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THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

GRADUATE SCHOOL

Report

of

Committee on Thesis

The undersigned, acting as a Committee of the Graduate School, have read the accompanying thesis submitted by Wilma Emily Eustis for the degree of Master of Arts.

They approve it as a thesis meeting the requirements of the Graduate School of the University of Minnesota, and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

GRADUATE SCHOOL

Report

of

Committee on Examination

This is to certify that we the undersigned, as a committee of the Graduate School, have given Wilma Emily Eustis final oral examination for the degree of Master of Arts . We recommend that the degree of Master of Arts be conferred upon the candidate.

Minneapolis, Minnesota

May 28.....1919

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THE POLICIES OF FRANCE AND PRUSSIA

1865-1870

A Thesis submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Minnesota

by

Wilma E. Eustis

In partial fulfillment of the requirements

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THE POLICIES OF FRANCE AND PRUSSIA

1865-70

Chapter I

Introduction

Policies make and unmake nations. During this eventful third quarter of the nineteenth century, two of the most interesting figures of history acted as sponsors for the policies of France and Prussia. Napoleon III was generally considered a crafty diplomat. France, the strongest power on the Continent, stood back of him.¹ Bismarck was just entering the field of diplomacy as minister for the new state of Prussia. Indeed, there was even considerable evidence that all parties in Prussia did not favor the Bismarckian dreams. The same purpose dominated the work of both statesmen. Theirs was a struggle for power, power that would keep France the controlling force on the Continent, power that would make Prussia the new dictator of European affairs.²

1. Bernstorff Papers II; p. 100.

2. Lenz; Geschichte Bismarcks; p. 313.

Certain personal traits and conditions affected the work. With a vigor born of youth and health, Bismarck energetically grasped the European situation. Every circumstance was turned to help build Prussia's future greatness. In 1865 Napoleon's fatal illness began its deadly work, at a time when the Emperor needed all his strength and clearness of mind to control matters at home and abroad. Instead of squarely facing the situation within and without France, Napoleon refused to acknowledge the existing state of affairs. As a result there was a futile struggle in this changing order to retain French prestige.¹ Troubles of long brewing came to the boiling point in this period. Situations, complicated and unexpected, added to the difficulties. Bismarck realized that he had a game yet to win, so he dealt his cards and arranged his stakes accordingly. The contest was a close one, for Napoleon made a valiant fight and only a slight change in French policy at various points might have wrecked irremediably Bismarck's careful plans. One false move prepared the way for another until at last the various incidents and forces culminated in the great disaster of 1870.

While these European events were taking place there were also extensive changes worked out for good or evil within France and Prussia. The inseparable relation between domestic conditions and foreign success made it clear that the man who lost at home would necessarily lose abroad. Bismarck fully

1. Ollivier; L'Entrevue de Biarritz; Revue des Deux Mondes; June 1, 1902; p. 518.

appreciated this truth and acted upon it. While Napoleon realized that he must have popular support in order to rule at home, he believed that he could cover up the blunders made within the Empire by dazzling foreign manoeuvres. Alas for the Emperor, certain matters would come to the light. One by one he had alienated his old adherents; the days of his popularity were waning. In 1860 Napoleon was forced to the decision that any support would have to come from his old-time opponents. Consequently a Liberal Empire was now the only solution.¹

The decree of November twenty-fourth gave the Legislative Body a chance to review the government's policy, but it is probable that neither government nor country realized the full significance of this measure.² A little over a year later by the senatus-consult of December 31, 1861, parliamentary power was extended in the matter of finances.³ The Emperor was taking apparent steps toward his Liberal Empire, but the mere passage of decrees and laws would be valueless ~~except~~^{except} the spirit which originated these laws would remain active to enforce them. There was no evident increase in popularity for Napoleon as a result of these first two liberal measures. The 1860 Treaty of Commerce with England, an almost free-trade agreement, was extremely unpopular with the large and influential manufacturing class.⁴ The elections of 1863 revealed to the government its precarious situation. A new factor, the workman's party, made its first appearance.⁵

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1. La Gorce; Histoire du Second Empire; vol.IV: 120.
 2. Ibid; p. 120.
 3. Ibid; p. 152.
 4. Ibid; IV: 145.
 5. Ibid; IV: 270.

This group with its radical program was a small problem in the beginning, but was to grow to alarming proportions before Napoleon's downfall. The immediate danger for the Emperor was the union of the new labor and liberal group with the "men of 1848"¹. Thiers, candidate in four departments, was the most prominent man of the opposition. Persigny, leader of the government forces, stated that Thiers favored the replacement of the fruitful movement of action by sterile word agitation.² In a speech before the Legislative Body, Thiers introduced into the political vocabulary the ominous phrase "libertés nécessaires"³. Bribery and corruption even to the extent of changing the boundaries of electoral districts brought the result of the 1863 elections in favor of the official candidates.⁴ The elections were a triumph for "classical liberalism"⁵. It is significant, however, that the opposition,--Catholics, Protectionists, Monarchists, and Republicans--obtained nearly a third of the votes cast. Moreover, Thiers and Berryer, men of reputation, old hands at the parliamentary game, were elected. Because of their influence over the deputies, these two men were more to be feared than the democratic opposition.⁶

Napoleon was trying desperately to meet the internal situations. Possibly, if the Emperor had kept entirely out of foreign affairs, he might have been successful at home. His theory of "nationalities" and distraction from domestic turmoil by brilliant foreign successes would never permit a purely domestic policy. Rome was the point where Napoleon's foreign actions first

1. La Gorce; IV: 271.
2. La Gorce; IV: 229.
3. La Gorce; IV: 254.
4. La Gorce; IV: 232.

5. La Gorce; V: 388.
6. La Gorce; IV: 235.

touched his standing at home and ultimately his future policy in vital European questions. Napoleon at Plombières had started a game which he could not finish. With the exception of Venetia and Rome, the Kingdom of Italy stood as a unit. Austria was still an Italian power; the Pope still ruled at Rome. England who favored complete Italian unity was vexed with France for having left the task uncompleted, more than that, for having robbed Italy of Savoy and Nice. Venetia and Rome afforded fruitful fields for discord. In the Venetian struggle Prussia might side with Austria against France and Italy, but would Austria care to be indebted to her German rival? Could Napoleon hold the favor of the new Italian Kingdom and of his own Catholic subjects? The question of Roman liberty had now become that of the unity of Italy.¹ Could the Emperor pursue a dual policy and give aid to both?

The battle of Castelfidardo was the first incident which aroused the Catholics. That Napoleon should allow such action as the defeat of the Papal army by his ally, Piedmont, was treason to the Catholic cause; yet to prevent utter abolition of the papal territory by Garibaldi, French troops had occupied Rome.² Cavour had cherished the dream of Rome for Italy. In 1861, he had proposed that the French withdraw and that Italy herself guarantee Rome to the Pope.³ The death of Cavour ended this plan for the time being altho it presaged the September Convention. Ricasoli, now prime minister, sent Arese with a letter to Thouvenel untactfully demanding France to fix a near

1. Bourgeois; Napoleon III et Rome; p.200.

2. Ibid; p. 203.

3. Ibid; p.207.

termination of their occupation of Rome since the said occupation was an obstacle to Italy's national aspirations.¹ On March 16, 1863, Arese wrote to Pasolini, minister of foreign affairs in Italy, that Napoleon would do all in his power to secure Venetia, but it was impossible for the present to desert Rome.² But Napoleon had also stated that for Italy to say she must have Rome because she desired it was as foolish as for France to claim the Rhine. Arese's conjecture, that in view of the coming elections of 1863 the Emperor wanted to keep the Roman question in as favorable a light as possible before his Catholic subjects, was undoubtedly correct. For the time at least Italy could hope for no change in Napoleon's attitude.

Later Drougn de Thuys, called to oppose Thouvenel's position as minister of foreign affairs, signed the September Convention of 1864.³ The protocol required the transfer of the Italian capitol to Florence.⁴ This convention, more of a compromise than a settlement, left the Pope extremely bitter against the French,⁵ while the Italians looked upon Florence as only a stepping-stone to Rome.⁶ The more immediate result was the turning of Italian aspirations from Rome to Venetia. As early as December 1862 a German messenger was sent to Turin to inquire what would be the conduct of Italy in case of a war between Austria and Prussia. The reply was "One will always find us with the enemies of Austria". With the Italian desires centered in Venetia what other policy than alliance with Prussia might France have expected

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1. La Gorce; IV: 156.
 2. La Gorce; IV: 178.
 3. Bourgeois; p.211.
 4. La Gorce; IV: 535.
 5. Bourgeois; p.212.
 6. La Gorce; IV: 536.

Italy to follow in 1866? Not until after the whole disastrous period of 1865-1870 was over, did France realize the full significance of her Roman Policy. It was directly after Castelfidardo that the inimitable Cavour said in reply to M.Brassier de Saint Simon's protest against such violation of right,--"You will thank us some day for having opened the way for you"¹. In these trying days, France needed a Cavour not a Napoleon.

Both Napoleon's theory of nationalities and his belief that disorder and discontent at home could be blotted out by foreign gains led him into the Mexican affair. The immediate cause which brought Mexico to the foreground under the presidency of Juarez was the measure passed by the Mexican Congress July 1861, sanctioning the suspension for two years of debts written in the Foreign Conventions.² ~~The~~ governments, France, Spain, and England, were interested in Mexico commercially. The general opinion seems to have been that France, with full intentions from the beginning of setting up a monarchy in Mexico, was the promotor of the joint expedition. On the strength of unpublished documents which came to him in his official capacity, M.Mon, former ambassador of Spain at Paris, contended,--"The Mexican affair finds its birth in the energetic resolution taken by the Spanish government to employ the action of intervention to get satisfaction for demands, to set up a stable government in the form Mexico desired"³ The United States was invited to join the Convention of London

1. La Gorce; IV: 530; from Nicomède Biancho--Storia documentata; vol.VIII: 356-357.

2. La Gorce; IV: 19.

(These debts were incurred thru damage to property in the Mexican Civil War.)

3. Archive's Diplomatiques 1863; I pt 2: 43.

signed between Paris, London and Madrid.¹ Seward replied in a circular d espatch that the United States was opposed to all monarchical government and to European interference in the American Continent.² Only the Civil War prevented the United States from actively prohibiting French intervention in Mexico. The Soledad Convention of early 1862 bound the allies to respect the integrity of the Mexican Republic. This was the last joint action since France preferred to give a broader construction to all these agreements and to help actively in setting up a government in Mexico rather than passively to let the Mexicans take the initiative.

France was now left alone to carry on this glorious expedition. The French people were more interested in the affairs in Europe than in Mexico.³ M. de Boissy first brought the matter before the Senate saying, "I fear that we will but remain in Mexico at our expense and to the profit of others". Before the Legislative Body M. de Pierres exclaimed "We have our little sister Italy and now we add little brother Mexico. China? Syria? When will our family end?"⁴ The Maximillian candidature was not popular with Austria or Spain. England was indifferent. Italy with France favored it.⁵ The Tuilleries and the Legislature headed by Thiers and Berryer favored the prompt discontinuance of the expedition.⁶ Rouher, however, held the majority for the government. The Convention of Miramar bound the archduke with old

1. La Gorce; IV: 27.

2. Stevenson, S.Y.; Maximillian in Mexico; p.22.

3. La Gorce; IV: 75.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid; p.317.

6. Ibid; p.323-4.

debts even before his accession. In Mexico the Austrian was enthusiastically received since he appeared to the people as the fulfillment of their ancient tradition of a prince from the East with blond hair who was to be their savior.¹ By 1866 everyone had become tired of the Mexican affair and the French journals clamoured for evacuation.² Affairs in Europe and the close of the Civil War in America made no other plan than evacuation advisable.³ Maximilian elected to stay and began his last desperate attempt to rally his forces. He was captured at Queretaro and on June 19, 1867 was court martialled and shot. The Mexican expedition for France was disastrous, draining her resources in money and men at the very time when she needed to be strong to meet the European situation. Nor did it add to Napoleon's glory, rather it was a deadly blow to his popularity and prestige, a veritable mill-stone in his European policy.

As surely as the Emperor was ruled by the exigencies of the day, just as surely did Bismarck control the questions of his early ministry to the profit of his bigger future plans. The idea of German unity was of long duration. By 1859 Prussia had come to the conclusion that "Germany without Prussia would be merely the plaything of the other European powers".⁴ Nevertheless, she claimed it was a sacrifice for her to give up her own respected position to take up the leadership thrust upon her. The struggle over the Constitution which centered around the military budget was becoming acute in 1862. All parties, the

1. La Gorce; IV: 334.

2. La Gorce; IV: 378.

3. Ibid; p. 384.

4. Lorenz; Kaiser Wilhelm und die Begründung des Reichs; p.37.

old Liberals, the Left Center, Catholics, and Progressivists, agreed in the principle no supplies without the approval of the Lower House¹ as the foundation and corner-stone of a constitutional state. The Lower House refused the budget which the King, determined that Prussia should not meet another Olmutz, considered essential to his military program.

In such a situation, Bismarck was called to the ministry² on September 1862. He was considered a "dyed in the wool" Junker and was a member of the Kreutz-Zeitung reactionary group. On the immediate question of the budget the Prime Minister said that Prussia was not England, that since expenditures were necessary to a state's existence, if these were not granted in the regular way, the royal government would have to provide for them.³ An address of the Chamber of Deputies to the King, January 29, 1863, asked for a return to constitutional life, stating "the Constitution is violated at this moment by the ministers"⁴. The King's dissolution of the Chamber only resulted again in the return of a majority hostile to the cabinet.⁵ Bismarck, called to the ministry, contrary to William's personal wishes, won over his sovereign by supporting the military matters in spite of the opposition of the majority in the Chamber and the lack of a budget.⁶ On September 1863, Bismarck stated his policy before the Budget Committee, concluding with the words "The great questions of the times will not be decided by speeches and decisions of the

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1. Von Sybel; The Founding of the German Empire; Vol.II: 509.
 2. La Gorce; IV: 406.
 3. Sybel; II; p. 514-515.
 4. Archives Diplomatiques 1863; vol.I pt I: 467-68.
 5. La Gorce; IV: 410.
 6. Matter; Bismarck et Son Temps; vol.II: 24-26.

majority--that was the great fault of 1848 and 1849--but by blood and iron".¹ The unfavorable results of the 1863 elections scarcely affected the minister of such a dictatorial government as Prussia. The truth was that his vigorous words and policy had disturbed the country to such an extent that moderates, as Bernhardt and Treitschke,² believed the dynasty in peril.

In any scheme for German Unity, the South German State had necessarily to be considered. Various plans of unity were projected such as the Bavarian which placed Prussia on a level with even the smallest German states and the Dahlmann plan which gave Prussia the leadership.³ In 1863 Bismarck had persuaded William not to attend the Conference of Princes called by Franz Josef for revision of the Federal Pact, mainly because he did not desire to see Prussia meet on a par with the lesser States as a subordinate to Austria.⁴ Incidentally, the measure for federal reform was lost since the unanimous assent of all members of the Diet was required.⁵ According to a letter of Prince Hohenlohe to Queen Victoria in 1865, Bavaria saw the salvation of the South German States in a "Triad", Austria, Prussia at the head of North Germany, and Bavaria at the head of South Germany. Various difficulties beset this plan. Many of the small rulers would give up none of their power to join a South German Confederation. Some of the Democratic party looked to the formation of a Federal State under Prussia. In their eyes Bismarck's government was only a temporary evil, after whose passing a national

1. Matter; II: 32.

2. Matter; II: 139-40.

3. Lorenz; p.16-18.

4. Matter; II: 157.

5. Loftus; Diplomatic Reminiscences; I: 21.

union would result; the Ultramontane party in Austria objected to a third group made up of Catholic and Protestant States; Prussia saw in the Triad an impediment to Prussian hegemony.¹ Not until 1866 was the upstart Prussia greeted with any favor by the older dynasties.² There might well be some uncertainty as to how far Bismarck was to be successful in his control of these states when the day for the breaking up of the old German Empire should come.

Although Bismarck believed that German Unity had to come about without foreign influence and from the national impetus within,³ European affairs could not be ignored since it was evident that Austria would never agree to Prussian hegemony,⁴ and consequently Austria would have to be expelled from Germany. This could only be accomplished thru war. In the numerous continental difficulties of the day, therefore, Bismarck had to choose carefully his policy. A false move might alienate a valuable ally or even incur the active hostility of some power. According to Émile Ollivier the year 1863 and the Polish Revolution opened the Bismarckian era.⁵ In January 1863 the storm broke in Russian Poland. All France and England were sympathetic with Poland, but the matter that raised the affair to international importance was the Alvensleben Convention concluded February eighth between Russia and Prussia. Even the Prussian people and the House believed that Bismarck had no other motive than the suppression of all freedom, and therefore voted that Prussia just

1. Hohenlohe; I: 136-137.

2. Lorenz; p. 15.

3. Matter; II: 88.

4. Matter; II: 387.

5. Ollivier; Poland Revue des Deux Mondes; p. 318.

replied that it was her purpose to keep the insurrection in Poland localized because of fear of trouble in Galicia. As Austria had refused to side with the two other partitioners so she must refuse the "identical note" project and keep her entire independence.¹ The States of South Germany disapproved Prussia's action and favored Austria's stand in regard to Poland.²

Buchanan at Berlin and Napier at St. Petersburg both assured Russell that they were convinced that the Convention had no political significance, that it was only an agreement on police regulations necessary to commerce. There was no clause on ratifications, either party could break the engagement at will.³ England, even less than the French government, restrained her feelings.⁴ She was only too willing to send protests to St. Petersburg in conjunction with France since England did not favor the "rapprochement" between her oriental ally, France, and her oriental rival, Russia.⁵ On March second to Napier at St. Petersburg and on March fifth to Cowley at Paris, Lord Russell sent despatches claiming the right of European interference on the basis

1. Archives Dip. 1863; I; pt. 2: 312.

2. Archives Dip. 1863; I; pt. 2: 443. Malet to Russell Frankfort

3. March 21, 1863.

3. Archives Dip. 1863; I; pt. 2: 388-394. The substance of the Convention: "If troops of one government are forced to withdraw upon the territory of the other they will be authorized to keep their arms and to recross the frontier as soon as they are in a position to do so; and the troops of either are free to follow the insurgents upon the territory of the other. The railways are also placed at the disposition of either government". Despatch Buchanan to Russell, Feb. 14 1863. Archives Diplomatiques 1863; I; pt. 2: 366.

4. Débidour; Histoire Diplomatique; II: 258.

5. Débidour; II: 247.

of the treaties of 1815 which granted autonomy to Poland.¹ Urged on by French public opinion, Napoleon much against his will accepted England's proposal.² With the pressure of both France and England upon her, Austria finally consented to go only so far as to make a diplomatic remonstrance to St. Petersburg.³ The tone of these notes varied from the harsh English to the gentle Austrian.⁴ Gortschakoff's replies (April 26) echoed the tone of each and refused thruout the right of the interference of the powers. Conditions in Poland grew worse rather than better. Finally on June seventeenth and eighteenth the three Western Powers sent notes placing as a basis for common action the well-known six points.⁵ It was generally believed that England would not use force to back these up. Palmerston had said, "Poland may count on our sympathies, not our material assistance". June eighth, Lord Russell in speaking to the House of Lords stated, "There would be no recourse to force".⁶ Austria, because of her exposed frontier and many nationalities, had repeatedly shown her unwillingness for war in behalf of the Polish people. Gortschakoff proposed that the three partitionary powers settle affairs, using the six points as a basis. The results would then be reported to the Western Powers.⁷ Austria, as an ally of the Western Powers,⁸ refused this. Perhaps feeling that she had performed her duty in regard to Austria and the other nations, Russia now proposed a

1. La Gorce; IV: 437.

2. Ibid; p.445.

3. Ibid; p.443.

4. Ibid; p. 449.

5. Ibid; p.454-455.

6. La Gorce; IV: 455.

7. La Gorce; IV: 458.

Archives Dip.1863; II; pt. 2:324. Napier to Russell St.P.July 18

8. Sybel; II: 601.

joint war with Prussia against France and Austria.¹ Prussia thru Bismarck refused such a move. The Prime Minister knew well that the war would have to be fought on Prussian territory, that the army in the process of reorganization was not ready, and that King William was still unwilling for actual separation from Austria. Above all Bismarck did not care to have the peace terms dictated by Russia nor² be indebted to Russia for German unity. The Russian memorandum of September seventh absolutely declined any more diplomatic overtures on the Polish Affair.³

Napoleon was not satisfied with this outcome. There were many ills in Europe for which the Emperor believed the panacea for all would be a European Congress. November fourth, invitations were sent from Paris to all the greater and lesser European nations. The Congress was to arrange a new basis for the portions of the Act of Vienna which had fallen into disuse, had been violated, modified, or misunderstood.⁴ A Congress would discuss not only Poland but the Danish Duchies, Venetia, anarchy in the Danubian Principalities, and the Roman question.⁵ The German Confederation and Austria desired the bases of negotiation to be fixed first. All the other powers accepted, but England firmly refused, declaring she did not consider the Treaty of Vienna broken and ceasing to exist as did the Emperor.⁶ Lord

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1. Sybel; II: 602-603.
 2. Ollivier Poland; Revue des Deux Mondes; pp.344-345.
 3. Debidour; II: 260.
La Gorce; IV: 260.
 4. Archives Dip. 1863; II; pt.2: 188.
 5. Archives Dip. 1863; I; pt. 1: 50.
 6. Archives Dip. 1864; I; pt. 1: 45.

