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The Origin and Development
of
Religious Experience.

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts,

-by-

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All men are equal in their birth,
Heirs of the earth and skies,
All men are equal when that earth
Fades from their dying eyes.

All wait alike on Him whose power
Upholds the life He gave,
The sage within his star-lit tower,
The savage in his cave.

Harriet Martineau.

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I. Introduction.

The Fundamentality of Religion.

The declaration that man is a religious animal has been so frequently insisted upon and is so generally recognized that the statement seems almost superfluous in any connection. Its validity will be examined, however, at the outset of this thesis with a view to laying it down as fundamental to the entire discussion. And in considering this question, it is well to begin with a full appreciation of the character of the material with which we are dealing. This material, in a sense the subject of our enquiry, is the human mind itself, and the human mind is fearfully and wonderfully complex.

The evolutionary hypothesis has entrenched itself beyond possibility of dislodgment as an explanation of the physical nature of man, and having been once accepted, there carries presumptive evidence with it as regards the psychical nature of man as well. But one enigmatic fact remains above all others shrouded in mystery. This is the great difference, the remarkable unbridged gap, between the mental powers of man and the highest non-human animals. Peer back into the darkness of the prehuman period as we may, we find no ray of light on the "how" of this problem and the wisest leave us confused when they attempt to bridge over the chasm. Let it

not be supposed at this point or at any other that the writer is contemplating abandonment of the evolutionary hypothesis. Far from it; in fact, his whole view of religious origins is colored with it and depends upon it, and most of all at this point of transition from animal to man. All that is here being emphasized is the extreme mistiness of the whole subject. For instance, a certain anatomist assures us that the increase in mentality in man began first with language and then with tribal organization. But when the lowest known specimens of humanity, say the Australian bushmen are considered, their (relatively to the highest apes) large cranial capacity taken into account, and then their primitive language and very primitive tribal organizations taken into account, the effect seems out of all proportion to the cause, to say the least. On the one hand we have the hypothetical "common ancestor," ~~on the other~~ the anthropoid apes with their prognathism, ^{on the other} and a man with his cranial development, but only an aching void in between, where the common ancestor should be. What took place during the ages represented by that blank? The mind of man was made, but how? "The jump was made rapidly," says someone; and after we have assumed that, our mystery is the same. This is a borderland, a debatable ground, where science and theology alike must tread softly. One thing is plain: that this was the critical moment in all evolution. "And God said: " 'Let us make man in our image.' " In the presence of this fact, we stand with bowed heads.

And the more so for this reason that the object of this inquiry, the religious consciousness of man, was the great outstanding work of that transition period. That this is true rests on the supposition, generally accepted by anthropologists, that, travellers' tales to the contrary notwithstanding, no race or tribe of men exists, or has been known to exist, without its religious concepts. Tylor, in his "Primitive Culture" makes this point clear beyond all reasonable doubt, and indeed the fact that actual accounts are at hand of religious beliefs of the Australians, the Andamanese, and the extinct Tasmanians, leaves no room for doubt on this point. On the other hand, nothing equivalent to a religion or religious instincts is discernible in any of the lower animals. The development of a religious nature was therefore one of the achievements of that unknown transition period between the brute and the man, and in a special sense we stand on holy ground when we contemplate this question.

But by this time, the terms "religion" and "religious experience" demand definition. The terms themselves are hazy and elusive. Attempts to define religion often fail because the attempt is made to compress the word and all its connotations into the limits of a narrow interpretation based on the relatively narrow views of the definer's own religion. Notable attempts at broad definitions have failed in part for what is at bottom the same reason. For

instance, take Mr. Tylor's definition. "By requiring in this definition the belief in a supreme deity or of judgment after death, the adoration of idols or the practice of sacrifice, or other partially diffused doctrines or rites, no doubt many tribes may be excluded from the category of religions. But such narrow definition has the fault of identifying religion rather with particular developments than with the deeper motive which underlies them. It seems best to fall back at once on this essential source and simply to claim as a minimum definition of religion, the belief in spiritual beings. If this standard be applied to the descriptions of low races as to religion, the following results will appear. It cannot be positively asserted that every existing tribe recognizes the belief in spiritual beings, for the native condition of a considerable number is obscure in this respect, and from the rapid change or extinction they are undergoing may ever remain so. It would be yet more unwarranted to set down every tribe mentioned in history or known to us by the discovery of antiquarian relics, as necessarily having possessed the defined minimum of religion. Greater still would be the unwisdom of declaring such a rudimentary belief natural or instinctive in all human tribes of all times, for no evidence justifies the opinion that man, known to be capable of so vast an intellectual development, cannot have emerged from a non-religious condition, previous to that religious condition

in which he happens at present to come with sufficient clearness within our range of knowledge."

Primitive
Culture I:425

Tylor here rightly emphasizes the importance of a broad definition of religion, and then, before he has written two sentences, falls into the very error which he condones. His error consists in making a belief in spiritual things a "religious minimum", whereas there is considerable evidence that the earliest religious conceptions involved no such thing as a distinction between the material and the spiritual. It is probable that a few such conceptions still survive, as for instance among the Banks Islanders (Melanesia) which will be considered later. Why is it not reasonable to suppose that if we could catch an instantaneous impression of the religious status of man just as he emerged from his non-religious, brute condition, we would find such a conception universal? Tylor's deliberately stated intention of investigating early religion under the name of Animism is therefore a mistake, and that this is so appears as he goes on with his discussion in which he is unaccountably oblivious to a great deal of evidence tending to show that man's first religious thoughts involved no such conceptions as "spiritual." The importance of a broad, a very broad, definition of religion can hardly be overemphasized.

Seeking to arrive at a definition of religion we must first try to understand or accommodate ourselves to the mind of primitive man--pre-primitive man, one might almost say. And first of all we will notice that morality

has nothing necessarily to do with the beginnings of religion. In other words it is reasonable to suppose that man has a religious experience before he had a knowledge of good and evil, and that the condition that is described by James as "your mere animal man who has not tasted of the tree of good and evil" lasted later than we usually think in human development.

In the second place we may say that primitive man did not enter into religious speculation by any consciously self-propelled efforts. He had no doubts to solve. He had no religious cravings to satisfy,--as far as he knew. He did not have to meet any opponents. He did not have to elaborate a "system." He did not have to go back of ~~known~~ known facts, or what seemed to him known facts. He was not seeking the "ultimate" nor as final explanation of the mystery of things. To very primitive man, there was probably no mystery in nature; everything in his environment was a matter of course to him. He felt no necessity of knowing the great "Wherefore"; the "What" satisfied him completely. The writer remembers his impatience, as a child, over being told that Newton's great discovery lay in explaining why an apple fell from the tree. No further explanation seemed called for than this: that it fell because it had nothing to hold it up. So the savage, with a certain naivete never questioned the mechanism of the universe at all; he needed no laws and he needed no gods in mountains and trees to

explain it. He felt no curiosity about such details.

