follow one mode of conduct rather than another. It tries to get at the real springs of action which includes, of course, much of which the individual is not aware at the time he reaches his decision. In this thesis the two ideas have been allowed to overlap and the term motivation used to cover both as it seems to the writer a difficult and more or less profitless

4. *ibid.* p 118

5. *ibid.* p 119

task to attempt to indicate where one ends and the other begins.

Dewey sees in motives a refinement of the ordinary reactions of praise and blame. "After a time and to some extent, a person teaches himself to think of the results of acting in this way or that before he acts. He recalls that if he acts this way or that some observer, real or imaginary, will attribute to him noble or mean disposition, virtuous or vicious motive.⁶ Moreover, "There is no call to furnish a man with incentives to activity to general. But there is every need to induce him to guide his own action by an intelligent perception of its results."⁷ Finally, a motive is "an impulse viewed as a constituent in a habit, a factor in a disposition. In general its meaning is simple. But in fact motives are as numerous as are original impulsive activities multiplied by the diversified consequences they produce as they operate under diverse conditions." In the light of these facts how strange seems the notion that the motive of financial gain is the adequate explanation of economic activity today. Of course, the manner in which work is done brings to the foreground the economic reward connected with it. "It exemplifies again our leading proposition that social customs are not direct and necessary consequences of specific impulses, but that social institutions and expectations shape and crystallize impulses into dominant habits."⁸

Regarding motivation Dewey finds that the great fallacy in the popular mind is due to the dogma of a unitary self which directs all the overt activities of the organism. "There is no one ready-made self behind activities. There are complex, unstable, opposing

6. *ibid.* p 121

7. *ibid.* p 121

8. *ibid.* p 122

attitudes, habits, impulses which gradually come to terms with one another, and assume a certain consistency of configuration, even though only by means of a distribution of inconsistencies which keeps them in watertight compartments, giving them separate turns or tricks in action." Much of the confusion is due to popular conceptions attaching to words when the word 'self' is prefixed to them. "The word self infects them with a fixed introversion and isolation. . . . Pity fulfils and creates a self when it is directed outward, opening the mind to new contacts and receptions. Pity for self withdraws the mind back into itself, rendering its subject unable to learn from the buffetings of fortune. . . . Confidence as an outgoing act is directness and courage in meeting the facts of life, trusting them to bring instruction and support to a developing self. Confidence which terminates in the self means a smug complacency that renders a person obtuse to instruction by events."⁹ The true self, then, is in process of making and includes a number of inconsistent selves. For even a Nero may be capable upon occasion of acts of kindness. This holds except where "it has encased itself in a shell of routine."¹⁰ Also, the real self, is the self in action; "a disposition means a tendency to act, a potential energy needing only opportunity to become kinetic and overt. Apart from such tendency a 'virtuous disposition' is either hypocrisy or self-deceit."¹¹

Dewey uses the terms 'instinct' and 'impulse' interchangeably and his joint discussion will be followed here. "The word instinct taken alone," he states, "is still too laden with the older notion that an instinct is always definitely organized and adapted -- which for the most part is just what it is not in human beings. The word

9. *ibid.* pp 138-139
 10. *ibid.* p 137
 11. *ibid.* p 44

impulse suggest something primitive, yet loose, undirected, initial. Man can progress as beasts cannot, precisely because he has so many 'instincts' that they cut across one another, so that most serviceable actions must be learned. In learning habits it is possible for man to learn the habit of learning. Then betterment becomes a conscious principle of life."¹²

The idea is stressed that the impulse is of less importance than the habits which grow out of combinations of impulses. "In short, the meaning of native activities is not native; it is acquired. It depends upon interaction with a matured social medium. In the case of a tiger or eagle; anger may be identified with a serviceable life-activity, with attack and defense." With the human being it is a meaningless "physical spasm, a blind dispersive burst of wasteful energy. It gets quality, significance, when it becomes a smouldering sullenness, an annoying interruption, a peevish irritation, a murderous revenge, a blazing indignation. And although these phenomena which have a meaning spring from original native reactions to stimuli, yet they depend also upon the responsive behavior of others. . . . They are habits formed under the influence of association with others who have habits already and who show their habits in the treatment which converts a blind physical discharge into a significant anger."¹³ The true meaning of social psychology is then the discovery of those environmental pressures which educate original activities into significant dispositions. For it is true that "The same original fears, angers, loves and hates are hopelessly entangles in the most opposite institutions. The thing we need to know is how a native stock has been modified by interaction with different

