

THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

GRADUATE SCHOOL

Report

of

Committee on Examination

This is to certify that we the undersigned, as a committee of the Graduate School, have given Sister Eileen Haggerty final oral examination for the degree of ~~Master of Arts~~. We recommend that the degree of Doctor of Philosophy be conferred upon the candidate.

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THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

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Report  
of  
Committee on Thesis

The undersigned, acting as a Committee of the Graduate School, have read the accompanying thesis submitted by Sister Eileen Haggerty for the degree of Master of Arts. They approve it as a thesis meeting the requirements of the Graduate School of the University of Minnesota, and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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.....1918



ENGLAND AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE CRIMEAN WAR

A thesis submitted to the faculty of the graduate school

of the

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

by

SISTER EILEEN HAGGERTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

of

MASTER OF ARTS.

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## England and the Outbreak of the Crimean War.

## Introduction.

In a letter dated September 1, 1850, Lord Palmerston, at that time Foreign Minister in the Cabinet of Lord John Russell, sends to his brother a report of his position in the Commons: "I have been more entirely swamped by business during the whole of this session of Parliament than I ever was at any former time.... But I have no reason to find fault with the session, for it has left me at its close in a very satisfactory and gratifying position. I have beaten and put down and silenced, at least for a time, one of the most widespread and malignant and active confederacies that ever conspired against one man without crushing him. But I was in the right and I was able to fight my battle.... The death of Louis Philippe delivers me from my most artful and inveterate enemy whose position gave him in many ways the power to injure me; and though I am sorry for the death of Peel from personal regard, and because it is no doubt a great loss to the country, yet as far as my own political position is concerned, I do not think that he was ever disposed to do me any good turn." (1) This letter which was written a little more than two months after the famous "Civis Romanus Sum" oration of June 28, 1850, marked the zenith of Lord Palmerston's popularity as Foreign Minister. The Revolution of 1848 which had shaken the continent to its foundations had left England

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1. Honorable Evelyn Ashley, Life of Lord Palmerston, (London, 1879),  
II, p. 164.



## 3.

practically untouched. The short-lived, farcical Chartist movement of 1848 only confirmed the political domination of the middle classes for a generation longer. The Tories, or Conservatives, had gone out of power in 1846 and the Whigs, or Liberals, were in control of the Government. For some time previous to 1850 English legislation had shown a decided trend toward humanitarianism and Liberalism. The Tories had revised the criminal code (1821), recognized Trade-Unions (1825), passed the Test and Corporation Acts and the Catholic Emancipation Bill (1828--29), and repealed the Corn Laws (1846). Lord John Russell's Government worked for the suppression of slavery, and passed the Factory Act of 1847 which limited the hours of labor for factory-workers. In 1849 prominent Englishmen were advocating representative institutions for those colonies in which the white race was predominant; Lord John Russell favored constitutional freedom for the colonies; Cobden and Bright believed in absolute non-intervention. (1) England had seen no real war since the days of Waterloo, and had busied herself in promoting the works of peace. Lord Palmerston could point to these conditions when defending his foreign policy before the Commons (June 28, 1850); he could say, "For while we have seen ... the political earthquake rocking Europe from side to side... this country has presented a spectacle honorable to the people of England and worthy of the admiration of mankind." (2) Relatively speaking, England was "a spectacle. . . worthy of the admiration of mankind", -- and Lord Palmerston was the

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1. Herbert Paul, A History of Modern England, (New York, 1904), I, p. 185.

2. Ashley, Palmerston, II, p. 159.



most influential man in England.

Although Palmerston's vigorous foreign policy had won for him the acclamations of the Commons and the great mass of the people, it had made England hated abroad. Mr. Paul says; He (Palmerston) was a great European diplomatist who wanted England to have a finger in every pie.... He always took a side, and though he hated reform at home, he loved revolution abroad." (1) He offered England's support to Turkey when that country refused to give up the Hungarian refugees at the behest of Austria and Russia. (2) and openly sympathized with the draymen who assaulted the Austrian general "Haynau; (3) his policy in Italy was described by the Queen as "abetting wrong" (4) and was up to this time, unsuccessful; during the Don Pacifico affair he had risked war with both France and Russia. He lost the support of John Russell and his colleagues in the Cabinet because of his independent management of foreign affairs; the Queen complained bitterly of being committed to policies which she would not have sanctioned had she been sufficiently informed. (5) At last the inevitable came to pass. Palmerston gave his personal approval to Napoleon's coup d'état of 1851 without consulting either Cabinet or Queen. Lord John Russell, with the approval of the Cabinet gave him his dismissal, -- and there was great rejoicing in certain of the courts of Europe. Lord Palmerston took his dismissal very quietly and treated his successor, Lord Granville, with the greatest courtesy. He had every reason to believe that the people would retain the impression which they had received of his independent and ap-

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1. Paul, History of England, I, p. 236.
  2. H. E. Egerton, British Foreign Policy in Europe, (London, 1918) p. 207.
  3. Paul, History of England, I, p. 230.
  4. Egerton, British Foreign Policy, p. 204. 5. Paul, I, pp. 226, 227.

parently efficient foreign policy. On February 20, 1852, Lord John Russell, in concession to popular clamor which feared another Napoleonic invasion, brought in a bill for a local militia; Lord Palmerston, who favored a national militia, moved to omit the word "local". To Lord Palmerston's great surprise the Government was defeated. "I had my tit-for-tat with John Russell, and I turned him out on Friday last." Lord Palmerston wrote to his brother. "I certainly, however, did not expect to do so, nor did I intend to do anything more than to persuade the House to reject his foolish plan and adopt a more sensible one." Palmerston then mentions "the almost insulting manner towards him (Lord John) in which the House, by its cheers, went with me in the debate". Evidently Lord Palmerston's dismissal has not lessened his popularity. He concludes with a comment on the Derby Protectionist Ministry which he had refused to join; "I cannot conceive how such a Government can stand long, or can even get a majority by a fresh general election." (1) A little later (April 30, 1852) he gives his reason for not joining the Derby Government and discusses the probabilities of forming a new Government; "I do not think highly of him as a statesman, and I suspect that there are many matters on which he and I should not agree. Besides, after having acted for twenty-two years with the Whigs, and after having gained by, and while acting with them, any little political reputation I may have acquired, it would not answer nor be at all agreeable to me to go slap over to the opposite camp, and this merely on account of a freak of John Russell's

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 1. Ashley, Palmerston, II p. 230.

which the whole Whig party regretted and condemned. With regard to a new Government he says: "... John Russell..would have much difficulty in forming a new Government. He would try to get Graham and the Peelites;with Graham alone he could not do ....If I was sent for ....I should have some difficulty in forming a Government,but I think I could do it;and though I should be conscious that I am wanting in many of the requisite qualifications for the post of Prime Minister,yet I think on the whole my deficiencies are not greater than those of Derby and John Russell,or of any other person who at present could be chosen for such a duty."(1) It is very evident that Lord Palmerston regarded his eclipse as temporary.

The Derby Ministry came into power under the very unpopular auspices of Protection. Palmerston said that the Government had only two real men in its ranks,--Derby and Disraeli.(2) This stop-gap Government lasted until December 16,1852,when it was defeated on Disraeli's financial budget. Contrary to all Lord Palmerston's expectations the Queen sent for Lord Aberdeen to form a Government.

Lord Aberdeen,having obtained Lord John Russell's promise to serve as Foreign Minister,formed his Coalition Cabinet of Whigs, Peelites,and one Radical. Lord Palmerston said that the Government included every man of the first rank in the House of Commons except Mr.Disraeli. The Peelites were Lord Aberdeen ,the Prime-Minister, Mr.Gladstone,Chancellor of the Exchequer ;the Duke of Newcastle, Secretary for the Colonies;Sir James Graham, Lord of the Admiralty;

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1. Ashley,Palmerston,II,p.233.

2. Ibid.,II,P.236.



and Mr. Sidney Herbert, Secretary at War. The Whigs were Lord John Russell, Foreign Secretary; Lord Cranworth, Lord Chancellor, Lord Granville, President of the Council; the Duke of Argyll, Lord Privy Seal; Lord Palmerston, Home Secretary; Sir Charles Wood, President of the India Board; and Lord Lansdowne, without portfolio. The Radicals were represented by Sir William Molesworth, Chief Commissioner of Woods and Forests. (1) Later, about the middle of February, Lord John Russell handed over the post of Foreign Secretary to Lord Clarendon and became leader of the House of Commons with no salary and no office in the Cabinet. The Coalition Government gave its attention to works befitting the time of peace; Sir Charles Wood's East India Bill introduced the principle of Civil Service Competition into India; transportation of criminals to the Colonies was abandoned (1853); the Children's Factory Bill, and the Charitable Trusts Bill which provided for an inquiry into the management of charities in England and Wales, were passed; Lord Palmerston was giving some of his attention to the Home Office, ---enforcing the burial laws of 1850, compelling factories to use up their own smoke, and finding out ways and means for diverting sewage from the Thames, (2) when lo! the ever-threatening yet always unexpected and never-solved problem, -- the Eastern Question.

Miller says, "The Eastern Question may be defined as the problem of filling up the vacuum created by the gradual disappearance of the Turkish Empire from Europe." (3) For over fifty years the Turkish Empire had been undergoing a progressive disorganiza-

1. Paul, History of England, I, p. 277.

2. Ibid., I, pp. 287, 288, 289, 290, 297, 298.

3. William Miller, The Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913, (Cambridge, 1913) p. 1.



tion which was complicated by the factors of reform and nationalism. Mahmoud II, who became Sultan in 1808, saw that Turkey's only chance for salvation lay in a strong ruler supported by an army trained on the European model. The Janissaries, the real rulers of the Turkish Empire, were opposed to any reform movement which would lessen their power. Therefore they revolted against the Sultan's military reforms and were destroyed. (1827) Von Moltke, who was in Turkey at this time, said that ten years of peace would have enabled the Sultan to carry out his reforms and Turkey would have become the most formidable power in Europe. (1) But in 1829 the Greeks won their independence. Montenegro (1799) and Serbia (1815) had already won recognition of their virtual independence. Mehemet Ali, the viceroy of Egypt revolted in 1831. The Czar Nicholas I, faithful to the traditions of the Russian rulers, had since 1829 (Adrianople)" endeavored to establish a predominant influence over the counsels of the Porte, tending in the interest of absolute power to exclude all other influences, and to secure the means, if not of hastening the downfall of the Empire, at least of obstructing its improvement and settling its future destinies to the profit of Russia, whenever a propitious juncture should arrive." (2) From 1696, during the reign of Peter the Great, to 1812--in the time of Alexander I, the Russian frontier had crept slowly from Azov on the northern shore of the Black Sea to the Pruth River on the west. The treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji (1774) had given Russia the right of making representations for the Greek Christians in Turkey and of speaking in favor of the Roumanian

1. J.A.R. Marriot, The Eastern Question, (Oxford 1917), p. 193.

2. Eastern Papers, part 1, p. 237. (Quoted from Kinglake, I, p. 65.)

principalities; the treaty of Adrianople confirmed the autonomy of Moldavia and Wallachia which were said at this time to be really a Russian protectorate; the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (1833) which took the form of a military alliance, contained a secret article which released the Sultan from any obligation to render assistance to Russia save by closing the Dardanelles to the war-ships of any other power. (1) This treaty intensified the fear of a Russian invasion of India which was at its height in England in the early thirties of the nineteenth century. (2) Skrine says that the Tsar was so anxious to conciliate England that he willingly gave up all that was gained in 1833 by joining in the convention of 1840--41. (3) The treaty of the Straits closed the Dardanelles to the war-ships of all foreign nations while Turkey was at peace. (1840) In 1844 the Czar visited England, and while there discussed the condition of Turkey with the British ministers. (4) Before he left he embodied his impressions in a memorandum in which was written the following clause; "That, in the event of any unforeseen calamity befalling the Turkish Empire, Russia and England should agree together as to the course that should be pursued." (5) The Czar left England with the impression that Aberdeen, the Foreign Secretary, was a lover of peace, and that he and Aberdeen understood one another perfectly. But unfortunately, Nesselrode sent Lord Aberdeen a memorandum which interpreted the clause mentioned above as referring to the demolition of the Turkish Empire: This interpretation aroused suspicion in the minds of men

1. Marriot, Eastern Question, p. 210.

2. Ramsey, Muir, The Making of British India, (London, New York, Bombay, 1915) p. 308.

3. Francis Henry Skrine, The Expansion of Russia, (Cambridge 1903) p. 140.

4. Ibid., p. 141.

5. Duke of Argyll, Autobiography and Memoirs, (London, 1906) I, p. 442.

who had been very favorably impressed with the personality of Nicholas. (1) Consequently, when Nicholas approached Sir Hamilton Seymour in 1854 and suggested that England take Egypt and Candia as her share of the decadent Ottoman Empire, Sir Hamilton replied that England had no interest in Egypt save as the means of communication with India. (2) The Tsar must await a more favorable opportunity.

Meanwhile, Abul-Mejid (1839-1861) had been inspired by his progressive minister Reschid Pasha to publish the hatt-i-sharif of November 3, 1839. This charter guaranteed the lives, property, and honor of all the Sultan's subjects irrespective of creed or race. Taxes and military service were to be regulated according to the European system; a scheme of military reform was initiated. (1843); local government was reorganized; the market for negro slaves was abolished; a model school and a military academy were established and technical training was encouraged. (3) Of course, these reforms existed only on paper, but the Czar was very uneasy and did not intend to allow Turkey the time to thus transform itself. (4) He supported Danilo the new ruler of Montenegro in his designs of doing away with a theocratic government and founding a new dynasty. Danilo, thus encouraged, opened hostilities July 1852 against the Sultan, who suspected that Montenegro bade fair to become a Russian protectorate and would not consent to Danilo's proposal. (5)

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1. Skrine, *Russia*, p. 141.

2. Paul, *History of England*, 1, p. 304.

3. Marriot, *The Eastern Question*, pp. 222, 223.

4. Debidour, *Histoire Diplomatique De L'Europe*, (Paris, 1891) Part II.  
Vol. II, p. 82.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 83.



## II.

The Czar intended to make this refusal a *casus belli* against Turkey but Austria intervened at Danilo's request and the Czar lost another opportunity. (1) But he had not long to wait.

Napoleon III, Emperor of the French since 1852 was seeking an opportunity to strengthen his position both at home and abroad. Debidour says, "...the old monarchies of Europe, with the exception of England treated him as an intruder and scarcely hid their distrust and disdain... Napoleon III felt that he would be for a long time yet, suspected, watched, shunned by them if he did not impose respect by some striking act." (2) Furthermore, the Czar had urged Austria and Prussia to refuse recognition to the parvenu Emperor and had been so discourteous as to call Napoleon "friend" rather than "brother". (3) At this time the Greek monks were practically in control of the Holy Places in Jerusalem because since 1740, the French government had taken no interest in the matter and had not supported the Latin monks. Francis I and the Sultan had made a treaty by virtue of which the Holy Places in Palestine (of which the chief were the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, the shrine of the Virgin, and the Sacred Manger in the lower part of the great Church of Bethlehem), and the monks who took care of them were placed under the protection of the crown of France. (4) In 1740 France obtained a grant or treaty, the articles or "Capitulations" of which purported to confirm and enlarge all the then existing privileges of the Latin Church in Palestine. (5) The question of control of the Holy Places

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1. Miller, Ottoman Empire, p. 199.

2. Debidour, II, p. 91.

3. Francis Henry Skrine, The Expansion of Russia, (Cambridge, 1903) p. 149.

4. Theodore Martin, The Prince Consort, (New York, 1877) II, p. 411.

5. Alexander Kinglake, The Invasion of the Crimea, (New York 1863) p. 48.



had been brought up in 1851, but Napoleon, not quite sure of his position, waited until 1852 to press the claims of France. Kinglake says: "Stated in bare terms, the question was whether, for the purpose of passing through the building into their Grotto, the Latin monks should have the key of the chief door of the Church of Bethlehem, and also one of the keys of each of the two doors of the sacred manger, and whether they should be at liberty to place in the sanctuary of the Nativity a silver star adorned with the arms of France." (1) This dispute was settled before the end of 1853 by the skillful diplomacy of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. But the Czar believed the time ripe for taking a bold step. He had given military aid to Austria in 1848 therefore he counted on the neutrality of Austria, perhaps even an alliance with Austria and Prussia. England's attitude worried him a little, but just at this time Aberdeen's Cabinet was in power and men who might not favor Russia, such as John Russell and Palmerston did not hold the important places; furthermore, Aberdeen was a personal friend of Nicholas, therefore Nicholas flattered himself on being able to influence the Prime Minister as he desired. (2) The Czar knew that the Queen and Prince Consort had little sympathy or esteem for Napoleon, so believed an Anglo-French alliance impossible. Therefore he seized his opportunity and made the dispute about the Holy Places the pretext for demanding a protectorate over all the Greek Christians living in the Turkish Empire. Debidour briefly summarizes the significance of this demand; "As the heads of

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1. Alexander Kinglake, The Invasion of the Crimea, (New York, 1863) p. 51.
  2. Debidour, Histoire Diplomatique, II, p. 94.

this Church exercised the most extensive temporal power, and as they commanded twelve or fifteen million of the Sultan's subjects in Turkey, the submission of Andul-Mejid to the Czar would be a real abdication (1) Prince Menshikov, who had made the demand on behalf of the Czar, presented an ultimatum to the Sultan April 19, 1853; encouraged by the French and British ambassadors, the Porte refused. On May 23, 1853 Menshikov left Constantinople. A few days afterward Nesselrode sent out a new ultimatum to the porte giving the Sultan only eight days to submit to the conditions proposed by Menshikov after which time, in case of refusal the Czar would occupy the Principalities. (2) On July 2, the Russians crossed the Pruth.

These events caused great excitement throughout Europe, but particularly in England, and this for various reasons; (a) British statesmen believed that the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was necessary to the maintainance of the balance of power in Europe and of interest to England and in particular because of the profitable trade carried on with Turkey, Persia, and the Ionian Islands, (3) (b) since the time of Napoleon I England was ever on the watch for an invasion of India, at this time a source of unlimited raw material and a place of refuge for younger sons who had humble prospects at home; From 1848-1856 during the administration of Governor-General Lord Dalhousie, the British power became obsessed by the fear of a Russian invasion and felt itself impelled to annex Sind, Afghanistan, and the Punjab, -- the natural approaches to India. (4) For this reason English Statesmen

1. Debidour, Histoire Diplomatique, 11, p. 97.

2. Ibid., 11, p. 98, 99.

3. Viscount Palmerston, Opinions and Policy, (London, 1852), p. 310.

4. Muir, Making of India, pp. 306, 307.

were on the alert to check Russia in any attempt to get control of the Straits; Englishmen believed that Russia in control of the Straits could make of the Black Sea a bastion from which she could carry on gigantic naval operations. On the other hand, Russia's most fertile agricultural region, the Ukraine, was exposed to any great naval power such as England, which could enter the Black Sea by way of the Straits. (c) Public opinion in England had begun to look upon the Turk as a gentleman, because of the Porte's gallant refusal to surrender the Hungarian refugees to reactionary Austria and Russia, and because of the continued attempts (on paper, at least) to reform the Turkish Government. We shall now turn our attention to the diplomatic situation which prevailed from the crossing of the Pruth to the declaration of war in the latter part of March.

The crossing of the Pruth put Austria in a most embarrassing situation; Russia claimed her gratitude for assistance given in 1848; Austria's polyglot empire was liable at any time to be shattered by the disruptive force of nationality; the Czar himself could easily stir up a Pan-Slavist rising; therefore, the Czar must be conciliated. On the other hand, she feared that France and England might appeal to Italy, Hungary, or Poland; in that event, Austria in the throes of revolution might need the assistance of the Czar. Count Buol, the Austrian Chancellor, planned to preserve Turkey from attack without getting into the war, and began to negotiate with Russia and Turkey under pretense of conciliation. In order to quiet the Czar, she ignored Drouyn de Lhuys' suggestion that a conference be called to enforce the convention of 1841 which justified the collective interference of Europe in the affairs of the Near East, and offered his



personal mediation instead. The Czar eagerly accepted the offer thinking that he could easily influence the court of Vienna. Buol also urged the Sultan to protest against the occupation of the principalities and not regard it as a casus belli. (July 14)<sup>1.</sup> Then Buol gathered the ambassadors of the five powers at Constantinople and together they drafted the Vienna Note, which was to be transmitted to the cabinets of Constantinople and St. Petersburg. In Debidour's opinion, "This note was a declaration sufficiently vague, sufficiently susceptible of contradictory interpretation of things understood for both the Czar and Sultan to declare themselves satisfied." (2) The Czar accepted it without alteration and demanded that the Sultan do in like manner. But the Porte considered that the note virtually conceded all that had been originally demanded by Menshikov and refused to give to the Czar the privileges demanded. The objectionable clause read as follows: "Whereas, if at all times the Emperors of Russia have evinced their active solicitude for the maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the Orthodox Greek church in the Ottoman Empire, the Sultans have never refused to confirm them; ... the government of His Majesty the Sultan will remain faithful to the letter and to the spirit of the treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople relative to the protection of the Christian religion, and His Majesty considers himself bound in honor ... to cause the Greek rite to share in the advantages conceded to the other Christian rites by convention or special arrangement." (3) Stratford de Redcliffe

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1. Debidour, Histoire Diplomatique, II, pp. 100-101. (Whole diplomatic situation.)
  2. Ibid., II, p. 101.
  3. Miller, Ottoman Empire, p. 209.



officially obeyed Clarendon's orders that the Porte should be urged to sign the note. But the Turkish ministers knew what the "Great Elchi's" personal opinion was and refused to accept the Vienna Note unless they were allowed to amend it.(1) The amended note stated: "whereas,if at all times the Emperors of Russia have evinced their active solicitude for the Orthodox Greek religion and Church,the Sultans have never ceased to provide for the maintainance of the immunities and privileges which they have spontaneously granted at different times to that religion and to that Church in the Ottoman Empire,and to confirm them; .... the government of His Majesty the Sultan will remain faithful to the stipulations of the treaty of Kainardji,confirmed by that of Adrianople,relative to the protection by the Sublime Porte of the Christian religion,and .... His Majesty considers himself bound in honor ... to cause the Greek rite to share in the advantages granted,or which might be granted,to the other Christian communities,Ottoman subjects."(2) The Czar rejected this note. Shortly afterward Nesselrode sent a confidential memorandum to the Russian Minister at Berlin in which he gave the note the same interpretation as did the Sultan's ministers.(3) (Sept.7, 1853) . On October 7,1853 the Porte gave Russia fifteen days in which to evacuate the principalities;as the Czar did not respond the Porte declared war on Russia October 23,1853. A day earlier the British fleet had entered the Dardanelles. The Czar complained that

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1. Alexander W.Kinglake,The Invasion of the Crimea,(New York,n.d.) I,pp.229,230.
2. Miller,Ottoman Empire,p.210.
3. Paul,History of England,I,p.318.

this action was a breach of the treaty of 1841 which declared the Straits must be closed to all war-ships while the Sultan was at peace,---the Powers had asked the Sultan not to regard the occupation of the principalities as a casus belli.(1) Early in November the Turks won a skirmish at Oltenitza;on November 30,1853 a Turkish fleet lying in the harbor of Sinope was annihilated by the Russians, and London raved over the "massacre" of Sinope. Just at this point Napoleon III who was well aware of the unpopularity of Aberdeen's policy of peace,(2) proposed that the English and French fleets should enter the Black Sea with the avowed intention of confining all the Russian ships of war within the harbor of Sebastopol.(3) On Jan.4,1854,the English and French fleets entered the Black Sea(4) February 4,the Russian ambassador Baron Brunnow,announced to Lord Clarendon his orders to depart from London,and Lord Clarendon recalled Sir Hamilton Seymour from St.Petersburg.(5) (Feb.7) Count Buol then proposed to the French ambassador at Vienna that England and France should set a date for the evacuation of the principalities by Russia,Austria supporting this demand. Lord Clarendon considered that Austria's military assistance was implied,and demanded the evacuation of the principalities by April 30,(Feb.27) and gave the Czar six days to answer. The French minister of Foreign Affairs made the same demand. As the Czar made no response to either,

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1. Miller ,Ottoman Empire,p.210.
  2. Kinglake,Crimea,I,p.247.
  3. Paul,History of England,pp.325--326.
  4. Ibid.,I,p.328.
  5. Paul,History of England,I,p.330.

war was declared by France (Mar.27) and England.(March 28) (1)

It is generally believed that the policy of the Coalition Government, though intended to avert war was really instrumental in bringing it on. In other words the Crimean War was fought because England just at this time was so unfortunate as to have a Coalition Government. The Cabinet was quite naturally divided into groups, two in this instance,--of which one, headed by Aberdeen, thought to keep the peace by conciliating Russia, the other, headed by Palmerston, thought to keep peace by standing up for the Turk. For this reason most of the decisions of the Cabinet were compromise measures which encouraged the Turk to hope for England's aid, and at the same time, encouraged the Czar in his belief that the English people would not ally with the French, and that, under no consideration, would the English go to war.(2) During the summer of 1853 the question of the extent to which England should consider herself bound to support the Turks against the encroachments of Russia was in the hands of the Coalition Cabinet. By the autumn of 1853 the English people had been seized with war-fever.(3) After the Battle of Sinope (Nov.30, 1853) they were completely out of hand, and the Cabinet forced there- to by public opinion, declared war on Russia, March 28, 1854.(4)

It is our present purpose to ascertain the attitude taken

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1. Paul, History of England, I, p. 334.
2. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 130, p. 74.
3. Paul, History of England, I, p. 322.
4. Charles M. Andrews, The Historical Development of Modern Europe, (New York, 1898) II, pp. 62, 63.



during this period by those leaders of English policy, whether in Parliament or out of it, who stand forth as recognized guides of public opinion, and the reason for each, individual attitude. We shall then endeavor to ascertain what attitude was taken by the mass of the English people and the reasons for the attitude; in connection with this last point, we shall try to distinguish the different currents of public opinion, and the relative strength or weakness of each current. Having gathered together as much information as is possible on the facts mentioned, we shall try to answer the question:--How far did the policy of the leaders represent the policy of the people?