Russell wrote to Lord Cowley, November 25, 1863, "If the simple expression of opinions with no force to back the decisions of the majority of the Congress do not settle matters, it is probable that more bad feeling than before will be created. Her Majesty's government finds it impossible to accept the invitation"¹. Consequently, the affairs of the Poles were lost in the general European turmoil.

It is too broad a statement to say as La Gorce that Bismarck was the only beneficiary of the Polish affair.² England, because of the Oriental situation, rejoiced in preventing the alliance between France and Russia.³ Since France was now forced to seek the friendship of Prussia, the Emperor favored the Prussian-Italian Alliance of April 1866 which had Venetia as its prize. Thus Italy and Italian Unity became benefited indirectly, at least. The European attempts at intervention had certainly been of no aid to the Poles. The most disastrous effects were upon France. Since Napoleon because of Venetia could not ally with Austria, he was deprived of all his natural allies against his inevitable enemy Prussia, while Prussia had gained the valuable friendship of her Russian neighbors.⁴ In a sincere effort to carry out his theory of nationalities, Napoleon had been completely worsted. When the next occasion came in which this favorite theory should likewise have applied, it was used in

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1. Archives Dip. 1864; I; pt.1: 53.
 2. La Gorce; IV: 466.
 3. Ollivier-Poland; Revue des Deux Mondes; p.349.
 4. La Gorce; IV:466.
Ollivier-Poland; pp.349-350.

an opposite manner altho even more to the detriment of France.

The trouble over Schleswig Holstein had long been brewing. Holstein was distinctly German, a member of the German Confederation but united by a personal bond to the King of Denmark. Schleswig was both Danish and German in population, and was also attached to Denmark by a personal bond only. By the Treaty of London it was understood that the Duchies were united in an indissoluble union and Denmark agreed never to incorporate Schleswig as the Eider Danes had desired to do.¹ There was, nevertheless, considerable unrest and mistrust between the German States and Denmark. Denmark took the first open step March 30, 1863, making Holstein autonomous.² On November 13, 1863, Schleswig, now separated from Holstein, was virtually incorporated into the Kingdom.

Indignation was more than rife in Germany. The South German States all along had desired action in the Duchies on the part of the Confederation.³ They would have been only too glad to have another small state added to their number. Bismarck appeared inclined to look unfavorably upon war. However, to keep matters in his own hands, rather than to allow Saxony the leadership of the Middle States, he agreed to Federal Execution in Holstein (December 4, 1863).⁴ Austria in order not to be left out of the game acted with Prussia. December twenty-eighth a joint note from Austria and Prussia demanded that Denmark call

1. Matter; II: 193.
2. La Gorce; IV: 474.
3. La Gorce; IV: 477.
4. Ibid; pp.478, 480-481.

a Diet to revoke the November Constitution. Should Denmark refuse, Schleswig also would be occupied.¹ The German powers claimed that they would not enter Schleswig for conquest and that the integrity of Denmark would be respected.² January 10, 1864, an ultimatum was sent to Denmark giving her forty-eight hours in which to abrogate the objectionable Constitution. The old Rigarad was not in session, and there was not sufficient time to call a parliament under the new Constitution, hence Denmark was unable to meet the demands of the German powers.³ German troops penetrated into Schleswig and Denmark was rapidly being defeated.⁴

There need be no doubt that Bismarck had carefully viewed his European situation before taking decisive steps in the Duchies. This was simple to do in a question of such long standing. Bernstorff wrote in a memorial of October 1861, "A war for the just cause of Schleswig Holstein, which Prussia avoided in 1850, will blot out her former humiliation. It will be an outlet for the dark surging elements which always rise at times of excitement where no active policy exists. It will raise the self-esteem of the Prussian army, and above all will give Prussia a right to the leadership of Germany, while her opponents will no longer be able to say that their propter agenda trust in her is not propter acta. By this means the opposition of the German governments against all that emanates

1. La Gorce; IV: 493.

2. La Gorce; IV:493.

3. Archives Dip. 1864; I; pt. 2: 373. Russell to Plomfield Feb. 24, 1864.

4. Matter; II: 190.

from Berlin will be broken at last. It is an opposition which only finds support thru the lack of energy in Prussia.¹ If as far back as 1861 a war over the Danish Duchies was of a great importance as Bernstorff's Memorial indicates, then on the day when Denmark had taken overt steps it was worth risking a bit on Prussia's part to bring about the necessary war. As far as France was concerned, Prussia had little to fear. Because of the Vienna Treaty of 1815, Napoleon disliked Austria, but Prussia was a new power, a power not strong enough to overthrow the European equilibrium, a power friendly to progress, so the Emperor could with safety and pleasure favor Prussia.²

The English were the leaders in the defense of Denmark, yet Bismarck did not seem to feel it necessary to make particular overtures to them as he did to the French. When the Diet of the Confederation proposed federal execution, following the patent of March thirtieth, England urged the Diet to refrain from taking such action.³ The affairs of Schleswig were international in character and could not be decided by the Frankfort Diet. It was now England's turn to propose "identical notes" and France's turn to refuse. Drouyn de Lhuys claimed that

1. Bernstorff Papers; II: 102.

2. La Gorce; IV: 359.

Bernstorff; II: 159. From Bismarck ~~Fahrbruch~~; VI: 147.

Bismarck to Bernstorff, Paris July 15, 1862.

"The Emperor will meet us as far as he can, that is, he will further the division of Schleswig if we desire it, and will probably get Russia to do the same, but hardly so far as to England and Austria and he will not quarrel with England about it. Before we have got strong enough at sea to cope with Denmark, we should not waste any words on the matter. But with three or four ironclads we would be in a position to settle the matter."

3. Archives Dip. 1864; I; pt. 1: 13. Russell to A. Malet Sept. 29, 1863.

France was interested in the integrity and independence of Denmark but that the Polish affair had proved mere "identical notes" useless. France did not care to be again placed in the undignified position of refusal. For the time being she would maintain her liberty of action.¹ When Napoleon's proposition of a General European Congress on all the ills of Europe was presented, England, altho interested in Denmark, tho that it was advisable to refuse such a dangerous project.² The demands of Prussia for the revocation of the Schleswig Constitution and the Federal execution of December seventh again drew England into the field. Gortschakoff had previously assured London of his support in Danish affairs.³ It was time for action. Lord Wodehouse sent from London, expressed in conjunction with the representatives of Russia and France, the desire that Denmark withdraw the November Constitution, but the Danish ministers refused to yield.⁴ Denmark thru the English press and the sympathies of the English people felt rather certain of assistance from her sister naval power.⁵ On January twenty-sixth, 1864, Lord Russell wrote to Napier that the English government had not disadvised resistance in Schleswig. Russia, England, and France, then France, Russia, and Sweden joined in efforts to secure a delay in the Prussian and Austrian action. Denmark did attempt to call a new Rigsrad but the effort

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1. Archives Dip. 1864; I; pt.2: 50-51. Gray to Russell Sept. 18, '63.
 2. La Gorce; IV: 463.
 3. Archives Dip. 1864; I; pt.2: 72. Gortschakoff to Brunnow
St. Petersburg September 12, 1863.
 4. Walpole; Life of Lord John Russell; II: 387.
 5. Walpole; Russell; II: 388.
FitzMaurice; Life of Granville; I: 452.

was useless since Austria and Prussia denied the delay of six weeks asked for.¹ On February first 1864 the allies crossed the Eider.² Palmerston and Russell urged material assistance on the part of England. Lord Palmerston on his own responsibility told the Austrian minister, "If an Austrian squadron were to pass along our coasts and ports and go into the Baltic to help in any way the German operations against Denmark, I should look upon it as an affront and insult to England. That I could not, and would not stand such a thing and that unless in such case a superior British squadron were to follow with such orders for acting as the case might require, I would not continue to hold my present position".³ The Cabinet, however, did not indorse Palmerston's language to Austria. Queen Victoria, because of family ties, was very much opposed to any anti-German policy. The "manufacturer's peace party" fought against war. Furthermore, the concurrence of France could not be secured. Drougn de Lhuys said that England with her navy could easily carry on a warfare on sea by means of blockades and the like, but France as a neighbor of Germany could not carry on war with land forces without great danger and probable insinuations as to the French desire to conquer Rhine lands which would arouse all Europe against France.⁴ Moreover, in this instance Napoleon played behind his theory of nationalities, claiming that many of the people of Holstein were German and did not desire to come under the rule of

1. Archives Dip. 1864; I; pt. 2: 364.

2. La Gorce; IV: 497.

3. Walpole; Russell; II: 392.

4. Archives Dip. 1864; I; pt. 2; Russell to Cowley, London, January 30, 1864.

Denmark, hence "he could not lay himself open to the charge of pursuing one policy on the Eider and a totally different one on the Po"¹.

With the same persistence that France exhibited in the Polish affair, England now, other measures failing, proposed a conference.² Austria and Prussia accepted the invitation without any basis.³ Monrad for Denmark accepted but desired the 1851-52 arrangements to be the foundation for discussion altho⁴ this should not be to the exclusion of other arrangements. France thot the conference a fruitless measure for the solution of the⁵ Danish question but did not refuse to be represented there. The first call of the conference on April twentieth found the German delegates not present. But on April twenty-fifth the conference again met with all ready for business. There was a state of disagreement all thru the London Conference. Krieger of Denmark maintained the "absolute and solid character of the engagements taken by the Treaty of London". Bernstorff, on the other hand, contended that the Treaty of London was concluded "not between all the Powers who signed but between Denmark and each of the other Powers"⁶. This position held by the Prussian minister as good as stated that the Treaty of London did not make the Danish question an international affair. The various attempts made by the English representatives to save Denmark from losing

1. Walpole; Russell; II: 390-391.

2. La Gorce; IV: 501.

3. Archives Dip. 1864; I; pt. 2: 378.

4. Ibid.

5. Archives Dip. 1864; I; pt. 2; p.56.

6. Archives Dip. 1864; II; pt. 1: 21. London Conference May 12, 1864.

the whole of the Duchies were blocked by the absolute refusal¹ of Denmark to concede one iota. The Conference closed June twenty-fifth with no settlement made. An armistice had been concluded for the period of the Conference. Germany was now free² to procede without fear of further intervention in her warfare. The Danes implored aid from both England and France, receiving³ assistance from neither. The war ended July eighteenth. August first the preliminaries were signed; October thirteenth by the Treaty of Vienna Schleswig, Lauenburg and Holstein were ceded by Christian IX, indivisibly to Austria and Prussia. On September twelfth between the preliminaries and the treaty a deputation from North Schleswig appeared before the King of Denmark begging their sovereign to believe in their loyalty and imploring⁴ some measure to spare them from the enemy's yoke. Denmark, deserted by those who should have befriended her, was forced to bow before her conquerors. Would those who selfishly forgot that ancient monarchy ever meet the day when they too should bend and break before that same dread policy of "blood and iron"?

1. Granville; I: 469.

2. Beust; Memoris; p. 260.

3. La Gorce; IV: 512.

Despatch M. Torben Bille to M. Bluhme London July 15, 1864.

"Understand there is no real rapprochement between the Cabinets of England and France, both mistrust the other. The English Cabinet is not entirely convinced that France has not a secret understanding with Prussia relative to our affairs and the Cabinet of Paris always has the fear that in case of a great European crisis, England will place herself on the side of the enemies of France."

4. Address presented September 12, 1864 to the King of Denmark by a deputation of the inhabitants of North Schleswig:

"We affirm loudly that the people of North Schleswig are Danish, heart and soul, that they tremble at the idea of being placed in obedience to their sworn enemy-----It is with the energy which despair inspires that we come to beg the aid of the throne of the nation. We are not able nor wish to understand that the King of Denmark or the Danish people can consent to

Bismarck in his first adventure had judged his Europe rightly and well. England had again demonstrated that "she opposed every change in European systems by diplomatic notes and afterwards recognized the fait accompli".¹ Russia, too, would go no farther than diplomacy.² The Prussian Prime Minister feared most of all France. At this time France was still recognized as the leader of the Great Powers.³ But Denmark was not a field to tempt the Emperor. Sufficient rebuffs in his other schemes led Napoleon to procede carefully in order to insure himself of praise.⁴ From the conversation which Bernstorff had with the Emperor at Compiègne in 1861, it was evident that France would not give material aid to Denmark. Rouher admitted after the London Conference that the "liberation of Venetia" or the Rhinelands took precedence over Denmark altho he believed that if England took action the Emperor would follow.⁵ Prevost-Paradol looking back to Sadowa and seer as he was looking into the future as well wrote in 1868 "Yes, France will have to expiate, one way or the other, with the blood of her children, if she succeeds, with the loss of her greatness, perhaps of her very existence, if she fails, it is the series of faults committed in her name by her government since the day when the dismemberment of Denmark was commenced under her eyes, since the day when France favored that great disorder in the vain hope of profiting by it".⁶

sacrifice their own flesh and blood as long as there remains any army in a position to fight and a fleet intact to defend and protect Denmark." Archives Dip.1864; II; pt. 2: 238.

1. Bernstorff; II: Papers II: 152.
2. Bernstorff; Papers II: 102.
3. Bernstorff; Papers II: 100.
4. La Gorce; IV: 519.
5. Walpole; Russell; II: 395.
6. London Quarterly Rev. 1863-4; p.201.

Chapter II

Gastein thru Sadowa

The full significance of the Schleswig-Holstein struggle now became apparent. Since Bismarck's entry into the ministry he had become convinced that Austria would never consent to a new Germany. Austria must therefore be expelled from Germany.¹ War seemed the only effective method to accomplish this radical step. Schleswig-Holstein would furnish the casus foederis.² Bismarck's intention since 1864 had been to annex the Danish Duchies to Prussia.³ Would Austria allow Prussia to do this? The first evidence of antagonism between Austria and Prussia appeared in the debate in the Diet over the proposal of Bavaria, Saxony, and Electoral Hesse that the Duchy of Holstein be given to Augustenburg.⁴ Since condominium of the Duchies "compromised the good understanding between their governments and the interests of the Duchies" the Gastein Convention of August 14, 1865 was concluded.⁵ Prussia was clever enough to introduce clauses which would prepare for her future rule in the Elbe Duchies. The separation of the two Duchies was greatly regretted by the people of Holstein who expressed their dissatisfaction both to the German Diet and to Bismarck.⁶ Three days

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1. Matter; II: 387.
 2. La Gorce; IV: 525.
 3. Loftus; I: 40.
 4. La Gorce; IV: 555.
 5. Archives Dip. 1865; II; pt. 2: 6-8.
 6. Archives Dip. 1865; II; pt. 2: 13-14.
Archives Dip. 1866; I; pt. 2: 339-40.

after the protest of the Holstein nobility, Bismarck complained to Werther at Vienna of the Austrian administration in Holstein. Disagreement followed between the two German Powers as to the exact nature of the Gastein Convention. Austria then brought the question of the Duchies before the Diet, an act in violation of Gastein. Could Bismarck carry this to the point of war? Was the situation at home and in Europe ready for a conflict?

Russia, whom Prussia had befriended in the Polish Revolution would maintain a benevolent neutrality. She preferred a strong Prussia, her sure ally, rather than a powerful Austria, her bitter opponent of southeastern Europe.

England, absorbed in her Reform Bill, was not concerned with continental affairs. She had expressed her disapproval of the Gastein Convention because she considered "violence and conquest" as its only basis. In the dispute which arose out of this she considered Austria entirely in the right. However, England's hatred of the Vatican and sympathy for Italian Unity might lead her to permit a war which would ensure Venetia to Italy. "Better a dozen wars than that Venetia should remain crushed down, as she is, by sheer brute force, than the spectacle of wrong permanently triumphant and the priest and the soldier combining successfully to trample down a free race of a higher civilization than their own!" A united North Germany and an

1. Ollivier; La Politique Française après Sadowa; Revue des Deux Mondes; May 15, 1903: p.315.

2. Matter; II: 416.

3. Archives Dip. 1865; II; pt. 2: 12-13.

4. Loftus; p. 43.

From the Spectator of Apr. 7 1866. English Sympathies in German Affairs: Living Age 89: 350.

5. Ibid; p.351.

enlightened rule over the little feudal states would be witnessed with pleasure in England. Unless Belgium were endangered, she¹ did not care enough to take any active measures on either side. Bismarck, therefore, need not worry about Russia or England.

The relations between France and Prussia had been growing steadily more friendly. France, still considered the greatest power on the Continent, had carefully been courted. It remained to be seen how far she had been won. The value which France placed upon a possible Prussian alliance was shown in her action in the Schleswig-Holstein affair. French disapproval of Gastein disturbed relations somewhat; Bismarck, however, was able to smooth this over.² The neutrality of France was essential to Bismarck's free action. What might be the price of it? "Feelers" had been sent out from time to time from Berlin, but Napoleon had never committed himself definitely.³ At Biarritz Bismarck undertook to sound the Emperor. The minister of state pointed out that France needed the Prussian Alliance as a bulwork versus Russia. Prussia, on the other hand, preferred an alliance with civilized France rather than with barbarous Russia.⁴ Napoleon was little interested. Affairs of State in his condition of physical suffering had entirely lost their poignancy. He dreamed rather of a federation of all people, with solidarity of economic interests and settlement of international differences

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1. From the Spectator of May 12 1866; The Emperor and the War; Living Age 89; p.682.
 2. Archives Dip. 1865; II; Pt.2: 10-11.
 3. Ollivier; L'Entrevue de Biarritz; Revue des Deux Mondes; June 1 1902; p.493-4.
 4. Eves Dropping at Biarritz; Blackwoods; Feb. 1867; p. 195.

in Congresses by arbitration. His desires varied with the wind. One day Nigra would have ground to report to his government, "The Emperor desires to obtain Rhine frontiers"; the next day, "The Emperor has renounced all aggrandizement. He does not care for a Rhine Venetia". From such a man as this, Bismarck could gain little satisfaction. The sentiment among ministers and diplomats was that there had been a momentous conversation between these two leaders of policies, yet none knew whether there had been a second Plombières or a tête-a-tête. Napoleon only went so far as to say that in return for her neutrality France must be rewarded for her aid in Prussian aggrandizement by the rectification of French frontiers and the coal fields of Saarlouis. Bismarck suggested, "Belgium possesses richer coal fields and Luxemburg, an important fortress, can be placed in French hands". In the general conversation which ensued Bismarck was convinced that "Venetia for Italy" was a project dear to Napoleon. The alliance of Prussia and Italy and the common antipathy for Austria might lead to at least French neutrality which was so much desired. Bismarck was ready to make a definite bargain with France, but the elusiveness of Napoleon led to the development of nothing further than suggestions. France lost an opportunity for clinching valuable territorial gains, while Bismarck was forced to leave with no definite agreement to aid him in urging Italy on to alliance.

