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THE ARISTOTELIAN THEOLOGY.

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THE ARISTOTELIAN THEOLOGY.

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Pre-Aristotelian

In the consideration of this subject it is necessary first of all to examine the pre-Aristotelian theology, and determine, if possible, its nature and limitations, in order to estimate the value of the Aristotelian system.

Difficult-ies

From the few scattered fragments, often vague and contradictory, it is extremely difficult to formulate the theological conceptions of the Pre-Socratic philosophers. The difficulty is heightened when one remembers that the problem is ever a cosmological one, especially down to the time of the Sophists. During all this period the conceptions of God are materialistic and mythological.

Pre-Socratic problem.

Ionians

The pre-Socratic philosophers were busy in attempting to solve the problem of φύσις, or how it was that the world was ever one of changing phenomena. The Ionians posited material causes. Thales explained everything in terms of water. Anaximenes assumed the principle of air. Both derived the gods from these elements.* But Anaximander gave a different account of reality. He said that it was ἄπειρον, or eternal something that governed all things.**

* Mullact - Fragments, Vol 1 p. 242.

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Out of it were generated the worlds. These, Cicero explains, were gods that came into being by an ebb and flow movement.* But the fact that ἀπειροτ is given the predicate τὸ θεῖον, the divine, Windleband thinks quite significant. He regards it as "the first attempt to strip the idea of God of mythical form".** It is evident that θεῖον is foreign to the original text. But suppose that Anaximander did include the divine in his concept. The water and air postulates may also be taken in the same sense. If all three Milesians, as indicated, derived their Gods from some form of matter, there is every reason to suppose that the idea of God was just as mythical with the one as with either of the other two.

Xenophanes

It is Xenophanes who must receive the credit for "the first attempt" to break away from the mythological conception of God. He declares that. -

1. There is one God greatest among gods and men; neither similar in body or mind to mortals.
2. He is all seeing, all knowing:
3. And without pain he moves everything by force of mind.
4. Always in the same way he remains unmoved; nor does it befit him to go from place to place. '*

Here is the first step taken by the early Greek philosophers toward a pure and noble conception of God.

*De Nat.De 1 -11.

** Windleband History of Philosophy, p. 34.

'* Fr. 1 - 101.

No doubt it is a mistake to speak of Xenophanes as a monotheist or as monotheistical. But if a polytheist, he certainly was free from the mythological absurdities of his time. This is clearly indicated by his polemic against the popular religion.* There is in the conception of Xenophanes the germ of the idea that God and thought are identical. But from the very nature of the data, it is impossible to say just how far this is so. On the contrary, Simplicius states that Xenophanes identified God with the heavens.**

Heraclitus

With Heraclitus we have a typical example of how inseparably bound up theology was with cosmology. The interpretation of the one depends upon the interpretation of the other. We read about an everlasting fire, part kindling, part going out,*** etc. Was this fire a material reality, or was it simply a symbolical of the changing world about us? The Fragments become clearer, if the latter interpretation is applied. Heraclitus did not go back to the Ionians and build upon their crude conceptions. His position was distinctively unique and original. He is not concerned with what sort of matter will best account for change but rather with the change itself. He calls attention to the orderly arrangement in the universe. Everything moves in obedience to a Divine Law. It is this idea that is fundamental in his theology.

* 1 Fr. 5, 6 and 7.

** Diels Dox. 480, 8 - 11.

*** Fr. 20.

The same terminology is used. God is summer and winter, day and night, kindling and going out of fire. As fire is want and satiety,* so God is satiety and hunger.** Heraclitus identifies God with the universal order - with a law that governs the whole world of phenomena. The position taken by Burnet is misleading. He says that "Heraclitus disagreed with Anaximander and "Xenophanes in identifying God with primary substance and "not with the world."*'But the statement that Anaximander found Deity in something else than in primary reality, thus differing radically with Thales and Anaximenes, is untenable. Then to say that Heraclitus found God in material reality is to miss the point. That would be the Milesian gods over again. On the contrary, Heraclitus speaks of God as Wisdom,'* but never as something material in the Ionian sense. God, he says, is infinitely superior to man as man is to the ape. *** Still further in his attack upon anthropomorphic polytheism he says that God may be called Zeus, if we will, but not Zeus in the low popular sense. ***

Parmenides

With Parmenides we have a conception that is all important. He conceived of pure Being as a continuous one (ἕν ἄσβεστον) that is immovable and without an end. *** He defines it as that which is not nor will be,

* Fr., 24
** Fr., 36

' Early Greek Philosophy, 170
'* Fr., 65.
*** Fr., 20.

