

The Black Prince at War:
The Anatomy of a *Chevauchée*

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Abstract

The *chevauchée*, a fast-moving raid, was a common feature of English campaigns during the Hundred Years War and late medieval warfare more generally. These were highly complex, organized, and focused operations rather than unfocused raids with no other purpose but pillage and ravishment. The model of the army “living off the land” is untenable; some system of supply was necessary, even for an army pursuing a raiding strategy like that of the Prince of Wales’ 1355 campaign in southern France. The logistics of supply and the realities of geography and human topography helped determine the route the army followed and what it could accomplish. The success of the *chevauchée* depended on the pre-existing system of purveyance and recruitment in England, rested upon an efficient supply train that accompanied the army, and relied on resupply from England. The Prince employed this raiding strategy to accomplish his aims, namely the punishment of the duke of Armagnac for his encroachments on English Gascony and disruption of the enemy’s ability to provision a military force. Moreover, the actions of the Anglo-Gascon army effectively demonstrated to the inhabitants of Languedoc that the French king and his lieutenants could not protect them from the English. Thus, the Prince also achieved Edward III’s larger strategic goal: the re-enforcement and projection of English royal authority and power in Gascony and France.

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Abbreviations

BPR: Register of Edward the Black Prince

CCR: Calendar of the Close Rolls

CLBCL: Calendar of the Letter Books of the City of London

CPR: Calendar of the Patent Rolls


DNB: Dictionary of National Biography

ODNB: Oxford Dictionary of National Biography

TNA: The National Archives, Kew, UK




Map 2: Bordeaux to Arouille




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
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
Map 5: Montgiscard to Narbonne



Map 6: Narbonne to Pennautier




Map 7: Pennautier to Carbonne



Map 7: Pennautier to Carbonne

Map 8: Carbone to Réjaumont



River 8: Carbone to Réjaumont

Map 9: Réjaumont to La Réole



Map 9: Réjaumont to La Réole

Chapter One: Introduction

On 19 September 1356 Edward of Woodstock (1330–1376), the Prince of Wales and often called the Black Prince,¹ and his Anglo-Gascon army defeated King Jean II (1319–1364) of France at the Battle of Poitiers.² In many ways, this victory was the culmination of the Prince's expedition that began in 1355.³ The Prince could not have anticipated

¹David Green, *Edward the Black Prince: power in medieval Europe* (Harlow/New York: Pearson/Longman, 2007); idem, *The Black Prince* (Charleston: Tempus, 2001); Richard W. Barber, *The life and campaigns of the Black Prince: from contemporary letters, diaries and chronicles, including Chandos Herald's Life of the Black Prince* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986); idem, *Edward, Prince of Wales and Aquitaine: a biography of the Black Prince* (London: Allen Lane, 1978); John Hooper Harvey, *The Black Prince and his age* (London: Batsford, 1976); Barbara Emerson, *The Black Prince* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976); Hubert Cole, *The Black Prince* (London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1976); M.S. Coryn, *The Black Prince* (London: A. Barker, ltd., 1934); Henry Dwight Sedgwick, *The life of Edward the Black Prince* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill company, 1932); R.P. Dunn-Pattison, *The Black prince* (New York, 1010); Louise Creighton, *Life of Edward the Black Prince: Historical Biographies* (London: Rivingtons, 1877); G.P.R. James, *A history of the life of Edward the Black Prince: and of various events connected therewith, which occurred during the reign of Edward III, King of England, from the second edition* (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, 1842); William Shirley, *Edward, the Black Prince* (London, 1825–1827); Arthur Collins, *The life and glorious actions of Edward prince of Wales (commonly call'd the Black Prince) eldest son of King Edward the Third...also the history of his royal brother, John of Gaunt* (London: Printed for T. Osborne, 1740); Samuel Clarke, *The life and death of the thrice noble and illustrious Edvvard, surnamed the Black Prince son to our victorious King Edward the Third, by whom he was made the First Knight of the most honourable Order of the Garter* (London: Printed by William Birch, 1673);

²Christian Teutsch, *Victory at Poitiers: the Black Prince and the medieval art of war* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2010); David Green, *The Battle of Poitiers, 1356* (Stroud/Charleston: Tempus, 2002); Donald Featherstone, *Poitiers, 1356* (London: C. Knight, 1972); Hilaire Belloc, *Poitiers* (London: H. Rees, 1913).

³Peter Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince: The Road to Poitiers, 1355–1356* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2011); H.J. Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition of 1355–1357* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 1958); Jean-François Jeanjean, *La guerre de cent ans en Pays Audois. Incursion du Prince Noir en 1355* (Carcassonne: Les Imprimeries Gabelle, 1948); M.L. de Santi, "L'expédition du Prince Noir en 1355," *Mémoires de*

such a triumph when he and his army left Plymouth in September 1355 and sailed to Bordeaux. His campaign was Edward III's (1312–1377) response to the Gascon lords' appeal for help in resisting the French, specifically the military actions of Jean I, count of Armagnac (1311–1373). The Prince campaigned through southern France—from Bordeaux to Narbonne and back—in the fall of 1355, but his success in 1355 is often overshadowed by the victory at Poitiers in 1356. The 1355 *chevauchée* is typically cast as the prelude to Poitiers. Indeed, a recent title states this relationship explicitly: *In the Steps of the Black Prince: The Road to Poitiers, 1355–1356*.⁴ While the two campaigns of 1355 and 1356 were part of the same expedition, each needs to be assessed and examined individually. The chapters that follow, then, focus on the 1355 *chevauchée*, not as the prelude to Poitiers but rather as a case study of the logistics of a *chevauchée* and fourteenth-century warfare more broadly. It is useful as a case study because there *were* no extraordinary events. It was typical in that the Prince's army had to be transported across the Channel and cross through lands held by the English, Gascons, potential allies, and enemies, which necessitated that the army pursue a variety of strategies for acquiring supplies. This campaign demonstrates that a *chevauchée* needed logistical support; moreover, the logistics speak to the Prince's goals for this specific campaign and more generally to Edward III's grand strategy. Thus, the logistics are a

l'Académie des Sciences de Toulouse, series 10, vol. 4 (1904): 181–223; J. Moissant, *Le Prince Noir en Aquitaine* (Paris, 1894); other studies that address the campaign in detail include Jonathan Sumption, *The Hundred Years War: Trial by Fire* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001); Clifford Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2000).

⁴Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*.

method for understanding decisions made during a campaign, decisions that might otherwise remain opaque.

The Prince's *grande chevauchée* of 1355 should be understood in the context of the Hundred Years War and its progress up until the Gascons appealed to Edward III for assistance.

The Hundred Years War

The roots of the Hundred Years War arguably date to the Norman Conquest, which established the curious situation in which William the Conqueror was both sovereign king of England and duke of Normandy, a vassal of the French king. The marriage of Henry II and Eleanor of Aquitaine aggravated the state of affairs. However, the English kings did not perform homage for Aquitaine until Henry III conceded that in the 1259 Treaty of Paris. By the time Edward III assumed the English throne in 1327 English territory in France was only a small part of Aquitaine along the Atlantic coast and Bordeaux and Ponthieu.

Then King Charles IV (1294–1328) of France died without a male heir. After much discussion about whether the French crown could be passed through the female line, Philip de Valois (1293–1350) became King of Philip VI of France in April 1328. Edward III's claim as the closest male relative of Charles IV and King Philip IV (1268–1314) was overlooked.⁵ Within a month of taking the throne, Philip VI called upon Edward III to perform homage for his lands in France. Philip VI had to threaten the

⁵Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 9–10; Jonathan Sumption, *The Hundred Years War: Trial by Battle* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999); Edouard Perroy, *The Hundred Years War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), 33.

confiscation of the duchy to make Edward III offer homage in 1329. Even then, the English king offered only 'simple' homage instead of 'liege' homage, thereby acknowledging Philip VI as his landlord but not his sovereign. Philip VI accepted this, and the tensions, while not resolved, were for the time being smoothed over.

Various small quarrels arose between 1331 and 1336, when Philip VI began making plans to invade Gascony and Edward III searched for alliances in the lands along France's northern border. This was exacerbated when Philip ordered Edward III to surrender Robert of Artois, the French king's brother-in-law. The English king refused, and French officials attempted to seize Saint Macaire,⁶ just upriver from Bordeaux, in February 1337. Philip VI officially confiscated Gascony, and letters to that effect reached the English seneschal in Gascony by 13 June 1337.⁷ Edward III issued his own manifesto: "[Philip] striving by all means that he could to undo the King of England and his people, so that he could keep what he had wrongfully withheld [i.e., Gascony] and conquer more from him, refused all offers, but, seeking his opportunities, busied himself in aid and maintenance of the Scots, the enemies of the king of England, attempting to delay him by the Scottish war so that he could would have no power to pursue his rights elsewhere,"⁸ i.e., in Gascony. Thus the first phase of the war opened with no mention of a claim to the throne of France but rather focused on Gascony.

⁶The same Saint Macaire was used as a supply depot in the Black Prince's 1355 campaign.

⁷Anne Curry, *The Hundred Years War: British History in Perspective* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 279.

⁸TNA, C 54 (Close Rolls), 1337.

The French military actions of 1337–1338 were centered in Gascony, and the French had made significant gains by 1339 because of the lack of English reinforcements; Bordeaux was besieged for a week. French naval forces raided the English coast in 1339, and only the mutiny of the Genoese seamen prevented the English situation from becoming truly precarious. Edward III was pursuing other aims in 1339, namely alliances with the northern princes and Holy Roman Emperor. When the French and Anglo-Imperial armies met in October at Buironfosse, there was no battle, and the campaigns ended inconclusively.⁹

The 1340 campaign also involved alliances for England and included the Flemish burghers. The English sailed in June and defeated the French naval forces in the Zwin estuary at Sluys. The French lost 90 percent of their ships and up to 18,000 men.¹⁰ Edward laid siege to Tournai shortly thereafter, and a nine-month truce was agreed upon in September.¹¹ Over the next two years, Edward III focused on Scotland, and then, in 1341, there was a succession crisis in Brittany. Both kings involved themselves, each supporting a rival candidate: John of Montfort supported by England and Charles of Blois supported by France.¹² The truce of 1343 was supposed to last until 1346, but Edward repudiated it in 1345.

⁹Curry, *The Hundred Years War*, 31–35.

¹⁰The French defeat was a result of several factors: wind, sun, a confined anchorage, and the unwillingness of the French admirals, Hugh Quiéret and Nicholas Béhuchet, to listen to the advice of Pietro Barbavera, an experience corsair in command of the Genoese galleys.

¹¹Curry, *The Hundred Years War*, 36.

¹²Sumption, *Trial by Battle*, Perroy, *The Hundred Years War*, 114. What is particularly interesting is that Charles of Blois' claim was through his wife, who, according to the principles established in 1328, ought to have been excluded from the inheritance. John of

This marked the beginning of the great English victories. English and Gascon forces led by Henry of Grosmont (1310–1361), the earl of Lancaster as of 1345, retook Bergerac, La Réole, and Aiguillon in Gascony during Lancaster's campaigns of 1345–1346. Edward III's forces took Caen on 26 July 1346 and pulled off a stunning victory over the French at Crécy on 26 August of that year. Furthermore, and more important for Edward's future goals, the English captured Calais on 4 August 1347. In Scotland, too, the English were successful at Neville's Cross (14 October 1346). Then Philip VI died on 2 August 1350, and Jean II (1319–1364) became king of France.¹³

Jean II faced many of the same problems his father had, as well as the additional concern about the loyalties of Charles of Navarre (1332–1387), his son-in-law and an important lord in Normandy. During the 1354 peace talks, hosted by the papacy, Edward III insisted "that the English king should hold the entire duchy of Aquitaine, himself and his heirs, in perpetuity, freely and quietly, without performing homage to any king of France."¹⁴ Naturally, the French refused, and the English planned a tripartite invasion for 1355. The King would lead an army in Picardy, Lancaster (duke of Lancaster as of 1351) would lead forces in Normandy, and the Prince of Wales, Edward of Woodstock, would lead a combined Anglo-Gascon force in Gascony in response to the Gascons' appeal for aid.

Montfort was the nearest male relation, and argued that Joan's claim was invalid. The Breton civil war continued until 1364, when Charles of Blois was killed in the Battle of Auray.

¹³Curry, *The Hundred Years War*, 37–41.

¹⁴Robert of Avesbury, *De Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, ed. Edward Maunde Thompson (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1889), 420–21. "quod rex Anglorum habuisset integrum ducatum Aquitanniae, sibi et heredibus suis, imperpetuum, libere et quiete, sine homagio cuiquam regi Franciae faciendo."

Anglo-Gascon Relations

A few words about the relationship between Gascony and England are necessary. The Gascons specifically requested English military aid, and they participated actively in both the 1355 and 1356 campaigns. H.J. Hewitt describes the Gascon leaders as “active and resourceful.”¹⁵ Knighton’s chronicle claims that Gascons made up part of the infantry.¹⁶ This is hardly a surprise, given that English armies had campaigned in France during the reign of Edward I (1239–1307) and in the 1340s, and the Gascons’ military service is reflective of the relationship between England and Gascony, and Gascon soldiers fought in England in Edward I’s armies.

England and Gascony had a long political relationship and strong economic ties. Gascony was not always the top priority for the English kings, but that changed as land in Normandy and Anjou was lost to the French kings. Gascony became England’s foothold on the continent—and its main supplier of wine. The actions of the English kings were intended to secure its frontiers, assert their will, and settle the question of sovereignty over the duchy. The continuing English campaigns were unsuccessful, and the Treaty of Paris (1259) left Henry III with only Gascony and the obligation of homage to the French king.¹⁷

Edward I (1239–1307) met this obligation to the letter—if not the spirit—of the treaty. Of all the English dukes, Edward I was the one who “most involved himself in the

¹⁵Hewitt, *The Black Prince’s Expedition*, viii.

¹⁶Knighton, *Knighton’s Chronicle*, ed. G. H. Martin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 136–37. “*pedalibus absque numero.*”

¹⁷Prestwich, *Edward I*, Yale English Monarchs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 8.

affairs of Gascony.”¹⁸ He received the grant of the duchy from his father at the age of ten, although Henry III kept the title of Duke of Aquitaine. Edward I spent several years there and aided the duchy by promoting commerce and building and maintaining fortifications. He also used Gascon soldiers in his wars against the Scots and the Welsh as they were good soldiers and skilled with crossbows. His forces in the 1282 campaign against the Welsh included 533 foot soldiers, 21 knights, and 52 mounted crossbowmen; these numbers increased the following year.¹⁹ In addition to troops, Gascony also provided provisions: 1000 quarters of oats, 2000 quarters of wheat, 1000 pigs, 300 quarters of beans and peas, and, unsurprisingly, 500 tuns of wine.²⁰ Gascony remained an important source of supply for some years; however, Gascony, particularly when English troops served there, still depended on English grain and victuals to supply these extra troops. Despite Philip IV’s efforts—pressure on the frontiers and declaring the duchy forfeit—Edward I’s hold on Gascony was as strong at the end of his reign as it had been in the early years.²¹ This did not last during the reign of Edward II (1284–1327), who faced military problems in Wales, Scotland, Ireland, and Gascony, not to mention political problems with the English baronage. Charles IV (1294–1328) seized the opportunity and confiscated the duchy.²²

¹⁸Christopher Turgeon, “Bacchus and Bellum: The Anglo-Gascon Wine Trade and the Hundred Years’ War (987–1453 A. D.,” (MA Thesis, College of William and Mary, 31 March 2000), 58.

¹⁹Jean Paul Trabut-Cussac, *L’administration Anglaise en Gascogne sous Henry III et Édouard I de 1254 à 1307* (Geneva/Paris: Droz, 1972), 69–70.

²⁰*CWR*, 214–16.

²¹Turgeon, “Bacchus and Bellum,” 58–60.

²²Turgeon, “Bacchus and Bellum,” 60–62.

Politically, Gascony had chosen to align itself with England and the English kings. This served the political interests of the Gascons, namely their desire to maintain their independence. No doubt this helps to explain England's minimalist approach to governing the duchy. This approach left local government predominately in the hands of locals because that was what England could afford and, more importantly, was what the Gascons would allow. England made no attempt to defend Gascony in its entirety, counting on the Gascons to take care of their own.²³ It was a political partnership that served the interests of both England and Gascony.

Economically, the Anglo-Gascon relationship was also profitable, particularly in terms of the wine trade and, to a lesser extent, the salt trade.²⁴ By the beginning of Edward III's reign in 1327, Gascony was the favored supplier of wines to the English court. Seventy-five percent of the wine imported in England came from Bordeaux, and England was importing some eighty thousand *tonneaux* (twenty million US gallons) of wine per year. Duties and taxes on wine brought in £13, 000 in 1324. The wine trade was second only to the wool trade in terms of royal revenue.²⁵ Gascony supplied most of this wine.

Gascony had been involved in the wine trade since the Romans had recognized the significance of the river system, and Bordeaux was a thriving port by the fourth century; in the late Middle Ages Bordeaux had approximately thirty thousand people,

²³Turgeon, "Bacchus and Bellum," 62–65.

²⁴Frank McLynn, *Richard and John: Kings at War* (Cambridge: De Capo Press, 2007), 16.

²⁵Turgeon, "Bacchus and Bellum," 4–6.

only ten thousand fewer than London.²⁶ The rivers “made England, the Low Countries and Scandinavia nearly as easy to reach as other parts of France,”²⁷ so it is no wonder that England and Gascony developed strong economic ties that only strengthened over the decades. In 1240, the king received £600 from the wine trade; by 1300 this had increased to £6000 and double that by 1307.²⁸

This wine trade picked up particularly after John lost the port at La Rochelle in 1203, and the main source of wine for the English shifted south from the Loire valley to Gascony.²⁹ While this necessitated a change in taste for the English, it also forced an agricultural shift upon the Gascons who converted their fields into vineyards, not to mention an expansion of the labor force. In less than fifty years, the Gascons took over the wine trade from the German merchants. The Gascon merchants at first used only Gascon ships, although the sheer volume of the trade made it necessary to bring in foreign—English—shippers, not to mention the adoption of larger vessels, such as the cog, to deal with the massive October shipments of new wine to England. English merchants also started shipping other goods to Bordeaux, particularly grain, which was much needed because the expansion of the vineyards had reduced the amount of land available for the cultivation of grain. This valuable trade required royal protection and resources, and the English kings certainly benefitted from providing these, including the right of *prisage* for royal use, which “encompassed personal consumption and the use of

²⁶Kenneth Fowler, *The Age of Plantagenet and Valois, the Struggle for Supremacy, 1328–1498* (New York: Putnam, 1967), 41–42.

²⁷Turgeon, “Bacchus and Bellum,” 51.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 60.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 70.

wine for his own armies.”³⁰ Furthermore, the king and his armies would also benefit from the experience and familiarity of merchants, captains, and mariners with this trade route, as well as the way the wine trade used the Gascon river system to transport goods to Bordeaux.

The English clearly saw Gascony as important, not only because it provided a base for English operations in France but also because of close economic ties. By the reign of Edward III, it was England’s second largest trading partner; the biggest trading partner, naturally, was the Low Countries because of the dependency on English wool.³¹ England and Gascony were economically inter-dependent: England needed Gascon wines, and the Gascons needed English grain. Politically, they also depended on each other. Gascony had chosen England and an oft-absent duke and needed protection from the encroachment of French armies and administrators; the English kings, hoping and planning to reclaim their lost territories in France, had to maintain this foothold on the continent, and so it behooved them to keep the Gascons, particularly the residents of Bordeaux, happy. Given these considerations and the history of Anglo-Gascon relations, it is hardly a surprise that the Gascons requested English troops and that Edward III responded positively.

This, then, is where Anglo-Gascon relations stood at the beginning of the Hundred Years War. As discussed above, the war opened in Gascony with the confiscation of the duchy in 1337. Even when Edward III was occupied with events in England or Normandy, Gascony was never ignored.

³⁰Ibid., 71–85.

³¹Ibid., 91.

The Expeditions of 1355

The Prince's 1355 expedition was part of a multi-pronged strategy. The traditional understanding of Edward III's plans for 1355 argues that three campaigns were planned. Lancaster would lead an army in Normandy; the Prince would lead his forces from Bordeaux, and Edward III himself would lead a third army from Calais. Clifford Rogers, however, argues that there were only two campaigns planned for 1355.³² Regardless of whether there were two campaigns or three campaigns planned, the Prince's expedition was competing for resources, funds, soldiers, and shipping.

Among the many reasons for using this particular campaign as useful test case for examining the broader question of fourteenth-century military logistics three stand out in greater importance. First, there are the problems of cross-Channel transport and supply; the prince's army had to cross the Channel, with their horses and enough comestible supplies for the eleven-day voyage. If Avesbury's numbers are correct, the prince had to arrange for transporting more than three thousand men, with their animals, across the English Channel. It took eleven days, which means that the ships, in addition to men, including the sailors, and animals, had to carry enough food and fresh water for the voyage. The ships had to carry equipment as well. This suggests the existence of the necessary naval technology, i.e., ships with adequate carrying capacity and capable of sailing the English Channel and transporting horses.

Secondly, the prince's expedition through southern France passed through lands held by the English, lands belonging to English allies—or potential allies—and lands

³²Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 293, n.38.

held by enemies, which allows for a discussion of differences in the means and methods of resupply at various stages of the *chevauchée*. His army also had to deal with the Landes, numerous river crossings, adverse weather, and lack of water. Examining the logistics of the Prince's *chevauchée* helps explain how the army managed these difficulties.

Thirdly, the prince operated in conjunction with the Duke of Lancaster's planned campaign in Normandy, which suggests that England had the resources for a bipartite invasion.³³ The planned operations emphasize the economic, administrative, and human resources of England and its ability to pursue and support two parallel invasions. It also speaks to the larger question of Edward III's larger strategic aims. The Black Prince's expedition is significant not only because it was the only successful campaign of the planned tripartite invasion but also in light of its aftermath: the disruption of the French economy and logistics, the destruction of economic resources and infrastructure, and the terrorization of the populace.

The Black Prince's expedition was a thoroughly planned military operation not an ad hoc raid. The logistical requirements of the expedition necessitated a highly developed administration capable of arraying, equipping and transporting the Black Prince's forces, and the relationship between Gascony and England and Gascony and France required that the diplomatic situation and niceties be preserved. The campaign also was not a disorganized rampage by an undisciplined mob without any clear objectives. Rather, the Black Prince had a specific agenda, and while plunder was part of

³³Sumption, *Trial by Fire*, 168.

it, it was not the only goal. Looking at the logistics of the campaign suggests that the Prince's actual goals were in keeping with his stated aims, namely bringing Armagnac to battle, punishing those who had left their allegiance to Edward III, and restoring and extending English royal authority in Gascony and France more generally, which certainly speaks to the grander strategic aims of Edward III.

Edward III's "grand strategy"³⁴ and ultimate goal in 1355 was the re-establishment and, if possible, extension of English royal authority in Gascony. Fundamentally, the Hundred Years War was a conflict about authority, not only Edward III's (and later English monarchs, as well) efforts in Gascony but also the French kings' endeavors in France. The conflict in Gascony, after all, was at heart a dispute over who was the final, ultimate source of authority in the duchy. Edward III meant for it to be him and him alone. Considering the Prince's stated aims, not merely the words but also the ensuing action, makes it clear that he and Edward III intended to restore English royal authority, through force if necessary.

Examining the logistics of this campaign, particularly in the preparations and aftermath, re-enforce this interpretation of Edward III's strategic goals.³⁵ Even the northern campaign led by Lancaster can be understood in this light. Lancaster's campaign, while it did not enjoy the success that the Prince's did, still advanced Edward III's aims. If it did nothing else it disrupted the French logistics, hindered France's

³⁴For further discussion, see Edward Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from the first century AD to the third* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).

³⁵It could be argued, of course, that the Prince overstepped his stated aims by leaving the duchy and taking the war to France. However, his actions had the desired effect, in that they disrupted France's and Armagnac's ability to mount an effective response.

ability to produce comestible supplies and wealth, and forced the French to split their troops and resources to deal with Lancaster in the north, the Prince in the south, and a possible third arm of the invasion led by the king.

The Prince's logistics tell us that this was no ad hoc raid; rather it was a carefully planned and considered expedition with specific aims and strategic importance. This is more than an argument that people in the Middle Ages were intelligent and had intelligible reasons for what they did. I argue, rather, that the Prince's 1355 *chevauchée* was part of an overall grand strategy that governed Edward III's conduct of the war with France, that his ultimate aim was full sovereignty in Gascony, and that the logistics provide concrete evidence as to the Prince's intentions on campaign, which in turn speak to the aim of his expedition and how that expedition fit into Edward III's grand strategy. Therefore, this dissertation is also an argument for logistics, and by extension military history, as a method for illuminating what otherwise might appear to be opaque decisions made in the course of campaigning or battle.

Outline of the Dissertation

The dissertation is best considered in three parts: introductory material, preparations, and the campaign itself and its aftermath. Chapter Two discusses the historiography, sources, and methodology. The second pair of chapters covers the preparations and the Prince's army. Chapter Three addresses when the decision to send an expedition was made, when the planning began, and the actual preparations in England. Sending an army across the Channel was no simple matter and required considerable care and due consideration. The success of the campaign, particularly ensuring that the army arrived "in fighting trim,"

rested upon a sophisticated system of supply and purveyance that already existed in England. Chapter Four discusses the Prince's forces. It includes recruitment, wages, "paperwork," and a prosopographical survey of the key men of the Prince's command staff, both English and Gascon. England's system for recruiting men was as well established and highly organized as the purveyance structures. This is evident in the meticulous accounts of wages, lists of men excused from military service, and deserters, as well as the ability of England to recruit, equip, and transport an army (more than one, in fact, that same year) in a matter of months less than a decade after the Black Death. The final three chapters cover the campaign and winter operations. Chapter Five covers the route from Bordeaux to Narbonne, and specific logistical problems, such as crossing the waterless Landes, and how logistical considerations affected the decision making process of the Black Prince and his commanders at key junctures of the campaign, such as at Toulouse. It shows that the Prince and his army could not simply 'live off the land.' Even troops engaged in a *chevauchée*, the fast-moving raids that were a common feature of English warfare in this period, had to have a supply train, and the Prince's army was no different. Moreover, the manner in which the army acquired supplies varied. While in Gascony and when crossing the lands of the Count of Foix, a potential ally, the army purchased the majority of its supplies. Even deep within enemy territory, the Prince's purveyors continued to pay for certain items. Certainly the army raided towns and manors for provisions; however, many of these targets were strategic and chosen for the store of supplies, a store the army could and did transport with them. Chapter Six follows the return march from Narbonne to Bordeaux and demonstrates how the logistics of

supply and the capabilities of men and horses not only allows for a re-examination of the route itself but also helps understand the Prince's objectives. One of the key questions about this campaign considers whether the Prince sought battle with Armagnac, particularly as November progressed, or meant to make for Bordeaux with all speed. The route that matches the sources most closely suggests that the Prince and his army chose the most difficult path, logistically speaking, which would mean the army was in definite pursuit of Armagnac. Chapter Seven examines the winter operations of the Prince's captains, resupply and re-enforcement from England, and the financial picture of the campaign. Resupply by sea from England, both in terms of men and provisions, was crucial for keeping the Prince's army supplied and ready to campaign throughout the winter months and early spring.

Conclusion

Based on the care with which this campaign was planned, it is clear that this was not a disorganized undertaking. Furthermore, the fact that the decision to send an expedition to Gascony was not made suddenly but rather deliberately, with due consideration given to the choice of commander and command staff, it is also clear that Edward III wanted this expedition to succeed. He certainly did everything reasonably in his power to ensure its success by making certain that the Prince had the funds, an able staff, soldiers and archers, supplies, a fall back plan, and the authority to carry out the king's commands. This further suggests that the Prince's expedition had specific goals, goals that the Prince and Edward III were both cognizant of, and Edward III gave the Prince the tools necessary to achieve them.

Given the Prince's stated goals, the means with which he was provided to pursue them, and the time remaining to campaign in the fall of 1355, a *chevauchée* was the best option. It was fast, covered more than 600 miles in a short period of time, and inflicted the maximum damage on the enemy in that time. In these terms, the Prince's campaign was a typical English *chevauchée*, and like other campaigns of this type, it rested upon a sophisticated and established system of purveyance, recruitment, and transport in England, depended upon a mobile supply train that was restocked at regular intervals, and relied upon resupply by sea from England when the army remained in France at the conclusion of the campaign.

Chapter Two: Historiography, Sources, and Methods

This chapter provides a basic survey of the historiographies necessary to this study and then moves on to examine the sources available. The final section outlines the methods used. The historiography section has several parts. The first covers the recent work on military logistics, as this study fits into and draws upon these works. The second deals with the historiography of the Hundred Years War, both general and specific studies. The latter include works on broad regions, individual cities, and institutional developments, e.g., the administration of English Gascony. The final sub-section addresses the Prince's campaign itself, including the debate about whether the Prince went north or south around Carcassonne, which is significant as it speaks to the Prince's motivations: was he avoiding or seeking battle, particularly during the later stages of the campaign?¹ The section on sources examines the major types of sources and addresses specific problems with each group, e.g., narrative sources. It also highlights some of the most relevant unpublished sources for the Prince's campaign, such as the financial journals of John Henxteworth, the Prince's cashier during the campaign. The final section, methodology, discusses the basic theories and methods used in subsequent chapters, such as Donald Engel's equation for determining the carrying capacity of a military force.

The Historiographic Tradition

¹For a summary, see Peter Hoskins, "The Itineraries of the Black Prince's Chevauchées of 1355 and 1356: Observations and Interpretations," *Journal of Medieval Military History VII, The Age of the Hundred Years War* (2009): 12–37, at 15–17.

Logistics

Building a logistical model requires a clear understanding of what, precisely, is meant by logistics and, by extension, what elements will be incorporated into the model.

Therefore, a definition of logistics is needed. Definitions of logistics, however, are complicated, particularly when looking for one that is epistemologically necessary and sufficient. Most military dictionaries define the term as “the organization of moving, housing, and supplying troops and equipment” and “logistic support” as “the support that encompasses the logistic services, materiel, and transportation required to support” a military force.² Although this is necessary and sufficient, it misrepresents the fundamental importance of logistics by referring to it as only one part of military science when it undergirds all military action. Strategy, tactics, and combat techniques depend upon the resources available and a society’s ability to allocate and efficiently distribute those resources to its military. The logistical system determines both the capabilities and effectiveness of a military force. Karl von Clausewitz’s definition of military science incorporates this. It is “the totality of those branches of knowledge and those appliances of skill occupied with material things,” which includes “the pattern and preparation and the mode of using arms, the construction of fortifications and entrenchments, the organism of an army, and the mechanism of its movements.”³ Clausewitz’s contemporary, A. Jomini, succinctly defines logistics as “the art of moving armies,”

²“logistics” *The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military* (New York: Berkley Books, 2001). “logistic support” *The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military* (New York: Berkley Books, 2001) Oxford Reference Online.

³Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 1976), 133. Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege* (Frankfurt am Main, 1995), 106–107.

limiting the term to “the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics.”⁴

These nineteenth-century definitions are both descriptive and functional, but they are, perhaps, overly general and fail to enumerate those specific elements that must be considered when constructing a logistical model for premodern warfare. Donald Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* (1978), is one of the modern school of historians to build a logistical model and apply it to an actual campaign, particularly the relevant geography and climate.⁵ Engels, in contrast to the expansive definitions above, limits his study to provisioning: “supply is the basis of strategy and tactics.”⁶ Before considering individual campaigns and the logistical problems unique to each of them, he presents his basic model based upon the real physical needs of men and animals for food and water, the weight of the comestible and non-comestible supplies, and the carrying capacity of the supply train. He also uses this information to determine how many pack animals would be needed to carry the grain supply. This equation allows him to account for some climatic and geographic differences, especially the availability of fodder and water.⁷ The application of this basic

⁴A. Jomini, *The Art of War*, trans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill (Westport, 1971), 69.

⁵Donald Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* (Berkeley, 1978), 4.

⁶Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army*, 2.

⁷Ibid, 19–22. For discussion of Engels’s work in reference to Carolingian warfare along rivers, see Charles R. Bowlus, *Franks, Moravians, and Magyars: The Struggle for the Middle Danube, 788–907* (Philadelphia, 1995), 25–30.

model to the terrain covered by Alexander the Great's campaigns reinforces Engel's early claim that planning was absolutely necessary for the efficient provisioning of the army.⁸

Although Engels deals with the logistics of ancient warfare, his model has value for studying the logistics of medieval warfare. The physical realities of supplying an army remain relatively constant, e.g., pack animals will consume a portion of their burden each day. While his basic model does take water supply and the availability of fodder into account, it does not expressly lend itself to analyzing the impact of water transport, and it lacks the nuances of Jonathon Roth's later study (1999). Roth takes Engels' model and applies it to the Roman army, thereby demonstrating its applicability in markedly different terrain. He agrees that supply affects both strategic and tactical decisions and defines logistics as the supply and transport of provisions, i.e., food, fodder and firewood, to the army. Like Engels, Roth considers the needs, resources and technology of the Roman army; however, he also explicitly addresses the administrative aspects of supplying the legions.⁹ Roth refines Engels' calculations, basing his own upon the minimum caloric requirements, which are lower than the recommended levels that Engels used. Additionally, he factors in the average age, which affects caloric requirements, and size of the soldiers, as well as the importance of nutrition rather than simple calories.¹⁰ The basic model, however, remains applicable.

Roth's analysis begins with the men and animals, but he does not limit his study simply to the legions. He examines the political ramifications of requisition and pillage,

⁸Ibid., 9.

⁹Jonathon P. Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (264 B. C. – A. D. 235)* (Leiden/Boston, 1999), 2–3.

¹⁰Roth, *Logistics of the Roman Army*, 7–9.

the primary purpose of which is “to strike terror into an enemy.”¹¹ The importance of infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, and canals, is emphasized, as a state needs “a certain level of economic development, technology, infrastructure and administrative skill to supply its armies at a distance.”¹² Furthermore, he considers logistics not merely as a factor influencing decisions but also as a strategic and tactical weapon; cutting off the enemy’s water supply, for example, is “the most effective logistical weapon on a tactical level.”¹³ The logistically stronger army also has the ability to postpone battle, as an undersupplied army can only grow weaker, further underscoring the importance of logistics in warfare, whether premodern or modern.