1. Rotham; La Politique Française en 1866; p. 89.

2. Rotham; La Politique Française en 1866; p. 89.

3. Ollivier; L'Entrevue de Biarritz; Revue des Deux Mondes; June 1 1902; p.507.

4. Eves Dropping at Biarritz; Blackwoods; Feb. 1867; p.195.

Italy as a Prussian ally in a war against Austria was indispensable. One man of the time wrote, "Italy needs war as most other countries need peace."¹ Would it be difficult, then, to gain her alliance in a war versus her arch enemy Austria? Italy in the past had found in France a sure protector, and refused² now to move without the consent or assurance of her old friend. Arese, a favorite at Paris, was sent to interview the Emperor. He telegraphed back to Florence that Napoleon advised the alliance with Prussia; however, the French emperor emphatically stated that he counselled this as a friend and that no engagement on the part of France was implied.³ Drouyn de Lhuys said that Italy would attack Austria at her own risk and peril. Napoleon was eager for any step that would free Venetia from Austria and appease the Roman question. Earlier efforts, as the attempt to negotiate a sale of Venetia or to trade Roumania for Venetia, had failed.⁴ War over this point also seemed the only means to coerce Austria. In the meanwhile, Cavonne had gone to Berlin, ostensibly to study the Prussian army, in reality with full powers to negotiate. Bismarck had had difficulty in winning his sovereign over to friendliness toward Italy. King William was loathe to smile on the sworn enemy of Vienna. The Zollverein again proved useful for a treaty concluded between Italy and that trade union⁵ influenced William to favor Italy. It was English

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1. From the Spectator; The Coming War; Living Age; 89: 634.
 2. Matter; II: 325.
 3. Ollivier; Premier Conflit avec la Prusse; Le Luxembourg; Revue des Deux Mondes; May 15 1904; p. 242.
 4. Rothan; La Politique Française en 1866; p.84.
 5. La Gorce; IV; p. 568-70.
Rothan; La Politique Française; p. 85.
 5. Benedetti; Ma Mission en Prusse; p. 69.

opinion that "Italy is not acting without secret guarantee from Napoleon that she shall not be conquered.¹ The truth was that Italy still wanted to keep France in good humor. Even while negotiations were going on for the Prusso-Italian treaty at Berlin, Govonne, without any request from the Emperor, many times suggested to Bismarck some territorial compensations that would satisfy France.² The facts of the case were that the Venetian question was the most vital to Napoleon. Consequently if he could be assured that war would guarantee Venetia to Italy, he would not oppose such a war. Italy had a lingering hope that "Vienna frightened by enemies on either side would withdraw from Venetia and the object of the war be obtained without a battle."³ Austria, however, made it perfectly clear that her honor would never allow the peaceful sacrifice of Venetia.⁴ On April eighth and offensive and defensive treaty was signed between Prussia and Italy.⁵

The next vital question was,--how did this war appeal to France? At Biarritz the Emperor had been non-committal. Now, however, since the war between Prussia and Austria seemed near, the Emperor himself greatly desired it. The Austrian and Prussian forces were well balanced; the war would drag out interminably, but if either won it would be Austria. It was Napoleon's plan to mediate when the contending parties were weary of the struggle. The price of mediation would be the rectification of French frontiers and Venetia.⁶ France would be the European dictator as

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1. From the Spectator; The Coming War; Living Age; 99: 635.
 2. La Gorce; IV: 625.
 3. La Gorce; IV: 582.
 4. Ollivier; Un Cas de Conscience Diplomatique en 1866; Revue des Deux Mondes; April 15, 1903; p.725.
 5. La Gorce; IV: 592.
 6. Matter; II: 346.

in the days of 1856. Venetia at any event must be secured. Altho France denied direct negotiations with Italy, it has been discovered that they were in progress. On May fourth the Emperor wrote to Nigra the following formal proposition: "Finally Austria has shown herself disposed to cede Venetia on condition that Italy and France remaining neutral would let Austria indemnify herself in Prussia by the conquest of Silesia. The cession of Venetia would be made to France who would cede it to Italy. One reservation was insisted upon, namely, cession and conquest were to be simultaneous.¹" The Emperor asked if Italy could free herself from her Prussian alliance. It was evident at this time that Austria and France were aiming to get Italy on their side in order to check Bismarck in his war game. They did not know that the Count had another card to play in stirring up the national sentiment of the people who, if they would not fight for the Elbe Duchies, would shed blood for the Constitution of 1849.² It was certain that Austria would never accede to this Constitution.³ The result here would also be the exclusion of Austria thru war. Bismarck was saved working this alternative plan openly, for La Marmora replied to Napoleon III that he would prefer war rather than the cession of Venetia at the hands of France; especially if that cession would not be by universal suffrage.⁴ France, therefore, carried on negotiations alone with

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1. Rothan; La Politique Française en 1866; p. 132-3. Persigny; Memoirs; 2: 359.
 2. Rothan; La Politique Française en 1866; p. 136. Ollivier; Un Cas de Conscience Diplomatique en 1866; Revue des Deux Mondes; Apr. 15, 1903: p134.
 3. Benedetti; Ma Mission; p. 93.
 4. Ollivier; Un Cas de Conscience Diplomatique en 1866; Revue des Deux Mondes; Apr. 15, 1903; p. 729.

Austria. On June twelfth ~~Grat~~¹ concluded a treaty of three articles by which Austria agreed if victorious "to cede Venetia and not to change the territorial state created by the war of 1859 on condition that the Emperor keep absolute neutrality and make all efforts to obtain the same attitude from Italy.¹ However the war might result, Venetia would go to Italy. Napoleon breathed easier for thru Venetia Rome was saved.²

Napoleon now wanted war. He could not see the danger in a strong, united Teuton neighbor; he saw only the need of turning attention from his failure in Mexico and the growing discontent with the government at home.³ In his Sunday speech at Auxerre, it was obvious that he intended to gain from the struggle the breaking up of the hated 1815 treaties and to satisfy all national and democratic aspirations short of stimulating any people into revolutionary enthusiasm⁴". The 'Economist' in an article of May fifth estimated the position of Napoleon as follows: "France holds the key to the situation and she would have used it already to prevent war if she had wished to do so."⁵

Whatever Napoleon may have wanted, the French people, society, commerce, army, and peasantry were clearly opposed to war. The bourgeoisie were discontented; the peasantry were stirred up by the curés who disapproved of the Mexican and Roman policy.⁶ They desired liberal concessions from the imperial dynasty. What

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1. Ollivier; Un Cas de Conscience Diplomatique en 1866; Revue des Deux Mondes; Apr. 15, 1903; p. 746.
 2. Rothan; La Politique Française en 1866; p. 58.
 3. Ibid; p. 58.
 4. From the Spectator of May 12, 1866; The Emperor and the War; Living Age; pp. 89: 682.
 5. From the Economist of May 5, 1866; The Prospects of War; Living Age; 89: 637.
 6. From the Spectator; The French Chamber; Living Age; 89: 172.

would France gain from a possible war? Venetia only appealed to the clericals as a safeguard for Rome. France had no surety for even a rectification of her frontiers. Biarritz had resulted in no binding agreement. Along in the early spring, directly after the Council of Ministers in Berlin, Goltz was sent to Paris to negotiate with Napoleon. Goltz presented the Letter of William to Napoleon. This letter stated war was not for annexation solely, but for the unity of Germany of the North under Prussia, and of the South under Bavaria to the exclusion of Austria.

"Now what will be the price of France."¹ Napoleon hinted about the frontiers of 1814 and Rhenish Bavaria, but he realized that the king's aversion to the cession of Prussian territory would prohibit these from being turned over to France. The Emperor concluded with a characteristic phrase, "We will see later." The Prussian government can count on my benevolent neutrality, and the King on my friendship."² It was impossible for a statesman like Bismarck to believe that his colleague could allow such stupendous changes in Europe as Prussia proposed unless there was some compensation. Bismarck was uneasy. At the time of the signing of the Prusso-Italian treaty and of the excitement over the Federal Reform, Bismarck talked of compensations with Benedetti. Since the French minister had no instructions, he could not negotiate.³ All these valuable opportunities when Bismarck, still uncertain of his game, was anxious to please, were allowed to pass by. Thiers and his followers took their habitual stand

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1. Ollivier; Le Première Candidature Hohenzollern 1866; Revue des Deux Mondes; 171: 771.
 2. Ibid; p.772.
 3. Rothan; La Politique Française en 1866; pp. 137-8. Benedetti; Ma Mission; p. 91.

of opposition to Napoleon and his policy. They favored on their part a disunited Germany and Italy in order that the power of France might never be challenged.¹ Rouher claimed that France was unaffected by the new Germany. "The current of events have been irresistible, the increase of Germany has been the will of Allah."² Nevertheless, the ordinary French politician was extremely discontented with the inconsistent policy of Napoleon. Furthermore, what right had their Emperor under any circumstances to subordinate the interests of France to Italy?³ In the latter part of April Nigra wrote, "The prospect of considerable aggrandizement cannot make the Emperor decide to enter into a war against the wish of his country, after the manifestations of the legislative body."⁴

Bismarck had fully as hard a time at home as abroad to swing things his way. There was considerable doubt as to whether the German people would favor a war for the exclusion of Austria. The Particularistic elements were constantly gaining strength in their opposition to Prussian hegemony;⁵ the king likewise stood hostile to war.⁶ Only the military party had been eager for battle from the beginning.⁷ If possible, Bismarck would lead the king to favor a war for the Elbe Duchies. The disagreement with Austria over the interpretation of the Gastein Convention did become so serious that William finally called a Council of

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1. From the Spectator of May 12 1836; The Emperor and the War; Living Age; 89: 682.
 2. From the Saturday Review; M. Thiers on French Policy; Living Age; 89: 682.
 3. Rothan; La Politique Française en 1866; p. 418.
 4. Ibid; p. 126.
 5. Lenz; Geschichte Bismarcks; p. 276.
 6. Ollivier; Un Cas de Conscience Diplomatique en 1866; Revue des Deux Mondes; April 15, 1903; p. 741.
 7. Benedetti; Ma Mission; p. 31

his Ministers at Berlin on February 28, 1866.¹ The deliberation of the Ministers resulted in evidence of their desire for war. Would the King disagree? William finally expressed his opinion, "The possession of the Duchies is worthy of a war, but the explosion of war ought not to be hastened, for if it was possible to wait pacifically the end pursued, such a result would be always preferable. The decision depends upon the ulterior conduct of Austria. For the present Prussia confines herself to diplomatic negotiations likely to assure her favorable chances. Peace is desired, but if it fails after having asked God the right way be shown us, war will be considered as just."² The problem for Bismarck now was to make the "ulterior conduct of Austria" appear objectionable. Austria had sent some troops into Bohemia merely for the purpose of keeping order she claimed. Karolyi expressed to Bismarck Austria's regret as to the hostile intentions attributed to Austria in regard to Prussia.³ Nevertheless affairs between the German powers were becoming very strained; whereupon England proposed simultaneous disarmament.⁴ April fifteenth Bismarck had offered to discontinue her preparation for mobilization if Austria would take the initiative in disarmament,⁵ but on April twenty-first in reply to simultaneous disarmament Bismarck as good as refused since he insisted Austria's more complete armament would take longer to demobilize and he could

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1. Lorenz; Kaiser Wilhelm und die Begründung des Reichs; p. 53.
 2. Ollivier; La Première Candidature Hohenzollern 1866; Revue des Deux Mondes; 171: 770.
 3. Archives Diplomatiques 1866; I; pt. 2: 363-4.
 4. Rothan; La Politique Française en 1866; p. 146.
 5. Archives Dip. 1866; I; pt. 2; 387-9.

only follow Austria step by step. ¹ Because of the action of the Italian troops in Venetia it was impossible for Austria to withdraw her forces from Venetia. With no hesitation, Bismarck used this predicament of Austria as a proof of her treachery. As a result the aid of Italian action made it possible to win over the ² King.

Since Bismarck desired the national sentiment back of him, his work at home was not yet done. Only April nineteenth he had been forced to reply to an address presented to the King by the syndicate of the corporation of merchants of Berlin in favor of the conservation of peace. ³ The means by which to reach the people was thru the German question. In this his two levers ⁴ were the calling of a national parliament and universal suffrage. On March fourteenth the first day that Bismarck started negotiations with Govonne, the local paper came out with the statement that ⁵ federal reforms were to be considered. Treitsche in the following words gives his reaction to this move, "A strange and almost weird spectacle, that the thot of German Unity was thus brought before the unprepared people. It seemed as if the grandest idea of the century was a sword blow in a diplomatic tournament. Bismarck counted on pushing Austria to the wall. This he had announced. But the national program was for him not only a cause, but also a means, a weapon in the struggle." ⁶ It was

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1. Archives Dip. 1866; I; pt. 2: 391-2.
 2. Lenz; Geschichte Bismarcks; p. 292.
 3. Archives Diplomatique 1866; I; pt. 2 : 391.
 4. Penedetti; Ma Mission en Prusse; p. 104.
 5. Lenz; Geschichte Bismarcks; p. 295.
 6. Ibid; p. 296.

Bismarck's belief that federal reform would start in the Diet
greater confusion than war.¹ Neither the conservatives nor liberals
were completely on the side of Bismarck. The conservatives
reckoned that the man of the Junker party who could advise a
national parliament based on universal suffrage must have had a
"change of heart". Bennigsen, the leader of the liberals, said
that he and his party would neither oppose nor support Bismarck's
policies; they could not as yet believe in the seriousness of
Bismarck's propositions. He maintained in addition that Bismarck²
could not make war since the public opinion was against him.
To which Bismarck replied, "One does not shoot the enemy with
public opinion but with powder and lead"³.

The South German States and the surrounding little
states in the north had also to be considered. On March twenty-
sixth the Prussian government sent out two circulars to the
German courts. The first denounced Austrian armament and asked
the courts to join Prussia who had to arm for defense. The
second claimed, "The causes of ill-feeling between Austria and
Prussia are a result of the vices of the federal pact," and
asserted, "Prussia proposes institutions more conformable to the
true interests and demands of our times, namely, a German Parlia-
ment with the constituent directly elected by the electoral
colleges of all the states."⁴ In spite of the promise of valuable
territory and a federal pact, from all parts and all classes of

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1. Benedetti; Ma Mission: 93.
 2. Lenz; Geschichte Bismarcks; p. 305.
 3. Ibid; p. 305.
 4. Benedetti; Ma Mission; pp. 58-59.

the monarchy came pleas for peace. The deputies at Frankfort¹ were violently opposed to war. Public opinion which had refused to believe in a war between the two German States was at last awake to the danger. The Spectator said that in "the coming crisis in Europe" there were only two possibilities of peace; first that Frederick William might at the last hour when his troops were already in motion hesitate in the middle of a prosperous reign to play so tremendous a stake; second that Napoleon aware that a war would make a General who would not be himself, might once more demand a European Congress.² The latter was tried.

Because of the differences of opinion within France as to the part France should take in the approaching struggle, Drouyn de Lhuys urged a Congress to settle the three questions of the Duchies, Federal Reform, guarantees for temporal power of the Holy Father, and Venetia.³ May twenty-fourth was the date set for this assembly. Napoleon, paralyzed by the public opinion⁴ that Thiers had aroused, let the events take their course.⁵ "Justice on the Elbe as on the Adriatic" was the popular cry. The Emperor, pretending that he was in accord with the pacific feelings of his country, sent out invitations for a Congress to promote peace. Nigra seems to have felt that the Emperor sincerely⁶ desired a Congress. Clarendon accepted for England; Gortschakoff after a few objections that he made were met by modifying the basis

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1. Ollivier; Un Cas de Conscience Diplomatique; Revue des Deux Mondes; Apr. 15 1903; p. 739.
 2. From the Spectator March 31, 1866; The Coming Crisis in Europe; Living Age; 89: 285-6.
 3. Rothan; La Politique Française en 1866; p. 418. Archives Dip. 1867; I; pt. 1: 182.
 4. Rothan; La Politique Française en 1866; p. 158.
 5. Ollivier; Un Cas; Revue d. Deux Mondes; Apr. 15, 1903; p. 731.
 6. Ibid.

of the meeting of the Congress, also agreed. While these communications were passing back and forth, Bismarck was frantic. Even if he lost he could still hope to see his dreams realized for as he said, "I will have prepared the ground in increasing the abyss between Austria and Prussia and the liberal party coming to power will achieve the task I imposed upon myself." Bismarck now willing to concede anything reasonable was desperately anxious to know what the Emperor was after. Goltz could only get from Napoleon the words "equivalent compensation", "discussion of three questions", "demanded absolutely nothing". Since King William did not really wish war, he would undoubtedly assent, for in a Congress he could with good grace make concessions to Austria that he could not make elsewhere. Bismarck forced to go to the Congress said, "They wish that I go there, be it so, I will go; but it will be to put fire to powder, we will enter war." June first Austria replied that because of the nature of the three questions of Rome the Duchies and the Federal Pact she could not enter the Congress proposed for June twelfth without a basis for negotiation. Since Austria placed outside of all discussion the Italian difficulties England and Russia felt that the conference was useless and the Emperor had to relinquish for another time his favorite panacea. The opinion in England had been that a

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1. Benedetti; Ma Mission; p. 96.
 2. Ollivier; Un Cas de Conscience Diplomatique; Revue des Deux Mondes; Apr. 15, 1903; pp. 735-6.
 3. Benedetti; Ma Mission; p. 124.
 4. Ollivier; Un Cas de Conscience Diplomatique; p. 737.
 5. Archives Dip. 1866; II; pt. 1: 36-8.
 6. Ibid; p. 48-9.

conference may be all well and good "but if Prussia, Austria, and Italy really desire peace, they can lay down their arms without the aid of any Congress."¹ However, England earnestly desired peace and regretted that even this chimerical chance for a solution of difficulties had to be abandoned.² In truth Austria had saved the day for Bismarck since by refusing the Congress she appeared to provoke war. The King, now convinced that Austria did not wish peace was eager for war. Prussia again was saved.

Bismarck, not without hours of keenest anxiety and uncertainty, had at last lined up his Europe. Russia was passively friendly; Italy had become a party to an offensive and defensive treaty; England stood aloof; France was neutral, Napoleon asking in return only a guarantee from the Count "that after the war he would not proceed to any arrangement without an entente with him"³. The most important of all, Austria, appeared as the aggressor.⁴

Since Austria had referred the affair of the Duchies to the Diet June first, Bismarck could also claim this as provocation for war. Yet Bismarck declared that they would never go to war for the Duchies alone.⁵ Bismarck did his best to persuade Italy to take the aggressive in Venetia, but Italy refused. The three months of the Italian treaty's duration

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1. From the Saturday Review May 19, 1866; The Congress; Living Age; 89: 830.
 2. Archives Dip. 1866; II; pt. 1: 47-8.
 3. Ollivier; Un Cas de Conscience Diplomatique; Revue des Deux Mondes; April 15, 1903: 746.
 4. Benedetti; Ma Mission; p. 164.
 5. Loftus; p. 53.

were nearly gone. War had to come and come quickly. Prince Napoleon had fixed a project of alliance between Prussia, ^{France,} Austria, and Italy. This alliance could be used to hurry Italy into action. The Emperor absolutely refused to enter into such an agreement.¹ It was evident that Prussia would have to take the first step. Claiming that Austria had already broken the Gastein Convention, Bismarck ordered Prussian troops to go from Schleswig into Holstein. June eleventh due to this action of Prussia Austria brought the whole matter before the jurisdiction² of the Diet and demanded the mobilization of the federal army. Counting on the influence of this, Bismarck had intended as a counter proposal the demand made to the Diet to call a German Parliament elected by universal suffrage to offset Austria's proposal before the Diet. The statesman figured that Austria (since her voice would be feeble in such a Parliament) would have to fight or else lose her entire influence over Germany. The people would never fight against Germany unity realized in the Parliament. Thus, Austria would have to go to war shorn of her "natural allies".³ Bismarck demanded that a vote be taken on the proposition June fourteenth. Every vote against this was to be considered as a declaration of war.⁴ None of the German governments wished for war. Saxony was the only central State whose armaments were completed and this was not because of any

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1. Rothan; La Politique Française en 1866; p. 174-5.
 2. La Corce; IV; p. 629.
 3. From the Spectator 1866; Count Von Bismarck's Last Move"; Living Age; 89: 428-9.
 4. Ollivier; Un Cas de Conscience Diplomatique; Revue des Deux Mondes; Apr. 15, 1903; p. 739.

warlike intention.¹ Hesse, Saxony, and Hanover refused the Prussian summons. On June seventeenth, Bavaria who had seemed inclined towards the Prussian side, also refused and joined her smaller neighbors.² On June fifteenth war was declared. The struggle for power had begun.

The question of who was right in 1866, Prussia or Austria, is a perplexing one. Beust said "Either might be guilty, Austria who proposed in consequence of Prussia's arbitrary measures in Holstein the mobilization of federal forces, the Central States which assented to this motion; or Prussia who professed to see in that assent a violation of the Federal Constitution".³ In spite of Bismarck's efforts to make the war appear a struggle for German Unity rather than for the Elbe Duchies, his attempts to bring up the question of federal reform lost their desired effect thru the greater interest in the probability of war itself, regardless of the cause of war. Bismarck was forced in the end to use the situation in the Duchies as the casus foederis. Who ever may have been technically correct, Bismarck was morally to blame.