What then was the reason for his postulating a god. No moral consideration certainly. For him things were good or bad only as they reacted on the affective elements of his consciousness or the consciousness of his group; good or bad were wholly practical things. Morality was not keyed up to anything higher than earthly strains of music. There was no sense of craving for harmony with the universe; he was quite "in tune with the Infinite" as far as he knew. Morals, mores, customs, were all utilitarian. But religion was something different; it involved his consciousness of distinctness or separateness^{from} Somewhat in the universe beyond his control or understanding.

In the third place, primitive man's religion was intensely anthropomorphic. All things were to be interpreted in terms of human nature, and "man the measure of all things" was a religious rule long before Protagoras embodied it in Philosophy. As early as 550 B. C. we have the record of Xenophanes inveighing against popular anthropomorphism somewhat as follows: "Mortals, of course accept the authority of Homer and Hesiod, and think that the gods are born as they are and like them have feeling, voice and body; and they ascribe to the gods all things that are a shame and disgrace among men,--theft, adultery, and falsehood. They do as the oxen or lions would do if they could paint; they would certainly represent their gods in the form of lions

or oxen." This indictment is significant because it is set forth against a people who were emerging into a higher civilization and yet clung to man-like gods. Nor is anthropomorphism dead in us yet; the child and the unsophisticated mind still picture God as a Great Man. How much more, then, did savage brute-man set all his religious thought by human standards!

Bearing in mind then that primitive man's religious thought was non-moral, spontaneous, and anthropomorphic, let us take as a minimum definition of religion simply the consciousness or apprehension of higher beings. This takes nothing for granted as to the attitude toward these beings; whether any relations were understood to be sustained toward them or not will next be discussed. We leave the definition of religion with these words from James: "...the whole array of our instances leads to a conclusion something like this: It is as if there were in the human consciousness a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception of what we may call 'something there' more deep and more general than any of the special and particular 'senses' by which the current psychology supposes existing realities to be originally revealed."

But what is "religious experience", of which nothing has so far been said? According to the definition just given, such a thing is perhaps conceivable as a religion without a religious experience. But as a matter of fact, proba-

Weber:History
of Philosophy.
p.26.

James:Varie-
ties of Reli-
gious Exper-
ience.

bly no such state of affairs ever existed. Any consciousness of a higher power meant an attempt to come en rapport with it, either from a sense of dependence on it, or fear, or for some other reason. In other words, there is nothing to prevent our assumption that religion is instinctive or intuitive in man. Mr. James Mark Baldwin, it is true, thinks that the intuition theory "shuts the door to analysis" and if by the intuition theory any formulated religion is meant, then he is quite right. But no psychological phenomena can be traced back phylogenetically without coming inevitable to a point where the door to analysis shuts of its own accord, and all that we insist on here is the legitimacy of assuming that at that point, wherever it may be, in religious development, religion is intuitive, instinctive, innate, indigenous to the soul of man.

But an instinct is a yearning, a tendency towards something. The religious instinct is the yearning towards the "Something There." Any satisfaction of this yearning I take to be a religious experience. Stated more precisely, religious experience is any occurrence in which the individual is a main factor, and which seems to the individual to bring him in touch with the power which is the object of his yearning.

If we try to probe back far enough into the nature of man to ask why this yearning exists, we may not be far wrong in referring it to the native state of wonder. To the irreligious man, the atheist, wonder is foreign. In the last

Religious Experience Defined.

Another Definition.

analysis it will be found that the more thorough-going the atheist is, the more self-sufficient he is. He can hardly be anything else but irreligious; he can hardly remain himself and not take all things calmly for granted. His general deportment toward creation is cosmopolitan; he acts like one of the earth's few initiated; he allows nothing to surprise him, and he regards himself as sufficient unto his own needs. In the most religious-minded individuals, on the other hand, we are almost certain to find an attitude of wonder before the universe, like a child gazing at the starlit sky. It is the religious mind that indulges much in contemplation. Contemplation means wonder, wonder means striving after, striving after means worship eventually. We might now re-define religious experience as that which satisfied the wonder of man.

Let us come at our initial conception of religious experience in another way. Having noticed the anthropomorphic tendency of the human mind, we may safely say that religion begins with a personal conception of a god. Even to such a mind as that of Sir Oliver Lodge (to cite a recent example), and certainly much more inevitably to the mind of our primitive man, it is an easy mode of regarding the universe to think of it as invested with the attributes of personality. He implies that for religious purposes this is up and away the most convenient, not to say efficacious, mode of regarding the universe. In this the savage would unconsciously agree with Sir Oliver. Now most, if not all,

Another
Definition

Sir Oliver
Lodge: The
Substance of
Faith.

religions, are records of attempts to bring about contact between the man and this personal aspect of the universe; e.g. Brahmanism. One religion, Christianity, is the record of an attempt on the part of the Deity himself to bring about the same result. The ideal religious experience would mean success on the part of both; the meeting of the father and the prodigal son remains for all time the type of the perfect religious experience. We might, therefore, reword our definition again to read like this: Religious experience is any occurrence which the individual believes to be a mutual, personal reaction between himself and a higher power.

Now if religious experience is an occurrence, what kind of an occurrence is it? Obviously that answer depends on the nature of the individual. The Brahman authors of the Upanishads, lost in the mazes of their own personalities, were as nearly totally subjective as men can be; the negro, sitting in solemn contemplation of his wooden fetish, does so because his personality has no intricacies in which he may wander, so that he must focus his thought on something objective. Both the Brahman and the negro are religious, and are undergoing religious experiences, but of different characters, suited to their personal peculiarities. In order, then, to include the experiences of all men, let us reshape our definition once more: Religious experience means any occurrence or phenomenon of an unusual significance or an abnormal nature, taking place either subjectively or objectively, and as a result of or in connection with the

Another
Definition

contemplation or practice of religious beliefs or aspirations. This seems preferable to other definitions like that of James, because our present purpose is more sociological than psychological, and much of what we shall consider will refer not to the experiences of individual men in their solitude, but of individual men in groups, striving to bring about harmony between the divine power and the group.