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## CHAPTER I.

Attitude of Members of the Cabinet toward the Problem of the Near East from 1850--54.

"I think the machine will float." Lord Granville, President of the Council in the Coalition Cabinet wrote thus to his friend Lord Stanley in the early winter of 1853. (1) Greville said, "It will be wonderfully strong in point of ability, . . . . but its very excellence in this respect may prove a source of weakness, and eventually of disunion." (2) Lord Russell and Lord Palmerston were about this time running neck and neck to the goal of popularity,--Russell's name being properly associated with Liberal and Reform movements, Palmerston's famed for his bold and high-handed management of Foreign Affairs. If Palmerston had formed a Cabinet, Russell would have broken it up, and vice versa. Lord Aberdeen, the veteran Peelite, was persona grata with the Queen and Prince-Consort mainly because of his conciliatory foreign policy which had always been distinctly contrary to that of Palmerston. Moreover, Aberdeen's was not the personality likely to stir up jealousy or animosity in others. It was therefore hoped that he would be a binding element sufficiently strong to keep all diverging factions together.

Though the Cabinet offices were about evenly distributed

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1. Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice, Life of the Second Earl Granville, (New York, 1905) I, p. 82.
2. Charles C. F. Greville, A Journal of the Reign of Queen Victoria, (New York, 1887) III, p. 20.

between Whigs and Peelites, who would naturally be expected to differ on matters of policy, there is every reason to suppose that for the first year of its administration the members were cordial in their relations with one another, and that such differences as did arise did not necessarily follow the lines of party cleavage; for instance, Lord Palmerston, a Whig; Lord Granville, a Whig; and Mr. Gladstone, a Peelite, were opposed to any change in the Parliamentary franchise; Lord John Russell was the only member of the Cabinet who believed that the East India Company should be permitted to renew its charter. (1) However, there seems to be a general impression that the Cabinet was from the beginning hopelessly divided on the Near Eastern question. Egerton says, "The Crimean War may or may not have been necessary; what is certain is that it was entered upon by a divided Cabinet, united in nothing except the desire to keep together." (2) Paul says, "Unfortunately, however, the Cabinet were divided, and that not, as all Cabinets must be, on matters of detail, but on matters of principle." The war party at first consisted of Lord Palmerston, Lord Lansdowne, and the Duke of Newcastle, who were afterwards joined by Lord John Russell, Lord Clarendon, and Sir James Graham. Even Mr. Gladstone went with the stream. (3) Kinglake describes the Cabinet as "drifting." "Wishing to control events they were controlled by them." (4)

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1. Lord Stanmore, Sidney Herbert, (London, 1906), I, pp. 171--172.
2. Egerton, British Foreign Policy, p. 230.
3. Paul, History of England, I, pp. 311-312.
4. Kinglake, Invasion of Crimea, I, p. 283.



Spencer Walpole assumes that had Lord Aberdeen prevailed in the Cabinet he would have told the Porte that England would be no party to war. Had Lord John Russell and Lord Palmerston been supreme they would have informed Russia that England was Turkey's ally. But as the presence of Lord John and Palmerston made Aberdeen's course impossible, Lord Aberdeen's presence made impracticable the policy of Lords Palmerston and Russell." It resulted therefore, that the Ministry had no firm mind on the matter; and while the ship of State was drifting without clear direction, the tiller was grasped by Lord Stratford, and the vessel steered into the whirlpool of war."<sup>(1)</sup>

These conclusions are vigorously denied by two members of the Cabinet, the Duke of Argyll, and Mr. Gladstone, and indirectly by Lord Palmerston. Indirect statements made in the memoirs of prominent statesmen during this period will also serve to throw some interesting side-lights on the subject. These statements do not minimize the well-known fact that individual Cabinet members had decided opinions on the question of the Near East, but they give good reason to suppose that these men did yield to the consensus of opinion in the Cabinet until well toward the autumn of 1853, and in all probability would have continued to work on a common policy had not extraneous factors influenced their conduct of affairs. In order to determine the position of the Cabinet as a whole, we shall, first of all examine the statements made by Cabinet members regarding this point.

The Duke of Argyll, Lord Privy Seal, testifies to the harmonious working of the Cabinet machinery; "... I do not recollect that

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1. Walpole, Life of John Russell, II, p. 180.

the wretched squabble between the French and Russian Embassies at Constantinople was ever made the subject of Cabinet discussion at all." (1) Speaking of the Convention of 1841, Argyll states that Aberdeen approved of Palmerston's conduct of affairs as exemplified in this matter. "Lord Aberdeen heartily approved of it." "I think Lord Palmerston is on the right course," wrote Lord Aberdeen to Madame de Lieven in June 1840; and I hope he will persevere in it." So that when these two reputed antagonists came together most unexpectedly in the same Cabinet in 1853, the basis of our policy in any revival of the Eastern Question rested on maxims of policy on which all the members of that Cabinet had been long thoroughly agreed." (2) It was not until April 27, 1853 that the Cabinet was faced with Menshikov's demands on the Porte. (3) The Duke thus described the temper of mind in which the Cabinet faced the new problem; "There was not a single man of us in the Cabinet who had any feeling of enmity to Russia, or any tinge of that exaggerated fear of her which animated the whole school of Anglo-Indians.... On the other hand, there was not one of us, unless it was Palmerston, who had any sympathy with the Turks either as a people or as a Government." With regard to the impression of a divided Cabinet he states positively; "The public impression which has arisen of a deeply divided Cabinet does not consist with my memory at all. Many of the disputes spent themselves

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1. Duke of Argyll, Autobiography & Memoirs, (London, 1906) I, p. 445.
  2. Argyll, Autobiography, I, p. 441.
  3. Ibid., I, p. 445.

in personal letters, which were never brought before the Cabinet at all, and the comparatively few which required to be settled by the Cabinet were decided by the most calm and amicable discussion, it being evident in every case what the general sense was. Not only was there <sup>never</sup> an actual division taken--for this is very rare in Cabinets--but there was not even one single heated discussion." (1) Speaking of Lords John and Palmerston he says, "Extremely irritable in his letters, he (Lord John) was always calm and dignified in the Cabinet, sometimes, however, with an evident air of self-suppression. As to Palmerston he was singularly silent, and when he did discuss, it was always frankly, always with perfect temper, and always acquiescing without any show of irritation in the general sense of the Cabinet." (2) He then gives an illustration of Palmerston's way of doing business in the Cabinet." When Turkey declared war against our advice in the autumn, Palmerston thought we ought to take auxiliary measures in her support---measures which would be acts of war against Russia, although war was not to be actually declared. He wrote to the Prime Minister that he would so move in a Cabinet which was to be held on October 7th. Aberdeen, in his description of what occurred says: 'Palmerston urged his proposal perseveringly, but not disagreeably.' This exactly agrees with my recollection of all our discussions. So does Aberdeen's description of the parts we all severally took." (3) Aberdeen's description of this Cabinet may well be inserted here:

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1. Argyll, Autobiography, I, p. 455.
2. Ibid., I, p. 455.
3. Ibid., I, p. 456.



"the aspect of the Cabinet (Oct.7,1853) was, on the whole, very good,-- Gladstone active and energetic for peace: Argyll, Herbert, Charles Wood, and Granville all in the same sense; Newcastle not quite so much so; Lansdowne not so warlike as formerly; Lord John warlike enough, but subdued in tone. Palmerston urged his views perseveringly, but not disagreeably. The Chancellor said little, but was evidently peaceful. Molesworth was not present."(1) Referring to Spencer Walpole's analysis of the Cabinet (See page 22) Argyll says; "There is no shadow of truth in this representation of the facts. Palmerston and John Russell were very far from being close allies. Sometimes their views coincided, but as often they disagreed, and it was evident from Palmerston's manner that old scores had been by no means forgotten."(2) We shall now see what Mr. Gladstone has to say about the Cabinet.

Mr. Gladstone's testimony corroborates that of the Duke of Argyll; "I must say of this cabinet of Lord Aberdeen's that in its deliberations it never exhibited the marks of its dual origin.... There were some few idiosyncrasies without doubt. Lord Palmerston, who was home secretary, had in him some tendencies which might have been troublesome, but for a long time were not so. It is, for instance, a complete error to suppose that he asked the cabinet to treat the occupation of the Principalities as a casus belli.(3) Lord Russell shook the position of Lord Aberdeen by action most capri-

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1. Stanmore, Sidney Herbert, I, P. 204 (Letter from Aberdeen to Sir James Graham.)
  2. Argyll, Autobiography, I, P. 459. Argyll's Memoirs were not begun until 1897, forty-four years after.
  3. This is the only one of Greville's statements regarding the Cabinet which is denied by Gladstone in the Vindication quoted on page 7.

scious and unhappy. But with the general course of affairs this had no connection; and even in the complex and tortuous movements of the Eastern negotiations, the cabinet never fell into two camps. That question and the war were fatal to it. In itself I hardly ever saw a cabinet with greater promise of endurance." (1) In 1881 Gladstone told John Morley; "As a member of the Aberdeen cabinet I never can admit that divided opinions in that cabinet led to hesitating action or brought on the war. I do not mean that all were always and on all points of the same mind. But I have known much sharper divisions in a cabinet that has worked a great question honorably and energetically, and I should confidently say, whether the negotiations were well or ill conducted, that considering their great difficulty they were worked with little and not much conflict. It must be borne in mind that Lord Aberdeen subsequently developed opinions that were widely severed from those that had guided us, but these never appeared in the Cabinet or at the time." (2) In his vindication of the Cabinet written in 1887, Mr. Gladstone makes the following statement; "I have witnessed much more of sharp or warm argument in almost every other of the seven cabinets to which I have had the honor to belong. This general description applies in full strictness to the course of the negotiations which ended in the war." (3) Here we have two Cabinet ministers testifying to the eminently harmonious tone of the cabinet even when facing the Near Eastern negotiations. We shall now turn our attention to the opinions of

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1. John Morley, Life of William Ewart Gladstone, (New York, London, 1903 I, p. 450.
2. Morley, Gladstone, I, p. 495.
3. William E. Gladstone, "The History of 1852-60 and Greville's Latest Journals," in English Historical Review, (New York & London) II, p. 288.

Lord Palmerston.

On January 31st, 1853, Palmerston writes to his brother: "It is clear that if we were to be turned out, the only Government that could be put in our stead would be Derby's and experience has proved that his Government could not stand .... Though the Cabinet consists of men of various parties and shades of opinion, all, having agreed to unite, will, I doubt not, unite to agree and in that case we shall go on very well." (1) This is Lord Palmerston's policy, --- one of expediency. He joined the Government in the first place because he had no notion of being relegated to "a little agreeable political solitude." (2) The Foreign Office being out of his reach, he was perfectly satisfied to take the Home Office knowing well that as a member of the Cabinet he would be able to influence its policy. The Government was a fairly safe proposition, and Palmerston, the Home Secretary, wielded more power as a member than he would have wielded outside of it. For the greater part of the first year therefore Lord Palmerston's "troublesome tendencies" were not apparent. He writes to his brother, April 3, 1853, "Our session will be long but not dangerous .... I do not see that any other Government is at present, possible .... We may have some difficulty next year about Parliamentary Reform but enough for the year are the troubles thereof. As yet, nothing can be more harmonious than our Coalition Cabinet." (3) Here we note his suspicion that Lord John may try to get in the public eye by some striking action, but there is no thought of difficulty over the Eastern Question. Some time

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1. Ashley, Palmerston, II, p. 261.
  2. Ibid., II, p. 259.
  3. Ibid., II, p. 264.



before he had written to his brother William, "The truth is that the Whigs would be glad to get rid of John Russell and to have me in his stead if this change could be well accomplished .... It is difficult to reduce to the second place a public man who for many years has occupied the first place both as leader of Opposition and as head of a Government; and such an active man as John Russell cannot be put on the shelf". (1) Lord Palmerston and Lord John, each after his own lights, will take more than a passing interest in one another's policies. When Lord John brought forward his reform project late in 1853, after Sinope had raised the war-temperature to fever-height, Lord Palmerston resigned December 16, 1853 ostensibly because of his objection to Reform. He could not consistently use the Eastern Question as a pretext because he had never "urged his views disagreeably",--had never made the following of his policy a condition for remaining in the Cabinet. Now just what were the views of those Cabinet members who had a definite near eastern policy? Does the story of the Cabinet negotiations show that up to a certain time the individual members really did yield to a consensus of opinion in order to get a working policy which would bring about a peaceful settlement of the Russo-Turkish difficulty?

Mr. Gladstone tells us that all through the negotiations on the eastern question Lord Clarendon was the center of a distinct set of communications; first, with the Prime-Minister; next with Lord John Russell as leader in the Commons; and third, with Lord Palmerston whose long and active career at the Foreign Office had given him special insight in that department. (2) Therefore we shall

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1. Ashley, Palmerston, II, p. 233. Letter written to Lord Palmerston's brother, April 30, 1852.
  2. Morley, Life of Gladstone, I, p. 481.

a very little time to a general discussion of the views of the individual Cabinet members and examine more closely the views of this "Big Four".

Aberdeen, in his account of the Cabinet meeting of October 7, 1853, (See Page 25) mentions Gladstone, Argyll, Herbert, Charles Wood, and Granville as his active co-workers in the cause of peace; Newcastle not quite so much so; Cranworth evidently peaceful. Later on, Aberdeen speaks of Molesworth as being a mere cipher in the Cabinet, who became outrageously warlike after war had broken out and was popular. (1) Sir James Graham might be placed with the peace element in the Cabinet until January 15, 1854, when he believed peace no longer possible. (2) Mr. Gladstone gives us his views in a conversation held with the Prime-Minister; " I replied that my own views of war so much agreed with his, and I felt such a horror of bloodshed, that I had thought the matter over incessantly for myself. We stand, I said, upon the ground that the Emperor has invaded countries not his own, inflicted wrong on Turkey, and ... most cruel wrong on the wretched inhabitants of the Principalities... that we were not going to extend the conflagration, ... but to apply more power for its extinction, and this I hoped in conjunction with all the great Powers of Europe. That I, for one, could not shoulder the musket against the Christian subjects of the Sultan. (3) In other words the Czar has offended against the public law of Europe and must be checked by

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1. Morley, Life of Gladstone, I, p. 482. Quoted from Mrs. Simpson's Many Memories, p. 264.

2. Maxwell, Clarendon, II, p. 38.

3. Morley, Gladstone, I, p. 482.

Europe, but, on the other hand, Gladstone could not, on principle, support the Sultan against his Christian subjects. Argyll thus sums up his attitude and Aberdeen's; "Aberdeen was always against any step which would render war inevitable. So was I." (1) Herbert writes to Aberdeen the evening after the Cabinet of October 7th "... that we ought with our fleet to protect Turkey from attack, that we ought to endeavor to prevent her bringing on that attack by any act of war, and that we should endeavor to reopen negotiations with a view to pacific adjustment in the interim if possible." (2) Clarendon in a letter to Sir Charles Wood, Oct. 20, 1853 states: "I can honestly affirm that peace has been my only object. I won't say peace a tout prix-- but to maintain our principle and protect our ally by a peaceful and not a warlike solution has been the aim I have kept steadily in view." (3) Here are eleven members of the Cabinet who favor a peaceful solution of the difficulty. We have left Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell; Palmerston as of old, believed in the force of "Remonstrances and warlike demonstrations" (4) as a means of securing peace. Herbert Paul says, "War at any price" was his (Palmerston's) object in 1853." (5) But there is a distinct difference between a "war-at-any-price" policy and the use of "remonstrances and demonstrations" as a means of securing peace. Lord John was distinctly warlike in the beginning, more amenable to reason for a part of the summer of 1853, and not-

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1. Argyll, Autobiography, I, p. 456.
  2. Stanmore, Herbert, I, p. 208.
  3. Maxwell, Clarendon, I<sup>1</sup>, p. 28.
  4. Walpole, Russell, I, p. 182.
  5. Paul, History of England, I, pp. 311--314.



ably pro-Turkish and warlike in the last stage. This sounds like an echo from the masses; "The Emperor of Russia is clearly bent on accomplishing the destruction of Turkey, and he must be resisted." (1) There is no policy of warlike demonstration or conciliation as a means of securing peace, or no hint of any other solution of the problem in the following sentences; "... in case of the invasion of Turkey by Russia on any pretence, we ought to send a message to Petersburg and demand the evacuation of the Principalities, and, in case of refusal, to enforce this demand." (2) This is war pure and simple. The Cabinet as a whole did not reach this stage till February 7th, 1854. It might be said with truth that on a few occasions Lord John out-Palmerstoned Palmerston. It may be well to note here that Lord Aberdeen had no confidence in the Turk and characterized the whole Turkish system as "vicious and inhuman" (3) while on the other hand, Lord Palmerston believed that Turkey could be rehabilitated by means of judicious reforms; Lord John Russell believed that if England went to war, "she must act, not for the Sultan but for the general interests of Europe" (4) i.e., the Christian subjects of the Porte must be considered; Clarendon's attitude may be gathered from his instructions to Stratford de Redcliffe; "Nor will you disguise from the Sultan that perseverance in his

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1. Walpole, Russell II, p. 181. Letter to Clarendon Mar. 20, 1853.

2. Ibid., II, p. 181.

3. Theodore Martin, Life of the Prince Consort, (New York, 1877) II, p. 428 .

4. Walpole, Russell, II, p. 194.

present course must end in alienating the sympathies of the British nation." (1) Greville quotes Clarendon as saying that Aberdeen was "always full of consideration for the Emperor." (2) Mr. Paul states that Palmerston detested the Czar because of his protest against Palmerston's treatment of Greece. (3) Palmerston distrusted Russian diplomacy; "... the Russian Government has always two strings to its bow--moderate language and disinterested professions at St. Petersburg and London; active aggression by its agents on the scene of operations." (4) These impressions of Aberdeen and Palmerston have some influence on the negotiations prior to the Crimean War.

There is perhaps no better way to approach our study of these negotiations than to study the attitude of Lord Palmerston at the different stages of the Eastern Question, and, at the same time, compare his attitude as revealed in private communications with his attitude at the Cabinet meetings. The position taken by Clarendon, Russell, and Aberdeen respectively, will then clearly appear in its relationship to that of Palmerston.

When the dispute about the Holy Places was first brought up in 1851 by Louis Napoleon, Lord Palmerston, then Foreign Minister, writes to Normanby; "Now a blockade of the Dardanelles is, of course, a very easily accomplished thing .... But the maritime trade up and down those straits .... is a matter of the utmost interest to many

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1. Maxwell, Clarendon, II, p. 7.
2. Greville, Journal, III, p. 90.
3. Paul, History of England, I, p. 306.
4. Ashley, Palmerston, II, p. 273.

nations of Europe and especially to us English....In the meanwhile the Russians would not be idle, and somehow or other they would probably contrive to send succor to the Sultan; and if...the attempt (of France) should fail, the French Government would have lost caste in Europe and would have made itself ridiculous; and, moreover, the French Government would have done more than Russia unaided could do in half a century to counteract and upset the policy which England and France have hitherto pursued in regard to Turkey-- a policy the great object of which has been to foster the independence of Turkey, and to get her out of the hands and influence of the Russian Government." (1) There is no suggestion here of assisting France to get her demands from Turkey even though there is the probability that Russia may thereby get her hands and influence on Turkey. An offer of mediation is all that is forthcoming. While John Russell was Foreign Minister under Aberdeen, the dispute about the Holy Places was renewed. Lord John expressed regret that two of the great powers of Europe should go to war on such a pretext, but conscious of the latent possibilities in such a state of affairs he sent Stratford de Redcliffe back to Constantinople. Lord Aberdeen, who had had some dealings with Stratford while he was Foreign Minister, was filled with misgiving and directed that exact instructions be given to Stratford; "The assurances of 'prompt and effective aid on the approach of danger' given by us to the Porte would, in all probability, produce war.... It may be necessary to give them a moral support and to endeavor to prolong their existence; but we ought to regard as the greatest misfortune any engagement which compelled us to make up arms for the Turks.... I do not

1. Ashley, Palmerston, II, p. 189. 190.



believe that any power at this time entertains the intention of overthrowing the Turkish Empire, but it is certainly true that any quarrel might lead to this event .... We ought by all means to keep ourselves perfectly independent, and free to act as circumstances require. Above all, we ought not to trust the disposal of the Mediterranean fleet--which is peace or war to the discretion of any man." (1) Somewhat later (Mar. 21, 1853), Aberdeen wrote to Clarendon; "We desire the preservation of Turkey but we must take care to avoid entering any engagement with France, either positive or conditional upon this subject. We have a general treaty, to which all the Powers are parties. This is enough for the present." (2)

The first Cabinet meeting in which we are interested was held on March 20, 1853, Colonel Rose, alarmed about Menshikov's demands and the massing of Russian troops on the Moldavian frontier, had applied to Admiral Dundas, who was in command of the Mediterranean fleet, to send a squadron to Besika Bay for the protection of Constantinople. Dundas would not move without instructions from home. Late on the night of March 19th Sir James Graham notified Clarendon about the despatch and next morning a meeting was held at the Admiralty,--Aberdeen, Russell, Graham, Clarendon, and Palmerston being present. "Never was so good a hit", said Graham afterwards. (3) Palmerston must be kept in good humor. (4) An entry in Greville's Journal says; "He (Clarendon) had written to Lord John and sent him the despatches; he got an answer from him full of very wild talk of strong measures to be taken, and a fleet sent to the Baltic to make

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1. Walpole, Russell, II, p. 178.
  2. Maxwell, Clarendon, II, p. 14.
  3. Ibid., II, p. 3.
  4. Greville, Journal, III, p. 48.

peremptory demands on the Emperor of Russia. This, however, he took no notice of, and did not say one word to Aberdeen about it, quietly letting it drop .... I asked him what were Palmerston's views. He replied that he did not say much, and acquiesced in his and Aberdeen's prudent and reserved intentions, but he could see from a few words that casually escaped him, that he would have been ready to join in more stringent and violent measures if they had been proposed. His hatred of Russia is not extinguished, but as it was, there was no expressed difference of opinion and a general agreement. (1) Mr. Greville's testimony is verified by the notes published in Walpole's John Russell. On March 20th Lord John wrote two letters to Clarendon which are "full of very wild talk;" "The Emperor of Russia is clearly bent on accomplishing the destruction of Turkey, and he must be resisted." In the second letter he says; "The vast preparations at Sebastopol show a foregone purpose, and that purpose is, I fear, to extinguish the Turkish Empire .... My own opinion is that, in case of the invasion of Turkey by Russia on any pretence, we ought to send a message to Petersburg, and demand the evacuation of Turkish territory, and, in case of refusal, to enforce this demand both in the Baltic as well as in the Dardanelles. We should, of course, enter into concert with France." (2) This last idea is contrary to that of Aberdeen, who placed his trust in a union of the Four Powers. It was well that Clarendon said nothing about these despatches. Maxwell says that Aberdeen and Clarendon persuaded the others that as yet there was no casus belli and that action should be suspended for the

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1. Greville, Journal, III, p. 48. Mr. Greville was a contemporary observer of the events mentioned, and, according to Mr. Gladstone, was also a personal friend of Lord Clarendon. (English Historical
  2. Walpole, Russell, II, p. 181. Review, II, p. 288.)

nonce.(1) After news reached London that Menshikov had departed from Constantinople Palmerston wrote to Graham:

May 29-- "Walker's answers to your excellent queries make me wish more than ever that our fleet was cruising off the Dardanelles at this moment. We must give Stratford leave to send for it under certain and prescribed circumstances. Aberdeen has now less objection to this than he had." This is the turning of the tide for Aberdeen.