* * Fr., 96-99.
*** Fr., 59-61.

but is now - a perfect sphere that fills all space. It may be almost impossible to render the Being τὸ ὄν of Parmenides intelligible. But one thing is certain. As Aristotle points out,*it involves something more than a mere material conception. It put a stop to the Ionian talk about the origin of or change in things and called attention to the unchangeable present. Thus the trend of thought was turned in the opposite direction. For the first time the unchangeable as opposed to the changeable is emphasised. It is this postulate - this idea of reality as immovable that becomes all-important in the Aristotelian theology.

Transition
with
Anaxagoras

But the actual transition of Greek philosophic thought from a material to a spiritual conception began with Anaxagoras. He was the first who really distinguished between mind and matter.** This is very important for theology. All other things, he says, partake of a portion of everything but νόος, or mind, is infinite and is mixed with no matter (χρέμα) but is alone by itself.*' But though νόος is thus separated from the χρέμα, it none the less influences it. Not creating these χρέματα it simply arranged them in order (διεκόσμησε). It put the revolutions of the heavenly bodies in motion. Thus did the Divine Intelligence bring a world harmony out of Chaos. That the orderly universe was the result of some

*' Fr., 6.

Metaphysics Bk. 1, Chap. 3, Sec. 11.M.1-3-12,13 &14

intelligent principle was the valuable contribution of Anaxagoras. This is clearly indicated by his use of the verb *δλεκόμενος* which now appears for the first time in Greek philosophy. There is no reason for taking the position that this *νοῦς* was a stuff, or substance, a material reality or corporeal element.* Aristotle clearly implies that the conception of Anaxagoras is not to be regarded in this sense. Referring to this philosopher he says that he deserves great credit when he spoke of the *νοῦς* as passionless and unmixed - thus making it an intelligible principle of motion. Only in this way can the immovable be said to move and the unmixed have power.** The *νοῦς*, then, is purely an efficient cause* and is necessarily an immaterial, incorporeal essence to account for the origin of motion.

Plato

The theology of Plato may be summed up in his theory of ideas. In terms of these everything finds its explanation. The ideas are something more than mere abstractions. They are created by God himself and serve as patterns after which everything in the world is modelled. But what does this imply? By the very nature of the theory Plato is driven to postulate an eternal pre-existing idea, in order that God himself, when framing the universe, may have something to look at. But the conception becomes unintelligible when Plato speaks of this original pattern as a perfect living being

* Windleband History of Philosophy, p. 40.

** Physics, VIII - 5 - 5.

'M.I-3-13.

comprehending within itself all perfect living beings.* Thus we are at once hurried into a dualistic conception. The idea of God found another idea of God somewhere and by some process one so acted upon the other that a universe symmetrical in proportions and harmonious in movement was evolved.

Summary.

Pre-Socratic philosophers offered no rational theology. The Ionians derived God from material reality. Xenophanes identified God with the heavens. Heraclitus saw Divinity in the laws of nature. All postulated various phenomena or changes in or conditions of those phenomena as explanations of the whole world of phenomena. Reality with them, says Aristotle, was for the most part something material. The object must be brought beneath the senses to be real. But as explanation such an account is worthless. Equally useless was the attempt to render the universe intelligible in terms of the Platonic ideas. Truth, Justice, Courage, etc., what are they but the Homeric gods under new names? God and not ideas of God must be the explanation and the only explanation of existence. Of the Pre-Aristotlian conceptions, that of Anaxagoras is the most intelligible. On the one hand there is the world, and on the other there is God, the immaterial moving principle, *τὸ ὄν*. But this is about all we can say. When we raise the

* 1 Jowett-Timaeus, III - 450.

question: - How did God get over into the world and put motion into it, or in what sense did the Divine Thought give rise to the revolutions of the universe and how does it happen that these revolutions, wholly apart from the influence of the $\nu\omicron\delta\varsigma$, are ever becoming larger there is no answer. Such a conception of ^{εί} ~~Deity~~ is altogether too vague and indefinite for working purposes.

Aristotelian
Theology.

Aristotle takes up the problem of God and the world and approaches it from an entirely different point of view. We are not concerned about the beginning of things but with the attempt to make our knowledge of the universe intelligible. God must be studied in the epistem^ological not in the ontological sense. We shall not begin to build up a theological system, as Plato did, and then try and see how the world is to be understood in terms of that system. Our knowledge of reality must first be analysed and then we shall be prepared to formulate our conceptions.