Both Roth and Engels have shown the viability of this type of study for the Roman and Macedonian armies. Bernard S. Bachrach has done the same for Merovingian and Carolingian warfare; aside from his application of these basic models, his work is especially pertinent to this study because it deals explicitly with warfare in southern France.¹⁴ Additionally, his work considers administration, medieval technology, and the logistics of siege warfare.¹⁵ Charles Bowlus (1995) also includes logistical considerations in his study of Carolingian campaigns against the Magyars,

¹¹Ibid., 134, 142, 305.

¹²Ibid., 214, 244.

¹³Ibid., 279, 307.

¹⁴Bernard S. Bachrach, *Early Carolingian Warfare: Prelude to Empire* (Philadelphia, 2001), passim. Bernard S. Bachrach, “Logistics in pre-Crusade Europe,” in *Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present*, ed. John A. Lynn, 57–78 (Boulder, 1993).

¹⁵Bernard S. Bachrach, “Animals and Warfare in Early Medieval Europe,” in *Armies and Politics in the Early Medieval West*, ed. Bernard S. Bachrach, 708–51 (Aldershot, 1993), passim. Bachrach, *Early Carolingian Warfare*, passim. Bernard S. Bachrach, “Charlemagne and the Carolingian General Staff,” *The Journal of Military History* 66, no. 2 (April, 2002): 313–57.

although it is not his focus. Particularly relevant for this project, given the fluvial geography of southern France, are his remarks upon using rivers for resupply, notably that this requires not only a ship and a trained crew but also a place to unload supplies safely and men to defend it.¹⁶

Unfortunately, there has been little systematic work done on logistics for the later Middle Ages, although there are exceptions. For example, John Haldon has dealt with the Byzantine material,¹⁷ and David Bachrach has written on both the administrative and technological capabilities of medieval armies.¹⁸ Yuval Harari's 2000 article, "Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion Campaigns," explicitly addresses military logistics. He supplies a basic model for armies using land, river, and sea transport. While he alludes to specific fourteenth-century campaigns, he does not systematically apply his model to any single campaign.¹⁹

Other recent work on fourteenth-century logistics includes Bryce Lyon's 2003 article, which addresses the expenses of Edward I and Edward III while campaigning in France and Brabant,²⁰ and A. Carr's 2004 article, "War in Fourteenth-Century Europe,"

¹⁶Bowlus, *Franks, Moravians and Magyars*, 27.

¹⁷John F. Haldon, *Byzantium at War, AD 600–1453* (New York, 2003), passim. John F. Haldon, *The State and the Tributary Mode of Production* (London, 1993), passim.

¹⁸David S. Bachrach, "The Military Administration of England: The Royal Artillery (1216–1272)," *The Journal of Military History* 68, no. 4 (Oct., 2004): 1083–1104. David S. Bachrach, "Crossbows for the king: the crossbow during the reigns of John and Henry III of England," *Technology and Culture: The International Quarterly of the Society for the History of Technology* 45, no. 1 (2004): 102–19.

¹⁹Yuval Noah Harari, "Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion Campaigns," *The Journal of Military History* 64, no. 2 (April, 2000): 297–334.

²⁰Bryce Lyon, "What were the Expenses of Kings Edward I and Edward III When Absent from their Realm," *Journal of Medieval History* 29, no. 4 (2003): 331–45.

which discusses logistics during the Hundred Years.²¹ Of especial significance is Craig Lambert's book, *Shipping the Medieval Military: English Maritime Logistics in the Fourteenth Century* (2011). He focuses on the administration of English sea transport, the methods of procuring shipping, and the size of English fleets. One of the fleets Lambert specifically addresses is the one that transported the Black Prince, his troops and horses, and their supplies to Gascony in September 1355.²²

The more theoretical aspects, as well as both the difficulties and rewards of applying modern theories, such as linear programming, to medieval warfare, are addressed in *General Issues in the Study of Medieval Logistics: Sources, Problems and Methodologies* (2006). Helen Gaffney's article, "Superiority of numbers: methodologies for modeling the behavior of armies," explores logistical models from a methodological standpoint rather than providing a case study of one theory, as the other essays in the volume do.²³ Strategy is "the art of the possible."²⁴ By extension, then, it is the result of what is logistically possible, particularly in light of two of her comments: armies are usually short of money, and foraging will work for only a short period of time. Her description of logistics includes the needs of the force, the available and expected

²¹A. Carr, "War in Fourteenth-Century Europe," in *Power, Violence, and Mass Death in Pre-Modern and Modern Times*, ed. Joseph Canning, Hartmut Lehmann, and Jay Winter, 67–89 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004).

²²Craig L. Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Military: English Maritime Logistics in the Fourteenth Century*, *Warfare in History* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2011), esp. 152–55.

²³Helen Gaffney, "Superiority of numbers: methodologies for modeling the behavior of armies," in *General Issues in the Study of Medieval Logistics: Sources, Problems and Methodologies*, ed. John F. Haldon, 251–72 (Leiden, 2006).

²⁴Gaffney, "Superiority of numbers," 253.

supplies, the organization and administration of the army, and supply, transport, and communications.²⁵

The Hundred Years War

The historiography of the Hundred Years War can be divided into two general categories. There are the synthetic works which present the larger narrative of the war from the initial succession crisis in 1328 to the English and Gascon surrender of Bordeaux in 1453. Juxtaposed with these broad studies are those that focus more narrowly on a specific aspect of the war, e.g., a specific campaign such as that of the Black Prince in 1355, although accepting the general narratives presented in the surveys. These broad works follow the same general format and are structurally similar. They begin with a description of England and France before the war and then move on to the succession crisis before advancing to the war itself. Of late, however, there has been a shift in studies of the Hundred Years War to move beyond France and England. The most recent example of this trend are the volumes edited by Villalon and Kagay, *The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus* and *The Hundred Years War (II): Different Vistas*, which are collection of essays that examine, for example, the effects of the war in Spain or geopolitics.²⁶

²⁵Ibid., 253–55.

²⁶Donald J. Kagay and L. J. Andrew Villalon, eds., *The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus* (Leiden, 2005). For the relevant essays, see Donald J. Kagay, “The government besieged by conflict: the parliament of Monzón (1362–1363) as military financier,” 117–50; Maria Teresa Ferrer Mallol, “The southern Valencian frontier during the War of the Two Pedros,” 75–116; Clara Estow, “War and peace in medieval Iberia: Castilian-Granadan relations in the mid-fourteenth century,” 151–75; Sergio Boffa, “The duchy of Brabant caught between France and England: geopolitics and diplomacy during the first

The classic narrative history of the Hundred Years War remains Edouard Perroy's *La guerre de cent ans* (1945).²⁷ Notably, he rejects what was then the contemporary textbook explanation of the war's cause: a dynastic quarrel. Rather, Perroy finds the roots of the conflict in the struggles of the French and English kings for control of Gascony and describes the war as "a conflict feudal in its origin."²⁸ There is no question that Gascony, and the difficulties presented by Edward III's unique status as both king of England and duke of Gascony, is among the central causes of the Hundred Years War, but perhaps it would be better to characterize the conflict in terms of seigniorial rights and sovereignty rather than feudalism. Additionally, it is, at times, difficult to resist reading Perroy's personal experiences into his narrative, particularly as he wrote much of his account of France as an occupied country while evading the Gestapo in German-occupied France.²⁹

Among the studies that embrace a broad scope are the more recent works of Christopher Allmand³⁰ and Jonathon Sumption,³¹ both of which rely upon Perroy for the narrative of the war and accept his general interpretations of the causes and events.

half of the Hundred Years War," 211–40. Donald J. Kagay and L.J. Andrew Villalon, eds., *The Hundred Years War (Part II): Different Vistas* (Leiden/Boston, 2008).

²⁷Edouard Perroy, *La guerre de cent ans* (Paris, 1945). Edouard Perroy, *The Hundred Years War*, trans. W. B. Wells (Oxford, 1951).

²⁸Perroy, *The Hundred Years War*, 69.

²⁹Perroy, *The Hundred Years War*, xxvii. This is also the likely reason for the lack of notes and real bibliography.

³⁰Christopher T. Allmand, *The Hundred Years War: England and France at War, c. 1300–c. 1450* (Cambridge, 1988).

³¹Jonathon Sumption, *Trial by Battle; Trial by Fire; Divided Houses* (Philadelphia, 2009). These three volumes cover the Hundred Years War to 1399. If the remaining volumes are equally detailed, his history of the war will be, if not the definitive narrative, certainly the most extensive.

Allmand also finds the origins of national identities in the war.³² The other important general history of the Hundred Years War is Alfred Higgins Burne's two-volume military history.³³ The first volume in particular is relevant because he chooses to consider Edward III's campaigns of 1337 to 1360 as a unit and focuses on campaign strategy and battlefield tactics, although he fails to locate adequately the war in its political, social, and economic contexts. His periodization is important when examining the Black Prince's expedition of 1355 as part of Edward III's larger military policy.

Since the publication of Perroy's work in 1945 and its English translation in 1951, works related to the war have proliferated. One area that has received significant attention is the administration of society, particularly a society at war, and military service. Works on England include those of Michael Prestwich (1996),³⁴ A. Ayton (1994),³⁵ and Herbert James Hewitt (1966).³⁶ Among the scholars focusing on France are Jacques Miquel (1981),³⁷ Philippe Contamine (1972),³⁸ and John Bell Henneman

³²Brian G. H. Ditcham, "Mutton guzzlers and wine bags: foreign soldiers and native reactions in fifteenth-century France," in *Power, Culture and Religion in France c. 1350–c. 1550*, ed. Christopher T. Allmand, 1–13 (Woodbridge, 1989).

³³Alfred Higgins Burne, *The Crécy War: A Military History of the Hundred Years War from 1337 to the Peace of Bretigny, 1360* (London, 1955); idem, *The Agincourt War: A Military History of the Latter part of the Hundred Years War from 1369 to 1453* (Westport, 1976).

³⁴Michael Prestwich, *Armies and warfare in the Middle Ages: The English experience* (New Haven, 1996); *Plantagenet England, 1225–1360* (Oxford, 2007, 2005); *The Three Edwards: War and State in England, 1272–1377* (New York, 1980); *War, Politics and Finance under Edward I* (London, 1972).

³⁵A. Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses: Military service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III* (Woodbridge, 1994).

³⁶Herbert James Hewitt, *The Organization of War under Edward III* (Manchester, 1966).

³⁷Jacques Miquel, *L'architecture militaire dans le Rouergue au Moyen Age et l'organisation de la défense* (Rodez, 1981).

(1971, 1976).³⁹ Directly related to these works are studies of military demography, such as those done by Bernard S. Bachrach.⁴⁰ Although these focus on an earlier period, they are useful for the method of determining the order of magnitude of a medieval army. More pertinent, perhaps, to the Hundred Years War is Claudine Billot's article on mercenaries as migrants.⁴¹ Additionally, there are recent articles on the recruitment of the armies. For example, Bertrand Schnerb looks at the changing structure of the French army following the defeat at Crécy (1346),⁴² and Neil Jamieson has examined recruitment practices in northern England, albeit for a slightly later period.⁴³ The two most recent studies on the medieval English soldier are *The Soldier Experience in the Fourteenth Century* (2011), edited by Adrian Bell and Anne Curry,⁴⁴ and *The Soldier in Later*

³⁸Philippe Contamine, *Guerre, état et société à la fin du moyen âge. Étude sur les armées des rois de France, 1337–1494* (Paris, 1972).

³⁹John Bell Henneman, *Royal Taxation in Fourteenth Century France: The Development of War Financing, 1322–1376* (Princeton, 1971); idem, *Royal Taxation in Fourteenth Century France: The Captivity and Ransom of John II* (Philadelphia, 1976).

⁴⁰Bernard S. Bachrach, "Early medieval military demography: some observations on the methods of Hans Delbrück," in *The Circle of War in the Middle Ages: Essays on Medieval Military and Naval History*, eds. Donald J. Kagay and L.J. Andrew Villalon, 3–20 (Woodbridge, 1999); idem, "The siege of Antioch: a study in military demography," *War in History* 6, no. 2 (1999): 127–46.

⁴¹Claudine Billot, "Les mercenaires étrangers pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans comme migrants," in *Le Combattant au Moyen Âge*, 2nd edn., 279–86 (Paris, 1995).

⁴²Bertrand Schnerb, "Vassals, allies and mercenaries: the French army before and after 1346," in *The Battle of Crécy, 1346*, ed. Andrew Ayton and Philip Preston, 265–72 (Woodbridge, 2005).

⁴³Neil Jamieson, "The recruitment of Northerners for service in English armies in France, 1415–50," in *Trade, Devotion and Governance: Papers in Later Medieval History*, ed. Dorothy J. Clayton, Richard G. Davies, and Peter McNiven, 102–15 (Stroud, 1994).

⁴⁴Adrian R. Bell and Anne Curry, eds., *The Soldier Experience in the Fourteenth Century* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2011).

Medieval England (2013).⁴⁵ The latter draws extensively on the *The Soldier in Later Medieval England*, a multi-year project funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council (UK).

Works on military demography depend, in part, upon larger studies of demography. This is particularly relevant to this project, as the expedition of 1355 had to draw upon a population depleted by the Black Death. Lawrence Poos has conducted a demographic study of Essex in the wake of the plague, in which he delineates the socio-economic relationships of the population, relying mostly upon quantitative data.⁴⁶ Among the works on the demography of France are Edouard Baratier's *La démographie provençale du XIII^e au XVI^e siècle* (1961) and Jacques Dupaquier's *Histoire de la population française* (1988).⁴⁷

There are regional studies of the relationship between the French crown and the French peers, particularly in regards to the Low Countries, Brittany, Burgundy, and Gascony. The general narrative in these works is one of a struggle for independence from the French kingdom and state formation. Two recent titles reflect this trend in the scholarship of the Low Countries: Samuel Kohn's *Lust for Liberty: The Politics of Social Revolt in medieval Europe, 1200–1450: France, Italy and Flanders* (2006) and Jean-

⁴⁵ Adrian Bell, Anne Curry, Andy King, and David Simpkin, *The Soldier in Later Medieval England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

⁴⁶ Lawrence Poos, *A Rural Society after the Black Death: Essex, 1350–1525* (Cambridge, 1991), passim.

⁴⁷ Edouard Baratier, *La démographie provençale du XIII^e au XVI^e siècle, avec chiffres de comparaison pour la XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1961). Jacques Dupaquier, *Histoire de la population française, i, Des origines à la renaissance* (Paris, 1988).

François Nieuws's *Un pouvoir comtal entre Flandre and France* (2005).⁴⁸ Michael Jones has explored Breton history as a process of state formation during the later Middle Ages, although the earlier work of M. Armand Rébillon suggests a history of support for the central government.⁴⁹ For Burgundy, the focus is very much upon the formation of the duchy. The classic work is Jean Richard's *Les ducs de Bourgogne et la formation du Duché du XI au XIV siècle* (1954), and Bert Lambert's recent work, *The City, the Duke and their Banker: the Raondi Family and the Formation of the Burgundian State* (2006), continues this theme. Even Richard Vaughn's biography of Philip the Bold (1962) focuses upon state formation.⁵⁰

Especially relevant for this project are the works on Gascony. As with the Low Countries, Brittany, and Burgundy there has been attention drawn to the relationship of Gascony with the French crown, but there is little discussion of Gascony as a late medieval state. Both these areas have been overshadowed by the uniqueness of Gascony as a duchy held by the English king, and this relationship has often dominated works on

⁴⁸Samuel Kline Kohn, *Lust for Liberty: the politics of social revolt in medieval Europe, 1200–1450: France, Italy and Flanders* (Cambridge, 2006). Jean-François Nieuws, *Un pouvoir comtal entre Flandre et France: St. Pol, 1000–1300* (Brussels, 2005).

⁴⁹John Bell Henneman, *Olivier de Clisson and political society in France under Charles V and Charles VI* (Philadelphia, 1996). Michael Jones, *The Creation of Brittany: a late medieval state* (London, 1988). M. Armand Rébillon, *Histoire de Bretagne* (Paris, 1957). A. le Moyne Borderie, *Histoire de Bretagne* (Rennes, 1905–1914).

⁵⁰Jean Richard, *Les ducs de Bourgogne et la formation du Duché du XI au XIV siècle* (Paris, 1954). Bert Lambert, *The City, the Duke and their Banker: the Raondi Family and the Formation of the Burgundian State* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006). Richard Vaughn, *Philip the Bold: The Formation of the Burgundian State* (London, 1962). Other works include George Holmes, *Europe, Hierarchy and Revolt, 1320–1450* (Oxford, 2000). Jean Rauzier, *Finances et gestion d'une principauté au XIVe siècle: le duché de Bourgogne de Philippe le Hardi, 1364–1384* (Paris, 1996). Jacques d'Avout, *La querelle des Armangacs et des Bourguignons [histoire d'une crise d'autorité]* (Paris, 1945).

Gascony. For example, Eleanor Constance Lodge published her *Gascony under English Rule* in 1926; nearly sixty years later Margaret Wage Labarge produced *Gascony, England's First Colony*. Nor is the English-Gascon connection of interest only in the Hundred Years War, as Jean-Paul Trabut-Cussac's work, published posthumously and unfortunately incomplete, on the English administration of Gascony under Henry III and Edward I is fundamental for understanding the duchy's role in the Black Prince's logistics, particularly for the discussions of centralization and the origin and roles of the duchy's permanent officers.⁵¹

There are also economic works dealing with the Hundred Years War. The original work is that of Shulyer B. Terry, *Financing the Hundred Years War* (1914). It presents a somewhat Marxist interpretation, i.e., the Hundred Years War is the period of transition from the feudal to national economy with a system of taxation and the rise of the merchant class, and the successful picture he suggests lays the groundwork for later debate regarding the costs of the war. This is most clearly expressed in the 1962 and 1964 articles of K. B. McFarlane ("War, the Economy and Social Change") and M. M. Postan ("The Costs of the Hundred Years War"), respectively, in *Past and Present*.

⁵¹Renée Mussot-Goulard, *Histoire de la Gascogne* (Paris, 1996). Jean-Pierre Augustin, *La Gascogne: pays, nation, région?* (Paris, 1982). Margaret Wage Labarge, *Gascony, England's First Colony, 1204–1453* (London, 1980). Trabut-Cussac, *L'administration anglaise en Gascogne*. Malcolm G. A. Vale, *English Gascony, 1399–1453: a study of war, government and politics during the later stages of the Hundred Years War* (London, 1970). Jack Earl Wiedemer, "Recovery in Gascony: a study in the military history of the Hundred Years' War and in sources thereto pertaining" (M. S. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1963). Charles Dartigue-Peyrou, *Histoire de la Gascogne* (Paris, 1951). Eleanor Constance Lodge, *Gascony Under English Rule* (London, 1926). Ló Drouyn, *Bordeaux vers 1450: description topographique* (Bordeaux, 1874). Leó Drouyn, *La Guyenne militaire*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1865).

McFarlane holds the position that England profited from the war, but Postan, while agreeing that perhaps certain individuals profited, argues that England as a kingdom suffered economically, albeit not as severely as France. Other economic histories have focused more narrowly, such as Christopher D. Turgeon's thesis (2000) on the Anglo-Gascon wine trade.⁵²

There have been social and cultural surveys, such as Denise Baker's *Inscribing the Hundred Years' War in French and English Cultures*.⁵³ Women other than Joan of Arc, e.g., Jeanne de Montfort, also had significant military roles, particularly in terms of defending towns and cities. James Gilbert's essay in *The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus* (2005) specifically addresses the importance of women in defense and in perserving supplies, which shows women as more than victims of violence.⁵⁴ Nor should

⁵²Shulyer B. Terry, *Financing the Hundred Years War, 1337–1360* (London, 1914). More recent works include: Christopher D. Turgeon, "Bacchus and Bellum: the Anglo-Gascon wine trade and the Hundred Years War (987 to 1453 A. D.)" (MA thesis, College of William and Mary, 2000). Nathan Sussman, "Mints and Debasements: monetary policy in France during the second phase of the Hundred Years War: 1400–1425" (Ph.D. diss., University of California-Berkeley, 1990). A. R. Bridbury, "The Hundred Years' War: Costs and Profits," in *Trade, Government and Economy in Pre-Industrial England* (London, 1976), 80–95. Margery Kirkbride James, *Studies in the Medieval Wine Trade* (Oxford, 1971). M. M. Postan, "The Costs of the Hundred Years War," *Past and Present* 27 (Apr., 1964): 34–53. E. B. Fryde, *The Wool Accounts of William de la Pole: a study of some aspects of the English wool trade at the start of the Hundred Years War* (York, 1964). K. B. McFarlane, "War, the Economy and Social Change," *Past and Present* 22 (Jul., 1962), 3–18.

⁵³Denise Nowakowski Baker, *Inscribing the Hundred Years' War in French and English Cultures* (Albany, 2000).

⁵⁴Aline S. Taylor, *Isabel of Burgundy: the duchess who played politics in the age of Joan of Arc, 1397–1471* (Lanham, 2001). Monique Sommé, *Isabelle de Portugal, duchesse de Bourgogne: une femme au pouvoir au XVe siècle* (Septentrion, 1998). More general works include James E. Gilbert, "A medieval 'Rosie the Riveter?' Women in France and southern England during the Hundred Years War," in *The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus*, ed. L. J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay, 489–507 (Leiden, 2005). Jean

the numerous biographies of the major actors, such as Charles V,⁵⁵ and minor figures like William de la Pole, be overlooked.⁵⁶ The studies on the Black Prince, himself, and a number of his advisors are discussed below.

In addition to these are the studies that examine walled towns as independent military actors, such as Paul Solon's 2005 essay on Toulouse, which does discuss the Black Prince's actions at Toulouse in some detail. The walled town is of especial relevance to understanding the prince's logistics because he had to account for fortified towns and their role in French logistics. The articles of Philippe Lardin, "Le financemant des fortifications en Normandie orientale à la fin du Moyen Age" (1996), is useful for understanding the relationship of building fortifications and the fisc, if only for comparative purposes. It should also be remembered that the Duke of Lancaster was leading another English force through Normandy and would have had to face walled cities.⁵⁷

Verdon, "La femme et la violence en Poitou pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans d'après les lettres de rémission," *Annales du Midi: Revue archéologique, historique et philologique de la France méridionale* 102, nos. 189–190 (1990): 367–74.

⁵⁵Françoise Autrand, *Charles V: le Sage* (Paris, 1994).

⁵⁶E. B. Fryde, *William de la Pole, merchant and king's banker* (1366) (London, 1988). One of his relations, Michael de la Pole, served with the Prince in Gascony.

⁵⁷Paul D. Solon, "Tholosanna Fides: Toulouse as a Military Actor in Late Medieval France," in *The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus*, ed. L. J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay, 263–95 (Leiden, 2005). Kathryn L. Reyerson, "Medieval walled space: urban development vs. defense," in *City Walls: The Urban Enceinte in Global Perspective*, ed. James D. Tracy, 88–116 (Cambridge, 2000). Josiane Treysot, "Les villes d'Auvergne pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans," in *La Guerre, la violence et les gens au Moyen Age, II: Guerre et gens*, ed. Philippe Contamine and Olivier Guyotjeannin, 49–57 (Paris, 1996). Philippe Lardin, "Le financement des fortifications en Normandie orientale à la fin du Moyen Age," in *Les Normands et le fisc: XXIXème Congrès des Sociétés Historiques et Archéologiques de Normandie, Elbeuf-sur-Seine, 20–23 octobre 1994*, 47–58 (Elbeuf-sur-Seine, 1996). Michael Wolfe, "Siege warfare and the Bonnes

There have also been studies of mercenaries more closely related to the military action of the Hundred Years War, such as William Caferro's work on John Hawkwood and the White Company.⁵⁸ Of particular importance to a logistical study of the Hundred Years War are works on military technology. The longbow has received attention, as has the possible role of gunpowder and canons in late medieval warfare.⁵⁹ More recently, maritime technology has been examined. As Bachrach's article on William the Conqueror makes clear, any army wishing to cross the English Channel with their horses had to possess, borrow, or develop the proper naval technology.⁶⁰ There also is the work

Villes of France during the Hundred Years War," in *The Medieval City under Siege*, ed. Ivy A. Corfis and Michael Wolfe, 49–66 (Woodbridge, 1995). Jacques Gardelles, *Les chateaux du Moyen Age dans la France du Sud-Ouest: la Gascogne anglaise de 1216 à 1327* (Geneva, 1972). M. W. Beresford, *New Towns of the Middle Ages: town plantation in England, Wales and Gascony* (New York, 1967).

⁵⁸William Caferro, *John Hawkwood: an English Mercenary in Fourteenth-Century Italy* (Baltimore, 2006). William Caferro, "'The fox and the lion': the White Company and the Hundred Years War in Italy," in *The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus*, ed. L. J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay, 179–210 (Leiden, 2005). Billot, "Les mercenaires étrangers pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans comme migrants," 279–86.

⁵⁹Andrew Ayton and Philip Preston, "Topography and archery: further reflections on the battle of Crécy," in *The Battle of Crécy, 1346*, ed. Andrew Ayton and Philip Preston, 351–77 (Woodbridge, 2005). Kelly DeVries, "Catapults are not atomic bombs: towards a redefinition of «effectiveness» in premodern military technology," *War in History* 4, no. 4 (1997): 454–70. Kelly DeVries, "The impact of gunpowder weaponry on siege warfare in the Hundred Years War," in *The Medieval City under Siege*, ed. Ivy A. Corfis and Michael Wolfe, 227–44 (Woodbridge, 1995).

⁶⁰Timothy J. Runyan, "Naval power and maritime technology during the Hundred Years War," in *War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, ed. John B. Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger, 53–67 (Woodbridge, 2003). Francis Davey, "What happened to the West Country pilgrim ships in 1451? Part II," *Devon and Cornwall Notes and Queries: A Journal Devoted to the Local History, Archaeology, Biography and Antiquities of the Counties of Devon and Cornwall* 39, no. 3 (2003): 72–76. Ian Friel, "Winds of change? Ships and the Hundred Years War," in *Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War*, ed. Anne Curry and Michael Hughes, 183–93 (Woodbridge, 1994). Bachrach, "William the Conqueror's Horse Transports," *passim*.

of John Pryor on ships and naval warfare,⁶¹ and, as is discussed above, Craig Lambert's book on English maritime logistics places the transport of English troops during the Hundred Years war squarely into this tradition of cross-Channel campaigning.

The Prince's Campaign

Most relevant to this project are the studies dealing with the individual campaign. First among these studies is Herbert James Hewitt's *The Black Prince's Expedition of 1355–1357*.⁶² While he addresses the question of supply, his focus when dealing with the preparations is upon the indentures and recruitment, and the discussion is, perhaps, too narrowly focused on Cheshire, particularly in regards to recruitment, which are important for his discussions of military demography and the structure of the prince's army. Hewitt's study is also more qualitative than quantitative, and the latter approach, while still incorporating qualitative evidence, would serve to illustrate more concretely the sheer volume of economic and human resources designated for military consumption. A possibly more serious shortcoming is his uncritical reliance upon Froissart and the other chroniclers, who, as discussed below, need to be read critically with an eye to their personal agendas, rhetoric, and literary style, and checked by *Sachkritik*, the use of the material evidence to critique the written sources. Since the publication of his book, there have also been numerous studies of both Cheshire and military recruitment that

⁶¹John Pryor, *Commerce, shipping and naval warfare in the medieval Mediterranean* (London, 1987). John Pryor, *Geography, technology, and war: studies in the maritime history of the Mediterranean, 649–1571* (Cambridge, 1987).

⁶²Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*.

supplement his work.⁶³ Furthermore, specific questions of supply and military logistics, discussed more fully above, have begun to be asked only in the last decade.⁶⁴

The Black Prince's 1355 campaign has been the subject of renewed interest, as two recent pieces in the *Journal of Medieval Military History: VII. The Age of the Hundred Years War*, and the Black Prince has been the subject of new biographies and studies of how the Prince exercised power, such as David Green's *Edward the Black Prince: Power in Medieval Europe* (Harlow, 2007). Peter Hoskin's article, "The Itineraries of the Black Prince's *Chevauchées* of 1355 and 1356: Observations and Interpretations," is among the most recent works on this campaign, and he uses the itineraries provided by Geoffrey the Baker and Thomas of Malmesbury to "shed light on the nature of the operations" and "resolve differing views of the conduct of the prince's campaign."⁶⁵ He focuses on the route between 13 and 15 November and the dispute as to whether the Prince and his army passed north or south of Carcassonne, which is significant as this choice speaks to the Prince's intentions: avoiding battle or pursuing the French with the purpose of seeking battle. Hewitt, as well as four French historians of

⁶³For example Philip Morgan, *War and Society in Medieval Cheshire, 1277–1403* (Manchester, 1987). Paul Howson and Willson Booth, *The Financial Administration of the Lordship and County of Chester, 1272–1377* (Manchester, 1981). Philip Morgan, "Cheshire and the Defense of Aquitaine," *Transactions of the Historical Society of Lancashire and Cheshire* 128 (1979): 139–60.

⁶⁴Specifically for the Hundred Years War, see Yuval Noah Harari, "Strategy and supply in fourteenth-century Western European invasion campaigns," *Journal of Military History* 64, no. 2 (2000): 297–333.

⁶⁵Hoskins, "The Itineraries of the Black Prince's *Chevauchées* of 1355 and 1356: Observations and Interpretations," 13.

the campaign—Henry Mullot and Joseph Poux,⁶⁶ J.F. Jeanjean,⁶⁷ and Tourneur-Aumont⁶⁸ all argue for the northern route and battle avoidance, but Clifford Rogers makes a case for the southern route and pursuit of the French.⁶⁹ Hoskins convincingly argues for the southern route based not only on toponymy and topography but also on the letters of the Prince and John de Wengefeld and “an assessment of time and distance.”⁷⁰ His book, *In the Steps of the Black Prince: The Road to Poitiers, 1355–1356*, builds on his previous article and relies on his personal experience walking the campaign route, primarily following the itinerary laid out in Geoffrey the Baker’s chronicle (discussed below).⁷¹

Another area in which there has been renewed interest is in recruiting and accounting (see the works by Bell and Curry above). Nicholas Gribit argues that 1337–1360 was a “period of transition in terms of the methods of recruitment used and the means by which they were administered.”⁷² It is particularly difficult during the early years of the war to determine payments to individual soldiers, especially on an expedition not led by the king, and the indenture system was a response that allowed multiple English armies to campaign in France simultaneously. The accounts of James Audley’s contingent that served with Henry of Grosmont (later Duke of Lancaster) in Gascony in 1345 shows that this was “a fully contract army.” It is also clear that experienced

⁶⁶Henry Mullot and Joseph Poux, *Nouvelles recherches sur l’itinéraire du Prince Noir à travers les pays de l’Aude* (Toulouse, 1909), 14

⁶⁷Jeanjean, *La Guerre de Cent Ans*, 42

⁶⁸J.M. Tourneur-Aumont, *La Bataille de Poitiers* (Paris, 1940), 85–87

⁶⁹Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 310, 318.

⁷⁰Hoskins, “Itineraries of the Black Prince,” 22.

⁷¹Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*.

⁷²Nicholas Gribit, “Accounting for Service in War: The Case of Sir James Audley of Heighley,” *Journal of Medieval Military History VII, The Age of the Hundred Years War* (2009): 147–67, at 147.

professional administrators would be needed, and Gribit argues that administrative pressures “may have acted as a catalyst and added impetus towards the use of indentures as the normal method of recruitment from 1356.”⁷³ The Black Prince’s campaign of 1355–1356, then, was part of this shift to the indenture system.

One significant lacuna in the American, English, and French historiography of the Hundred Years War is a general unawareness of the German scholarship. Some of it is admittedly dated; for example, Wolf Stechele published *England und der Niederreihn bei beginn der regierung Eduards III. (1327–1337)* at the beginning of the twentieth century.⁷⁴ Helmuth Weiss’s study of French relations with the Rhineland has a similarly early date.⁷⁵ However, there are more recent works, such as Angelika Heinrichs’s work (2004) on Duke Raynald II and his role in the English alliances with the Holy Roman Empire and Georg Jäger’s examination (1981) of Froissart’s depictions of the war and knighthood.⁷⁶ Additionally, there are German historians that deal with war more generally, such as Hans Delbrück in *Geschichte des Kriegskunst in Rahmen der politischen Geschichte*.⁷⁷ The works of Marcus Junkelmann should also not be overlooked because, even though the focus is mostly upon the Roman military, they

⁷³Gribit, “Accounting for Service,” 147–49.

⁷⁴Wolf Stechele, *England und der Niederreihn bei beginn der regierung Eduards III. (1327–1337)* (Trier, 1908).

⁷⁵Hellmuth Weiss, *Frankreichs Politik in den Rheinlanden am Voraben des Hundertjährigen Krieges* (Revall, 1927).

⁷⁶Angelika Heinrichs, *Herzog Rainald II. von Geldern und seine Rolle im deutschen-englischen Bündnis zu Beginn des Hundertjährigen Krieges* (Cologne, 2004). Georg Jäger, *Aspekte des Krieges und der Chevalerie im XIV. Jahrhundert in Frankreich: Untersuchungen zu Jean Froissarts Chroniques* (Bern, 1981).

⁷⁷Hans Delbrück, *Geschichte des Kriegskunst in Rahmen der politischen Geschichte*, vol. 3 (Berlin, 2000).

address the physical capabilities of the soldiers.⁷⁸ Sumption's work has clearly benefited from the proliferation of work on the myriad aspects of the war, as his wide-ranging and detailed narrative, extensive notes, and bibliography can attest; however, he includes but one German title in his bibliography of scholarly works,⁷⁹ and his basic interpretation of events remains markedly similar to Perroy's. Nor has he availed himself to the recent work on military logistics.