12. *ibid.* p 105n

13. *ibid.* p 90

environments."¹⁴

Yet unlearned activities are highly significant in social psychology, for, "Impulses are the pivots upon which the re-organization of activities turn, they are agencies of deviation, for giving new directions to old habits and changing their quality."¹⁵ They may be twisted in any direction so that "Fear may become object cowardice, prudent caution, reverence for superiors or respect for equals; an agency for credulous swallowing of absurd superstitions or for wary scepticism."¹⁶ Thus it comes about that, on the whole, society is so reticent to make significant changes, for, "among the native activities of the young are some that work towards accommodation, assimilation, reproduction, and others that work toward exploration, discovery and creation. But the weight of adult custom has been thrown upon retaining and strengthening tendencies toward conformity, and against those which make for variation and independence. . . . The child learns to avoid the shock of unpleasant disagreement, to find the easy way out, to appear to conform to customs which are wholly mysterious to him in order to get his own way--that is to display some natural impulse without exciting the unfavorable notice of those in authority."¹⁷ And so the cake of custom hardens until some sudden accumulation of stresses, as wars or incoming barbarians, breaks through it. An old nation resembles superficially an old man, yet, "Not the nation but its customs get old. Its institutions petrify into rigidity; there is social arterial sclerosis. Then some people not overburdened with elaborate and stiff habits take up and carry on the moving process of life." Now this hardening of the cake of custom results in an abnormal development of the individual, for,--"In the career

14. *ibid.* p 92

15. *ibid.* p 93

16. *ibid.* p 95

17. *ibid.* pp 97-98

of any impulse activity there are speaking generally three possibilities. It may find a surging, explosive discharge--blind, unintelligent. It may be sublimated--that is, become a factor coordinated intelligently with others in a continuing course of action. Thus a gust of anger may, because of its dynamic incorporation into disposition, be converted into an abiding conviction of social injustice to be remedied, and furnish the dynamic to carry the conviction into execution. Or an excitation of sexual attraction may reappear in art or in tranquil domestic attachments and services. Such an outcome represents the normal or desirable functioning of impulse; in which, . . . the impulse operates as a pivot, or reorganization of habit." Or failing to get either of these two outlets the impulse may be "suppressed." Now "Suppression is not annihilation. 'psychic' energy is no more capable of being abolished than the forms we recognize as physical. If it is neither exploded nor converted, it turns inwards, to lead a surreptitious, subterranean life."¹⁹ And this results, which has such unfortunate--often pathological--consequences, is brought about most frequently where customs are most rigid, as "the stiffer and more encrusted the customs, the larger is the number of instinctive activities that find no regular outlet and that accordingly merely await a chance to get an irregular, uncoordinated manifestation. Routine habits never take up all the slack."²⁰ It follows then that the place of impulse in conduct may be defined as follows: "On one side, it is marked off from the territory of arrested and encrusted habits. On the other side, it is demarcated from the region in which impulse is a law unto itself. For although "Impulse is a source, an indispensable source, of liberation;" nevertheless it is only valuable "as it is employed in giving habits pertinence and freshness" for only thus does it liberate power.²¹

19. *ibid.* pp 156-157

20. *ibid.* p 102-103

21. *ibid.* p 104-105

At the present time it seems to superficial observation that not too much of rigid habit and custom exists but too little. "The remedy is said to be to return from contemporary fluidity to the stable and spacious patterns of a classic antiquity that observed law and proportion; for somehow antiquity is always classic."²² Yet what we have is a mild degree of dissociation of personality through the loyalty of the individual to different institutions with different norms fostering antagonistic impulses. The attrition which results may release many impulses for activity outside of any norm. However, restoring old habits is not the way out. "But the remedy lies in the development of a new morale which can be attained only as released impulses are intelligently employed to form harmonious habits adapted to one another in a new situation. A laxity due to decadence of old habits cannot be corrected by exhortation to restore old habits in their former rigidity. Even though it were abstractly desirable it is impossible."²³

Regarding the classification of unlearned trends or patterns of behavior Dewey sets forth clearly the fallacy of the instinctivists, previously referred to in this thesis. "Man has been resolved into a definite collection of primary instincts which may be numbered, catalogued, and exhaustively described one by one. Theorists differ only or chiefly as to their number and ranking. Some say one, self-love; some two, egoism and altruism; some three, greed, fear and glory; while today writers of a more empirical turn run the number up to fifty and sixty... Just now another simplification is current. All instincts go back to the sexual, so that cherchez la femme (under multitudinous

22. *ibid.* p 129

23. *ibid.* p 130

symbolic disguises) is the last word of science with respect to the analysis of conduct."²⁴ The list, however, could be lengthened indefinitely depending upon the purpose for which it is to be used.