Method.

"Theological
Knowledge"

Aristotle begins by making a three-fold division of knowledge. Not only are there the physical ($\phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$) and mathematical ($\mu\alpha\theta\eta\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$) but there is also the theological ($\theta\epsilon\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$) knowledge. In this adjective $\theta\epsilon\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$, which now appears for the first time in Greek philosophy, we catch the Aristotelian spirit at once. God, as well as matter in motion, or ~~number~~, becomes an object of scientific

inquiry. Indeed God is the necessary postulate of all reality. Previous philosophers, says Aristotle, seem to have recognized this to some degree, for all regarded God as one of the causes (τῶν αἰτίων) and a first principle (ἀρχή τις).*

Its subject
matter.

then, be a distinct theological knowledge. Its subject matter will be the separable and immovable reality (τίς οὐσία χωριστή καὶ ἀκίνητος) or Divinity (τὸ θεῖον) - the most excellent thing in existence (τὸ τιμιώτατον τῶν ὄντων)* as opposed to that which is movable (κινούμενον) merely and which comes under the senses. The first from its very nature is imperishable but the second may be either corruptible, as plants and animals, or incorruptible, as the heavenly bodies.'*

The
Immovable

Aristotle then goes into a complete analysis of this immovable reality. He distinguishes between the object moved (τὸ κινούμενον), that by means of which the object is moved (τὸ ὧ κινεῖ) and that which causes the object to move (τὸ κινεῖν *) The object moved must necessarily be moved but it does not necessarily cause motion and that by means of which the object is moved must necessarily cause motion and also of necessity be an object moved. But that which causes motion as distinguished from that by means of which it causes motion must be the true cause of motion,

Analysis
of
Motion

because it at the same time is the cause of its own motion. To use his illustration, the hand (τὸ κινῶν) moves the stone (τὸ κινούμενον) with the staff (τὸ ὧ κινεῖ). Here the stone is not moved in the sense that the staff is. Neither is the hand, or cause of motion, moved in the way that the stone is. If I throw a ball I cannot be said to be thrown as a ball. If I teach the student geometry, I cannot be said to be taught geometry in the sense that the student is taught. In all of these examples, Aristotle wishes to emphasise that the theory of motion necessarily implies a cause, object and agent.

Objections

Against these distinctions, which seem so apparent, various objections are raised. It may be urged that the cause and the object of motion are practically identical, - for may not the one or the other move or be moved? But what would this lead to? Not being able to speak of the first mover in the strict sense, we should have the hopeless task of trying to arrive at definite knowledge through an ever changing and indefinite terminology.*

(1) Mover
& moved
identical

An objection quite similar to the first is to say that a thing moves or is moved, but only as a whole. This is unintelligible. If I am riding in the car, do I move in the sense that the car moves and does the car move in the sense that the current moves? Can the passenger, car and current possibly be taken at one time

(2) Mover as a
"whole".

only as the cause or at another time only as the object or still again only as the means of motion? By the very nature of reality, we must say that a thing as a whole (ὅλον) is not moved by the whole (ὑφ' ὅλου) but, as examination will show, by some one of its parts (ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτοῦ τειγος) (τε μέρειος) - distinct and separable (χωρισθῆν) from all the other parts. The same is true of the means and object of motion. On this basis we can account for the self-moved (αὐτοκίνητος) or immovable (μὴ κινούμενος). Otherwise if we assume the objection is valid - that the whole moves only in the sense of the whole - we must say that the parts move themselves, solely by accident (κατασυμβεβηκός). With this hypothesis we are driven to the conclusion that the world is not governed by intelligence but is at the mercy of fate.

Subject,
means &
object of
motion

No - repeats Aristotle, we must insist upon describing motion under three distinct denominations - namely, (a), the subject of motion, (b) the agent of a's motion, and (c) the object of that motion. Thus we may speak of the whole series A.B.C. as self-moved, but with reference to what? With reference to the A,B,C or anything else, as our objection^{or} would urge? By no means. A,B,C is self-moved, but solely with reference to A. If C is taken away what follows? C cannot be the

cause of its own motion. But A B is none the less self-moved. Now, if we remove A, BC cannot possibly move itself. If we take BC away, A still remains as the immovable cause of motion. Hence from these considerations a thing in toto may be said to be the immovable first mover but only as A (*μη κινούμενον πρώτον κινούν*); is the means of motion (*τὸ ὦ κινεῖ*) only as B and is the object of motion (*τὸ κινούμενον*) only as C and so is what it is, the unity (*ὅλον*) expressed as ABC.* These distinctions are just as pertinent to clear thinking as those of heat and be heated, teach and be taught, etc.