Sources

A study of the military logistics of the Hundred Years War has to draw creatively on a wide variety of sources. These fall into three broad types: narrative and literary sources, record sources, and archaeological evidence. Included among the narrative sources are the numerous chronicles, such as the *Anonimale Chronicle* and the *Chronique des quatre premiers Valois*.⁸⁰ Works like Robert of Avesbury's *De gestis mirabilibus regis Edwardi tertii* would also be included under narrative sources.⁸¹ Literary sources include such works as Christine de Pizan's *Le livre des fais et bonnes meurs du sage roy Charles V*,⁸² as well as contemporary poems, such as the Chandos Herald's French poem, *La vie du Prince Noir*.⁸³ The chronicles provide the narrative of events and specific interpretations of them, and they describe the general context in which to interpret the

⁷⁸Marcus Junkelmann, *Die Legionen des Augustus: der römische Soldat im archäologischen Experiment* (Mainz am Rhein, 1986). Marcus Junkelmann, *Muli Mariani: Marsch in römischer Legionärsrüstung über die Alpen* (Stuttgart, 1985).

⁷⁹F. Trautz, *Die Könige von England und das Reich, 1272–1377* (Heidelberg, 1961).

⁸⁰*Anonimale Chronicle, 1333–1381*, ed. V. H. Galbraith (Manchester, 1927). *Chronique des quatre premiers Valois (1327–1393)*, ed. S. Luce (Paris, 1862).

⁸¹Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*.

⁸²Christine de Pizan, *Le livre des fais et bonnes meurs du sage roy Charles V*, 2 vols., ed. Eric Hicks and Thérèse Moreau (Paris, 1997).

⁸³Chandos Herald, *La vie du Prince Noir*, ed. Diana B. Tyson (Tübingen, 1975).

record sources. The potential difficulties inherent in using the chronicles are the remove at which most of the authors write, the impact of rhetoric, and their personal agendas. For example, Geoffrey the Baker, the principal chronicler of this campaign, wrote at a certain distance. It is unlikely he served personally; thus, he had to rely upon a campaign diary and the reports of others who may or may not have actually been in Gascony in 1355 and 1356 and who would have had their own purposes in speaking with the chronicler. Baker had connections to the earl of Warwick's household, and his chronicle gives significant attention to the earl and the movements of the column he commanded. Moreover, while Baker does an admirable job reporting the events of 1355, his style changes for the 1356 campaign. Suddenly, the Prince of Wales and the French king make grand speeches on the eve of battle; yet even in the more quotidian narrative for 1355 there are a few dramatic gestures and declamations, such as the Prince's statement that he came "not for gold but for justice, not to sell but to take cities."⁸⁴ While the Prince did, indeed, refuse to accept a ransom to spare Carcassonne, these words are likely Baker's invention.

The literary sources, e.g., the works of Christine de Pizan and the Chandos Herald, which make no claim to historicity, are also useful for the descriptions of settings and for contemporary attitudes toward events, but author and authorial intent need to be remembered.

The record sources can be further divided and sub-divided into national and municipal records; the strength of these sources is that they are more quantitative in

⁸⁴Barber, *Life and Campaigns*, 65.

focus, which allows for the gleaning of the data necessary for a logistical study.

However, they are sometimes incomplete, and the records do not necessarily include the information being sought.

Narrative Sources

The most well known of the chroniclers is Jean Froissart.⁸⁵ Given how often his work is cited, it is especially important to treat his works with caution and subject his writings to rigorous criticism, using both the record sources and *Sachkritik*. Peter Ainsworth, *Jean Froissart and the Fabric of History: Truth, Myth, and Fiction in the Chroniques* (1990), is among the most recent critical work in English decoding Froissart to re-evaluate Froissart's value as an historian.⁸⁶ He fits into a growing corpus of literature that has moved away from Johan Huizinga's summation of Froissart's reliability, namely that "Froissart, himself the author of a super romantic epic of chivalry, *Méliador*, narrates [in the *Chroniques*] endless treasons and cruelties without being aware of the contradictions between his general conceptions and the contents of his narrative."⁸⁷ Ainsworth, in his book, has outlined a useful critical method for reading Froissart; he recommends, first, that Froissart must be understood as working within the romance tradition, one feature of

⁸⁵Jean Froissart, *Chroniques*, ed. George T. Diller (Geneva, 1991–1998) is the most recent edition. For an English translation see Jean Froissart, *The Chronicle of Froissart*, trans. John Bouchier, Lord Berners (New York, 1967). Idem, *Oeuvres de Froissart*, ed. Joseph Marie Bruno Constantin Kervyn de Lettehoove, Baron, and Auguste Scheler (Brussels, 1867–77).

⁸⁶Peter F. Ainsworth, *Jean Froissart and the fabric of history: truth, myth, and fiction in the Chroniques* (Oxford, 1990).

⁸⁷Johan Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages: A Study of the Forms of Life* (London, 1924), 56–57. More nuanced accounts of Froissart can be found in George T. Diller, *Attitudes chevaleresque et réalités politiques chez Froissart* (Geneva, 1984) and John Palmer, ed., *Froissart: Historian* (Woodbridge, 1981).

which is the blurring of the line between history and fiction. Ainsworth also notes Froissart's efforts "to provide moral *exempla*."⁸⁸ In addition to placing Froissart within an historiographic context, Ainsworth delineates the distinctive features of Froissart's writing: he was a poet, and portions of the text can be read alternatively as narrative history, *exempla*, or romance, making his text literary in ways that other chronicles, such as those of Jean le Bel, were not.⁸⁹ He follows this with an examination of the relationship between history and ideology in the fourteenth century and the chronicler's relationship with contemporary institutions and ideas and subjects the *Chroniques* to philological and literary criticisms to understand Froissart's methods, such as including himself as a participant.

There are a few major chronicles that detail the Black Prince's campaign, as well as several smaller snippets that appear in other chronicles. The most important of these chronicles is Geoffrey le Baker's *Chronicon*. It is possible that, given the day-to-day account he provides, he may have had access to an eyewitness,⁹⁰ and Hoskins's work demonstrates the accuracy of Baker's chronicle. The manuscript (Bodley 761) dates to c. 1400, so the extant copy, if not the original, was written roughly fifty years after the events it describes with regards to the Black Prince's campaigns. Barber's *Life and*

⁸⁸Ainsworth, *Jean Froissart*, 6, 23–31.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 46–50.

⁹⁰Barber, *Life and Times*, 41. Caille, "Nouveaux Regards," 90. M. L. de Santi, "L'expédition du Prince Noir en 1355, d'après le journal d'un de ses compagnons," *Memoires de l'Academie des Sciences, Inscriptions, et Belles-Lettres de Toulouse*, series 10, vol. 4 (1904): 181–223.

Times of the Black Prince suggests that Baker was writing about 1357–1360, which would make him a contemporary of the events.⁹¹

Giles' preface identifies Baker as a monastic writer, most likely from Swinbroke, as his name, Geoffrey le Baker of Swynbroke, suggests, in Oxfordshire, and there is widespread agreement on this point.⁹² Barber agrees with this, and moreover suggests that Baker had contacts in high places, although instead of quoting documents, as Adam Murmimuth and Robert of Avesbury do, Baker tends to re-write them. Barber does suggest the changes “consist largely of questions of style” with “a fondness for rhetoric at moments of high drama.”⁹³ There is a large difference, for example, in Baker's account of the Battle of Poitiers (1356) and the campaign of the previous year. Barber suggests that “the dry, terse narrative of the day's marches of the 1335 campaign” indicates that Baker “is clearly using a campaign diary.”⁹⁴ This section of the *Chronicon* is distinct from the rest of Baker's writings; it details the daily marches, as Baker writes “in order to make these matters clearer, it will be of interest to put in the individual day's marches of the prince in Narbonnese France.”⁹⁵ Rogers concurs with Barber's assessment, namely that Baker had access to a campaign diary,⁹⁶ which is no longer extant.

Baker's account of Poitiers, according to Barber, represents an eyewitness account, most likely from a soldier serving with the earl of Warwick. Baker does put

⁹¹Barber, *Life and Times*, 41.

⁹²Baker, *Chronicon*, vii–ix.

⁹³Barber, *Life and Times*, 41.

⁹⁴Ibid. A campaign diary is extant for 1356 in the Malmesbury chronicle; however, Baker does not use this; his account of the campaign through the Loire is rather general.

⁹⁵Baker, *Chronicon*, 226–27.

⁹⁶Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 317–18.

words in the Prince's mouth, the spirit of which Livy's Cloelia and Scaevola would recognize, but such rhetorical flights are absent from the account of 1355.⁹⁷ That said, Jacqueline Caille's article, "Nouveaux regards sur l'attaque du Prince Noir contre Narbonne en Novembre 1355," and use of French sources does show that Baker is, despite his occasional high rhetoric, accurate in his description of Narbonne.⁹⁸

The manuscript presents a particular difficulty, and that is the ability, or lack thereof, of the copyist. Giles describes the manuscript as "one of the worst written and most unsatisfactory volumes that they have ever tried to decipher."⁹⁹ This is most clear in the issue of proper names, which becomes significant when attempting to plot the Prince's itinerary, as more than one reading is possible.

The *Brut* continuations in Corpus Christi College Oxford MS78, which may be derived from William Pakington, treasurer of the Black Prince's household in Gascony during the 1360s, provides a brief description of the 1355 and 1356 campaigns. This account in French, according to Clifford Rogers, "certainly appears to be based on eyewitness accounts" and describes how the Prince presented himself and established his claims to authority in Gascony. It further gives details of the council meeting prior to the Battle of Poitiers (1356).¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Barber, *Life and Times*, 60–61; Baker, *Chronicon*, passim.

⁹⁸ Caille, "Nouveaux regards."

⁹⁹ Baker, *Chronicon*, x.

¹⁰⁰ Corpus Christi College, Oxford, MS 78, edited and reproduced in Clifford J. Rogers, "The Black Prince in Gascony and France (1355–1357), According to MS7 of Corpus Christi College, Oxford," *Journal of Medieval Military History VII, The Age of the Hundred Years War* (2009): 168–76.

Several campaign letters are extant, including two from the Prince himself. There are also letters from the Prince's steward, Sir John Wengefeld. With some exceptions, these letters, addressed for the most part to the Bishop of Winchester, head of the Prince's council in England, were public and would have been circulated. It is no accident that the return to Bordeaux is depicted in terms of pursuing French forces when it is just as much a prudent retreat.¹⁰¹ Although the letters are not as openly propagandistic in tone as those sent during and following the Crécy campaign, that element is still present in the public letters. One of Wengefeld's letters, though, is more private in nature and addressed to Sir Richard Stafford, a member of the Prince's forces who had returned to London to obtain reinforcements.¹⁰²

The French chronicles deal with the 1355 campaign in only the most cursory manner. Indeed the Prince's presence in Gascony appears to be of little note until the following year, when naturally the capture of Jean II merited significant attention.

The literary sources, while they can be treated in a broadly similar manner, require a somewhat different approach. Like the narrative sources, the literary and rhetorical techniques of the author need to be acknowledged, as well as personal idiosyncrasies and leanings, when using them as evidence. It is certainly important that Sir John Chandos, the patron of the Chandos Herald, author of *La vie du Prince Noir*, was one of the Black Prince's officers during the campaign of 1355.

Unpublished Documentary Sources: England

¹⁰¹Barber, *Life and Times*, 49. For a further discussion of the return to Bordeaux see Chapter Six, as one of the debates about this campaign deals specifically with the route and what that indicates about the Prince's motives.

¹⁰²Barber, *Life and Times*, 49.

The unpublished documentary sources for England include the Exchequer Accounts, Chancery records, and Close and Patent Rolls. Within the records of the Exchequer are diplomatic documents,¹⁰³ treasury books,¹⁰⁴ Pipe and Issue Rolls,¹⁰⁵ wardrobe accounts, *Nuncii*, and ordnance documents.¹⁰⁶

The Pipe Rolls are extant from the reign of Henry II (1133–1189), with few breaks and are the first source for financial information. Additional records of the royal finances include the Fine Rolls, enrolled annually since John's reign; Originalia Rolls, the Chancery list for the Exchequer of the debts in need of collection; Receipt Rolls, which the Exchequer used to record additional income; and Memoranda Rolls. The wardrobe accounts, as well as the debentures, provide useful information on the financing of diplomatic and military policy.¹⁰⁷ Included among the Chancery documents held at the National Archive at Kew are the Gascon Rolls for 1347–1369,¹⁰⁸ Treaty Rolls,¹⁰⁹ the Chancery Warrants,¹¹⁰ and council and parliamentary proceedings.¹¹¹

¹⁰³Exchequer, E30 Diplomatic Documents.

¹⁰⁴Exchequer, E36/79 Treasury Books.

¹⁰⁵Exchequer, E372/193–212 Pipe Rolls [enrolled accounts] [1347–1368]. Exchequer, E403/341–438 Issue Rolls [1348–1370].

¹⁰⁶Exchequer, E361 Wardrobe Accounts [1257–1548]. Exchequer, E101/312/27-101/315/40: *Nuncii* [messengers and diplomatic agents] [1348–1370]. Exchequer, E101/25/29–101/29/40, 101/35/1–30, 101/531/36 Army, Navy and Ordnance [1347–1370].

¹⁰⁷For the introductory information see Bryce Lyon, *A Constitutional and Legal History of Medieval England*, 2nd edition (New York, 1980), 220–21, 475–77.

¹⁰⁸Chancery, C61/59–82 Gascon Rolls [1347–1369].

¹⁰⁹Chancery, C76/25–52 Treaty (formerly French) Rolls [1347–1369].

¹¹⁰Chancery, C81/325–413 Chancery Warrants [1347–1369].

¹¹¹Chancery, C49/46 Council and Parliamentary Proceedings.

The account book of John Henxteworth, the Black Prince's cashier, is also extant in the Duchy of Cornwall Office.¹¹² Little is known about Henxteworth himself; he was part of the Prince's household staff and accompanied the 1355 campaign to Gascony.¹¹³ Most of his work occurs before and at the end of the campaign, although he does make payments during the march.¹¹⁴ He is meticulous and precise, and the accounts suggest that he was an able cashier and likely a professional administrator, and his journal reflects the pace of the campaign: a flurry of activity prior to the army's departure (e.g., payments for the carriage of wheat to St. Macaire, an advance supply depot) and upon the return to Bordeaux (shoeing of horses, in particular) and a relatively slower pace during the campaign. His accounts provide detailed information on wages, the cost of horse shoeing, the amount of wax purchased (for example, 6£ 13s 4d on 27 September and a 75s advance on the price of 450lbs of wax candles on 4 October),¹¹⁵ and the Prince's gambling debts (60s on 20 September related to a dice game).¹¹⁶ Henxteworth, in addition to details about wages, also records payments for victuals, herbage, carriage of equipment, and some of the Prince's personal purchases, such as 10s paid as an advance to William Stratton, the Prince's tailor, for three pieces of rayed cloth on 4 October.¹¹⁷

Despite all these details, Henxteworth's journal does have several important lacunae. First, he only provides the sums paid in wages with no indication as to the period for which the wages were paid; he rarely gives figures for how wages of archers

¹¹²London, Duchy of Cornwall Office, Account of John Henxteworth.

¹¹³Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*, 23.

¹¹⁴DCO, Henxteworth accounts, passim.

¹¹⁵DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 27 September and 4 October.

¹¹⁶DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 20 September.

¹¹⁷DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 4 October.

and grooms were calculated, or even to indicate how many were drawing pay from the same sum. Second, although Henxteworth records his sums in sterling, he used several different types French specie, particularly at the close of 1355 and in early 1356. According to Hewitt, one leopard was worth 4s 6d at the beginning and close of the journal (Henxteworth dutifully notes a temporary change in value in May 1356).¹¹⁸ Third, Henxteworth, with a few exceptions, deals almost exclusively with men serving in the Prince's company, which means that the men serving under the earls rarely appear. The fourth blank is that, in spite of his meticulous nature, Henxteworth records payments for goods and services and does not always record the payee, so it is unclear in these instances if the payee is English or Gascon.¹¹⁹ Despite these qualifications, however, Henxteworth's journal remains a valuable source for the Prince's campaign and military finance.¹²⁰

Henxteworth also often references a book of memoranda, which has yet to be identified with any extant source and may not survive. Based on the entries in the accounting journal, this book of memoranda records specifics about wages and indentures.¹²¹

Published Documentary Sources: England

¹¹⁸DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for May 1356. Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*, 84.

¹¹⁹DCO, Henxteworth accounts, passim. Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*, 195.

¹²⁰Hewitt, however, thinks the journal "has limited value as a source for the study of army finance." *The Black Prince's Expedition*, 82.

¹²¹DCO, Henxteworth accounts, throughout.

The published English record sources include the Black Prince's register, which contains copies and translations of his instructions to his subordinates,¹²² *Anglo-Norman Letters and Petitions*,¹²³ the Calendars of Close Rolls, Patent Rolls, Fine Rolls, and Letter Books of the City of London.¹²⁴ The letter books, while perhaps more useful for studies of London or guilds, contain information that relates to military and logistic concerns: For example, there is a "writ to the Sheriffs to make proclamation against the [unauthorized] exportation of bows or arrows" in 1357 and another in 1369, which also forbids the exporting of grain, gold and silver in addition to the bows and arrows.¹²⁵ The published records also include the Parliament Rolls.¹²⁶

The Black Prince's Register complements Henxteworth's journal and provides additional names of men serving with the Prince. It also details the arrangements made for the governing of the Prince's council and lands during his absence, as well as the actions taken by men serving in his company.¹²⁷ The Close and Patent Rolls also indicate such arrangements made by the earls, e.g., appointments of attorneys and letters of protection.¹²⁸

Unpublished Documentary Sources: France

¹²²*Register of Edward the Black Prince, preserved in the public record office*, 4 vols, ed. Michael Charles Burdett Dawes (London, 1930–1933).

¹²³*Anglo-Norman Letters and Petitions*, ed. M. D. Legge (Oxford, 1941).

¹²⁴*Calendar of Close Rolls*, 45 vols. (London, 1892–1954). *Calendar of Fine Rolls*, 22 vols. (London, 1911–1963). *Calendar of Letter Books of the City of London*, 11 vols., ed. R. R. Sharpe (London, 1899–1912).

¹²⁵*Calendar of Letter Books*, 92.

¹²⁶*Rotuli parliamentorum Angliae hactenus inediti MCCLXXIX–MCCCLXXIII* (London, 1935).

¹²⁷BPR, passim.

¹²⁸CCR, X, throughout; CPR, X, throughout.

The unpublished French record sources in the Archives Nationales include Série J and Série JJ for the Trésor des Chartres, Layettes, and Régistres, respectively,¹²⁹ as well as the records of the Chambre des Comptes in Série P.¹³⁰ The accounts of Barthélémy du Drach, the war treasurer for 1348–1350 and 1355, and Jean Chauvel, who held the same office 1351–1354, also remain unpublished along with other records of the Chambre des Comptes in the Bibliothèque Nationale that deal specifically with war accounts and travel expenses.¹³¹ The Collection Doat, also at the Bibliothèque Nationale, includes records dealing with Languedoc, including specific collections for Guyenne, Carcassonne, Montaubon, and Narbonne, as well as the houses of Foix, Armagnac, Albret, and Périgord.¹³² These sources indicate the economic impact of the Prince's campaign, specifically tax exemptions to help pay for rebuilding and the region's contributions to the royal coffers both before and after the Anglo-Gascon army ravaged the countryside. There are also unpublished sources in the *départemental* archives, which provide evidence of the destruction caused by the Prince's army, particularly in terms of rebuilding. For

¹²⁹Paris, Archives Nationales, Série J Trésor des Chartres, Layettes, 514: Brocard et Fénétrange, 636–642 and 654–655: Angleterre, 677: Écosse. Paris, Archives Nationales, Série JJ Trésor des Chartres, Régistres, 76–117 [1345–1380].

¹³⁰Paris, Archives Nationales, Série P Chambre des Comptes, 2292–2295: Mémoires C, D [1346–1381].

¹³¹Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Manuscrits français, 20684: War Treasurers' Accounts, Barthélémy du Drach, 1348–1350, 20692: War Treasurers' Accounts, Barthélémy du Drach, 1355, n.a. 9421: War Treasurers' Accounts, Barthélémy du Drach, 1355, and n. a. 20528: War Treasurers' Accounts, Jean Chauvel, 1351–1354. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Manuscrits français. 32510: Chambre des Comptes, war accounts, musters, n. a. 7412–7414: Chambre des Comptes, war accounts, musters, 20590: Chambres des Comptes, travel expenses.

¹³²Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Collection Doat (Languedoc): 117: Guyenne, 64: Carcassonne, 87: Montaubon, 53: Narbonne. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Collection Doat (Languedoc): 190–197: Houses of Foix, Armagnac and Albret, 243–244: Counts of Périgord.

example, the *archives départementales des Pyrénées-Atlantiques* at Pau contains sources dealing with Armagnac and Foix,¹³³ and the *Archives communales de Martel*, located within the *Archives départementales du Lot* at Cahors, contain two series of documents that deal with accounts from 1349–1362 and war correspondence.¹³⁴

Published Documentary Sources: France

There are many published records for France, such as the *Archives municipales de Bordeaux*,¹³⁵ *Gascogne dans les registres du Trésor des Chartres*,¹³⁶ and the *Inventaire-sommaire des Archives Communales antérieures à 1790*, which includes *Ville de Toulouse* among others.¹³⁷ There are also published sources that deal explicitly with financial matters, such as the *Comptes de l'argenterie des rois de France au xiv^e siècle*.¹³⁸ Additionally, the published sources from the papacy of Innocent VI (d. 1362), such as the edition of the *Lettres secrètes et curiales*, which provide detail not only on papal activities during the Hundred Years War but also on the relationship between France and Avignon.¹³⁹

Archaeological Sources

¹³³Pau, Archives départementales des Pyrénées-Atlantiques, Série E, 237–287: Armagnac, 391–484: Foix.

¹³⁴Cahors, Archives départementales du Lot, Archives communales de Martel, CC 3–4: Accounts [1341–1343, 1349–1362], EE 1: War (correspondence).

¹³⁵H. Barckausen, ed., *Archives municipales de Bordeaux* (Bordeaux, 1890).

¹³⁶Charles Samaran and Pierre Rouleau, eds., *La Gascogne dans le registres du Trésor des Chartres* (Paris, 1966).

¹³⁷E. Roschach, ed., *Ville de Toulouse* (Toulouse, 1891).

¹³⁸*Comptes de l'argenterie des rois de France au xiv^e siècle*, ed. L. Douet d'Arcq (Paris, 1851).

¹³⁹*Innocent VI, Lettres secrètes et curiales*, 4 vols., ed. P. Gasnault, M. H. Laurent and N. Gotteri (1959-in progress).

The archaeological material, particularly the evidence for roads, fortifications, and ports, is important for reconstructing the Black Prince's route through Languedoc and for criticizing the narrative sources. The weakness of the archaeological material, however, is that it is difficult to interpret without means of the written sources. The archeological sources for England and France include ships, weapons, coins, and fortifications. There are also roads, ports, and bridges, and the Prince and his forces did, indeed, make use of the Roman roads and bridges throughout the campaign.¹⁴⁰ The coins and weapons can be found in museum catalogues and excavation reports, and coins and other artifacts have been found along the campaign route. At Pezens, for example, Julien Courtieu's excavations uncovered a hill that commanded the Fresquell valley and uncovered pottery, coins, and "*un boulet de bombarde, envoyé par les Anglais.*"¹⁴¹ Jean Sarrand's argument for identifying "Alieir" as St-Hilaire depends, in part, on coin finds, specifically the discovery of French coinage no longer in use in Languedoc at the time of the Prince's raid,¹⁴² and considering Henxteworth's use of multiple specie it is possible that members of the Prince's company could have carried these.

Cities and fortifications, which include fortress cities, also have individual excavation reports. For example, Plymouth, the port from which the Black Prince

¹⁴⁰Baker, *Chronicon*, 229–45. For a specific example, see Maurice-Rene Mazieres, "Faits et gestes de la maisons de Voisins en Languedoc lors de l'invasion du Prince Noir," *Memoires de la Societé des arts et de sciences de Carcassonne*, series 4, vol. 6 (1968–1970): 123–26, at 125.

¹⁴¹Mazieres, "Faits et gestes," 126.

¹⁴²Jean Sarrand, "La chevauchée du Prince Noir dans la region de Carcassonne, novembre 1355," *Mémoires de la Société des arts et des sciences de Carcassonne*, series 4, vol. 5 (1963–1967): 155–58, at 158. The dating of the coinage was determined by Maurice Nogué.

embarked, has been excavated and several reports have been published.¹⁴³

Archaeological work has also been done on Toulouse,¹⁴⁴ Bordeaux,¹⁴⁵ and

Carcassonne.¹⁴⁶ The basic work on the road system is Raymond Chevallier's *Roman*

Roads.¹⁴⁷ Marjorie Nice Boyer has also written on bridges in medieval France,

considering both their construction and impact on the surrounding environment.¹⁴⁸ The

work on the roads and bridges is important, as the Prince and his forces made use of both.

Methodology

The statistical data in Chapter Seven was derived in the main from the information in Henxteworth's journal. Each entry was entered into a database and the details divided into the following categories: date, location, payee (when known), the position of the payee (e.g., clerk, archer, minstrel, tailor, among others, when given), the amount paid out, and the expense. The expenses are further broken down into specific categories of spending: wages, victuals, horse-related expenses, transport, the Prince's personal expenses, and miscellaneous. Expenses also are examined according to the offices

¹⁴³Keith W. Ray, *Archaeological investigations and research in Plymouth* (Plymouth, 1995). Cynthia Gaskell Brown, J. P. Allan, and Abhainn Preston, *Plymouth excavations* (Plymouth, 1986). Barry W. Cunliffe and Paul T. Bidwell, *Mount Batten Plymouth: a Prehistoric and Roman Port* (Oxford, 1988).

¹⁴⁴Musée des Augustins, *Archeologie et vie quotidienne aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles en Midi-Pyrénées* (Toulouse, 1990).

¹⁴⁵Fédération Aquitania, *Sites défensifs et sites fortifiés au Moyen Age entre Loire et Pyrénées : actes du premier colloque Aquitania, Limoges, 20–22 mai 1987* (Bordeaux, 1990).

¹⁴⁶Nicolas Gouzy and Jean-Marie Pesez, *Actes de la 3e Session d'histoire médiévale de Carcassonne, 28 août–1er septembre 1990* (Berne, 1992).

¹⁴⁷Raymond Chevallier, *Roman Roads* (Berkeley, 1976).

¹⁴⁸Marjorie Nice Boyer, *Medieval French Bridges: A History* (Cambridge, 1976).

designated by Henxteworth, e.g., the office of the hall. The cross-tabulations of expense categories and offices show how the Prince's finances were handled during the campaign.

Logistics

The following chapters draw on a logistical model based on the consumption rate of the army. This is most simply expressed in Engel's basic equation. He expresses this mathematically as

$$N = \frac{d(a + b + c) - (yz + 200x)}{250 - d(e + f + g)},$$

In this N = the number of animals, a = total weight of grain required, b = total weight of fodder required, c = total weight of water required, d = days in the field, e = weight of grain for the animals, f = weight of fodder for the animals, g = weight of water for the animals, y = number of personnel carrying supplies, z = the approximate weight carried by each man, and x = number of cavalry horses carrying supplies.¹⁴⁹ The model can be adapted to carts by changing the 250 to the carrying capacity of the cart and multiplying $d(e+f+g)$ by the number of horses needed to draw the cart.

Based upon Roth's work on Roman logistics, the caloric needs of the soldiers have been reduced from the recommended 3600 calories per day to 1600–2000 calories per day. However, the rations he reconstructs total 3,390 calories per day.¹⁵⁰ The caloric requirement has also been divided into different groups of food, as soldiers did not get all of their calories from grain. For example, Roman soldiers received rations that included meat, vegetables, and cheese, in addition to grain, and Henxteworth's journal records

¹⁴⁹Engels, *Alexander the Great*, passim

¹⁵⁰Roth, *Logistics of the Roman Army at War*, 7–8, 43.

payments for meat, poultry, cheese, fish, nuts, and other victuals.¹⁵¹ Rations for animals have been broken down into “hard fodder,” such as grain, “green fodder,” and “pasturage.” These divisions are similar to the way Henxteworth differentiates between grain, hay, and herbage.¹⁵² The weight of Roth’s rations comes to 2.8 lbs (1.3 kg).¹⁵³ I have rounded this figure to 3 lbs. In creating a model of the Anglo-Gascon army’s logistics I have also drawn on data from US Army field manuals. Many date to before World War II, although one is considerably more recent: FM-31-27, which is the current field manual for US special forces and the use of pack animals. Comparing the earlier data with this new manual shows how little the recommendations and practices for the care and use of pack animals has changed.

The following chapters make use of these data in a variety of ways. In Chapter Three the needs of men and horses are used to determine the amount of supplies the Prince’s fleet had to transport from England to Gascony. The supply needs, then, help ascertain the minimum carrying capacity of the Prince’s fleet. Once the army reached Bordeaux and began campaigning through southern France, the army’s comestible requirements, along with the carrying capacity of the pack animals and carts, and the speed these animals and carts could achieve and maintain, are used to establish the size of the Prince’s supply train (Chapter Five). These logistical needs and limitations

¹⁵¹Roth, *Logistics of the Roman Army at War*, 18, 25–26, 32–34. DCO, Henxteworth accounts, throughout.

¹⁵²DCO, Henxteworth accounts, throughout. Roth, *Logistics of the Roman Army at War*, 61.

¹⁵³Roth, *Logistics of the Roman Army at War*, 43.

undergirded the campaign, which began with the preparations in England, the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter Three: The Preparations for the *Chevauchée*

The 1355 campaign's success rested upon careful preparations. As this chapter will discuss, these preparations encompassed a wide variety of necessary tasks. Money had to be raised; food had to be purveyed; horses had to be purchased; ships had to be manned. Men also needed to be recruited, but the Prince's soldiers are discussed separately in the following chapter. All of these tasks took time to complete, and as this chapter shows, the planning and preparations began well before the Prince and his company sailed from Plymouth. The chapter begins with the decision to send an English army to Gascony, followed by discussions of the finances, supplies, and the Prince's fleet. All of these topics are set within the larger context of the existing purveyance structure in England and England's experience with transporting men, horses, and supplies to France.

On 1 June 1355 King Edward III addressed the archbishops of Canterbury and York, all the bishops of England, the heads of the four orders of friars, and the chancellors and proctors of Oxford and Cambridge via letters close. He requested their prayers, and through them the prayers of the people, for himself and his men for the upcoming campaigns. Edward III explains clearly in these letters close that he sought peace while King John II of France used the peace negotiations to delay and cost him [Edward III] large sums of money even as the French king was "preparing for war." Edward III's request concludes: "therefore the king [Edward III] is compelled to renew

the war.”¹ Edward III could have done little else that would have so quickly published the upcoming campaign to his subjects.² He meant for the news to spread. The request to the friars preachers included a clause that directed them to share the information “from convent to convent of their visitation.”³ The friars, bishops, chancellors, and others were further instructed to make public prayers in the churches for the success of the expedition, thus enabling Edward III to reach the majority of his subjects.⁴ While this may have been the first time many of Edward III’s subjects may have learned of the expeditions, for others this was old news as the actual preparations had been underway for some months.⁵

The decision to send an army under the command of Edward of Woodstock, Prince of Wales, to Gascony was not made lightly. It was considered and deliberate; it was well planned from the moment the decision was made. Indeed, it was already being planned *well before* April 1355, when Edward III and his council formally rejected the proposal for continued negotiations put forward by Androin de la Roche (d. 1369), a

¹TNA, C 54/193, m. 19v. Rymer, *Foedera*, 236. CCR, X, 210. “...guerram resumere nostram compellimur ad defensam...” Edward III’s actions were certainly not original. John II of France published his own proclamations about the “guerre contra les Anglais” on 17 May 1355. (Rymer, *Trésor des Chartres and Archives de France*, 141).

²Hewitt, *The Black Prince’s Expedition*, 14. There is a long tradition in England of using letters close to inform the king’s subjects of military activity. See, for example, Pierre Chaplais, *English Medieval Diplomatic Practice Part I, Documents and Interpretations*, vol. II (London, 1982), “Diplomatic preliminaries to war.” Like Edward III, Edward I and Edward II used such letters to inform their subjects.

³TNA, C 54/193, m. 19. CCR, X, 210.

⁴Hewitt, *The Black Prince’s Expedition*, 14, for his discussion of the use of such requests to spread news of the King’s policies.

⁵For example, orders for ships and mariners were issued in March, and soldiers were to muster in Plymouth in mid-June; therefore, they knew about the expedition before 1 June 1355. See below.

Benedictine monk and Abbot of Cluny (1351–1361), who led the papal legation which was trying to persuade Edward III to renew negotiations for the continuation of the truce with France. Once the decision was made, preparations for the campaign began in earnest.⁶

The pace of the preparations certainly intensified, money was gathered and dispersed, men were recruited, and “paperwork” was filed. The scale—let us not forget that Edward III was planning a three-pronged invasion of France⁷—and efficiency of this process demonstrates that the Black Prince’s *chevauchée* was highly organized and well-planned; contrary to the traditional view of the *chevauchée*, it was not a spur-of-the-moment raid lacking focus and strategic aims.⁸ The careful attention to the logistics necessary to orchestrate the recruiting, not to mention paying and equipping, of soldiers, the organizing of supplies, both comestible and non-comestible, and the transport of men, supplies, and horses first to Plymouth and Southampton and thence to Bordeaux, show not only that those overseeing the process had both the skills and tools to do so but also that the start of this campaign was a highly organized operation. This also indicates the importance of this expedition to Edward III’s larger strategy for the 1355 campaigning

⁶It appears that preliminary preparations were already underway early in 1355, but the orders, requests, and letters became much more frequent as the campaign’s departure neared. See below.

⁷While three separate campaigns seem to have been planned, Clifford Rogers has argued that there were only two fleets. Clifford Rogers, *War, Cruel and Sharp*, 293, n. 38.

⁸Hewitt, *The Black Prince’s Expedition*, 13. He writes that “many campaigns were marked by an absence of strategy” and “no clearly defined objective.” For further descriptions of *chevauchées* as lacking focus and strategy, see A.H. Thompson, “The Art of War to 1400,” *The Cambridge Medieval History*, VI; T.F. Tout, “Medieval and Modern Warfare,” *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* 5 (1919):, 24; and H. Belloc, *Crécy* (London, 1912).

season—the multi-pronged invasion of France led by Lancaster, the Prince of Wales, and Edward III—and illuminates what the king hoped to achieve through his war with France.