"One of the great evils of this artificial simplification is its influence upon social science. . . . All sociological facts are disposed of in a few fat volumes as products of imitation and invention, or of co-operation and conflict. Ethics rest upon sympathy, pity, benevolence. . . . It is surprising that men can engage in these enterprises without being reminded of their exact similarity to natural science before scientific method was discovered in the seventeenth century."²⁵ What is needed, obviously, is detailed studies regarding the effect of differing environmental pressures upon original human nature which is subject to innumerable modifications through the action of such mechanisms as the conditioned reflex. The studies of W. I. Thomas with the Polish peasant is a promising lead in this direction. Just as "Control of physical energies is due to inquiry which establishes specific correlations between minute elements. It will not be otherwise with social control and adjustment. . . . A study of the educative effect, influence upon habit, of each definite form of human intercourse, is prerequisite to effective reform."²⁶

The author grounds human conduct squarely upon habitual and impulsive facilitations even asserting that there are no separate instincts, in the sense of separate psychic forces. Thus regarding the sex "instinct" or any other similar instinct, there are two fallacies. "The first consists in ignoring the fact that no activity (even one that is limited by routine habit) is confined to the channel

25. *ibid* pp 132-133

26. *ibid.* p 148

24. *ibid.* pp 150-151.

which is most flagrantly involved in its execution." The whole organism is in action. "In the second place, the environment in which the act takes place is never twice alike. Even when the overt organic discharge is substantially the same, the acts impinge upon a different environment and thus have different consequences." These differences, "are immediately sensed if not clearly perceived; and they are the only components of the meaning of the act."²⁷

In the conclusion of his discussion regarding impulse the writer states that "Breach is the crust of the cake of custom releases impulses; but it is the work of intelligence impulse in every moment of impeded habit. But unless it is nurtured, it speedily dies, and habit and instinct continue their civil warfare." So it comes about that "Every moral life has its radicalism; but this radical factor does not find its full expression in direct action but in the courage of intelligence to go deeper than either tradition or immediate impulse goes."²⁸

27. *ibid.* pp 150-151

28. *ibid.* pp 170-171

Summary and Conclusion

As a basis for discussing motivation in social control the unlearned patterns of response in the individual were considered with particular reference to the basis of emotions in physiological functions. Certain experiments on the ductless glands were summarized especially those of Cannon on the Adrenals, and the conclusion was reached that there is a close correlation existing between the organic tone of the individual and the secretions of the ductless glands. Among implicit responses three well defined types of emotion are native while among overt responses the negative conclusion was reached that the lists of human instincts are in the main mythological.

Unlearned conduct is modified with extraordinary facility in the human being, especially through such factors as the conditioned reflex. While the extraordinary richness and variety of the psycho-social environment results in carrying the personality far from its instinctive base. The rapidity with which this psycho-social environment changes makes impossible the biological adaptation of the organism to fit it through hereditary means.

The distance that the individual in civilized society travels from his instinctive base results in certain of his habit systems becoming grouped about an organic hunger, as sex, while other habits become organized about a group of social conventions. The results, when the split in habit systems seeking different outlets is mild, in the 'wish' or 'complex', which is a beginning of dissociation of personality. It is through opposed wishes seeking outlet that much light is thrown upon the psychology of errors. Thus slips of the tongue or pen,

failure to remember names or places, wit and humor, together with the dream and daydreams, show how suppressed wishes find a channel of outlet. For those whose imaginations are torpid society furnishes such outlets as fairy stories, the movies and cheap literature. In so far as these represent sublimated outlets they are of value while in so far as they stimulate a higher degree of dissociation they are worse than useless. The advanced stages of dissociation are seen in abnormal conduct in such phenomena as somnambulism, automatic writing, hallucination and delusion; and in the extraordinary cases of multiple personality, such as the case of Ansel Bourne. In normal behavior a certain degree of dissociation is probably inevitable and the significance of this fact to social theory is very great.

There are at least three important currents of theory regarding motivation in social control: that which rests it upon the instinct of which McDougall gives the most complete statement; that which would take over the principle concepts of the psychoanalysts such as the wish, which position is well put by Thomas; and that which stressed the force of environment, habit and impulse and this position is clearly stated by John Dewey.

Finally, it may be stated that every writer in the field of the social sciences discusses or at least assumes a certain position regarding motivation in social control. It could not be otherwise in any extensive treatise on society from whatever angle approached. However, comparatively little is known definitely though volumes have been filled with speculation. This thesis, when it came to close quarters with the problem, could only sift out those concepts in the field which were regarded as more important, and tentatively present them. A wide

field for sociological experimentation is here revealed, the technique for which has not been perfected. Will not experiments and progress in this field be basic to further advances in social theory?

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