As necessary
distinctions

All this, then, urges Aristotle, is something more than mere verbiage. The terms immovable and movable, let it be repeated, subsist not by accident (*κατὰ συμβεβηκός*) but of dire necessity (*ἐξ ἀνάγκης*). The distinction comes about from the very nature of things. This applies to all our knowledge, no matter whether it be physical, mathematical or theological. In the last branch, especially, we must assume a permanent reality upon which we may suspend (*ἤρτηται*) heaven and nature, or as Aristotle meant in terms of which we may explain the universe.** It will not do to go back into infinity

* 1 Phy. VIII - 5 - 11.

** M. XI - 7 - 5.

for a cause for then we should always be dealing with something indefinable because indefinite. * Of the processes of generation and corruption must we not say that there is some reality back of it all by which it is generated or corrupted, in order that the process may not continue forever? ** An ABCD series will never give us an intelligible explanation of things. We must find some cause that is actually and which of itself will account for all change.

First Prin-
ciple im-
perative.

The very nature of motion and time demands such a postulate. It is impossible, says Aristotle, to think of motion as being subject to generation or decay for it always existed. So it is with our idea of time. We cannot speak of what is before or after on the ground that time does not exist.'* Time then is a reality similar to the reality motion or it is a passive form of motion. Both are the eternal conditions of existence and hence they imply something eternal as their groundwork, and this is the immovable reality.*'

Nature of
the analytic

Now what is this but a typical piece of Aristotelian analytic. It is not strictly argument nor is it proof. Such, indeed, it does not pretend to be. It is simply an examination of all that an intelligible account of our postulate of primary reality would seem necessarily to imply. Aristotle did not build up a theological system. Hence it is idle to speak of his ontological

proof for the existence of God, for such does not exist. The analytic here is engaged solely in attempting to make our conception of God and the world rational. This problem gives rise to what Aristotle is pleased to call the "theological knowledge" (*θεολογική*)

First mover

Having shown the absolute necessity of assuming the postulate of the Immovable Mover, we proceed to point out what this assumption necessarily implies.

Eternal

Not only must the First Mover be eternal, but it must also be one (*ἓν καὶ αἰδίδιον*); for the proposition that motion is eternal implies that it must be in an unbroken series. Movement is necessarily one and continuous (*μία, ἓν*). If, on the other hand, there is another and again another mover (*ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο*), the whole movement is not an unbroken (*συνεχής*) but a broken (*ἐφεξῆς*) series. But this is untenable. Moreover the First

Without
space &
time

Mover must be free from spacial, as well as from temporal, characteristics. It cannot have magnitude because it imparts motion throughout infinite time and nothing that is finite can have an infinite potentiality. Magnitude is said to be either finite (*πεπερασμέτου*) or infinite (*ἄπειρου*). But this serves no purpose. It is very evident that the First Mover does not involve finite magnitude. Infinite magnitude can not be applied for that is a contradiction in terms. Therefore, the First Mover is not in space

for it has no magnitude (οὐδέτι ἔχον μέγεθος)
 and so must be indivisible (ἀδιαίρετον)
 and without parts (ἀμερές)*

Immaterial

But our conception involves something more. The First Mover must be immaterial to render intelligible the eternity of motion. For how could matter (ὕλη) per se give rise to motion? Will the material for building a house move itself instead of the art of carpentry? How will matter be put in motion if the cause of motion does not subsist in energy (ἐνέργεια)?***

Especially
 an
 energy.

The important principle of the Mover as immaterial energy was overlooked by the Theologians who generated all things from night. Just as great a mistake was made by Physicists, who, failing to recognize the principle of energy, put forth the impossible theory that everything came about by spontaneous generation. Leucippus and Plato declared that motion was eternal. But such a

Where previous Philosophers failed.

theory does not go far enough. It fails to state the "why", (διὰ τι) "what" (τίνα) and "how" (ὡς) of reality. There is no advantage gained, not even in making reality eternal unless there is inherent some principle capable of working a change.'* Neither will it be of any use to us to assume one Immoveable Mover that is incorporeal and indivisible. Our postulate implies still greater extension. It must also be energy

(ἐτέργεια - τὸ ὦ κινεῖ). This is the most important principle of the whole system of theological knowledge. It will be necessary for us to examine the Aristotelian theory of development, somewhat in detail, and see what the energy implies.