Furthermore, the meticulous attention to the preparations suggests that the Prince and his advisors understood that supply is the basis of strategy.⁹ They knew that a good start to the campaign would establish a firm foundation for the *chevauchée*, and that men and horses had to arrive in Bordeaux healthy and in fighting trim in order to take advantage of the campaigning season. This became especially crucial as the Prince's departure from Plymouth, planned for late July or early August. No specific departure date was given, but the Prince had stated he would be in Plymouth as of 1 July (he failed to arrive until 26 July),¹⁰ men were to be in Plymouth by mid-June¹¹. His departure was delayed until 9 September and the time available for a campaign in 1355 dwindled (the latest date at which a campaign could begin was 1 November, and that only if the army stayed west of the Garonne). Therefore, ensuring adequate supplies for the eleven-day journey from Plymouth to Bordeaux was a pressing matter. Fortunately for the Prince,

⁹C.T. Allmand, *The De re militari of Vegetius: the reception, transmission and legacy of a Roman text in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 33–41; Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army*, 2. J.F.C. Fuller, *The Generalship of Alexander the Great* (London, 1958), 52. Jonathan Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War* (Leiden/Boston, 1999), passim. This was also widely recognized by ancient writers, such as Vegetius, *De Re Militari*, ed. M.D. Reeve (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 3.3 and medieval writers, such as Christine de Pizan, who was clearly aware of Vegetius's work, as she quotes from it freely. Christine de Pizan, *The Book of the Deeds of Arms and of Chivalry*, trans. Sumner Willard (Brig. Gen., USA Ret.), ed. Charity Cannon Willard (University Park, PA, 1999), 40–43.

¹⁰BPR, IV, 143; TNA, C 61/67, m. 5.

¹¹Rymer, *Foedera*, III, i, 298–99.

there existed a highly efficient supply system in England¹² that was capable of meeting his supply needs, if not his transport requirements.¹³ The machinery of purveyance swung into action once the formal decision to send the Prince of Wales to Gascony had been taken.

The Decision to go to War

Henry of Grosmont (c. 1310–1361), the Duke of Lancaster, left England for the papal court in November 1354 “on the weighty business of the king and his realm,”¹⁴ namely the negotiation of a suitable peace (*pace competenti*) with France, before the expiration of the existing truce, which was set to end on 5 April 1355.¹⁵ Lancaster and his fellow legates had the power to negotiate a final peace with France and to establish an alliance

¹²See Michael Prestwich, in particular: *Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages, the English Experience* (New Haven, 1999, 1996), 250–62; *The Three Edwards: War and State in England, 1272–1377* (New York, 1980), 70–72, 223–25, 265–70; *War, Politics and Finance under Edward I* (London, 1972), 114–36, 151–76; *Plantagenet England, 1225–1360* (Oxford, 2007, 2005), 335–36, 348–49. Ilana Krug, “Royal Prerogative Gone Astray: The Social and Economic Impact of Purveyance of the English Peasantry at the Beginning of the Hundred Years War” (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2006); Ilana Krug, “Peasants and Purveyance at the Beginning of the Hundred Years War: Maddicott Reexamined,” in *The Hundred Years War (Part II): Different Vistas*, ed. Donald J. Kagay and L.J. Andrew Villalon, 343–66 (Leiden/Boston, 2008).

¹³This is not to say that the administration or the system in place was incapable of assembling a fleet; rather, there were not enough ships available for two fleets. See Craig Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Military: English Maritime Logistics in the Fourteenth Century* (Woodbridge, 2011) 152–55. See also, idem, “Taking the War to Scotland and France: The Supply and Transportation of English Armies by Sea,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Hull, 2009), 235.

¹⁴BPR, III, 181. Letters of protection were drawn up for Lancaster for matters concerning him in Chester and Flint.

¹⁵Henry Knighton, *Knighton's Chronicle, 1337–1396* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 126–27.

between Edward III and Jean II.¹⁶ Edward III wanted the entirety of Aquitaine for himself and his heirs, no homage required, in perpetuity. His instructions to Lancaster and the rest of the deputation made this explicit: “namely, that the King should have freely and as an alod, for himself and his heirs in perpetuity, in recompense for the crown of France, the entire Duchy of Guienne as fully as any King of England has ever held it...”¹⁷ The King further specified in a schedule that he required “the entire duchies of Aquitaine-Guienne and Normandy and the county of Ponthieu...and with this Angers and Anjou, Poitiers and Poitou, Le Mans and Maine, Tours and Touraine, Angoulême and Angoumois, Cahors and Quercy, Limoges and Limousin...”¹⁸ The French envoys to the papal court (unsurprisingly) rejected these terms in early 1355, and the Duke of Lancaster and the Earl of Arundel left for England, minus the third member of their group, the bishop of Norwich who had died.¹⁹ Papal nuncios followed them to England.²⁰

Even before the papal legates arrived, the Duke of Lancaster reached England (28 March 1355) with the news that the negotiations had, to no one’s very great surprise,

¹⁶Kenneth Fowler, *The King’s Lieutenant: Henry of Grosmont, First Duke of Lancaster* (London, 1969), 134.

¹⁷Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi*, 421. “...rex Anglorum habuisset integrum ducatum Aquitanniae sibi et heredibus suis, imperpetuum, libere et quiete, sine homagio cuiquam regi Franciae faciendo...”

¹⁸F. Bock, “Some New Documents Illustrating the Early Years of the Hundred Years’ War,” *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* XV (1931): 94—96. Original in French. Clifford Rogers, ed., *The Wars of Edward III: Sources and Interpretations*, Warfare in History (Rochester, NY, 1999), 146–48.

¹⁹Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 421. “Tunc, dicto episcopo Nowycensi ibidem morte praevento, ceteri nuncii Anglici, infecto negotio, in Angliam sunt reversi.”

²⁰Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 424; Rymer, *Foedera*, 297, for the safe conducts granted to the papal nuncios.

failed to accomplish much beyond the extension of the truce to 24 June 1355.²¹ The papal envoys were not far behind, as indicated by the safe conduct for the abbot of Cluny, Androin de la Roche, and Johann, bishop of Elne, which date to 2 April 1355.²² Edward III received Lancaster almost immediately upon his return to London; the papal legates, on the other hand, arrived only two days after Lancaster but were made to wait for their audience with Edward III until mid-April.²³

When the papal legates, led by de la Roche, approached Edward III with their proposal, to extend the truce between France and England past 24 June 1355, when it was due to expire, the king “heard [the envoys] in person.”²⁴ The king “responded that it was not his intention to accept the latest truce” (whether he is referring to the one negotiated by Lancaster and due to expire in June or the one being proposed by the current legation is unclear) because the French often used papal legates to offer truces and then renounced them.²⁵ Despite these reservations, however, the king offered to discuss the proposal with the royal Council.²⁶ One can only conclude that Edward III mentioned a truce, although it seems clear from his response to the papal legates that Edward III had no interest in truces. According to Avesbury’s account, in the same Council meeting in which Edward III conveyed the envoys’ proposal “it was ordained that the lord Edward, the oldest son of the king of England, prince of Wales, then in his twenty-fourth year,

²¹Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 421. “Et eodem tempore inter dicta regna captae sunt treugae usque festum sancti Johannis baptistae, contingens anno proximo tunc sequente [24 June 1355].”

²²TNA C 66/245, m. 12; CPR, 10, 203. Rymer, *Foedera*, III, I, 297.

²³Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 424.

²⁴Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 424. “in propria persona audita.”

²⁵Ibid., 424. “respondit quod non fuit intentionis suae treugis ulterioribus consentire.”

²⁶Ibid., 424. “voluit tamen super his cum concilio sui plenius deliberare.”

would cross [the English Channel] into Gascony.”²⁷ It appears, based on Avesbury’s account, that the Council voted to pursue the war in Gascony and Normandy before the papal legates had even left London, let alone reached Dover to return to France.²⁸

To Avesbury, or to anyone else observing events from a remove, it may well have seemed as though the King and Council had rejected the papal legate’s proposal almost before it had been offered, and it certainly appears that way. I would argue, however, that Edward III had already made up his mind to send an expedition to France before Lancaster had returned to London. Edward III, a king renowned for his generalship and leadership, was unlikely to have rejected a truce if he did not already have a viable alternative in mind. All questions of character aside, a military leader of Edward III’s caliber would not rebuff the offer of a truce if his troops (and logistics) were in disarray or insufficient to pursue military action. He took the time a truce afforded him to rebuild, resupply, and finalize the preparations.²⁹

For that very reason, Edward III—and John II—accepted the original three-month truce negotiated by Pope Innocent VI (d. 1362). The Duke of Lancaster, the Earl of Arundel, Bartholomew de Burghersh, constable of Dover castle, Michael, bishop elect of London, and Bishop William of Norwich represented Edward III and England at the papal court in Avignon.³⁰ The Duke of Bourbon and Chancellor Pierre de la Forêt

²⁷Ibid., 424. “In dicto concilio apud Westmonasterium ordinatum fuit quod dominus Edwardus, primogenitus dicti regis Anglorum, princeps Walliae, tunc xxiii^{ium} annum suae aetatis agens, transfretaret in Vasconim.”

²⁸Innocent VI, *Lettres secretes et curiales*, nos. 1394–1395. Rymer, *Foedera*, III, i, 297. Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 423–24.

²⁹Sumption, *Trial by Fire*, 142.

³⁰Rymer, *Foedera*, III, i, 283.

represented John II and France.³¹ The extended truce would begin 1 April and expire 24 June.³² Edward III needed that time to complete the preparations for his 1355 invasions of France, which had *already* been set in motion, and he and his advisors and generals used that time to their advantage.

It should be noted that among the English delegation were several high-ranking Gascons: Bernard Ezi, lord of Albret; Guy de Bryan, lord of Lagherne; Guillaume de Pommiers; Bertrand, lord of Montferrand, and Magister Gerard de Podio.³³ This suggests not only that the Gascons were involved in the negotiation of the original truce but that they also would be able to relay the results—or lack thereof—directly to Bordeaux and the rest of Gascony. This means that the Gascons would have had some knowledge upon which to base their own decisions, and, indeed, this information may have prompted the Gascon delegation to England in January 1355 and its request for a military force led by the Prince of Wales.

Given the Gascons' involvement in the negotiations it is hardly surprising that they also were involved in the decision to send an expedition to Gascony.³⁴ They certainly were interested parties. The speed with which the raid was assembled after the Prince landed at Bordeaux on 20 September—the army left Bordeaux on 5 October—,

³¹On a side note, the extension of the truce was the only accomplishment of the negotiating parties. The main issue, unsurprisingly, was Edward III's status: king of France, sovereign duke, or rebellious vassal. Neither side was prepared to negotiate on that issue.

³²Sumption, *Trial by Fire*, 142.

³³TNA, C 76/32. *Foedera*, III, i, 289. This is dated 30 October 1354. Albret, Pommiers, and Aymery, lord of Montferrand, all served during the Black Prince's campaign. Their presence among the delegation is indicative of their status and that they were known to Edward III, certainly through the mayor and constable of Bordeaux if not personally.

³⁴Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*, viii, 3.

suggests that the Gascons had already prepared for an expedition of some kind and had made advance preparations, e.g., assembling their own men and supplies, although there are no clear records of this. Clearly, then, the Gascon commanders knew about the expedition early on in the planning process, presumably as soon as a messenger could travel from London to Bordeaux after Edward III had agreed to the Gascons' request for military aid.³⁵

When, then, was the decision to send an expedition to Gascony made? The latest date suggested is Henry Knighton's claim that the decision was made after 24 May, at which time the Prince was given command.³⁶ Knighton's date is indisputably wrong, given an order of 24 April "to Robert de Eleford, steward and sheriff of Cornwaille, John de Kendale, receiver there, John de Skirbeek, and Thomas the havener" to "arrest all the wines that they can find..." and to "purvey 300 quarters of oats and 100 quarters of wheat." The order explicitly states they are to do so because the king has granted command to the prince, who "must needs be at Plymouth at the octave of Midsummer [1 July]." After amassing the supplies, the men are to see that the supplies are taken to Plymouth.³⁷

Furthermore, there is another order, dated 25 May, that instructs Thomas the

³⁵The voyage from Plymouth, one of the main English ports involved in Anglo-Gascon trading, to Bordeaux took approximately ten days. Accounting for the time it would take for a messenger to reach Plymouth, a message could reasonably reach Bordeaux in two weeks.

³⁶Knighton, *Knighton's Chronicle*, 128–29. "Post Pentecostem rex tenuit consillium apud Londonias, et misit in Vasconiam contra Francos principem Wallie..."

³⁷BPR, II, 77. The octave of midsummer, if calculated from the date of the actual midsummer solstice, gives a range of 28 June through 2 July. I have calculated the date as 1 July, using the octave of the Feast of St. John on 24 June, which corresponded with midsummer.

havener and John de Kendale to deliver a tun³⁸ of wine and 10 quarters of wheat to Sir Bartholomew de Burghersh or his attorney “as an advance towards his expenses on his arrival there [Plymouth].”³⁹ Given the distance of 269 miles (433 km) between London and Cornwall, the decision to go to war had to have been made in London before 24 May in order for the Prince’s officials in Cornwall to receive such orders on 25 May, orders that must have been given prior to that date, especially considering the orders of 24 April more than a month earlier than Knighton’s suggested date.⁴⁰

There is further evidence that the decision was certainly made no later than early May. A 21 May 1355 order to John de Delves, lieutenant of the justice of Chester, and the chamberlain of Chester, John de Brunham, commanded them “to test and array 200 of the best and most skillful” archers from the county hundreds, as the Prince, understandably enough, “wills that he be supplied before all others,”⁴¹ and the Prince’s orders specify that he is to have 700 archers.⁴² What is key here, in terms of when the decision was made, was that these orders were in response to a letter Delves and Brunham had already sent to John de Wengefeld about archers they had arrayed in Chester, which suggests an earlier order to start arraying archers. Furthermore, arrangements were already being made in May for the payment of soldiers’ advance

³⁸ I have used 'tun' to indicate the unit of volume equal to 252 gallons. To avoid confusion, I have used the British spelling, tonne, to indicate the unit of weight equivalent to 2240 lbs or 1000 kg.

³⁹BPR, II, 78.

⁴⁰Knighton, *Knighton’s Chronicle*, 128–29.

⁴¹BPR, III, 199.

⁴²TNA, E 278, f. 88; BPR, IV, 143; Cf. Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 424, who gives the figure of 2000 archers, and Knighton, *Knighton’s Chronicle*, 128–29, gives a figure of 1400 archers.

wages,⁴³ which they would receive before leaving for the muster point and use to provide for themselves while on the way to the muster point.⁴⁴ This would mean that the latest date for a decision would be early-mid April, given the time needed to send the letters and to array the initial archers.

The decision to send troops to Gascony dates to no later than 10 March, the date of the first orders to “arrest ships” to take the Earl of Warwick and unspecified others from Southampton to the duchy. All ships of thirty tuns carrying capacity⁴⁵ or more were to be arrested and mariners found for them expressly to take Warwick “and other magnates and men-at-arms” to Gascony.⁴⁶ Robert de Ledred, Walter de Harewell, and Richard de Bosevill were to search a large area (from the mouth of the Thames and throughout the liberty of the Cinque Ports which extend south to Hastings, and “in parts of Wales”⁴⁷). That and the size of the ships they were to arrest suggest that the King needed a large number of ships.⁴⁸ This in turn is indicative of the scale of the operation.

It is not clear in these orders in March if the Prince had already been appointed

⁴³BPR, III, 201.

⁴⁴Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*, 17.

⁴⁵Rymer, *Foedera* III, i, “. . . ad omnes naves portagii triginta doliorum et ultra.” Tun and ton were originally the same word and used interchangeably. It is both a unit of ship capacity and of weight. As a weight it could range from 2000–2400 lbs. However, it is possible the source means ships with a carrying capacity of 30 or more wine tuns, as the Latin in the source is ‘dolium,’ which is often used to indicate the ‘tun’ as a measuring capacity for liquids. The tun held on average 252 gallons, which was standardized in the early fifteenth century. See Ronald Edward Zupko, *A Dictionary of English Weights and Measures from Anglo-Saxon Times to the Nineteenth Century* (Madison, 1968), entries for ton and tun.

⁴⁶Rymer, *Foedera*, III, i., 297. “ac aliorum magnatum et hominum ad arma.”

⁴⁷Rymer, *Foedera*, III, i, 297. “ab ore aquae Thamisis, tam infra libertatem Quinque Portuum. . .” “in partibus Walliae.”

⁴⁸Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Military*, 152, n. 260.

the commander of the expedition, but Warwick was one of the earls who accompanied him as part of the Prince's command staff. This date, 10 March 1355, then, is the latest possible date at which the planning of the expedition could have begun, which indicates that any decision to send an expedition must have been made before 10 March, i.e., *before* Lancaster returned to London from Avignon on 28 March. Therefore, Edward III decided to send an expedition to Gascony—and the planning had advanced to the stage of arresting ships and naming commanders—prior to hearing Lancaster's personal report and prior to meeting with the papal envoys. Indeed, given that the planning of the expedition had been underway for more than month by the time Edward III met with the papal envoys, it seems clear that the English king had no intention of accepting an extension of the current truce beyond 24 June 1355.

Furthermore, Avesbury's chronicle describes the French rejection in late 1354 of Edward III's peace terms—essentially, sole sovereignty and authority over the entire duchy of Gascony, likely using its most extensive “borders,” “for himself and his heirs in perpetuity” without owing any homage to the French king.⁴⁹ This rejection, given the controversy over Edward III's homage for the duchy and past negotiations, cannot have been completely unexpected. The formal rejection of the terms occurred around Christmas (*circiter festum Nativitatis Domini*) 1354 at the papal court in Avignon,

⁴⁹Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 420–21. “...quod rex Anglorum habuisset integrum ducatum Aquitannieae sibi et heredibus suis, imperpetuum [an Anglo-Norman word with a Latin ending, meaning in perpetuity], libere et quiete, sine homagio cuiquam regi Franciae faciendo...”

following which the English ambassadors returned to England in early 1355.⁵⁰ Although Lancaster did not return to England until 28 March 1355, it is certain that Edward III knew of the failure to secure the peace terms he had put forward well before the duke's return, at which point the King could have begun his preparations.

Assuming a messenger left Avignon on 1 January 1355, he could be in London by the end of the month, if not sooner.⁵¹ The mounted *nuncii regis* and unmounted *cursores* regularly covered 30–35 miles in a day, including the regular stops to rest the horse every 10 miles.⁵² However, given that Edward III could not have entertained much hope that the French king would deem his terms anything but unreasonable and unacceptable,

⁵⁰Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 421. “Tunc, dicto episcopo Norwycensi ibidem morete praevento, ceteri nuncii Anglici, infecto negocio, in Angliam sunt reversi.”

⁵¹It is just over 700 miles overland and across the Channel from Avignon to London. Assuming a messenger changing horses could average 50 miles a day and figuring a day for the Channel crossing, it would take just over 14 days to make the trip. In 1406, Thomas Della Croce managed the journey from London to Milan in six days, averaging 100 miles each day. Mary Brayshay, “Post-haste by Post Horse?” *History Today* 42, no. 9 (1992): 35–41, at 35. This assumes an English messenger could travel through France. Although the English and French delegations did have safe conducts, there was no guarantee those would be honored. A safer route would have been overland from Avignon to Bordeaux, which would have taken several days, followed by the 10–11 day voyage to Plymouth or Southampton, then a couple days overland to London. Alternatively, a messenger could have sailed from Bordeaux directly to London, which would have been a longer sea voyage but would have eliminated the overland journey to London. Given the high volume of trade between Bordeaux and France, finding passage should have presented little difficulty. A final option would have been to travel south to Montpellier or Marseilles, then take a ship to London from there. The delegation did, in fact, dispatch a messenger to Charles of Luxembourg, and his safe arrival does suggest that an English messenger could travel through France. For another example of the speed messengers could achieve, see Bernard S. Bachrach, *Charlemagne's Early Campaigns (768–777): A Diplomatic and Military Analysis* (Leiden/Boston, 2013), 21, for the discussion of the Carolingian *tractoria*. This system of relays allowed information to travel rapidly, as a message could travel 186–205 miles (300–330km) in 24 hours in ideal conditions.

⁵²Ann Hyland, *The Horse in the Middle Ages* (Redwood, 1999), 118.

Edward III was likely already preparing for a campaign in Gascony *before* getting word that negotiations had failed to achieve anything more than an extension of the truce until June 1355.

Gascony and the War with France

Edward III was certainly thinking about Gascony in the fall of 1354. On 24 August 1354 “four books newly written [missing or no longer extant], touching the state of the duchy of Gascony, were delivered to Master Michael de Northburgh, [bishop] of London,”⁵³ the same Michael, bishop elect of London, who accompanied Lancaster and Arundel as part of the English delegation to Avignon. The books were returned to Roger de Chesterfield, a chamberlain at the Chancery, for safekeeping in January 1356.⁵⁴ The King’s yeoman, Richard English, was sent to Gascony “to further some business of [the king’s] there” in 1354.⁵⁵ The King was in regular communication with John de Stretete, the constable of Bordeaux.⁵⁶ Furthermore, the King appointed Thomas Dautre, sergent-at-arms, on 18 February 1355 to arrest three ships in Southampton “to take victuals from England to Gascony for the munition of some of the king’s castles there.”⁵⁷ This is but one example of Edward III’s efforts to supply the English castles and garrisons in Gascony; nor was he the first English king to concern himself with these matters.⁵⁸ Perhaps these ships carried John Gubby and the 120 bacon pigs and other victuals purveyed from Wiltshire and

⁵³TNA, C 54/192, m. 15d. CCR, 10, 83.

⁵⁴CPR, 10, 84. According to an email from Paul Carlyle at The National Archives, it is possible these books are still extant, perhaps among the Exchequer records, but thus far they have not been discovered or catalogued

⁵⁵TNA, C 66/244, m. 13. CPR, 10, 137.

⁵⁶TNA, C 66/242–250; TNA, C 54/192–194; TNA, C 61/66–68; TNA, C 76/32–34.

⁵⁷TNA, C 66/245, m. 24. CPR, 10, 178.

⁵⁸Prestwich, *The Three Edwards*, passim.

Southampton to “certain of [the king’s] castles” in Gascony.⁵⁹

Although this is only circumstantial evidence that the King was planning to send an expedition to Gascony as early as February 1355, it is more than suggestive as it indicates that the King was making certain that his castles in Gascony were properly supplied. Which, granted, he may have done regardless as it was in his best interest in terms of keeping the Gascons happy and in terms of maintaining English royal authority in the duchy. Clearly, though, Gascony and its military preparedness was not far from his mind at this time, which would have been the case given that he had sent legates to Avignon to negotiate the extension of the existing truce with France.

The King’s concern for the duchy’s military defenses is hardly surprising given events of 1354 in Gascony. French forces had enjoyed a series of successes that year. Under the leadership of Jean I, count of Armagnac, the French had taken Madaillan,⁶⁰ Praysas, and Aiguillon at the confluence of the Lot and Garonne rivers. Luisignan (in Poitou), “Lendin,” and other castles also were taken.⁶¹ The loss of these and other fortresses was a serious blow to English efforts to hold Gascony and to project royal authority. Several Gascon lords abandoned their allegiance to the English king, and one of the stated aims of the campaign was, indeed, the recovery of these allegiances.⁶² Others, such as the Albret (Lebret) family, remained loyal to Edward III; members had

⁵⁹TNA, C 54/193, m. 35. CCR, 10, 112. The order to purvey the pigs dates to 15 February 1355.

⁶⁰This fortress belonged to the Albreys, a key Gascon family that had significant ties to England.

⁶¹Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 293—94; A. Breuils, “Jean Ier, Comte d’Armagnac,” *Revue des Questions Historiques* LIX (1896): 48–52; Adolphe Magen *Jurades de la ville d’Agen* (Auch, 1894), 328–29.

⁶²BPR, IV, 143–45.

served in English armies, and members would serve on the Prince's campaign. It was in Edward III's best interests to demonstrate his own loyalty, that he cared about his Gascon subjects and their concerns. Therefore, Edward III knew before Lancaster's journey to the papal court in late 1354 that a military response to Armagnac's activities in Gascony was necessary. Gascony cannot have been far from Edward III's mind during the winter of 1354–1355.

Edward III was also thinking about the more general conflict with France. John de Bokenham and Robert Cursoun of Lenne, along with other merchants, were granted licenses to sell ale, flour, and malt outside of England "to any foreign parts not at enmity with the king; on condition that they find security in the port of shipment that they will not take the same to parts of enmity."⁶³ In some cases the license specifies that the merchants are to trade only with Flanders, Holland, or Zeeland, all places "in the king's friendship."⁶⁴ Regardless of whether Edward III was already planning expeditions to France, he clearly did not want France to receive goods from England, particularly goods that could help France supply its troops.

Preventing French troops from receiving English flour placed additional pressure on the ability of the French to supply their own troops, particularly in areas that had experienced *chevauchées*. Interestingly enough, the King did grant the Countess of Pembroke, whose son (b. 1347) was raised with Edward III's children and later married

⁶³TNA, C 66/244, m. 8. CPR, 10, 148.

⁶⁴TNA, C 66/244, m. 6. CPR, 10, 151.

his daughter Margaret in 1359,⁶⁵ permission in early February to stay “beyond the seas” until Martinmas (11 November) “on condition that, if war break out between the king and his adversary France” she was to return to England with all possible speed.⁶⁶ While this certainly is not direct evidence that the King was planning an expedition, it does indicate that he believed the truce with France would not last and that there would be a renewal of hostilities.

It also seems clear that Edward III was planning on renewing those hostilities himself, and, indeed, commanded an army in France in 1355. At the very least, he was not actively trying to prevent a renewal of the conflict. In January of 1355, Edward III ordered crews to be deployed on vessels that were in royal service. The orders do not specify the ships’ destinations but do suggest that the King was planning an expedition. The places that were to provide the mariners, from the mouth of the Thames to London, might suggest these men would be serving on the ships that would convey Lancaster’s troops to France, as his expedition was to sail from London.⁶⁷

Furthermore, the King also sent orders, dated 20 January 1355, to Bartholomew de Burghersh regarding horses. Specifically, Burghersh, in his position as the constable of Dover castle and as a Warden of the Cinque Ports, was to ban the sale and transport of horses outside of England. In the event that he discovered any horses thus sold illegally before the expedition(s) set sail, he was to seize the animals and record the numbers and

⁶⁵Her son John Hastings was the second earl of Pembroke and later served on campaigns with the Black Prince in Spain and as a lieutenant of Aquitaine.

⁶⁶TNA, C 66/245, m. 28. CPR, 10, 170. This issue came up again several times, and the King granted a number of extensions.

⁶⁷TNA, C 66/244, m. 4. CPR, 10, 155. For Lancaster’s expedition, see Chapter 1.

values of the horses thus seized, then send the information to chancery from time to time.⁶⁸

The King's concern with the availability of horses in England is evident. While merchants, per the orders discussed above, were allowed to export grain and other goods as long as the final destination was not France, Burghersh's orders forbade the sale of horses *anywhere* outside of England.⁶⁹ This suggests an expedition was being planned. As will be discussed below, a large number of horses would be needed for any expedition. The list of witnesses for the order to prevent the sale of horses abroad is noteworthy as it includes the mayor and bailiffs of Kyngston upon Hull, Leyne, and Southampton and the bailiffs of Boston, Sandwich, Baudeseye in Suffolk (modern Bawdsey), Shorham, Great Yarmouth, Herewich (Harwich), Ipswich, Colchester, and Dorchester;⁷⁰ all are ports and coastal towns.

These officials clearly were aware of the King's orders and likely would be the ones responsible for enforcement should similar orders be sent to their respective ports. While there is no direct contemporary evidence that these men were to make and enforce similar proclamations, it is highly unlikely that they would have witnessed this document and believed themselves to be unaffected by it. Given that Edward III went to the trouble of explicitly banning the sale and subsequent transport of horses overseas from Dover, it

⁶⁸Rymer, *Foedera*, III, i, 293. "...ne quis mercator, seu alius quicumque, aliquos equos venales, magnos vel parvos, nisi solummodo parvos equos pro equitatura sua, extra regnum nostrum Angliae...mittat vel traducat; et omnes equos venales, quos...inveneritis traducendos, capi et arestari, et custodiri..."

⁶⁹Rymer, *Foedera*, III, i, "nè quis mercator...extra regnum nostrum Angliae." It is unclear if the sale and transport of horses to Gascony was also banned.

⁷⁰Rymer, *Foedera*, III, i, 293.

is likely he intended the ban more generally—unless, of course, there was a significant problem with horse smuggling based in the port of Dover.

In addition to the ban on the export of horses, an order of 6 February 1355 called on the town of Sandwich to prevent foreigners (*peregrini*) from leaving “for foreign parts”⁷¹ via the port.⁷² Any shipmasters and mariners who provided transport faced a “heavy forfeit” (*gravi forisfactura*) unless the foreigner had “our specific command.”⁷³ While the order fails to state explicitly the reasons for this action, it is likely due to concern about foreigners either purposefully or inadvertently providing King Jean II and his military staff with information about England’s military activities, particularly in port towns. In short, Edward III obviously had some notion that the French government employed spies and cultivated informants.⁷⁴

The activity at ports, it should be remembered, would be a key indicator of an upcoming expedition because the arresting and mustering of ships, mariners, and victuals would begin long before an expedition sailed from England. Like the order to Burghersh discussed above, this latter order to prevent foreigners from leaving England had several witnesses from key ports, including men from four of five of the Cinque Ports (Dover, New Romney, Hythe, and Hastings—Sandwich is not listed), Great Yarmouth, Boston, Dartmouth, Bristol, Plymouth, Weymouth, Ipswich, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, and

⁷¹Rymer, *Foedera*, III, i. “ad partes exteras.”

⁷²Rymer, *Rymer*, III, i, 295. “quivis magister, aut marinarius, sub gravi forisfactura nostra, hujusmodi peregrinos ad easdem partes traducat...”

⁷³Ibid. “sine mandato nostro speciali.” The text does not specify the precise penalty for the mariners and the captains who transported foreigners, although imprisonment was a possibility.

⁷⁴Sumption, *Trial by Fire*, 154.

Greenwich, among others.⁷⁵ What is particularly significant about this list is that the ports represented in the list of witnesses were all involved in the arresting and mustering of ships for the upcoming expeditions to France, those led by Lancaster, the King, and the Prince.⁷⁶

Based on the above information, it seems clear that the King's decision to send troops to Gascony was made well before the council at Westminster, which met after 5 April 1355,⁷⁷ but before Lancaster returned from the failed negotiations on 28 March, and even possibly before Edward III knew officially that France had rejected his peace terms. Arguably, given that Edward III was well aware of the French position on his demands from previous negotiations it is unlikely he had any serious expectations that the French would now agree to those demands, especially in light of the success of Armagnac's encroachments on the Gascon frontier. Edward III sent Lancaster and his fellow deputies to Avignon in 1354 to negotiate a peace with France, but as he did so, the King likely was already have been looking ahead to the 1355 campaigning season.⁷⁸

Choosing a Commander

The decision to send an expedition to Gascony having thus been made, Edward III also had to appoint a commander, a choice that might have been made at the same time as the decision to send a force to Gascony or at some point after that. As discussed above, the

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Military*, 152–55, Rymer, III, i, 297–300.

⁷⁷Hewitt only commits to saying that “[c]ertain steps taken early in 1355 may perhaps foreshadow a policy not declared till April.” Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*, 4. Avesbury dates the key council meeting to “after Easter (post Pascha),” which was 5 April 1355. Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 423.

⁷⁸Given this, one does wonder if Edward III actually was interested in peace terms or merely in buying time in which to reorganize and mount an expedition.

King and Lancaster, who would have been a sound choice as he had previously led campaigns in Gascony (1345–1347),⁷⁹ were already committed to lead separate invasions of France.⁸⁰ Lancaster was given command of the arguably more significant operation in northern France. When the shortage of ships meant both forces could not sail at the same time, priority was given to Lancaster's expedition, gathered at London, and the Prince had to wait at Plymouth for sufficient shipping.⁸¹ He also had to wait on a "favorable wind...for more than forty days."⁸²

Aside from the issue of transport, it could be argued that Lancaster's campaign was more important as that expedition was entrusted to a man of considerable experience and ability, both as a military commander and a diplomat, while the Prince was relatively untried. However, the earl of Warwick, like Lancaster, was an experienced commander and soldier. As of 10 March 1355, Warwick was committed to Gascony,⁸³ and he undoubtedly could have been given command of the expedition. Perhaps Warwick was the King's original choice to lead an expedition to Gascony. It is not until April, more than a month after the ships were arrested for Warwick's passage, that there is direct

⁷⁹Incidentally, this was also part of a multi-pronged campaign with the King attacking from Flanders and the Earl of Northampton from Brittany, and 1346, of course, was the Crécy campaign and the year Lancaster (then the earl of Lancaster, as he did not become the duke of Lancaster until 1351) besieged and captured Poitiers.

⁸⁰Rogers has argued for only two campaigns and that Edward III always intended to lead the second expedition. He suggests that Lancaster was named as the commander in order to mislead French agents. While his argument for only two fleets seems reasonable, I find this claim implausible given Prestwich's work with the documentary evidence.

⁸¹Baker suggests this possibility when discussing the Prince's delay at Plymouth as caused by the wind, "the others having been supplied (*cæteris paratis*)." Baker's meaning, however, is not entirely clear.

⁸²Baker, *Chronicon*, 226. "...ventum prosperum...per amplius quam quadraginta dies."

⁸³Rymer, *Foedera*, III, i, 297.

evidence that the Prince was going to Gascony. The first orders to purvey supplies for the Prince's expedition date to 24 April, and the first orders to arrest ships for the Prince's passage to Gascony date to 27 April 1355.⁸⁴ Even if the Prince were chosen to lead the expedition at the council that met after 5 April 1355, Warwick had already been committed to going to Gascony for more than a month.

It is, however, likely that Edward III, known for his military acumen, assigned his commanders based on more than just their personal experience: He picked the commander most likely to accomplish the goals of a particular campaign, and the goals of Lancaster's expedition were different than those of the Prince's campaign. The ultimate goal of Edward III's strategy was full sovereignty over (an expanded) Gascony. But these two expeditions pursued specific objectives beyond simply pressuring the French by wreaking economic havoc. Edward III's strategic aims help explain why the Prince was given command of the expedition to southern France rather than more experienced commanders. It was also a way to provide the future king with military experience.