Contrary to Napoleon's calculations, the war was short and decisive. Sadowa came like a thunderbolt. Francis Joseph with moral and military defeat in his army was forced to seek French mediation.⁴ Could the French Emperor accept this request from Austria? There was still in the Empire that old

1. Beust; Memoirs; I: 288-298, 327.

2. Ollivier; Un Cas de Conscience Diplomatique en 1866; Revue des Deux Mondes; Apr. 15, 1903; pp. 751-2.

3. Beust; Memoirs; I: 278.

4. Ollivier; Sadowa; Revue des Deux Mondes; May 1, 1903; p. 19.

lack of unity in action and policy. One faction headed by Drouyn de Lhuys and Randon were inclined towards an alliance with Austria.¹ France must retrieve the loss at Sadowa for in Randon's words, "It is France who has been conquered at Sadowa".² Why delay! It was the general belief that the French army was powerful. Randon, minister of war, claimed that by calling the reserves France could have in a month an army of 450,000 men, not counting the armies of Africa, Mexico, and Rome.³ A mere military demonstration on Germany's unprotected Rhine frontier would intimidate Prussia into submission and bring some large compensations.⁴ The other faction led by Rouher and La Valette, both maintaining that France was in no position to wage war, besought the Emperor to keep peace.⁵ Napoleon, in a daze, did not realize the peril which threatened France.⁶ For a time, he wavered between these two parties for peace and war.⁷ Bismarck was not particularly worried whichever way the Emperor might decide; in fact he favored the French alliance with Austria rather than mediation. In the days before the war when Bismarck had been unable to let Napoleon state definitely his terms, the Prussian had contemplated persuading Austria that France was the real enemy of Germany, that Austria and Prussia should make a defensive and offensive alliance, divide Germany between them,

1. Matter; II: 457.

2. Ollivier; La Politique Française après Sadowa; Revue des Deux Mondes; May 15, 1903; p. 313.

3. Rothen; La Politique Française en 1866; p. 219.

4. Ibid; p. 190.

5. Ibid; p. 205.

6. Ibid; -. 192.

7. Matter; II: 454.

give Venetia to Italy, and the three all turn against France. A Prussian officer had been sent to investigate the condition of the French army and had reported that it would take France at least four months to put an effective army on the field. The facts of the case have shown that France had "no force to back up the Drouyn de Lhuys program after Sadowa". Furthermore, Napoleon's relation to the Prusso-Italian treaty would not permit it. Napoleon, however, fortunately chose the lesser of the two evils in deciding to act as mediator. After some delay Prussia accepted the French mediation. In England neither the Whigs nor the Tories favored French mediation. England would not repeat today her statement made after the war of 1866: "We have no fears at beholding Prussia take her place in the vanguard of political power because she is already in the vanguard of civilization-----She has solved the problem of the maximum of political strength with the minimum of standing armies." Russia rather than the matter was too large for France to handle alone and proposed that St. Petersburg, London, and Paris send a note to Berlin. Italy was furious at the possibility of stopping the war. Again she asserted that Venetia should come as the result of a military victory and not of diplomatic negotiations. The South German States, who now distrusted Vienna instead of Berlin, desired peace. Bismarck expressed his personal opinion as

1. Persigny; Memoirs; pp. 378-9.

2. Rothan; La Politique Francaise en 1866; p. 234.

3. Lenz; Geschichte Bismarcks; p. 315.

4. Matter; II: 462.

5. From the British Quarterly Review 1866; The New German Empire; Living Age; 92: 148.

6. Rothan; La Politique Francaise en 1866; p. 212.

7. Ibid; p. 196.

to French mediation in the few words that he was going to repay the Frenchman as soon as he had a chance.¹ In spite of this unfavorable attitude on the part of other countries, Napoleon might have gained much from his rôle as mediator. The public in France rather favored mediation, considering it a "crowning victory"² of French neutrality.

Did France gain anything from her pacific intervention? Again, Venetia, assured the Emperor, seemed to have prepared imperfectly for other interests. Benedetti, absolutely without instructions as to a definite basis of peace, was sent to Bismarck and the King to arrange for a truce.³ Bismarck was faced by the military party, supported by the King, clamoring to enter Vienna. This was the critical moment for France to make demands for compensation. Prussia's complete victory was so very near, yet so dangerously uncertain.⁴ As at previous times, in this most psychological moment Benedetti had not been given the power for negotiations. Bismarck's best judgment told him that he must yet make a friend of Austria, for France was his ultimate enemy. Thru the aid of the Crown Prince and his own inflexibility of purpose he at last won the King's consent to an armistice.⁵ In the meanwhile, Napoleon talked on in a rambling fashion with Goltz at Paris. Altho the Emperor seemed to realize that the French people would demand compensations, this same indefiniteness continued while the Preliminaries of Nikolsburg were arranged. Bismarck had more serious difficulties with William. The King

1. Hohenlohe; *Memoirs*; I: 157.

2. Rothau; *La Politique Française en 1866*; p. 192.

3. Von Sybel; *The Founding of the German Empire*; V: 304.

4. Rothau; *La Politique Française en 1866*; p. 261.

5. La Gorce; V: 46.

insisted that no little sovereigns should be deposed but that a little piece of each one's territory should be taken. Bismarck convinced him of the folly of this by showing that the people as a whole wanted to come under the stable rule of Prussia. The preliminaries were arranged satisfactorily to Bismarck if to no one else. The slight concessions made to France would never bother. As far as the voting of the people of North Schleswig was concerned, he remarked, "I shall take care that they do not vote until they are certain to vote quite impartially."¹ The other points would also in time be invalidated. French diplomacy on the surface did not seem utterly defeated since the integrity of Saxony and of Austria with the exception of Venetia was agreed upon, and since any junction of the United States of the South with the Northern Confederation would have to come from those Southern States themselves. Bismarck's own criticism on the results of the French mediation was that Austrian Silesia should have gone to Austria and that "bone of contention" between Austria and Prussia have been removed; the Southern States were practically thrown into the arms of Prussia, while a ground for² differences between them and Prussia should have been created. France was soon to learn also that a Bismarck could not be restrained by mere treaty stipulations. After Nikolsburg,³ Bismarck might well "laugh up his sleeve".

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1. From the Saturday Review of Dec. 29, 1866; Count Bismarck"; Living Age; 92: 252.
 2. Persigny; Memoirs; p. 380.
 3. Rothen; L'Affaire du Luxembourg; p. 20.

Chapter III

The Luxemburg Question

Following Sadowa, Paris was conscious that a power¹ had arisen to challenge French superiority. With the consent of France this power was gaining from three to four millions of people. Could France go empty handed in the face of this? Because French public opinion was hostile to Prussian aggrandizement, half-hearted attempts to conciliate this feeling had been made. But, as in every question, there was a split at court over the demanding of compensations. Nothing, therefore, had been definitely accomplished. "To demand nothing was to raise public opinion in France against the government of the Emperor and the foresight of his diplomacy. To demand and obtain nothing would but add to our disgrace and wound our pride."² La Valette and Rouher believed that the friendship of Prussia would be valuable. They counselled taking only such compensations as could be obtained in a friendly spirit. Drouyn de Lhuys and Randon maintained that France could get nothing without being backed by a military force on the Rhine.³

France should have had her compensations guaranteed before this time. Why had it not been done? Bismarck had shown his willingness at Biarritz. At Zwittau he had assumed that

1. Von Sybel; V: 240.

2. Rothan; La Politique Française en 1866; p. 348.

3. Ollivier; La Politique Française après Sadowa; Revue des Deux Mondes; May 15, 1903; p. 317.

Napoleon would probably make no objections to the incorporation of the smaller states of the north into the North German Confederation and had stated that he would be willing to comply with demands for compensation provided that France would not seek to enlarge her borders upon German soil (but in Belgium or French Switzerland) and should arrange the matter alone with Prussia without the intervention of other Courts.¹ Goltz had talked with Napoleon at various times during the month of July. On the thirteenth, Napoleon, entirely absorbed at that moment in the question of Saxony,² made no request for compensations. By the twenty-eighth the Emperor had reached the point where Goltz reported that Napoleon had asked him confidentially the day before whether at the final settlement of German affairs, France could not receive Laudan and Luxemburg,---saying that this would only give strength to the French defensive position without in any way affecting the security of Germany and that public opinion in Paris was very much aroused and threatened the dynasty if France should go away entirely empty handed.³ Drouyn de Lhuys with more decision informed Goltz that "All annexations upon the right bank of the Rhine would inevitably provoke an annexation on the left bank."⁴ The preliminaries of peace had been signed July twenty-sixth.⁵ Drouyn de Lhuys showed fine perception when he remarked, "Now there is nothing to do but weep".⁶ After Prussia had her victory clinched, the Emperor made an earnest beginning to try to wring

1. Von Sybel; V: 314.

2. Ibid; p. 294.

3. Von Sybel; V: 395.

4. Rothan; La Politique Francaise en 1866; p. 274.

5. Archives Diplomatique 1866; II; pt. 1: 403-7.

6. Matter; II: 468.

from Prussia some territory for France. Drouyn de Lhuys and Napoleon held a conference at Vichy. The Russian Congress proposal was refused. Also, Benedetti at Berlin received instructions to negotiate with Bismarck a public treaty for the territory taken in 1815, the provinces of Bavaria and Hesse on the Rhine including Mayence.¹ There was also a secret treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, to assure Belgium. For himself, Bismarck said, "I would prefer to disappear from the political scene rather than consent to the cession of Mayence."² August seventh he gave the King's refusal³ and advised the Emperor to push demands no further or war would result. France had run against the steadfast principle of the King to never cede an inch of German territory. With the undaunted persistence which should have evinced itself a month earlier, the French made another attempt. August sixteenth Benedetti received instructions in regard to Belgium.⁴ He drew up for Bismarck the projects of this secret treaty as follows:

Article I. The French Emperor admits and recognizes the acquisitions that Prussia has made at the close of the last war.

Article II. The King of Prussia promises to facilitate to France the acquisition of Luxemburg.

Article III. The Emperor of France is not opposed to the federal union of the North with the States of the South

1. Matter; II: 528.

2. La Gorce; V: 54.

3. Ollivier; La Politique Française après Sadowa; Revue des Deux Mondes; May 15, 1903; p. 328.

4. Rothan; La Politique Française en 1866.

of Germany with the exception of Austria--which union must be based on a common parliament and all respecting in just measure the sovereignty of States.

Article IV. Prussia will help France by arms if necessary to conquer Belgium.

Article V.¹ This is considered a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance.

At Bismarck's request Benedetti left this written copy in order that Bismarck might talk it over with the King. Incidentally,² Manteuffel left that very night for St. Petersburg. It has been suspected that he carried the terms of the treaty with him. Bismarck would promise nothing; he would delay giving a reply and thus prevent France from taking any part in the war. In the meanwhile, he would settle affairs with Austria. On August twenty-third, the Treaty of Prague was signed. The Luxemburg question, however, was not settled for eleven months more.

Napoleon had tried, but failed to win the complete following of his people and statesmen. M. Thiers, the outstanding opponent and critic of the French policy, maintained that France had not followed a consistent, intelligent plan, but had vacillated between action and inaction. It was not her business³ to preside over the rise of nationalities or the agglomeration of nations, but to stand by the balance of power.⁴ Thiers believed in a disunited Germany and Italy in order that France in comparison might be strong. Frenchmen were half inclined to

1. Rothan; La Politique Française en 1866; 383-4.

2. Ibid; p. 253.

3. From the Sat. Rev.; M. Thiers on French Policy; Living Age; 95: 190.

4. Von Sybel; VI: 88.

believe with Thiers that the Napoleonic foreign policy was too generous by half, a belief not conducive to the stability of a parliamentary dynasty.¹ Rouher defended the policy of the government asserting, "France is unshaken by altered Germany".² M. Thiers with Favre was opposed to any warlike policy. The question was whether France really wanted war. Defeat might cost Napoleon his throne; therefore, England did not believe that France would really enter war. It was perfectly evident that Bismarck feared a war with France, for he had made provision against that day thru the treaties with the South German States.³ The "war growl" of the French people was muzzled by their superiors.⁴ An English admirer of Napoleon wrote that if the Emperor had been ready for war, he would have appealed to arms, but "he alone of all the French nation seems to have estimated at its true gravity the impending struggle" and chose to reorganize his military force, biding his time until 1870.⁵ 1870, however, proved to be no more propitious than 1866.

The French people for a time retained their confidence in the Emperor.⁶ Conditions in Paris were very much disturbed. Instead of discrete conferences, all the ministers carried on open discussions with the foreign representatives of diplomatic affairs.⁷ The ministers, receiving no clear orders from the Emperor, veered whichever way they thought the wind blew. Certain

1. From the Economist of July 14, 1866; The Policy of France in The New Position of Europe; Living Age; 90: 444.
2. From the Saturday Review; M. Thiers on French Policy; Living Age; 93: 192.
3. France in 1866; London Quarterly Review; p. 158.
4. From the Spectator of Sept. 8; The Dismissal of M. Drouyn de Lhuys; Living Age; 91: 60.
5. France in 1866; London Quarterly Rev. p. 158.
6. Ollivier; La Pol. Française après Sadowa; R.d.D.M.; May 15, '03; 314
7. Rothan; La Politique Française en 1866; p. 305-307.

ones of them controlled the press. The Emperor himself was constantly compromised by the actions of his ministers who flaunted his personal views expressed in an informal chat as binding and official statements. As a result, the people never really knew the true state of affairs. Their early confidence in Napoleon began to wane. Ollivier sensed the situation when he said, "The principle of the French government is based on confidence in the strength of their Emperor whom they now believe ill and enfeebled. It is up to the Emperor to perform some strong, decisive act to restore confidence. He may do it by war or audacious liberal measures, but by no half-way timid actions."¹

Napoleon, since his sojourn at Vichy, was in better health, and now endeavored to enforce his own policy.² Contrary to his custom, he forgot for the moment the clamour of his people for compensations. Drouyn de Lhuys had to resign from office mainly because he was too ardent a champion of the policy of compensations.³ Napoleon had his views published under what became known as the La Valette Circular of September 16, 1866. It spoke of a possible alliance with Austria, friendship with England, and a "rapprochement" with Russia.⁴ All of these would counterbalance Prussian aggrandizement. Napoleon here stated, "Policy ought to raise itself above prejudices of another age. It is an error to believe that the grandeur of one country depends

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1. Ollivier; La Crise Intérieure après Sadowa; Rev. de Deux Mondes; June 1, 1904; p. 526.
 2. Rothan; L'Affaire du Luxembourg; p. 39.
 3. Ollivier; La Politique Française après Sadowa; Rev. de Deux Mondes; May 15, 1903; p. 337.
 4. Ollivier; La Politique Française après Sadowa; Rev. de Deux Mondes; May 15, 1903; pp. 345-6.

upon the enfeeblement of peoples who surround it; it is wrong to lament the dissolution of the German Confederation, the aggrandizement of Prussia, and the constitution of an Italian nationality.¹"

La Valette expanded on the idea of a Germany in three parts, a North German Confederation under Prussian hegemony, a South German Confederation under Bavaria, and Austria.² None of these would ever be sufficiently strong to threaten France. It is curious to note that this peace circular included a plan for military reorganization.³ Napoleon was a contradiction in his entire policy. When he felt too weak to oppose public opinion or his ministers, he would follow whichever was more insistent. At times when he was filled with vigor he carried out his own desires. Could there be any consistency in the policy of such a statesman? Nevertheless, even after all his shifting from a policy seeking for a rectification of frontiers, and then with apparently no consciousness of the weakness of the act turning to a policy of no compensations, there was a feeling at least in England that "though Napoleon's policy may appear foolish, he has some astounding plan which will regain at a blow his somewhat impaired prestige."⁴ Would that the French people might have had the same confidence in their ruler!

The growing unrest in France reacted upon Napoleon's mental peace. To prove his strength to his people, he began to build new plans. The Emperor discussed reforms with his ministers

1. Rothan; L'Affaire du Luxembourg; p. 52.

2. Ibid; p. 194.

3. Ollivier; La Politique Française après Sadowa; Rev. des Deux Mondes; May 13, 1903; p. 346.

4. From the Spectator; August 25, 1856; The Enigma; Living Age; 90: 763.

in the course of which Ollivier advised no augmentation of the army. The Emperor, however, still showed sufficient self will to insist that numbers in war were decisive.¹ Altho he valued the advice of Ollivier and Rouher on details of execution, Napoleon showed unusual determination and persistence in pursuing his own plans.² He attempted to give the promulgation of his projects to Rouher, but that minister opposed, as did La Valette, these liberal reforms and threatened to resign. As a result, on January nineteenth Napoleon gathered his ministers together,³ thanked them for their zeal, and demanded their resignations. At the same time he sent to the *Moniteur* a letter stating his reforms. These were to achieve the "crowning edifice of firm government through closer touch with public powers."⁴ The new measures would give the people of the street more voice, bringing in one more conflicting element on foreign policy. The Emperor now revised his ministry. Niel replaced Randon in the War Ministry, Moustier became Minister of Foreign Affairs, and strange as it may seem, Rouher, Minister of Home Affairs. In fact, the Emperor weary and ill took part only in critical moments; Rouher virtually became the director of the policy of the Empire. Could this reform program have been quickly carried out, it would have complicated matters for Bismarck.⁵

Now that the war was settled, Bismarck had turned with full energy to the interior conditions of Germany. In

1. Ollivier; *La Crise Intérieure après Sadowa*; *Rev. des Deux Mondes*; June 1, 1904; p. 527.

2. *Ibid*; p. 532.

3. *Ibid*; p. 536.

4. *Ibid*; p. 537.

5. Von Sybel; V: 243.

order that his work of interior reorganization might be accomplish-¹
ed unmolested, he proceeded cautiously in his foreign policy.
He had entered the war in spite of public opinion; he must now²
conciliate the King and his people. The Peace of Prague was
considered as a hindrance to the Unity of Germany. Bismarck was
to prove the contrary.³ The Prussian liberals came to tolerate
Bismarck, for he seemed to have partially, at least, liberalized⁴
the Conservatives. Hanover was the only state which raised
serious objections to joining the Confederation. She was soon
settled. The others, Hesse, Saxony, and the Elbe Duchies, de-
manded with varying degrees of emphasis to be fused with Prussia.
All his energies could now be placed upon the new Constitution.
There were to be three powers, namely, the federal council, the
parliament or diet, and the president or king. The federal
council was to be the representative of the Confederate States.
Of the total forty-three votes Prussia was to have seventeen.
The diet was to be elected by universal suffrage and was designed⁵
in appearance to satisfy the liberal party. The various govern-
mental powers were detailed among the three divisions. The Con-
stitution arranged that relations with the South German States
were to be regulated by special treaties approved by the federal
council.⁶ There was more or less haggling over the various points

1. Rothan; L'Affaire du Luxembourg; p. 90.

2. Lenz; Geschichte Bismarcke; pp. 322-3.

3. Lorenz; p. 90.

4. From the Saturday Review; The North German Parliament;
Living Age; 93: 199.

5. Benedetti; Ma Mission en Prusse; pp. 211-213.

6. Ibid; p. 220.

of the Constitution. Bismarck urged, for the present at least, the adoption of the document as it stood. Otherwise, while it was yet weak, the Constitution might not withstand all the shocks, and the whole project would fall.¹ The King joined in entirely with Bismarck on the promulgation of the Constitution. On April seventeenth the Constitution was accepted by the allied governments of the North German Confederation.²

Bismarck was equally successful in his dealings with the South German States. His attitude, according to Von Sybel, was conformable with the Treaty of Prague which set forth some important stipulations.³ In the first place, none of the South German States were to be received into the North German Confederation until all the states desired admission. Second, there was to be no establishment of international relations with any of the Southern States which would not have been permitted to a Southern Confederation by the Treaty of Prague. Third, in every case, a third party which had not participated in the treaty should be refused absolutely the right to interfere with its execution.⁴ The Southern states who wanted to join directly with Prussia were forced to wait. It was only a matter of time, however, before all would be absorbed into a German Confederation. On the seventeenth of August, Baden signed a public treaty with Prussia which Wurtemberg had already signed the thirteenth. Bavaria followed the twenty-second with Hesse Darmstadt a close rival.⁵ Bismarck,

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1. From the London Review of March 2, 1867; The North German Confederation; Living Age; 93: 58.
 2. Von Sybel; The Founding of The German Empire; VI: 197.
 3. Ibid; p. 222.
 4. Von Sybel; The Founding of The German Empire; VI: 222.
 5. Archives Diplomatique 1866; II; pt. 2; p. 186-227. (Treaties of peace concluded between Prussia and the various German States)

realizing his power, had absolutely refused to treat with these little states until he was back at Berlin. Then, Von der Pfordten, pleading for more leniency towards Bavaria, received this significant reply from him, "What do you expect? Austria is interceding¹ for Saxony, Russia for Wurtemberg and Darmstadt, no one for you." The French demands for Mayence came just in time for Bismarck to demonstrate to the Southern States the futility of dependence upon Napoleon.² Count Bismarck went further in concluding secret conventions of offensive and defensive alliance which provided that all the forces of these smaller states were to be organized under the Prussian system and in case of war should be under the command of Prussia.² Bismarck announced these treaties as his reply to Thiers and Rouher's debate in the spring of 1867. Again Bismarck had his Germany well in hand. There could be no uncertainty as to whose policy ruled. His struggle for power had progressed so far that it was now Prussia who had become the first Power in Europe.³

Austria, the seeming object of Prussia's wrath, had been treated generously and with moderation. She had been forced to give up her leadership in Germany and to hand over Venetia to Italy. Her own action in requesting the mediation of France had driven her German allies from Austria since among both the South Germans and Liberals at Vienna, this was considered as treachery. Consequently these elements turned toward Berlin.⁴

1. Hohenlohe; Memoirs; I: 159.

2. La Gorce; Histoire du Second Empire; V: 70.

3. From The Spectator of July 7; The First Result of The Ten Days' War.

4. From The Economist of July 14, 1866; The Policy of France in The New Position of Europe; Living Age; 90: 446.

Austria's internal difficulties made peace the "sine quo non". However friendly the feeling of Beust might have been towards France, this financial bankruptcy and fear of Russia would insure Austria's benevolent neutrality.¹ Propitious as all Europe seemed, Bismarck had to take this into consideration since French demands might bring war.