May 31.--"We have now determined to give Lord Stratford power to call up our squadron for the defense of Constantinople. Does it not follow that we should place that squadron as near as we properly can to the points which it may suddenly be called upon to defend?"(2)

Palmerston is urging his forward policy with might and main. Just here Greville tells us;"The Cabinet is going on in the greatest harmony."(3) On May 31st John Russell writes to Clarendon that it was "absolutely necessary that the fleet at Malta should go at once to Vourla, and that orders for this purpose should go to-night or to-morrow at latest."(4) Lord John will not be outdone by Lord Palmerston. June 1st, Graham answers Palmerston's letters;

"It is always easy to involve this country in war; but the reaction of the public mind is speedy and violent, when the evils of war have become inevitable. To prevent the Russians reaching Constantinople is a British object of primary importance, which would

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1. Maxwell, Clarendon, II, p. 3.
2. Charles Stuart Parker, The Life and Letters of Sir John Graham, (London 1907), II, p. 219.
3. Greville, Journal, III, p. 56.
4. Walpole, Russell, II, p. 181.



justify many risks and great sacrifices. Nothing but the imminent danger of so great a disaster would be regarded as a sufficient plea for a sudden rupture with Russia."(1)

Aberdeen expressed like sentiments to Clarendon:

"I think our best prospect of success is to be found in the union of the Four Powers, and in their firm but friendly representations at St. Petersburg. The authority given to Lord Stratford to call up the fleet to Constantinople is a fearful power to place in the hands of any minister, involving as it does the question of peace or war."(2)

Aberdeen feels that he has made a dangerous concession to those of the Cabinet who want an energetic policy. On March 24 Clarendon told Greville of an interview with Brunnow, the Russian ambassador, in which Clarendon assured him that the British government relied with implicit confidence on the Emperor's word of honor that he had no sinister or hostile intentions.(3) June 5 Clarendon is reported by Greville as being greatly disgusted at having been deceived by the Emperor. "He says he is harrassed to death with the whole affair, and with the multiplicity of business he has besides; he has a difficult task to perform, taking a middle position in the Cabinet between the opposite opinions of those who are for more stringent measures and those who, like himself, are for patience and moderation. Palmerston, . . . is for vigor, and as in former times 'leading John Russell by the nose,' Clarendon and Aberdeen for moder-

1. Parker, Graham, II, p. 220.

2. Ibid., II, p. 221.

3. Greville, Journal, III, p. 47.

ation; but he is beset by different opinions and written suggestions and proposals, and all this worries him exceedingly. "(1) A note from Aberdeen to Clarendon (June 5) gives us the first mention of the term "drifting" as descriptive of England's state at that time. Aberdeen says:

"As we are drifting fast towards war, I should think the Cabinet ought to see where they are going.... I do not object to proposed draft provided it is understood that no actual engagement to make war is adopted, and that we are still free to take the last step or not, as we may think proper.

The independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire may be a great object of European policy, and, under certain circumstances, may call for the most vigorous exercise or warlike measures. But we are under no obligation or guarantee, and ought to look at this matter with perfect freedom." (2)

The proposed draft referred to the project of convention submitted by Clarendon to be forwarded by Lord Westmorland, British ambassador at Vienna, on the publication of Nesselrode's ultimatum to the Turks.' (3) (See Introduction p. 13) June 19, Lord John presented a memorandum to the Cabinet which states that in the event of Russia taking Constantinople, England must take war on Russia herself in concert with France and Austria. He writes:

"On the whole, supposing peace not to be made during the Russian occupation of the Principalities, three separate stages of sus-

1. Greville, Journal, III, p. 58.

2. Maxwell, Clarendon, I, p. 15.

3. Ibid., II, p. 14.

pense and conflict appear to be approaching. c

1. While Russia holds the Principalities, and persists in her present demand.

2. While Russia, having invaded Turkey is marching on Constantinople.

3. When Russia, having taken Constantinople, is setting forth terms of peace distinguished by moderation.'

Our policy in the first case is already decided on ....

In the second stage we must, I conceive, aid the Sultan in defending his capital and his throne.

In the third stage we must be prepared to make war on Russia herself. In that contest we ought to seek the alliance of France and Austria." (1)

Spencer Walpole states that this memorandum had the effect of eliciting the views of the other Cabinet members at this stage. Clarendon agreed with Lord John. Lord Lansdowne thought that any further invasion of Turkey by Russia should be regarded as a casus belli by England and France; that this opinion should be made known to Russia, and that Russia should at the same time be informed that in the event of any catastrophe England would consider Greece heir of Turkey. Sir James Graham agreed with Lansdowne, but thought it undesirable to decide beforehand on any policy; Lord Palmerston agreed with Sir James Graham that there was no use in determining on a policy till the contingency contemplated by it had arisen; but in the meanwhile, he was in favor of compelling Russia to evac-

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1. Walpole, Russell, II, p. 181.



uate the Principalities by the force of remonstrance and demonstration. Lord Aberdeen was averse to indulging in warlike speculations, and wished to preserve freedom to act as our interests might require. (1) Greville here testifies to different individual policies in the Cabinet but agreement on the whole. It is in this entry that Greville makes the statement denied by Gladstone; "It appears that Palmerston proposed on Saturday last that the entrance of the Russians into the Principalities should be considered a *casus belli*, in which, however, he was overruled and gave way. The Cabinet did not come to a vote on it but the general sentiment went with Aberdeen and Clarendon, and against Palmerston. He seems to have given way with a good grace and hitherto nothing has occurred of a disagreeable character; on the contrary both Clarendon and Granville tell me Palmerston has behaved very well." (2) Meanwhile the Russians crossed the Pruth. The combined English and French fleets were at Besika Bay near the entrance to the Dardanelles. Palmerston wrote to Aberdeen (July 4); "I quite agree with you that we ought to try whether we can devise any proposal which, without involving any departure by the Sultan from the ground of independence on which he has taken his stand, might satisfy every just claim which the Emperor can put forward. In the meantime, however, I hope you will allow the squadrons to be ordered to go up to the Bosphorus as soon as it is known at Constantinople that the Russians have entered the Principalities, and to be further at liber-

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 1. Walpole, Russell, II, p. 182.

2. Greville, Journal, III, pp. 61--62.

ty to enter the Black Sea, if necessary or useful for the protection of Turkish territory." He gives his reasons for proposing this action: (a) it would encourage the Porte; (b) it would prevent further inroads on Turkish territory in Europe and Asia; (c) it would act as a check on the Czar and would stimulate Austria and Prussia to increased exertions to bring the Russian government to reason; (d) "it would relieve England and France from the disagreeable, and not very creditable, position of waiting without venturing to enter the back door as friends, while the Russians have taken forcible possession of the front <sup>hall</sup> ~~door~~ as enemies." He concludes by saying; "I am confident that this country expects that we should pursue such a course, and I cannot believe that we should receive anything but support in pursuing it from the party now in Opposition." (1) Palmerston knows what "the country" wants and what the country's representatives, the mouth-pieces of their constituents, will support. Lord Aberdeen replied that in a case of this kind he dreaded popular support, just as on some occasion, when the Athenian assembly vehemently applauded Alcibiades, he asked if he had said anything particularly foolish. (2) Lord Aberdeen will for some time longer hold his own against the bombardments of public opinion. It may be interesting in this connection to note Greville's entry for June 22nd quoted above; "Clarendon thinks (and in this I concur) that the country would never forgive the Government for going to war, unless they could show that it was absolutely necessary and that they had

1. Ashley, Palmerston, II, pp. 274-275.

2. Ibid., II, p. 275.

exhausted every means of bringing about a pacific solution of the question, and nobody here would care one straw about the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia." (1) Clarendon and Greville are somewhat slow when compared with Palmerston. Palmerston wrote to John Russell (July 7) making the same proposal and concluding with the same arguments; "We should be much relieved from embarrassment in the approaching debate if we could say that orders for this purpose had actually been sent, and the actual advance of the squadrons ought surely to accompany any overtures made to Russia." (2) A strong argument to advance when we remember that Lord John had to defend the Cabinet policy in the House of Commons. Lord Palmerston also mentions the fact that "the Cabinet agreed provisionally to an amended draft of convention to be proposed for Russia and Turkey, simply renewing the engagements of Kainardji and Adrianople without any extension .... This Convention made no mention of the Holy Places, because the French would not agree to a Convention between Russia and Turkey on that matter .... All this is very well for effect and for a Blue Book, but, in my opinion, the course which the Emperor has pursued ... seems to show that he has taken his line, and that nothing will satisfy him but complete submission on the part of Turkey .... I tried again to persuade the Cabinet to send the squadrons up the Bosphorus but failed. I was told that Stratford and La Cour have powers to call for them. This is no doubt stated in public despatches but we all know he has been privately desired not to do so.

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1. Greville, Journal, III, p. 62.
  2. Ashley, Palmerston, II, p. 277.



I think our position waiting timidly and submissively at the back door while Russia is violently, threateningly, and arrogantly forcing her way into the house, is unwise with a view to a peaceful settlement, and derogatory to the character, and standing, and dignity of the Two Powers. I think that when pressed on this point, as of course we shall be in both houses we shall have no good answer or explanation to give." (1) Here we may note that Lord Palmerston is recommending a policy which will tend to strengthen, not weaken the Government. Lord Palmerston no doubt, does "behave well" in the Cabinet but has other ways and means of forcing his policies. With reference to Palmerston's failure to induce the Cabinet to send the fleets up the Bosphorus, Gladstone said long afterwards; "The recollection of the surviving members of that day is that the mention of the subject in the Cabinet was slight and that the suggestion of Lord Palmerston was unsupported." (2)

The Russian Government now announced to its diplomatic agents that the occupation of the Principalities was an answer to the British and French fleets and would cease when they withdrew. Palmerston (July 12) sends a memorandum to the Cabinet in which he again submits his opinion that the fleets should be forthwith sent to the Bosphorus in answer to the inadmissible pretension of Nesselrode's note. He attacks the whole policy of the Government up to this time:

"If the two powers had acted with that energy, decision and

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1. Ashley, Palmerston, II, p. 276.

2. Gladstone, English Historical Review, "The History of 1852-60",  
April 1887. II, p. 286.

promptitude which the occasion required; if when Menshikov began to threaten, the two squadrons had been sent to the neighborhood of the Dardanelles, and if the Russian Government had been plainly told that the moment a Russian soldier set foot on Turkish territory, or as soon as a Russian ship of war was approached with hostile intentions, the combined squadrons would move up to the Bosphorus, and, if necessary, operate in the Black Sea, there can be little doubt that the Russian Government would have paused in its course, and things would not have come to the pass at which they have now arrived. But the Russian Government has been led on step by step by the apparent timidity of the Government of England, and reports artfully propagated that the British Cabinet had declared that it would have "La paix a tout prix" have not been sufficiently contradicted by any overt acts."(1)

Aberdeen believed that the circular should be met by a grave expostulation:

"When the four Powers simultaneously advised the Porte not to regard the entrance of the Russian troops into the Principalities as a casus belli, it was not that they attached any weight to the declaration of the Emperor that he did not intend to make war upon Turkey, or that they entertained any doubt of an act of real hostility having been committed, but they wished to accept his declaration so far as to preserve in their own hands the means of negotiating with greater hopes of success than if the utmost extremity of war had been proclaimed."(2)

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1. Ashley, Palmerston, II, p. 278.

2. Ibid., II, p. 279.

These views were shared by Clarendon. Palmerston wrote in reply to Aberdeen:

"As to the fleet I acquiesce in your reasoning, and, on consideration, I admit that, as we have launched proposals for a peaceful arrangement it would be better not to endanger the negotiation by throwing into it any fresh element of difficulty; and I am, therefore, prepared to share the responsibility of submitting even to insult rather than afford to the quibbling and pettifogging Government with which we have to deal any pretext arising out of our course for refusing terms of accommodation unobjectionable in themselves." (1) Here Palmerston admits that Aberdeen's policy is right and that he is prepared to share responsibility for it. This point is also made by Mr. Gladstone in the vindication of the Cabinet before quoted. ( See page 26.)

But Greville later gives us the idea that Palmerston did not at this time commit himself to this policy when it was brought up in Parliament. August 27th he makes the following observation: "John Russell gave a night at last for the discussion of the Turkish question, and made a sort of explanation which was tame, meager, and unsatisfactory. (Aug. 17, 1853) After some speeches expressive of disappointment and disapprobation, Cobden made an oration in favor of peace at any price, and this drew up Palmerston, who fell upon him with great vigor and success. The discussion would have ended languidly and ill for the Government but for this brilliant improvisation, which carried the House entirely with it. It was not however,

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1. Ashley, Palmerston, II, p. 280.



if analyzed and calmly considered, of much use to the Government as to their foreign policy, for it was only an answer to Cobden, and Palmerston did not say one word in defense of the policy which has been adopted, nor identify himself with it as he might well have done. Though there was nothing in it positively indicative of dissent and dissatisfaction, anyone might fairly draw the inference that if Palmerston had had his own way he would have taken a more stringent and less patient course." (1) It is interesting to note a comment on this speech from the London "Examiner" of August 20, 1853; "His (Palmerston's) speech would have formed an excellent defense for a course opposed to the Ministry for which he spoke." (2) On October 4th Greville writes to the same effect; "He (Palmerston) has been speechifying in Scotland, where, though he spoke very handsomely of Clarendon, he did not say one word in defense of Aberdeen, or anything calculated to put an end to the notion and repeated assertions that he and Aberdeen had been at variance on the Eastern Question. I find Aberdeen feels this omission very much ".... (3) It is not at all strange, under these circumstances, that the general public gets the impression of a Cabinet divided on the Eastern Question. But of course, Lord Palmerston must keep his standing with the "country." (3)

Greville also tells us that Clarendon had written a private letter to Seymour, a "stinging one but very good," (4) which Seymour

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1. Greville, Journal, III, pp. 69--70.
2. Littell's Living Age, "The Debate in the House of Commons" copied from "The Examiner", Vol. 39, p. 57.
3. Greville, Journal, III, p. 80.
4. Ibid., III, p. 67.

read to the Czar. On July 31st, 1853, Palmerston, who had heard Clarendon read the letter at a Cabinet meeting, wrote; "I admired greatly your letter to Seymour, but I did not like to say too much in its praise at the Cabinet, for fear that by doing so I might lead others to think it was too strong. I can assure you that it is a great comfort and satisfaction to me to know that the conduct of our foreign relations is in such able hands as yours, and your administration of your important department is attended with the advantage to the country that, from a variety of circumstances, you can do and say things which could not so easily have been said or done by me." (1) Palmerston and Clarendon are certainly in accord here.

The next phase of the negotiations centers around the Vienna Note. (See Introduction, p. 15)

The Czar accepted the Vienna Note on August 3rd. Lord John Russell said that the Turks should be allowed no discretion in the matter and should be plainly told that they "must" sign the note. (2) July 20th he writes to Clarendon:

"The Emperor of Russia should be allowed to choose the French or the English project as he likes best: and whichever he chooses must be imposed on the Turks." (3)

While Lord John was at Roseneath he received letters from Aberdeen and Clarendon stating that the Turks had refused the note. Of course, Lord Aberdeen hoped that the Czar might be brought to accept the amendments, but says that "in case of failure we are bound to make the Turks agree to the terms we have prescribed, or to let them take their own course." (4) Lord John agreed with Aberdeen and

1. Maxwell, Clarendon, II, p. 16.

2. Walpole, Russell, II, pp. 183--184.

3. Ibid., II, p. 184. N.B. Drafts of the Vienna Note were prepared originally by both France and England.

4. Ibid., II, p. 185.

Clarendon . August 27th, he wrote to Clarendon; "The Turks are immense fools not to snap at what has been offered them. But still I hope the Emperor of Russia will accept the modifications." (1) Then on the 29th of August he writes to Clarendon:

"I think this Eastern Question has got into as entangled a position as can well be. If we act against Russia it seems a bad return for her last compliance. If against the Turk it will be considered that we have given him false hopes and allowed him to fall a victim to our shabbiness.... I keep to my opinion that we ought to endeavor to gain the winter for further negotiation. But, if this cannot be done, I am for the Turk against the Russian." (2)

August 30th he writes to Aberdeen; "Hitherto we have shown great forbearance to Russia. It now becomes us to show a similar indulgence towards Turkey, when she becomes in her turn willful and wrong-headed." (3)

Lord John then came up to London and met Palmerston, Aberdeen, and Clarendon at the Foreign Office. In the memorandum which he then presented (Sept. 3) he speaks sympathetically of the Sultan's opposition to the note; "All he now asks is to make some amendments to save his honor and dignity in a note presented to him by the Four Powers." (4) On September 16th he received word from Aberdeen (Lord John was at Roseneath) that the Emperor had refused the note

1. Walpole, Russell, II, p. 186.

2. Ibid., II, p. 186.

3. Ibid., II, p. 186.

4. Ibid., II, p. 187.



with the Turkish modifications. Aberdeen also informed him that Palmerston, Clarendon, and himself had agreed to urge the Porte to sign the unamended note with the understanding that the allies interpreted the note in the same sense as did the Porte. (1) Lord John wrote to Clarendon on the 17th of September:

"I must say I much lament the step you have taken. I think it is degrading Turkey not to reject her modifications, but to reject them after submitting them to the Emperor of Russia.

The conference at Vienna in Westmoreland's hands has been an instrument very injurious to peace .... I am vexed about the last move, and you must not be surprised, if it is accepted at Vienna, if I were to decline any responsibility." (2)

Here is a threat of resignation because the very policy recommended by Lord John some weeks before (See page 47.) has been followed by the other members of the Cabinet. On September 19th he wrote to Aberdeen:

"All this makes me very uneasy; and, if the Austrians agree to Clarendon's terms, and forward them to Constantinople, I do not see how I can remain a member of your Government." (3)

That evening at a public meeting at Greenock Lord John said; "While we endeavor to maintain peace, I certainly should be the last to forget that, if peace cannot be maintained with honor, it is no longer peace." (4)

1. Walpole, Russell, II, p. 188.

2. Ibid., II, p. 190.

3. Ibid., II, p. 190.

4. Greville, Journal, III, pp. 75, 77.

Evidently Lord John will run no risk of being misunderstood by the "country". Even Lord Palmerston had agreed that the Turk must sign the unmodified note.

Greville testifies to Cabinet tranquillity during this period: September 3rd.--Palmerston is extremely reasonable, does not take the part of the Turks, but on the contrary blames them severely for making difficulties he thinks absurd and useless, but is still for not letting them be crushed. He is on the best terms with Clarendon, and goes along with him very cordially in his policy on this question. Both Palmerston and Lord John seem to agree with Clarendon on the disposal of the fleet better than Aberdeen.

September 8th.--The four ministers met to discuss the matter (the policy to be pursued if the Czar should refuse the amended note) and were very harmonious. Palmerston not at all for violent measures, and Clarendon said he himself was the most warlike of the four. (1)

On September 21st Palmerston, in a letter to Sidney Herbert, for the first time speaks of war as inevitable; "I believe that the real fact at the bottom of all these unintelligible pretences is that what he (the Czar) really wants is that the Sultan should not, by liberal measures and progressive improvement, interfere with the arbitrary and tyrannical powers which the Greek clergy now too often exercise .... I believe that what I have last stated is what the Emperor really means and wants, and therefore I am coming reluctantly to the conclusion that war between him and Turkey is becoming inevitable. If such war shall happen, upon his head be the responsi-

1. Greville, Journal III, pp. 75, 77.

bility of the consequences.

....My wish is that England should be on friendly terms with Russia; it is desirable that this should be for the sake of this country and for the sake of Europe. Neither country would gain anything by war with the other; and Russia, if her Government understood properly her position, has important and useful functions to perform in the system of Europe. The Emperor has, since 1848, and till this last affair performed those functions to the admiration of all thinking men. He seems latterly to have lost his reasoning faculties." (1)

This letter shows no traces either of Russophobia or personal hatred of the Czar. It is a calm, business-like summary of the situation, devoid of any personal bias.

Meanwhile Count Nesselrode in a despatch to Baron Meyendorff (Sept. 7) made statements which proved that the Czar interpreted the Vienna Note in the same sense as the Turks. England and France could no longer urge the Turk to sign the note, unless they were prepared to defend him in any future contests concerning its interpretation. (2) Aberdeen wrote to the Queen (Sept. 23):

"The war-frenzy and fanaticism of the Turks have passed all bounds, and threaten the safety of the Sultan and of the Christian inhabitants of the capital. Under these circumstances authority has been given to call up the English and French fleets for their protection. The ambassadors have already agreed, each of them to

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1. Ashley, Palmerston, II, pp. 281--282.

2. Martin, Prince Consort, II, p. 417.



summon two war steamers for this purpose."(1)

Three days later Clarendon wrote to his wife; "Everything seems drifting toward war."(2)

On October 5th Lord John submitted a memorandum to the Cabinet stating that "in the event of Russia not making peace on fair terms, we must appear in the field as the auxiliaries of Turkey, and that if we are to act in conjunction with France as principals in the war we must act not for the Sultan; but for the general interests of the population of European Turkey."(3)

Meanwhile the Turks had decided to declare war (Sept. 26). The news reached England around October 5th and a Cabinet was called for October 7th. This Cabinet meeting passed off peacefully. (See Page 25) Clarendon described the Cabinet of the next day: "The Cabinet was harmonious yesterday--Palmerston less cocky and Aberdeen less timid than on Friday, and all my drafts of despatches succeeded pretty well. The fleets are not to assume an aggressive attitude, but are to defend Turkish territory against attack .... With reference to public feeling in England, we could not well do less, and if any Russian attack were made upon Turkey that our fleets might have prevented, we never should have heard the end of it. I see little chance of averting war, which, even in the most sacred cause is a horrible calamity; but for such a cause as two sets of barbarians quarrelling over a form of words, it is not only shocking but incredible."(4)---

1. Martin, Prince Consort, II, p. 417.
2. Maxwell, Clarendon, II, p. 30.
3. Walpole, Russell, II, pp. 193, 194.
4. Maxwell, Clarendon, II, p. 26. (Letter to G.C. Lewis, M.P.)

Here is an open confession. A war measure, sending the ships to Constantinople, has been taken not because Aberdeen wanted one thing and Palmerston and Russell another, for Clarendon's statement contradicts any such supposition, but because public opinion demanded it. The clause regarding the consequences of any attack on Turkey that might have been prevented is almost prophetic of Sinope.

Dasent quotes the following statement written by Delane at four o'clock in the morning, Oct. 4:

"There is an end of negotiation and it is war at last. So says Clarendon at least, and very distinctly. The orders (to the fleet) were to go tonight, and were resolved on by a Committee of the Cabinet, comprising Aberdeen, Clarendon, Newcastle, Palmerston, Granville, and Herbert. The others will meet immediately, and then probably the House." (1)

Mr. Dasent considers this item very important because in none of the memoirs of the Aberdeen Cabinet is there any mention of the fact that the inner circle of ministers regarded war inevitable at this early date. (2) Greville states (Oct. 6) that Aberdeen told Delane, then editor of the "Times" and a confidential friend of Aberdeen, (3) on the 4th of October, that he was resolved to be no party to a war with Russia on such grounds as the present, and he was prepared to resign rather than incur such a responsibility. Greville thinks this very important because not unlikely to lead to some difference

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1. Arthur Irwin Dasent, John Thadeus Delane, (New York, 1908), I, pp. 160, 161.

2. Ibid., I, p. 161.

3. Ibid., I, p. 150.

In the Cabinet, and possibly to its dissolution. (1) But there was no dissolution. Aberdeen went with the stream.

At the Cabinet of October 7th, Palmerston had proposed "that in the event of war being declared by Turkey, the allied squadrons should enter the Black Sea and should notify the Russian admiral at Sebastopol that any Russian ship-of-war found cruising in the Black Sea should be detained and given over to the Turkish Government. Secondly, Palmerston proposed that France and England should engage to give the Sultan such naval assistance as was necessary and should also engage to permit their respective subjects to enter the military or naval service of the Sultan. In return the Sultan was to engage that he would consult with England and France as to the terms and conditions of the new treaty which is to determine on the conclusion of hostilities, the future relations of Russia and Turkey". (2) This proposal was rejected by Aberdeen who thought that the present state of the Russo-Turkish affair would not justify such a proceeding. (3) We note here that the sphere of Palmerston's demands has widened perceptibly. October 15th the Prince Consort writes to Stockmar:

"The Cabinet up to this time have maintained perfect harmony-- Aberdeen has unfortunately made concessions, which bring us nearer war." (4)

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1. Greville, Journal III, p. 81.
  2. Ashley, Palmerston, II, p. 283.
  3. Ibid., II, p. 284.
  4. Martin, Prince Consort, II, p. 423.



A series of letters from Sir James Graham will reveal Cabinet operations up to October 23rd. We shall quote sentences bearing on these operations:

October 14th--Lord John remains in London. He has broached the significant proposal of assembling Parliament immediately; if he insists on this proposal, the effect and the intent are obvious and inevitable.

October 15th--There is an important new note on the anvil, in lieu of the Vienna note; and the instruction to Stratford Canning, which will accompany it, may give rise to very serious discussions.

October 16th--The Note is not yet finally arranged, and will probably be submitted to the members of the Cabinet now in London.