Edward III's objective in Gascony was the re-establishment (and re-enforcement) of English royal authority in Gascony. Successfully achieving this goal would support his claim to sole sovereignty in the duchy, as well as provide a foundation for future campaigns. To achieve his aim of possessing Gascony in full sovereignty, then, Edward III had to demonstrate his ability to project and enforce English royal power across the Channel, not only to the self-interested Gascon nobility but also to Jean II. Therefore, since the King could not lead the expedition himself, he sent his heir, the Prince of

⁸⁴Rymer, *Foedera*, III, i, 298–99. TNA, C 76/33, m. 12.

Wales, who was appointed—officially—at the council at Westminster, which met sometime after 5 April 1355.⁸⁵

This choice was not lightly made, and Edward III had clear reasons for it. One was that the Gascons themselves had requested the Prince lead such an expedition. Jean de Grailly, the Captal de Buch (d. 1376), Aguer de Montaut, lord of Mussidan, and Guillaume Sans, lord of Lesparre, led the Gascony embassy to England,⁸⁶ and these men specifically asked for the Prince to lead the English forces. According to *Le Vie du Black Prince Noir*, Jean de Grailly, the Captal de Buch, led a contingent of Gascon barons to London and requested a “*chieftaine de vostre sang*.”⁸⁷ The Prince, then, was someone whom the Gascons were willing to acknowledge as a leader and to follow, and the Prince was not unknown to them. Indeed, the Captal de Buch was a familiar figure at the English court.⁸⁸ The Prince also was a renowned and respected soldier; he had already proven himself at Crécy (1346) when he was sixteen, both to Edward III and to many of the soldiers who accompanied the Prince to Gascony in 1355.⁸⁹ He could command loyalty. Furthermore, as the Prince of Wales, he was a legitimate choice to endow with

⁸⁵Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 424. “In dicto concilio apud Westmonasterium ordinatum fuit quod dominus Edwardus...transfretaret in Vasconiam...”

⁸⁶Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 15; Green, *The Black Prince*, 53; Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 293–4.

⁸⁷Chandos Herald, *Le Vie du Black Prince Noir*, ed. Diane B. Tyson (Tübingen, 1975), 63, lines 542–43.

⁸⁸De Buch’s name appears throughout the documentary and narrative sources. For more on de Buch, see next chapter. For the most recent monograph on de Buch, see Denis Blanchard-Dignac, *Le captal de Buch: Jean de Grailly, 1331–1376* (Bordeaux, 2011).

⁸⁹Kelly DeVries, “Teenagers at War During the Middle Ages,” in *The Premodern Teenager: Youth in Society, 1150–1650*, ed. Konrad Eisenbichler, 207–23 (Toronto, 2002), at 208.

the power to represent the king and speak with the king's voice in Gascony and France.⁹⁰

Nor was the Prince's relative inexperience—as a commander not as a soldier—ignored in the choice of secondary commanders. It is no accident that the Prince's (presumably) closest advisors were both experienced and familiar to the Prince.⁹¹ Nor is it a coincidence that his staff included four earls and no fewer than ten of the original Knights of the Garter, including Jean de Grailly and other leading Gascon nobles. The careful selection of advisors suggests not only that Edward III wanted to make sure that his son was advised ably but also that the King wanted to do whatever he could to ensure the success of this expedition.⁹² This perhaps also helps explain the early orders for ships for the earl of Warwick. It is possible that Warwick and his retinue sailed for Gascony prior to the Prince's departure in order to prepare for the arrival of the Prince's troops. Warwick did, in fact, serve as the constable of the army and led the vanguard when the army left Bordeaux.⁹³ Warwick and Robert Ufford, first earl of Suffolk (1298–1369), did

⁹⁰The indenture between the Prince and Edward III explicitly states “as if the king were there in person” and grants the Prince broad authority to make truces, accept homages, pass judgment, and punish rebels, all of which is in keeping with Edward III's goals. For more about the sources of the Prince's authority, see my article, “Symbols and Soldiers: English Royal Authority in Gascony, 1355–1356,” in *Authorities in the Middle Ages: Influence, Legitimacy, and Power in Medieval Society*, Fundamentals of Medieval and Early Modern Culture 12, ed. Sini Kangas, Mia Korpiola, and Tuija Ainonen, 267–83 (Berlin, 2013). For the Anglo-Norman text of the indenture, see Mollie M. Madden, “The Indenture between Edward III and the Black Prince for the Prince's Expedition to Gascony, 10 July 1355.” *Journal of Medieval Military History* XII (2014): 165–71.

⁹¹The earl of Warwick, for example, had been the Prince's mentor on the Crécy campaign. See Baker's descriptions of the Crécy campaign for the list of men who served with and under the Prince in 1346. Many of them are the same men who served in 1355–56. See also David Green's work on the Prince's retinue.

⁹²Like the small raids the Prince led during the Crécy campaign, this expedition also was a learning experience.

⁹³Baker, *Chronicon*, 230.

leave from Southampton, rather than Plymouth, and while it is unclear which part of the army departed first for Bordeaux, it is clear that the Prince's expedition was meant to absorb Warwick's force.⁹⁴

Money

The *chevauchée* required a great deal of money to organize and finance, and once the decision to send an expedition to Gascony became official at the council there was a flurry of financial activity. The Prince, like his soldiers, was "paid advance war wages and reward for himself and the men of his own retinue for half a year," with more advances promised if the king "wishe[d] the prince to stay longer in those parts."⁹⁵ The Prince's wages and "regard" (bonus) came to 8129*l* 18*s*.⁹⁶ The four earls also received considerable sums. The wages and regard for the Prince and the earls ran to nearly 14,500*l*. The Prince's treasurer also distributed advances and wages and paid for supplies and victuals. Before the expedition had even sailed for France, Peter de Lacy, the Prince's receiver-general, had *already* paid more than 7242*l* ¼*d* "for the fees and wages of divers knights and men-at-arms retained for the prince's expedition to Gascony, as well as for victuals and other items needed for the expedition."⁹⁷ This required a flow of ready cash, which meant the Prince had to find ways to raise it, in addition to that provided by the King.

One source of money was the Prince's own resources, which, however, were insufficient for his needs. His wardrobe accounts *should* have been well-organized,

⁹⁴Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*, 22.

⁹⁵TNA, E 36/278, f. 88r. BPR, IV, 144.

⁹⁶TNA, E 403/377, m. 29.

⁹⁷BPR, IV, 156.

considering that Gervase de Wilford, Hugh de Colewik, Nicholas Pynnok, and William de Sridlyngton were commissioned in late November 1354 to audit William de Northwell's accounts as keeper of the Prince's wardrobe and the "treasurer of the household" "for the whole duration of his keepership."⁹⁸ The accounts of Peter de Lacy, the Prince's receiver-general in London, were also audited in late November and early December of 1354.⁹⁹ Granted, these audits are not evidence of campaign planning as early as November 1354, but they do suggest that, when the decision was made to send the expedition to Gascony, the Prince—or at least his administrators—had a relatively good idea as to his available funds and the state of his financial affairs¹⁰⁰—and his need for additional money. It cannot have escaped their notice that he was in debt, that of the 422*l* expected from North Wales in the spring 300*l* was assigned to pay France Bochel, merchant of London, Thomas Perle of London, and William Orleton, merchant of Lodelow, with the remainder to pay the wages of John de Wengefeld.¹⁰¹ These funds, then, were not available to finance the Prince's military preparations.

Given the known state of the Prince's finances, it was patently obvious that he needed more money. Master John de Brunham, chamberlain of Chester, was to bring with him to London "as much as he can get of the moneys assigned for the prince's household and the works of Kenyngton, retaining the moneys assigned for the prince's

⁹⁸BPR, IV, 120.

⁹⁹BPR, IV, 121.

¹⁰⁰Hewitt argues that the Prince's finances were unstable. Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*, 25. He had many debts, had recently given lavish gifts, and enjoyed dice. Creditors were understandably concerned about the possibility of the Prince's death in France.

¹⁰¹BPR, IV, 130, 132.

chamber and wardrobe for making the payments of fees to the knights and esquires...and for buying cloth for the prince's archers."¹⁰² This tells us that the money for paying soldiers and providing livery to archers was to come from specific accounts and that the Prince, in London, needed money. The wages of archers from Chester and Flint, as well as the wages of their captains, came "out of the common fine of Cheshire [the fine imposed on Chester as a result of the aborted 1353 rising] and the subsidy of the county of Flynt [a grant of 1000 marks (666.67L) made to the Prince by the county of Flint in 1353]."¹⁰³

As of 4 September, the Prince's auditors had informed him of the funds available from all of his lordships: 1338*l* 8*s* 2.5*d* from Chester; 1093*l* 13*s* 10.5*d* from South Wales; and 587*l* 16*s* 5*d* from North Wales.¹⁰⁴ The total funds the Prince could hope to levy from his holdings, then, came to 3,019*l* 18*s* 6*d*. While this is a not insignificant sum, assuming it was levied in full and in a timely fashion, it would be insufficient to meet the financial needs of the Prince's expedition—especially considering the initial outlay for shipping and advance wages. According to Henxteworth's financial accounts of the campaign, the "sum of the issue" regularly came to more than 100*l* per week. Over the course of the eight week campaign, Henxteworth paid out 1650*l* 16*s* 9*d* and an additional 2006*l* 6*s* 9.9*d* upon the conclusion of the expedition, for a final sum of 3657*l* 3*s* 6.9*d*. The Prince's personal resources alone could not cover these expenditures, let alone the total cost of the

¹⁰²BPR, III, 201. The Cheshire archers wore green and white livery. BPR, III, 204.

¹⁰³BPR, III, 204. In 1353 there was the threat of a rising in Chester. The Prince averted it through a show of force. Heavy fines followed. See BPR, III, 137, 140, and 162 for other entries related to the subsidy of Flint.

¹⁰⁴BPR, III, 214-5.

campaign. During the expedition, the Prince received several large loans totaling 1638*l* 1*s* 9*d* from John de Stretle, the Constable of Bordeaux.¹⁰⁵

Another source of money was the King and grants made expressly to the Prince of moneys that usually would have gone to the King. For example, the King on 21 June “granted...to the prince...all the issues [fines], amercements [a penalty or fine assessed at the discretion of the court] and other profits of the last sessions in Cornewaille which pertain to the king,” and Robert de Eleford was ordered to levy the funds with all haste on 8 July 1355. It was the same for Devonshire.¹⁰⁶ The Prince, as we know, had not yet arrived in Plymouth, and he was in need of funds, especially as it became clearer that the army would be in Plymouth for some time and would need to be supplied for the duration (see below).

The Prince also received money “of the king’s gift” from the previous sessions of the justices of trailbaston [travelling tribunals appointed to suppress violence by brigands and local disorder] in Cornwall. Some of this money was used to pay for purveyance [provisioning] at Plymouth. By 7 September the cost of purveyance of victuals for the Prince’s household, which numbered more than 250 in 1369,¹⁰⁷ not the entire force, had

¹⁰⁵Henxteworth, *passim*. These seem to be personal loans, as Henxteworth differentiates loans from Stretle and loans from the treasurer, which came to 2058*l* 3*s* 8*d*. The Prince also received a number of small personal loans from individual soldiers, such as Sir William Peykirke who leant the Prince 9*l* during the campaign. (DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 14 January 1356, which records the repayment of the loan).

¹⁰⁶TNA, C 66/246, m. 20; BPR, II, 79; CPR, 10, 251.

¹⁰⁷David Green, *Edward the Black Prince: Power in Medieval Europe* (Harlow, 2007), 129. This figure is more than twenty years after the 1355 expedition and dates to the Prince’s tenure as Prince of Aquitaine, which began in 1362. He and his spouse resided in Gascony and had an established household. It is likely his household was smaller in

reached a sum greater than 1000*l*, and the Prince also contacted the chamberlain of South Wales for an additional 400*l* to help pay for it.¹⁰⁸ As further recognition of the Prince's unusual expenses, he received another 1000 marks (666.67*l*) yearly, which would be taken out of the customs of London.¹⁰⁹ This grant recognized that the earl of Salisbury received a grant of 1000 marks (666.67*l*) yearly from Cornwall, money that would not then be available to the Prince.¹¹⁰

The Prince also found money from other sources. For example, Robert de Eleford, steward and sheriff of Cornwall, was ordered on 8 March 1355 “to join with the prince's havener [harbor master] in selling the said wines [seized from a ship in Plymouth in February 1355], as the prince has learned that the wines in those parts are now dearer than they had been, to wit, 10 marks [6.67*l*] the tun.” This order was made on the advice of John de Wengefeld, the Prince's bachelor,¹¹¹ who was “chief of the Prince's council under the earl of Suffolk”¹¹² in 1351 and later described as the “governor of [the Prince's] affairs” in 1358.¹¹³ A later order to Thomas Filz Henry, the havener, of 28 March instructed him “to sell the said wines quickly at as high a price and in as profitable a manner as possible,” despite a decline in the market price.¹¹⁴ This could suggest that the

1355. It was not yet firmly established, and not every member of the household accompanied the Prince on the expedition.

¹⁰⁸BPR, II, 86.

¹⁰⁹TNA, C 66/246, m. 18; CPR, 10, 255.

¹¹⁰TNA, C 54/193, m. 12; CCR, X, 154.

¹¹¹A bachelor was a man who had been knighted but did not have his own banner, thus he was not a banneret.

¹¹²BPR, IV, 31.

¹¹³BPR, IV, 263. For more about Wengefeld's importance and role in the Prince's affairs, see below.

¹¹⁴BPR, II, 77.

Prince needed to raise cash, possibly to help fund the expedition to Gascony. Other revenue options included pressing for the repayment of debts, such as the 500*l* owed by Sir Thomas Wogan and the approximately 250*l* owed by the countess of Hainault, which might provide a nice sum but would have been insufficient to meet his pressing and extraordinary needs.¹¹⁵

The Prince also needed money to use abroad, and this is why the merchant Cenobe du Chastel was appointed on 27 June 1355 “to buy gold of all sorts for the prince’s use, both for convenience of carriage of the prince’s moneys during this expedition and also for the prince’s profit in making payments beyond seas.”¹¹⁶ This means the Prince would be carrying cash with him and would be accompanied by the necessary accountants and treasurers to keep track of it. The Prince’s yeoman, John Henxteworth was assigned to this ‘department.’ Based on his careful accounts Henxteworth was more than capable.¹¹⁷ Wages had to be paid during the expedition; supplies had to be purchased.

Furthermore, the final reason for Chastel’s appointment, “making payments beyond seas,” certainly could refer to wages and purchases but more likely refers to other types of payments, namely financial incentives to potential allies or to those Gascons

¹¹⁵See, for example, BPR, IV, 139 and 143 regarding the repayment of a loan made to the Countess of Hainault, the Prince’s aunt.

¹¹⁶BPR, IV, 134.

¹¹⁷Henxteworth’s accounts and abilities will be discussed further in this and later chapters. He was an able, efficient, and meticulous cashier for the duration of the campaign.

would need to be ‘encouraged’ to return to their loyalty to England.¹¹⁸ Furthermore, the indenture [contract for military service] between Edward III and the Prince addressed this concern, stating that the Prince would be taking money with him “sufficient for the conciliation of the people of the country and such other purposes as he shall think proper for the king’s profit.”¹¹⁹ This suggests that Edward III’s purpose in sending this expedition to Gascony was more than the destruction of an enemy’s resources, although that was certainly part of it. It indicates that the King and the Prince were committed to the aims of the campaign: restoring English royal authority in Gascony.

The Prince, of course, was not the only one who needed money. Those who accompanied him also had to find the funds to pay for their equipment and retainers. For example, John de Sancto Philberto requested, and was granted, permission to “alienate in fee his manor...to the man or men who will provide for him a certain sum of money to fit him out to go to Gascony...”¹²⁰ for up to two years after his death to raise the loan to pay for equipping himself for the expedition to Gascony.¹²¹ Essentially, then, John de St. Philbert could transfer the “ownership” of his manor in exchange for the money he needed to outfit himself for the campaign.¹²²

Supplies

Transport Costs

¹¹⁸Henxteworth did make cash payments to a few Gascon nobles who changed their allegiance to Edward III. DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 24 and 30 June 1356.

¹¹⁹TNA, E 278, f. 88. BPR, IV, 144. “...sufficeaunte p\ur/ conforter les gentz du pais *et* p\ur/ autres choses qil verra *que* soit affaire p\ur/ profit le Roi...”

¹²⁰CPR, 10, 224.

¹²¹CPR, 10, 303.

¹²²For discussion on alienation of property, see Susan Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals: the medieval evidence reinterpreted* (Oxford, 2001), 379–84 for England.

Supplies, of course, had to be transported to Plymouth from the English countryside, and the least expensive way to do so was water transport.¹²³ The receiver [an official charged with receiving rents, tolls, and other monies; similar to a treasurer] and havener of Cornwall were both familiar with using the rivers and sea to transport supplies. For example, an 11 September 1354 order commanded John de Kendale (receiver) and Thomas (havener) to hire “carriage by sea as far as Suthampton [sic.] for the venison [and] fish... which the prince has at Rostormel [sic.]”¹²⁴ As Restormel Castle is on the River Fowey, the most logical course of action given the comparatively high cost of overland transport would have been to send the supplies to the coast via river transport, then transfer them to another ship for the journey to Southampton. This transshipping, according to James Masschaele, was common. Based on his study of the shrieval purveyance accounts, which record transport costs with varying degrees of specificity, Masschaele concludes that overland transport cost 1.5*d* per ton-mile, river transport cost 0.7*d* per ton-mile, and sea transport cost between 0.2*d* per ton-mile (coastal transport) and 0.3*d* per ton-mile (to the continent). The ratio, then, of the costs of land transport : river transport : sea transport is approximately 8 : 4 : 1.¹²⁵

This was a common procedure, as shown in John Langdon’s article on the inland waterways, which demonstrates the frequency with which sheriffs and purveyors shipped

¹²³A. Burford, “Heavy Transport in Classical Antiquity,” *Economic History Review*, New Series 13, no. 1 (1960): 1–18; Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army*, 26–27.

¹²⁴BPR, II, 68–9.

¹²⁵James Masschaele, “Transport Costs in Medieval England,” *Economic History Review*, New Series 46, no. 2 (1993): 266–79, at 271–73. The ‘standard rate’ of pay was 14*d* per day per cart, although some sheriffs did pay 18*d* per day per cart.

supplies to the coast via river transport, then along the coast to another port where the supplies were loaded onto a sea-going vessel.¹²⁶ This order is further evidence that an organized supply and or trade route existed which the Prince's purveyors could use in 1355.¹²⁷ In particular, the use of inland waterways in purveyance was "exceedingly complex,"¹²⁸ and it was typical for the sheriffs charged with the purveyance of supplies and carriage of same to use a combination of land and water transport. Typically, the supplies would be transported overland to a depot near water, where it was loaded onto suitable river transports and shipped to the coast. Upon reaching the coast, the supplies either were loaded onto a sea-going vessel for transport to the ultimate destination or taken along the coast in a smaller ship to the final port.¹²⁹

The Prince's retinue mustered at Plymouth, a port town, not simply because it needed a port from which to sail but precisely because of the ease with which supplies could be brought to the assembled army, an advantage that became quite clear as the army remained at Plymouth some weeks past its scheduled departure. Without the option of resupply from the sea and the high cost of land transport, the army would have

¹²⁶John Langdon, "The Efficiency of Inland Water Transport in medieval England," in *Waterways and Canal Building in Medieval England*, ed. John Blair, 110–30 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 112, 117–19. River transport was capable of shipping loads of less than 25 quarters (7047.6 lbs) to more than 100 quarters (21,190.4 lbs).

¹²⁷The necessary coastal infrastructure had existed for some time, given that Restormel Castle dated to the Norman period and given that the castles in Wales depended on resupply by sea as recently as Edward I's reign. Peter Brears, "Food Supply and Preparation at the Edwardian Castles," in *The Impact of the Edwardian Castles in Wales*, ed. Diane M. Williams and John R. Kenyon, 85–98 (Oxford, 2010), 85.

¹²⁸Langdon, "The Efficiency of Inland Water Transport in medieval England," 129.

¹²⁹Masschaele, "Transport Costs in Medieval England," 267.

stripped the surrounding area of available resources long before its eventual departure.¹³⁰ Furthermore, these resources must have been stored from the previous harvest, as the 1355 harvest would not have been gathered in July.

Supplies also came from diverse sources. For example, the mayor of Dartmouth and the water-bailiffs [port officer responsible for enforcing shipping regulations, collecting customs, and searching ships] arrested the cog [a one-masted ship, see below], *Le Escluse*, supposedly laden with wheat. Once it was clear it held “wares of divers merchants,” the ship was released on condition that it unload those wares nowhere “within the power of France or elsewhere for the succour of the enemies of the king and the prince.”¹³¹ This incident also shows the concern with keeping supplies away from France.

In England, comestible supplies were generally purchased, and fairs and markets in the designated area were regularly cancelled in advance of purveyance to ensure an ample supply of goods for the king’s use.¹³² Without the fairs and markets, farmers and merchants had little choice but to sell to the royal purveyors. Richard Gerounde and Walter de Wyght were to be paid 7*l* 22*d* and 19*l* 16*s* respectively “for wheat purchased for [the Prince’s] expedition to Gascony.” The purchases were made before 6 September,

¹³⁰See Engels, 45–47, for examples of this on Alexander’s campaigns; Douglass Southall Freeman, *Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command*, vol. 3 (New York, 1944), 20–189, for his explanation of how supplies affected General Lee’s decisions at Gettysburg in 1863.

¹³¹BPR, II, 80. It should be noted, too, that the system was plagued by corruption. See, for example, CPR, X, 161 for an actual complaint. See also the works by Ilana Krug, cited below.

¹³²Ilana Krug, “Royal Prerogative Gone Astray: The Social and Economic Impact of Purveyance of the English Peasantry at the Beginning of the Hundred Years War (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2006), iii–iv.

when Peter de Lacy, the Prince's clerk, was ordered to pay their bill.¹³³ Payment, of course, could take time. John son of John Rous of Northflete was still waiting in February 1356 for his 33s 4d for beans and peas purchased before the Prince's fleet left Plymouth.¹³⁴ That said, it seems that there was an effort to ensure timely payment. On 7 September, shortly before the fleet sailed, the Prince ordered that "speedy payment be made for the victuals which he has taken for the expenses of his household at Plympton [Plympton Priory was about 4–5 miles from Plymouth]...up to the sum of 1067l 8s 11 ¾d, which is the extent of the purveyance, as more fully appears by...an indenture containing respectively the names of persons, the particulars, and the amounts of the said purveyance..."¹³⁵ The indenture was included with the order. The Prince's chamberlain of South Wales received his own orders, namely to provide 400l to help pay the bills.¹³⁶

Clearly, a large amount of supplies was needed. More than one hundred pigs had already been shipped from Southampton to Gascony, although those pigs were officially for provisioning castles.¹³⁷ In March, the sheriff of Southampton received orders to arrest threshers [workers to separate the grain and straw, usually by using a flail] "for threshing the wheat bought and purveyed...for provisioning the king's towns and castles in Gascony," and to pay them the King's wages, and arrange transport.¹³⁸ The transport of

¹³³BPR, IV, 153.

¹³⁴BPR, IV, 180. Rous had his tally and had the support of Sir Ives de Clynton, who was willing to pay the sum in the event it was not reimbursed by the Prince's staff. The document states only that the food was purchased for the Prince's expedition to Gascony and does not give a specific date.

¹³⁵BPR, II, 86.

¹³⁶BPR, II 86.

¹³⁷TNA, C 54/193, m. 35. CCR, X, 112.

¹³⁸TNA, C 54/193, m. 32. CCR, X, 118.

wheat from England to Gascony was a regular feature of Anglo-Gascon trade—the Gascons shipped wine, but this shows the machinery of purveyance in action. Clearly, purveying the wheat, itself, was not enough. It had to be threshed, then transported. While this wheat was not meant for the Prince’s army—at least not as of 1 March—it illustrates the method by which the Prince’s army would be supplied. As of 14 April no wheat was to be taken out of England except to Calais, i.e., not for Gascony or for selling abroad.¹³⁹

The purveyance procedure was already well established by Edward III’s reign. He made one significant adaptation, the shift to the use of royal clerks to oversee the process in 1336. Each clerk or official was responsible for a county or number of counties in England.¹⁴⁰ In many cases, though, the sheriff continued to be charged with purveyance. Whether the sheriff worked alone or in collaboration with the official royal purveyor, he remained an integral part of the administration of purveyance as had been the case from the Norman and Angevin periods.¹⁴¹ The sheriffs and their bailiffs acquired the goods and arranged transport; upon reaching the depot or port, the official responsible for receiving the supplies (the receiver) recorded the supplies in his accounts. All the officials—purveyors, sheriffs, and receivers—kept meticulous accounts, which were subject to auditing by the royal government. Purveyance took an average of five to ten

¹³⁹TNA, C 54/193, m. 28v. CCR, X, 190.

¹⁴⁰Krug, “Royal Prerogative,” 103–11.

¹⁴¹Krug, “Royal Prerogative,” 103–11.

months and was widely dispersed throughout England.¹⁴²

The purveyance for the Prince's expedition followed similar lines. Orders were sent to officials in Cornwall, typically the sheriff and steward, John de Kendale, the receiver John de Skirbeek, and the havener Thomas. The purveyance began in April and the army sailed from Plymouth in late September, which allowed the purveyors just over five months to complete their task. That said, if the expedition had sailed as planned, the purveyors would have had only four months in which to gather adequate supplies. This would be slightly below the average but still achievable.

As an example of the purveyance in action, in April, officials in Cornwall received orders to purvey oats (300 quarters),¹⁴³ wheat (100 quarters), and brushwood (presumably for fuel), as well as to stop selling the wine and instead preserve it for the expedition.¹⁴⁴ The quarter equaled eight bushels or sixty-four gallons.¹⁴⁵ This one order, then, amounted to 2400 bushels of oats and 800 bushels of wheat, or 84,571.2 lbs and 28,190.4 lbs respectively.¹⁴⁶ The oats would provide the daily allotment of grain for 8457 horses or two days' rations for 4228 horses. In other terms, the oats thus purveyed

¹⁴²Krug, "Royal Prerogative," 103–11. See also, Prestwich, *War, Politics, and Finance under Edward I*; and John Robert Maddicott, *The English Peasantry and the Demands of the Crown, 1294–1341* (Oxford, 1975).

¹⁴³A "quarter" was equivalent to eight bushels of wheat; one bushel of wheat was defined as eight gallons of wine and customarily weighed 64 tower lbs. Zupko, *English Weights and Measures*, entry for "quarter".

¹⁴⁴BPR, II 77.

¹⁴⁵TNA, 54/193, m. 12d; CCR, X, 226. See Zupko, *English Weights and Measures*, entries for "quarter" and "bushel." By comparison, in the US, the legal standard for wheat is 60lbs per bushel. My calculations are based on the English Winchester bushel standard of 35.238 lbs.

¹⁴⁶The US standard for oats is 32lbs per bushel. I have used the Winchester bushel weight of 35.238 lbs in my calculations.

would provide the grain ration for between 750 and 800 horses for the voyage to Bordeaux at maximum rations, although the horses could survive on less as they were hardly working aboard the ships. While these initially seem like large amounts of grain, when subjected to the ineluctable reality of the horses' daily needs, this purveyance would barely dent the overall needs of the army. Clearly, a great deal more would be needed. All these supplies were to be amassed near Plymouth.¹⁴⁷

Wine was another key component of the purveyance, and Edward III, like English kings before him, interfered by setting prices. Enterprising wine owners, "seeing the need of those about to set out" had raised prices after the expedition became public knowledge. In response, in June, Edward III sent his butler, Henry Picard, and the mayor and sheriffs of London to inspect all cellars and enroll the wine in lists; then, they were to take the wine from the vintners and taverns and deliver it "to the magnates and other lieges about to set out." The vintners and tavern keepers were to receive the earlier, lower price. Should the amount of wine thus purveyed prove insufficient, Picard, the mayor, and the sheriffs were to use their lists and take the wine "beyond [the individual owners'] own moderate and necessary consumption" from individual owners so that

¹⁴⁷BPR, II, 77. This assumes an average daily requirement of 10lbs of grain per horse. Professional Papers, No. 29. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. Fourth (Revised) Edition, with Addenda. Engineer Field Manual, Pts. 1–4. Prepared under direction of Brig. General A. MacKenzie, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1912. War Department Document 355 indicates 9.5lbs of grain per animal (428). The 2000 FM-31–27 (Pack Animals in Support of Army Special Operations Forces) indicates a range of requirements based on feeding weight but with an average requirement of 10lbs per day. See FM-31-27, section 2-33 and table 2-3. Yuval Harari gives a figure of 10kg (22lbs) of dry fodder (grain and hay) as the daily ration per horse. Harari, "Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion Campaigns," 305. See also Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army*, 18.

departures would not be delayed.¹⁴⁸ Edward III also ordained that a gallon of Gascon wine should sell at the same price in Bristol as in London regardless of the additional transport costs.¹⁴⁹ The wine in this case was for consumption on board the ships, not for resale in Gascony.

Incomestible supplies were also needed. The Prince had “divers saddles...made...for his expedition to Gascony,” and Lambekyn, a saddler identified as “of Almain,” was paid 13*l* 6*s* 8*d* on 28 June as an advance for his work.¹⁵⁰ Clearly, saddles were costly items, and the Prince needed more than one. This perhaps indicates the reality of wear-and-tear on equipment, which would be a natural consequence of the rigors of campaigning; repairs could take time, and the Prince likely had different saddles for riding and for battle.¹⁵¹ Armor was another key item that was in high demand, and the armorers of London knew it—and raised their prices accordingly. In much the same manner as with the wine, Edward III sent men to examine all the armor in the city and suburbs, to appraise it, “and to cause it to be sold to the magnates and other lieges...for a reasonable price.”¹⁵² As with the wine, anyone trying to hide armor would forfeit the said item.¹⁵³

Another key item was equipment for the archers. A 6 September order to Peter de Lacy, keeper of the great wardrobe, commanded him “to purvey for the prince’s use 400

¹⁴⁸TNA, C 54/193, m. 25. CCR, X, 134.

¹⁴⁹TNA, C 54/193, m. 25v. CCR, X, 196.

¹⁵⁰BPR, IV, 152.

¹⁵¹Piotr A. Nowakowski, “Remarks on the Construction, Evolution and Use of the War Saddle in Late Medieval Poland,” *Fasciculi Archaeologiae Historicae* 21 (2008): 61–73.

¹⁵²TNA, C 54/196, m. 24. CCR, X, 134.

¹⁵³TNA, C 54/196, m. 24. CCR, X, 134.

bows and 1000 sheaves of arrows [traditionally, there are 144 arrows to a sheaf], or as many as possible up to that number, and deliver them to the prince's yeoman...by indenture."¹⁵⁴ This order acknowledges the necessity of additional equipment, and it indicates that the expedition would have a sizeable supply train (discussed in chapter 5). The use of the indenture suggests the importance of these items. There are indentures for the purveyance and delivery of wheat, just as there are indentures for jewels and gold...and bows and arrows. It appears that the requested bows and arrows were delivered as of 5 September 1355, when the Prince ordered the auditors of his accounts to reimburse de Lacy.¹⁵⁵

Aside from these supplies, the Prince needed a few specialized items. Foremost among these was the new seal made for the Prince's use in Gascony. It was made by John Grenewich, goldsmith, and was equal in weight to 37s 1d. The Prince paid 4l 17s 1d for it.¹⁵⁶ Unfortunately, it is unclear whether this is a new seal for the Prince to replace an existing one or if this is a copy of the King's seal for the Prince's use in Gascony. Per the indenture between the King and the Prince, the latter was to "have full power under the king's great seal."¹⁵⁷ It is tempting to speculate about the appearance of this new seal, but the Prince's register fails to provide any particulars. Silk cord was purchased "for letters patent made in the King's Chancery on behalf of the Prince

¹⁵⁴BPR, IV, 153.

¹⁵⁵BPR, IV, 169.

¹⁵⁶BPR, IV, 166.

¹⁵⁷BPR, IV, 144.

touching his expedition to Gascony.”¹⁵⁸

The Prince took care to make sure his captains also were supplied. Consider the 25 May orders (discussed above) concerning the purveyance of wine and wheat for Bartholomew de Burghersh and assistance with the carriage of said supplies to Plymouth.¹⁵⁹ Henry de Blakebourn, clerk and treasurer of the Prince’s household, was to make sure that the earl of Oxford, John Willoughby, and Bartholomew de Burghersh received their wine.¹⁶⁰ The Prince’s generosity extended to other items, too. The steward of the household, Edmund de Wauncy, received a bascinet [helmet] as a gift.¹⁶¹ His indenture with the king also specified compensation for lost horses.¹⁶² This was a key point, as the cost of horses was not inconsiderable.¹⁶³

The Prince’s archers from Chester received livery (white and green cloth for coats and hats), and the Cheshire archers also received advance pay (6*d* per day for twenty-one days) to cover the expenses of their journey to Plymouth.¹⁶⁴ The Welsh archers, too, received an advance, but it was considerably smaller (3*d* per day for ten days) than that of

¹⁵⁸BPR, IV, 167. These letters are likely the ones read out in Bordeaux at the cathedral of St. Andrew.

¹⁵⁹BPR, II, 78.

¹⁶⁰BPR, IV, 148-9. Oxford received 2 tuns, Burghersh two tuns and a pipe, and Willoughby one tun.

¹⁶¹BPR, IV, 149.

¹⁶²BPR, IV, 144.

¹⁶³See Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, passim. His data show that the appraised value of warhorses lost on campaigns in the 1330s and 1340 ranged from 100s (5L) at the low end for an “equus” to 100L at the high end for a destrier; the value of a courser ranged from 30L–50L. See Ayton, 237–40 for his tables.