Unwittingly Russia had nearly ruined Bismarck's plans by her proposal of a Congress to settle affairs of the war. French refusal had prevented this catastrophe. Altho she did not approve of the reorganization in Germany and Bismarck's treatment of the South German States,² in reality Russia rejoiced in the Prussian victory which assured her Prussia's friendship. In August of 1866 Manteuffel's report of the French demands strengthened the tendency of Russia against France. The big Giant's eyes were on the Orient. Prussia had never blocked her progress there as had Austria, France, and England. More than any other power,³ Prussia favored Russia's scheme of breaking the treaty of 1856. Any enemy to Austria, her rival in the Near East, made a favored Russian suitor. The Tsar wrote to King William, "Russia will never ally with the adversaries of Prussia. In return she wants aid in the future when the treaty of Paris is revised."⁴

England had consistently evidenced her lack of interest in European affairs. Whatever expression she had made

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1. Rothan; L'Affaire du Luxembourg; Appendix; Reunion of Heads of Rothschild House at Frankfort; July 1867.
 2. Rothan; Luxemburg; Appendix; Bavarian Chambers and Military Conventions.
 3. Von Sybel; VI: 4-5.
 4. Ollivier; La Politique Francaise apres Sadowa; Revue de Deux Mondes; May 15, 1903; p. 336.

had been favorable to Prussia. England did not approve of the French demands for equal compensation.¹ She felt that a reconstituted Germany would ultimately be a benefit to France since innumerable temptations to war would be removed.² Neither did she favor Austria. The Austrian cession of Venetia to Napoleon aroused mistrust against Austria.³ In regard to Prussia herself she had written, "Even if the scheme of a German Parliament to be elected by universal suffrage inspires little confidence, it is unnecessary for foreigners to express an opinion on the internal affairs of Germany".⁴ In prophesying what the New Germany might be, England concluded that altho the army was strong and the bureaucracy numerous, if the army was of the people and the bureaucracy were Liberals, the people under these circumstances had only to will to be free.⁵ She even went so far as to declare, "In Germany English statesmen will recognize not merely a reunited nation, but a valuable ally."⁶ England would fight only in case Belgium were endangered, in which situation France would be the enemy.

Prussia's ally in the war, Italy, gave considerable trouble. In the first place, she had refused to accept the July armistice, and not until October third did she acquiesce to the Treaty of Prague. Italy was free from the "Alps to the

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1. Saturday Review of Sept. 29, 1866; England and Her Ally; Living Age 91: 353.
 2. Saturday Review of July 21, 1866; England and The Continent; Living Age; 90: 474.
 3. Spectator of Aug. 4, 1866; What Germany Will Become; Living Age; 90: 569.
 4. Saturday Review of Dec. 29, 1866; The Foreign Relations of Eng.; Living Age; 92: 479.
 5. Spec. Aug. 4, 1866; What Germany Will Become; Living Age; 90: 571.
 6. Saturday Review of July 21, 1866; England And The Continent; Living Age; 90: 474.

Adriatic" with the exception of Rome. This was to be the cause of the eventual downfall of France just as Venetia had been the saviour of Prussia. The September Convention of 1864 expired on December 15, 1866.¹ Consequently there would no longer be any French troops to protect the Holy Father. Furthermore, Sadowa² meant the fall of the last of the "Great Ultramontane Powers". The Italian people were all back of La Marmora's statement "that Italy had not pledged and will not pledge herself to tolerate the permanent sacrifice of Rome to the interests of the Catholic world, or the meddling of a power other than France in her internal affairs."³ With Napoleon it was a vital point of honor to save Rome as the temporal state of the Holy Father. In August Goltz and Moustier drew up a treaty which France and Prussia were to enforce.⁴ In this Napoleon hoped for a beginning of more friendly relations between the two governments.⁵ Bismarck replied that Prussia could see no advantage in such a treaty, and that furthermore Goltz had misrepresented his government.⁶ The project was blocked. Prussia could be sure that if France would give Rome to Italy, then Italy would become an ally of France.⁷ Although the French people's sympathies were against the Roman project, although the French troops were forced to evacuate Rome, Napoleon clung heart and spirit to the protection of the Pope's

1. Spectator; Sept. 15, 1866; Rome Three Months Hence; Living Age; 91: 125.

2. Spectator; July 21, 1866; The Effect of Sadowa on The Papacy; Living Age; 91: 486.

3. Spectator; Feb. 17, 1866; Napoleon and Rome; Living Age; 88: 199.

4. Ollivier; Premier Conflict avec La Prusse; Revue de Deux Mondes; May 15, 1904; 246.

5. Ibid; p. 248.

6. Von Sybel; The Founding of The German Empire; VI: 6.

7. Sat. Rev.; Feb. 11, 1866; Napoleon III and Italy; Living Age; 84: 475.

temporal power. While the Emperor had strength to enforce his wishes, Bismarck need not fear a Franco-Italian alliance.

Bismarck's foresightedness now stood him in good stead. His dreams were being realized, both at home and abroad, without antagonism, except in France. Napoleon if left in his natural lethargy might have allowed Prussia to progress uncontested. The French people were too wide awake to permit any such Napoleonic policy. As a sop to their demand for compensation, the Emperor was forced to raise the question of the cession of Luxemburg. This matter first brought up in the heated days of August had slid into the background while some internal problems were being alleviated. Before it could be entirely disposed of, it was destined to come onto the stage of a European Congress. This particular bit of territorial compensation is generally conceded to have come at the suggestion of Bismarck himself. There has been found in Rouher's papers a note written from La Tour d' Auvergne to Thouvenel (April 1862) which shows that France had even then a covetous eye upon the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. It was reasonable to believe that Bismarck was sincere and would carry out his promises. The first definite proposition had come up in August; then, because of the absorption in the liberal reforms,

1. Benedetti; *Ma Mission en Prusse*; p. 186.

Rothan; *La Politique Française en 1866*; p. 389.

2. Bernstorff Papers; II: 156-7 (footnote). "The idea that we should lay claim to the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg as a set-off to our compliance to Prussia's acquiring a valuable increase of territory in the North of Germany is evidently well thought out, but it is hardly accurate to say it is possible. We must hold to this plan, in any case, and leave it to ripen. It would be dangerous to let our plan be known to people with fine sentiments of national honor as are at present exhibited in Berlin. The only person I know to whom one could venture to make such proposals is M. de Bismarck."

the reorganization of the army, and the execution of the September Convention in Rome, Moustier had allowed the Luxemburg question to drop.¹ December third Benedetti again approached Bismarck on this subject.² Thus far the situation stood as follows: According to the treaty of 1839, one third of the old duchy of Luxemburg was given to the King of Holland. Prussia had the right to garrison it.³ In a review of the conversations between Prussia and France, it can be seen that Belgium and Luxemburg had been repeatedly offered as a favorable reward for French neutrality. The duchy was a part of the old German Confederation but was not included in the new North German Union.⁴ Why Bismarck did not incorporate Luxemburg can only be a matter of conjecture. The Prussian minister, however, admitted that the right of the Prussian troops to garrison Luxemburg was doubtful since the old Confederation had broken up.⁵ Luxemburg was considered German by the States of the Confederation.⁵ Because he knew the German sentiment against the cession of an inch of German territory, whatever he himself thought, Bismarck played a dilatory policy and refused to broach the matter to the King or parliament. Bismarck went so far as to maintain, however, that if France would go ahead and secretly make the negotiation with the King of Holland, he could accept the matter as "fait accompli".⁶ The importance of this was that such a procedure would give him freedom of action when the news of the cession should finally come up in parliament.

1. Rothan; Luxemburg; p. 109-111.

2. Ibid; p. 92.

3. The Economist; The Situation in Europe; Living Age; 93: 479.

4. Rothan; L'Affaire du Luxemburg; p. 29.

5. Lenz; Geschichte Bismarcks; p. 343.

6. Lenz; Geschichte Bismarcks; p. 343.

Rothan; Luxemburg; p. 191.

After getting Bismarck's views the next step for France was to arrange matters with Holland. This ought not to have been difficult since the war had awakened great fear in Holland of Prussia.¹ Holland asserted that after the dissolution of the old German Confederation, Luxemburg and Limburg were no longer bound to Germany. Bismarck maintained a silence which worried the Dutch since they had heard rumors of Luxemburg being a topic of debate between France and Prussia.² Despite Moustier's inactivity, in February negotiations finally began between France and Holland.³ The French maintained that the interests of peace and the protection of the French frontier required that Luxemburg be theirs. They thus raised the question from sordid compensation to the higher plane of the nation's safety. Furthermore, the incorporation of the duchy would not violate the doctrine of nationalities. Napoleon asserted, "There does not exist a Belgian nationality; it is important to fix with Prussia this essential point."⁴ France, furthermore, would not be guilty of seizing by force any territory, however small. Accordingly Moustier announced to the Legislative Body that the consent of the Grand Duke would be procured, that the parties to the treaty of 1839 would be consulted, and that the vote of annexation by universal suffrage would be taken.⁵ Political agents were sent into Luxemburg to encourage the inhabitants in the desire for incorporation into France.⁶ As a result, there came to be a strong

1. Matter; Bismarck; II: 589.

2. Rothan; Luxemburg; p. 153.

3. Ollivier; Premier Conflit; Rev.d. Deux Mondes; May 15, 1904; p. 256.

4. La Gorce; Second Empire; V: 67.

5. Sat. Rev. April 3 1867; France and Germany; Living Age; 93: 177. Rothan; Luxemburg; p. 162.

6. Von Sybel; The Founding of The German Empire; VI: 117.

party in the Duchy who favored French rule. February twentieth M. de Lightenvelt asked Moustier, "What would be the attitude of France if Prussia attacked Holland?"¹ Napoleon immediately proposed that Holland make an alliance with France. This would be done with the "tacit consent" of Prussia. France on her side would leave Limburg and take only Luxemburg. Later, as further inducement, Moustier offered a big indemnity. Baudin demonstrated to the Hague the advantage of this cession made without injury to the German feelings.² France was desperately in need of territorial acquisition. If this was denied it might mean a war of which Holland would be the victim.³ Benedetti reported that all but the King at Berlin were favorable to the cession, but that acquiescence could not be made openly because of the feeling of the German people.⁴ The King of Holland, since the announcement of the South German treaties and the French debates on Sadowa, had begun to doubt the friendly relations of France and Prussia. March nineteenth, therefore, Baudin endeavored to make Prussia a third party to the treaty. Bismarck steadfastly refused, insisting that France must attend to the effect of the cession on Prussia, and that absolute secrecy was imperative.⁵ Apparently, induced by the indemnity offered, the King of Holland seemed decided to cede Luxemburg without the open consent of Prussia and all the signatory powers of the Treaty of 1839. March twenty-sixth King William III wrote

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1. Matter; Bismarck; II: 589.
 2. Rothan; Luxembourg; p. 169.
 3. Ibid; p. 170.
 4. Ibid; p. 201.
 5. Ibid; p. 191.

Napoleon that it was his intention to cede the Duchy. March
twenty-eighth the Prince of Orange reported the same to the
Tuileries.¹ Since the people of Luxemburg and Tormaco, their
minister, were also willing, the treaty was expected to be signed
March thirty-first.²

April first at the meeting of the Prussian parliament,
Bennigsen brought up the Luxemburg question. Contrary to
agreement, the King of Holland, wishing absolute surety, and know-
ing well the weakness of France as an ally in war, had written
the Prussian King before signing the treaty.³ This traitorous
step and Moustier's procrastination were responsible for the
failure of the cession of the Duchy.⁴ Feeling in Berlin ran
high. The King considered it "his duty not to withdraw his
troops from a place of which the guard had been entrusted by
Europe."⁵ Luxemburg as the gateway to Belgium and the Rhine
was strategically too valuable to surrender.⁶ The German press
declared Luxemburg German territory. With Prussia it was a
question of honor not to give up the Duchy. Bismarck, on his
part, attempted to quiet the assembly in his reply to the two
interpellations of Bennigsen. In the first place, he stated,
"The duchy is no longer an integral part of the Confederation
and has recovered its full sovereignty."⁷ In the second place,

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1. La Gorce; Second Empire; V: 167.
 2. Von Sybel; The Founding of The German Empire; VI: 131.
 3. Ibid; p. 126.
 4. Ollivier; Premier Conflict; Rev. d. Deux Mondes; May 15, 1904;
p. 269.
 5. Rothan; Luxemburg; p. 119.
Ollivier; Premier Conflict; p. 254.
 6. Ollivier; Premier Conflict; p. 255.
 7. Ollivier; Premier Conflict; p. 263.

he maintained that official diplomatic negotiations relative to
Luxemburg had not been entered into between France and Prussia.¹
The true feeling of Germany in this matter of the cession of
Luxemburg was evident. Bismarck sent the following word to his
minister at the Hague: "The King of Holland is independent and
has liberty of action, but he has also responsibility for it and
if he has seen up to the present in the transaction which he pur-
sues as a guarantee for peace, it is my duty to undeceive him."²
Tornaco who had been summoned by post was not reached in time to
sign, as planned, on March thirty-first.³ Since the assent of
Prussia had been one of the conditions for cession, the King of
Holland now considered himself "unbound" and refused to sign the
treaty.⁴

The air was heated with debates and popular demonstra-
tions of feeling in France and Germany. Will there be war;
will the "struggle for European supremacy" take this form?⁵ In
Germany the military party were eager for war. Moltke exclaimed,⁶
"Another such chance will not come in twenty-five years. The
Prussian party called for the defence of Luxemburg as a German
state. The anti-Prussian party maintained that it was the duty
of Prussia to repel France.⁶ If there ever was any feeling of
gratitude in Prussia for French neutrality, it had entirely disap-
peared. The essence of the popular feeling seemed to be that
the German States were being "unfairly sacrificed to the necessities

1. Ollivier; Premier Conflit; p. 264.

2. Ibid; p. 264.

3. Rothan; Luxemburg; p. 228.

4. Ollivier; Premier Conflit; p. 264.

5. The Economist; April 27, 1867; The Peculiar Danger of The
Threatened War; Living Age; 93: 532.

6. Von Sybel; German Empire; VI: 145.

of the French Empire.¹ The King and Queen stood alone for peace. It was not, however, what the royal heads might wish, but what Bismarck desired that would rule Prussia. The army was powerful; war at this point could not fail to aid in uniting the dissatisfied elements in Germany. Would Bismarck give the word for war?

Conditions in France were no more peaceable than those in Germany. Late in 1866, the military reorganization mentioned in La Valette's peace circular began to be carried out.² The Emperor himself realized the inefficiency of the veteran French army for modern war.³ Niel told Napoleon that he would be helpless on the battlefield unless the army could be increased. Niel and Thiers debated the question. The French people agreed with Thiers that the present army was sufficient for defensive purposes.⁴ Napoleon went ahead with his new military plan which would only give him the semblance of great power since he did not have the support of his people in this measure. All the while that he was agitating his military plan, he asserted his pacific aims. Napoleon did foresee a possible conflict with Prussia. He did not wish war, because he knew France was not yet a military equal of Prussia. Niel was urged to redouble his efforts in the army reform in case a conflict should take place.⁵ A war for Luxemburg would have been popular with the

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1. Sat.Rev.Apr.27, 1862; Will There Be War; Living Age; 93:533.
 2. La Gorce; Second Empire; V: 79.
 3. Rothan; Luxemburg; p.101.
 4. Ibid; p. 107.
 5. Ibid; p. 337.

French who wanted at least as much compensation as the Duchy.¹ Napoleon was held between two dangers, namely, the loss of his power and of French prestige thru weak inactivity or ~~thru~~^{thru} an unsuccessful war which would lose him his throne. He had failed in Mexico, at Nickolsburg, and in Schleswig, and in the eyes of many in Rome also. To maintain his influence, he could not give up the Luxemburg project. Who would win out in this phase of the struggle for power,--Prussia or France?

The attitude of the other states would have great effect upon Bismarck's policy, and possibly some upon Napoleon's. One attempt to line up a German power thru the Tauffkirchen mission to Austria had been rebuffed. Austria was offered a guarantee of all her German possessions, and temporarily of all her non-German territory as well as a number of political, industrial, and commercial advantages.² Beust, the hater of Prussia, declared, "Austria would never league against France who scarcely six months ago mediated in Austria's favor."³ Austria would, therefore, remain neutral. The South German States were rather non-committal. If anything, Wurtemberg influenced by Russia was opposed to war.⁴ Bavaria would not enthusiastically but dutifully abide by her treaty.⁵ Probably all the South German States would do as much as Bavaria.

Russia's opinion as to the cession of the duchy was unexpressed. Sir Robert Peel thought it an unlikely situation, that Russia, as one of the five parties to the Treaty of 1851

1. Ollivier; Premier Conflist; Rev.d.Deux Mondes; May 15, 1904; p.268
2. Rothan; "Luxemburg"; p. 337.
3. Ibid; p.338.
4. Rothan; Luxemburg; Appendix; The Resistance of Wurtemberg.
5. Hohenlohe; Memoirs; I: 2 ll.

"would view this annexation with indifference.¹ She went no further either way than to make it fairly evident that she desired the pacific settlement of the Luxemburg question.²

Italy was an uncertain quantity. France, on her part, was intriguing for Italian favor and attempting to replace Ricasoli with Ratazzi, for under Ricasoli's sane guidance there would be no difficulty between Italy and Rome. By this means France could best prevail since she needed some excuse to maintain her hold over Rome.

England distinctly disapproved of the war between Prussia and France.³ Queen Victoria wrote that she was in no position to aid Prussia.⁴ England would only favor Berlin because of "latent fear" for Belgium. Lord Stanley recognized that the French were reasonable in their demands and offered his "good offices". His view was that "the security of Belgium is an entirely different matter" than Luxemburg's independence since in Belgium "we are involved in a guarantee solemnly and deliberately entered into".⁵ England according to her custom was neutral.

Possibly because of European opinion, possibly for other assigned reasons, Bismarck was conciliatory. On one side, Von Sybel claimed that Bismarck was perfectly sincere throughout the Luxemburg affair; on the other side, Benedetti and Ollivier maintained that Prussia wanted a little more time to

1. Hansard; Parlia Debates; 156: 1250.

2. Matter; Bismarck; II: 599.

3. Ollivier; Premier Conflict; Rev.d.Deux Mondes; May 15, 1904; p. 271.

4. La Gorce; Second Empire; V: 188.

5. Hansard; Parlia Debates; 186: 1257.

6. Ollivier; Premier Conflict; Rev.d.Deux Mondes; May 15, 1904; p. 268-277.

consolidate her German possessions and organize her federal army.¹
At this critical time Bismarck went to Pomerania for the sake
of his health, possibly also to save his popularity.² The King
was left to deal with affairs.