It will be noted that religious experience as here considered has nothing to do, necessarily, with personal "devoutness" in our modern moral sense. It is not yet developed to that point. It is still in "the dim backward" or common root of things, lying, with many other mental activities of man, in the germ, not yet differentiated very far, some not even functioning.

Many problems confront us at this point, some of which are too difficult to be handled now; but among the questions which will be somewhat discussed are the physical or bodily contribution to man's religious experience, the stages of development of religious experience, the various theories of development, and the priesthood. This is almost a random selection from the many topics connected with the whole subject.

Religious experience will be considered under two main headings, (1) Primary ideas;—the simplest ideas of the creative or overruling power formulated by man as the result of his natural experiences. The claim will be made and upheld that these first ideas were not those of the current

James' definition: "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude so far as they apprehend themselves in relation to whatever they may consider to be divine." Varieties of Religious Experience: p.31.

anthropological theories of the origin of religion, but antedated the development of any of those ideas. --(2) Secondary ideas, or the later development of Animism and Polytheism, developing from ghost belief, ancestor worship, etc.

Some stages of religious experience to be encountered are (1) Objective experiences subjectively interpreted. (2) Subjective experiences of an involuntary nature. (3) Self-induced experiences. (4) Experiences shaped by reason.

II. Primary Ideas.

The first religious idea took shape as the positing of one anthropomorphic god. This was done in accordance with well recognized philosophical and psychological principles. Hume says: "It is certain that the most ignorant and stupid peasants, -- nay, infants, may, even brute beasts, -- improve by experience and learn the qualities of natural objects by observing the effects which result from them."

That is, even pre-Adamites could get the cause and effect connection. Going on the supposition -- generally regarded as true -- that primitive man is self-centered, and self-important, what would be his natural mental process when for the first time, he conceived the world as something beyond him, something continually coming to pass, -- what, but, by a process analogous to his other every day processes of cause and effect connection, to fill in the gap with a Personal Cause, something like himself only more powerful? In

Hume: Human Understanding, p.38. (Open Court Edition.)

other words, God was the common-sense and necessary conclusion. It came not by revelation and not by way of an innate idea, but from what seemed to be the necessity of the case. Man unconsciously made use of the "argument from design"-- the very first argument which the "plain man" makes use of to-day. We say "unconsciously" because there was no intention of arriving at the idea of God. To quote Hume again:

Ibid.p.46.

"All belief of matter of fact or real/existence is derived from some object present to the memory or senses, and a customary conjunction between that and some other object."

And again: "...the animal infers some fact beyond what immediately strikes his senses and, this inference is altogether grounded on past experience, while the creature expects in the present object the same consequences which it has always found in its observation to result from similar objects. It is impossible that this inference of the animal can be founded on any process of argument or reasoning, by which he concludes that like events must follow like objects...Animals therefore are not guided in these inferences by reasoning; neither are children; neither are the generality of mankind in their ordinary actions and conclusions."

He speaks here of inferring from cause to effect, but his remarks apply equally well to the process of inferring from effect to cause. It is simply a matter of "Customary conjunction."

Ibid.p.111.

But how can we be sure that only one god was assumed and not many? The evidence is not as complete as could be

desired, and the bulk of the testimony on this point will appear later, under the "degeneration theory," but meanwhile it is to be noticed that the question really hinges on this other one: did they conceive of every mysterious and unexplained phenomenon as due to a separate agency or did they conceive of many of the chief phenomena as coming from a common source somewhere beyond?. I personally incline to the latter view as being more natural:-

"Setebos, Setebos, and Setebos,-

Thinketh he dwelleth in the cold o'the moon."

Savage man might take himself, his comrades, and the environing trees, rocks, and animals, for granted. They remained about the same from one day to another, were more or less on an equality with him, and were subject to his will to a considerable extent. But around him and over him was always something else. There were the clouds that rolled up from below the rim of the earth, the winds that came from far away, and the stars that started forth at night from the depths of the outer blackness. He did not stop to say: "The stars impress me with awe,--there must be a cause back of them; the clouds are wonderful,--they must have another cause; the winds are mysterious in their coming and going,--they are the effect of a third cause." But he did feel over-awed, curious, and admiring on the whole, in general, and his first religious step was simply to recognize another person besides himself at work. "For the invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made,

Browning: Caliban upon Setebos.

even his everlasting power and divinity."

This, then, we take to be the origin of man's religious experience,--protoplasmic religious experience we may call it,--a vague, undifferentiated shiver of awe and fear and wonder, as he realized that while he lay beneath the forest trees or squatted around his fire at night, he was momentarily in the presence of Something Else, from which he felt unable to hide away.

Speculation such as this may merit the reproach of trying to pry back too far into the unknowable period of human beginnings. But the trouble with at least one of the best known theories of religious origins is just on this point, that it does not go back far enough. I refer to Spencer's theory, which it may be in order briefly to examine at this point.

Mr. Spencer begins at the point when man noticed certain local phenomena of a mysterious nature. These may be grouped in three divisions: (1) such things as shadows, echoes, reflections, the vapor of the breath, etc., suggesting that there is another part of man besides his body; (2) such occurrences as dreams, hallucinations, etc., suggesting the possibility of life outside the body; (3) sleep, swoon, apoplexy, and death, showing various degrees of vital connection between the two existences.

Spencer's
Theory.

It is not my purpose to attack the general scheme or coherence of this theory. That all these phenomena were early noticed by man is obvious, and that they

played an important part in his religious experience there can be no doubt. But that they were the primary, the original factors of his religion is not clear. This is no mere cavil. It is a very vital question. I have shown that my account of the beginning of religious manifestations is based on an easy, natural, and legitimate process of association of ideas, a simple effect-and-cause process. Spencer's theory, however, makes the basis of religious thought a series of conclusions from phenomena which modern psychology interprets in such a way as to make those basal conclusions false. According to Spencer the religious fabric was conceived in error and built on sand. It is a vital question.

I cannot accept the idea that primitive man began to speculate on the things that Spencer says he began on, when I remember that we are dealing now with a transitional character--man in the making. We have seen that we must begin with man in the making because we must believe that as soon as man was made he was already religious, or, in other words, that the making of man and the making of his religious nature were contemporaneous events. Now to man in the making we must be very careful not to impute any mentally complex processes; in fact, other things being equal, that explanation of the religious development which involves the least complex mental process carries with it the greatest presumptive evidence. Let us therefore put side by side in the briefest form possible the necessary steps in the two proposed processes. Our own supposition is that primitive

man thought like this:

(1) These meteorological phenomena are of peculiar import.