¹⁶⁴BPR, III, 201, 204. The chamberlain of Chester was to pay the archers before the octave of Midsummer.

the Cheshiremen, and the Welsh troops had farther to travel.¹⁶⁵ Nor were the archers the only members of the expedition that received help with outfitting themselves for the campaign. The Prince spent more than 250*l* for “divers officers of the household...towards their outfit.”¹⁶⁶ Two Friars Preachers, possibly serving as chaplains, also received money (7*l* 6*s* 8*d*) “towards their preparations for the voyage.”¹⁶⁷

All in all, the machinery of purveyance and recruitment seems to have functioned without undue difficulties, as there is no evidence of failure in the records.¹⁶⁸ The purveyors’ efficiency, though, ran up against the long delay in Plymouth—more than forty days according to Baker¹⁶⁹—and additional supplies were needed. The Prince owed Ralph de Midway and Thomas Waryn for twenty quarters and seventeen and a half quarters of wheat, respectively, purchases that were made for the Prince’s household while at Plymouth. Incidentally, they were to be paid in part from the money raised from the last trailbaston session in Cornwall and Devonshire.¹⁷⁰

There is no suggestion in the sources that the army went hungry at Plymouth or ran out of comestibles during the sea voyage, suggesting that the purveyors were able to acquire the additional supplies needed not only for the extended stay at Plymouth but also for the journey to Bordeaux. Their successful handling of the problem is further testimony to their efficiency and England’s economic strength. The ability of the military

¹⁶⁵BPR, III, 204 and 491.

¹⁶⁶BPR, IV, 166–67.

¹⁶⁷BPR, IV, 167.

¹⁶⁸See Krug, “Royal Prerogative Gone Astray,” and Krug, “Peasants and Purveyance at the Beginning of the Hundred Years War.”

¹⁶⁹Baker, *Chronicon*, 226.

¹⁷⁰BPR, II, 83.

purveyors to adapt to the delay also indicates the importance of the weather and the need for adequate shipping,¹⁷¹ as the need for additional supplies was a result not of shortcomings on the part of the purveyors but of a decided lack of shipping and adverse weather.

The delay also exposed the expedition to another danger: attack. In July, the King learned that French “galleys and ships in no small multitude” were sailing for England “to burn and destroy his [Edward III] shipping...” Ports received orders to protect ships by bringing the ships as near to land as possible and make certain that any vessels leaving port were “well and sufficiently furnished,” as well as to take steps to safeguard the town and shipping districts. Southampton and Plymouth figured prominently in the list of ports thus addressed. These included: Southampton, Portsmouth, Hastings, Shorham, Peiveseye, Chichester, Melcombe, Weymouth, la Pole, Lyme, Warham, Toppesham, Exeter, Plymouth, Dartmouth, Exmouth, Fowy, Barnestaple, and Sidemouth.¹⁷²

Ships

Clearly, the Prince needed ships capable of transporting him and his army—and all of the equipment and victuals that were not in Aquitaine—to Bordeaux. The English had significant experience at cross-Channel transport, and Edward III and his advisors clearly understood the complexities of raising and victualling a fleet.¹⁷³ Those charged with the task were administrators well-versed in their duties and procedures, and the “complexities

¹⁷¹Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*.

¹⁷²TNA, C 54/193, m. 17v. CCR, X, 214–15.

¹⁷³Craig Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Military: English Maritime Logistics in the Fourteenth Century* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2011), 6.

of the bureaucratic procedures involved in raising a fleet... show that the Edwardian kings and their advisors had a firm grasp of the advantages to be gained through careful management of the kingdom's maritime resources and by the deployment of fleets."¹⁷⁴

And well they should, as it often required mobilizing more manpower—and funds—than raising land forces and was a key part of the supply systems on which land-based troops depended, and “the logistical capabilities of the English merchant fleet were paramount to any successful campaign... in enemy territory.”¹⁷⁵ One reason for their success was the continuity in administrative personnel and the knowledge of experienced clerks, although in the 1350s through the 1370s there was less continuity as the bureaucratic tasks were carried out by sergeants-at-arms appointed on an ad hoc basis instead of professional clerks.¹⁷⁶

England's Shipping Experience

Naval forces were, obviously, fundamental for cross-Channel warfare, and England's ability to transport and supply troops was a crucial part of the English successes during the Hundred Years War. Ships were necessary for Edward III to maintain a trans-marine kingdom in peace time, and the naval conflict during his reign was part of an ongoing pattern dating at least to the reign of Edward I (1239–1307) and likely earlier.¹⁷⁷ England had had to transport soldiers, horses, supplies, war machines and support personnel for

¹⁷⁴Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Military*, 6.

¹⁷⁵Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Military*, 2 and 9.

¹⁷⁶Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Military*, 25 and 31.

¹⁷⁷Timothy J. Runyan, “Ships and Fleets in Anglo-French Warfare, 1337–1360,” *The American Neptune* 40, no. 2 (Spring 1986): 91–99, at p. 91.

more than a century, and ships provided both convoy escorts and logistical support.¹⁷⁸

Ships were not used to fight naval battles (with a few exceptions, such as Sluys in 1340),

but to carry soldiers and supplies for planned expeditions or to resupply campaigns or

sieges already in progress.¹⁷⁹ Edward III's 1337 claim to the French throne did not

change this pattern; rather, it increased the importance of control of the English

Channel¹⁸⁰ and English shipping. Thanks to the victory at Sluys, Edward III had "firmer

control of the North Sea and English Channel,"¹⁸¹ which was a central component of his

continental strategy.¹⁸² If nothing else, it enabled the (relatively) unhindered

transportation of English armies to the Continent.

There were three main types of sea-going vessels during the early phases of the Hundred Years War: small sailing vessels, oared boats, and large ships of up to 250 tuns

carrying capacity,¹⁸³ approximately 33–40 cubic feet.¹⁸⁴ For example, a late-fourteenth-

century cog of 78–80 tuns would not be considered a large vessel, but a 240-tun cog from

¹⁷⁸Timothy J. Runyan, "The Cog as Warship," in *Cogs, Caravels and Galleons: the sailing ship from 1000–1650* (London, 1994), 47–58, at 50, 53.

¹⁷⁹Bryce Lyon, "The Infrastructure and Purpose of an English Medieval Fleet in the First Phase of the Hundred Years' War (1338–1340)," *Handelingen der Maatschappij voor Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde te Gent*, New Series 51 (1997): 61–76, at 64.

¹⁸⁰Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, "Naval Warfare after the Viking Age," in *Medieval Warfare: A History*, ed. Maurice Keen (Oxford, 1999), 230–52, at 245.

¹⁸¹Lyon, "The Infrastructure and Purpose of an English Medieval Fleet," 62.

¹⁸²Timothy J. Runyan, "Naval Logistics in the Late Middle Age: The Example of the Hundred Years War," in *Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present*, ed. John A. Lynn, 79–100 (Boulder/San Francisco/Oxford, 1993), at 93.

¹⁸³Timothy J. Runyan, "Naval Power and Maritime Technology during the Hundred Years War," in *War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, ed. John B. Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger, 53–69 (Woodbridge, 2003), at 60. The ton/tun is the wine tun of 252 gallons, which weighed approximately 2520 lbs; therefore, a ship of 80 tons had a carrying capacity of 201,600 lbs (100.8 tons).

¹⁸⁴Runyan, "Cog as Warship," 49.

1241 would be.¹⁸⁵ In the 1350s, there were ships with tonnages greater than 150 tons, but these were relatively rare.¹⁸⁶ Customs evidence from 1327 shows that there were ships carrying greater than 200 tons of cargo,¹⁸⁷ and a ship of 200 tons, the *Seintmaricog*, did sail in the Prince's fleet.¹⁸⁸

During this phase, all ships were one-masted, as two- and three-masted ships did not appear until the early fifteenth-century.¹⁸⁹ One-masted ships with a square sail were typical of northern Europe, and the earliest two-masted English ship dates to 1410 and was first used in Henry V's (1387–1422) fleet in 1414/1417.¹⁹⁰ Therefore, we can reasonably conclude that the Prince's fleet likely included a number of one-masted ships of varying carrying-capacities, but somewhere between 78–80 and 150 tons or 2574–2640 ft³ and 4950 ft³ carrying capacity, with a few ships outside of those parameters. *Seintmaricog* certainly exceeded 150 tons, and undoubtedly smaller vessels sailed in the fleet, as the order of 27 April 1355 for the arrest of all ships of more than twenty tons indicates.¹⁹¹

Oared vessels had an advantage over sailing ships, in that they could move

¹⁸⁵Runyan, "Naval Power and Maritime Technology," 62. Jan Bill lists the Bremen cog as an 84 ton vessel in "The Cargo Vessels," in *Cogs, Cargoes, and Commerce: Maritime Bulk Trade in Northern Europe, 1150–1400*, ed. Lars Berggren, Nils Hybel, and Annette Landen, 92–112 (Toronto, 2002), at 99.

¹⁸⁶Ian Friel, "Oars, Sails and Guns: The English and War at Sea, c. 1200–c. 1500," in *War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, eds. John B. Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger (Woodbridge, 2003), 69–79, at 76.

¹⁸⁷Bill, "The Cargo Vessels," 99. His evidence comes from the Calendar of Memoranda Rolls for 1326–1327.

¹⁸⁸TNA, E101/26/37, m. 3.

¹⁸⁹Runyan, "Naval Power and Maritime Technology," 60.

¹⁹⁰Friel, "Oars, Ships and Guns," 71–72.

¹⁹¹Rymer, *Foedera*, III, i, 298–99.

independently of the wind. They could be quite large; according to Ian Friel's research a ballinger [a light, oared vessel, sometimes referred to in Middle English as a barge] dated to 1401 had a hundred oars. However, the large crew this necessitated limited the time the ship could spend at sea, and, by the fifteenth-century, sailing ships had replaced oared vessels as the primary naval force of the English fleet. Oared vessels continued to be used as auxiliary crafts, particularly for reconnaissance and patrol.¹⁹² Replacing oared vessels with sailing ships was economical, in that it reduced the crew size and cost because oarsman no longer needed to be paid or fed. It increased the amount of space available for carrying supplies, as the oarsman would not be taking up that space.¹⁹³ The height of the sailing ships and the addition of fighting castles were causes of this shift; height, especially, was a critical advantage in naval warfare during the Middle Ages.¹⁹⁴ Height was particularly advantageous for the archers and crossbow men.¹⁹⁵ These factors made the ships more difficult to attack.¹⁹⁶

The records of English ships show a variety of vessels active between 1337 and 1360 and, therefore, available to Edward III and his administration for the purposes of transporting men, horses and supplies to the continent. These included hulks [large, unwieldy transport vessel], caracals or carracks [large transport ships, often outfitted for war], galleys [low, oared vessels with a single deck], and cogs [one-masted ships with a

¹⁹²Friel, "Oars, Sails and Guns, 70–71.

¹⁹³Fernandez-Armesto, "Naval Warfare," 236.

¹⁹⁴Friel, "Oars, Sails and Guns," 71. Fernandez-Armesto, "Naval Warfare," 236.

¹⁹⁵Runyan, "Cog as Warship," 50.

¹⁹⁶Kelly DeVries, *Medieval Military Technology* (Toronto, 1992), 304.

stern rudder], as well as others.¹⁹⁷ England relied primarily upon the cog, while France generally employed galleys.¹⁹⁸ In England, galleys were for the king, and they did not lend themselves to bulk transport. However, galleys were best for raiding the shore.¹⁹⁹ Of these types, the cog is most prevalent.²⁰⁰ During this period, Timothy Runyan has shown that of the ships identified by type in the records 57 percent are cogs. There are one hundred eighty-seven cogs, compared to forty-six “ships”, the only other type that has more than twenty vessels listed.²⁰¹ While these percentages do not necessarily apply to the remaining 965 unidentified vessels, it is possible that a large number of them also were cogs.

The cog was not fast, but it was durable. It had a boxy shape, straight stem and stern, flush-laid bottom and a high freeboard. It was also clinker-built and had a single, square sail, which was easier, and cheaper, to use than the lateen sail. A Mediterranean vessel with lateen sails needed roughly double the crew.²⁰² At the time of the Prince’s voyage, the most common vessel was the cog, followed by barges and ballingers. The majority of his fleet was made up of cogs.²⁰³

The Prince’s Fleet

The Prince’s fleet, according to Craig Lambert, was “one of the most important of the

¹⁹⁷ Runyan, “Cog as Warship,” 50.

¹⁹⁸ Runyan, “Cog as Warship,” 50.

¹⁹⁹ Runyan, “Naval Power and Maritime Technology,” 59–60, 65. Timothy J. Runyan, ed., “A Fourteenth Century Cordage Account for the King’s Ships,” *The Mariner’s Mirror* 60, no. 3 (August 1974), 311–28, at 312.

²⁰⁰ DeVries, *Medieval Military Technology*, 305. Runyan, “Ships and Fleets,” 96.

²⁰¹ Runyan, “Ships and Fleets,” 93.

²⁰² Runyan, “Cog as Warship,” 47, 49.

²⁰³ Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Military*, 6–7.

period.”²⁰⁴ He needed sufficient transport for his men, horses for those who would not be purchasing mounts in Bordeaux, and sufficient comestible supplies, including water, for the journey from Plymouth and Southampton to Bordeaux (420 and 421 nautical miles,²⁰⁵ respectively), not to mention the incomedible supplies such as extra bow staves and arrows.²⁰⁶ Securing adequate shipping, then, was an immediate concern, particularly given that Lancaster’s campaign, departing from the Thames *also* required ships as did the king’s proposed personal expedition to Picardy.²⁰⁷

Furthermore, one significant reason for the Prince’s delay in Plymouth was a lack of ships, underscoring in that failure the singular importance of this aspect of the Prince’s logistics. The difficulty in providing transport also indicates that England lacked adequate shipping, in this instance, to meet the transport needs of multiple expeditions. Orders regarding this issue indicate that the naval clerks,²⁰⁸ the sheriffs of Devon and

²⁰⁴Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Army*, 153.

²⁰⁵James Inman, *Nautical Tables Designed for the Use of British Seamen*, New Edition, Revised, Rearranged, Enlarged (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, & Co., Ltd., 1892), Table 51.

²⁰⁶Edward III did send munitions to Gascony (see above). The proportion of the supplies available to the Prince was probably limited, given that the castle garrisons would need supplies. It is also possible that some of these munitions helped equip the Gascon forces assembling to join the English forces. In December 1355, there was an urgent need for more bows, as indicated by the Prince’s orders to Chester.

²⁰⁷See Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 293, n. 38. He argues for only two fleets in 1355, suggesting that Lancaster’s and the King’s forces sailed together. The total number of ships needed, though, would have been similar, as combining Lancaster’s and the King’s forces would not have changed the number of men and horses for which transport was needed.

²⁰⁸Walter Harewell, Robert Ledred, Richard de Bosevil, Richard de Cortenhale, Robert de Baildon, John de Ellerton, John de Haddon, and Robert de Appelby were all charged with arresting ships for the expedition. Rymer, *Foedera*, III, i, 297–98.

Southampton; John de Beauchamp, admiral of the fleet,²⁰⁹ and his lieutenant Thomas de Hoggeshawe, who accompanied the expedition,²¹⁰ Roger Mortimer, earl of March and Warden of the Cinque Ports;²¹¹ the King's council, and Edward III himself were fully aware of the situation and were taking all steps to correct it. The effectiveness with which these challenges were met indicates the "English had, by this period, developed a safe and secure system of cross Channel communication and transportation,"²¹² which directly benefitted the Prince's expedition.

There was a massive effort to secure shipping through a variety of means preceding the Prince's eventual departure on 9 September. Lambert has shown that England had a highly developed and effective administration for arresting ships and finding mariners.²¹³ The search for ships for the expedition to Gascony began no later than 10 March. Robert de Ledred, Walter de Harewell, and Richard de Bosevill were ordered by the king to arrest all ships with a carrying capacity of "thirty tuns and

²⁰⁹Beauchamp was named admiral (*admirallum*) in March 1355 and was responsible for the territory east and south of the Thames, which included the Cinque Ports. Rymer, *Foedera*, III, i, 296.

²¹⁰He was appointed to accompany the Prince on 27 May 1355. Rymer, *Foedera*, III, i, 302.

²¹¹*A Brief history of Dover-Castle; Or, A description of Roman, Saxon and Norman, fortifications, to which is subjoined a list of the constables and lord wardens of the Cinque-Ports; with short remarks and the blazoning of their arms* (Canterbury, 1787), 106. R.R. Davis, "Mortimer, Roger (VI), second earl of March (1328–1360)," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: OUP, 2004). For recent work on the Cinque Ports and their military service, see Susan Rose, "The Value of the Cinque Ports to the Crown, 1200–1500," in *Roles of the Sea in Medieval England*, ed. Richard Gorski, 41–57 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2012), and Craig Lambert, "The Contributions of the Cinque Ports to the Wars of Edward II and Edward III: New Methodologies and Estimates," in *Roles of the Sea in Medieval England*, ed. Richard Gorski, 59–78 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2012).

²¹²Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Military*, 1.

²¹³Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Military*, passim.

greater”²¹⁴ and “take mariners for the ships and put the mariners on the ships.”²¹⁵ They were to search from the mouth of the Thames to the Cinque Ports.²¹⁶ De Harewell was further ordered to do the same in Wales (the text is no more specific than “*in partibus Walliae*”).²¹⁷ On 27 May, several captains were given permission to seize (*arrestandum*) mariners, at the Prince’s wages, for their ships going to Gascony. While these orders do specify the number of mariners to be taken for each ship, they fail to indicate if these vessels are to muster at Plymouth, which is possible, as it does say “to set out in that [expedition] with our dear and devoted [son], Edward prince of Wales,”²¹⁸ although the ships in question could easily have been sent to Southampton for Warwick’s and Suffolk’s use.

The expedition clearly had trouble securing shipping, as two months later Richard Cortenahle, Robert de Baildon, John de Haddon, Robert Appelby, John de Ellerton, Robert Ledrede, Richard Bosevil, and Walter de Harewell were commanded to arrest ships of “thirty tuns and greater” from the mouth of the Thames north to Lynn, from Lynn to Berwick-upon-Tweed, from London to Exeter, and in Exeter, Dynbegh, and Wales, man them with mariners, and array and outfit the ships for the expedition.²¹⁹ These orders to arrest smaller vessels clearly indicate that more ships were needed. The

²¹⁴“triginta doliorum et ultra.”

²¹⁵Rymer, *Foedera*, III, i, 297. “et ad marinarios pro navibus illis capiendum, et in eisdem navibus ponendum...”

²¹⁶Rymer, *Foedera*, III, i, 297. “ab ore aqua Thamis’, tam infra Cinque Portuum nostrum quam alibi versus parte occidentales...”

²¹⁷TNA C 61/66, m. 14; Rymer, III, I, 297.

²¹⁸Rymer, III, I, 302. “ad proficiscendum in eâdem cum dilecto & fideli nostro, Edwardo principe Walliae.”

²¹⁹TNA C 76/33, m. 12; Rymer, III, I, 299.

ships were to be at Southampton by 11 June. As the Prince and his retinue sailed from Plymouth, these ships would have been for the transport of Warwick and Suffolk, their retinues, and their horses (discussed below).

Another method of acquiring ships was building or repurposing them. In April 1355 John Loveryk and William Cundy were ordered to “arrest all carpenters and other shipwrights” in Sandwich and the Cinque Ports and “put them in the works of the king’s ships.”²²⁰ It is not clear if they are to build new ships or repair or refit existing ships, but it does indicate the level of activity surrounding the organization of transport for the expeditions. The orders were also issued “on the information of John de Bello Campo (Beauchamp)” (discussed in the next chapter).²²¹ Similar orders on Beauchamp’s information were issued in May 1355 and specified that ships were being both built and repaired.²²² In June, Robert de Selby, Henry de Selby, and Thomas de Stanton were to select twelve carpenters to repair three ships in Kingston-upon-Hull.²²³ There was a similar situation at York.²²⁴ The varied locations show that the fitting out of ships was not localized in any one port and that the King and his administration were attempting to find ships wherever and however they could.

²²⁰TNA, C 66/242, m. 23; TNA, C 66/245, m. 12; CPR, X, 203. This probably means they were modifying the ships for war, e.g., building ‘castles’ on the ships. There were few purpose-built warships, and the king had to rely upon the civilian shipbuilding industry. The king owned several vessels, but these were meant to form the core of a fleet. See Friel, “Oars, Sails, and Guns,” 69. There was still clearly a need for ships, as more ships’ carpenters were ordered to be arrested for that purpose in July 1356. TNA, C 66/249, m. 18d; CPR, X, 446–47.

²²¹TNA, C 66/245, m. 12; CPR, X, 203.

²²²TNA, C 66/245, m. 8; CPR, X, 212.

²²³TNA, C 66/246, m. 25; CPR, X, 243.

²²⁴TNA, C 66/246, m. 24; CPR, X, 244.

There were specific requisition methods for arresting vessels: arrest ships from every port; arrest ships in a specific administrative district—for example, John de Beauchamp was admiral (*admirallum*) for the territory south and east of the Thames; arrest ships from specific ports; arrest ships in a given geographic zone; or arrest ships from individual owners,²²⁵ as well as a variety of sources of ships, which included requisitioning merchant vessels (the largest source of ships), the King’s own ships, the Cinque Ports, agreements with owners and port burgesses, hiring ships from other kingdoms, city-states, or private persons, “asking” a port to provide a specific number of ships, seized vessels, ordering the construction of new ships, and offering owners and or masters a pardon in exchange for ships and or service without wages.²²⁶ That said, it should not be taken as an indication of a haphazard approach. Rather, it is indicative of the scope and far-reaching capabilities of the naval administration and underscores the “underlying sophistication” that enabled administrative personnel to assemble two fleets in this manner.²²⁷

That administration also was working to outfit these ships and was still scrambling to do so in late July. Richard Cosyn, William Hichcock, Robert Budde, and Edward Goderych were ordered to find corders [rope-makers] “and other workers of cords and cables for ships” and “to purvey hempen thread [to make] the cords and cables.”²²⁸ There is a particular urgency in the Prince’s order of 29 July to John le Clerc, mayor of Hampton, to have the ship *Seint Esprit* out of Bayonne “suitably repaired by

²²⁵Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Military*, 20.

²²⁶Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Military*, 11–16.

²²⁷Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Military*, 11.

²²⁸TNA, C 66/246, m. 7; CPR, 10, 275.

advice of the master,” John Loyas, and the costs would be paid by the Prince. *Seint Esprit* had been “assigned for the Prince’s hall [for public meetings and assemblies],” although he actually sailed on a different ship.²²⁹

The journeys from Plymouth and Southampton to Bordeaux were certainly familiar to mariners, as was the transport of men and horses. For example, Richard English, his men and horses, sailed either from Plymouth or Weymouth for Gascony in late November 1354 on the king’s business,²³⁰ and Thomas Dautre’s January 1355 re-supply mission sailed from Southampton.

The Prince’s ship was the *Christofre*,²³¹ and its captain was John le Clerc, mayor of Southampton,²³² who received 10*l* on 27 September as a gift from the Prince upon reaching Bordeaux.²³³ It was not the largest of the ships in the Prince’s fleet; that was the *Seintmaricog*, which had a carrying capacity of 200 tuns, making it a very large vessel, as discussed above.²³⁴ It appears that the outfitting of the *Christofre* was underway until the point of departure, as gear for the ship was purchased as late as 7 September, two days before the Prince sailed for Gascony.²³⁵

Even after boarding, the ships did not sail immediately for Gascony, and there

²²⁹BPR, IV, 143.

²³⁰TNA, C 66/244, m.13; CPR, 10, 137. Richard English was authorized to take a ship in Weymouth or Plymouth “for the passage of him and his men and horses.” In this instance, the horses and men were to be transported on the same ship.

²³¹BPR, IV, 166; E101/26/38; Hewitt, *The Black Prince’s Expedition*, 40; Green, *The Battle of Poitiers*, 28.

²³²Hewitt, *The Black Prince’s Expedition*, 37; BPR, IV, 166.

²³³DCO, Henxteworth, entry for 27 September 1355.

²³⁴Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Army*, 153, n. 266. It was captained by John Wilydon and owned by Henry Finch of Winchelsea. For the size of vessels, see below.

²³⁵BPR, IV, 158.

was still communication with the Prince's administrators remaining in England. One of the final orders is dated 6 September. It was issued "by the prince himself, on board his ship in the port of Plymmuth [sic] on his departure for Gascony."²³⁶ It does not address anything related to the expedition; rather it is a remission to Henry de Blakebourn, one time receiver of the chamber, of anything that "the prince might have against him by reason of his said office."²³⁷ This suggests that, even though departure was imminent, the business of the Prince's administration continued and would continue in his absence.

Number of Ships

Given that the Prince's expedition was delayed due to a lack of shipping, unfavorable conditions notwithstanding, the obvious question becomes how many ships did the Prince require. Here, then, we must again turn to the logistics and the hard and fast 'rules' about how much men (soldiers and mariners) and horses must eat and drink, how much cargo space comestible and incomestible supplies require, how much space horses require,²³⁸ and the carrying capacity of the ships.

The Prince commanded a force of roughly 2200 men from England and Wales,²³⁹ including the retinues of the four earls. Each man would need 3.5 lbs (1.6 kg)²⁴⁰ of food

²³⁶BPR, IV, 149.

²³⁷BPR, IV, 149.

²³⁸It is certain that some men did bring their own horses, as Henxteworth's accounts relating to the disembarkment at Bordeaux list payments for windage and re-imbusement for horses lost at sea.

²³⁹See next chapter for discussion of military demography and the Prince's numbers. The size of the force would increase significantly with the addition of the Gascon troops.

²⁴⁰Based on the army rations for 1901. Army Ration. Issue and Conversion Tables, War Department, 1789–1909 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1901). This assumes a moderate level of activity aboard the ships. More food would be needed on the march. See the next chapter for more.

to meet his daily caloric needs, 3250 kcal/day for a man weighing 174 lbs (79 kg) and 5 ft 9 in (1.75 m) tall.²⁴¹ He would also need at least 2 qts (1.9 L) of water. These figures are from the 2001 US Army Regulations about nutritional standards, and I have chosen these figures because they represent the needs of active soldiers and men generally ranging in age from their late teens to late thirties.²⁴² Granted, members of the Prince's company fall outside of this range—including three of the four earls—, but most of his active

²⁴¹For the height of the men, see Veronica Fiortato, "Townton, AD 1461: Excavation of a mass war grave," *Current Archaeology* no. 171, XV, no. 3 (December 2000): 98–103, at 101. The heights ranged from 5'2" (158.5 cm) to 6' (183.5 cm); they were "reasonably healthy," "ate reasonably well, but neglected their teeth..." As the age of the soldiers ranged from 16–50, it is likely the shorter skeletons belonged to subadult soldiers. See also Fiortato, *Blood Red Roses: the archaeology of a mass grave from the battle of Townton, AD 1461* (Oxford, 2000). For his discussion of the height and weight of Roman soldiers, see Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War*, 9–10. While average male height ranged from 5'4" (162 cm) and 5'7" (171 cm), Roth argues that the Roman soldiers were taller than average based on Vegetius' minimum standards: 6 Roman feet (178 cm) for cavalry and 5'10" (173 cm) for the first cohort, with an average of 5'7" for the army as a whole. Roth uses the US Army height and weight tables to determine that the average weight was 145 lbs (65.7 kg). For the food requirements, see Army Regulation 40–25, BUMEDINST 10110.6, AFI 44–141, Medical Services, "Nutritional Standards and Education," Headquarters, Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force (Washington, DC, 2001). http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r40_25.pdf (accessed 27 February 2013). There is no print version of this document, only electronic media. AR 40–25, i.

²⁴²Fiortato, "Townton, AD 1461," 101. Based on the archaeology, all age bands "from the 16–25 band to the 36–50 band" were evenly represented, and the average age was thirty. Roth's Roman soldiers joined the army between 18 and 23 and served into their forties. The average age during the Empire was around thirty. Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War*, 11–12. Of course, the soldiers on board were probably not expending the same number of calories that they would during the campaign (or that the mariners were expending), but I am using these numbers as a baseline for consistency throughout the dissertation and on the assumption that the Prince had no wish to arrive in Bordeaux with a hungry army.

soldiers would likely have been between the ages of twenty and forty.²⁴³ These numbers also represent the minimum requirements for a man of the above height and weight; a larger or smaller man would need more or less food, respectively. For example, a man, 5'2" (1.6m) tall and weighing 134lbs (61kg) needed 2895 calories; a man 5'7" (1.7m) tall and weighing 145lbs (66kg) would need 3000 calories per day, and a man of 6' and 160 lbs would need 3057 calories per day.²⁴⁴ I have used an average of 3000 calories a day, slightly lower than the 3390 calories per day Roth suggests for Roman soldiers. Given these requirements and the 2200 men, not including the mariners who also had to eat and drink, the daily allotment of food and water per man totaled 3 lbs (1.3 kg) and 2 qts (1.9 L), respectively.²⁴⁵

For a sea journey of eleven days, with no access to resupply, the ships had to carry 33 lbs (15 kg) of grain and 5.5 gal (21L) of water for each man. For an estimated force of 2200 men this would mean some 72,600 lbs (32,931 kg) of grain and 12,100 gal (46,200 L) of potable water for a total of almost 100 tons (193,000 lbs). These numbers represent only the needs of the soldiers. There would also be "support staff," such as grooms for the horses. The mariners would also need food and water, but we cannot estimate their numbers until we have a reasonable estimate as to the number of ships. For

²⁴³William de Montagu, earl of Salisbury, was 27; Robert d'Ufford, earl of Suffolk, was 57; John de Vere, earl of Oxford, was 43; and Thomas Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, was 42.

²⁴⁴Calculations are based on the formula (for 25-year old men) given in US Army (1961), 20: $0.95(815 + 36.6W)$. W is weight in kg. This is the same formula used in Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War*, 12. Roth calculates the average daily ration for Roman soldiers as 3390 calories (Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War*, 43).

²⁴⁵Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army*, 18; Army Ration. Issue and Conversion Tables, War Department, 1789–1909; Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War*, 43.

the soldiers' food and water we know the Prince's purveyors required a minimum of 100 tuns of carrying capacity.

Aside from food, the soldiers had other needs as well, namely space for themselves and their personal gear. Additionally, they needed a certain amount of incombustible supplies, such as armor, livery, harness, and rope. The army also carried with it a supply of extra bow staves and arrows, which were transported from the ships at Bordeaux to the advance supply depot at St. Macaire.²⁴⁶ Individual soldiers would have carried their own personal gear: clothing and weapons, possibly cooking equipment and small tools.²⁴⁷ Other needed items, though unmentioned in the sources, must have included hand mills for grain and tents.²⁴⁸ The fleet did not carry siege or mining equipment.²⁴⁹

As this expedition was planned as a *chevauchée*, we know that most of the men, including the majority of the archers, were mounted.²⁵⁰ Some of the archers brought their horses with them, as shown by Henxteworth's accounts for 1 October 1355. He paid to "divers archers" under Hamon Masey and Robert Brun (see next chapter for their roles as captains) a sum of 12l 18s 8d as a gift to replace horses lost at sea,²⁵¹ which indicates not

²⁴⁶DOC, Henxteworth accounts. Henxteworth paid the clerk of the spicery 8s 9d on 3 October for carriage of the bows and arrows to St. Macaire.

²⁴⁷Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War*, 72.

²⁴⁸Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War*, 77.

²⁴⁹There is no evidence in any source that the Prince's army carried siege or mining equipment; nor did Henxteworth pay any siege or mining 'specialists'. Caille, "Nouveaux Regards," 89.

²⁵⁰See Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, Ch. 1. The Prince's indenture specifies both mounted and foot archers, although it is unclear whether this indicates that the foot archers marched on foot. See the next chapter for the rate of march and discussion of this issue.

²⁵¹DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 1 October 1355.

only that the archers had horses but also that the safe passage of the horses was not assured. No doubt this is why some chose to purchase their horses upon arrival in Bordeaux.

The Prince's other great need, then, was transport for the horses and their food and water. Those ships carrying horses were outfitted especially for the task with hurdles placed between the horses and the ships fitted with slings, not to mention special gangways for loading and unloading the horses.²⁵² For example, the sheriff of Cornwall received orders dated 6 May 1355 to provide 2500 hurdles and fifteen gangplanks for the shipping of the horses, as did the sheriffs of Devon and Southampton.²⁵³ These hurdles would be used for constructing temporary stalls for the horses.²⁵⁴

The cog was already well suited for transporting troops and bulk supplies,²⁵⁵ and

²⁵²John Pryor, "The Transportation of Horses by Sea During the Era of the Crusades, Eighth Century to 1285 A.D.," in *Medieval Warfare 1000–1300*, ed. John France, 524–68 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), passim; originally published in *The Mariner's Mirror* 68 (1982): 9–30 and 103–26. See also, John Pryor, "The naval architecture of Crusader transport ships and horse transports revisited," *The Mariner's Mirror* 76, no., 3 (1990): 255–73, at 255–56.

²⁵³TNA, C 61/67, m. 13. Rymer, III, I, 299–300. "...duo milia & quingenta claias & quindecim pontes...pro eskipamento equorum..." The orders specify that 8 of the bridges should be 20 feet long and 7 14 feet long. The original 'claias' and 'eskipamento' appear to be Anglo-Norman words to which Latin endings have been added. 'Claias' (and several alternate spellings) appears often in the following phrase: "cleyes e pountz," giving it the meaning of gangplank. However, given that there are 2500 "claias" needed and the specifications as to length pertain only to the "pontes" I have chosen to use "hurdles."

²⁵⁴Runyan, "Naval Power and Maritime Technology," 53. There is no good description of a "claias." T. Hunt, *Teaching and Learning Latin in Thirteenth-Century England*, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1991) includes the following description: "une cleie que soit coché sur le fosse e cele cleie seit coverte de foil..." Langdon, "Efficiency of Inland water Transport," 113, cites examples of sheriffs using river transport to ship the wooden hurdles to ports.

²⁵⁵Runyan, "Cog as Warship," 56.

the ships could be modified easily to carry horses. There was a *paliolus*, a floor constructed on top of the structured floor of the hold, to protect the floor from the impact of soldiers and horses, as well as damage that could be caused by horseshoes.²⁵⁶ The stalls were located fore and aft, not abeam.²⁵⁷ Hurdles were used to build stalls.²⁵⁸ Between 1338 and 1359, some 16,000 hurdles and 200 gangways for horses were built and transported to ports, such as Plymouth and Southampton. More than 3000 horses had been shipped from Sandwich to Calais in 1354.²⁵⁹ Clearly, then, the English were experienced in transporting horses to the continent, especially given that the 16,000 hurdles could have been used to transport a minimum of 8000 horses.²⁶⁰ The ships in Edward III's 1338–1340 campaign transported more than 4,500 horses.²⁶¹ The horses were put in slings,²⁶² and Pryor argues for stall dimensions of approximately 2 m long and 1 m wide.²⁶³ Using these dimensions, he suggests that the Crusader transport ships could transport roughly thirty horses.²⁶⁴

Loading and unloading the horses from the main deck required a special dock, or special gangways, most of 15–20 feet (4.6–6m), that could be used from ports in the

²⁵⁶Pryor, "The Naval Architecture of Crusader Transport Ships and Horse Transports Revisited," 257.