Favoring peace, he still did not like the proposal of
Loftus to have a conference based upon Prussia's consent to
evacuate the fortrens. Bismarck on his return said that it
would be difficult to refuse the conference, but did not express
himself on the right of garrison.³ The people of Luxemburg frank-
ly desired independence. To push matters to war might endanger
Bismarck's German policy. He, therefore, welcomed Russia's
proposal of a congress providing⁴ that the basis for settlement
was satisfactory. Bismarck had at one time even expressed the
wish that the Grand Duchy become a neutral state so that it was
likely that he would be sane in his requirements and a peaceful
settlement would thus be possible.⁵

At this juncture, France seemed to recognize that a
peaceful settlement of the Luxemburg question was to her best
interest. Napoleon, therefore, expressed his consent to the
neutralization of the Duchy. Gortschakoff, asked by England to
be mediator, proposed London as the place for the conference to
open on May seventh.⁶ For a while longer Europe was to have peace.

As usual with diplomatic gatherings, the vital business
was all settled beforehand. Lord Stanley sent work to the various

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1. La Gorce; V: 188.
 2. Rothan; Luxemburg; p.344.
 3. Ibid; pp. 347-8.
 4. Von Sybel; VI: 201.
 5. La Gorce; V: 190.
 6. Rothan; Luxemburg; p. 376.

cabinets that the evacuation and dismantling of the Duchy was to be ruled on before the neutralization. Neither was neutrality to be placed under the collective guarantee of Europe. Bismarck insisted that neutralization should precede as a condition of evacuation, and that collective guarantee was the condition "sine que non"¹. At length the following was agreed upon: "Each of the Five Powers is to pledge itself in writing to declare war upon any Power which may attempt to seize this military position."² England, tho she felt this contrary to the Treaty of 1839 which gave the Duchy to Holland, finally consented.¹ Lord Stanley desired that the King of Holland as territorial sovereign send out the invitations.³

The European Powers, England, Russia, France, Austria, Prussia, and Italy, recently recognized, were represented. On May seventh, the difficulty over the collective and individual guarantee was settled by the La Chatre note of Brunow, leaving this question in such a way as to open the matter to either one's interpretation. May eleventh the treaty was signed and on May thirty-first ratifications were exchanged.⁴ The reaction of the three powers particularly interested was varied. In England there was, as always, the opposition and the government. Lehouchere, an opponent, said, "Press this doctrine to its legitimate consequences, and within a given time every spot of debatable land in Europe would have its independence and neutrality secured by a guarantee to which we should be made parties"⁵. Granville,

1. Ollivier; Premier Conflict; Rev.d.Deux Mondes; May 15 '04; p.273.

2. Spectator; May 11, 1867; Lord Stanley and The Luxemburg Question; Living Age; 93: 866.

3. Ollivier; Premier Conflict; Rev.D.Deux Mondes; May 15 1904; p. 272.

4. Von Sybel; VI: 210.

5. Hansard; Parlia Debates; 187: 1910.

Redcliffe, Derby and Clarendon complimented Russell on his
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procedure.

Bismarck was not completely the loser in the Luxemburg affair. The very fact that he was allowed to speak at the London Conference for the Confederation of the North and German interests was a tacit recognition of Prussia's conquests and
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position. For the time being, nevertheless, his prestige was injured.

France appeared the diplomatic victor. Moutier, forgetting that in 1866 France could have had the Grand Duchy outright for the asking,
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regarded the Luxemburg affair as the master stroke of his diplomacy. Now he saw only that France had been relieved of this dangerous garrison on her frontier and that she had been saved a war. Unfortunately, Paris did not consider
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the Luxemburg settlement a success. The people realized that it was only thru Bismarck's unwillingness to wage war again, contrary to European opinion and his king, that gave France this partial appearance of victory.

The final burst of the Empire's glory came in the Universal Exposition. This was purely a play time filled with wonders to gaze upon and comic opera to amuse one. The significance of this event lay in the relations between the various sovereigns. Altho the Emperor of France had invited the rulers to come at different periods, William and Alexander planned to be in Paris at the same time. The Prussian King deliberately counted

1. Hansard; Parlia Debates; 188: 158.

2. Rothan; "Luxemburg"; p. 403.

3. Ibid; p. 23.

4. Ibid; p. 408.

on this opportunity to come into closer relations with Russia. The illustrious trio of Bismarck, Moltke, and the King left together. Before going, Bismarck had signed the Convention which created the customs parliament made up of delegates from both North and South Germany. This would conciliate the people for the Luxemburg affair.¹ Bismarck now came to Paris to charm the people there into belief of ^{his} sincerity in this same matter of the Duchy. Leboz² claimed that "everyday Moltke studied the best method to attack Paris". William, as far as he was concerned, came solely to enjoy himself. Napoleon refused to believe that any of them came for any other purpose. Unfortunately Alexander had his enjoyment impaired by the cry of "Vive la Pologne" and the crude attempt of Perezowski to assassinate him.³ The outcome of this event cost France the friendship of Russia. The news of the execution of Maximilian came June nineteenth to further dampen the ardent spirits.⁴ The Emperor Francis Joseph because of this was unable to attend the Exposition. Some thought this affair would cause a rift between France and Austria. On the contrary, their common grief bound them closer together. As a result, when the Exposition was over, the Emperor's visit of condolence at Salzburg aroused grave suspicions that an alliance was being formed.

All the little princes had come after the Emperors and Kings had departed. Even Abdul Azis had lent his oriental color to the scene. If anything, Paris was even more magnificent than

1. Rotham; "Luxemburg," pp. 412-17.

2. Ollivier; Fetes at Paris; Rev. d. D. Monde; June 16, 1904; 811.

3. Ibid; p. 809.

4. Ibid; p. 815.

in the prosperous days of 1856. To all appearances the Exposition was a gorgeous affair. It was only these unfortunate circumstances which broke thru to prove that underneath the surface there was still dissension. Napoleon had had his last fling. It would soon no longer be possible to cover over the true state of affairs. Bismarck was becoming master of Europe; the power of France was nearly beyond redemption.

Chapter IV

Events Immediately Preceding The Franco-Prussian War

Ominous black clouds more threatening than those which had loomed over the dazzling Exposition now hung over France. It was sufficiently unfortunate to be estranged from the Tsar and to have the failure in Mexico threaten the invaluable friendship of Austria without having the Roman Question again become acute. December 15, 1866 had been the date set for the execution of the September Convention.¹ When Napoleon made this compromise settlement two years before, he had hoped that Pius IX would be dead before the term of the Convention ended and that France could then influence the election to gain a Pope less set on maintaining his temporal power.² France had not been saved from facing this perplexing matter in any such fortunate way. The Princes of the Church could reach no decision on what the Pope should do upon the withdrawal of the French military protection.³ The Pope believed that at the last moment the French army would find a pretext for remaining.⁴ Napoleon had helped the Holy Father to recruit his own army and true to the terms of the Convention evacuated Rome.⁵

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1. From the Spectator of Sept. 15, 1866; Rome Three Months Hence; Living Age; 91: 125.
 2. From The Sat. Rev. of Feb. 11, 1866; Napoleon III and Italy; Living Age; 84: 478.
 3. From the Spectator; Sept. 15, 1866; Rome Three Months Hence; Living Age; 91: 125.
 4. From the Spectator of Dec. 15, 1866; The Evacuation of Rome; Living Age; 92: 116.
 5. Bourgeois; Napoleon III et Rome; p. 216.

In the early fall of 1867, the appearance of Garibaldi, the unruly champion of Italian Unity, at the Peace Congress at Geneva presaged difficulties. Garibaldi entered Italy, pushing down into the pontifical territory. The papacy besought aid from its old friend, France.¹ Napoleon did not rush to succor the Pope. The truth of the matter was that Napoleon's own sympathies had been all along with the Italian Liberals, but as head of a great Catholic Power he could not appear to desert the Pope.² The ministry were divided between advocates for the clerical policy of intervention in order to win the catholics in the elections and for the Italian policy in order not to throw Italy into the open arms of Prussia.³ Nigra went to Biarritz to prevail upon Napoleon to refuse to intervene. The Italians greatly desired to be rid of the French occupation in Rome. Nigra's special task was to conciliate the French with the idea of an Italian army in Rome for the purpose of protecting the Holy Father. The Italians were not successful in holding back the Garibaldian forces so the Emperor ordered the troops to be amassed at Toulon. As a last resort, Nigra proposed that the Italian troops be allowed to enter the papal territory, but leave as soon as order was established. Nigra prevailed upon Napoleon to withhold from immediate intervention. The Emperor could not please both parties at home. If the Italians could protect the Vatican and would respect the papal territory, the clericals would then have no cause for complaints. The troops, gathered for embarkation, upon assurances from Italy

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1. La Gorce; V: 282.
 2. Jerrold; Napoleon III; IV: 338.
 3. La Gorce; V: 286-7.

were ordered to stay. Affairs in Italy came to such a point that ultimately the troops did sail, landed, and defeated the revolutionary forces at Mentana.¹ By this action France had for the time being alienated Italy. "Napoleon III henceforth did not have any confidence in Italy, and Italy hoped for nothing more from Napoleon."² Circumstances might in future days alter this unfriendly relationship.

A conference on the Roman question was proposed. Bismarck did not desire a conference, perhaps feeling as ^{the} Kreuz-Zeitung expressed it, "All the world knows today that it is only to make others share the responsibility of the enterprises which the French government contemplates against the temporal power of the Papacy."³ Prussia would not accept unless England did; Russia, out of courtesy to France and Austria, as a Catholic Power, accepted. England refused and consequently the Conference idea failed.⁴ France still had the Roman problem on her hands. The aged Metternich had remarked at Plombières, "The Emperor has still some beautiful cards in hand but the revolutionary empire will shatter on the Italian rock". Would his prophecy come true?

At Sadowa Napoleon had been hindered in his foreign policy by the weak condition of the French army. The Emperor and Randon set about to formulate a plan for the increase of the military forces. This proposed army reform was extremely unpopular.

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1. La Gorce; V: p. 306.
 2. Bourgeois; p. 217.
 3. Benedetti; Ma Mission; p. 236.
 4. Loftus; I: 196-99.

with all classes.¹ In forming his new ministry early in 1867, the Emperor secured the military genius, Niel, as his minister of War. Thiers, standing for the old system, debated with Niel, the formulator of the new project. The Army Plan was published in March 1867.² It was not voted until January 1868 when it went thru by a big majority.³ Marshal Niel's purpose was first to increase the number of soldiers to an active army of 415, 250 and a reserve army of 329, 318,⁴ then to complete the armaments and finally to measure the resources of Germany as a future enemy as well as to study strategy, topography, transportation, and administration in war-time. This admirable plan met opposition from the army who thought the old methods were good enough, from the Legislative Body which objected to the expense, and from the public. In spite of the difficulties which he encountered, Niel had accomplished a great deal by the time of his death in August 1869. General Leboeuf, his successor, at once allowed the work to slacken. Perhaps no greater misfortune could have happened to France than the death of Marshal Niel just at this critical time.

If the Emperor needed a stronger army to enforce the position of France abroad, he required fully as much more in order to ensure within France the continuance of the Liberal Empire. On the surface the home conditions appeared good, but the foundations were unstable.⁵ The 'L'Internationale' which started in Paris

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1. La Gorce; V: 330.
Lorenz; p. 169.
From the Economist Dec. 15, 1866; The Moniteur on the Reorganization of the French Army; Living Age; p. 124.
 2. La Gorce; V: 335.
 3. Ollivier; La Loi Militaire; L'Empereur et Niel; Rev. d. Deux. Mondes; June 15, 1905; p. 753.
 4. Ibid; p. 753.
 5. La Gorce; VI; 135-142.
 6. La Gorce; V: 373-375.

with only a membership of five hundred in 1866 had grown by 1869 to include seventy thousand members in Paris alone out of two hundred thousand members in all of France.¹ The Liberal Reforms promised by Napoleon in January 1867 attempted to satisfy the growing radical group.² In reality these liberal measures only gave greater opportunity for the socialist elements to attack law and order. The replacement of the Address by the right of interpellation wisely regulated gave the opposition a chance to question the government on every action or point of policy. The law on the press was not finally voted until March 9, 1868. Since there was such a long interval before its acceptance, the law did not have its full effect.³ The number of radical journals proves, however, that the correctional tribunals did not have power to control the press.⁴ The two great journals of the democratic party had been "L'Opinion Nationale" and "Le Siecle".⁵ Now after the press law went into effect numerous small papers arose as Victor Hugo's "Le Rappel", Deleschluze's "Le Reveil, a daily, and Rochefort's "La Lanterne". These all attacked the Empire and its democracy, serving to excite greatly the people and to weaken the authority of the government.⁶ Not only in Paris, but throughout the departments, the number of republican journals increased until under the Liberal Empire suppression was so very imperative that the prisons were filled with journalists.⁷ Napoleon had

1. La Gorce; V: 434.

2. Ollivier; La Crise Intérieure après Sadowa; Rev. S. Des Mondes;
June 1, 1904; p. 536.

3. La Gorce; V: 362.

4. Delord; Histoire du Second Empire; VI 37.

5. La Gorce; V: 394; for the alignment of the papers of the day
see Delord; VI: 30-32.

6. Delord; VI: 31.

7. Ibid; p. 42.

promised the Law of Reunion on the theory that if gatherings and cooperative associations were allowed to freely talk over their own matters, they would be less likely to discuss political questions.¹ Various societies were formed, anti-religious, intellectual, and socialistic, but all became the rendez-vous for the discontented elements and criticism of the government was rife.² There was an alarming resemblance to the days of the Jacobins and Girondists. The Second of December became a rallying cry. In all this confusion Napoleon, due to the death of his old associates, was left to depend upon new and untried young ministers. All the opposition groups united against the official candidates³ in the 1869 elections, but the rural districts saved the Empire. The conditions in France grew alarming. A special session of the Legislative Body met the last of June and July twelfth the reforms of the Senate and Legislature were completed.⁴ Rouher left his position as Minister of State for that of President of the Senate.

Ollivier after much persuasion agreed in December to form a new ministry. The group chosen consisted of unusually splendid men.⁵ Their early measures were overshadowed by the popular excitement due to the murder of Victor Noir and the trial of Pierre Bonaparte. After the passage of the *Senatus Consultum* by the Senate, the Emperor suggested to the Council a plebiscite.

1. La Gorce:V: 383.

2. Ibid; p. 446, 461.

3. Ibid; p. 486.

4. Ibid; p. 493-4.

5. Ollivier; Le Ministère Du 2 Janvier 1870; Rev.d.Deux Mondes;
June 1, 1907; pp. 533-4, 550.

Ollivier, in spite of the opposition it brought from the Left Center¹, promoted this measure, and took the credit to himself. The issue of the vote on May eighth was not simply the senatus consultum or liberal reforms, but the support or downfall of the Empire.² The towns and the army were hostile.³ Incidentally the count of the army votes gave Prussia the exact total of the French military forces.⁴ Confidence in the Emperor was expressed by a big majority and it appeared that the Liberal Empire was to bask peacefully in a flood of popularity.

Bismarck's whole policy centered about the unity of Germany. The interior conditions were, therefore, vital, even determining all foreign relations. After Nickolsburg the Liberals were somewhat disappointed because Saxony had not been annexed to Prussia. To them the formation of a North German League meant "division" not "unity" of Germany.⁵ Only Bismarck's hard work prevented King William from slicing up the smaller states rather than incorporating them as units into the League. The new parliament was predominated by the Liberal party and Bismarck, really a conservative, was forced to fraternize with liberals in order to use them for his ends.⁶ The federal pact was voted as Bismarck wished. An extraordinary amount of power was left in the minister's own hands since he was the only responsible minister.⁷ This North German League was to be the kernel of German unity. Right at

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1. Ollivier; Le Plébiscite; Rev.d.Deux Mondes; May 15 '08; p.286-97.
 2. La Gorce; VI: 113.
 3. Jarrold; IV: 437.
 4. Delord; VI: 138.
 5. Loftus; I: 105.
 6. Rothan; Luxemburg; Appendix; Bismarck and the Parliament of the North; Frankfort; Mar.10, 1867.
Benedetti; Ma Mission; p. 286.
 7. Loftus; V: 226.

first the states incorporated had seemed fairly contented. But by August 1867 the Crown Prince Frederick reported to Bismarck that the government was plainly losing the confidence of the national party and that there was "bitter feeling" in Hanover, Hesse, and Frankfort especially.¹ The effect of the French liberal reforms upon Germany was to make the tyranny in the conquered countries seem even greater.² The national party was strong and waited with impatience to cross the Main and effect true German Unity. Matters in North Germany itself were reaching a critical point.

The Treaty of Prague had stipulated that the South German States should enter the Northern Confederation only as a unit and upon the desire of all the Southern States.³ The task for Bismarck was not easy. Baden led in the agitation for union. Wurtemberg whom Prussia had favored did not dare to show open opposition to Prussia. Bavaria, as the largest and strongest of the South German States, desired a South German League which she dreamed of directing. Austria and France favored this South German League.⁴ Austria nourished the hope of eventually leading a South German League under Austria as a balance for the North German Confederation under Prussia.⁵ The jealousies between the States of the South kept them from forming a League which would have given them a more independent political status.⁶ This

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1. Correspondence of William I and Bismarck; Crown Prince Frederick to Bismarck; August 1, 1867.
 2. Ollivier; La Prusse et La France au Commencement de 1870; Revue d. Deux Mondes; May 1, 1908; p. 6.
 3. Lorenz; p. 89.
 4. Ibid; p. 69.
 5. Wertheimer; Graf Julius Andressy; p. 443.
 6. Rothan; Luxemburg; Appendix; Program of Prince Hohenlohe; Frankfort; Jan. 20, 1867.

division helped Bismarck. Prussia followed the policy of leading rather than forcing the Southern States. The demands of France for Rhine territory in 1866 had made it comparatively easy to conclude the military conventions of August 22, 1866.¹ These were further codified at the Stuttgart Conference.² The States, however, reserved the right in this final settlement to examine the casus foederis.

Besides these military treaties, the Zollverein re-organized provided a commercial bond. A Customs Parliament at Berlin comprised representatives of the Reichstag and of the four States of the South. Bavaria and Wurtemberg did not elect men of the "unitary" party.³ Considerable unrest was caused by this Parliament since the question was whether the discussion would be kept upon purely economic matters.⁴ Bismarck did not care to coerce the Southern States; therefore he was satisfied with the progress made thru these two avenues. There could be no doubt of the final plan to consolidate Germany. At the opening of the Reichstag (February 24, 1867) King William had said, "For the attainment of this mutual understanding our hand will be held out frankly and willingly to the countries of South Germany as soon as the North German Confederation shall have made sufficient progress in the establishment of its Constitution." Prussia had taken the preliminary steps; when would it be time to conclude matters?

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1. Rotham; Luxemburg; App.; Benedetti to Moustier; Berlin Mar. 9; 1867
 2. Hohenlohe; I: 188. Journal Jan. 25, 1867.
 3. La Gorce; VI: 131.
 4. Benedetti; Ma Mission; p. 142.
 5. Hohenlohe; I: 202; footnote.

The conditions in South Germany were not growing more favorable. In Wurttemberg and Bavaria the anti-Prussian feeling was becoming pronounced.¹ Hohenlohe, the Bavarian minister favorable to Prussia, was forced to resign.² Baden alone grew stronger in desire for union with North Germany. The Lasker Motion of February 24, 1870 on the Union of Baden was quashed. Bismarck regarded this motion as a criticism on the slowness of his unity policy. In reply to Miquel who championed the motion he said, "If you think you know better than I, then take my place and guide public policy."³ The acceptance of Baden would surely have brought war. Bismarck wanted a war, but a war on a bigger issue and in which he would not have to appear as the aggressor.⁴ There was no mistaking the unsatisfactory progress, apparently retrogression of German Unity.⁵ Lorenz says, "The Interior Situation could not be unravelled but by an attack on France."