October 17th--The Note and the covering despatch to Stratford Canning hang fire; Lord Aberdeen's words of coercive warning to the Turk are under Palmerston's consideration, and he is unwilling to admit them. Lord Russell seeks to modify them. I am more sanguine in my hope that we shall arrive at an agreement without either a Cabinet or a break-up.

October 18th--Things look better. Palmerston has consented to the substance, though not to the words of Aberdeen's proposal; and Lord Aberdeen will not insist on the particular form of expression.

October 20th--The recast Note has become so Turkish in its fresh attire that there is little danger of its rejection at Constantinople but much less chance of its acceptance at St. Petersburg, and Lord Aberdeen is now uneasy under the pressure of the other horn of the dilemma. He is disposed to take his stand on a requisition to the Turk that there shall be an armed truce while negotia-

tions are pending.

Oct. 22nd--I .... trust the course which we consider prudent may be adopted by consent. But Palmerston and Lord John are somewhat jealous of each other, and when one makes a concession the other is disposed to hang back.

Oct. 23rd-- The Note and the course of proceeding have been settled without a Cabinet, by the concurrence of Lord Aberdeen, John Russell, and Palmerston. Concord exists here. (1)

The entry of 22 October goes to show that neither Lord John nor Lord Palmerston is going to lose his opportunity of gaining political capital with the Commons and the country. That of Oct. 23rd also testifies to peace in the Cabinet .

The requisition mentioned in the extract above finally took a modified form requiring the Porte to suspend hostilities "for a reasonable time" during the peace negotiations, "on the understanding that no hostile movement is made on the part of Russia." But the Turks interpreted "a reasonable time" as a fortnight, and the last phrase as referring to Russia's occupation of the Principalities, and the resistance which they offered to the operations of Omar Pasha on the north side of the Danube which he had crossed in spite of Stratford's remonstrances. (2) Therefore this last move availed nothing in the cause of peace.

October 19th the Prince Consort wrote to Stockmar:

"The Palmerston<sup>ian</sup> stocks have gone up immensely, people saying

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1. Stanmore, Herbert I, pp. 210, 213.

2. Ibid., I, p. 214.

that if he had been at the Foreign Office, he would by his energy have brought Russia to reason." (1)

On October 21st the Prince Consort wrote a memorandum for the consideration of the Cabinet, which concluded with the statement that if England and France had such a strong interest in keeping Turkish territory out of the hands of Russia as to go to war for that purpose, the war ought to be carried on unshackled by obligations to the Porte, and "will probably lead in the peace which must be the object of that war, to the obtaining of arrangements more consonant with the well understood interests of Europe, of Christianity, liberty, and civilization than the reimposition of the ignorant barbarian and despotic yoke of the Mussulman over the most fertile and favored portion of Europe." (2)

Aberdeen, Clarendon, Graham, and Russell agreed with the Prince. Lord Palmerston held the opinion that we are bound by our own interests to defend Turkey." .... A reconstruction of Turkey means neither more nor less than its subjection to Russia .... we must help Turkey out of her difficulties by negotiation if possible; .... if negotiation fails, we must, by force of arms, carry her safely through her dangers." (3) Perhaps Palmerston, remembering the past, was glad to pick flaws in His Highness' ideas about foreign policy. At any rate, he has taken just the position most likely to be popular at this time;--here is a man who does not fear to differ from royalty,--and

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1. Martin, Prince Consort, II, p. 425.
  2. Ibid., II, p. 427.
  3. Ashley, Palmerston, II, p. 287.



"Germanism."

The Prince tells Baron Stockmar 19 Oct. that England's relations with France have settled into an entente cordiale. (1) Somewhat later (November 27) the Prince tells the same friend; "Louis Napoleon shows by far the greatest statesmanship, which is easier for the individual than for the many; he is moderate, but firm; gives way to us even when his plan is better than ours, and revels in the enjoyment of the advantages he derives from the alliance with us." (2) This state of affairs is exactly what Aberdeen had wished to avoid. (See page 34. )

There was at this time some talk about holding another conference. Palmerston agrees with Lord John in his objections to Vienna and speaks of the "political miasma" of the place. "A Vienna Conference means Buol, and Buol means Meyendorff, and Meyendorff means Nicholas; and the Turks know this and so does all Europe." Palmerston also agrees with Russell that it is inadvisable to present the note ( See page 55.) to the Turks without leaving any discretion as to alterations. He concludes by saying; " It is indeed doubtful whether the gold and silver age of notes has gone by and whether when the "Fury" gets to Constantinople she will not find the age of brass and iron already begun; but we are quite right to make the attempt." (3) There is no dissent from Cabinet policy here.

Greville makes an interesting entry on November 15th. He says: " Yesterday morning, having met Clarendon on the railway, . . .

1. *Martin, II, p. 425.*

2. *Martin, Prince Consort, II, p. 432 .*

3. *Ashley, Palmerston, II, p. 288.*

I got into the carriage and went home with him. He told me all he had to tell of what he had to go through with the conflicting proposals of Palmerston and Aberdeen in the Cabinet; the latter as averse as ever to any strong measures, and always full of consideration for the Emperor; the former anxious for war, and with the same confidence and rashness which were so conspicuous in him during the Syrian question, insisting that nothing will be so easy as to defeat Russia, and he now goes the length of urging that none of the old treaties between her and the Porte should be renewed. All this "jactance", however, does not go much beyond words, for he evinces no disposition to separate from his colleagues or to insist on any course which the majority of the Cabinet object to."(1) Here is additional proof of the statements of Argyll and Gladstone. Palmerston does not insist on any course "which the majority of the Cabinet object to."

Greville also tells an interesting little anecdote (Nov. 27) which will give an idea of Aberdeen's general attitude in these recent Cabinet meetings, as well as that of Palmerston and John Russell; "I brought Clarendon from the station to Downing Street .... He said nothing could exceed the difficulties of the case .... Then at home the difficulty is just as great between Palmerston, who is all for going ahead, and wants nothing less than war with Russia, and Aberdeen, who is in the other extreme--objecting to everything, and proposing nothing. John Russell is very reasonable, and agrees almost entirely with Clarendon; but whenever he thinks he is going to be outbid by Palmerston, is disposed to urge some violent measures also. He said he had a regular scene with Aberdeen the other

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1. Greville, Journal, III, p. 90.

day. After this (Note (or whatever it was) had been discussed and agreed to in the Cabinet, and all settled Aberdeen came into the room, and began finding fault with it and raising all sorts of objections, when Clarendon, out of all patience, broke out: 'Really, this is too bad. You come now, after it has all been settled in the Cabinet where you let it pass, and make all sorts of objections. And this is the way you do about everything; you object to all that is proposed and you never suggest anything yourself. What is it you want? Will you say what you would have done?' .... Aberdeen had nothing to say and knocked under." (1) Aberdeen evidently yields and makes concessions which are against his better judgment and wails about it afterward. Paul has stated that Aberdeen would have defied Palmerston and all in the Cabinet who wished for war. Undoubtedly Aberdeen cared less for public opinion than did most of the Cabinet members but he cared a little. October 14th Lady Clarendon writes in her journal; "Then Lord Aberdeen .... had been with George as usual; when various people were waiting for audiences of George as usual, he would go over old blue-books, finding out mistakes and dangers in everything; till George quite lost patience with him too." (2)

The next attempt to bring about a peaceful settlement was in the shape of a protocol (which was signed December 5th; Herbert writes hopefully to Gladstone (Nov. 29):

"On Saturday last we took a real and good step in the Cabinet by agreeing to the French protocol stating that, whatever be the result of the war between Russia and Turkey, we cannot allow the territorial conscription and 'l'état de possession que le temps a consac-

1. Greville, Journal, III, p. 93.

2. Maxwell, II, p. 26.



cré en l'Orient' to be altered ... it defines the limit and cause of our interference ,namely the preservation of the status quo and it tells the belligerents plainly that they are fighting for nothing,which may cool their ardor. If Austria and Prussia sign this it will be an immense coup and will so mark the isolation of the Emperor that it must have an effect on him."(1)

But alas! The news of Sinope (Nov.30) was soon on its way to England and the day of notes and protocols was over. When the news reached England (Dec.10),Palmerston stated his opinions in a letter to Aberdeen. There is no doubt that Palmerston's demands are considerably wider in scope. One might say that they keep about even with the rising war-fever.

Palmerston states the objects of the war as twofold;"the one to put an end to the present war between these two Powers,the other, to prevent,as far as diplomatic arrangements can do so,a recurrence of similar differences,and,through these differences renewed dangers to the peace of Europe." He recommends,what he proposed before namely;" that the Russian government and Russian admiral at Sebastopol be informed that so long as Russian troops occupy the principalities,or hold a position in any part of the Turkish territory,no Russian ships-of-war can be allowed to show themselves out of port in the Black Sea." He suggests that the treaty to be concluded between Russia and Turkey should be an ordinary treaty of peace and friendship,of boundaries,commerce,and mutual protection of the subjects of one party within the territories of the other,and "that all

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1. Stanmore,Herbert,I,p.215.

the stipulations which might be required for the privileges of the Principalities and of Serbia...should be contained in a treaty between the Sultan and the Five Powers."(1)

Aberdeen replied that he was not prepared to adopt the mode which Lord Palmerston thought most likely to restore peace; that he should prefer an open declaration of war instead; that as the union of the Four Powers (See page 60.) had just been effected with the declaration that the integrity of the Turkish Empire was an object of general interest, it was to be presumed that they would take the measures to secure it."(2)

December 16th Lord Palmerston resigned. Ashley says that Palmerston resigned because he saw that the people would never forgive the Cabinet for not demanding more strenuous measures after Sinope, and Palmerston saw no way to bring them about. But Palmerston used the Reform Bill which was broached by John Russell on 12 November as a pretext.

Some months before when Parliament prorogued (August 20, 53), and there was a good prospect of settling the Eastern Question, Lord Aberdeen had decided to retire in favor of Lord John, according to an "expressed intention"(3) of Aberdeen's when the Cabinet was formed. Lord Aberdeen declared his intentions to Lord John at the time mentioned above but said that he would not retire without the assent of his colleagues. Lord John believed that if he could introduce his reform bill as Premier he would have a better chance of carrying it through.(4) Lord Aberdeen found that his retirement

1. Ashley, Palmerston, II, P. 289.
2. Ibid., II, p. 290.
3. Walpole, Russell, II, p. 164.
4. Martin, Prince Consort, II, p. 422.

would lead to a break-up of the Cabinet as no one was anxious for Lord John's leadership. When the bill was introduced in the Cabinet it encountered little opposition as the members did not wish Lord John to break up the Government. Greville (Nov.27) says that, "Palmerston has written a letter to Lord John ... denouncing the measures as unnecessary and unwise .... Then after criticising <sup>the Bill,...</sup> he ends by announcing that he shall consent to it." (1) December 12th Greville informs us that Palmerston was meditating mischief:--"This morning the Duke of Bedford came here and told me he had called on Clarendon on Saturday, when he said to Clarendon that he was very uneasy about Palmerston, and thought he was meditating something though he did not know exactly what he was at. Clarendon interrupted him, ---'Certainly, he is meditating breaking up the Government; in fact he told me so.'" (2) The Prince Consort says that Lord John's Reform Bill was the real cause of Palmerston's retirement, --that Lord Palmerston hoped Lansdowne would go out with him and that the "Ministry would be blown into the air." (3) Greville's entry for December 17th gives Clarendon's account of the affair: "He (Clarendon) had been quite prepared for it, Palmerston having told him that he could not take this Bill. Clarendon says Palmerston behaved perfectly well, and in a very straightforward way from first to last. When he was invited to join the Government, he told Aberdeen and Lansdowne that he was afraid the Reform Bill would bring about ano-

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1. Greville, Journal, III, pp. 92, 93.
  2. Ibid., III, p. 95.
  3. Martin, Prince Consort, II, p. 433.



ther separation between them. "Then Clarendon makes substantially the same statements which Palmerston himself makes in a letter written to his brother-in-law, the Right Honorable Laurence Sullivan (December 19):(1)

"The state of the matter is plain and simple. I told Aberdeen and Lansdowne last year when I joined the Government that I felt great doubts as to my being able to concur in the plan of Parliamentary reform which John Russell might propose this year.

The other day I was put on the Committee of the Cabinet to prepare the plan. I stated my objections. I restated them verbally in the Committee and stated them again to the Cabinet....I stated them in a private interview afterwards to Aberdeen. I stated them afterwards to him in writing. In reply to that communication I was first told by him that he would communicate with the Queen and his colleagues. He then afterwards wrote me word that he had communicated with John Russell and Graham; that they said my objections were inadmissible. I had then nothing left for it but to resign.

The "Times" says there has been no difference in the Cabinet about Eastern affairs. That is an untruth; but I felt that it would have been silly to have gone out because I could not have my own way about Turkish affairs, seeing that my presence in the Cabinet did good by modifying the views of those I thought bad."(2)

But Greville's entry for December 21st gives a different im-

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1. Greville, Journal, III, p. 96.
  2. Ashley, Palmerston, II, pp. <sup>269</sup>270, 271.

pression ;"Delane went to Aberdeen and asked him for his version of the affair,when he said at once that he had no hesitation in saying that the Eastern Question was the cause and the sole cause of Palmerston's resignation;that he had all along been opposing what was done,and might have resigned upon it any time for months past,and that but for that question he would have swallowed the Reform Bill. Delane observed that if this was true Palmerston had acted a very highminded and disinterested part." Greville then says" ... but still I am struck with the fact of his having refrained from resigning on the Eastern Question,when by doing so,he might have damaged the Government immensely and obtained for himself increased popularity and considerable power if these were his objects."(1) Here Aberdeen is either putting off Delane by making a few statements which Delane afterward repeated to Greville in the form mentioned,or perhaps Aberdeen's mind is so filled with the Eastern Question that he remembers only the great difference between the line of action suggested by Palmerston's notes and by his motions in the Cabinet,and the policy followed by the Cabinet as a whole under the leadership of Aberdeen.

Lady Clarendon's Journal (Dec.20,1853) probably gets to the heart of the matter. Palmerston had written to Aberdeen stating his objections;Aberdeen answered that he had communicated with John Russell and Sir James Graham and they had decided that Palmerston's objections were inadmissable. With regard to this matter Lady Clarendon says;"I called upon Lady Palmerston to express our great regret at Lord P's resigning ... she gave me an account

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1. Greville,Journal,III,p.99.

of how, upon the receipt of Lord Aberdeen's letter... Lord Palmerston had expressed to her his notion that Lord Aberdeen wished him to resign .... In short, he felt the letter was so abrupt, and worded in such a manner, that he thought it best to resign." (1) Greville says that Palmerston sent in his resignation in a letter described to be brief and peremptory in its tone; "All these letters were wrong and none of them ought to have been written. I see they (his colleagues or some of them) think Palmerston never really had any intention of quitting his post, but more suo tried to bully a little, not without hopes that he might frighten them into some concessions on the Reform Bill, and meaning if he failed to knock under, as he has so often done upon other occasions." (2) The truth apparently lies very close to these last statements. Palmerston's wishes concerning reform being ignored and answered in a manner most inconsiderate of Lord Palmerston's dignity and importance, it behooved Lord Palmerston, who had Irish blood in his veins, to "show" the Cabinet what a big man they were ignoring. He knew, no doubt, that his resignation would be credited to the Eastern Question, a fact which incidentally, just at this stage of affairs, would serve to increase his popularity. The coup would place the Government in a critical position, at least. When the Government did not break up as Lord Palmerston had hoped, he was glad to return. He did not leave the Whigs when dismissed by John Russell in '51 because he had seen over twenty years of service with them, and he was not going to waste all

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1. Maxwell, Clarendon, II, p. 36.
  2. Greville, Journal, III, p. 104.



that precious time and leave the whole field to Lord John in the bargain. Meanwhile, how did the Cabinet carry on in Lord Palmerston's brief absence?

December 18th Clarendon writes to Lady Clarendon. "Cabinet harmonious--regretting P's resignation, but not appearing much alarmed at it. His absence seemed to make J.R. more reasonable on Eastern affairs." (1) Greville here makes the following statement (Dec. 24); "Granville thinks Palmerston has no racune<sup>n</sup> against Aberdeen, but a good deal against John Russell." (2) Since Lord John, as we have seen, was undoubtedly the more warlike of the two, it would seem that the chief element of discord in the Cabinet is not the Eastern Question, a fact affirmed by Argyll and Gladstone, but the presence in the Cabinet of two rivals for Whig supremacy, one of whom, John Russell, tried to trip up the Premier first on the Eastern Question, then on Reform, in order that he might supplant him; the other, Palmerston, watching every opportunity to checkmate Russell, perhaps giving in on the Eastern Question for this very reason.

On December 22nd the Cabinet decided to send the squadrons to the Black Sea. Aberdeen informs Palmerston of this decision in the following note: "I am glad to find that you approve of a recent decision of the Cabinet with respect to the British and French fleets adopted in your absence. I feel sure you will have learnt with pleasure that, whether you are absent or present, the Government are duly careful to preserve from all injury the interests and dignity

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1. Maxwell, Clarendon, II, p. 31.
2. Greville, Journal, III, p. 102.

of the country."(1) Certainly this is not a divided Cabinet. It is a Cabinet with the "war-at-any-price" member left out, agreeing nevertheless, on a policy which will satisfy public opinion. Even if Palmerston had not returned, which he did on December 26th, there is every reason to suppose that a more active policy would have been followed. Clarendon wrote to Lord Cowley, December 16th; "You will have heard before this of Palmerston's resignation .... but it has nothing to do with the Eastern Question, though we may swear that till we are black in the face and no one will believe either at home or abroad .... I am afraid our difficulties abroad will be increased by the notion that there will now be a change in our policy, and that we shall be more disposed than hitherto to tolerate Russian encroachment on Turkey or Russian insolence to England. This shall not be the case, however, so long as I am a member of the government, and you may assure Drouyn of it in the strongest terms .... Princess Lieven (2) will, of course, be very full of the event, and, I suppose, very glad of it. I wish you would call upon her and prevent her writing to St. Petersburg that Palmerston's resignation is a letter of licence to the Czar, or that there will be any change of policy here or less union with France."(3) This is perhaps the first reason why the decision about the fleets was adopted during Palmerston's absence.

1. Ashley, Palmerston, II, p. 291.

2. Princess Lieven was a Russian lady, who lived in Paris, and, according to Greville had an insatiable curiosity for political information which she was said to impart to the Imperial Court of Russia. Greville, Journal, III, p. 339.

3. Maxwell, Clarendon, II, p. 35.

A few more extracts and the series is completed. January 2nd, Lord Clarendon wrote to Lady Clarendon; "I have a bellicose letter from Lord John, assuming that the terms of the Porte are what we know them to be and proposing that the Emperor should have only seven days for accepting or refusing them. J.R. secretes something of this kind, daily now; however, for my part, I am getting in favor of war. Of course, a patch-up would be the least troublesome thing now; but I believe that it would only be playing the Emperor's game and allowing him to make monster preparations for monster objects." (1)

On February 16, Lord Clarendon, in answer to Clanricarde's question, "If we are at peace, what is the peace? And what is the peace that is the object of the war?" described very accurately England's position: "We are not at war because war has not been declared; we are not strictly at peace with Russia .... I consider that we are in the intermediate state; that our desire for peace is just as sincere as ever; but then I must say that our hopes of maintaining it are gradually dwindling away, and that we are drifting towards war." (2)

On February 12 Aberdeen had written to Clarendon; "I still say that war is not inevitable; unless, indeed, we are determined to have it; which perhaps, for all I know, may be the case." Aberdeen should know by this time that "we", the "country", are determined to have war. Therefore, let the stage be set for the Crimean tragedy.

1. Maxwell, Clarendon, II, pp. 36--37.

2. Ibid., II, p. 40.



## CHAPTER II.

## Attitude of Leaders of English Policy outside of the Ministry.

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Hansard's Parliamentary Debates for the years 1850--54 inclusive, show very little discussion of the Russo-Turkish problem until the late summer of 1853. Lord Derby, leader of the Conservatives, led the Opposition in the House of Lords,--Mr. Disraeli, that of the House of Commons. Mr. Cobden and Mr. Bright represented the constituencies of West Riding and Manchester respectively, and in the beginning, found themselves supporting the Government in its efforts to arrive at a peaceful solution of the Eastern problem. The Marquis of Clanricarde in the House of Lords, and Mr. Layard in the House of Commons initiated and took an important part in the debates on Turkish affairs.

At first the Opposition contented itself with asking questions which might elicit some information on Government policy and succeeded in finding out very little beyond the fact that negotiations were still in progress. For example, the Marquis of Clanricarde asks the nature of Menshikov's mission (April 25, 1853.) (1) The Earl of Clarendon assures him that the Czar has answered all the Government's questions with regard to this matter and assures the House that the Czar will not break his word. (2) Mr. Disraeli concentrates his attention on the fleet,--its whereabouts and the orders given to the admirals. Lord John Russell declines to answer his questions. (3) On June 13, Mr. Layard, Mr. Disraeli, and the Marquis of

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1. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 126, p. 371.
  2. Ibid., 126, p. 378.
  3. Ibid., 127, p. 787.

Clanricarde make inquiries concerning an article in the "Moniteur", the French official paper, which stated that the French and English fleets had been ordered to the mouth of the Dardanelles and that the admirals were to receive instructions from their respective ambassadors. The Opposition is pleased to learn that the report is true. (1) By July 12, there were more persistent queries concerning Nesselrode's note, which asserted that Russia would not abandon the Danubian principalities until England and France withdrew their fleets from Turkish waters. (2) From this time forward inquiries are more numerous and complaints are made of the complete mystery which "involves the opinions, policy, and proceedings of this country;" the governments of France and Russia give the utmost publicity to their policy and proceeding while the English Parliament has no definite information whatever. (3) On August 2nd, there are demands for the immediate evacuation of the Danubian principalities. (4) The next time the Eastern Question is debated (August 12) Clanricarde asserts that England's trade with Turkey is two-thirds better and more important than that with Russia; without an independent Turkey England could not keep her hold on India; Turkey is not in a state of decay, -- her policy toward foreigners is improving and the noble marquis knows of no country so liberal to all religious denominations. (5) The Earl of Malmesbury bewails the fact that the English fleet did not go with the French

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1. Hansard, Vol. 128, pp. 1, 57.
  2. Ibid., 129, p. 90.
  3. Ibid., 129, pp. 347, 1424.
  4. Ibid., 129, pp. 1419, 1425.
  5. Ibid., pp. 1617, 1618. (Speech of Clanricarde.)

fleet when Colonel Rose sent for it,--thereby giving <sup>the Gov</sup>Russia the impression that the fleets were working separately. Malmsbury does not think the Government has acted wisely;"...when the Russian army crossed the Pruth,the moment had arrived to go a step further and to give instructions to the allied fleets to enter the Dardanelles. In my opinion,the crossing the river was a casus belli,and I consider that Her Majesty's Government did not act wisely in not issuing such instructions for .... I firmly believe that had the fleets entered the Dardanelles we should be in a more advantageous position than we are at present."(1) From this time forward we hear the same idea expressed again and again in both houses of Parliament. Mr.Layard,the famous excavator of Niniveh,strikes a popular variation of this popular theme when he regrets that the Prime Minister's policy is essentially based on peace;"Why have we heard on all sides during the recent alarm in the lobby of this House,in private circles,amongst men of all opinions,---'Had the noble Lord the member for Tiverton(Palmerston) been at the Foreign Office we should not have been in these straits?' Was it because the country wanted war? No,sir;it was because the country was convinced that the best means of preserving peace was to assume at once a firm and dignified attitude;to let the world know that however anxious England might be for peace,she was prepared for war, if unfortunately she should be called to go to war in support of our own rights,or of those rights which she was bound by treaty to defend,or upon

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1. Hansard,Vol.129,pp1613, 1622.



which depended the balance of power in Europe." (1) Later (August 16.) Mr. Layard declares that the power at Constantinople will be the dominating power of the world; if Russia should be that power, England's hold on India would never be more than a pure military tenure; the crossing of the Pruth should have been made a casus belli and the fleets should have been sent to Constantinople. Layard then criticises Aberdeen's policy during the Serbian uprising of 1843,-- Aberdeen had then stated that Russia had the right to put the construction on her own treaties; England had taken the place of a second-rate power and conceded that of a first rate power to Russia alone. (2) Here is the gist of the nationalistic argument which later on, (February 17) as expressed by the same gentleman, characterizes Sinope (3) "not merely an attack on Turkey but an attack on the honor of England." There is no doubt that Mr. Layard was in a position to exercise considerable influence on public opinion. "The London Examiner" of August 20th makes the following comment: "Mr. Layard, whose long experience in the East and intimate acquaintance with the Christian provinces of Turkey render his opinion on this subject of high value declared his conviction that the Russian troops would speedily withdraw from the principalities inasmuch as the Emperor had obtained everything which at present he desires." (4) <sup>i.e.,</sup> (Through the Vienna Note.) Greville says that Layard was a bitter

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1. Hansard, Vol. 129, p. 1770. (Aug. 16.)
  2. Ibid., pp. 1776, 1773, 1777, 1780.
  3. Ibid., 130, p. 846.
  4. Littell's Living Age, "Debate in the House of Commons," Vol. 39, p. 57.

enemy of Aberdeen,(1)and that Disraeli urged Layard to persevere in his policy of bringing on debates concerning Russo-Turkish affairs, while Derby recommended Clanricarde to give it up.(2) All these factors, together with Mr. Layard's open approval of Lord Palmerston, conspire to make the honorable member for Aylesbury play a considerable part in stirring up public opinion against the Government in general and Aberdeen in particular, to the great detriment of a peaceful solution of the Eastern problem. Moreover, he is the first to speak openly of making the country ready for war.(3)

Richard Cobden, the member for West Riding, refused to take a stand for the preservation of Mohammedanism in Europe where the majority of the people are Christian; he disapproved of the Government policy in sending the fleet to Besika Bay, thus keeping up the expense of armaments and encouraging the Turk to prepare for war. Mr. Cobden did not believe that Russia on the Bosphorus would be a danger. He commended the Government for its efforts to arrive at a peaceful solution of the problem and warned the House that the shallow people who were then calling for war, would, in less than six weeks, demand the disgrace of the Ministers who began it. Then indulging in a bit of mild sarcasm, Mr. Cobden congratulated the Ministry on having been as peaceful as the people would allow them to be.(4)

Meanwhile word was received that the Czar had accepted the

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1. Greville, Journal, III, pp. 145.
2. Ibid., III, p. 63.
3. Hansard, Vol. 129, p. 1770.
4. Ibid., Vol. 129, p. 1798.