Analysis
of
Reality.

To Aristotle reality is known by the general term οὐσία, - a term applied to all phenomena.* to understand the οὐσία in its broadest significance is possible only in so far as we grasp its meaning, or the τότι πᾶν εἶναι. In other words to give an intelligible account of phenomenon, we must present its essential characteristics. This conception becomes clearer by considering reality in another way. We

The ὕλη
&
μορφή

may say that an object is matter (ὕλη) appearing under a certain form (μορφή), that is, that it is the union of the two, matter-form or form-matter. Thus we describe the statue as the ὕλη brass upon which has been stamped the μορφή or peculiar form of the statue.** We recognize a thing by its μορφή or eternal shape. The μορφή ἰσως as it were, the tag by which we read the ὕλη as statue, house, etc. But it is strictly objective not subjective. It gives no account of the statue as it existed in the mind of the sculptor, nor of the house as it was planned by the architect, nor does it show how those conceptions became

the actualized statues or houses.

Necessity
for
postulate.

Now to make our conception of reality complete - no matter whether it is the reality that comes from nature (φύσει) art (τέχνη) or chance (ἀπὸ ταῦτο - μάτου) we must know three things, - (1) from what (ἔκ τερος) and (2) by what (ὑπό τερος) that reality comes to exist and (3) what (τί) that reality is that exists.* Of these the μορφή is simply the "what" (τί) or outward expression of reality and hence of itself is an inadequate explanation of reality. There must then be some higher principle. This Aristotle calls the εἶδος or true form. It is the efficient principle (ὑπό τερος) which so prevails upon the seed (ὕλη - ἔκ τερος) that the seed is forced to become a flower. The term μορφή is simply applied to this transformed ὕλη, or flower, as opposed to some other ὕλη, similarly transformed, as book. But in order to show the value of the εἶδος process we give a complete history of the development of the flower. This is expressed by the word σύνολον (ἔκ τερος, ὑπό τερος + τί). All this applies equally as well to artificial generation, except that the εἶδος, or true form, is not in the seed but in the soul of man.** We cannot say that a house is constructed from a house, nor a statue from a statue, nor that

And value
of same.

health is generated from health. Matter must result from that which is not matter, and that is the form which is in the mind of the carpenter, the sculptor, and physician, and gives rise respectively to house, statue and health. What the εἶδος implies is a νόησις and a ποιήσις*. The νόησις is that which arises from the first principle or form, as the idea of health in the mind of the doctor and the ποιήσις is the application of this to the ὄλῳ or sick person. These principles, says Aristotle, also apply to spontaneous as well as to natural and artificial generation. What then in general the τότι πᾶν εἶναι is to the οὐσία or all reality, so in a narrower sense the εἶδος is to the ὄλῳ. Without the pre-existing εἶδος nothing could be produced. The ὄλῳ would always remain passive. **

Nature of
potentiality

This conception of matter and form is further expressed in terms of potentiality and energy or actuality. To say that a certain particular thing is in matter is to say that it is in capacity (δυναμει) or that it is the subject of various conditions either with reference to place (κατὰ τόπον), as a thing may be here and then there, or according to increase (κατ' αὐξήσιν), as an object is now small and again large. So with respect to change (κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν) - a person may be healthy today and sick tomorrow. The

same is true of reality (κατ' οὐσίαν) - a thing may now be in a state of generation and again in decay, etc.* But the question is raised - can we look at everything in this way? How may we recognize potentiality? Is earth, for example, a potential man? The rule is that there is some extrinsic principle of generation (ἐξωθεν ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως).** The seed is not as yet potential, but as soon as it becomes fruit, then with reference to that fruit, it was a seed that existed in a potential state. But it does not become any fruit, but only its own peculiar kind as determined by its first principle. Earth is not a statue in potentiality, for when it is changed, it at once becomes brass. Potentiality, then, can be predicated only of a thing that admits change and only in accordance with the inherent nature or efficient principle of that thing. Hence Aristotle defines potentiality as the first principle of change.'*

Significance
of
the energy.

There is a higher factor than capacity in reality. As ἐνέργεια was seen to be the final cause of the ὕλη so energy (ἐνέργεια) is the complete complement of potentiality (δύναμις). The one is understood only in terms of the other. The relation that exists between the carpenter and the timber, between the

*M.VII-1-7.