(2) Events of peculiar import usually have human agencies back of them.

(3) Hence there must be a human-like power behind these greater phenomena.

Mr. Spencer produces a vast mass of facts from which primitive man is supposed to have reasoned. They cannot be put into one syllogism without presupposing a prior mental process on the part of man, which we are not presupposing just now. Put as simply as possible, the thought process would be:

(1) Voices, reflections, etc., are human characteristics.

(2) Voices, reflections, etc., sometimes accompany me, sometimes not.

(3) I therefore possess another detached personality.

And again:

(1) In dreams I have wandered.

(2) But my body does not wander.

(3) Hence I possess a double.

And again:

(1) My friends sometimes become apparently lifeless.

(2) They do not always stay so.

(3) Hence they have two parts--a body and a life.

Now all these cogitations probably did, at a later time in man's religious development, play an important part, but not at first. For any one of them is a more difficult conception than the one I have suggested. And they are not necessary conceptions. Men might at first have regarded the apparitions, reflections, and echoes he encountered as simply flitting creatures of the forest. What then? He would be on the way to mythology rather than religion proper.

And at any rate, the idea of a double, a personality that is a part of the man and at the same time not a part of him, is a very difficult one for our savage, who is, ex hypothesi, only man in the making. It seems more probable that he began with a plain, common-sense postulate of one human-like but super-human god. Spencer's process came later, at least.

However, suppose we accept, for the argument's sake, the conclusion that man did arrive at the belief in the double personality as soon as he arrived at any religious belief. What, it may then be asked, is the result of this belief? and the answer, whatever else it may be, certainly cannot be " a sense of dependence on a higher power or powers," The doubles of men, the souls of the dead, even, might be regarded simply as hungry and emasculated smoke-wraiths of humanity, preferring, in the words of Achilles, life on earth as a slave rather than in the hereafter as princes. Another whole step is necessary to bring

about a religious attitude toward disembodied souls. They must, i.e., have higher rank conferred upon them. Only then can the belief in them take the form of a religion. But this added step means added thought power. It appears then that following the course of human religious development as projected by Mr. Spencer, in order to arrive at the first concept that can possibly be called religious, we have to allow a greater mental capacity in man than is needed for the theory of "direct inference" as I have outlined it above.

Another reason why Spencer's hypothesis does not seem as satisfactory as that of direct inference is this: the phenomena which he discusses are relatively rare. Coma, apoplexy, and other like pathological conditions, as well as very vivid dreams were probably not seen so often in the lifetime of our primitive man as to force him to draw conclusions, nearly as soon as the more common but equally impressive movements of the heavenly bodies, the winds, etc. The uncultivated or low-developed brain, as is well known, requires considerable reiteration to produce a definite effect. This applies when we are considering events happening at rare intervals with others happening with considerable frequency. On the whole, then, we prefer to relegate Mr. Spencer's system to a point a little later in religious development.

Let us next examine a theory quite different from the one just considered,--the so-called Orenda theory of Hewitt. This theory, in brief, is as follows:--Primitive man recognizes in himself what may be called a creative spirit

The "Orenda Theory.

a surging ego or personality, and by analogy attributes it to all other objects. This power is termed Orenda. Self-preservation leads all things to seek to increase their Orenda and to overcome the Orenda of other things. The hunter matches his Orenda against the Orenda of the hunter animal. The acquisition of the Orenda of another adds to the power of the conqueror. The world is thus a kind of multiform pantheism. The acquisition of Orenda, or the pacification of more powerful Orendas becomes religion, which is simply the attempt to further welfare or avert illfare by the possession or use of the Orenda of another.

The objections to this theory may be best set forth by referring directly to Mr. Hewitt's article. In the first place he says: "That life is a property of every body whatsoever...is a postulate fundamental to the cosmologic philosophy of savage man." Now what does he mean by "life"? This sounds too much like a highly cultivated pantheism, in other words, a developed philosophy. But philosophy follows religion, and not vice versa.

Besides this, surely savage man had distinctions in the manifestations of this all-animating power, Orenda. He recognized, for example, a difference between a live body and a corpse. But if "life is the property of every body whatsoever" then what is this difference? It begins to be a question of words.

If man is inclined to notice any controlling power outside of himself, surely he conceived of it as something

J.N.B.Hewitt:
"Orenda and a
Theory of Re-
ligion."

p.33

"By reflecting upon itself, religion becomes theology, theology, in its turn, reflects upon itself, and becomes religious criticism, philosophy." Weber: Hist. of Phil. footnote, p.18

generically different from stocks and stones. Whether the object of his worship and the stocks and stones which he does not worship both possess "Orenda" has nothing to do with the discussion as far as religion is concerned, the important point is that he worships some things and not others.

The concept of Orenda is far more becoming to a Brahman priest than to a naked savage. How far down the scale of humanity Mr. Hewitt might find such a concept we are not prepared to say, but for man just emerging into the human state, it is absolutely out of the question.

Mr. Hewitt continues: "...Man in all times and in all lands learned that he must struggle against the adverse physical conditions of his environment. Interpreted in terms of his self-centered philosophy these unfavoring conditions were to the savage man the handiwork of mystic potency directed by the will of the environing bodies...The savage man conceived the diverse bodies collectively constituting his environment to possess inherently mystic potency, and to be living, willing, thinking, passionate beings." Now it would seem from this wording that the "adverse conditions of his environment" are none other "the environing bodies" themselves,--yet the former, and not the latter are conceived, according to this view, to be the "handiwork of mystic potency." That is to say, mystic potency makes adverse conditions, and adverse conditions are environing bodies, and environing bodies possess mystic potency. It seems to be arguing in a circle. It is not at all clear why it could not just as truly be put this way: environing bodies make adverse

p.33

conditions, and mystic potence makes environing bodies. Or this way: Mystic potence makes adverse conditions in the form of environing bodies. Which would seem most ultimate, most causal,--"mystic potence" or the "will" of "environing bodies." Certainly the first. Primitive man, we are insisting, did not have a metaphysically endowed brain, but he did have plain common sense. Environing bodies do not act as if they had wills to direct things, but they do act as if they were directed by mystic potence, (if the phrase is insisted on.)

The truth is this "mystic potence" is more euphonious than useful. Men as primitive as those who first developed a religious concept were no more capable of mentally dividing an environing body from its mystic potence than they were of mentally dividing a body from its soul, and what mystic potence means, if ^{it} means anything, is just the plain anthropomorphic conception of God which we have been presenting.