Vienna Note . The diplomats rejoiced because there was good reason to believe that the Russo-Turkish problem was nearing a peaceful solution.

From the time that Parliament prorogued (August 20, 1853) until it reopened (January 31, 1854) various events occurred which diverted the current of public opinion into the maelstrom of war. The Turks refused to sign the Vienna Note. On October 18, 1853 the Turkish Divan met to declare war against Russia, without formally consulting either France or England; (1) the "massacre" of Sinope occurred on November 30; Lord Palmerston resigned on December 15 shortly after the news of Sinope reached London, and public opinion interpreted his resignation as proof positive that he and Aberdeen were at variance on the Eastern Question. When Parliament reopened the Opposition was ready with all the popular objections to Government policy: the vacillating and inconsistent policy of the Government and the erroneous impressions given to Russia in consequence,-- England would not go to war, England would not form an Anglo-French alliance; the different situation which would have prevailed had a firmer policy been adopted; admiration of French policy during the period and invidious comparisons with that of England; Russia, the despot whose iron heel had crushed out all liberal institutions; the spirit of moderation, sagacity, and firmness displayed by the Turk; the toleration and valor of the Turk,-- that "valor as strong now in the bosom of the Osmanlis as when they twice thundered at the gate of Vienna." (2) Of course, the Vienna Note is pounced upon by

1. Paul, History of England, I, pp. 319--20.

2. Hansard, Vol. 130, p. 873. (Speech of Viscount Jocelyn.)



Derby, Disraeli, and Clanricarde. Derby finds fault because the proposition was made to one of the parties, (Russia) without the knowledge of the other, when it should have been imposed on both alike; Disraeli sees no difference between the Note and the Menshikov ultimatum; Clanricarde holds that a note, made out in Vienna where M. de Meyendorff, the ablest diplomat in Europe, was present on the Russian side might as well have been made out by the Russian chancellorie (1) Still one may easily discern evidences of cautious handling and avoidance of carping criticism on the part of Derby and Disraeli, coupled with pledges of patriotic support in assisting the Government to carry on the war. Perhaps such newspaper items as the following, taken from "The Economist" of January 14th may help to account for this modified Opposition: "We do not know if there really be, as is rumored, any section of British statesmen or Senators rash enough or mean enough to endeavor to make 'political capital' out of the crisis, and, for the sake of party purposes and with the selfish aim of preparing their own backward path to office .... 'If England does not love Coalitions,' (2) assuredly she loves unpatriotic and dangerous intrigues still less.... An Opposition now ... would have to make good their case against Ministers notoriously inclined to peace on the highest grounds of policy and morality, friends to freedom, rigid economists, and stainless in their public, as in their personal honor. And the motive for the ill-timed assault would be too obvious to escape detection, ... a keen-sighted and scandalized pub-

1. Hansard, Vol. 130, pp. 65, 162, 30.

2. Disraeli's statement. Money Penny & Buckle, Disraeli, III, p. 447.

lic would tear off the thin disguise... unmask the insidious assailants, and dismiss them to their earned reward. In the midst of a war only disloyalty could create disunion."(1)

The Marquis of Clanricarde initiated the attack of the Opposition in the House of Lords. His appeal was made to the Nationalist type of Englishman; "No object is held out by the Government as that for which we are striving except the preservation of peace; not one word is said about maintaining the honor or character of this country of of fulfilling its engagements...." Those of your Lordships, who have visited the Continent ... cannot but have perceived that the people of Europe have conceived a very low opinion of English character and conduct as exhibited in these affairs." Then the Marquis attacks the Government through an appeal to the middle-class interests of the country: trade has been checked, commerce injured; speculation throughout the country stagnated; the financial operations of the Finance Minister of the country have been impeded by the state of things in the East. Then reverting to his nationalistic argument the Marquis says that "the massacre of Sinope was an eternal disgrace to this country."(2)

The Earl of Derby began his speech with a few leading questions; "Are we belligerents? Are we partisans? Are we carrying on war openly and boldly or are we carrying on that which is tantamount to war, but a war carried on in a pettifogging manner, and, I might almost say, in a manner discreditable to this country." Of course Derby must express some of the prevailing sentiment against

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1. Littell's Living Age, "Duties of the People in the Event of War," Vol. 40, p. 432.
  2. Hansard, Vol. 130, p. 19. (Speech of Clanricarde.)

Aberdeen;"The noble Earl appears to have acted as if he had some unknown clog around his neck, some unacknowledged obligation--some personal spell upon him by which he was debarred from taking that course which if he had taken it firmly, temperately, but vigorously, I believe we would have escaped from the unfortunate state of things which we now lament." Derby uses the Nationalist argument,---"It is impossible consistently with the honor and character of England that Russia should be allowed to advance." Derby cannot but look on the whole course of Government proceedings as "the natural fruit of that extraordinary fusion or confusion of political opinions of which Her Majesty's Government is composed." In conclusion Derby hopes that whatever may be the difference of political opinions there will be none "as to our cordial concurrence in seeking the best mode of extricating our country from her position with honor to her arms and with honor to the character she bears among nations." (1)

Mr. Disraeli attacked the Government policy as exemplified in the project of the Vienna Note, a plan which Her Majesty's Government sanctioned six months ago but would not sanction now; when the Government speaks of negotiations still proceeding they should tell Parliament that the negotiations are not in the spirit of the Vienna Note, which, six months before, the Foreign Secretary (Clarendon) had not regarded as derogatory to the interests of the Porte. Mr. Disraeli is gratified at the cordial relations with France, and wished to be assured that England was in co-operation with the other powers as well. He opposes a Reform Bill at this time when the en-

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1. Hansard, Vol. 130, p. 65.



ergies of the country should be concentrated on war, and asks why the bill was not brought in during the preceding year when there was no danger of invasion. Still he asserts, that the Government has no excuse for evading Parliamentary reform. (1) Perhaps we may get a clue to this seemingly inconsistent speech by noting an extract from a letter written to Lord Henry Lennox, March 14, 1854; "The 'Hounds' are damaged daily; but I don't see the turning of the lane yet. If Johnney can be kept to Reform, it is all up with them: but that seems a poor chance ...." (2) Later on, (Feb. 20, 1854) Disraeli maintained that the vacillating course pursued by the Government must be credited either to credulity or connivance; if to credulity in believing Russia's assurances, the war might be long and severe but might be of some benefit, such as restoring Bessarabia to the Porte, making the Crimea independent under the protection of the Great Powers, the Danube a free river, and the Euxine a free sea. But if the vacillating policy of the Ministry had been motivated by connivance with the idea of bringing to an end the independence of Turkey, the war would be proportionally timid and vacillating and would end with some such transaction as the Vienna Note. (3) But of course Mr. Disraeli will give his support to this "just but unnecessary war," (4) -- "We shall remember what we believe to be our duty to the country." (5) On March 31, 1854, after war had been declared Mr. Disraeli fixed the responsibility for the war on Aberdeen who, he said, had not been able to act freely because of the understanding with the Czar in 1844. (6) . This accusation is very mild when compared with the

1. Hansard, Vol. 130, p. 162.

2. Money Penny and Buckle, Life of Benjamin Disraeli, (New York, 1914)

III, p. 536.

3. Ibid., III, pp. 536--37.

5. Ibid., III, p. 537.

4. Ibid., III, p. 539.

6. Ibid., III, p. 538.

scathing criticisms directed at Aberdeen through Mr. Disraeli's paper, the "Press." Mr. Buckle says that there is every probability that the accusations were written by Disraeli's own hand. (1) We shall quote a few of them; May 21:--"Lord Aberdeen seems paralyzed with the responsibility of action, and Lord Clarendon only whimpers and wrings his hands.... The curse of "antiquated imbecility" has fallen, in all its fulness, on Lord Aberdeen." (2) Nov. 26:--"Lord Aberdeen has precipitated the convulsion, and is, at the same time, alike unfit and unprepared to control the storm." (3) Dec. 16:--"He will betray the honor and the interests of our country --it is the law of his nature and the destiny of his life." (4) Nevertheless, Mr. Disraeli justifies British opposition to Russian encroachments; "We oppose the policy of Russia, because, if she succeeds in getting possession of Constantinople, we believe she will exercise such a preponderating influence on European politics as would be fatal to the civilization of Europe, and injurious to the best interests of England." (5) This is the popular argument of the "balance of power". Apparently, Mr. Disraeli aims at making trouble for the Ministry with an eye to forming a combination with the supposedly disgruntled Palmerston, in case of the dissolution of the Government, --while keeping in with the country by opposing the unpopular Ministerial policy and pledging his patriotic support to the "just but unnecessary war."

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1. Money Penny and Buckle, Disraeli, III, p. 525.
  2. Ibid., III, p. 521.
  - 3 & 4. Ibid., III, p. 525.
  5. Ibid., III, p. 539.

The opposition has taken its cue and shows itself more warlike than ever the so-called war-favoring section of the Cabinet dared to be.

Mr. Bright and Mr. Cobden found themselves on the unpopular side because they believed in non-intervention where England's interests did not hang in the balance and openly opposed the war demanded by the public opinion. They appealed principally to the manufacturing and commercial interests, but Mr. Bright made a strong appeal to the landed interests as well. On February 20, Mr. Cobden says; "It comes then to this ---that we are to go to war and deluge Europe with blood because Turkey refuses to do by a note to Russia that which she is going to do for the Four Powers of Europe. That is the whole difference... for which Europe is to be plunged into war. Was there ever such an infinitesimal ground of national quarrel as this ?" Mr. Cobden then enumerates the valuable articles imported from Russia, ---valuable not only to the manufacturers but to the landed interests as well; England imports tallow from Russia to the value of 1,300,000£ ;" How would your locomotives travel without tallow? How would your mechanic carry on his operations if he did not grease his wheels? (A laugh) .... We import linseed oil to the value of 1,300,000£ per annum from Russia. No class in this country have so great an interest in the importation of linseed-oil as the agriculturists who are always complaining about the high price of food for cattle. Surely they do not want our supply of linseed oil cut off. To turn to the district I represent myself---there can be no doubt that if you stop our trade with Russia, you will inflict great misery and hardship on some parts of the West Riding of Yorkshire and I am informed that the



manufacturers of Sheffield would find it impracticable to carry on business as far as the finest quality of articles is concerned, if they were deprived of a supply of Russian iron." Mr. Cobden then gives figures to show that the Russian trade is three times as important as that of Turkey. "There is no one foreign country whose trade is as important to us as Russia excepting the United States and it is well to remember that all the carrying trade between our ports and Russia is in our own hands." In conclusion Mr. Cobden asks a few pertinent questions: "How are you going to carry on this war if you get into it? What is the war? For what are we going to fight?.... And is England the only country which is going to fight the battle?..The noble Lord (Lord John Russell) talked the other night of united Europe resisting the encroachments of Russia. But when he came to explain, it turned out that he did not mean Europe at all, the fact being that all the great countries of Europe with the exception of England and France are remaining neutral." The speaker calls attention to the fact that England's position on the map of Europe gives her the least interest in the Eastern Question as England is an island, and has nothing to fear from the aggressions of Russia if commerce flourishes<sup>as</sup> now; he scores the "mad policy" of sending troops such a distance. Then comes an open avowal of opposition to the war; "I would withdraw the promise of material assistance to Turkey unless she signed that Declaration (The Vienna Note)....I take upon myself all the unpopularity of opposing this war and I would not give a six months purchase for the popularity of any gentleman in this House or out of it who will vote for it."(1)

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1. Hansard, Vol. 130, p. 917.

Mr. Bright gave the first of his Crimean speeches on March 31, after war had been declared. He rose to answer Mr. Layard, who justified the Opposition attacks on Ministerial policy by their results; these attacks had shown that "there has been but one feeling in England and . . . Ministers have been compelled to adopt, however tardily, the only policy worthy of the nation. No Minister could oppose the popular feeling on the subject, and with the exception of a small section in this House, we have one united feeling on the subject. If compromises should be proposed that would be unworthy of the dignity and character of the country, there is public opinion and there are statesmen that are able to resist all these attempts and to carry the country triumphantly to the position in which it should be placed." (1) Evidently, the joy of being approved by public opinion has gone to the head of the honorable gentleman, depriving him of that common sense which he ordinarily possesses. Mr. Layard glories in the victory won by popular feeling. Not so Mr. Bright, who argues that when the question of war is being deliberated it is necessary to show that the objects for which the war was undertaken were at least possible of attainment, -- and the end proposed worth the cost and the sacrifices about to be incurred; Turkey is falling to decay; to pledge ourselves to effect its recovery and sustentation is to undertake what no human power will be able to accomplish. Mr. Bright blames Stratford de Redcliffe for having encouraged the Porte to make no concessions to Russia: "I defy anyone to read the despatches of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe without coming to the conclusion that from the beginning to the end of the negotia-

1. Hansard, Vol. 132, pp. 242, 243.

tions the English ambassador had insisted in the strongest manner that Turkey should refuse to make the slightest concession on the real point at issue in the demands of the Russian government....I differ very much from those Gentlemen who condemn the Government for the tardy nature of their proceedings....I believe and indeed I know that they committed themselves and the country to a policy which left the issue of peace or war in other hands than their own--- namely, in the hands of the Turks.....In my opinion, the original blunder was committed when the Turks were advised to resist and not concede; and the second blunder was made when the Turks were supported in their rejection of the Vienna Note; the "balance of power" is a "hackneyed term" and difficult to define; peace will never be secure if this phrase can be used as an argument for war. He appeals to the interests of the manufacturing and landed classes: "We are not going to fight for tariffs, or for markets for our exports. In 1791 Mr. Grey argued that the imports from Russia (1,000,000 £ sterling) made it undesirable that we should go to war; in 1853 the Russian imports to England were 14,000,000 £ sterling. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has no surplus in the treasury... the income-tax may be doubled but this will not give a double sum because profits will be diminished; real property, lands, and houses must bear the burden of war; the Government cannot reimpose excise duties which have been repealed----or impose import duties... therefore the property tax is the lever or weapon which the proprietors of lands and houses will have to support the integrity and independence of Turkey." Then with respect to the injury done to trade, Mr. Bright says: "The Russian trade is not only at an end but it is made



an offense against the law to deal with any of our customers in Russia; the German trade is most seriously effected by the uncertainty which prevails... the Levant trade is almost extinguished. All property in trade is diminishing in value, whilst its burdens are increasing. The funds have fallen in value to the amount of 120,000,000 £ sterling, and railway property is quoted at 80,000,000 £ less than was the case a year ago.... Alliances are dangerous things. It is an alliance with France that has drawn us into this war. I would not advise alliances with any nation, but I would cultivate amity with all nations." Mr. Bright makes a statement which is the direct antithesis of that made by Mr. Layard; "I am told that the war is popular, and that it is foolish and eccentric to oppose it. I doubt if the war is very popular in this House .... I despise from my heart the man who speaks a word in favor of this war, or of any war which he believes might have been avoided, merely because the press and a portion of the people urge the Government to carry it on." Mr. Bright asserts that the past events of England's history will show that the intervention of England in European wars is not only unnecessary but calamitous; if England seventy years ago had adopted the principle of non-intervention in every case where her interests were not directly or obviously assailed she would have been saved much of the pauperism and brutal crimes which have disgraced the Government and people; perhaps there would have been no Trafalgar or Waterloo but England would have set the high example of a Christian nation, resting its policy on a foundation of Christian morality. (1)

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 1. Hansard, Vol. 132, p. 243.

Mr. Bright is not the type of man who will say, "My country, --right or wrong." He speaks his honest mind believing that the day will come when the people will admit the truth of his words. Shortly after Bright entered a comment on this speech in his journal; "I spoke more than an hour and a half; well listened to and with effect on many members, judging from their warm congratulations when I sat down. From this and other evidence I am satisfied there are many calm thinking men in the House who condemn the war but feel it difficult to oppose it .... Time will show who is right in this war-policy." (1) Greville testifies to the truth of this statement in an entry made on April 2nd; "Nobody ventures <sup>†</sup> to cry out against it (the war) but Bright in the House of Commons, and Grey in the House of Lords, but already I see symptoms of disquietude and alarm. Some of those who were most warlike begin to look grave, and to be more alive to the risks, difficulties, and probably dangers of such a contest. I cannot read the remonstrances and warnings of Bright without going very much along with him...." (2)

Reaction had already set in and other less influential members of Parliament had raised protesting voices. On February 24, Lord Lyttelton said; "I therefore cannot resist the conclusion that the Porte ought to have been advised to accept this ultimatum: and that, if so, the war would have been averted or postponed." (3) Lord Claud Hamilton on March 13, declined taking any responsibility for the war and Mr. Ball also protested against it. (4) But the masses

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1. George Macaulay Trevelyan, The Life of John Bright, (Boston, New York, London, 1913) p. 234.
  2. Greville, Journal, III, pp. 129, 130.
  3. Hansard, Vol. 130, p. 1238.
  4. Ibid., Vol. 131, pp. 728, 740.

were "violent for war"(1) as John Bright expressed it.

The British nation has no lack of men who will lead where-  
soever "the country" wishes to go,---therefore Parliament as a body  
will quickly respond to the emotional foolishness of the masses.

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1. Trevelyan,Bright,p.230.



## CHAPTER III.

## Attitude of Leaders of English Policy outside of Parliament.

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Of those outside of Parliament who were in a position to exercise considerable influence on public opinion from 1850--1854, perhaps the most notable were Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the British ambassador at Constantinople; David Urquhart, who had travelled extensively in the east and was secretary of the embassy, at Constantinople from 1835 to 1837; and John Thadeus Delane, Editor of the London "Times." The influence of Mr. Delane will be estimated in the next chapter which will consider the attitude of the press.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe made his first trip to Constantinople in 1808 as first secretary on an important mission to that city. In 1810 when the British ambassador at Constantinople was transferred to Vienna Lord Stratford was Minister Plenipotentiary until the post was filled. In 1853 he was sent to Constantinople for the fourth time, in order that he might use his experience and skillful diplomacy in settling the dispute about the Holy Places. He was appointed ambassador at St. Petersburg in 1832 but he was persona non grata with the Emperor Nicholas, who refused to receive him. (1) Stratford's friends believed that Nicholas did not want to have an English ambassador who was thoroughly acquainted with the whole policy of Russia towards Turkey. (2) No doubt this incident intensified Stratford's suspicions of Russian policy and had some influence on his attitude in future negotiations. He took an active interest in Russian policy even while he was at the court of

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1. Paul, History of England, I, p. 306.

2. Stanley Lane-Poole, The Life of Stratford Canning, (London 1888),  
& New York. II, p. 21.

Madrid (1833), and warned Palmerston that "The Sultan's acceptance of Russian aid is surely a terrible step towards his dependence upon that Power. Let me entreat you to adopt a regular system at Constantinople in order to counteract that influence, ere it be quite too late. Austria may say what she will, but the object of the Czar is neither more nor less than to take the Porte and Persia into keeping." (1) Another factor which had perhaps more influence than anything else on Stratford's Turkish policy was the habit he had acquired of acting on his own responsibility. Lane-Poole says, "To receive an answer to a request for instructions involved a delay of four months, and by the time the instructions came, the crisis for which they were required would in all probability be past. The minister was thus compelled to act on his own responsibility, and partly in consequence of the distance from home, partly because the Foreign Office chose to leave him unnoticed for nearly the whole of his earliest mission, when he was but a boy-minister, he acquired the habit of acting on his own responsibility to a degree which no modern ambassador could realize." (2) It is also probable that Stratford gained a great influence over the Turks and was jealous of that influence. Greville says (Nov. 10, 1853); "Reeve (3) is just returned from the East having spent some time at Constantinople .... Lord Stratford treated him with great kindness and

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1. Lane-Poole, Stratford Canning, II, p. 31.

2. Ibid., II, p. 56.

3. Reeve was a correspondent for the "Times."

hospitality, and talked to him very openly. He says that Stratford exercised a great but not unlimited influence and control over the Turkish government, and of course is very jealous of the influence he possesses." (1) Stratford mistrusted the attitude of the Aberdeen government; "I feel confident of being right, but seeing the tone and temper of those who prevail in the Cabinet I scarcely know what to expect. If care be not taken our influence here will be cut up for many a day to come." (2) On the other hand there is no doubt that Palmerston and Stratford understood one another thoroughly. Palmerston was most cordial to the ambassador and showed great respect for his opinions on Eastern affairs. When Stratford came back to London in 1832 Palmerston greeted him so enthusiastically that the Minister's heart was filled with joy; "He placed his hand upon my shoulder and to use his own words, said; 'Canning, you are the man.' How could I be otherwise than flattered by so expressive a welcome?" (3) When the northern boundary line of Greece was being decided Palmerston agreed with Stratford; "Volo and Arta is the line, and should be striven for by all possible means." Then after a short discussion of the relative merits of suggested boundary lines he wrote; "But you must be so much better judge of these details from the information which you will have received that it is useless for us here to give you our opinion on them." (4) But when Russia and Austria demanded that Turkey give up the Hungarian refugees, Palmerston was master of the policy pursued. On July 1, 1848 Stratford tried to induce Palmerston to form a friendly alli-

1. Greville, Journal, III, p. 89.

2. Lane-Poole, Canning, II, p. 298. Letter to Lady Stratford, Aug.

3. Ibid., I, p. 518. Memoirs. 26, 1853.

4. Ibid., I, p. 498. Letter from Palmerston, March 7, 1832.



ance with Turkey: "It is evident that in the present unsettled state of Europe the Sultan looks upon England as his sheet anchor in the event of the storm extending to his dominions, and ... considers the opportunity a good one for improving and drawing closer the ties of sympathy which unite the two countries and their respective governments. Your Lordship will, I hope, think it worth while to consider this overture." Lord Palmerston did not deem it wise to rouse the jealousy of the Eastern powers. (1) In 1849 Stratford expected war and wanted the fleet near at hand. He wrote to Palmerston (Feb. 19), " ... the moment is arrived when general understandings, general representations, and general assurances, must be followed up with distinct agreements, positive declarations, and pledges, not to be mistaken, of sympathy and eventual support." But Lord Palmerston did not feel that the time had actually come for a naval demonstration. (2) On October 2, 1849 Palmerston wrote that he intended to propose to the French Government that the English and French fleets should enter the Dardanelles, but made certain suggestions which, under the circumstances, were as good as limitations; "I think it however, much better that the Porte should be advised not to send for the squadron to enter the Dardanelles without real necessity. The example might be turned to bad account by the Russians hereafter; and it would be too much of an open menace, and the way to deal with the Emperor is not to put him on his mettle by open and public menace." (3) A little later (Oct. 6) Palmerston wrote; "The Government here have resolved to support the Sultan

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1. Lane-Poole, Canning, II, pp. 182, 183.
  2. Ibid., II, p. 183.
  3. Ibid., II, p. 198.

at all events; but we must be able to show Parliament that we have used all civility and forbearance, and that if hostilities ensue they have not been brought on by any fault or mistake of ours. There never was such unanimity in England upon a question not directly affecting the interests of England; but that unanimity would cease if we did not play our game with great discretion." (1) This correspondence might be that appertaining to the negotiations previous to the Crimean War with the parts of Aberdeen and Palmerston reversed, Stratford taking the part of Palmerston. But the "country" is not out of hand, Palmerston is monarch in the Foreign Office,-- and Palmerston knows how to manage Stratford de Redcliffe. It may be noted in this connection that the Russian Foreign Office suggested that "if the private correspondence of these two statesmen could be known, it is probable that in it would be found the secret of all this Oriental crisis." (2) Lady Clarendon has the following entry in her diary; Nov. 8, 1853 ".... George (Lord Clarendon) believes that Lord Stratford and Lord Palmerston are in communication together. It is a fact that, some time ago, Lord Palmerston broached a proposition to the Cabinet almost in the words of that now come from Turkey for an offensive and defensive alliance against Russia." (3) Greville makes the following entry for February 9th, 1854; "I find he (Stratford) has been all the time in correspondence with Palmerston, who, we may be sure, has incited him to fan the flame, and encourage the Turks to push matters to extremi-

1. Lane-Poole, Canning, I, p. 199.

2. Ibid., II, p. 231.

3. Maxwell, Clarendon, II, p. 28.

ties . I should like to know what Palmerston would have said when he was at the Foreign Office, if one of his colleagues had corresponded with any one of his Ministers abroad in a sense differing from that in which he himself instructed him." (1) Lane-Poole characterizes the statement from the Russian Foreign Office as wholly false; "Lord Stratford wrote twice to Lord Palmerston in 1853, on insignificant subjects, such as about a traveller who brought an introduction from the Home Secretary. There was no political correspondence between them." (2) Lane-Poole denies the accusation from the Russian Foreign Office on his own authority and certainly there is no correspondence published, but Lady Clarendon's and Greville's statements must be considered. (3) It is probable that Clarendon may have communicated his suspicion to Greville, but there is a good interval of time between November 8th, 1853 and February 9th, 1854, --- when the Blue Books were on inspection, and Greville usually makes explicit statements about information received from Clarendon. Moreover, when one considers Palmerston's methods in carrying out his policies at all hazards, is it not more than probable that, failing in the Cabinet, he influenced the conduct of affairs through Stratford de Redcliffe ?