**M VIII-7-3.

'* M IV-12-1.

one who is awake to the one who is asleep - this expresses the difference between energy and potentiality.* Energy is the complete realization of the potential. From the theory it follows that every potential reality has its own peculiar energy. For example, a threshold, says Aristotle, is a piece of wood or stone laid in this way, a house is bricks and timber erected in a certain manner, a lump of ice is water frozen or solidified in some form, harmony is a mixture of the sharp and flat, etc., etc.** Whence arise the principles of all true definition. Persons who define house as stones and timber make a ~~grave~~ mistake. They speak of the potentiality of the house simply. A complete definition of house is given when its peculiar energy is also predicated, - namely, a place where goods and materials are stored.* From all of this we see that Aristotle practically identifies the *ἐνέργεια* with the *εἶδος*. He has the same conception as Archytas, who asks - What is calm? and replies that it is smoothness in the surface of the sea. The sea is the *ἕλκη* and smoothness is energy or form.*

Its historic
-al refer-
ence.

This whole analysis of potentiality and energy was directed mainly against the Megarians, who denied and difference whatever between the principles of capacity

*M.VIII-8-3.
'* M. VII-2-7.

**M.VII-2-6.
*'M.VII-2-8.

and energy.* Among the things they said was that a man could not be a builder unless he did actually build a house. Aristotle ridicules this by saying that just as soon as the man stopped building he would have lost his art. This is very much like saying that he who stands will always stand, and he who sits will always sit, hence the man will not rise up if he is sitting down, for the simple reason that he no longer has the power of rising up.** If then we are to escape the foolishness of the Megarians we must conceive of energy as necessarily bound up with motion. If we are to speak as intelligent creatures, we must consider motion as constituting the energy or life of a thing. No matter how we view energy, it always implies activity. If we regard it as in a state of rest, this pre-supposes that the end to which it has attained was brought about by motion. For how ~~could~~^{came} the man to sit or stand? And if we think of energy as proceeding toward an end, what is this but motion itself?

Energy Superior to potentiality

Still greater emphasis is thrown upon energy, when Aristotle proceeds to point out what it necessarily implies with reference to potentiality. Energy is prior in definition (τῷ λόγῳ) and knowledge (τῆν γυνῶσιν). Thus when one speaks of the man who is skilled in building, he means that the carpenter has a

*M.VIII-3-1.

** M.VIII-3-4.

capacity of building. The definition and knowledge of energy, then, must of necessity pre-exist the definition and knowledge of potentiality.*

(2) In time So in time, (τῷ χρόνῳ) energy is prior to potentiality. Though the matter of which an animal is composed is prior to the living animal, yet this does not affect the theory of priority as stated. There must still be some pre-existing energy or productive power that shall generate the animal from matter. Hence the law of generation - from an entity in capacity arises an entity in energy.** The principle of priority is what makes one a master of any art. A person who learns to play upon the harp, learns only by actually playing. Here the energy is prior in time. It presupposes and conditions the skill of the musician.

(3) In reality Energy is prior to capacity in reality (οὐσία) also. This, of course, follows from the conception. What is the first capacity but the capacity ~~of~~^{to} energize? Thus a man is in possession of the art of building that he may actually build, or of the art of speculation that he may actually speculate.'* Energy is an end and that is why potentiality is assumed.

(4) In Mathematics Mathematics shows the priority of energy. Why has a triangle angles equal to two right angles? Because the angles about one point are so equal. Aristotle, then, concludes that mathematical diagrams subsist in potential-

ity but are discovered only when they are reduced to energy, and the reason of this is that the understanding ($\nu\acute{o}\pi\sigma\iota\varsigma$) constitutes the energy.*

(5) In the nature of eternal.

But the priority of energy to capacity is best seen when we consider the nature of the eternal, the very essence of which is energy. If we examine the heavenly bodies we find that the sun and stars and the whole heaven continually energize ($\xi\tau\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\tilde{\iota}$). There is therefore no ground for supposing, as some philosophers do, that these bodies may come to a standstill. For they are not tied^r in the operation of revolving - as is the case with things subject to decay - so as to make the continuity of their motion laborious. This would be true did the heavenly bodies subsist in matter and potentiality and not in energy.** They may be said then to be divine, because they have the marks of divinity.

(6) In other ways.

Aristotle proceeds still farther in his theory of the priority of energy. To his mind potentiality must be the imperfect; energy the perfect. Potentiality must represent the corruptible¹* and false; energy the incorruptible and true. But the climax is reached when he tells us that potentiality is the evil¹* and energy is the good. Then we learn that a valuable theory has been pushed to the extreme.

* M. VIII-9-3.
 1* M. VIII-10-4.