The Orenda idea is about equivalent to pantheism unless we take the alternative that it was not the ultimate conception of those employing it. Are we sure, by the way, that primitive man regarded the signs of power or activity as belonging to the objects themselves? Is the rumbling under the ice the manifestation of the lake itself or a spirit ~~under~~ within the lake? is the souging of the wind caused by the wind itself or a spirit riding on the wind? is the mysterious murmuring of leaves and trees due to the "mystic potence" of the trees (meaningless phrase!) or to dryads?

Hewitt does not bridge the gap between the human and the divine. He gets men to worshipping objects that possess Orenda, but he does not suggest how they came to conceive of gods as separate from objects. The logical outcome of Orenda is magic, not religion.

We will now consider a little more particularly our primary idea of a single, inferred, anthropomorphic god. We have purposefully left till now a discussion of an hypothesis which is older than any yet taken up--the old "Degeneration Theory." It is with such trepidation that I consider this outworn theory for discussion at all that I hasten to say that I do not believe it can be upheld any longer in its old form. That was substantially that the first race of men on earth were semi-civilized, and that from them has been produced savagery by retrogression and civilization by progression. This hypothesis, founded on a misinterpretation of the Biblical account, is, if taken as universal, contrary to our knowledge of the laws of evolution in human history.

But nevertheless there is a sufficient kernel of truth in the degeneration theory to pay us for sifting it out. In the first place it must be remembered that degeneration or retrogression is a frequent fact in evolution. There are always two points of view. To take a simple illustration from outside the religious realm, when the anthropoid apes and man developed from their common forebear

by divergent paths it is quite easy to take them both as perfections of adaptation to environment and the action of natural selection, while from a higher "spiritual" stand we must regard man as having progressed and the ape as having retrograded farther "back into the beast." Spencer admits the fact of degeneration explicitly, "...there are reasons for suspecting that men of the lowest type now known, forming social groups of the simplest kinds, do not exemplify men as they originally were. Probably most of them had ancestors in higher states; and among their beliefs remain some which were evolved during those higher states. (The italics are ours.) While the current (Biblical) degradation theory is untenable, the theory of progression, in its ordinary form seems to me untenable also....It is possible, and, I believe, probable, that retrogression has been as frequent as progression." Quotations could be multiplied giving cases of probable degeneration. Keane quotes Sir Harry Johnson as saying: "I can believe it possible that, had the Africans been more isolated from contact with the rest of the world, and cut off from the immigration of the Arabs and Europeans, the purely Negro races, so far from advancing toward a higher type of humanity might have actually reverted...to a type no longer human." In the island of Mass, (New Hebrides) was found a large stone with carvings of the sun and moon, in volcanic rock, too hard to be carved with the stone and shell-axes of pre-Christian days; likewise stones resembling curtain-rings "of a mathematical accuracy of circumference of which I hardly think

Principles of
Sociology,
I. chap.VII.

Keane:World's
Peoples. p.

the existing natives capable." The natives explain these things just as they do their pig sacrifices and ceremonial dances: "Ole fella man befo me, e makeum." Miss Kingsley thinks we may have to reconstruct all our knowledge of the African tribes on some kind of a degeneration theory. Tylor, the most reluctant of all, admits that the evidence for degeneration is very often good, though usually ambiguous. He may be right in contending that savages are never pure monotheists, but that would not preclude the possibility of a pure monotheism existing, tucked away in forgotten recesses of the tribal mind, buried under popular animism, but lingering on in the minds of the elders and priests,--a possibility of which more will be said hereafter. Sir Monier Williams finds the same difficulty among the more advanced races, writing: "Non-Christian Bibles are all developments in the wrong direction. They all begin with some flashes of true light and end in darkness", while Max Muller, commenting on the exalted language in which the Vedas describe the god Varuna, says, "The more we go back, the more we examine the earliest germs of any religion, the purer I believe we shall find the conceptions of the Deity." A brief examination of a few actual beliefs may serve to make this perfectly clear. We begin with the teaching of the Vedas themselves.

It is necessary at the outset in studying the gods of the Vedas, to distinguish between "Revelation" and "Tradition" or the gods of "poetry" and "philosophy," or the

Somerville: Anthropological Society, 23:8

"Travels in West Africa." quoted by Den-net, "At the Back of the Black Man's Mind," preface.

Prim.Cult.
vol. 2.

Quoted by M. Phillips, in "The Teaching of the Vedas."

Ibid.

"former" and the "latter" gods. The chief characteristics of the "former" are concrete and physical and of the "latter", abstract or metaphysical. This indicates progress in mentality. The gods of the physical class, ~~na~~ however, are not identical with the objects with which they are associated. Now the conception of a supreme god among the primitive Indo-Europeans before they separated is well shown in the following. "The correspondence in substance and in name between Varuna and Ouranos, and in substance between Ahura-Magda and these two, leads to the conclusion that Varuna was the supreme God of the united Aryans in the primitive home. And by comparing the attributes of Varuna with those of Ahura-Magda, and the attributes of both with those of Zeus-Jupiter, we arrive at a tolerably correct idea of the conception of God which prevailed among the Indo-Europeans before they separated. We find that they conceived God as the "creator" or "organizer" of the world, the "severeign Lord", the "omniscient spirit", possessing a moral nature in which justice and mercy were prominent. We find also that this abstract spiritual conception was so closely connected with a concrete material conception that one could not separated from the other, and hence both found expression in Varuna. Varuna therefore represents both the material heaven and the god of heaven". We have quoted this at length because of the remarkable similarity thus brought out Ibid. between the "Aryan" and savage beliefs,--particularly in failure to distinguish between spiritual and material, and

in the high moral character of the supreme god. In short, the Vedas show an ancient monotheism, followed by a polytheism which clouded it over, till the names of God became gods, and their real meaning was lost. Now how was it with the characteristically savage beliefs?

"The Andamanese", says E. H. Man, show "no traces, even in bygone years, of any forms of worship or acts of veneration to bodies celestial or terrestrial...yet there is a vague belief in the existence of One (called Puluga) who, they say, lives in the sky, is Immortal, Invisible, Omniscient in the day time, even reading the thoughts of men, the creator of the world and of all objects animate and inanimate, though not of the evil spirits which are three or four in number. They say the Puluga pities those in pain and distress, and that it is he who sometimes affords relief. There are certain crimes and offences which anger him, and storms are regarded as evidence of his wrath. He is supposed to eat and drink, and during the dry months he is said to sleep, as thunder, which is his voice, is then rarely heard. But for all this their belief in and dread of evil spirits is much stronger, almost all deaths, sickness, and calamities being attributed to their machinations." A summary of the beliefs about Puluga would have to include these six points:

J.A.I.11:288

I. Though his appearance is like fire, he is (nowadays) invisible.

II. He was never born and is immortal.

III. By him the world and all objects, animate and inanimate, were created, excepting only the powers of evil.

IV. He is regarded as omniscient (during the day at least) knowing even the thoughts of men's hearts.

V. He is angered by the commission of certain sins, while to those in pain or distress he is pitiful and sometimes deigns to afford relief.