Stratford de Redcliffe is accused of having obeyed the letter, but not the spirit of Clarendon's injunction that the Porte be urged to sign the unamended Vienna note. It is evident that Clar-

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1. Greville, Journal, III, p. 117.
  2. Lane-Poole, Canning, II, p. 231.
  3. Lane-Poole's Stratford Canning was published in 1888, Maxwell's Clarendon in 1913, and Greville's Journal in 1885. Lane Poole does not mention Greville's statement.



endon and his colleagues, Palmerston perhaps excepted, had no confidence in Stratford's repeated assurances that he had obeyed Clarendon's instructions. We shall note a few extracts from Clarendon's correspondence .

Lord Aberdeen to Lord Clarendon, August 19, 1853.

....I fear Stratford intends to give us some trouble, otherwise he might have acted on the telegraphic despatch, as the other ministers were ready to do. (1)

Aug. 20th....I have prepared the Queen for the possibility of Stratford's resignation....In fact, I think his delay in obeying your instructions... would justify his recall. (2)

Sir James Graham to Clarendon:

Aug. 18....Stratford is hardening himself to resist the proposed Note from Vienna....Notwithstanding, the peremptory order to the contrary he is quite capable of advising the Turk to be refractory. (3)

Lord Clarendon to Lord John Russell.

Aug. 25.--I have felt all along that Stratford would allow of no plan of settlement that did not originate with himself. (4)

Lord Cowley sends some interesting information to Clarendon;

"You must not show me up, but De la Cour, (the French ambassador at Constantinople) in the despatches which Thuvenel showed me says that he has no doubt that Lord Stratford's strange conduct... has had much to do with the attitude taken by the Porte....De la Cour asserts further that, to his "intimés", Lord Stratford uses the most

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1 & 2 . Maxwell, Clarendon, II, p. 17.

3. Ibid., II, p. 16.

4. Ibid., II, p. 16.

violent language, that he disapproves all the proceedings at Vienna, declares war preferable to such a solution, that the position of Turkey was excellent, etc. etc. Then he goes on to say ... that he will resign, that he knows the government of England is not united on this question, and that a change must take place there which will bring into power the friends and supporters of his policy in Turkey.

I think it is fair that you should know this. I wish I could feel that it was quite as fair in me telling it." (1) Judging from this communication Stratford is doing his best to neutralize the policy of the Cabinet, and is even looking forward to its dissolution. We shall now examine Stratford's own statement on the subject.

In a letter written to W. Canning, October 9, 1854, Stratford stated; "The head and front of the offense is that man who has been humbugging Europe, and perhaps at times duping even himself, for the last quarter of a century.... I have done my best for peace--in propria persona where I could with honor and conviction,--as an agent when I did not like the manner of proceeding:--but I have also stuck close to the Question and we now have ample proof from Russia herself that the Turks were right in mistrusting the Vienna Note, and that there is a question worth contending for, as is admitted even by Mr. Reeve, the "Times" writer who is now here and dined with me yesterday." (2) "The Question," Lane-Poole says, "was the Eastern Question taking the form of an attempt of Russia to obtain a recognized ascendancy in Turkey by means of a new hold upon the Greek subjects of the Ottoman Empire." (3) A memorandum written in Lord

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1. Maxwell, Clarendon, II, pp. 18 and 19. (August 29, 1853.)
  2. Lane-Poole, Canning, II, p. 303.
  3. Ibid., II, p. 229.

Stratford's hand will show what were his intentions. "To prevent the proposed protectorate of Russia from being accepted by the Porte. Done. To bring this about in such a manner as may prevent a quarrel. Not done." (1) Therefore we must conclude that Stratford's efforts for peace consisted in getting Stratford's settlement of the "Question" in such a manner that if possible there would be no war. If Stratford's settlement could not be secured without war, then war must come. Lane-Poole says that Stratford's despatches show that he used his official power to the full in support of the instructions of his Government, and that he "scrupulously abstained" from letting his personal opinions transpire. (2) But we have John Bright's opinion of these despatches, (See Page 83.) and Greville had practically the same opinion: He says; "Stratford's despatches are very able but they leave the impression (which we know to be the truth), that he has said and done a great deal more than we are informed of; that he is the real cause of this war, and that he might have prevented it, if he had chosen to do so, I have no doubt whatever." (3) But Stratford knew that the "country" was with him. On March 13, 1854 he wrote to his wife; "With you and the country on my side, I care, under Providence, for nothing else." (4) Perhaps Stratford heard of some of the compliments which were given him in the House of Commons in the latter part of February.

On February 20th, Greville says: "It is disgusting to hear everybody and to see all writers vying with each other in lauda-

1. Lane-Poole, Canning, II, p. 337.

2. Ibid., II, p. 295.

3. Greville, Journal, III, p. 117.

4. Lane-Poole, II, p. 343.



tion of Stratford Canning, who has been the principal cause of the war. They all think that, if he had been sincere in his desire for peace, and for an accommodation with Russia, he might have accomplished it, but on the contrary he was bent on bringing on war." (1) After the Blue Books had been put on inspection Stratford was freely quoted,--those who were in favor of a peaceful solution quoting Stratford as being hopeless of Turkish reform (Stratford had never been sanguine about the possibilities in that direction), and those who were opposing the Government quoting him for their purposes. For example, Derby says, "....I concur with the opinion which was expressed in the month of July last by one in whose praise this House has been unanimous--to whose praise I can add nothing, except my cordial concurrence in every word that has been said in laudation of his discretion, firmness, and judgment....I concur with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe in thinking that our intense anxiety to maintain peace, notwithstanding the progress of circumstances prejudicial to its continuance... may eventually go far towards frustrating the object, without preventing the occurrence of a war." (2) Lord Dudley Stuart said on February 17; "He believed there was not a statesman who better understood the position of Turkey, or who was more anxious to defend the interests of England as connected with it, than Lord Stratford de Redcliffe." (3)

The "country" calls for war: Lord Stratford, in the

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1. Greville, Journal, III, p. 120.
  2. Hansard, Vol. 130, p. 629. Speech of Derby, Feb. 14, 1854.
  3. Ibid., Vol. 130, p. 887.

opinion of the "country" has managed to bring on war, and the "country" is loud in his praise; therefore enterprising members of Parliament must show some appreciation of Stratford's admirable qualities. We shall next consider the position taken by Mr. David Urquhart, and his influence on public opinion in England.

Mr. Urquhart was at Argos in 1830 when the Greeks received news of their territorial boundaries. In 1834 he arrived at Constantinople on a secret mission,---to inquire into the opportunities for British trade in the Near East and the disadvantages under which it labored. He had been sent on this mission at his own request and became so friendly with the Turks that Palmerston had him recalled. After his return to England Urquhart tried to induce the Wellington Ministry to take active measures against Russia, but failed. In 1835 he was appointed secretary of the embassy at Constantinople. Finding that Russia had prohibited foreigners from trading with Circassia, Urquhart contrived to send a British steamer, "The Vixen", to Saudjauk Kale where she was seized by a Russian warship. But the scheme failed as the home government would not take drastic action on the question and recalled Urquhart in 1837. A motion made in the House of Commons to inquire into Palmerston's conduct of affairs was defeated by a small majority, but Palmerston admitted during the debate that Urquhart had acted in accordance with the wishes of the Ministry. Urquhart, before he left England in 1835, had drawn up a treaty with Turkey which was designed to offset the trading advantages given to Russia by the treaty of Adrianople. The Government was to send this treaty to Urquhart at Constantinople, but failed to do so until 1838, when the treaty was so modified that

that Urquhart repudiated it.(1) All these incidents explain Mr. Urquhart's insistence on his peculiar idea that the English government and its agent, Palmerston, were assisting Russia to carry out her crafty designs on Europe in general and Turkey in particular. They also explain Mr. Urquhart's motive for forming societies and Foreign Affairs Committees for the purpose of inquiring into the conduct of the government. But Mr. Urquhart's greatest influence was wielded through his writings on eastern affairs.

Karl Marx gives a pithy summary of Mr. Urquhart's works on Turkey; "If Mr. Urquhart were not a British subject, he would decidedly prefer being a Turk; if he were not a Presbyterian Calvinist, he would not belong to any other religion than Islamism; and thirdly, Britain and Turkey are the only two countries in the world which enjoy self-government and civil and religious liberty. This same Urquhart has since become the great Eastern authority for all English Liberals who object to Palmerston, and it is he who supplies the "Daily News" with the materials for these panegyrics upon Turkey." (2) Somewhat later (June 7, 1853) Mr. Marx notes that "Mr. Urquhart... has published a pamphlet on the Danish succession... The chief argument put forward in this publication is, that the Sound is intended by Russia to perform the same functions for her in the north as the Dardanelles in the south; viz., the securing her maritime supremacy over the Baltic in the same manner as the occupation of the Dardanelles would do with regard to the Euxine." (3)

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1. Dictionary of National Biography. (New York, 1899) Vol. LVIII. (All details of Urquhart's work at Constantinople.)
  2. Karl Marx, The Eastern Question, (London, 1897) p. 24. Date of Article, April 12, 1853. Mr. Marx was in London at this time and wrote leaders for the New York Tribune.
  3. Marx, Eastern Question, p. 39.



But these summaries do not do credit to Mr. Urquhart's method of stating facts. In a work published in 1853, entitled, "Progress of Russia in the West, North, and South, by Opening the Sources of Opinion and Appropriating the Channels of Wealth and Power," (1) (the title is a summary), we note the following statements; "The Turkish Empire is full of military vigor; the dangers to which it is at present exposed result not from its weakness but from its strength;" (2) "Another illusion is that the Christians of Turkey are Greeks, and consequently that they are united against the Mussulman rule." (3) "One of the victims (Kossuth) has said, "the events of 1848--9 show that in every Cabinet Russia has had a spy, and it is not too much to infer--an agent." (4) The inference is that if Europe is busied with revolution Russia may carry out her policy in the East. He quotes a story to make his point that all Russian ambassadors are such masters of intrigue that the ordinary Englishman cannot cope with them; "A sailor on board Admiral Duckworth's squadron, being asked what sort of vessels the Russians had, answered, "Russia wants no navy; she has ambassadors;" (5) "Send away the Russian Ambassador," writes Mr. Urquhart. "That would be worth more, even, than a squadron in the Black Sea." (6) The article entitled, "The Dardanelles" uses a letter from General Bem to the Turkish Minister of War, Mehemet Ali Pasha, to advertise Turkey's military preparedness. General

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1. This book has prefaces to the second and third editions and the title page is marked fifth edition.
  2. David Urquhart, Progress of Russia. (London 1853.) Preface p. III.
  3. Ibid., p. XIII.
  4. Ibid., p. LIX.
  5. Ibid., p. LXX.
  6. Ibid., p. LV.

Bem states that Turkey has an excellent army, which ardently desires to fight against Russia; General Bem would willingly engage to attack a Russian force double the number of these excellent Turkish soldiers, and knows that he would be victorious. (1) Karl Marx mentions this letter in his newspaper article of August 16, 1853. (2) The Progress of Russia also contains a chapter on the Hungarian refugees and expatiates on the nobility of the Sultan in refusing the demands of Austria and Russia. The Sultan holds forth in dramatic fashion; "Shall I who am the Master of the Empire, he denied the right of refuge, which I cannot refuse to the meanest of my subjects in the case even of a culprit? Sooner let the Empire perish!"<sup>3</sup> And this stand the Porte took in its isolation without the support of England or France! There are chapters on the Russian quarantine of the Danube and the coast of Circassia and chapters discussing at length the relation of European and Asiatic commerce to the free navigation of the Danube and the Empire. But the big thing which Mr. Urquhart labors to prove, i.e., the fact that Lord Palmerston has been accessory to Russia's policy in the Near East is not fully credited by the English people. "The British Quarterly Review" for August 1853, in a review of The Progress of Russia says, "In almost all that Mr. Urquhart says as to the flagitious unprincipledness and chicanery of the Russian system of managing affairs, we entirely agree with him: but we do not think as Mr. Urquhart openly asserts, that any man in the Cabinet of Great Britain, no matter what his politics, has been for the last five and twenty years

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1. Urquhart, Progress of Russia, p. XLVII.
  2. Marx, Eastern Question, p. 94.
  3. Urquhart, Progress of Russia, pp. 128, 129.

the tool of Russia."(1) However, there can be no doubt that this work together with earlier published works, England, France, Russia, and Turkey (1835) and The Spirit of the East, (1838), had an incalculable influence in stirring up that basic reason for the Crimean War,--fear that Russia would obtain a predominating influence in Europe, and righteous indignation against her suppression of Liberalism and attacks on weaker powers.

Mr. Urquhart's attitude at the time war was declared may be gauged from a petition presented in his name by Mr. Bright, in the House of Commons, March 13, 1854. The petition makes the following points: (a) the Ottoman Empire is able to maintain itself against any attack by Russia; (b) Russia would not have been guilty of her recent course if she had not hoped to be supported by the other powers; (c) Sending an army would lead to disturbance,--the naval forces have already made a disturbance; (d) the Turks, if restrained from falling on the enemy would fall on one another,--this would mean revolution; (e) if the Turks were free to capture the small army south of the Pruth our interference would be unnecessary,--but the Turks are not suffered to do so and are constrained to witness Russian troops pouring into the Danubian provinces as they did last year; last of all, "And your petitioner humbly prays that the Commons House of Parliament, in its wisdom may see fit to advise the Crown, without delay, to withdraw her ambassador from Constantinople, and her squadron from the Black Sea ." Here we see the significant word "laughter" .(2) Mr. Urquhart is taking a position which explains Mr. Bright's presentation of the petition, a position the direct opposite to that which is popular with "the country". Mr. Urquhart objected

1. British Quarterly Review, Vol. 18, p. 540. 2. Hansard, Vol. 131, p. 673.



to the position taken by England in this matter and held that the alliance of the Powers for the purpose of interfering in the internal affairs of Turkey or of any other country was a violation of international law.(1) But Mr.Urquhart's remonstrances like those of Mr.Bright fall on deaf ears. Though his numerous works on the policy of Russia have had a mighty influence in creating a public opinion against that country,he is utterly powerless to control that opinion so that it will carry out the policy of David Urquhart. Moreover,there is a good reason to believe that Mr.Urquhart's opposition to Palmerston in the long run only increased that gentleman's popularity with the "country". It may be profitable to examine a little more closely the relations between Mr.Urquhart and Lord Palmerston.

In 1838 Mr.Urquhart published a collection of diplomatic papers and correspondence between the Russian government and its agents in the first number of "The Portfolio",a periodical devoted to diplomatic affairs. These papers had been confiscated by Polish insurgents in 1830,had been brought to England by Prince Adam Czartoryski,and had passed over to the custody of the Foreign Office(2) "King William IV,"writes Greville," was nearly mad on the subject of Russia....Urquhart who had been in the East,published a violent anti-Russian pamphlet,which made some noise and which recommended him to the notice of Taylor,(3) and through him to that of the King. His Majesty took up Urquhart and recommended him to Palmerston.... He (Palmerston) accordingly appointed him---a very extraordinary appointment it was thought at the time---Secretary of Embassy at

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1. Dictionary of National Biography.
2. Ibid.,
3. The King's private secretary.

Constantinople . . . . When the death of the King was approaching, Palmerston foresaw that he would have to change his tone with regard to Eastern politics, and consequently that it would be convenient to throw over Urquhart, which he proceeded to do. This man first his tool and then his victim, turned out to be bold, unprincipled, and clever, and finding his prospects ruined and his reputation damaged, he turned fiercely upon him whom he considered as his persecutor and betrayer." (1) Palmerston would take no responsibility for the publication of the "Portfolio" although Urquhart "took every opportunity of consulting the Foreign Office and of trying to make Palmerston and his under-secretaries 'participes criminis' in order that they might share the responsibility and stand committed with him." (2) This affair led to a paper war, the letters of both Urquhart and Palmerston being printed in the "Times", but Urquhart's promised revelations never appeared and "the whole affair died a natural death." (3) But Mr. Urquhart's feeling against Palmerston did not die so quickly. While Urquhart was in Parliament as member for Stafford, (July 30, 1847--July 1852.) he availed himself of every opportunity of questioning Palmerston about Turkish affairs, with the object of picking flaws in the Government policy, and in 1849 we find Urquhart and Mr. Anstey making a violent attack on Lord Palmerston's policy and demanding articles of impeachment. (4) When Palmerston resigned in December 1853, Karl Marx made the following comment; "...

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1. Greville, Journal, I, pp. 103, 104.

2. Ibid., I, pp. 138, 139.

3. Ibid., I, pp. 102, 104.

4. Ashley, Palmerston, II, p. 61.

Lord Palmerston has had a special reason for surprising the world with this last act of self-sacrificing patriotism. He has been found out. His prestige has begun to wane, his past career to be known to the public. The people of England ... have been aroused by the revelations of Mr. David Urquhart, who has vigorously taken his Lordship in hand. This gentleman, by a recently published work called The Progress of Russia, by articles in the English journals, and especially by speeches at the anti-Russian meetings held throughout the kingdom, has struck a blow at the political reputation of Palmerston, which future history will but confirm. Our own labors in the cause of historical justice have also had a share... in the formation of a new opinion in England with regard to this busy and wily statesman.... The change in public feeling is not a pleasing one for its subject and he thinks, perhaps, to escape from the rising tide of reprehension, or to suppress it by his present "coup". We predict that it will not succeed, and that his lengthened career of official life will ere long come to a barren and unhappy end." (1) But alas for those who dare to read the political heavens and make prophecies concerning the Noble Member for Tiverton! Palmerston was back in the Cabinet on December 25th. Greville quotes Graham as having said that Peel who hated Palmerston, was too cautious to trust implicitly to Urquhart's assertions, and to commit himself by acting on them. (2) Evidently the politicians of 1838 did not place implicit confidence in the assertions of Mr. Urquhart since they would not use them even to make political capital at the ex-

1. Marx, The Eastern Question, p. 193. December 31, 1853.

2. Greville, Journal, I, p. 104.



pense of Palmerston. "The Morning Chronicle," "a rather steady-going supporter of Lord Aberdeen's policy," (1) in an article entitled "Lord Palmerston and his Position" (July 27, 1852), makes the following comment; "Moreover, he has often been particularly fortunate in his opponents. Mr. Urquhart's tiresome attacks had the effect of enlisting parliamentary favor on the side of the noble viscount ..." (2) All things work together for good to the man who leads the people where-soever they will go.

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1. H.R. Fox Bourne, English Newspapers, (London, 1887.) II, p. 192.
2. Littell's Living Age, "Lord Palmerston and his Position." Vol. 34, p. 477.

## CHAPTER IV.

## Attitude of the Masses of the English People.

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Dibblee writes; "The sensational part of journalism is the control of opinion. It is usual when speaking of the editorial side of a paper for nearly everyone, who is not within the narrow ring of professionals to mean the latter function of the paper, and not the mere collection and reproduction of news;" (1)...as an organ of opinion, the newspaper is on the whole much more comprehensively organized in the United Kingdom than in any other country. (2) During the greater part of the nineteenth century "The Times" was not so much first as sole and supreme;" in 1852 the normal daily circulation of "The Times" was 40,000; of the "Morning Advertiser" 7000; of the "Daily News" 3500; of the "Morning Post," 3000 (3) "The Times" said Lord Clarendon, "forms, guides, or reflects--no matter which--the public opinion of England." (4) Kinglake said that when practical men and women referred to public opinion they simply spoke of "The Times". (5) Since John Thadeus Delane, editor of the "The Times" from 1841 to 1877 inclusive, was the master who regulated and directed this mighty force, we shall study his attitude during the period previous to the Crimean war and try to estimate its relation to public opinion.

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1. G. Binney Dibblee, The Newspaper, Hone University series, (New York & London<sup>n.4</sup>) pp. 15, 16.
  2. Ibid., p. 31.
  3. Sir Edward Cook, Delane of "The Times", (London, 1915) p. 2.
  4. Ibid., p. 294.
  5. Ibid., p. 300.

Delane was very intimate with Lord Aberdeen; through his influence Sir William Molesworth, a Radical, became a member of Aberdeen's Cabinet. (1) Delane, like Aberdeen, was averse to foreign wars on principle, (2) but believed in preparedness. In June 1851 Cobden highly approved an article in "The Times" which said that a European war was both improbable and <sup>un</sup>desirable. (3) In April 1854 Bright made an entry in his journal to the effect that Delane agreed with him that the war was unnecessary. (4) But it is true, nevertheless, that for some months during the summer and autumn of 1853 it is a little difficult to decide on the attitude of "The Times". Judging from the tone of the other daily papers, many of its articles were more than conservative or moderate in tone,--they defended the Czar and were not at all optimistic about the chances for improvement in the affairs of the decadent Turkish Empire. But, on the other hand, we have two leaders on July 8, 1853, one warlike and firm,--the other pacific. Greville, who gives us this information, was of the opinion that there must be a double Cabinet influence acting on the paper. (5) However this may be, there is no doubt about Delane's personal attitude, which is clearly defined in a letter to "The Times" correspondent at Constantinople (September 5, 1853):

" You seem to imagine that England can desire nothing better than to sacrifice all its greatest interests and its most cherished objects---to support barbarism against civilization, the Moslem against the Christian, slavery against liberty, to exchange peace for

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1. Cook, Delane, p. 65.
2. Dasent, Delane, I, p. 155.
3. Cook, Delane, p. 66.
4. Ibid., p. 66.
5. Greville, Journal, III, p. 63.



war--all to oblige the Turk. Pray undeceive yourself. For political purposes we connive at the existence of the Turk; he fills a blank in Europe, he is a barrier to more aggressive power... We suffer him, and will not permit the Russian to dispossess him, but we are not blind to the fact that he is rapidly decaying, and if we were slow to fight for him when he had more vitality, we are less than ever inclined to do so when he is visibly fading away and when no amount of protection can preserve his boasted independence and integrity.