**M. VIII-8-13.
 1'M. VIII-9.

Meaning of
this princi-
ple.

But this whole conception of energy, upon which so much stress is laid, as a principle prior and superior to potentiality serves a very important purpose. It is the heart of the whole Aristotelian theology. We have found from the analysis of motion that it is useless to postulate simply an immaterial, indivisible, eternal something to explain the world of changing phenomena. From the investigation of potentiality and actuality, we have seen that matter per se can by no means explain this purposeful universe of ours. No, says Aristotle, there must be back of it all something more than a mere mover and a mere moved. There must be something higher than matter and form simply. If we are to have a rational theology we must posit something more than a God here and a world there. Otherwise we shall have fallen into a dualistic conception as did Anaxagoras and Plato and thus have made no more advance than they. At this point Aristotle comes up and bridges the gulf with this theory of the energy.

Energy as
"means"

We must start out with the postulates, mover and movable. We are obliged to assume matter and form. But there is somewhere or somehow the staff, to use the old illustration, by which the hand moves the stone. The energy is the means by which matter assumes its form. So the world is gradually becoming less potential and

God the
energy.

and taking on more and more form, because God is there as the absolute energy or source of this world-motion. Thus God is the First Mover. He is that principle which by its very presence so prevails upon or influences the whole universe, that everything moves inevitably toward it. God, then, is strictly the Immovable First Mover.* As Aristotle puts it - everything that is being produced advances toward a first principle or end (τέλος) for the final cause (τό οὐδέ γένεκα) is a first principle and the generation or production is on account of the end, namely, the energy.**

How develop-
ment possible

Now, why this should be, why there should be this conscious adaptation of means to an end, why everything should be struggling toward a higher purpose is because the object is that which is desirable (τὸ ὀρεκτόν) or, a term which is very much stronger, it is that which is loved (ἐρώμετον)* Look where we will and do we not find this principle of energy stamped upon the whole face of existence? The stone longs to be the doorstep of some house; the acorn struggles to find its highest realization in the oak, the egg wishes to become a chick; the soldier has the ambition of being made captain, etc. All reality, says Aristotle, either exists for some end (ματῆ), or, what is the same

*Phy. VIII-5-12.

**M. VIII-8-7.

'*M. XI-7-4.

thing, it is the result of things that so exist. (συμ-
πτώματα ἔσται τῶν ἐνεκάτου). In fact
it is the business of nature to realize the end, (τέλος
--- ὅ ἔσται φύσεως ἔργον).* So far as this
development is attained, to that degree has the individual
arrived at the eternal and primary moving energy (τῆς
τοῦ ἀεὶ κίνουτος πρώτης ἐνέργειας)**

Energy
primarily
life.

But all this becomes more intelligible when we
realize the exact significance of the energy. It is
that which belongs to God as his best and everlasting
life. (ἐνέργεια καθ' αὐτὴν ἐκείνου
ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ αἰδώς).* No
wonder then that energy is most desirable. It is the
life-giving principle of everything. And this is all
that the Aristotelian God can possibly mean - that in
which the whole world finds its life, its perfect
development, its complete ἐτελέχεια .
Take Divinity away, and the acorn will never become the
oak; the soldier will stop trying to attain to the
captaincy. And when you have done that, then you
have removed the εἶδος from the ὕλη , the
τότι πῶς εἶναι from the οὐσία . In other words,
take God out of the world and you take away its purpose,
its meaning, in fact its very life. Thus God becomes

* The Soul, III-12-3.

**M.VIII-8-10.

* M. XI-7-7.

the World-Soul in the highest sense.

God not a
personal
being

It is difficult from all this to show how far the God of Aristotle can be regarded as a personal being, especially when we remember the significance of Divinity with reference to the theory of development. God is not represented as an ethical being. Nowhere does he appear as a Moral Governor of the world. In no sense can he be taken as the Creator, for the $\psi\lambda\alpha$ always existed. He is strictly the Immovable First Mover Energy, in the sense already indicated, and when we have said that we have summed up the whole Aristotelian theology. It is significant that in both the Physics and Metaphysics $\kappa\iota\nu\omicron\upsilon\tau$ is almost exclusively used, while $\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ appears but four times in the latter treatise. The term $\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\rho\omicron\varsigma$ or $\epsilon\acute{\nu}\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha$ might just as well have been used, for either one represents the $\text{D}\dot{\iota}\epsilon\tau\acute{\iota}$ exactly. Hence for all practical purposes, we may say that the Aristotelian God is a principle ($\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta$)* rather than a being - a principle that is none the less living ($\xi\omega\eta$) and eternal - the nature of which is incidental to and determined by the Aristotelian conception of reality.