VI. He is the Judge from each soul receives its sentence after death.

The Fuegians have a tradition of a great man who has never been seen, and who inhabits the forest; he is a stern dispenser of justice, and both he and the adjacent Chonos' god are very "moral". Lang points out that if this be a sample of the earliest religions, (as we may fairly claim from the low cultural conditions of Fuegians) then the theology of many of the higher savages, (e.g. the Zulus) is decidedly degenerate.

"The Bantu", says Miss Kingsley, "Gives one accustomed to the negro the impression that he once had the same set of ideas but has forgotten half of them."

The Gulf tribes, according to E. Palmer, believe in spirits and in a spirit who looks after them after death.

Probably no people ranks lower culturally than the Australian aborigines. But their supreme god, unlike their lesser ones, is not regarded as a malevolent being, but is feared as one who can severely punish the trespasses against the tribal ordinances which he is supposed to have estab-

Travels in West Africa--p.442.

J.A.I.12:291

lished. He taught the known arts, named the totemistic divisions, and instituted the Initiation of Youths at which are taught (1) chastity, (2) respect for elders, (3) dignity and sobriety, (4) reverence and obedience to God.

Howitt.
J.A.I. 13:193

By this time it has become imperative that we synthesize the impressions we have been getting from this data, and come to some definite conclusion. We have seen continual references to the supreme gods of various tribes, in more or less perfect accord with the theory of primitive monotheism here advocated. But there have been many incidental allusions to lower gods, evil spirits. These lesser powers now demand explanation, and accordingly we leave the supreme gods for the time being. We will first try to discover how it was possible for these lesser gods to fight their way into a prominent position in man's religious consciousness in the face of the already existing supreme god.

III. A Dual Religious System.

An African missionary with a gift for observation, Mr. Dennet, says "...concurrent with fetishism, of Jujuisim, there is in Africa a religion giving us a much higher conception of God than is generally acknowledged by writers on African modes of thought." That is to say, when we are studying the religions of Africa (and then why not of any part of the savage world?) there are two great departments into which religious data should be put. One is, comparatively speaking, rubbish, foreign matter concealing the re-

Dennet: At the
Back of the
Black Man's
Mind. p. V.

ligion underneath. In this department we must put fetishism, demonalty, ancestor worship, etc., found in various forms universally. In the other must be put all those references to a single supreme God. The question immediately arises, why should the conception of a supreme God be allowed to lapse? The answer, in part, is that it was the savage method of dealing with the practical problem of good and evil. Strange forms of death presented themselves to man. Apparently viciously conceived accidents befell him. In their pettiness, their particularity, their singling out of persons, they did not remind him so much of a great overseeing God as of a very finite malevolent power. When the Andamanese finds his friend or relative dead unexpectedly, he hurls his spear into the bush, in the hope of striking the mischievous demon who is the cause of the trouble. But "Puluga" is not in his mind at all as connected with the affair. Hence the beginning of a very practical side of religion: since God is indifferent and the gods are not, then go to! we will concern ourselves with those who most concern themselves with us, we will propitiate those who have most to do with us! Again we have the philosophy of Caliban.

Take the case of the Australians, roaming in small bands without more formal rulers than headmen, not ancestor worshipers, not given to many gods, not speculative. How could they ever have arrived at their belief in a supreme god by speculating upwards from demon-worship?

"The Dinkas of the Upper Nile pay a very theoret-

ical kind of homage to the all-powerful Being, dwelling in heaven, whence he sees all things. He is called "Dendid" (great rain, that is, universal benediction?) He is omnipotent, but being all beneficence can do no evil, so not being feared he is not addressed in prayer. The evil spirit, on the other hand, receives sacrifices. The Dinkas have a strange old chant (not only beautiful but illustrative of the indifference of Dendid)

'At the beginning, when Dendid made all things,

He created the Sun,

And the Sun is born and dies and comes again!

He created the Stars,

And the Stars are born and die and come again!

He created Man,

And Man is born and dies and returns no more!"

Waitz, after careful investigation, admits with surprise that a great number of tribes are evidently on the border-land of monotheism, if not quite monotheistic, and that, lying above this monotheism, as if of later growth, is a mass of superstition.

A little further on in the book referred to before, Dennet becomes more explicit:--"Whether this fetishism...is properly speaking religion or not, is of small importance. There is at any rate side by side with this cult what few observers appear to have noticed, a higher religion which I call Nkicism...Many people talk of the gods of the Bavili, as they call the 'powers' and fetishes, but the Bavili them-

Lejean, Rev. des
Deux Mondes, Ap-
ril 1867. p. 760
Quoted by Lang
in The Making
of Religion,
p. 230.

Anthropologie
2:167 Quoted by
Lang, p. 239.

Dennet, p. 85.

selves say...'God made man and he made the powers on earth also'. And again: "Their ideas, it is true, are expressed in symbolic language, but fetishism bears about as much relation to this portion of their religion as popular Buddhism does to Buddhistic philosophy." (Buddhistic philosophy, by the way, is very much more ancient than popular Buddhism.)

Many difficulties attend the acquisition of data along this line. In the first place the language used in connection with these religious mysteries is usually archaic.

"The vocabulary of ordinary life is almost useless when the region of mysteries and superstitions is approached." Then there is always the danger of mistaking the incorporated teachings of missionaries as parts of the original, native belief. Last of all, it is difficult because these things are arcana, are jealously guarded, and are revealed only at rare intervals or in initiation ceremonies.

Now the antiquated forms of language used give proof in themselves of the ancientness of the beliefs which the language conveys. Then, as regards the creeping of foreign ideas, it would certainly seem from the frequency of warnings on this score found in literature on the subject, that no one is ignorant of this danger, and everyone accordingly takes precautions against it. And still in many cases, as in that of the Bavili tribes quoted above, the monotheistic faith is found to be purer in tribes where the missionary influence has been weakest. Lastly, the mysteriousness attached to these articles of faith vouches for

R.H.Codrington:
J.A.I.10:
263. "Religious
Beliefs and
Practices of
Melanesia."

their ancientness. The things that their fathers did, these are the sacred things to the savage men.