...you will perhaps understand, that our statesman here, looking rather to England than to Turkey, consider themselves at least as good judges of what their country requires of them as you and the small English clique at Constantinople... But English statesmen have at least as much reason to consider Lancashire and Yorkshire, Kent and Middlesex, as Moldavia and Wallachia, and owe their allegiance to the Queen and not to the Sultan."(1)

This letter and an article which will be quoted later, "The Necessity of the Porte's Acceptance of the Note," (Aug. 20) show conclusively that partly because of his own objection to war, and partly because of his friendship for Aberdeen, Delane gave his support to the Government until after he had decided that war was inevitable. (See Page 53.) (2) Dasent says; "Accustomed, as he had been, to give a hearty support to Lord Aberdeen and to oppose Lord Palmerston in his dealings with foreign affairs, he soon saw that the Eastern

1. Dasent, Delane, I. pp. 159, 160.

2. October 4. 1853.

tern Question required bolder handling than the Peelite section of the Cabinet was inclined to give it. (1) Fox Bourne calls "The Morning Chronicle" a more steady going supporter of Lord Aberdeen's policy than "The Times." He asserts that "The Times" certainly was not a safe friend to the Aberdeen Government. It urged it to be bellicose, yet did all it could to discredit Lord Palmerston, who was its most warlike member. With reason, however, it resented the shilly-shallying conduct of ministers, and, holding that the quarrel with Russia could not be patched up, it was anxious to precipitate a crisis. With this object it put pressure on the French as well as on the English authorities, sneering at their irresolution and disclosing their secrets." (2) Greville writes (Dec. 24, 1853); "Walewski has been making a great flare up about the article in 'The Times', stating that Dundas wanted to pursue the Russian fleet after Sinope, and that Baraquay d'Hilliers put his veto on the operation.... I offered to speak to Delane about contradicting it in the 'Times,' which I afterward did. He said the fact was true, and he had received it from various quarters, and it was useless to contradict it..." (3) On October 15, 1853 Aberdeen writes to Delane; "I am glad to hear of the improvement in public opinion which you describe; but I cannot think that you have turned the Edinburgh meeting to the best account. Without supporting the absurdities of the Peace Conference or even while ridiculing them as much as you please, I think that both the principal

1. Dasent, Delane, I, p. 157.

2. H. R. Fox Bourne, English Newspapers, (London, 1887.), II, pp. 192, 193.

3. Greville, Journal, III, pp. 102, 103.

speakers uttered so much truth as to deserve a different treatment, by which the cause of peace might have been further advanced. I should say that "The Times" this morning contains an article as practically warlike as any that has appeared."(1) Although "The Times" was pledged to no party and took the position of an independent mentor, it was usually regarded as official, but particularly so at this time because of the friendship between Delane and Aberdeen. Evidently this was not altogether to the advantage of the Ministry. In October 1853, Abraham Hayward wrote to his friend Sir John Young; "They (the Ministry) are now popularly judged not by their own acts and despatches, but by the vacillating tone and occasionally unprincipled articles of "The Times". Lord Aberdeen in particular has suffered greatly from being everywhere identified with 'The Times.'"(2) Delane did not initiate the public opinion which produced great changes, but he helped to carry all movements which were strongly initiated.(3) This was surely true in the case of the Crimean War. Mr. Bright has the following entry in his journal for March 24, 1854; "Conversation with Mr. Walter (Proprietor of 'The Times'.)...remarked upon 'The Times' being brow-beaten into a support of the war. He said when the country would go for war, it was not worth while to oppose it, hurting themselves and doing no good."(4) "The Times" being a newspaper which aims to be representative of the country, must set its sails to the popular breeze. But

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1. Dasent, Delane, I, p. 163.
  2. Fox Bourne, English Newspapers, II, p. 193.
  3. Cook, Delane, p. 298.
  4. Trevelyan, Bright, p. 233.



what were the views expressed by various other papers and periodicals published at this time? Though there is a dearth of material on this particular division of our subject, the popular ideas on Government policy were quite well defined at different periods of the negotiations, so that we may hope to arrive at a fairly definite conclusion.

"The Times" reflects the conservative phase of public opinion during the greater part of this period, but evidently there are occasional articles like those of July 8, 1853 (?) when Greville speaks of the "versatility and inconsistency of "The Times" which had two leaders, one warlike, the other peaceful, on the same day. When the Czar signed the Vienna Note "The Times" was firm,--the Turk must sign the note. After October 4, when Delane saw that war was inevitable "The Times" was dubious in tone, but as time passed showed a decided leaning toward war. We have Aberdeen's word (See page III) that "The Times" did not wait for Sinope. Therefore we may say that "The Times" did and did not reflect public opinion during the period from 1853 to the outbreak of war; in one sense it reflected public opinion,--when "The Times" was dubious, public opinion was not unanimous but doubtful,--public opinion was not yet out of control; on the other hand, it did not reflect public opinion because Delane, even when he knew that the great majority wanted war, tried to assist Aberdeen as much as he could without hopelessly compromising "The Times". The articles which are dubious or warlike in tone are intended to function as transitions when "The Times" shall be obliged to give up ground which is untenable, and shall speak as the representative of the people.

We shall now try to estimate, as best we can from the material at hand, the relative strength of the different currents of public opinion from 1850 to 1854. For information we shall depend mainly on Littell's "Living Age", which has copied extensively from "The Examiner" and "Spectator," which according to Buckle, (1) are the only two weeklies of any political importance; there are also a few articles from "The Times" and "The Press" (Founded May 7, 1853). Karl Marx, in his Eastern Question gives short summaries from the daily press of which we shall avail ourselves.

As Marx gives us no extracts from the London Press until after March 25, 1853, we shall take the views expressed by "The Examiner" and "The Spectator" (both Liberal), "The Times" (Independent), "The British Quarterly Magazine" (Science, Literature, and Politics), and "The United Service Magazine" (Army and Navy), in order to get some idea of public opinion on the Russo-Turkish question before 1853.

As far back as November 25, 1849 "The Examiner" is eloquent even extravagant in its praises of the Turk; (2) In a short paragraph written as nearly as can be guessed, some time in December 1849 (no magazine or paper named) we are informed that the Turks are very favorably situated for war; moreover, the Turk has shown much sympathy for Hungarians and Italians who took part in the late revolutionary movements; it would be curious if Turkey should unite with the "champions of progress" in the Mediterranean. (3) Littell's for March 23, 1850 contains an article from "The United Service Magazine" which dwells at length on the enormous strides made by Russia

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1. Money Penny & Buckle, Disraeli III, p. 490.
  2. Littell, "Turkey," Vol. 24, p. 148.
  3. *Ibid.*, "Turkey and Russia", p. 283.

during the preceding eighty years. This article presents the "balance of power" idea. The author is fearful of the danger to which England's Indian Empire is exposed by the Russian policy of aggrandizement, questions whether the time is not ripe for a war of policy, and hints at an alliance between England and France for this purpose. (1) "The British Quarterly Review" does not believe that England is justified in such application of Cobden's doctrine of non-intervention as would leave oppressed peoples such as the Hungarians, to their fate; on the other hand there is a note of warning to those who are over-enthusiastic about the Turks; Turkish rule, according to Mr. Layard's account, is a mere dead incubus on the shoulders of those subjected to it; "The Times" is scored for its attitude on the atrocities of Austria and Russia in Hungary. "Delane took the unpopular side in the case of Kossuth). Lord Palmerston's attitude is commended. (2) "The Times" for June 2, 1851 says; "...we do not believe that the intentions of Nicholas have ever assumed the active or aggressive character sometimes imputed to them .... It is not in the character or policy of the Emperor Nicholas especially as exhibited in the last three years to adopt adventurous or uncertain combinations .... Russia will neither attempt to compress Germany or to attack France. The attitude of the German Government and of Russia is strictly defensive ..." (3) "The Examiner" for August 9, 1851 suggests that "The Peace Society might with great consistency and advantage hold its meetings in St. Petersburg. (4)

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1. Littell, "Russian Aggression in the East," pp. 529, 535.
  2. Ibid., "Review of "The Times" and Palmerston's Speech on Refugees 1849.) Vol. 25, p. 352.
  3. Ibid., "Russia and Prussia" Vol. 30, p. 376.
  4. Ibid., "The Peace Society" p. 607.



On June 12, 1852 the same paper quotes an extract from Kossuth's speech in Boston (May, 1852). This extract, which was laid before the House of Commons by Lord Dudley Stuart, describes Turkey as the land of municipal institutions and religious toleration, and declares that Protestantism has grown up in Turkey "under the protecting wings of the Ottoman power;" "Peter, the Czar, left a testament to the people that Russia must take Constantinople;" "Russia has prohibitive duties on all articles except those without which manufacturing could not go on, while Turkey adhering to her immemorial policy of free trade, levies duties only for revenue. (1) "The Spectator" for October 23, 1852 says that in the event of war the freedom of Europe and the commerce of England are at stake. (2) Later (October 30, 1852) the same periodical tells its readers that Turkey is an anomaly in Europe, a very small minority without political convictions governing a much larger population with nationalities and convictions of their own;" "The Spectator" questions whether the small Turkish army of about 50,000 men has any men of superior generalship, but is also of the opinion that the vast Ultra-Oriental power of Russia is not so unquestioned as might at first appear. (3) Here we have, as far as can be judged, three definite currents of public opinion; (a) the "balance of power" idea, -- fear of Russia's predominance at the expense of Europe; (b) the idea of Russia as a destroyer of liberty and enterprise, and Turkey, a paragon of liberalism and toleration; (c) a more conservative current which does not share either in the

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1. Littell, "Designs Against Turkey," Vol. 34, p. 162.
  2. Littell, "What Would Be at Stake in a General War," Vol. 35, p. 572.
  3. Ibid., "The Turkish Question," p. 574.

exaggerated enthusiasm for the Turk, or the exaggerated fear of Russia. "The Times," which was representative of the last idea, and led all other papers in circulation must have had a strong moderating influence on public opinion. "The Times" is the only daily newspaper quoted above.

Karl Marx (March 25, 1853) says; "In ancient Greece an orator who was paid to remain silent was said to have an ox on his tongue. The ox... was a silver coin imported from Egypt. With regard to "The Times," we may say that, during the whole period of the revived Eastern Question, it had also an ox on its tongue, if not for remaining silent, at least for speaking." (1) "The Times" defended Austrian intervention in Montenegro on the plea of Christianity; when Russia interfered "The Times" declared the subject of no importance to the "subjects" of the Established Church of England; Turkey's commerce was important for Great Britain, therefore Great Britain would gain by exchanging Turkish free trade for Russian prohibition and Austrian protection; next "The Times" labored to prove that England was dependent on Russia for food, therefore must bow to the geographical ideas of the Czar; then it fell back on the statement that the Turkish Empire was falling to pieces, therefore Russia must presently become the executor and heir of that Empire; anon, "The Times" wanted to subject the inhabitants of Turkey to the "pure sway" and civilizing influence of Russia and Austria; in conclusion, "The Times" congratulates itself on the "brilliance" of its Eastern leaders, whereupon the whole London Press, daily and weekly, rose as one man against the leading journal. "The Morning Post" (Tory and Palmerstonian) mocks at the

1. Marx, The Eastern Question, p. 10.

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1. Marx, The Eastern Question, p. 10.



intelligence of "The Times" and accuses it of deliberately spreading false and absurd news; "The Morning Herald" (Protectionist) calls it our Hebrao-Austro-Russian contemporary; "The Daily News" (Liberal) calls it the "Brunnow organ;" (1) "The Morning Chronicle" (Peelite) says; "The journalists who have proposed to surrender the Turkish Empire to Russia, on the score of the commercial eminence of a dozen large Greek firms, are quite right in claiming for themselves the monopoly of brilliancy;" "The Morning Advertiser" (Radical) makes the following statement; "The Times" is right in stating that it is isolated in its advocacy of Russian interests... It is printed in the English language. But that is the only thing English about it. It is, where Russia is concerned, Russian all over. (2) Here we have "The Times" on one side, and the London press on the other. "The Examiner" (March 19, 1853) mournfully contrasts the present lack of interest in preserving the integrity of Turkey with the active interest of 1840; England is encouraging the enemies of her old ally, Turkey. (3) "The Economist" (Trade organ) says that the English press should not take the attitude that the destruction of Turkish dominion is a fated and inevitable thing; if Turkey be dismembered will the Czar or Kaiser govern her better than the Sultan? (4) "The Spectator" (March 12, 1853.) severely reprimands Lord Aberdeen for not having given an unequivocal dissent to "The Mutual Disarmament Mission" which had waited on him February 26th, and suggests that Mr. Cobden and Co. go to St. Petersburg and lay their proposition before the Czar. (5)

1. Brunnow was the Russian ambassador to England.

2. Marx, *The Eastern Question*, pp. 10. 11. 12.

3. Littell, "Austria and Turkey," Vol. 37, pp. 375, 376.

4. Ibid., "The Ottoman Empire," p. 376.

5. Ibid., "The Mutual Disarmament Mission," pp. 382, 374.

"The Spectator" mentions Lord John Russell's boast that England and France were in peculiarly friendly relations and wonders how the Emperor of France, who can have but little sympathy with constitutional government, should be the fittest person to consult regarding the state of Europe. (1) "The Economist" takes pride in the fact that England is the asylum for the victim of oppression, and praises Lord Palmerston for saying that England would refuse all demands for their extradition. (2) April 19th Marx writes that "The Daily News" clearly perceives that the dismemberment of Turkey would mean Russia at Constantinople; this would threaten the peace of the world, ruin the Black Sea trade, and necessitate new armaments in the British stations and fleets of the Mediterranean; therefore "The Daily News" must exert itself to arouse the indignation and fear of the British nation and writes panegyrics upon Turkey, which are supplied by Mr. David Urquhart. (3)

Then came the Menshikov ultimatum of May 7th, 1853. Marx (May 31) quotes "The Morning Herald," "Had Admiral Dundas been permitted to join the French squadron at Salamis, several weeks ago, the present state of affairs would be quite different;" (4) "The Times" says that "No correct conclusions could be drawn from that mendacious wire" (the electric telegraph); it also says that the progress of the Christians in Turkey, is the interest of the world; they must not come under Russia; resistance to Russia should be European. (5) This is a dubious attitude surely, when previous state-

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1. Littell, "Constitutional League in Europe," Vol. 37, p. 374.
  2. Ibid., "The Asylum of the World," p. 341.
  3. Marx, The Eastern Question, pp. 24, 25.
  4. Ibid., p. 33.
  5. Ibid., p. 34.

ments of "The Times" are considered. June 21, Marx writes that "The Times" is of opinion that Turkey should first suffer Russia to enter the Principalities and afterwards enter into negotiations with her; but if Turkey should regard the occupation as a *casus belli* England and France must not do so; if, nevertheless, England and France should do so, it should be done not as belligerents against Russia but as defensive allies of Turkey. Marx also observes that no other paper would follow the lead of "The Times." (1)

The Russians crossed the Pruth July 2, 1853. Marx says (July 8) that the English Press has lowered its warlike language and sums up the "Times" leaders of July 8 as follows; "... as the Russians could not master their propensity for civilizing barbarian provinces, England had better let them do as they desired, and avoid a disturbance of the peace by vain obstinacy." (2) On July 8th Mr. Layard was requested by Lord Palmerston to postpone indefinitely his motion for information on Turkish affairs; Mr. Bright at the same time seized his opportunity of congratulating Aberdeen on his cautious policy. Whereupon "The Morning Advertiser" made the following comment; "Were the Peace Society itself the Cabinet it could not have done more to encourage Russia, to discourage France, to endanger Turkey, and discredit England than the very good Aberdeen. Mr. Bright's speech was meant as a sort of Manchester manifesto in favor of the tremblers of the Cabinet." (3) July 19, Marx reports that "the Morning Advertiser," "The Morning Post," and "The Economist" are descanting on the lack of courtesy, wantonness of insolence, and vagaries of the Czar. (4) On

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1. Marx, *The Eastern Question*, pp. 44, 45.
  2. *Ibid.*, p. 56. Articles mentioned by Greville. See Page 112.
  3. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
  4. *Ibid.*, p. 72.



July 18, an "Englishman" in "The Morning Advertiser" called upon the Stars and Stripes to appear in the Mediterranean and shame the "muddy old Union Jack" into activity. (1) On August 2nd, "The Morning Post" asserts that the Vienna Note has been sent to St. Petersburg and states that "By the 10th of August the whole matter will be terminated peaceably, or the combined fleets will be commanded to proceed to the Bosphorus, or perhaps to the Black Sea. Active measures will succeed patient negotiation, and the threat of danger will no longer prevent the strong means, which may ensure safety. If the Czar accept the proposal now made, the first condition will be the immediate evacuation of the Principalities." (2) This sounds quite Palmerstonian. Just at this time Marx announces the publication of four letters on the Oriental Question by David Urquhart. (3)

The weekly periodicals come out openly and strongly. "The Examiner" of July 2, raves about the Nesselrode "ultimatissimum", calling it the most insolent and unconstitutional attack on a weak and almost unresisting neighbor since the days of the partition of Poland. Let France and England declare that the passage of the Pruth is a breach of treaty". The simplest precaution is that of <sup>(4)</sup> the allied fleets anchoring in the Bosphorus. "The Spectator" of June 11 expresses its alarm at the probable consequences of the treaty of May 8, 1852, which gave the House of Gottorp (The Czar was the head of the elder-branch of this family) a remote chance of succession to Holstein; England was interested in the power which might hold the keys of the Baltic; the Russian Emperor should be

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1. Marx, Eastern Question, p. 74.

2. Ibid., p. 82.

3. Ibid., p. 94. The letter from Bem is quoted on page 100.

4. Littell, "Nesselrode's Last," Vol. 38, p. 556. (This must refer to the ultimatum of May 31.)

forced to renounce all claim to the Danish throne; the House of Commons is urged to attend to the matter immediately. (1) "The Examiner" of July 9, says that Russia cannot retrace her steps without losing prestige,--fear is the only reason which she can allege for recoiling; "What if the Emperor Nicholas... had estimated exactly the amount of courage possessed by the English Cabinet, and had proceeded coolly upon a just calculation that Lord Aberdeen and his colleagues, when the final pinch came, would permit Turkey to be degraded without raising a hand in her defense?" If this should be the case it will be made clear to the world "that though her (England's) quarrel was a just one, though she was goaded by insult, and impelled by honor yet she was not brave enough, she was not powerful enough to enter into a conflict with the Emperor of the Russias;" "From the shores of the Bosphorus to the banks of the Indus and the Ganges, the word will go forth that the star of England has paled before that of Russia." (2) This nationalism is sufficiently fire-eating to satisfy the most rabid war feeling. The same number has an article which asserts that Austria is bound to assist Russia against Turkey;" As for Austria, we defy any British Minister, be he of what politics he may, to dare to offer the support of this country to a power which has done nothing but heap insult and injury on every British subject within the reach of its influence.... Austria is not more clearly bound to Russia than she is severed from English interests or sympathies.... To stave off war... is a question of life or death to Austria;" "The Examiner" advises a determined front of opposition to Russia unceasingly maintained as the safe means of avoiding war at present and for

1. Littell, "The Dardanelles and the Sound," Vol. 38, pp. 318, 319.  
 2. Ibid., "England or Russia," p. 504.

the time to come. (1) "The Spectator" of July 9 speaks of a telegraph despatch from Vienna which states that Russia will submit the Russo-Turkish question to a high arbitration; the despatch bears "more traits of plausibility than that channel usually conveys;" the Porte is commended for the moderate tone taken in answering the Nesselrode Circular of July 2; but the Czar's manifesto appealing to the fanaticism of his subjects is not promising for peace. (2) "The Spectator" is still normal. On July 16, "The Examiner" gives its estimate of the Nesselrode Note; "The pretence that the occupation of the provinces is the counterpart to or consequence of the presence of the fleets is of monstrous insolence. It is as if a burglar should justify breaking into your house by alleging that a friendly visitor was on the threshold of your door;" "Perfidious Albion" will be a well earned name if England should desert Turkey or advise <sup>her</sup> to compromise one jot of her honor or independence. (3) "The Spectator" of July 23rd states that the Czar has thrown off the mask; Russia proclaims war save on conditions most humiliating,--England must confront the question of peace or war; there is danger that England's long disuse of war may tempt her to succumb; if England deserts Turkey after encouraging her to rely on English support, England will henceforth take an isolated position in Europe; Russia will be inflated by her triumphs, English commerce will be endangered, the route to India and Persia threatened, and Europe will eventually come under the sway of a "great military despotism;" commerce, public law, and national independence are cast into the stake; England must go forward,--"must be prepared to meet aggression with aggression;" "The Spectator" admits that the soft-

1. Littell, "The Position of Austria," Vol. 38, p. 506.

2. Ibid., p. 506. 3. Littell, "Nesselrode's Last," Vol. 38, pp. 557, 558.



handed statesmen of the day could not fit themselves to such a policy on the instant;"We are slow to move;but if we once move,shall we once retreat,if with whole heart and a firm right hand we place all our trust in God and the right?"(1) "The Spectator"has cast its vote for war."The Examiner"gives its argument for war;"The duty now imposed and the interests appealing to England and to France together for protection involve no mere preferences of opinion. Considerations of democracy or despotism have nothing to do with them. It is the great material question,whether one power shall be allowed to become so preponderant on the confines of Europe and Asia,as virtually,if it succeeds,to dominate the two continents. It is a question,not merely of government or its principles,but of self-conservation,of national existence;"England cannot be a first-rate power and shirk her manifest duties. "If Russia comes forward with acts and armies,while the West merely advances with embassies and protests,or with navies sneaking for a few weeks without and around the entrances to Turkish ports, the Greek Christians (who are wavering between Russia and the West) have no choice." But "The Examiner"does not believe that Russia will risk war;"Russia ...has marched across the Pruth solely because of the conviction that Lord Aberdeen would not resent it."(2) July 23,"The Examiner"announces that Austria and Prussia are now in accord with France but holds that as a sine qua non of any agreement,Russia should evacuate the Principalities;it also deploras the fact that the governments of

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1. Littell,"War with Russia,"pp.558-560.

2. Ibid., "Why Russia Should now be Resisted,"Vol.38,pp.562-561-563.

Russia and France have had such regard for the support of public opinion that they have communicated all negotiations to the public, while Parliament and the English nation have been kept in dense ignorance of Government policy." (1) "The Economist" July 16, declares that though it has often denounced war, it has never concealed its opinion that there are cases when war "may be a necessity, a safety, a wisdom, and a virtue;" "The Economist" believes that a war with Russia to sustain Turkey in her present righteous cause would be such a case; then "The Economist" advances the familiar "balance of power" arguments, and believes that such a war entered into in cooperation with France would cement the friendship between the two countries; such a war "cannot" but be a hopeful omen to the trampled liberties and the crushed civilization of Italy, Hungary and Germany. Russia has been led to her present course by believing that England and France would not work together; that the arguments of the Peace-at-any-Price School were powerful enough to prevent her engaging in war; let England show the Czar that he has mistaken her position, and misconceived her temper. (2) "The Economist" now belongs to the war section of the country. "The Spectator" of August 6th demands the abrogation of all existing treaties between Russia and Turkey, -- a demand which is repeated again and again up to the outbreak of war. (3) "The Examiner" of the same date prints an article congratulating the Peace Society on the triumph of its principles and sees no earthly reason why it should not appear before the world under the patronage of its

1. Littell, "The Eastern Question," pp. 563, 564.

2. Ibid., "England's Interest in the Eastern Question," Vol. 38, pp. 565-567.

3. Ibid., "Russia Wills It," p. 698.

latest recruits;"H.R.H.Prince Albert;President,Mr.Cobden;Council, Lord John Russell, Lord Clarendon, Lord Palmerston and the rest of the Cabinet;Secretary, Lord Aberdeen, etc." (1) "The Spectator" prints two additional articles on the Danish question. (2) In an article entitled "Necessity of the Porte's Acceptance of the Joint Note" "The Times" says that the Vienna Conference has obtained better terms for Turkey than she could have obtained for herself; the late reports of the condition of the Turkish army have induced some of the friends of Turkey to form an exaggerated idea of her strength; the rejection of those terms and a declaration of war on the part of Turkey would eventually lead to the destruction of the Turkish Empire, the very condition Russia would desire; "it is not more inconsistent with her honor to accept than with our honor to recommend;" if Turkey decides that this Note drawn up by all the Powers is humiliating to her, "it is impossible that the Western Powers should be bound by steps the Porte may take in opposition to their advice." "The Times" is a Cabinet organ here. The next outburst of public opinion comes when the Porte rejects the Vienna note.

When news came that the Porte had rejected the Vienna Note, Marx says the whole Press assured its readers that the alterations demanded were insignificant, not worth speaking of and that the whole affair might be regarded as settled, but some days later "The Morning Chronicle" announced that the alterations proposed by the Porte were of a very serious character. (3) Then the Vienna Conference sent proposals to the Sultan that he should sign the note, and be content with an assurance that the Powers would abide by his inter-

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1. Littell, "Triumph of the Peace Party," p. 698.
  2. Ibid., "New Russo-Danish Question," Vol. 38, pp. 703, 704.
  3. Marx, The Eastern Question, p. 123.



pretation of the note. Marx says that the whole of the London Press, "The Times" included is silent on a revelation made by the "Journal des Debats" to the effect that Mr. Reeve had been sent with despatches from London, stating that the Porte would forfeit the support of the Four Powers if it refused to yield; "The Times" of August 20 says that "the Turkish Question" has plainly become a question of words; "The terms of this document were liable to misconstruction but two points were unimpeachably clear: first, that the four powers intended to maintain the territorial and administrative rights of the Porte; and, next, that in the event of dispute they would have been bound by this intention; a state which is so much in need of European protection, "must at least so far pay the penalty of its weakness as to receive aid indispensable to its existence on the terms least onerous to its supporters." Mr. Urquhart makes the following statement in "The Morning Advertiser;" "There is no alternative. Either the laws of England have to be exercised in their "penal rigor upon the persons of four traitors (Aberdeen, Clarendon, Palmerston, and Russell) or the Czar of Russia commands the world." (1) By September 23rd, "The Globe and "The Morning Post" (Both Palmerstonian) admit that the proposed Turkish modifications were necessary, the latter paper asserting that the Vienna Note was neither more nor less than the equivalent of the Menshikov Note. (2) "The Morning Advertiser" inconsistently declares "There is but one man to whom the country points at this important junction as fit to be entrusted with the helm of affairs. That man is Lord Palmerston." (3) "The Examiner" (September 3) has great sympathy for Turkey. Turkey is being kept in an atti-

1: Marx, Eastern Question, pp. 129, 130, 131, 132.