²⁵⁷Pryor, "Naval Architecture," 259.

²⁵⁸Runyan, "Naval Power and Maritime Technology," 53.

²⁵⁹Runyan, "Cog as Warship," 56.

²⁶⁰This allows two hurdles per horse, although three hurdles could be used for two horses if the central hurdle separated them. In that case, 16,000 hurdles could be used for 16,000 horses—not accounting for the re-use of hurdles.

²⁶¹Lyon, "Infrastructure and Purpose," 66.

²⁶²Pryor, "Naval Architecture," 259.

²⁶³Pryor, "Naval Architecture," 259. The architecture of Crusade ships indicates that there would have been 3.56 m in which to stable 3 horses abreast, sufficient for the horses' needs and providing enough space to maneuver between horses.

²⁶⁴Pryor, "Naval Architecture," 259.

hull.²⁶⁵ The position of the ports was particularly important in this matter. Pryor shows that these ports were located at the stern, allowing the ships to back onto beaches for amphibious assaults.²⁶⁶ There were two basic types of horse transports in the thirteenth-century: those with one stern entry (Pryor calls it a port) and those with two stern entries.²⁶⁷ The *paliolus*²⁶⁸ was also stronger at the stern, where, following Pryor's assertion about the stern ports, there would have been the most horse traffic.²⁶⁹

In addition to special gangplanks, horses also were loaded and unloaded via windage in which the horse was fitted with a sling and raised or lowered by means of ropes and pulleys.²⁷⁰ The two methods likely reflect the variety of shipping employed and suggest that some vessels were not (or could not be) adapted to allow the use of gangplanks; therefore, windage would have been a necessary alternative. In addition to the money spent on hurdles and gangplanks, Henxteworth paid 1/ 4s 8d out of the Prince's accounts for windage in Bordeaux, as well as 1/ 2s 10d for the transport of harness from the ships to Bordeaux.²⁷¹ The sheriffs of Cornwall, Devon, and Southampton were to be re-imbursed for the money they spent on the hurdles and gangplanks.²⁷² Therefore, it is likely that the Prince's fleet used both methods for loading

²⁶⁵Runyan, "Cog as Warship," p. 56.

²⁶⁶Pryor, "Naval Architecture," 255. Pryor primarily uses evidence from William of Tyre and MSS illuminations.

²⁶⁷Pryor, "Naval Architecture," 256.

²⁶⁸The *paliolus* was a "floor in a hold" that was built over the structured floor.

²⁶⁹Pryor, "Naval Architecture," 258.

²⁷⁰DCO, Henxteworth, entry for 29 September 1355. See also Matthew Horace Hayes, *Horses on Board Ship: A guide to their management* (London, 1902), 69.

²⁷¹DCO, Henxteworth accts, entry for 20 September 1355.

²⁷²TNA, Rymer, III, I, 299–300. "Et de custubus, quos circa praemissa apposueris, tibi, in compoto tuo, ad scaccarium nostrum, debitam allocationem habere faciemus." The order

and unloading the horses.

Given the relatively small carrying capacity of ships, even the large cogs, and the need to carry food and water, a ship could only carry a small number of horses, likely between eight and thirty animals.²⁷³ Each horse would need a daily ration of 15 lbs (6 kg) of forage (such as hay), a half ration of grain (5 lbs, 2.3 kg) starting the second day of the voyage, and at least 10 gallons (45.5 L) of water daily,²⁷⁴ totaling 50 lbs (24.9 kg) of grain, 165 lbs (74.8 kg) of forage, and 110 gallons (416 L) of water for the eleven day journey to Bordeaux. Therefore, a ship carrying eight horses would need to carry with it a minimum of 400 lbs (181.4 kg) of grain, 1320 lbs (598.7 kg) of forage, and 880 gallons (3331 L), or 8800 lbs (3992 kg) of water for a total of more than 5 tons of comestibles, while a ship transporting 30 horses would need at least 1500 lbs (680.4 kg) of grain, 4950 lbs (2245.3 kg) of forage, and 3300 gal (12,492 L), or 33,000 lbs (14,969 kg) of water for a total of more than 19 tons of comestible supplies for the horses (see Table 3.1).

for hurdles and bridges/gangplanks is quite common. Cf. TNA, C 54/192, m. 29. OCCR, X, 3.

²⁷³Incidentally, a soldier might receive a higher bonus for service in Gascony. Ayton suggests this is a recognition of the risk of horses dying on the voyage, as well as an encouragement to the soldiers to buy their horses in Bordeaux. Given the expense and risk of transporting the horses, this seems reasonable. Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, 125. Pryor estimates that Crusader horse transports carried an average of 30 horses. Pryor, "Naval Architecture," 259.

²⁷⁴Engineer Field Manual, Pts. 1–4, prepared under direction of Brigadier General A. MacKenzie, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1912), 428 and 451, particularly the paragraphs on shipping horses by sea. Increasing the grain ration after the second day is an option if necessary to ensure the animal's good condition, but due to the idleness of the sea voyage, there is the danger of overfeeding and the consequent problems. These numbers are an average of the amounts given for 3 separate feeding weights, 800 lbs, 1000 lbs, and 1200 lbs. Engels uses a statistic 10 lbs of grain, 10 lbs of forage, 8 gallons of water. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army*, 18.

Table 3.1: Rations for the horses during the sea voyage to Bordeaux.

	Day 1	Day 2	11-day voyage
1 horse	Grain: 0 lbs	Grain: 5 lbs/2.3 kg	Grain: 50 lbs/ 24.9 kg
	Forage: 15 lbs/6.9 kg	Forage: 15 lbs/6.9 kg	Forage: 165 lbs/74.8 kg
	Water: 10 gal/45.5 L (100 lbs ²⁷⁵ /45.5 kg)	Water: 10 gal/45.5 L (100 lbs/45.5 kg)	Water: 110 gal/416 L (1100 lbs/ 503 kg)
8 horses	Grain: 0 lbs	Grain: 40 lbs/18.1kg	Grain: 400 lbs /181.4 kg
	Forage: 120 lbs/54kg	Forage: 120 lbs/54.4kg	Forage: 1320 lbs/599 kg
	Water: 80 gal/364 L	Water: 80 gal/364 L	Water: 880 gal/3331 L

²⁷⁵Using the imperial gallon of 10 lbs.

	(800 lbs/363 kg)	(800 lbs/363 kg)	(8800 lbs/3992 kg)
30 horses	Grain: 0 lbs	Grain: 150 lbs/68 kg	Grain: 1500 lbs/680 kg
	Forage: 450 lbs/204 kg	Forage: 450 lbs/204 kg	Forage: 4950 lbs/2245 kg
	Water: 300 gal/1364 L	Water: 300 gal/1364 L	Water: 3300 gal/12,492L
	(3000 lbs/1360 kg)	(3000 lbs/1360 kg)	(33,000 lbs/14,969kg)

This does not include the horses themselves or incombustible supplies related to their transport and use (e.g., saddles). Nor does it account for the 5 lbs of straw needed for each animal, all of which would need to be mucked out and replaced daily. Soiled bedding had to be removed for proper sanitation, to control moisture,²⁷⁶ and to protect the horses' hooves from the corrosive effect of uric acid. One horse would need 55 lbs of straw for the eleven day voyage; eight horses and thirty horses would need 440 lbs and 1650 lbs of straw respectively. Combined with the weight of the food and water, a single horse would require 125 lbs of supplies daily, 1375 lbs for the eleven days at sea. A ship carrying eight horses would need 11,000 lbs, a ship with thirty horses 41,250 lbs.

The horses and their related supplies, then, would take up a not inconsiderable amount of space. A ship transporting eight horses would need a carrying capacity of at least 5 tons just for the horses' food and water. When the straw is added to that, the ship would have to carry a minimum of 5.5 tons in supplies for the horses, particularly as transferring supplies while at sea was impossible. On a 20 ton vessel, the minimum size

²⁷⁶FM 31-27, 2-31.

Richard de Cortenhale and Robert de Baidon were to arrest for the Prince's passage,²⁷⁷ that would amount to just over 20 percent of the vessel's carrying capacity for the horse's rations.

For heuristic purposes, let us suppose that less than half of the Prince's forces brought their own horses. The comestible supply needs of even 550 horses, which assumes one horse for every fourth man, would total more than 355 tonnes and require a fleet of ships with a carrying capacity of more than 320 tuns (the horses themselves must be included). If even half the Prince's force brought horses, assuming each of those men brought only a single mount which would not have been the case as a man-at-arms brought between two and five horses with him on campaign,²⁷⁸ that number would easily double. The combined total, then, of the comestible supplies for the Prince's 2200 men and 550 horses, a number probably on the low side, is approximately 430 tuns. Lambert suggests that the fleet could have transported some 2000 horses.²⁷⁹ This is certainly possible even if only trained warhorses were transported;²⁸⁰ however, given that the archers' horses were also transported it is clear not every horse shipped to Gascony was

²⁷⁷TNA, C76/33, m. 12. Rymer, III, I, 298.

²⁷⁸Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, 58.

²⁷⁹Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Army*, 154. As he rightly points out, there is no way to know how many horses were purchased in Bordeaux. He also estimates that the size of the force the fleet transported was 1500–2000 men, which is fewer than the 2200 men discussed above but not significantly so.

²⁸⁰Carroll M. Gillmor, "The *Brevium exempla* as a source for Carolingian Warhorses," *Journal of Medieval Military History* 6 (2008): 32–57; idem, "Practical Chivalry: The Training of Horses for Tournements and Warfare," *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History* New Series 13, ed. J.A.S. Evans and R.W. Unger, 5–29 (New York, 1992), 19–20.

an expensive warhorse.²⁸¹ If that is the case, the ships would have needed to carry more than 1300 tons of comestible supplies and water for the horses for the eleven day voyage, requiring a total tunnage of 1180 tuns.

Given these real and inescapable needs, how many ships, then, did the Prince require? We can approximate this using the following equation and entering the values that we know are concrete, such as the daily needs of men and horses. The results will be, at best, approximations, as are all models, in part because of incomplete data and because we cannot know for certain the exact composition of the ships (their size and tunnage varied considerably; see Appendix A) transporting the Prince's army nor can we determine precisely how they were laden. A ship capable of carrying 30 horses may only have carried 25, for example. Nevertheless, the following will allow us to determine the scale of the operation, which Lambert claims should be "regarded as one of the most important of the period."²⁸²

$$N = \frac{d(a+b+c) + d(e+f) + g}{x}$$

x

(For a detailed explanation of this equation, see Chapter Two: Historiography, Sources, and Methods, where it is described in detail).

The Prince's force numbered approximately 2200 men when the army sailed from England (more men would be added in Gascony), each requiring 3 lbs (1.3 kg) of food and 2 qts (1L) of water daily; each horse needed 18.5 lbs (8.5 kg) of food and 10 gal (30L) of water. It took the Prince's fleet eleven days to sail the 420 nautical miles to

²⁸¹DCO, Henxteworth accounts, passim.

²⁸²Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Military*, 152.

Bordeaux.²⁸³ We also know that a ship could carry as many as 30 horses or as few as 8, and that the average carrying capacity was just over 70 tuns.²⁸⁴ Further, we must account for the mariners, and a ship of 200 tuns, like *Seintmaricog*, would require a minimum of fifty sailors to crew it; the average crew size, however, was sixteen.²⁸⁵ Each of these sailors, too, would require 3 lbs (1.3kg) of food and 2 qts (1L) of potable water. Given these ineluctable constraints we can arrive at a reasonable estimate.

Lambert's research suggests a fleet of 187 ships provided by 37 different ports and sailed by nearly 3000 mariners, and that the average load of a ship was fourteen men and ten horses, as well as the sixteen man crew.²⁸⁶ That would mean that the average minimum carrying capacity of the ships was roughly eight (wine) tuns. However, given that the orders for arresting ships specified that ships be at least twenty (wine) tuns, that the smallest carrying capacity known for the ships in the Prince's fleet is 30 (wine) tuns (see Appendix A), and that the low-end carrying capacity for cogs was 78–80 tuns, that suggests four possibilities: one, that, even accounting for the men, mariners, and horses themselves, the ships were significantly under-laden, which is unlikely in the extreme; two, that ships carried an average of fifteen tuns of incomedible supplies, which is possible but improbable given the lack of siege equipment; three, that the expeditionary

²⁸³James Inman, *Nautical Tables Designed for British Seamen* (London: J.D. Potter, 1945), Table 51, 549.

²⁸⁴Based on the average of the known carrying capacities of the ships in the Prince's fleet; those capacities are known in forty cases.

²⁸⁵Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Military*, 153, n. 266. This is based on three Exchequer accounts (E 101/26/36, E 101/26/37, and E 101/26/38), which provide lists of wages, masters, and ships.

²⁸⁶Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Military*, 153–54. The exact number of mariners he provides is 2,937.

force was larger than the estimated 2200, and Lambert, in this case, seems to be accepting a force of 2600 men, although he claims that the size of the fleet suggests a force of 1500–2000 men,²⁸⁷ in which case the average number of men per ship would be 8–10.

Assuming a force of roughly 2200 gives us an average of 12 men per ship. Lambert's numbers also amount to nearly 3000 mariners (His precise figure is 2937.). Accepting that, the fleet transported a total of more than 5000 men-at-arms, archers, mariners, and support staff and some 2000 horses, as well as their supplies. The final possibility is that the fleet carried *more* comestible supplies than was needed for the eleven-day voyage. This way, the army could be sure of adequate supplies if the voyage took longer than eleven days and have supplies readily available upon arrival in Bordeaux. That the ships carried additional comestibles is indisputable. Henxteworth certainly paid for the transport of such supplies to Bordeaux and to the advance supply depot at St. Macaire.²⁸⁸

Table 3.2:²⁸⁹ The minimum needs of soldiers, mariners, and horses.

	Numbers	Food	Water
Soldiers	2200	6600 lbs/2994 kg	1100 gal/4164 L/4.4 tuns

²⁸⁷Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Military*, 154, n. 269.

²⁸⁸DCO, Henxteworth, entry for 1 October 1355.

²⁸⁹Tonnage calculated based on Langdon's findings of an average of 6.5 quarters of grain per wine tun. Langdon, "Efficiency of inland water transport," 113, 118. The tonnage for the water is calculated based on the 252 gallons/wine tun standard. Zupko, *English Weights and Measures*, entry for tun.

			(11,000 lbs/4990 kg)
Mariners	3000	9000 lbs/4082 kg	1500 gal/5678 L/6 tuns
			(15,000 lbs/6804 kg)
Horses	2000	389,000 lbs/174,447 kg	220,000 gal/832,791 L
			(1000tonnes/997.903kg)
Total		396,500 lbs/179,849 kg	222,600gal/842,633 L
			(1010 metric tons)

While the number of ships and mariners seems perhaps large, they are in keeping with earlier English fleets. For example, the fleet for Edward III's Low Countries campaign (1338–1340) comprised 370 ships,²⁹⁰ “370 masters, 282 constables, 11,325 sailors, 585 pages, plus 5 clerks and 4 carpenters for the king's ships”²⁹¹ and transported 2720 men-at-arms of varying social status, 5550 archers (mounted and unmounted), 4614 horses, and an additional 500 personnel from the households of the king and queen.²⁹² These 370 ships, then, transported more than 20,000 men [soldiers (8270), sailors (12,571), and support staff (500)] and 4614 horses—and their supplies to the Low

²⁹⁰Lyon's figure, which disagrees slightly from the traditionally accepted 260), is based on the *Incipiunt Vadia Nautarum* in the wardrobe book kept by William de Norwell for the period 12 July 1338 to 27 May 1340. Lyon, “Infrastructure and Purpose of an English Medieval Fleet,” 65–66.

²⁹¹Lyon, 67.

²⁹²Lyon, 66.

Countries, with an average of 31 sailors, 22 combatants, and 13 horses per ship. In comparison, the Prince's expedition was, taken by itself, a more modest expedition. Of course, Lancaster's and the King's expeditions happened concurrently, but the success of this earlier fleet indicates that the English naval administration was certainly up to the task.

Conclusion

The Prince's army mustered at two separate ports. The Prince and those sailing with him mustered at Plymouth, where he stayed at Plympton until he boarded *La Cristofre*, and Warwick and Suffolk and their companies were mobilized at Southampton. Their horses also were transported from Southampton.²⁹³

These disparate elements—planning, finances, men, horses, ships, supplies both comestible and incomedible—came together at Plymouth and Southampton over the summer months. The planning and preparations, of course, began several months in advance. Everything seems to have gone reasonably well and relatively on schedule, although the wind was unfavorable. Yet, when the wind turned favorable, the fleet was ready to take advantage of it. This testifies not only to the efficiency of the individual bureaucracies but also to the degree to which they worked together. It is clear that the expedition, at least as far as assembling a force and transporting it, was well-planned and took advantage of the existing, highly developed structures in use in England.

Thus, with little difficulty, the Prince and his army of 2200 men-at-arms and archers and 2000 horses left Plymouth (or Southampton) on September 1355 in a fleet of

²⁹³Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*, 36–40. Rymer, *Foedera*, III, I, 300.

187 ships and sailed for Bordeaux. This accomplishment testifies to the well-established ability of the English government to recruit and supply troops and transport them across the Channel. The Prince and his expedition benefitted from England's long tradition of transporting horses and soldiers to France. As early as c. 1080, the English government was able to transport 3000 horses to France.²⁹⁴ Thus, supplying and shipping the Prince's army to Bordeaux was well within the capabilities of the English government. As we shall see in the following chapter, the English were equally capable of recruiting a competent military force.

²⁹⁴Bernard S. Bachrach, "On the Origins of William the Conqueror's Horse Transports," *Technology and Culture* 26, no. 3 (1985): 505–31; Bernard S. Bachrach, "William Rufus' Plan for the Invasion of Aquitaine," in *The Normans and their Adversaries at War: Essays in Memory of C. Warren Hollister*, ed. Richard P. Abels and Bernard S. Bachrach, 31–63 (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2001).

Chapter Four: A Competent Military Force

When the Prince sailed from Plymouth on 9 September, he was in command of a sizeable though not extraordinarily large force, a force that would grow considerably between his arrival in Bordeaux and the army's departure from the city and its environs. The addition of the Gascon lords and their followers, not to mention a number of mercenaries, swelled the ranks of the Prince's army. (For a discussion of the Prince's army see below.) The size of the army, though, was of itself not key to the Prince's success. The Prince was extraordinarily fortunate in his advisors and command staff,¹ fortunate in the qualifications and experience of his subordinates and administrators, and happy in the skill and fortitude of his soldiers—those who had not deserted or committed a criminal offense (see below). The Prince's army was a well-organized force that was flexible enough to allow soldiers from England, Wales, Gascony, and other parts (the sources list describe several men as Spaniards and Allemains, or as coming from the Low Countries) to serve together and disciplined enough to keep these diverse men—who spoke different languages—working as an army under a single commander. This clearly indicates a functional chain-of command, skilled administrators, a competent and cohesive command staff, and at least some translators.

The Prince's forces were highly organized. Aside from the administration of recruitment and other "paperwork," such as indentures, letters of protection, and

¹For discussion of military advisors as a general staff, see Bernard S. Bachrach, "Charlemagne and the Carolingian General Staff," *The Journal of Military History* 60, no. 2 (April 2002): 317–57.

appointments of attorneys (all discussed below), a great deal of thought was put into who would accompany the Prince to Gascony and serve as his advisors and command staff. This included magnates and professional soldier-administrators. That a capable staff was necessary is indisputable given his relative inexperience as a commander² and the size of his force. That the Gascons did serve in this campaign is indisputable. They requested the Prince lead a campaign in Gascony, and it is unlikely that they would not participate. Furthermore, Henxteworth pays a number of Gascon lords (not just the Captal de Buch), and many Gascons receive mention or rewards in the *Black Prince's Register*.³ Geoffrey le Baker also mentions several Gascons in leadership positions.⁴ The Gascons, then, must be included in any discussion of the Prince's troops, as well as mercenaries such as Bernard van Zedeles who is described as an Almain. Zedeles and his companions are provided with funds and gifts "for the expenses of himself and his companions on their going to the parts of Almain [Germany]."⁵

Numbers

The force that sailed from Plymouth was by no means a small army; nor was it unusually large for the fourteenth century even after the Black Death. The estimates of its size vary from too low—usually because the Gascons are not included—to obviously exaggerated.

²The Prince had received excellent training and served on the Crécy campaign, during which he led small raids and commanded the center at the Battle of Crécy (1346). The 1355 campaign, however, was his first solo command of a large force and entire campaign.

³Henxteworth, *passim*. *BPR*, *passim*. Gascons, not to mention "almains," "Spaniards," "Burgundians," and "Hainaulters," also appear in the Gascon Rolls, Patent Rolls, Close Rolls, and other sources.

⁴Baker, *Chronicon*, 230–31. Barber, *Life and Campaigns*, 61–62.

⁵*BPR*, IV, 253.

Discounting the several thousand Gascons, of course, skews the numbers downward. The assumption that the chroniclers always exaggerate their figures and revising those figures downward is also problematic, as in most instances there is no explanation for why and how those numbers are established. Logistics and ineluctable realities, as well as the administrative documents, can be used to check the accuracy of the chroniclers and correct them as appropriate so that we can arrive at a figure more precise than John Trevisa's "many men of armes and archeres."⁶ First, though, a brief survey of previous estimates will illustrate the variety of figures and methods used to arrive at them.

Herbert Hewitt, in his study of the expedition, only offers numbers for the English troops. He gives the following figures: "1000 men-at-arms, 1000 horse archers, 300 to 400 foot archers, about 170 Welshman."⁷ His numbers are based on the earlier works of A.E. Prince and J.H. Ramsay, as well as the chronicles and the indenture between the Prince and Edward III, but he offers no further explanation as to how he arrives at these numbers.

Ramsay concludes the Prince took 3400 men to Gascony: the 1100 men specified in the indenture for the Prince's personal retinue and then double that number for the magnate's contingents, thereby arriving at an estimate close to Robert of Avesbury's 3000, plus Welshman. It is unclear as to why and how he arrives at that number for the

⁶*Polychronicon Ranulphi Higden Monachi Cestrensis together with the English Translations of John Trevisa and of an Unknown Writer of the Fifteenth Century*, vol. 8, ed. Rev. Joseph Rawson Lumby (London, 1882), 348–49.

⁷Hewitt, *Black Prince's Expedition*, 20–21. See also A.E. Prince, "The Strength of English Armies in the Reign of Edward III," *English Historical Review* 47 (1931): 353–71, at 355–66; and J.H. Ramsay, "The Strength of English Armies in the Middle Ages," *English Historical Review* 14, no. 114 (1914): 221–27.

earls' retinues. Ramsay discounts Knighton's 2200,⁸ a figure that fits the shipping data in the previous chapter. He does not address the Gascons at all for the 1355 campaign.⁹ He also argues that Baker's figures (a total of 7000 men) are too high, particularly the 4000 men-at-arms. In this he appears to be following Stow's translation of Baker, who writes that the Prince had "quatuor mille togatorum, mille servientes, et duo milia sagittariorum." Stow translates this as "four thousand men of arms, one thousand armed souldiours [sic], and two thousand archers."¹⁰ Barber renders the same phrase as "four thousand men-at-arms, 1000 knights, and two thousand archers."¹¹ A more likely interpretation is "four thousand men-at-arms (including knights), one thousand sergeants, and 2000 archers," which is more in keeping with English armies of the period.¹²

A.E. Prince, in his work on the strength of English armies during Edward III's reign, estimates the Prince had 2600 men in the force that sailed from England: one thousand men-at-arms, one thousand mounted archers, and three hundred to four hundred

⁸Ramsay, "The Strength of English Armies," 224. Ramsay's primary interest—aside from showing that the chroniclers invariably inflate numbers except when their numbers agree with his—is determining the size of the English force at Poitiers.

⁹Furthermore, Ramsey summarily dismisses Gascon participation at Poitiers in 1356 "as most of these [the Gascon troops] had to be sent back for home defense." According to his figures 5000 combatants is the largest possible force the Prince could have fielded at Poitiers. Thus the Gascons have no real role in either campaign.

¹⁰John Stow, *The annales of England, faithfully collected out of the most authentically authors, records, and other monuments of antiquitie, from the first inhabitation until this present yeere 1592* (London, 1592), 408.

¹¹Barber, *Life and Campaigns of the Black Prince*, 72.

¹²"Sergientium" is similar to "servientum" per Giles' edition and "serviencium" per Thompson's edition. Alternatively, the "servientes" could simply mean "men...provided under the terms of service," rather than a reference to a specific type of soldier. *Anglo-Norman Dictionary*, "servise." There are no data on the number of "knights" in England in the mid fourteenth-century; Prestwich finds there were approximately 1000 active knights in England in 1324. Prestwich, *Plantagenet England*, 390–92.

foot archers, plus about 170 Welshman.¹³ He bases his numbers on the Prince's indenture with the king, then uses the regards (bonus payments) to estimate the size of the earls' companies, Reynold Cobham, and John de Lisle. Using the rate of 100 (66.67) marks per 30 men-at-arms for a quarter year and the regards paid on 10 June 1355 for a half year's service, he arrives at the following figures (See Table 4.1).¹⁴

Table 4.1: A.E. Prince's estimates of men-at-arms in the Prince's and magnates' retinues.

	Men-at-arms
Prince of Wales	609*
Reginald Cobham	30
John de Lisle	60^
Salisbury	55
Suffolk	60
Warwick	120

*The Prince's indenture, however, specifies 433 men-at-arms.¹⁵

^Interestingly, the account drawn up upon de Lisle's death during the 1355 campaign

¹³Prince, "Strength of English Armies," 366.

¹⁴Prince, "Strength of English Armies," 367.

¹⁵BPR, IV, 143.

shows that he had “20 knights (*milites*), 39 esquires, and 60 mounted archers.”¹⁶

More recent work has revised the numbers upward and includes the Gascon contingents. Jonathon Sumption suggests that the Prince brought 2,200 men from England, a number supported by Lambert’s work on the Prince’s fleet. Sumption’s number includes the Prince’s personal retinue, as well as the companies led by the earls of Warwick, Suffolk, Salisbury, and Oxford, Reginald de Cobham, and John de Lisle (the six magnates named as accompanying the Prince to Gascony). He estimates the total force at “between 6,000 and 8,000 men...an army roughly comparable with the one which had fought under Edward III at Crécy [a decade earlier, i.e., before the plague];” this is after the addition of the Gascon nobility, which he suggests provided at least 4,000 men. Sumption chooses this number as the Gascons “provided nearly 4,000 men for the *chevauchée* of the Earl of Stafford in 1352” and “cannot have done less for the Prince of Wales.”¹⁷

Jacqueline Caille’s numbers are higher. She writes “the raid called together several thousand men-at-arms...*chevaliers*, an exceptional number of archers (some mounted, some on foot), the light troops named *bidauts* to which is added auxiliaries of all sorts (valets, purveyors, conveyors but not any siege specialists).”¹⁸ Caille estimates

¹⁶TNA, E 372/200, m. 43.

¹⁷Sumption, *Trial by Fire*, 175–76.

¹⁸Caille, “Nouveaux Regards,” 89. “Ce raid réunit plusieurs milliers d’hommes d’armes, de 10,000 à 20,000 (si ce n’est pas 60,000!) selon les sources et l’interprétation qu’en donnent les commentateurs: des chevaliers, un nombre exceptionnel d’archers (les uns montés, les autres à pied), des combattants légers appelés *bidauts* auxquels il faut ajouter des auxiliaires de toutes sortes (valets, pourvoyeurs, convoyeurs, mais aucun spécialiste

the force between 10,000 and 20,000. These numbers clearly include the auxiliaries, the Gascons, and the mercenaries. As the previous chapter indicates, the Prince's fleet transported about 2200 soldiers and others from England to Bordeaux; therefore, Caille's figures must include the Gascons and non-combatants.

The suggested 20,000, however, is too large. It would require the Gascons to field almost 17,000 soldiers, roughly four times the number Gascony provided for the earl of Stafford's 1352 raid.¹⁹ Furthermore, the needs of an army of 20,000 would have significantly increased the logistical difficulties of supplying the force. To begin, 250 pack animals would have been required to carry a single day's grain ration for the men, 4000 animals to carry a ten day supply. These figures also only account for the grain consumed by the pack animals (for each day, an animal would consume 10 lbs of its load of about 250 lbs), that is roughly ten pounds per day, and does not include the grain required by the cavalry horses. Even if only 5000 cavalry horses, assuming a very small number of men-at-arms (each with two to five horses), accompanied the army that would result in an additional 50,000 lbs of grain for each day (See Table 4.2). This would require nearly 8000 pack animals, more if additional fodder for the horses or water had to be carried. 20,000 thus seems to be too large a force. (For discussion of the 10,000 see below). Even if the army relied solely on carts to transport rations, that would have still required an additional 2700 cart horses (for the army's use of carts see Chapter 5: The Campaign to Narbonne).

des sièges urbains." She is correct about the lack of siege specialists. There was also no siege equipment, which is in keeping with the nature of the *chevauchée*.

¹⁹Sumption, *Trial by Fire*, 1745–76.

Table 4.2: Daily Grain needs for an army of 20,000 with 5000 cavalry horses.

	Numbers	Daily Grain Needs	10 Days' Ration
Men	20,000	3 lbs / 1.3 kg	600,000 lbs / 272,155 kg
Cavalry Horses	5000	10 lbs / 4.5 kg	500,000 lbs / 226,796 kg
Pack Animals	7900*	10 lbs / 4.5 kg	790,000 lbs / 358,337 kg
horses for 687 carts	2752	10lbs / 4.5 kg	257,200 lbs / 116,664 kg

* The number of pack animals needed to carry the 10 days' supply of grain.

Peter Hoskins proposes a total force of 9000–10,000, including non-combatants. He suggests a force of 2600 from England, that, when adding the Gascons and mercenaries, totaled 6000–8000 combatants. As for non-combatants, he writes that a complement equal to 50 percent of the army's strength would have been unremarkable, bringing his total to 8000–10,000.²⁰

Moving from these estimates to the chronicles reveals that the contemporary writers provide remarkably similar numbers, with the exception of the normally reliable Geoffrey Baker. His numbers are inflated. He writes that the army was divided in three battalions: a vanguard of 3000 men-at-arms, a main force of “seven thousand men-at-arms apart from clerks and foot soldiers,” and a rearguard of 4000. With men-at-arms,

²⁰Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 20–21.

clerks, archers, and others, Baker claims that the army had 60,000 men.²¹ Using *Sachskritik* and the logistical models discussed in Chapter Two (historiography, sources, and methods), it is clear that this number is patently exaggerated. For one thing, Edward III could not even begin to pay a force of that size, even if everyone received the same wages as a Welsh archer: 3*d* a day.²² That would amount to 750*l* per day and an enormous 5250*l* per week just for wages. The largest “sum of the issue” Henxteworth recorded was 27 December 1355 and amounted to 373*l* 2*s* 9.5*d*. The sum of Henxteworth’s “busiest” week came to 554*l* 4*d*, and the total for both November and December 1355, which saw the greatest number of payments of wages, ran to 2107*l* 7*s* 11*d*, and that total included payments for food, supplies, and other items. Looking solely at the pay records (the Prince and the magnates paid their companies from the advance wages they received) it is clear that Baker’s numbers are wrong.

Using Engels’s basic logistical model, even without properly nuancing the data he uses for caloric needs (for more on that see Chapter 5: The Campaign to Narbonne), also proves that Baker’s numbers are faulty. A force of 60,000 men would need 180,000 lbs (see Table 4.3) of grain daily just to feed the men, let alone the horses. The number of horses required for a three days’ march would be staggering, particularly if the army had to carry fodder and water. To start, some 1200 horses would be needed to carry a minimum of non-comestible supplies, assuming a low ratio of one horse to every fifty

²¹Baker, *Chronicon*, 230–31. “...septem mille viri armorum praeter clericos et servientes fuerunt...In toto exercitu taliter ordinato, fuerunt virorum armorum, clericorum, servientium, sagittariorum et brigancium et bidners, ultra sexgesies ille viri...” Cf. Engels’ discussion of Alexander’s army of 40,000.

²²BPR, III, 491. As far as I can tell, the Welsh archers received the lowest wages in the army, excluding support staff.

men and discounting cavalry horses, before including pack horses and their rations.²³

This expedition, however, was a raid. Therefore, cavalry must also be included. Baker claims there were 14,000 men-at-arms, so assuming a very conservative one horse per man-at-arms²⁴ would give us 14,000 horses, excluding the horses necessary for mounted archers, in addition to the 1200 baggage animals. Given that, the army would need roughly 1380 pack animals to carry a single day's grain ration and more than 4500 horses for a three days' march (see table 4.4).²⁵

²³Engels, 19. $N = \frac{1(192,000+0+0)-(0)}{250 - 1(250-10)}$

This assumes a ratio of one horse per fifty men and does not include cavalry horses. It further assumes that fodder and fresh water are readily available and that personnel are not carrying supplies. Therefore, 192,000 lbs is the total weight of the army's grain supply for personnel and packhorses. It is divided by the carrying capacity of a single horse less that horse's daily ration of grain.

²⁴Ayton's work clearly demonstrates that a man-at-arms would ideally have between three and five horses depending on rank. Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, 58.

²⁵Engels has shown that Alexander's army, with a total size of more than 100,000, navigated terrains and climates more inhospitable than Gascony, for example, the Gedrosian Desert. However, Alexander's plan relied upon resupply by sea—an option unavailable to the Prince—and, when the fleet was delayed several months, Alexander lost 75 percent of his army on the march, particularly women, children, and the baggage train. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army*, 13, n. 8, 94, n. 98, 110–18.