To recapitulate:--The great difficulty with the commonly accepted theories is their failure to meet and satisfactorily explain the widespread belief in a double system of deities, a higher and a lower. It is well developed in the lowest races, it occurs where there is no ancestor worship, it is generally esoteric, it often involves higher ethics than those of the group as a whole. In short it reminds one of the Degeneration Theory. Especially does it when we find this single god attaining more pronounced "epicurean repose" as we come higher in culture, while at the same time the crowd of lesser gods increases.

We shall now enquire more particularly into these lower gods and forms of worship.

IV. Polytheism.

This phase of our inquiry is almost infinite in scope and complexity. It embraces all of Spencer's theory of ghost and ancestor worship. It is Tylor's "Animism" to which he gives up over half of his two volume work on "Primitive Culture." It will therefore necessarily be incompletely discussed here.

For in the first place a great deal of effort may be saved by stating that at this state in the discussion, we accept practically in toto Spencer's account of the

method by which these secondary ideas developed into polytheism along the road of ghost-belief, spirits of the dead, and finally ancestor-worship. The question raised, it will be remembered, was on the point of where this process began.

But it is a temptation just to glance at a line of evidence which Spencer either overlooked or was ignorant of, and which Mr. Lang, in his "Making of Religion" has perhaps over-emphasized, at the same time giving a clear presentation of it.

This is the question whether the conclusions of savage men regarding ghosts and supernatural agencies were not founded in large part on phenomena of an occult nature, phenomena which to us as well as to them are not easily, if at all explained on any natural basis. The pertinency of this question is again just in this fact, that it somewhat affects the validity of their conclusions.

Lang quotes from the Program of the Society for Experimental Psychology of Berlin: "That many of the so-called mystical phenomena are more common and prominent among savages than among ourselves is familiar to everyone acquainted with the subject." Many interesting speculations group themselves around this fact. Frederic Meyers, for instance, regards the range of man's co-ordinations with the environing universe as a spectrum, ranging through the various senses on up to the occult, which we are ordinarily not sensitive to, just as there are rates of vibration at either end of the color spectrum which the eyes do not respond to.

Making of
Religion p. 7

Hegel put the occult at the lower end of the spectrum.

Dr. Max Dessoir suggests that hallucination is more common among lower types of men because of their being fewer memories to compete with each other for prominence in the mind.

Many reported instances of clairvoyance go to show the important part it played in the early life of the race. The foster-mother of John Tanner is said to have thrown herself into a clairvoyant state to ascertain the direction in which game lay. The Finns bow to the superior powers of the Lapp sorcerers, and the Lapps to the Samoyed clairvoyants. Highland "Second Sight" is familiar in literature. Other instances would be given if it were the purpose here to prove the genuineness of clairvoyance. Something no doubt can be made on that point; man may, in short, be so of the earth earthy, so closely related to the lower end of the spectrum that he responded better when savage than when civilized. The belief in the evolutionary development of man does not militate against this point of view, as it is often supposed to. We must keep in mind that facts do bear out the theory to this extent at least--that primitive man did respond better to the "X" influences of the mental realm than does civilized man. He may quite well then have made them a partial basis of a natural theology. Meanwhile the old monotheistic habit of mind would be slipping away into the background of consciousness. It seems to me that this is quite a different thing from the degeneration theory, as stated of old, and yet it does seem to explain the facts.

But here is the real point: No matter how distorted the conclusions of the savage mind, the phenomena of clairvoyance and hypnosis give occasion for clear-cut religious experiences of a personal nature. Hereafter there is not only a "Mutual personal reaction" between men and the higher powers, but exclusive reactions. Religion begins to come home to the heart. Every man, it now appears, may have a religious experience at any time, hence conformity to certain supposed conditions on which the experience depends. When the Indian seeress sang

Lang, p. 81.

"Illumines earth,

Illumines heaven!

Oh, say, what Spirit, or Body, is this Body,

That fills the earth around,

Speak, man, ah, say

What Spirit, or Body, is this Body!" everyone was quickened, put on the watch. It was a step toward greater definiteness in religious experience.

From this point on the Animistic or Polytheistic structure grows ever more complex. Religious experience meanwhile keeps pace. It becomes differentiated--One Spirit, but a diversity of gifts. It takes on notably a two-fold aspect, the personal and the social. There are strivings for individual experiences, for personal monopolies of divine favor, and there are organized attempts of the group to gain the same thing.

As an example of the group attempt at attaining religious experience, take the priesthood. Though all men desired religious experience it early became evident that some men could show evidence of more easy communication with the divine than others. This might either be done by clever pretence or by genuine success in attaining some pathological condition seeming to show superhuman possession. The more successful were naturally called upon to be of service to their less perspicacious companions,--to use their "influence" with the powers above. A line was thus early drawn between those easily attaining religious experience and those not. Then as now and as always men rose up to ask: What of our relation to the Infinite?" Anyone who professes to have a reply to this question always has a following, especially if he can substantiate his claim by some seemingly supernatural means. Hence the popularity of the medicine man.

"Persons whose constitutional unsoundness induces morbid manifestations are indeed marked out by nature to become seers and sorcerers...Thus, even in the lower culture a class of sickly, brooding enthusiasts begin to have that power over the minds of their lustier fellows which they have kept in so remarkable a way through the course of history." Unnecessarily severe as this seems upon the second estate, it is true that the clergy are the logical descendants of the medicine men of old. We define the priesthood, therefore, as an organized effort of a social group to attain a fuller religious experience.

But to understand the character of religious experiences of course it would be necessary to study individual efforts at close range. A savage's inner experiences are so very different from our own! A great many occurrences would pass for "religious" with him which we would simply consider "interesting" or "unusual." He would not be greatly inclined to introspection. Perhaps in a rough way we may say that the higher grades of culture exhibit greater culture and powers of inhibition than lower cultures, but there is no exact parallelism to be found here. The savage medicine man dancing himself into a state of excitement is "playing to the gallery" quite as often as not, and his mind is focussed outwardly, but at the same time he does succeed in so completely abandoning himself as to bring on an abnormal bodily condition. This is a genuine religious experience to him, and yet it is as far removed as possible from introspection and subjectivity.