Since the settlement of the Luxemburg affair, both France and Prussia had asserted their desire for peace. Napoleon's visit to Salzburg had provoked some suspicion of a Franco-Austrian agreement to prepare for a war of revenge. Bismarck and Napoleon both stoutly insisted that there was no political end attached to the journey.⁶ On his return Napoleon spoke in favor of peace. After the London Conference of 1867 the idea of disarmament had

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1. Ollivier; L'Europe et La Fin de l'Année 1869; Rev. d. Deux Mondes; May 1, 1907; p. 79.
 2. Rothau; L'Allemagne et L'Italie; p. 355.
 3. Hohenlohe; I: 403.
 4. Ollivier; La Prusse et La France au Commencement de 1870; Rev. d. Deux Mondes; May 1, 1913; p. 13.
 5. Ibid; p. 14.
 6. Ollivier; La Politique Extérieure après Le Plébiscite; Rev. d. Deux Mondes; June 1, 1908; p. 483.
 7. Bertheimer; Andrassy; p. 448.
 8. Hohenlohe; I: 242.

come up. Finally in 1869 Loftus presented the matter to Bismarck. France had been willing to accept, but Bismarck's reply was that it was impossible for Prussia to do so since her whole social and political system was so very closely related to the army.² The King had said, however, that he saw no pretext for war and wanted peace.³ France was determined to smooth over any points that might cause friction.⁴ Ollivier advised accepting the territorial status of Prussia as it was but not to let it be changed to the detriment of France.⁵ Even on Prussia's action in Schleswig the French contained their feelings. Flury desired to bring up the violation of this part of the Treaty of Prague, and gain the intervention of the Tsar at Berlin, but Daru replied, "Your attitude ought to be only that of great reserve, abstention, pure and simple, is alone proper for us, and you ought to avoid all insinuations, any word of the sort to involve in any degree the policy of the government of the Empire in this question of Schleswig which we intend to remain outside of".⁶ Especially after the plebiscite peace seemed possible,⁷ this attitude would contribute to that end. Late in June Granville said on taking up his ministry, "I do not remember of ever seeing Europe more calm and there has never

1. La Gorce; VI: 178-9.
2. Benedetti; Ma Mission; p. 295; (Berlin Mar. 8, 1870)
3. Fitzmaurice; Granville; I: 542; (Clarendon to Granville Aug. 25 '68)
La Gorce; VI: 130.
4. Benedetti; Ma Mission; p. 393-5; Extracts from speech of M. Valette to Legis. Body; Apr. 10, 1869.
5. Ollivier; La Prusse et La France au Commencement de 1870; Rev. d. Deux Mondes; May 1, 1908; p. 31.
6. Ollivier; Ibid; p. 28.
7. Dalord; VI: 122.

been less danger of serious complications"¹. Yet Benedetti had written to Daru that all these pacific views of the King and Bismarck did not keep Prussia from the development of her military forces.² The claim cannot be made that France did not want to keep up her army, however peaceful her policy. Napoleon had feared that the "liberal system" and the popularity of the French peace policy would lead to too great a decrease in the military forces. At his request the minister of war asked Thiers to use his influence in support of the annual contingent. Thiers addressed the Legislative Body saying, "Peace is maintained because we are strong. Marshal Niel has rendered a great service to the country"³. Both states claimed to be on a peace basis. Prussia could not disarm because she was doing all in her power to provoke a war. France was afraid to diminish her forces.

In spite of all these peace assertions and France's attempts to persuade herself that there need be no war, neither nation could neglect its relationship with the other European states. Bismarck had been playing for the favor of Russia ever since the days of the 1863 Polish Insurrection. After Sadowa Gortschakoff became somewhat jealous of the power of his pupil, Bismarck.⁴ Manteuffel's mission to St. Petersburg seems to have strengthened the bonds of friendship again. When Fleury, a personal friend of the Tsar, was sent as the French Ambassador, to

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1. Ollivier; La Politique Extérieure Après Le Plébiscite; Rev. d. Deux Mondes; June 1, 1908; p.514.
 2. Benedetti; Ma Mission; p. 284; Berlin Jan. 14, 1870.
 3. Ollivier; La Politique Extérieure après Le Plébiscite; Rev. d. Deux Mondes; June 1, 1908; p. 512.
 4. La Gorce; VI: 100.

Russia, there was considerable unrest. Bismarck could not allow France to ally with Russia for to lose the Russian alliance meant isolation for Prussia.¹ The only avenue to the firm friendship of the Tsar was thru revision of the Treaty of Paris. Fleury wished to make overtures to Gortschakoff on this question, but Daru fearing that this would endanger the French friendship with England advised great reserve.² There were certain points that the Tsar could not see with pleasure in Prussia's policy. The Tsar told William that he could count upon no aid from him in Schleswig and advised moderation, also William must respect the independence of the States of South Germany.³ Prussia could allow Russia a free hand in the Orient. As long as the old Tsar, William's uncle, lived, Prussia could be sure of at least Russian neutrality. After his death the Tsarevitch who was much more of a liberal than his father made it feared that relations would be entirely different between Russia and Prussia.⁴ Benedetti did not believe that there was any "official arrangement" between the two Courts.⁵

Because of her influence on international opinion England was a friend worth having.⁶ The relations between England and Prussia were friendly. Indeed, a nation with no more active foreign policy than England's could be friends with everyone and

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1. Rothan; L'Allemagne et L'Italie; p. 352.
 2. Ollivier; La Prusse et La France au Commencement de 1870; Rev. d. Deux Mondes; May 1, 1908; p. 28.
 3. Ollivier; La Politique Extérieure après Le Plébiscite; Rev. d. Deux Mondes; June 1, 1908; p. 489.
 4. Ibid; p. 490.
 5. Benedetti; Ma Mission; p. 300; (June 30, 1870).
 6. La Gorce; VI; 165.

England was. Prussia felt that the Queen favored her, and thus Prussia would have the balance in her favor. Especially after June 1870, the date of the death of Clarendon whom Bismarck considered his worst enemy, Prussia became more confident.

Italy had proved a good ally for Prussia in the War of 1866. Mentana had given her sufficient provocation to be cool to France and yet not appear ungrateful. Bismarck had refused to mingle in any way in the Italian affairs. His thesis was that France was the natural rival of Italy in the Mediterranean while Prussia with no conflicting interests was the natural ally of Italy. In the case of the Saint-Gothard railway, Bismarck persuaded the North German Confederation to subsidize it to the extent of ten million dollars. Obviously this direct line of communication with such a friend as Italy had a part in future plans. Feeling ran high in France, but it was decided not to make this a cause for war. The good-will of Italy was essential also to Austria and France. Would any of the three really conclude a definite agreement?

Austria since Beust had become minister was hostile to Berlin. She was not a particularly valuable ally to any one since she was financially bankrupt, embroiled at home and totally incapacitated for war. The leniency of Bismarck after Sadowa seemed forgotten in Austria. The German element persisted in the

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1. Ollivier; La Politique Extérieure après le Plébiscite; Rev. d. Deux Mondes; June 1, 1908; p. 513.
 2. La Gorce; VI: 164.
 3. Ollivier; La Politique Extérieure; Rev. d. Deux Mondes; June 1, 1908; pp. 486, 504.
 4. Lorenz; p. 168.

hope of regaining German influence if only in the South German States. France, who also favored the South German League would be a suitable friend.¹ The failure of the Mexican Empire had for the moment embittered Austria against Napoleon. The Emperor's visit to Salzburg removed the obstacles in the way of a more "integral union" altho no political agreements were reached. Bismarck, altho he said that he believed Beust's "soothing remarks"² were in good faith, was in reality somewhat skeptical. Nor were any more definite steps taken on the occasion of Francis Joseph's visit to Paris in October.³ Andrassy's commentator, Emard Von Wertheimer, says that the very fact that nothing came out of this visit shows the French statesmen's lack of confidence in Beust.⁴ Beust maintained a very friendly attitude to Prussia and this was somewhat disconcerting to France.

A common fear of Prussia drew Austria and France together. Beust, whose hatred of Prussia dated back to the trouble over Saxony in 1866, was now prime minister of Austria. Gramont, an ardent enthusiast for the Franco-Austrian alliance, represented France at Vienna. If Gramont and Beust had been sole dictators of the policies of their countries, an alliance would speedily have been arranged. But there was another person who had to be reckoned with. Andrassy who represented the Hungarian portion of the Dual Monarchy was distinctly opposed to the views of Beust. In case of a successful war with Prussia, France had offered to

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1. Bourgeois; Rome et Napoleon III; p. 222.
 2. Wertheimer; I: 446.
 3. Beust; Memoirs; II: 39.
 4. Wertheimer; I: 449.

Austria predominance in Germany. What advantage would there be to Austria-Hungary in her German predominance since it would be impossible to be influential both in Germany and in the Orient? Beust represented the German sentiments; Andrassy the Oriental. The views of Andrassy and Beust could never be reconciled. Beust as the promoter of German interests in Austria stood for a warlike policy. Andrassy wanted above everything else peace, for war would necessarily be with Prussia, one power who might permit Austrian expansion in the Orient. Hungary had a very real fear of Russia, her gigantic neighbor. Russia, too, was Hungary's rival in the coveted Turkish provinces. In order to realize his oriental dreams, Andrassy sought the friendship of Prussia who might serve as a bulwark against Russia. For the good of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, Russia should not be allowed to gain a foothold in the Balkan Peninsular, and thus eventually in Austria-Hungary. The crux of the disagreement was that the Slavic element led by Andrassy wanted to gain weight thru expansion in the Slavic States of the Turkish provinces, the German element led by Beust desired the return to the position of a great German Power thru winning to Austria's leadership the South German States. Gramont ignored the disposition of Andrassy who had made it plain to Napoleon that France could not depend on Austria-Hungary. From this time on Andrassy simply kept a courteous attitude and avoided all political discussions. Gramont, much to the regret of France later,

1. Wertheimer; I: 449.

2. Ibid; p. 457.

3. Ibid; p. 476.

Ollivier; L'Europe a La Fin de l'Annee 1869; Rev. d. Deux Mondes; May 1, 1907; p. 72.

considered Beust the sole director of Austria's policy.¹

Negotiations for a triple alliance had been in progress since the fall of 1868. Napoleon was attempting the difficult matter of an alliance with both Italy and Austria.² General Turr, a Hungarian, was charged with reconciling Austria-Hungary with Italy.³ Both Italy and Austria were willing to forget the past and open negotiations. The probability of a Franco-Austrian alliance was generally known throught Europe. Gramont used all his influence for this, but so secret had the negotiations upon the Triple Alliance been kept that Gramont, French ambassador at Vienna, knew nothing of it. Nevertheless, in a journal of March 20, 1869 the Prussian government gave indication that it had knowledge of the attempted negotiations.⁴ It was not until May 10, 1869 that Rouher drew up a tentative defensive and offensive alliance.⁵ Italy demanded as a basis of her concord the execution of the September Convention and the recall of the French troops from Civita Vecchia. Austria stood back of Victor Emmanuel in these demands. Beust on his side would gladly have seen Italy take Rome.⁶ It may seem strange that as minister of a great ultramontane power this should have been his attitude. He was aware, however, of the friendly feeling between the patriots of Hungary and the Italian patriots. There might be a chance of winning Hungary thru giving satisfaction to Italy.⁷ There

1. Ollivier; L'Europe a La Fin de l'Annee 1869; Rev. d. Deux Mondes
May 1, 1907; p. 72.

2. Bourgeois; p. 222.

3. Wertheimer I: 485.

4. Bourgeois; p. 223.

5. Ibid; p. 224.

6. Wertheimer; I: 487.

7. Bourgeois; p. 271.

was good reason to believe that Prussian money made it worth while for Italy to be stubborn and insist on these demands. Türr wrote to Andrassy in January 1869, "You cannot picture to yourself what pains Prussia and Russia are taking to keep Italy with them."

The argument which General Türr used with Italy was that Italy ought not to demand Rome since it was impossible for Napoleon to grant this. In a war all the strength of France would be needed. Napoleon had the opposition of his ministers, the clericals, and the Empress to face if he allowed the evacuation of Rome. Neither Türr nor Beust could gain any results. There was a deadlock.

The negotiations culminated only in an accord to maintain peace, guarantee of territory, and an agreement to negotiate with no third power without warning. The Treaty was considered suspended, not broken. At the first opportune moment it could be taken up again.

Autograph letters, stating the basis of accord were exchanged between the sovereigns. Gramont said that the letter of

Francis Joseph was written in his own hand and countersigned by the Austrian chancellor so that it constituted an official document.

The letter from Victor Emmanuel made no mention of his ministers and was therefore a private document which did not engage his government. There is no doubt of the authenticity of these documents;

Napoleon had them in his possession and showed them to his ministers in Council just before the outbreak of the war. The

1. Wertheimer; I: 486. (Türr au Vic Em. Jan. 11, 1869).

2. Bourgeois; p. 224.

3. Ollivier; Le Plébiscite; Rev.d.Deux Mondes; May 1, 1908; p.319.

4. Bourgeois; p. 228.

Wertheimer; I: 487.

5. Ollivier; Le Plébiscite; p. 319.

6. "These letters may be found in the private archives of the sovereign";

Bourgeois; P. 347.

whole difficulty centered around the importance placed on these letters. Napoleon who had instigated the negotiations considered them practically as good as treaties. He reckoned that if he were forced to it, he could immediately gain the active concord of Italy upon sacrificing Rome. Relying upon the assurance of Beust, Napoleon and Gramont did not worry about the solidarity of interests between France and Austria.

The event which was to test the strength of this mutual accord was on the horizon. The Hohenzollern Candidature¹ began to definitely be sought in September 1867. A brief calendar of the main steps of this affair will serve as an outline upon which to base discussion. September 1868 Werther demanded a confidential interview with Prince Charles Antoine in order to present Salazar who came to offer the Spanish crown to the hereditary prince of Hohenzollern. October 1868 Salazar published a letter in Madrid setting forth the wonderful suitability of his candidate. February 1870 after Victor Emmanuel had refused the throne for Charles II of Genoa, Salazar came on a secret mission to Berlin. March 1870 a council, half family, half state, was held at Berlin. Leopold refused the crown of Spain. His younger brother Frederick refused unless he was formally ordered to accept it by King William. Lothar Bucher and Veracez were sent to Spain. May 1870 they returned reporting happy conditions in Spain and a favorable attitude of the Cortés and the Country to the Hohenzollern Candidature. June 19, 1870 Leopold reconsidered and,

1. Malet; *A Propos de la Candidature Hohenzollern*; *Rev. des Etudes de Napoléoniennes*; VI: 156. (From *Notes sur la Vie du Roi Charles de Roumanie*); p. 195; Sept. 1869.

feeling it his duty to his State and to the Spanish people, accepted. William gave his assent. June twenty-third Salazar telegraphed to the regency Leopold's acceptance if the Cortés would give him a majority vote. Salazar was to arrive June twenty-sixth and the Cortés was to vote then. An error in the ciphering of the dispatch led to the dissolution of the Cortés until October. This mishap nearly overthrew the whole project. It was necessary that the election take place at once before discussion could influence the vote. July second when Prim returned from his mountain vacation; he was told that the candidature had been lost thru this premature divulgence. July third the news of the Hohenzollern Candidature reached Paris. July sixth the Emperor and his ministers deliberated the question at Saint-Cloud. That same day Gramont gave the reply known as the Declaration of July sixth to the Interpellation of the Legislative Body. July seventh Benedetti was telegraphed to go to Ems in order to consult with King William. July twelfth Prince Antoine withdrew the candidature of his son. July thirteenth Benedetti received Gramont's demands for the Prussian King's approval of the withdrawal together with guarantees for the future. Benedetti met William on his morning promenade and took that occasion to state the French position. The King replied he would have to wait for the official answer of Prince Antoine, but agreed to interview Benedetti that afternoon. In the intervening hours, Werther returned with his report of his interview at Paris with Gramont. It has been thought that the proposal by Gramont of a letter of explanation disgusted the King with the whole affair. Instead of replying to Benedetti himself he sent his side-de-campe

Radziwill. The night of July thirteenth Bismarck at dinner with Roon and Moltke received Abeken's telegraphic report of the events of that day. From the Prussian's misuse of this telegram came the famous Ems telegram. July fourteenth, when the Council of French ministers dispersed, the agreement was that the declaration to the Chambers should call for a Congress. A hasty gathering of the ministers, at which all were not present, in view of later telegrams which made it appear that French honor was at stake, changed the declaration from "Congress" to "War". July fifteenth this declaration was read to the Chambers. July eighteenth word of the French action reached Berlin. July nineteenth Prussia also declared war.

Whether Bismarck's knowledge of the negotiations for a Triple Alliance between France, Austria, and Italy hastened his war plans or not can only be speculated upon. There is no doubt but that Andrassy who was in close touch with Bismarck knew of Beust's project. Beust had kept strictly silent on the affair; nevertheless Andrassy penetrated the reason for such a skilled diplomatic envoy as Vitshum being sent to Brussels within a stone's throw of Paris. As far back as September 1868, Andrassy learned that former Hungarian diplomats whom Beust used for secret plans had come back from Paris to Vienna. The Hungarian who coveted the good-will of Prussia undoubtedly informed Bismarck of Beust's actions. These negotiations naturally made the Prussian minister uneasy. Austria without the hearty cooperation of Hungary would not be a formidable enemy. Furthermore, the Emperor and his Cabinet favored Andrassy's program of neutrality and a guarded

1. Wartheimer; I: 468.

Eastern frontier. Beust for love of his office gave up his principles and swung over to Andrassy's peace policy. Not much confidence could be placed in the steadfastness of the Austrian minister, but Andrassy, the Emperor, and the Cabinet standing for neutrality must have made Bismarck feel reasonably certain of Austria's inaction in war. There was grave doubt that Italy would ever trust France without having the concord of Austria as well. The alliance project, therefore, was not a large factor in Bismarck's haste to wage war with France. It was a phantom hovering in the background, but the vital need for war arose in the growing dissatisfaction in all parts of Germany. Unless there came speedily a war which would bind all the German people in a struggle for a common end, there would be disintegration rather than unity of the German Empire.

Who was the originator of this Hohenzollern Candidature which developed into such an important project? M. Richard Fester has published letters between Werther and Salazar dated September 1869 which intimate that the placing of a Hohenzollern on the Spanish throne was discussed by these two ambassadors as much as three years before.² By these he attempts to disprove Léonarden's and Ollivier's statements that Salazar and Prim were bought by Bismarck. Kendall says that Bismarck did not even show any interest in the project when Werther confidentially

1. Wertheimer; I: 468.

2. Malet; Letters published by M. Richard Fester; "New Beiträge zur Geschichte der Hohenzollernschen Thronkandidatur in Spanien". Leipzig 1913; Revue des Etudes Nap.; VI: 167-8.

reported to him the presentation of Salazar to Charles Antoine.¹
The Spanish Revolution took place in 1868. In the fall of that
year, various journals mentioned the Hohenzollern prince as a
likely candidate for the throne of Spain. At that time Antoine
of Hohenzollern wrote to his son Charles of Roumania "Because
of our relations with Prussia France will never permit the establish-
ment of the Hohenzollern dynasty on the other side of the Pyrenees."²
Hesselbarth claims Bismarck did not interest himself in the pro-
ject until Salazar's visit in February 1870; that at the Conference
of March Bismarck commented that in case of a war with France
it would be well to have a Hohenzollern in Madrid, but he did not
think that the candidature would cause a war; that in April after
the refusal of the two Sigmaringen princes Bismarck broke off
negotiations; that Salazar, because all other candidates, the duc
de Genes, Montpensier, and Alphonse of Portugal, were ineligible,
on June fourth renewed the negotiations with Bucher and Leopold;
and finally that the candidature had nothing to do with Bismarck's
actual policy.³ This is without a doubt a most biased and
extreme statement. It cannot be proved that Bismarck was the
first to conceive of the idea of the candidature, but the most
important fact is the use that he made of it. Common discernment
would have seen the effect that a Hohenzollern in Spain would have
upon France. Napoleon had said, "The candidature of Mont pensier

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1. Hesselbarth; De la lumière sur la Candidature Hohenzollern;
Revue des Etudes; V: 51-52.
 2. Malet; A propos de la Candidature Hohenzollern; Revue des
Etudes Napoléoniennes; VI: 176.
 3. Hesselbarth; De la Lumière sur la Candidature Hohenzollern;
Revue des Etudes Nap. V: 51-58.

is simply anti-dynastic--it does not affect me and I can accept it--
the candidature of a Hohenzollern is essentially anti-national--
the country will not support it and it is necessary to prevent it.¹
Bismarck could well afford to push this project so very unpopular
in France. King William showed no enthusiasm for the candidature,
and altho it was claimed to be only a family affair and if dis-
pleasing to the family should have been dropped, it was not dis-
pleasing to the government, namely Bismarck; consequently the
candidature was pushed to the limit. In March, when Leopold
refused, Bismarck insisted that the Spanish candidature should
not fall, and influenced Charles Antoine to telegraph to his
third son Frederick.² When "Fritz" refused the matter was not
dropped even then, but Lothar Bucher and Versen were sent to
Spain. The result of their work in Spain and of their reports
of conditions influenced Leopold to reconsider for the fourth
time.³ King William was rather annoyed at the matter coming up
again and did not give any encouragement. Feeling it to be his
duty to the Spanish people, Leopold accepted. A letter written
by Bismarck June eleventh betrays his elation over this apparent
success, "For myself, I believe that the Spanish government will
do better not to publish the letter of General Prim of February
seventeenth and its reply. We will have thus an unassailable
position before the European public; if they make a noise in
France, we will demand with simplicity: What do you wish? What

1. La Gorce; VI: 194.

2. Malet; A propos de la candidature Hohenzollern; Revue des
Etudes Napoléoniennes; VI: 158.

3. Ibid; p. 163.

do you wish to say to the decisions of the Spanish nation and of a single Germany?-----Without doubt they will cry intrigue and be furious against me, without having power to center the point of attack.¹ If France was sufficiently provoked to attack, she would appear the aggressor. The failure to decipher correctly Salazar's telegram of June twenty-third threw the whole project into confusion. The German people could not understand why their government should arouse French hostility only to satisfy the House of Hohenzollern.² Germany was really alarmed since they believed that the reforms in the French army had actually been accomplished and that alliances had been concluded between Vienna, Florence, and Copenhagen.³ At that moment the withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidature would have been received with favor in Germany as well as in France. But when such a happy state of affairs did exist, Gramont saved the day for Bismarck by presenting further demands.⁴ In the course of these later negotiations came the substance for the Ems telegram. By this the German people were aroused; France was stung into mad action by the insult to her national dignity. Bismarck had to have a war in order to accomplish German Unity. Every other card had failed, even the violation of the Treaty of Prague in Northern Schleswig; the only means left was the Hohenzollern Candidacy,⁵ in itself an innocent enough matter but in view of the inflammable state

1. Léonarden; Prim et la Candidature Hohenzollern; Revue Historique 74: 302.

2. Rothan; L'Allemagne et l'Italie; p. 3.

3. Ibid; p. 6-10.

4. Rothan; L'Allemagne et l'Italie; p. 11.

5. Ollivier; L'Europe a La Fin de l'Annee 1869; Rev.d.Deux Mondes; May 1, 1908; p. 845.

of Europe and the underlying feeling that a war between France and Prussia was inevitable it was almost insidious affair.