But a
living
principle.

Objection
considered.

But it may be asked - Does not Aristotle refer to a personal being when he speaks of the life of $\text{D}\dot{\iota}\epsilon\tau\acute{\iota}$

as being most blessed because self-conscious and contemplative? Again we must keep in mind the import of the *θεολογική* in the broadest sense. It represents a masterly attempt to unify all knowledge in terms of the so-called immovable and separable reality, and is not a system setting forth the nature and attributes of Godhead as such. Aristotle was an epistemologist and not an ontologist - much less a theologian. This is distinctively our thesis. Therefore, when he speaks of God as self-conscious, he gives us no warrant for taking this in the literal sense. God is not the personal being, as we understand the term, but the intelligible postulate for working purposes. The first principle of things is thought - *ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἡ νόσις* * The Immovables moves. Why? Because it is strictly *τὸ νοητόν* an intelligible something back there, toward which everything, for this reason, is justified in approaching. Hence God becomes purely a principle of speculative reason - a principle that is the logical outcome of the Aristotelian epistemology.

Pantheistic Moreover this conception of God, in so far as it is God, is necessarily pantheistic. It is hard to escape this conclusion. As already indicated every *ἕλη* must seek its *εἶδος*. Every plant and animal try to partake of the eternal and divine as far as possible

(ἵνα τοῦ ἀσὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου μετ-
έχουσιν ἢ δύναται);* for this desire

is universal and constitutes the end of all natural action. But if with Beun**, we separate God from the world as pure form from form, we fall into hopeless difficulties. Such terms as ἐτέργεια, ἐντελέχεια σύνολον etc., would be meaningless, and Aristotle

And not
theistic

becomes as thorough-going a dualist as Anaxagoras or Plato. We fail, then, to find any foundation for the supposed theism of Aristotle.

Value of
"theological
knowledge".

From these considerations we are now able to give some estimate of the value of the theological knowledge (θεολογική). Aristotle followed in the wake of the Pre-Socratics. He, too, observed the coming and going, the potentiality and actuality of things. But he

Chiefly in
its spiritu-
al aspects.

did not make their mistake in supposing that the universe was subject to machine law. To his mind this whole process implies intelligence. Everything in the universe is moving, not into water, or anything of that sort, but upward toward some high purpose, a Divinity, if you will, where it may fully realize its own complete and perfect reality (ἐντελέχεια). He sees God or life (ἐτέργεια) everywhere. Reality is reality only when it is purposeful, living. Then you can, by no means, study a thing apart from this, its essence, as Plato tried to do. You cannot separate

*The Soul II-4-2; Wallace p.,77.

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the mover (κινουῦν) from the moved (κινούμενον)
 the form (εἶδος) from the matter (ὕλη)
 the energy (ἐνέργεια) from the potentiality
 (δύναμις), the very nature of a thing (τό τε
 ἄν εἶναι) from the reality (οὐσία).

You cannot isolate the world from its living principle,
 its Soul, its God, and then expect to give me some
 intelligible account of that world. Again and again
 do we find Aristotle emphasising this conception in
 some form or other. Thus his theology is pre-eminently
 spiritual. And herein lies the chief value of the

Hence a
 reply to
 Materialism

θεολογική) It silences the arguments of
 materialism for all time. The more one studies the
 Metaphysic from the historical point of view, the more
 does he realize that this is its mighty import.

Why ontolo-
 gical treat-
 ment futile.

Our position is strengthened when we consider what
 the theology becomes, if treated in the ontological
 sense. Wenley and others accuse Aristotle for the
 "aloofness" of his God.* The guidance which should
 teach him how to live and die,** was not to be had. Of
 course man could find no satisfaction for his spiritual
 needs in such a Deity. Neither can the Aristotelian
 God be regarded in the sense of St. John's "God of Love",
 as McMahon' would have us believe. That was not why

*Wenley-Socratics & Christ pp.87,88.

**Lightfoot-Epistle to the Philippians, p 270.

!McMahon-Introduction to the Metaphysic.

the Immovable Energy was postulated. It was as much the God of plants and animals as of man. In that sense they had spiritual needs as well as he. Thus we are bound to plunge into all sorts of absurdities, and are certain of missing the whole significance of the *θεολογική*. It is only the interpretation of the Metaphysic from the epistemological point of view that can save us.

Geo. b. Dunlop.