But much of savage man's religious experience is absolutely without conscious deceit. "When Dr. Mason was preaching near a village of heathen Pivo, a man fell down in an epileptic fit, his familiar spirit having come over him to forbid the people to listen to the missionary, and he sand out his denunciations like one frantic. This man was afterwards converted and told the missionary that 'he could not account for his former experiences, but it certainly appeared to him as though a spirit spoke and he must tell what was commucinated.'" This type, the involuntary exper-

ience of a wholly subjective character, has a long line of descent, through demon possession of the New Testament, the "prophesying" of the writings of St. Paul, and the occasional seizures still witnessed in some religious gatherings. Illustrations of this kind are common among our American Indians. For instance, Agent Patrick writes concerning an entirely new religion which arose in 1883 among the Pottowotomi and Kickapoo tribes, that it seemed to manifest itself in the form of dancing as a means of expressing belief in the justice and mercy of the Great Spirit, and of their devotion to him, while among the Columbia River Indians the peculiar "Shaker" religion took the form of a quivering or shaking in the arms to express the same fact, the devotees for a long while protesting that they were powerless to prevent the shaking.

Still another important form of religious experience is the deliberately self-induced kind. Meditations, fastings, narcotics, excitement, disease,--all may bring on a morbid ecstasy not far different from the modern induced hypnotic trance. Prayer, and sacrifice both began early and developed through various stages. Time prevents an adequate discussion of these different forms of religious experience.

Polytheism had great effects. We have seen how it came after monotheism, gradually engulfed it, and was only gradually forced under again. What were the compensating circumstances? The answer is that in spite of the degradation it involved, it greatly enriched human life in the long

Prim.Cult.2:131

Report of the
Eth. Bureau.
vol.14,pt.2,
p.706.

run. As a single instance, take the development of the belief in the immortality of the soul through the growth of Animism or Polytheism, and consider the part it has played in solacing in trouble, answering the problem of evil, and inducing to a morally upright life. Animism in its full development means a belief in souls and a future life, and in divine personal control of the universe, and these doctrines all make for progress, all mean advance in psychical and social life, all mean greater and higher intellectuality. Though the old supreme Gods lie temporarily in a state of innocuous desuetude, (while the prophets cry "How long, O Lord?") it is only till the animistic belief shall have grown wide and deep and wise enough to take them in again.

V. Conclusion.

There is great danger of our thinking our thoughts into those of primitive men. Spencer's was hardly the mind to understand primitive men sympathetically, and we find that after all his carefully stated precautions he makes the pre-Adamic mind too acute. Undoubtedly if the idea of God is the consummation of an intellectual attempt at what is beyond, (the "Unknowable") then of course the monotheistic conception can only come at the latter end of the evolution. But if, on the other hand, the idea of God is the result of an attitude of worship, a sense of "infinite dependence" to use the words of Schleiermacher, then the unitary conception

can come at the beginning. As a child seeks its parent, so man sought God. He needed a great and all-powerful God to satisfy his feeling of vacuity behind the universe without one. He did not attempt to prove this postulate. He was not very much on the intellectual qui vive, this early forebear of ours, and the skeptic and the Philistine were not in his day. But the little gods and many--they were a different set. They were forced upon his observation by circumstances. He reasoned them out. He then went on reasoning and finally resolved his many gods back into the One again. It was a sublime guess in the dark, that first God; it was a case of the creature demanding that the universe live up to its logical necessities; it was man proving his kinship with God. Stevenson says in another connection, "We must needs have invented heaven if we had not heard of it,--there are some things that fall so bitterly ill on this side time", and the thought applies with equal force to the idea of God. The words of Max Muller on this point deserve a full quoting: "Of religion, too, as of language, it may be said that everything new is old and everything old is new, and that there has been no entirely new religion since the beginning of the world. The elements and roots of religion were there as far back as we can trace the history of man, and the history of religion, like the history of language, shows us throughout a succession of new combinations of the same radical elements. An intuition of God, a sense of human weakness and dependence, a belief in a divine government of the world, a distinction between good and evil, and a hope of

"Chips from
a German
Workshop. p. X.

a better life--these are some of the radical elements of all religions. Though sometimes hindered they rise again and again to the surface. Though frequently distorted they tend again and again to their perfect form. Unless they had formed part of the original dowry of the human soul, religion itself would have remained an impossibility, and the tongues of angels would have been to human ears as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal."

We have been following a course of development most of which took place beyond the curtain that hides the prehistoric from us. On this side is the light of fact, on the other, the darkness of ignorance, and the invisible, hypothetical hordes of men just rising to their feet and gazing about in awe and wonder. We have really been trying to read the Greater Book of Genesis. It may not be too presumptuous perhaps to compare our own account with the Book of Genesis that has so long been the standard of truth on religious origins. This is done not to "reconcile" the two, nor to corroborate either one, but simply because parallel with the preparation of this thesis a prolonged re-reading of the first chapters of Genesis, in the light of a small but increasing anthropological knowledge, convinced me anew of the harmony of the two, and their almost accurate agreement on the main facts of the creation of man, his early dealings with a conception of God, his "fall" and his process of returning to God. In the light of both accounts, we may summarize something after this fashion:

Man is the last and highest of created things. The manner of his creation was the same as that of other animals except that "man became a living soul." Whatever else that may mean, it plainly means this at least, that man was aware of God from the time he became man. He possessed the endowment of conscience plus the recognition of God. At the same time, he was unsophisticated, natural, animal-like. The combination is easy to imagine if one has watched the growth of a child. It is a sort of Golden Age. Man is perfect after his kind, but only in the childhood of his soul-life. He is not yet tried by fire and brought forth as gold. Before that should be accomplished there was a transition to pass through, and for a while the higher nature was actually subservient to the lower. Man's intellect grew rapidly; its will went beyond its understanding. It lacked knowledge and began to enact atrocities. Man differs from the animals in this, that his impetuous and uncontrolled but childish intellect urges him in his savage state to perversions of nature and bestialities that are nameless and indescribable. The first taste of the fruit of the tree of knowledge was indeed a sad one for man. Yet what could restrain him? The race was in its youth. Sin was new. Man's blood was new. He gave himself to it in an ecstasy of delight--self-conscious delight, a new thing. "And the Lord saw that the wickedness of man was very great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually."

The whole trend of the development of man's religious nature has been from the righteousness of innocence, from simple worship, through various stages of wisdom, back again to the God of Simplicity again. The fall was only a start along a necessary path, a path that ends only when God becomes inwrought in the personal and social consciousness of man. The religious history of mankind finds its culmination when the Son of Man sat by a wayside well in spirit-worshipping Samaria and said: "God is a Spirit, and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth."

F I N I S .