It had not been the intention of France to let Bismarck have his own way, nor was France totally blind to the whole matter. As far back as 1869, Benedetti had informed the French government of the Hohenzollern Candidature.¹ The general consensus of European opinion was that the Candidature would never go thru and therefore why worry about it. In March Benedetti had attempted to get at least information on the progress of the candidature. He only succeeded in seeing Bismarck's under secretary, M.Thile, who insisted that the Prussian government had undertaken no negotiations. Benedetti says that altho the language of Thile was final and definite, he added in his report to the Quai d'Orsay² that perhaps Thile was not taken into confidence on the project. Benedetti interviewed Bismarck himself in May. The report this time was, "Bismarck tried to persuade me that the rumors were unfounded, but he carefully abstained from giving me the formal assurance that the King would not permit in any case Prince Leopold to accept the crown which would be offered him."³ Bismarck attempted to "honey" France. Benedetti reported the reassuring speeches made by Bismarck and peace seemed possible.⁴

The Emperor, upon reading in the Journal des Débats of Prim's discourse in the Cortés, wrote to Gramont, his minister of foreign affairs, asking him to find out about matters. Verdier

1. Ollivier; Le Retrait de La Candidature Hohenzollern; Rev. d. Deux Mondes; April 15, 1909; p. 731.

2. Benedetti; Ma Mission; p. 304-6.

3. Ibid; 307-311.

4. Ollivier; L'Europe selon l'Indice de l'Année 1869; Rev.D.Deux Mondes; May 1, 1907; p. 78-80.

at Madrid replied that Prim counted on a conference with Napoleon in July and that nothing would be done about the candidature until then. Altho he knew that on June thirtieth the Prussian ambassador was ordered to forego his planned vacation, Mercier had such confidence in Prim that he was not alarmed. July second was the first that Mercier heard of the accepted candidature. The consternation that the news of this caused in Paris may be well imagined. Gramont said to Loftus that this candidature was intolerable for France and begged England to intervene; the same was said to Metternich of Austria and to Fleury at St. Petersburg.

That very day, July fifth, Cochery interpellated the government. At a council of ministers the reply to this interpellation was formulated. The ministers remembered the assertions of Niel that France was ready for war; Loboef gave a most encouraging report on the present military condition of France. In view of this, therefore, the declaration to the Chamber on July sixth took on more the character of an act of war than a conciliatory invitation to negotiate. Pressure was brought upon Napoleon by the militarists, bonapartists, and the Empress who all thought that a war might restore again the good old régime. The Senate more than the Legislature received this declaration with pleasure.

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1. Ollivier; La Politique Extérieure après Le Plébiscite; Rev. d. Deux Mondes; June 1, 1908; p. 499-502, 517.
 2. Léonard; Prim et la Candidature Hohenzollern; Revue Historique 74: 303.
 3. Ollivier; Les Préliminaires de la Guerre; Rev. d. Deux Mondes; April 1, 1909; p. 550.
 4. Ollivier insists that Gramont did not change the character of this declaration before reading it to the Chamber.

July seventh Benedetti was telegraphed to go to Ems to negotiate with the King directly since the candidature was a family matter. Now began the telegrams, back and forth, and the interviews at Ems and in Paris over which there has been so much disagreement. Benedetti has proven that he followed painstakingly his instructions, however little tact he may also have employed. The real blunders were made in Paris and at Saint-Cloud. It was not unreasonable for France to demand the withdrawal of the Hohenzollern Candidature. Practically all Europe recognized this.¹ Although it became apparent that no powers were ready to do anything, England disapproved of the candidature and used many persuasive words, especially in Spain, to bring about its withdrawal. At this point England could have blocked Bismarck's plans effectively by calling a conference on the basis that Gramont suggested, stating, "An international rule created by us in Greece denies to all great powers the right to place one of its members on a foreign throne without the accord of Europe previously. We believe it fitting under these circumstances which threaten the peace of the world to call a conference in order to examine the value of this rule and to appreciate the application which it is fitting to make to the candidate placed in Spain."² But Granville, not Clarendon, now held the foreign office and this suggestion was received with coolness.

Russia, in spite of Fleury's belief that he had won her friendship, had concluded a sort of "gentleman's agreement"

1. Ollivier; Les Preliminaires de la Guerre; Rev.d.Deux Mondes; April 1, 1909; p. 526.

2. Ollivier; Le Retrait de La Candidature Hohenzollern; Rev.d. Deux Mondes; April 15, 1909; p. 724.

with Prussia.¹ She might counsel William to be moderate, but Russia was not interested in France who had offered her nothing in the Orient.

Austria had no influence with which to prevent the execution of the candidature. Italy was rather indifferent. If this affair produced a war, Gramont was confident that he would have their support but as mediators they were ineffective.

Negotiations continued between France and Prussia alone. The happy result was reached of the withdrawal of Leopold's candidature by Prince Antoine.² The criticism has been made that Ollivier was overly hasty in giving to the Legislature this news before the assent of King William had been given. Since the withdrawal had been made with the promise of the King's assent, this is evidently only their splitting excuse of Gramont who placed the basis for his further demands upon the dissatisfaction of the public in "Father Antoine's" withdrawal. The Emperor was glad to accept the withdrawal in the form given.³ Ollivier certainly desired peace. That afternoon he participated in the conference between Werther and Gramont. He aided in the proposed letter of apology drafted for King William. But Ollivier claims that this interview was "entirely personal and had no sort of an official value" while Gramont says, "Nothing was more official than the interview which took place at that moment between the minister

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1. Ollivier; L'Europe a La Fin de l'Annee 1869; Rev.d.Deux Mondes; May 1, 1907; p. 66.
 2. Malet; A propos de la candidature Hohenzollern; Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes; VI: 166 (doc. quoted).
 3. Muret; Emile Ollivier et le Duc de Gramont les 12 et 13 juillet 1870; Revue d'Histoire Moderne; 13: 322-323.

of foreign affairs and the ambassador of Prussia¹. That evening followed a conference of an hour between the Emperor and Gramont after which the telegram was sent which instructed Benedetti to make further demands. Ollivier's anxiety to discount the Werther interview was because this was the only evidence of his mixture in the guarantee policy or in the coercion of King William. Both Ollivier and Gramont claim that the letter hastily drawn up was not in any sense a letter of apology as Werther seems to have interpreted it to the King. It is to this letter that Benedetti attributes the King's refusal of an audience with him and as a result the whole story upon which Bismarck so very cleverly based his Ems telegram.³ Gramont insists that the change in the King's⁴ attitude was on the contrary due to Bismarck's appearance at Ems. Interpellation of the government had been made by Jérôme David on July twelfth. The Council of ministers must take some action before Friday, the day set for the reply to the interpellation. At a long session on the fourteenth the ministers decided to call a Congress based upon the right of Europe to intervene in the enthronement in a foreign country of a prince of one of the great powers.⁵ Following this came news of the Ems telegram which Bismarck had correctly calculated would fire the passions of the French people as well as the German. A second meeting of the Council late that evening decided that the telegram in the

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1. Muret; Emile Ollivier et le duc de Gramont les 12 et 13 juillet 1870; Revue d'Histoire Moderne; 14: 182.
 2. Ibid; p. 187.
 3. Benedetti; Ma Mission; p. 382.
 4. Gramont; La France et La Prusse; p. 196.
 5. Gramont; La France et la Prusse; p. 212.

"Kölnische Zeitung" was a "casus belli". But more offensive still were the circulars which Bismarck had sent to the different governments. Strange to say of the ministers not reached for this nocturnal conference, there was a surprising majority of those who advocated peace. Ollivier agreeing with Gramont that the French national honor was at stake also believed war inevitable.¹ The declaration read July fifteenth before the Senate was enthusiastically received. In the Legislature there was a cry for the official documents.² This was satisfied by turning the matter over to a commission. The report gave an entirely false impression, saying that the object of the government had been the same from the first to the last. Since Thiers³ who gave the report was a man of absolute integrity, it was accepted. Gramont did not turn over the confidential dispatches to the commission but read portions of them to that body. The blame for the false impression has been placed upon Gramont's untruthful arrangement and presentation of these documents.³ Gramont has defended his action by the flimsy excuse that his mistake was entirely unintentional and wholly due to the rapidity with which the work had to be done.⁴ The Minister of Foreign Affairs more than any one person with the exception of Bismarck was responsible for the outbreak of the war of 1870. The Emperor was in wretched health, and therefore easily influenced. Ollivier seems to have been inexcusably ignorant on diplomatic affairs as well as on the preparedness of

1. La Gorce; VI: 295-7.

2. Ibid; p. 305.

3. La Gorce; VI: 310-312.

4. Gramont; La France et la Prusse; p. 269-274.

his country. No English Prime Minister would have allowed such free action on the part of a colleague. Benedetti was the least culpable of all. Had the French government given more heed to his reports or at least consulted him on the truth of the story in the Ems telegram,¹ French action might have been very different.

Gramont had assured the ministers in Council that the alliances with Vienna and Florence were certain. The Archduke Albert had practically forced Paris to consider his military plans just ten days before.² Altho Francis Joseph desired peace, Beust and the Archduke led France to believe that when once the Treaty of Prague was broken, there would be no doubt about Austria's entering into war. If the price of Rome be paid, Italy could be won over. To have the assistance of Austria and Italy would restrain South Germany. Bismarck had succeeded in taking France pretty much unawares by the Hohenzollern Candidacy. Consequently, Gramont entered into a wild scramble to convert the mutual accord into actual alliances. Gramont was loathe to accept Italy's basis of alliance until no other possible way could be found. Russia and England had on July fourteenth proposed a compromise to Prussia and France. France was to denounce her demand for future guarantees and King William was to give to the

1. "I would not wish, if I had need of it, to invoke any other witness than that of the King himself to prove that I did not forget one single time the deference I owed to a sovereign to whom I had at that moment the honor of being accredited. The Government of the Emperor, on its side, has never pretended that its ambassador had been personally offended at Ems, but that the cabinet of Berlin had presented to divers governments in an injurious and wounding manner for the dignity of France, the welcome which the King gave us last time." Benedetti; *La Mission*; p. 370.

2. Rothan; *L'Allemagne et l'Italie*; p. 376.

Cabinet at the Tuilleries his official adhesion to the withdrawal. Since this project was entrusted to Bernstorff, the sworn enemy of France, it is not hard to understand why this proposal did not reach Paris until the sixteenth. No effective mediation came from the powers in time. Gramont should have received the communication July eleventh from Beust to Metternich which informed Metternich that there was no necessity for siding France with armed cooperation.¹ When the declaration of war came, Austria did not immediately take up arms. Metternich, on the contrary, suggested to Gramont a concerted Austrian and Italian mediation on the basis that Prussia guarantee the actual territorial status quo. Gramont refused this, insisting that Prussia would also have to withdraw the 1866 military treaties with the South German States which were contrary to the spirit and letter of the Treaty of Prague.² Austria then declared neutrality, giving the excuse³ that this would afford her a chance to collect her armaments. Cazaux gave overly favorable reports of the Austrian situation, stating that her neutrality was to last only six weeks and that military preparations of a considerable extent were being pushed thru.⁴ Gramont telegraphed la Tour d'Auvergne (July 24) to insist on an army in Bohemia and a secret treaty. Austria refused to make any promises until Italy's action was known. The truth of the matter was that Beust no longer was influential with the Austrian government. Now the Hungarian Andrassy, who out of fear of Russia inclined towards Berlin, ruled at Vienna. All

1. Wertheimer; I: 499.

2. Bourgeois; pp. 261-262.

3. Ibid; p. 272.

4. Ibid; p. 274.

along Andrassy had feared the warlike policy of Reust. He had insisted that in case of a war between France and Prussia, Austria should keep her neutrality altho forces would be put in the Saxon mountain passes to prevent a second Villa franca.¹ Suddenly with no apparent reason Reust shifted his policy to that held by Andrassy. Even then Andrassy still suspected him of holding to his old warlike policy.² It may be that Reust realized the folly of trying to go to war with the opposition of Hungary and the dissatisfied German elements. Reust, at any rate, had³ made no mention to Andrassy of the negotiations with Napoleon. July eighteenth a council was held at Vienna. Vitzthum presented the formal plea for Austria to join with France. The ministers, Potocky and especially Andrassy stood for neutrality. Reust realized that the odds were against him and therefore decided upon the conciliatory policy of armed neutrality.⁴

Conditions in Italy were no more favorable to France. The Cabinet was divided on their attitude in regard to France; Parliament was hostile; Victor Emmanuel only was favorable since he felt honor bound by his engagements with France.⁵ Sella headed the opposition in Italy, demanding that the treaty of alliance be signed first between Austria and France.⁶ In desperation Vimercafé offered Victor Emmanuel not only the execution of the September Convention, but a definite ruling on the Roman

1. Wertheimer; I: 482.

2. Ibid; p. 484.

3. Ibid; p. 497. (Based on Grey July 14, 1870).

4. Bourgeois; pp. 270-271.

5. Olivier; L'Europe a La Fin de l'Annee 1869; Rev. d. Deux Mondes;
May 1, 1870; p. 69-69.

6. Bourgeois; p. 279.

question.¹ July twenty-fifth the Italian Parliament announced the neutrality of Italy. July twenty-sixth a treaty of armed mediation was drawn up between Austria and Italy. Andrassy had consented to Austrian intervention provided that France would not encourage the revolutionary Slavs and Roumanians. He felt that Napoleon was sufficiently hard pressed to ensure no backing down on his promises to Italy.² All now depended upon whether or not France would consent to an Italian army guarding the papacy. Ollivier informed Napoleon that neither the cabinet nor the Country would uphold this action. The Emperor, therefore, sent the reply that France could not consent to Italian troops in Rome.³ The question was whether it was more honorable to lose the alliances promised to the French people or to sacrifice Rome. Reust was only too glad to be so easily extricated. Word of his agreement with the French reply rejoiced France.

Vimercati and Vitzthum realizing the seriousness of Napoleon's situation undertook on their own responsibility to negotiate with Austria and Italy. Their task was difficult since Germany was holding out tempting inducements to both countries. On August ninth she had offered Italy Rome and the Tyrol.⁴ Victor Emmanuel who still remained loyal to Napoleon in the first days of August even consented to a triple alliance without the consent of Rome. Now, however, the other modification on immediate mobilization was opposed by Austria. Napoleon had to ask for the Italian alliance without that of Austria. No wonder that

1. Bourgeois; p. 279.
2. Bourgeois; p. 288.
3. Bourgeois; p. 300.
4. Bourgeois; p. 332.

Italy hesitated in the face of French defeats and the fear that Austria would ally with Germany. August nineteenth Napoleon offered Italy carte blanche. Lanza replied that Italy could not enter military action for a month and that it would then be too late since France would be defeated. Why suffer defeat in battle when neutrality would bring Rome as a gift! The aged Metternich had correctly prophesied that French diplomacy would be shattered on the Italian rock.

The South German States could not remain neutral since their territory would inevitably be the battle ground between France and Prussia. Due to the telegraphic dispatches sent them Bavaria and Wurtemberg stated their fidelity to the alliance. Denmark under threat of invasion declared her neutrality. The publication in the "London Times" of the fac simile of the Belgian Treaty of 1868 swung over to Prussia whatever sentiment there had been in England favorable to France. A few days before the draft treaty had been shown to Gladstone and Granville with the hope that they would bring the matter before the country. Perhaps the statesman feared the effect of this news upon the people; at any rate the scheme failed. Bismarck never at a loss turned to the "Times" to assist him in his despicable game. Russia had never given France any reasonable basis upon which to hope for her alliance. In some unexplainable manner France had been persuaded that Russia was her friend. The truth was that General Fleury telegraphed from St. Petersburg to Gramont, "Russia

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1. Bourgeois; p. 333.
 2. Rothan; L'Allemagne et l'Italie; p. 26.
 3. Cook; Debate of "The Times"; p. 228.

will consider as a personal threat all effective alliance with Austria".¹ It was Russia's influence over Hungary that had helped to make the Austrian alliance impossible.

France had in her most enthusiastic moments counted upon the active assistance of Austria and Italy and at least the friendly neutrality of the other European powers when the war with Prussia should break. The old, old story of "not ready" accounts for France standing alone to face the strongest power on the Continent. The apparent power of Napoleon's Liberal Empire now met the supreme test. The Emperor who had been led into this last fatal blunder witnessed its result in a crushed and bleeding France. Bismarck, the instigator of the war, viewed the completion thereby of the final step in German Unity.

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(These Ollivier articles by a statesman directly associated with the affairs of the day give his reaction to the events of 1863-1870. Thru his intimate relationship with the Emperor, Ollivier is able to betray the forces and influences which worked upon Napoleon.

21. Léonarden, H.; "Prim et la Candidature Hohenzollern"; Revue Historique; Vol. 74; pp. 287-310.
(Léonarden attempts to prove that the author of the Hohenzollern Candidature was Bismarck and that Prim was merely a tool.)
22. Muret, Pierre; "Emile Ollivier et le duc de Gramont les 12 et 13 juillet 1870"; Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine; Vol. 13; pp. 305-328; Vol. 14; pp. 172-213.
(This is an interesting study of the assertions of Ollivier and Gramont on their part in the most critical days of the Second Empire. Muret sets the statements of one against those of the other, criticizes both, and then draws his conclusion.)
23. Hesselbarth, Hermann; "De la lumière sur la candidature Hohenzollern"; Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes; Vol. V; pp. 50-62.
(The author sets that this short article is a result of documents lately published by Zingeler in "Deutsche Verlagsanstalt" 1911; by Fester in "Neue Beiträge zur Geschichte des Hohenzollern Kandidature in Spanien" 1913; and by Hesselbarth in "Drei psychologische Fragen zur Spanischen Thron kandidatur Leopolds" 1913. This is a justification of Prussia's action in the Hohenzollern candidacy.)
24. Malet, Albert; "A propos de la candidature Hohenzollern"; Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes; Vol. VI; pp. 153-179.
(This article is composed of extracts and criticisms of "Notes Sur La Vie Du Roi Charles De Roussane Par un Témoin Oculaire; Lettres Publiées Par M. Richard Fester in "Neue Beiträge zur Geschichte der Hohenzollernschen Thronkandidatur in Spanien"; Télégrammes Publiés Par M. Hermann Hesselbarth in "Drei psychologische Fragen zur Thronkandidatur Leopolds von Hohenzollern, mit geheimen despatches Bismarcks, Prim's etc." Malet in answer to Hesselbarth's article attempts to disprove Hesselbarth's conclusions.)
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38. "Austria and Prussia" From the "Saturday Review" Apr. 7, 1866. "Living Age; 89: 411.
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