2: Ibid., p. 136.

3: Ibid., p. 140. (September 22.)

tude of peace; while in this position the Porte is likened to a man who has his toes trodden and his nose pulled by his adversary, friends advising that such acts however unpleasant to the sufferer should not be regarded in the light of hostilities. "The Examiner" speaks of the fleets "skulking in Besika Bay"; if the combined fleets had entered the Dardanelles when the Russians crossed the Pruth, support would have balanced invasion; the position of England is lowered in the eyes of the world. (1) "The Economist" asks whether it is now too late to send the fleets into the Black Sea. (2) "The Spectator" for September 10, denies the charge that Prince Albert, who is German, has induced England to hush up the quarrel with scanty regard to the justice of the case, -- that Prince Albert has induced England to abandon her pledge and her ally. (3) In an entry for September 26th, Greville says; "Day after day the Radical and Tory papers, ... pour forth the most virulent abuse of the Emperor of Russia, of Austria, and of this Government, especially of Aberdeen" (4) "The Press (Disraeli) for October 8th, gives a humorous burlesque of a Cabinet meeting in which Lord Clarendon makes the following speech which is supposed to be descriptive of Ministerial policy; "As Foreign Secretary, I presume I am expected to propose some course. I continue to be of opinion that a communication should at once be framed for transmission to Vienna, by virtue of which negotiations would assume a specific aspect, which would in due course tend to their adopting a certain direction, and this followed as it undoubtedly would be,

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1. Littell, "The Predicament of Turkey," Vol. 39, pp. 123, 124.
  2. Ibid., "The Eastern Question," p. 128.
  3. Ibid., "False Positions" p. 239.
  4. Greville, Journal, III, pp. 78, 79.

by their presenting a determinate and recognizable basis would ultimately eventuate into relations of a temporarily, if not permanently desirable character. That is my frank and simple opinion."<sup>(1)</sup>

Palmerston is quoted as saying; "I am not Premier, I am not Foreign Secretary. I'm nobody of course. But I know what the people want and what they'll have--if not from you, from your successors. Order up every ship into the Black Sea and let them begin battering and blazing and let Europe see that you are in earnest."<sup>(2)</sup> There is also a parody on "The Spanish Troubadour;"

"Gayly Lord Clarendon puffed his cigar,  
Lightly pooh-poohing the prospect of war;  
Singing, "As Palmerston's pupil I come.  
Lor! in diplomacy ain't I at home?"<sup>(3)</sup>

October 27 "The Times" makes the following statements: "That there is a party in the country which would welcome a war with Russia is not to be denied, and the explanation is to be sought in the working of democratic principles. A Russian war is considered desirable because Russia is the acknowledged supporter of absolutism, because she represents irresponsible and anti-popular government, because she interfered to crush Hungarian independence, and because her intervention might again be forthcoming at similar conjunctures. These sentiments are entirely disconnected with the ostensible causes of quarrel. The Czar has encroached upon the privileges of the Sultan, and has committed an aggression upon territorial rights

1. Littell, "The Cabinet Council," Vol. 39, p. 510.

2 & 3. Ibid., p. 511.



but such allegations are merely used as pretexts. Proceedings of exactly the same character excited no disapprobation when they were reported from the United States. Of the two cases, the piratical descent upon Cuba without the shadow of a justification was certainly more gross than the occupation of the Danubian Principalities as excused by the Czar...."(1) Evidently "The Times" has been impressed by some of John Bright's ideas. Then on November 19 we have a "Times" article which may well function in the way of a transition; "This much is already certain--that we have entered upon a state of things in which the positive course of events and the terrible necessities of war have superceded the pretences of diplomacy;" "The Times" <sup>states</sup> that the war now going on between Russia and Turkey has thrown all the past and future relations of the two Empires open to controversy; all existing treaties are annulled and France and England must see to it that there is an honorable settlement; "The Times" still hopes for peace and urges the German powers to join with France and England,--it is impossible that Europe cannot enforce its will; if the Emperor of Russia persists in "his wild and wicked course" he has nothing before him but war. The Powers have tried with very indifferent success to propose terms of accommodation. Are they altogether unprepared to impose them?"(2) Under the circumstances admitted by "The Times" how is the "will" of Europe to be imposed on Russia if not by war? The next great outburst of public opinion comes after the "massacre" of Sinope.

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1. Littell, "Turkey and Russia," Vol. 39, p. 702.
  2. Ibid., "The Times" on Turkey", Vol. 40, pp. 91, 92.

After Sinope Marx informs us that "The Times" as the representative of the whole Cabinet, expresses its general indignation at the ingratitude of the Czar and ventures upon some menaces; "The Morning Post" gives its readers to understand that Sinope would never have occurred if Lord Palmerston were the Premier or, at least, the Minister for foreign affairs; "The Morning Chronicle" believes "it not improbable that the power which has disturbed the peace of the world may now be disposed to acquiesce in the termination of the war;" "The Englishman" (Independent) says; "Our fleet, at all events, is not there to prevent the Russians from attacking Turkey.... The fleet is not there to see that the Black Sea is not a Russian lake .... The fleet is not there to help our ally.... Russian admirals may manoeuvre ... within gun-shot of Constantinople, and the screws of England will continue as impassive as the prince screw, Lord Aberdeen, himself." (1) "The Economist" of December 31st, descants on "the disgraceful and melancholy butchery of Sinope," and fears not war but the consequences of any further attempts to avoid it. (2) In "The Examiner" of January 7, 1854 there is a fiery article on Sinope: the Czar having stolen the steed at Sinope, the Government gives notice of its resolution to close the stable door; "You have broken a Turkish fleet to shivers and it is time to take care of the pieces;" Let the Czar take Constantinople leaving the allies to take--a vigorous resolution; The Czar <sup>is</sup> the Harlequin of the pantomime, and England and France <sup>are</sup> the Clown and Pantaloon, following him to frustrate but never in time, blundering and bungling and misdelivering their most energetic

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1. Marx, Eastern Question, pp. 180, 181.

2. Littell, "War with a Despot," Vol. 40, p. 361.

slaps on the face."(1) "The Times"of December 31,1853 comes out with the following statement;"The combined governments of England and France have exhausted their diplomacy,their remonstrances,and their patience,and they now see themselves apparently reduced to the alternative of quitting forever their high stations among the nations of the earth,forfeiting their promises and abandoning their allies, or having recourse to war--the sport of barbarous sovereigns, but the dread of freeand progressive governments . There is no alternative. It is a decision. With whatever reluctance the western powers must accept the challenge so insultingly flung at them."(2) The "country"now speaks with no uncertain voice;all the currents of public opinion except that relatively small and unimportant influence of the "Peace Society",have merged into a mighty stream,--and "The Times",if it would preserve its prosperity,must go with the stream.

"The Spectator"of December 31 again asserts that Russia should not be permitted to resume the status quo,and is glad to see the same view supported by "The Economist,"on the ground that the existing treaties have given Russia perpetual pretexts for interference in the internal affairs of Turkey.(3) "The Spectator" is sure that <sup>the</sup> counsels of the Coalition Ministry are harmonious since Lord Palmerston has returned to office.(4) Moreover,"The Spectator" is much consoled by the fact that England and France are acting together with such cordiality;Napoleon is apparently much firmer and

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1. Littell,"Words versus Deeds",<sup>Vol. 41,</sup> p.418.
  2. Fox Bourne,English Newspapers,II,p.194.
  3. Littell,"Settlement between Russia and Europe,"Vol.40,p.397.
  4. Ibid., "England and Russia,"p.383.



more sincere than those miserable Bourbons would have been; he has committed crimes, to be sure, but his throne is not hereditary; Napoleon III is entitled at least to the courtesy and good-will of the English sovereign and the English nation as well as other royal personages of Europe whose lives have been passed in crime without Napoleon's excuse. (1) "Fraser's Magazine" for January 14 waxes eloquent over the union of the standards of St. Denis and St. George. This magazine declares; "The public mind of England has sufficiently declared itself upon each point as it arose, and so far as resistance to aggression, and positive reprobation of injustice and duplicity are concerned it is as that of one man." "...in the present instance there has been but one opinion, one voice, on the question of rights and justice against violence and wrong:..." "Austria, Russia, and Prussia are the nations which blotted Poland from the map of Europe. (2) "The Economist" testifies to the same conditions; "It is not a war of conquest or retaliation, it is not a war to subdue one dangerous power for the security of the rest... but one entirely for the sake of order, as that is understood by the majority of the European powers.... The present war is carried out against Russia solely to execute the award of the common opinion of Europe." (3) On the same day "The Examiner" states that there is a very general belief abroad that the English court is countenancing the restoration of the Bourbons; the visits of King Leopold of Belgium, and his son have given rise to this idea. (4) "The Spectator" on the same day discred-

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1. Littell, "England and Russia," Vol. 40, p. 384.
  2. Ibid., "The Russo-Turkish Question," pp. 99, 101, 103.
  3. Ibid., "Settlement between Russia and Europe," p. 361.
  4. Ibid., "The Bourbon Intrigues and King Leopold," Vol. 40, p. 424.

its the stories about Prince Albert, and enlarges on the discretion of the Prince as shown in times past. (1)

Perhaps there was a lull in the storm of invective directed against the Government after the Blue Books had been published. Greville says; (February 9): "The publication of the Blue Books has relieved the Government from a vast amount of prejudice and suspicion. The public judgment of their management of the Eastern Question is generally very favorable, and impartial people applaud their persevering efforts to avert war and are satisfied that everything was done that the national honor or dignity required. I have read through the thick volumes, and am satisfied that there is on the whole no case to be made against the Government though there are some things that might perhaps have been better done." (2) On the other hand, John Bright said that the war could not be justified out of these same documents. (3) Mr. Drummond saw clearly both from the title, -- "Correspondence respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey," and the contents, that England and France were entering into a religious war. (4) Of course we know that it would have been very unwise to print all these diplomatic documents in the original. Public feeling might have been so aroused that negotiations would have been hampered, if not made impossible. It is generally understood that the matter given out in the Blue Books has been so much revised that it is of precious little value to one who wishes to get at real facts. Sir. Wm. White's biographer states that

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- Vol. 40
1. Littell, "The Stories about Prince Albert," p. 425.
  2. Greville, Journal, III, pp. 116, 117.
  3. Trevelyan, Bright, p. 238. Dec. 22, 1854. Speech in House of Commons.
  4. Hansard, Vol. 130, p. 975. Feb. 20, 1854 " " " " "

the ambassador's best despatches never found their way into the Blue Books;"One official wrote to him saying:"We send you many despatches to revise as you wish. We have not given many of them for fear of compromising you and making it hot for you at Belgrade."  
 "Please go carefully through your despatches,"wrote another,"and say what additions or further omissions you propose."(1) Lord Claud Hamilton made the following comment on the Blue Books;"He feared he must say that the Blue Books bore evidence of having been "cooked" and he had heard out of the House that the beautiful way in which they were prepared had been made the subject of congratulation."(2)  
 In short there is such general distrust of the subject-matter contained in this collection of garbled documents that we may easily discount the influence which it might have in moderating public opinion. Greville writes on February 25;"The rage for this war gets every day more vehement,and nobody seems to fear anything,but that we may not spend money and men enough in waging it. The few sober people who have courage enough to hint at its being impolitic and uncalled for are almost hooted down,and their warnings and scruples are treated with indignation and contempt."(3)

Sir Edward Cook speaks of "that fluctuating and indeter- (4)  
 minate body of ideas and feelings which is called "public opinion". We know well the difficulty of attempting to gauge the strength of these different currents of public opinion(the term "currents" is only a convenient form)with the material at hand;but there is every

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1. H.Southerland Edwards,Sir William White,(London ,1902)p.80.
  2. Hansard,Vol.131,p.725.(March 13,1854)
  3. Greville,Journal,III,p.121.
  4. Cook,Delane,p.294.

N.B. Sir William white was appointed envoy extraordinary at Constantinople in 1885.



probability that such weeklies as the "Spectator" and the "Examiner" reflect the opinion expressed by the daily press. As we noted before, there were, as far as we could judge, four distinct currents of public opinion up to about April 1853; (a) the fear that Russia would predominate Europe; (b) the feeling that Russia and Austria were enemies of liberalism and constitutionalism, -- that they were responsible for the crushed and trampled liberties of Hungary, Italy, and the German states; (c) the feeling of exaggerated admiration for the Turk linked with a feeling of chivalrous sympathy for a weak power oppressed and overawed by a strong one; (d) a conservative sentiment neither pro-Turkish nor pro-Russian represented at first by such periodicals as "The Spectator," "The British Quarterly" and to some extent by the "Times", which can afford to speak more openly in favor of Russia. The second current (b) is strong on October 4, 1853, and still strong in April, 1854. On the first date Greville wrote; "Palmerston is lauded to the skies by all the Radicals who are admirers of Kossuth and Mazzini..." (1) In April 1854 Bright wrote "Our countrymen fancy they are fighting for freedom because the Russian Government is a despotism... they confound the blowing up of ships and the slaughter of thousands with the cause of freedom..." (2) The third current (c) gains rapidly in strength as time passes and adds a number of slogans, -- England and France must stand by their ally, Turkey; absolutely no such thing as union with Austria; contempt and scorn for such organizations as Peace Societies and their leaders; contempt and scorn for the poltroons who represent the English Government and for Aberdeen in particular; admiration and praise of Lord Palmerston, and last of all, suspicion that the Prince Consort

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 1. Greville, Journal, III, pp. 80, 81.    2. Trevelyan, Bright, p. 226.

is intriguing with the autocrats of Europe to the undoing of England. Apparently this last current gains overwhelming force, sweeping the Liberal, or relatively moderate current along with itself, until by mid-summer (1853) "The Times" and, perhaps for a little while, "The Morning Chronicle," (Peelite) are all alone on one side with the whole London press, daily and weekly, arrayed against them on the other. Then the "Times" current is swept along with the greater current and one more voice is added to the grand chorus,—"War! War! War! "

The statement of the Prince Consort, who lived at the time, will no doubt, give a much more accurate and trustworthy idea of the state of public opinion at this time; "The Emperor of Russia is a tyrant, the enemy of all liberty on the Continent, the oppressor of Poland. He wanted to coerce the poor Turk. The Turk is a fine fellow--he has braved the rascal, let us rush to his assistance. The Emperor is no gentleman, as he has spoken a lie to our Queen. Down with the Emperor of Russia! Napoleon forever! He is the nephew of his uncle whom we defeated at Waterloo. We were afraid of his invading us? Quite to the contrary! He has forgotten all that is past, and is ready to fight with us for the glorious cause against the oppressor of liberty. He may have played the French some tricks, but they are an unruly set and don't deserve any better. D---all the German Princes who won't go with us against the Russian, because they think they want him to keep down their own people. The worst of them is the King of Prussia, who ought to know better." (1)

1. Martin, Prince Consort, III, pp. 29, 30.

## CHAPTER V.

Relation between the Policy of the Leaders and that of the People.

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Our study of the attitude of the leaders and guides of the English people and of the English people themselves toward the problem of the Near East from 1850 to 1854 has reached its last phase. Having ascertained as well as we could the attitude of the leaders and the current popular opinion we shall now try to identify the leaders with the opinion which they either helped to create or used for their own purposes when it was once initiated.

Aberdeen, Bright and Cobden were openly and directly opposed to all the popular ideas<sup>(1)</sup> with this distinction,--Aberdeen wanted the Four Powers to act together in bringing about a settlement; Cobden and Bright wanted non-intervention. There is no relation between the policy of these leaders and that of the "country". The speeches of Cobden and Bright had their influence when the reaction began to set in, but not before.

Clarendon at first agreed with Aberdeen, but steered a middle course between Aberdeen and Palmerston, and later seemed to be more in accord with Palmerston. Finally he joined in the popular senti-<sup>(2)</sup>ment and became "hot" on the war, as Greville said. (February 27, 1854.)

Derby, Layard, and Clanricarde after January 31, 1854 simply criticize Government policy in general and judiciously season their

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1. See Pages 135, 136.

2. Greville, Journal, III, p. 122.



criticisms with complimentary references to the man of the hour, Palmerston. They bewail the fact that the vacillating and inconsistent policy of the Government has deluded the Czar into thinking that an Anglo-French alliance is impossible and that England will never go to war. But all except Clanricarde are sparing of remarks about the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire and prefer to attack Russian policy instead,--the "balance of power" and the "honor of England" arguments being most popular. Layard seems to have been the first to identify the Vienna Note with the Menshikov ultimatum(1) an idea which is expanded on "ad infinitum" by Disraeli and others when there is an outburst of sentiment against coercing the Turk to accept the note. All, including Mr. Disraeli, are enthusiastic about an Anglo-French entente, and Layard, Disraeli, and Derby are not above making personal attacks on Aberdeen either in Parliament or in the press, a procedure which is quite in order. But, on the other hand, we have Lord Claude Hamilton quoting Mr. Layard's works on Turkey in order to bear out his lordship's statements about the desolation and misery of those countries which were under Turkish rule.(2) And on January 31, 1854 we have Disraeli wishing to be assured that England is in cooperation with the other powers as well as with France.(3) But broadly speaking, the policy of these men connects very well with the popular ideas, (See Page 135.) those concerning the Prince Consort excepted. The Opposition goes along with the stream and helps to intensify the public opinion which has already been initiated.

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1. Marx, The Eastern Question, p. 110, (Aug. 18, 1853)
  2. Hansard, Vol. 131, p. 723. (March 13, 1854)
  3. Ibid., Vol. 130, p. 163.

Lord John Russell had little confidence in the Turk's ability to reform; in his memorandum of October 4, 1853 he quotes Stratford de Redcliffe's opinion of the chances for improvement in the conditions of the Christian subjects of the Porte. Lord John would not support the Turk to the detriment of his Christian subjects.<sup>(1)</sup> Moreover, Lord John does not join in the popular cry of union with France and detestation of Austria. On the contrary, in two instances (June 19 and October 4, 1853), we find him advocating action in conjunction with France especially, but also with Austria. But there is one instance in which there is every reason to believe that Lord John changed his policy because of public opinion. It will be remembered that Lord John at first was of the opinion that the Turk must sign the Vienna Note, but changed his policy when the Porte refused to accept the note. (August 29th & 30th.) "The Examiner" of August 20 quotes Mr. Layard's statement that the Vienna Note was not less injurious to the Turk than the Menshikov ultimatum, and we may be reasonably sure that this statement is an echo from the daily press. (See Page 73.) Lord John's sudden change of policy can only be accounted for by the influence of public opinion. Lord John is too conscientious to join in the popular praise of the Turk, but will agree that the Turk shall not be coerced. On January 31 we find him loyally vindicating the Prince Consort in the House of Commons. But Lord John feels that he must not endanger his political position by opposing the war sentiment, particularly when he is well aware that Palmerston is likely to make political capital out of the same.

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1. Walpole, Russell, II, pp. 193, 194.

Stratford de Redcliffe became popular after the "country" decided that the Turk should not be compelled to sign the Vienna Note. It was well understood, of course, that Stratford had used his influence to bring about this very situation. But Stratford, as we know, had no feelings of exaggerated admiration for the Turk, and was, if anything, pessimistic about the prospects for thorough going reforms. On the other hand, he shared in the popular distrust of Russia and there is reason to suspect, may have had personal motives for opposing the Emperor Nicholas. Stratford was suspicious of Austrian policy, but was also suspicious of the French Ambassador and of anyone who might possibly undermine Stratford's position at Constantinople. His motives were, perhaps, more personal than popular, but he used the war-sentiment for the carrying out of his own policy. Moreover, he was known to be a friend of Palmerston, therefore came in for some reflected popularity.

Delane was a supporter of the Aberdeen Government, therefore "The Times" was opposed to all the popular ideas until late October when the war-fever was reaching its height. "The Times" would have taken up the cudgels for Prince Albert but Aberdeen and the Prince were both of the opinion that it would be better to let the matter rest until the opening of Parliament. (1) Moreover, Delane was at this time, opposed to the policy of the people's idol,-- Palmerston.

Although Palmerston seems to have been more expressive of the general policy of "the country" than any of the other leaders, still on examination we find reason to believe that he did not at first agree with each and every phase of popular policy. But

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 1. Greville, Journal, 111, p. 110.



Palmerston had an advantage not possessed by John Russell and various Opposition leaders,--the advantage of a gloriously warlike past. As Foreign Minister he had carried out such a daring and energetic policy that he was hated by the greater part of the potentates of Europe, and became persona non grata with the Queen and the Prince Consort. Therefore if Palmerston did happen to adopt a policy which met with popular disapproval he needed only to keep a judicious silence and the "country" believed, as was its habit of believing, that Palmerston was as warlike as could be imagined. Palmerston had supported Turkey when she refused to give up the refugees at the demand of Austria and Russia, thereby identifying himself with the Liberal or even Radical sentiment of the country. While Palmerston shared the general optimism about Turkey (perhaps he had read Mr. Urquhart's works), he was not possessed by an exaggerated fear of Russia. As late as September 21, 1853 we find him expressing a wish that England would be on friendly terms with Russia. He did distrust Russia's policy in the Near East. (See Page 32.) Of course, he coupled England and France together in all his Cabinet notes, and his personal recognition and approval of Napoleon's coup d'état had given the impression that he was a friend of the Emperor. But Palmerston carried out what would have been Aberdeen's policy in 1841 when the Four Powers acted in unison,--excluding war-ships from the Dardanelles in time of peace. We know also that he had no intention of supporting France when she first made her demands regarding the Holy Places. (See Page 33.) Lord Palmerston agreed with Clarendon and Aberdeen that the Turk must sign the Vienna Note, and certainly this policy was anything but popular. But, on the other hand, Pal-

merston answered Cobden with high praise of the Turkey which had no Poland and no Siberia. (1) Palmerston was the first to advise the Cabinet to send the fleets to the Dardanelles (July 4, 1853) even before news came that the Russians had crossed the Pruth. We find the "Examiner" making the same demand on July 2, (See Page 120) but perhaps this is an echo of the "Morning Post" or some other or perhaps all of the daily papers, the "Times" excepted. On July 12 Palmerston wrote the following comment on the second Nesselrode Circular; "It is the robber who declares that he will not leave the house until the policeman shall have first retired from the court-yard." (2) On July 16 "The Examiner" says; "The pretence that the occupation of the provinces is the counterpart to, or consequence of the presence of the fleet in Turkish waters is of monstrous impudence. It is as if a burglar should justify breaking into your house by alleging that a friendly visitor was on the threshold of your door." (3) Then we have Palmerston's criticism of Government policy (See Pages 43 and 44) repeated again and again in the press and in Parliament until war is declared. When Turkey declared war against Russia, Palmerston suggested that the Russian ships be bottled up in the Black Sea, and that France and England should form an alliance with the Sultan. (See Page 54.) He declared in his answer to the Prince Consort's memorandum that France and England were bound to defend Turkey by force of arms if necessary. (4) This was the popular view which had been gaining in strength during the summer. October 4 he writes to

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1. Marx, Eastern Question, p. 116.
  2. Ashley, Palmerston, II, p. 278.
  3. Littell, "Nesselrode's Last", Vol. 38, p. 556.
  4. Ashley, Palmerston, II, p. 287.

Russell that any new note should be subject to alterations by the Porte. He does not want a revival of the Vienna conference;"A Vienna conference means Buol, and Buol means Meyendorf, and Meyendorf means Nicholas..."(1) Clanricarde expresses the same sentiments later in the House of Commons. (See Page 76.) Evidently Palmerston's expressions are borrowed freely by members of Parliament. Palmerston does not ask for the abrogation of all former treaties between Russia and Turkey until after Sinope, when the country is out of hand. The very fact that Palmerston is persona non grata with the Queen and Prince Consort only adds to his popularity. It is interesting to note that Palmerston does not play out all his cards at once as did John Russell but awaits the course of events, and then keeps pace with them by making suggestions or suggesting policies larger in scope than those preceding. (2) On the whole we may say that Lord Palmerston is apparently the first to correctly gauge the currents of public opinion and that he identifies himself with them by suggesting those policies which he knows the "country" will approve.

The man who is most responsible for creating the fundamental or basic sentiment which paved the way for the war agitators of 1853--54 is David Urquhart. We have already discussed his connection in this regard in Chapter III so will merely mention him here. He is the creator of that incipient opinion against intriguing Russia and in favor of the brave noble Turk, which later became so

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1. Ashley, Palmerston, II, p. 288.

2. See Chapter II, pp. 40, 54, 61, 62.



overwhelmingly warlike. The influence of his books and writings may be traced in those articles on the balance of power, Russian intrigues in Denmark, the navigation of the Danube etc., which we find in the "Spectator" and "Examiner" of the summer and autumn of 1853. It is possible that some of these articles were written by him. But Mr. Urquhart wanted no intervention either Anglo-French or European, in Turkish affairs, and most fatal of all things, - Mr. Urquhart made accusations against the popular leader, Lord Palmerston. Mr. Urquhart could say as he saw the results of his work, "Mischief, thou art afoot." And he might as well have said, "Take thou what course thou wilt."

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