Table 4.3: Daily Grain Ration for Baker's 60,000 soldiers and non-combatants.

	Numbers	Ration (lbs)/(kg) ²⁶	Weight (lbs)/ (kg)
Personnel	60,000	3 lbs / 1.3 kg	180,000 lbs / 78,000 kg
Cavalry horses	14,000 ²⁷	10 lbs / 4.5 kg	140,000 lbs / 63,000 kg
Baggage horses	1200	10 lbs / 4.5 kg	12,000 lbs / 5400 kg
Pack animals	1384	10 lbs / 4.5 kg	13,840 lbs / 6228 kg

Table 4.3: The army's grain ration for 1 day using Baker's numbers of 60,000, including 14,000 mounted men-at-arms, and assuming a ratio of 1 baggage animal to every 50 personnel. This scenario also assumes that fodder and water are available.

Table 4.4: Three days' grain ration for Baker's 60,000 soldiers and non-combatants.

	Numbers	Ration (lbs)/(kg)	Weight (lbs)/(kg)
Personnel	60,000	9 lbs / 3.9 kg	540,000 lbs / 234,000 kg
Cavalry horses	14,000	30 lbs / 13.5 kg	420,000 lbs / 189,000 kg
Baggage horses	1200	30 lbs/ 13.5 kg	36,000 lbs / 16,200 kg
Pack animals	4528	30 lbs / 13.5 kg	135,840 lbs / 61,128 kg

²⁶For the purpose of this basic exercise, I have maintained Engels' numbers for the rations needed by each man and animal, e.g., 3 lbs of grain per man per day. When this equation is applied to the Prince's actual army, I use more nuanced numbers that account for factors such as the average age of the men, their level of physical activity, and conditions. See Chapter 5.

²⁷14,000 is the bare minimum, as it assumes only 1 mount for each man-at-arms, which is unlikely.

Table 4.4: The army's grain ration for 3 days using Baker's numbers of 60,000, including 14,000 mounted men-at-arms, and assuming a ratio of 1 baggage animal to every 50 personnel. This scenario also assumes that fodder and water are available.

If forage and water were not readily available, which was the case along some points of the march, more than 13,000 horses would be needed to carry the weight of the army's total grain (332,000 lbs), fodder (152,000 lbs), and water (1,516,00 lbs)—impossible even for a force of 10,000 men—supplies for a single day (see Table 4.5).²⁸ A two day march would require 80,000 horses not including the 14,000 horses of the men-at-arms and the 1200 baggage horses, an astronomical number assuming that many could even be found (and given that typically a man-at-arms would serve with two to five horses depending on his status and that the archers would have been mounted).²⁹ Even if forage were available, it still would have been impossible for the land to provide the necessary forage for that number of horses, especially if the army camped in the same place for more than one night, which it did. A march of three days carrying grain, forage, and water would be impossible. The logistical models show that, given these ineluctable realities, it is clear that Baker's numbers are logistically nonsense.

The army could, of course, march on half rations, which would bring the total weight of the army's comestible supplies and water to 1,000,000 lbs. If personnel also carried supplies at 30 lbs per person, then no pack animals would be needed for the first

²⁸
$$N = \frac{1(332,000 + 152,000 + 1,516,000)}{250 - 1(10 - 10 - 80)} = \frac{1(2,000,000)}{150} = 13,334 \text{ pack animals.}$$

²⁹Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, 12–22 and 57–60. Considering that, an army of the size Baker describes could have had more than 100,000 horses with it.

day as the carrying capacity of the personnel [1,800,000 lbs (60,000 x 30 lbs)] would exceed the weight of the supplies. A second day's march would require 1000 horses, and a third day's march 8000 horses. If the cavalry horses carried supplies, the army could carry enough supplies for four days, but even with cavalry horses being used as pack animals, the army could not march five days.³⁰ This further underscores the improbability of Baker's numbers.

³⁰It is highly unlikely that cavalry horses were used in this manner. The larger point, though, is that a march of more than four days carrying food, forage, and water, even at half-rations, is impossible.

Table 4.5: One day's ration of grain, forage, and water for Baker's 60,000 soldiers and non-combatants.

	Numbers	Ration (lbs)/(kg); (gal)/(L)	Weight (lbs)/(kg)
Personnel	60,000	Grain: 3 lbs / 1.3 kg Water: .5 gal ³¹ / 1.89 L	180,000 lbs / 78,000 kg 300,000 lbs / 113,400 kg
Cavalry horses	14,000	Grain: 10 lbs / 4.5 kg Forage: 10 lbs / 4.5 kg Water: 8 gal / 30 L	140,000 lbs / 63,000 kg 140,000 lbs / 63,000 kg 1,120,000 lbs / 420,000 kg
Baggage horses	1200	Grain: 10 lbs / 4.5 kg Forage: 10 lbs / 4.5 kg Water: 8 gal / 30 L	12,000 lbs / 5400 kg 12,000 lbs / 5400 kg 96,000 lbs / 36,000 kg
Pack animals	13,334	Grain: 10 lbs / 4.5 kg Forage: 10 lbs / 4.5 kg Water: 8 gal / 30 L	133,340 lbs / 60,003 kg 133,340 lbs / 60,000 kg 1,066,720 lbs / 400,020 kg

Table 4.5: The army's grain, forage, and water ration for a single day using Baker's figure of 60,000, including 14,000 mounted men-at-arms, and assuming a ratio of 1 baggage animal per 50 personnel. This table assumes that forage and water are not

³¹Using the imperial gallon, which by definition weighs 10 pounds.

available and that personnel and cavalry are not carrying comestible supplies and that the army is on full rations.

Thomas Gray, in *Scalacronica*, claims the Prince went to Gascony “with a 1000. men of armes and the erles of Warwike, Oxford, Saresby, and Southfolk...with the Gascoynes.”³² Gray hazards no guesses about the size of the Gascon contingent, nor does he mention the archers. A thousand men-at-arms is a reasonable number, considering the 433 from the Prince’s retinue and the addition of the earls’ companies. At Poitiers, Gray writes that the Prince had “1900 men-at-arms and 1500 archers,”³³ for a total of 3400.

The indenture with the king states that the Prince had “433 men-at-arms and 700 archers (400 mounted and 300 on foot) as his own retinue.”³⁴ Henry Knighton claims the Prince had 800 men-at-arms and some 1400 archers.³⁵ This is roughly double the Prince’s retinue, per the indenture, so unless Knighton was including the retinues of the four earls in his estimate, he clearly is exaggerating. However, if Knighton *is* including the earls’ companies, than his total of 2200 men is in line with Sumption’s suggested figure and Lambert’s shipping data. Avesbury claims the Prince had 1000 men-at-arms and 2000 archers, as well as a “large number of Welshmen,”³⁶ for a total of more than three thousand men, a number that is unlikely even accounting for the retinues of the

³²Thomas Gray, Joseph Stevenson, and John Leland, eds., *Scalacronica* (Edinburgh, 1836), 140.

³³Gray, *Scalacronica*, 147.

³⁴BPR, IV, 143.

³⁵Knighton, *Knighton’s Chronicle*, 128–29.

³⁶Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 424. “...cum mille hominibus armorum et M¹M¹ sagittariis magnoque numero Wallensium.”

earls. To meet such a total, the earls would each need to supply a retinue of at least 500 soldiers—*milites*, squires, sergeants, and archers. Using Knighton's figures, the earls would each have to assemble a retinue of about 250 soldiers. For example, the earl of Warwick provided a retinue of "2 bannerets, 26 knights, 71 men-at-arms, 40 armed men, and 100 archers" in 1341;³⁷ Warwick's 1359 retinue included eighty men-at-arms and one hundred archers.³⁸ Suffolk provided a retinue of 55 men-at-arms for the 1342 Brittany campaign. Oxford's retinue in 1334–1335 had 28 men-at-arms and 12 mounted archers. Given these numbers, it is unlikely the magnates could have provided the remaining 527 men-at-arms to make Avesbury's 1000—coming up with 327 to meet Knighton's 800 would have been difficult enough. It seems safe to say, then, that the Prince brought roughly 2000 soldiers with him, a number that accords well with Lambert's data on the transport fleet and its capabilities (see previous chapter). With the addition of the Gascons, probably 3000–4000 men, the Prince had a force of between 5000 and 6000 combatants,³⁹ as well as a large number of non-combatants.

Aside from the combatants there would be those non-combatants essential to the functioning of the army, although one could argue that minstrels,⁴⁰ presumably for the Prince's personal entertainment, were hardly essential to the efficient progress of the

³⁷CPR 1340–1343, 264–67. H.J. Hewitt, "The Organization of War," in *The Wars of Edward III, Sources and Interpretation*, ed. Clifford J. Rogers, 285–302 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1999), at 289.

³⁸Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, 161. TNA, E 101/393/11, ff. 79, 87.

³⁹*La Vie du Prince Noir*, II, 643–44; Froissart, *Oeuvres*, vol. 5, 344; Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 305, n. 103. Sumption, *Trial by Fire*, 175–76; Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 21.

⁴⁰Henxte worth pays a number of minstrels throughout the campaign. See for example, DCO, Henxte worth accounts, entry for 5 October 1355.

army. This somewhat amorphous group would include cooks, grooms, chaplains, minstrels, the Prince's tailor—yes, the Prince's personal tailor accompanied the army and was kept quite busy⁴¹—, clerks, and hostlers. Based on Henxteworth's accounts, these non-combatants were organized into different 'departments,' such as the spicery, the kitchen, the marshalcy, and the butlery, among others. That there were a number of these non-combatants accompanying the army is indisputable; the question is how many of them did so.

This depends, in part, on the Prince's supply system. If the supplies are moved primarily by carts, the number could be larger if some of the non-combatants, such as grooms, did not double as drivers. On the other hand, if most of the supply transport is done by army personnel and pack animals, fewer non-combatants would be needed. Engels estimates a ratio of one 'follower' to three combatants for Alexander the Great's army.⁴² This would mean an additional two thousand men accompanying the Prince's army, for a total of eight thousand. Roth gives a lower ration of four to one,⁴³ which would add 1500 men and bring the Prince's force to 7500 men. Yuval Harari's work suggests a higher ratio,⁴⁴ namely as high as 50 percent of the army's strength (the number used by Hoskins in his calculations). In the case of the Prince's army, then, the noncombatants would come to 3000, for a total of 9000. It seems safe to conclude that

⁴¹Henxteworth pays him, and he is provided with cloth to make clothes for the Prince while on campaign. DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 1 October 1355, 11–23 December 1355, and 13 January 1356.

⁴²Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army*, 12–14.

⁴³Roth, *Logistics of the Roman Army at War*, 113–14. His estimate matches Junkelmann's numbers. Junkelmann, *Die Legionen des Augustus*, 124.

⁴⁴Harari, "Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Campaigns," 301–02.

the size of the Prince's army came to 8000–9000 men, including non-combatants, a number slightly higher than Sumption's 6000–8000 men and just lower than Caille's 10,000 soldiers (See Table 4.6 and Table 4.7). All further calculations will be based on a force of 8000 men, erring on the side of the minimum of which the Prince's logistics were capable.

Table 4.6: Historians' estimates of the strength of the Prince's force.

	Numbers
J. H. Ramsay*	3400; 5000
A.E. Prince	2600
Herbert Hewitt [^]	2570
Jonathon Sumption	6000–8000
Jacqueline Caille	10,000–20,000
Peter Hoskins	9000–10,000

*The first number is his estimate of the force that sailed from England. The second figure is the highest number he accepts for the English forces at Poitiers.

[^]Hewitt only gives numbers for the English troops and offers no numbers on the troops the Gascons supplied.

Table 4.7: The Prince's numbers according to the Chronicler.

	Numbers (1355; at Poitiers 1356)
Geoffrey Baker*	60,000; 7000
Robert of Avesbury	3000 ⁺
Henry Knighton	2200
Indenture [^]	1133
Thomas Gray	1000; 3400

*His numbers include the Gascons.

⁺He also includes a “large number of Welshman.”

[^]The indenture includes the Prince's retinue, not the retinues of the earls and other magnates.

Recruitment

England already had in place a highly sophisticated system of recruitment and array by the mid-fourteenth century. There were two distinct methods: commissions of array for archers and a variety of other means for men-at-arms, most notably the indenture. The commissions of array first came into use under Edward I (1239–1307) during the Welsh wars and Scottish campaigns. Initially, the responsibility lay with the sheriffs, but eventually this task passed to “magnates and knights with military experience.”⁴⁵ By the end of the reign, the commissions also focused on more limited geographic areas, such as specific counties. The commissions depended on local officials to select the soldiers and

⁴⁵Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, 123. “Knights” is Prestwich's word.

archers. The main result of these early commissions was large numbers of men of varying competence, given the common use of bribes to leave capable men who wanted to avoid service behind. The quality of the archers improved with a change in recruitment practices under Edward III: the inclusion of specified numbers of archers, as well as men-at-arms, in indentures with commanders. Commissions of array were still used, but by Agincourt (1415) almost every archer served in a retinue. The exact mechanism for recruiting archers into a retinue is unclear. They were not retained. Most likely, the first place a commander looked was his own estate.⁴⁶ This was certainly true of the Prince. The archers for his retinue primarily came from Chester.

The Prince required a large number of archers to be arrayed. His initial orders of May 1355 to array 200 archers were augmented in June, when he commanded de Brunham to “send 300 archers of the county of [Chester]” and another “100 archers of the county of Flynt.” They were to reach Plymouth by three weeks from Midsummer, so in mid-July.⁴⁷ In addition to the recruitment of these archers, the Prince at times also specified who should be leading the archers, which suggests the Prince and his advisors had detailed knowledge of the men available to serve and lead these companies. For example, the same order to John de Delves that commanded him to array archers for the Prince’s company specified that “Hamonet [sic] Mascy and Goldesburgh ‘le frere’” should lead the archers from the hundred of Broxton. John de Hide, Robert de Legh the son, Robert Bruyn, and John Griffyn were also named “leaders of the archers,” and the Prince’s orders further specified to which group of archers each captain was to be

⁴⁶Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, 122–25.

⁴⁷BPR, III, 199–200, 204.

assigned.⁴⁸ Later John de Hide was given command of all the archers from Mackelesfeld despite an earlier order that assigned half to him and the half to Robert de Legh, *films*.⁴⁹ The Prince, then, was not merely concerned with numbers; he was also involved in the selection of captains, which may have been made on the advice of the arrayers or other local officials. This clearly demonstrates that the Prince's army was hierarchically organized down to the smallest unit, namely a unit of twenty archers led by a captain, or vintenaar (for more on the captains, see below).⁵⁰

Recruitment, of course, did not always go smoothly. Men offered bribes—and recruiters accepted same—to avoid service.⁵¹ Occasionally “inferior men” were arrayed.⁵² Some archers in Chester chose to serve “in the companies of other persons” rather than in the Prince's company, which indicates that the Prince's retinue was not the only one that included archers. This was a direct violation of the Prince's decree that no archer could do so without special leave “until the prince should be assured of as many archers as he needed.” The Prince clearly took this seriously, as he ordered John de Delves and Thomas de Dutton, the sheriff of Cheshire, to seize the lands and goods of any man who had done so, any man who was leading these archers, and whomever “procured their withdrawal from the prince.”⁵³

There was also the problem of ensuring that men, once recruited, actually showed

⁴⁸BPR, III, 200, 204. This is Hamon Masey, who appears often in the BPR and in Henxteworth's accounts.

⁴⁹BPR, III, 205. This countermanding order is dated 4 days after the original order.

⁵⁰Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, 127.

⁵¹Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, 124.

⁵²Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 85–86. This was not a new problem. Edward III had such difficulties during the Scottish campaigns of the 1330s.

⁵³BPR, III, 205.

up. Take, for instance, the case of Thomas de Brescy. He received his cloth for livery, and possibly his pay, along with the other archers from Chester but failed to show up at Plymouth. Officials in Chester were instructed to find him and order him to “come to the prince with all speed.” In the event he made excuses or tried to evade, they were to arrest him and confine him at Chester castle.⁵⁴ At one point, action was to have been taken against Richard Bower of Knotesford, as an order of 22 August commanded the chamberlain of Chester “to supersede any impeachment or levying of issues which may have been made against him because he came not to the prince when his companions came.”⁵⁵

There were also desertions once the archers arrived in Plymouth. Richard de Wynstanston of Chester, for example, deserted and took with him more than 6/ from the Prince’s wardrobe. Unsurprisingly, the Prince commanded, on the advice of Sir Richard de Stafford, that Wynstanston be seized and imprisoned “until he has given satisfaction for the money and until further order.”⁵⁶ Similar orders to imprison and seize the lands and goods of all the archers who had, after taking wages and livery, “withdrawn themselves from the prince, wither the prince knows not” were issued from Plymouth on 5 September; a detailed list of thirty-nine names, organized by county, followed.⁵⁷ De Brescy and Wynstanston, mentioned above, are both included in the schedule for Chester and are two of the four men listed as ‘missing’ from Chester. The men from Flynt and

⁵⁴BPR, III, 212.

⁵⁵BPR, III, 214.

⁵⁶BPR, III, 214.

⁵⁷BPR, III, 215. The counties are Flynt, Cheshire, and North Wales. Copies of the letter and schedule were sent to John de Delves and John de Brunham, lieutenant justice of Chester and chamberlain of Chester respectively, and to the chamberlain of North Wales.

North Wales listed as deserters far outnumber the Cheshire archers.⁵⁸ All in all, the schedule lists thirty-nine archers who had deserted, four from Chester, fourteen from North Wales, and the remaining twenty-one from Flynt [in north-eastern Wales but linked to Chester for administrative purposes].

These failures to appear and desertions demonstrate the high level of administration involved in recruiting soldiers for the English expeditions across the Channel. The Prince's forces were organized enough to know not only who had enlisted, as it were, and accepted wages and or livery but also who took the money and ran. The seriousness with which these desertions were handled indicates an administration more than capable of recognizing the fraud and dealing with it effectively. It clearly was considered a crime and, as far as the Prince's orders are concerned, was to be handled as one. This is borne out in a separate command that certain archers who returned to Chester were *not* to be impeached because the Prince was satisfied that they were, indeed, "too ill to travel with him."⁵⁹ This order of 2 September, as well as similar orders from 7 September,⁶⁰ suggests that these eight men, without the protection of the Prince's blessing, could and likely would have been impeached, possibly imprisoned, and might have had their lands and or goods seized. They were not the only men to fall ill during the delay at Plymouth. Five men of North Wales and four men of Flynt were allowed to

⁵⁸Interestingly, the missing Welsh archers, based upon name evidence and the counties in which they were arrayed, far outnumber the English/Cheshire archers.

⁵⁹BPR, III, 214.

⁶⁰BPR, III, 215–16. These orders list several men and are among the final orders issued from Plymouth before the expedition sailed for Gascony.

return home under similar circumstances.⁶¹ This does raise the question of disease among the soldiers waiting at Plymouth. Unfortunately, there is no evidence as to what illness these men had or how many others had also fallen ill.

While archers were arrayed, men-at-arms (bannerets, bachelors, squires, serjeants, and others.) were ‘hired’ in a variety of ways,⁶² and according to Walter de Milemete service could be divided into three categories: voluntary, paid, compulsory.⁶³ Paid troops were a significant part of English armies. Military obligation was insufficient for raising the numbers needed and attempts to institute different forms of military obligation provoked significant hostility and resistance. Paying and rewarding troops was much more effective. This was done through indentures, i.e., contracts for military service. The use of short-term contracts dates to no later than the late thirteenth century, to 1270 and Prince Edward’s (Edward I) crusade expedition. These contracts became increasingly complex. The English crown used them, and Edward I used contracts when sending armies to Gascony in 1290s. Edward III did not use such contracts for campaigns he led personally, but did use indentures for expeditions led by others, such as the Black Prince (for more on indentures, see below).⁶⁴

The Prince had his own personal retinue of 433 men-at-arms, leaving the earls and those in their retinues to come up with the remaining 367 soldiers to arrive at

⁶¹BPR, II, 216.

⁶²*Servitium debitum* was not among them. Edward III’s reign saw one feudal levy in 1327. Edward III’s attempt to establish a new form of military obligation was abandoned in 1352.

⁶³M.R. James, ed., *Treatise of Walter de Milemete* (Oxford, 1913), xviii, ff. 27b–30. Milemete wrote his treatise in the last years of Edward II’s reign for the heir, the future Edward III.

⁶⁴Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, 88.

Knighton's total of 800 men-at-arms. In some cases the earls used indentures, as well as other methods to provide the needed men-at-arms. One source was men who had previously established relationships and agreements regarding military service. Roger Loring, for example, held a manor in Somerset of the earl of Salisbury, for which he was to "render a lance of war yearly."⁶⁵ He served in Salisbury's company on the campaign.⁶⁶ In addition to the earls' retinues, other men-at-arms had their own, smaller retinues. Richard De Stafford (the Prince's steward), for example, had his own company,⁶⁷ albeit not an overly large one.⁶⁸

Aside from the recruitment of soldiers, the Prince also had to recruit support staff. It is not an accident that Humphrey le Ferrou, farrier of the Prince's household, was pardoned a debt of 23l 8s 8d; the pardon is dated 1 June 1355 "by command of the prince himself."⁶⁹ Most of the support staff, though, likely would have been already in service, i.e. already members of the Prince's household. Hervey Hewe, for example, worked in the scullery before the campaign and continued to serve in that 'department' while in Gascony.⁷⁰

One other group that must be considered is mariners, who were not recruited in

⁶⁵TNA, C 54/192, m. 28v. CCR, X, 58.

⁶⁶TNA, C 61/67, m. 7. Rymer, Appendix E, 16.

⁶⁷BPR, III, 203, 212.

⁶⁸Exact numbers are unavailable, but there is a consensus that his company was small, possibly not more than 15–20 men. Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*, 79–81; Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 119.

⁶⁹BPR, IV, 132.

⁷⁰DCO, Henxteworth, 23. BPR, IV, 192.

the same way as archers and other soldiers.⁷¹ For example, Robert de Hull and Richard Theband were ordered to “take 120 mariners for the king’s service...in all ports and places from the mouth of the water of the Thames as far as the port of London, and put them on ships fitted out for his service to go at his wages as they shall be ordered.”⁷² In February 1355, Thomas Dautre, as part of his orders to arrest ships to carry supplies to Gascony, was “to take sufficient mariners for the governance (*gubernaculum*) of such ships and put them therein at the king’s wages.”⁷³ This is clearly a different procedure than the commissioning and arraying of archers, let alone the system of formal indentures. Shipmasters were also needed, and just as there was continuity in the personnel responsible for arresting ships there was some continuity among the shipmasters. Of those who sailed to Gascony in 1355, at least seventeen of them served the king in the same capacity but unconnected with the Prince’s expedition the following year (See Appendix A).⁷⁴

“Paperwork”

An expedition of this size generated an immense amount of paperwork, not all of it pertaining to the Prince’s military activities. To be sure, the flurry of orders between March and early September in the *Register* clearly shows that the Prince was putting his affairs in order. These orders included settling cases, assigning wardships, paying debts, appointing swan keepers (swanherds), and seeing to the administration of Cornwall,

⁷¹For the most recent work on this subject see Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Military*, 2011.

⁷²TNA, C 66/244, m. 4; CPR, 10, 155.

⁷³TNA, C 66/245, m. 24; CPR, 10, 178.

⁷⁴TNA, C 76/34, m. 17. Rymer, Appendix E, 19–20.

Chester, Wales, and other lands in the Prince's absence, among other things. On 24 August, John de Kendale was given the power "to remove and appoint bailiffs *in accordance with the orders given to him on 19 August* [emphasis mine]."⁷⁵ He also reminded Robert de Legh, *pere*, a forester in Mackelesfeld to take proper care of the forest, "for the prince would hate his game to be destroyed or ruined in any way during his absence beyond seas."⁷⁶

It also entailed setting up a council to oversee the Prince's affairs while he was in Gascony. First, Henry de Blakebourn replaced William de Northwell as the treasurer and keeper of the Prince's wardrobe. Blakebourn officially took over on 1 July 1355, the date on which Northwell was to deliver by indenture "everything of the prince's that he ha[d] in his keeping, to wit, moneys, jewels, silver vessels, victuals, and all other things."⁷⁷ Both men received letters to this effect. The accounts show that Northwell had surrendered the jewels by 8 July 1355, and the value of these jewels was more than 500*l*, a substantial amount.⁷⁸ One of Blakebourn's tasks was making payments, especially for foreign expenses like alms, messages, gifts, and wages and fees of war (advances paid to soldiers), and these payments were to be "allowed" to him along with all "other costs incurred by him at the prince's order."⁷⁹ Blakeburn, though, did have to justify his accounts with the auditors and the controller of the household, Alexander de Aungre. He was given detailed instructions, particularly in regard to double-checking the treasurer's

⁷⁵BPR, II, 82.

⁷⁶BPR, III, 207.

⁷⁷BPR, IV, 139.

⁷⁸BPR, IV, 141-2. The total value was 579*l* 10*s*, and the jewels included rings, silver gilt panners, brooches, diamonds, rubies, and enameled pieces, among other items.

⁷⁹BPR, IV, 149.

accounts before re-imbursing him.⁸⁰

The earls also made arrangements. Ufford, the earl of Suffolk, appointed men to receive money due him from the sheriffs and royal ministers.⁸¹ William de Montacute arranged to have his debts postponed and or forgiven.⁸² he also appointed Richard de Chadesle to pursue the 10,000/ owed the earl by the bishop of Salisbury and several canons of St. Mary's church.⁸³

The Prince's paperwork also included securing pardons for men in his company, men such as John Dymmok who had received known felons, specifically John de Lodelowe "indicted of the death of Simon le Keu."⁸⁴ Incidentally, Lodelowe served on the campaign and received his pardon for the felony on 5 June 1357.⁸⁵ He and Walter Lodelowe received pardons on 6 September 1357 for robbery (for more on the criminal element of the army see below).⁸⁶ Stephen Rollyng of Sandwich received a pardon on 28 July 1355 for stealing a cow. He was granted this pardon because he was "going on the king's service" to Gascony.⁸⁷ These men received pardons before going on campaign, which indicates that their business was sufficiently important to the king as to warrant pardons. Furthermore, it allowed these men to serve on the campaign without standing trial, thus removing their crimes from the normal course of the king's justice.

⁸⁰BPR, IV, 149.

⁸¹TNA, C 66245, m. 1; CPR, 10, 223.

⁸²Rymer, III, I, 305.

⁸³TNA, C 54/193, m. 34v. CCR, X, 180. Chadesle did succeed in securing payment.

⁸⁴TNA, C 66/246, m. 14; CPR, 10, 262.

⁸⁵TNA, C 66/252, m. 28. CPR, 10, 559. His pardon gives the dead man's name as Simon Cook

⁸⁶TNA, C 66/252, m. 6. CPR, 10, 599. Walter Lodelowe served in Salisbury's company according to his pardon.

⁸⁷TNA, C 66/246, m. 8.

In some cases, the pardon was also a recruitment tool.⁸⁸ In March 1296, pardons were given to prisoners and outlaws who provided the necessary sureties and pledged to serve in the army in Scotland. They also received the king's wages.⁸⁹ In 1339–40 more than 800 pardons were granted.⁹⁰ By 1343, as Edward III (1312–77) was preparing for the Brittany campaign, the system had altered somewhat. Pardons were still offered, but the criminal only received one *after* serving in France *at his own expense*.⁹¹ Pardons were offered so regularly that it appears some soldiers joined the army for the express purpose of obtaining one. Richard Holm of Yorkshire volunteered in 1359—after he had killed a man.⁹² Undoubtedly some men, like Holm, volunteered in order to receive a pardon. Parliament protested on more than one occasion about the practice.⁹³

A group of six men who threw two pirates overboard received pardons in 1355

⁸⁸Helen Lacey, *The Royal Pardon: Access to Mercy in Fourteenth-Century England* (Rochester: Boydell & Brewer, 2009), 100. For her discussion of the use of the military pardon and contemporary debates about it, as well as historiographic debates on the effect of the military pardon on public order, see 100–106. John Bellamy, *Crime and Public Order in England in the Later Middle Ages* (London/Toronto: Routledge & Kegan Paul/University of Toronto Press, 1973), 192–93.

⁸⁹CPR, 1292–1301, 186. Bellamy, *Crime and Public Order*, 192–93. Any who were appealed, though, still had to stand trial upon their return to England.

⁹⁰Neil Jamieson, “‘Sons of Iniquity’: The Problem of Unlawfulness and Criminality amongst Professional Soldiers in the Middle Ages,” in *Outlaws in Medieval and Early Modern England: Crime, Government and Society, c. 1066–c.1600*, ed. John C. Appleby and Paul Dalt, 91–110 (Farnham/Burlington: Ashgate, 2009), 103.

⁹¹Owen Pike, *A History of Crime in England, Illustrating the changes of the laws in the progress of civilization* (London, 1873–1876), I, 295; Bellamy, *Crime and Public Order*, 193.

⁹²Jamieson, “‘Sons of Iniquity’,” 102. K. Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 19. Holm started his career as a professional soldier with a homicide in Coventry in 1359. He went on to become a mercenary captain and ended as an esquire and captain of a castle in the Calais Pale in 1380.

⁹³Lacey, *The Royal Pardon*, 102–03.

before the fleet sailed for Gascony.⁹⁴ Given their actions, these six men were likely mariners, which raises the question of the use of pardons as an incentive for maritime service. Of greater import, particularly for the shipping of the army, are a set of pardons granted to Thomas Clerk, John Ram, John Spryngcman (Sperman), Hamo Louetoft (Hamond Lovetoft), William Odam, Thomas Ram, Bartholomew Stygan (Stigeyn), and Robert Hull: all shipmasters of ships known to have been arrested to transport the Prince's army to Gascony. The pardons were for "the account which [they] should render of moneys and profits" from previous voyages,⁹⁵ which may be indicative of smuggling. Also significant is their collective experience. Six of the seven had recently sailed to and from Gascony, specifically during "the last season of vintage [1354],"⁹⁶ and the seventh man, Bartholomew Stygan (Stigeyn) had recently called at Vermeo (Bermeo) in Biscay (now Basque Country in northern Spain). All seven, then, were familiar with the sea lanes between England and the ports on the Bay of Biscay. While the use of pardons in recruitment of ship masters and mariners is not as clear as in the recruitment of land-based troops, the timing of these pardons is suggestive.

Numerous letters of protection were "made out in favour of...those...who are to go in the prince's company." Many of these letters were valid for a year from the quinzaine of Trinity, 15 June 1355. Letters of protection also were made out in favor of men serving in other companies, such as Thomas Darden, who served in the company of

⁹⁴TNA, C 66/245, m. 12.

⁹⁵TNA, C 66/246, m. 5; CPR, 10, 280–81. Rymer, Appendix E, 13–14.

⁹⁶TNA, C 66/246, m. 5; CPR, 10, 280–81.

Richard De Stafford,⁹⁷ and John Tochet serving in the Earl of Warwick's company.⁹⁸

The practice was a normal part of military preparations. The earliest examples date to the 1220s and were a common feature of crusading.⁹⁹

There were also numerous "letters of attorney."¹⁰⁰ Roger de Clifford, who served in Warwick's company, appointed his attorneys in early June.¹⁰¹ These were not sought solely by members of the aristocracy and land-holding classes. Many were in favor of those from lower social levels, such as Alan Cheyne [a yeoman and later raised to knight bachelor sometime between 1357–1359] and Roland Daneys [raised to knight bachelor sometime after 1356 but before 1358].¹⁰² Executors were appointed. Roger de Cotesford was granted his request that, if he died while in Gascony, his executors could hold his manor for a year following his death.¹⁰³ The Prince's executors were to hold his estate for three years "to discharge his debts thereout."¹⁰⁴

Another form of "paperwork" involved the postponement of legal actions. An assize of *novel disseisin* against William le Vernoun of Gostre was postponed until after Easter 1356 "as the said William is to go with the prince to the war in parts beyond seas,"

⁹⁷BPR, III, 203, 212.

⁹⁸BPR, III, 208.

⁹⁹Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, 109.

¹⁰⁰As with the letters of protection, letters of attorney are not proof that a man actually served in Gascony. However, they do indicate the types and amount of paperwork that went into preparing for a campaign, both for the commanders and for individual participants who planned to go.

¹⁰¹TNA, C 66/246, m. 26; CPR, 10, 241. Clifford's attorneys were appointed until Christmas.

¹⁰²BPR, III, 213.

¹⁰³BPR, IV, 133.

¹⁰⁴TNA, C 66/246, m. 13; CPR, 10, 264.

and the Prince did not wish William's case to suffer "in any way while in his service."¹⁰⁵

Roger Lestraunge, lord of Maillorseisenek, was offered a "respite...of all things in demand against him" until the Prince returned to England at the Earl of Arundel's request.¹⁰⁶ In this case, the postponement of legal action benefited not only the Prince but also a man *not* serving on the campaign. The same was true for Thomas Gerveys, who was to be given respite in all matters against him until the Prince's return.¹⁰⁷

Concerns about legal actions during an absence, like letters of attorney, were not solely the province of the titled and landholders. Three of the Prince's archers (John de Neuton, Geoffrey de Stanlegh, and William de Chorlegh) were "greatly afraid of being damaged in the absence because they...are bound to the prince in diverse sums as pledges for certain men of the county..."¹⁰⁸ Both the lieutenant justice of Chester and the chamberlain of Chester were made aware of this concern and ordered "to shew them during their absence such favour in the matter of the said pledges as can fairly be shewn."¹⁰⁹ Simon de Grimesdich, John Starky, and John de Merbury, also archers of the Prince and pledges "pray[ed] the prince would grant them respite until their return to England."

The Prince's orders of 7 September, issued from Plymouth to the chamberlains and lieutenant justices of Cheshire and North Wales, commanded his administrators "to put in respite the execution of any indictments for trespass or felony made in any part of

¹⁰⁵BPR, III, 207.

¹⁰⁶BPR, III, 212.

¹⁰⁷BPR, IV, 142.

¹⁰⁸BPR, III, 213.

¹⁰⁹BPR, III, 213.

the county” against any of the men “who are with the prince in this expedition, until their return to those parts.”¹¹⁰ This shows that the Prince, if nothing else, knew that members of his expedition were leaving legal matters behind unresolved and that legal matters could arise during their absences. Clearly, he did not want his soldiers distracted or to suffer legal harm through their absence on his expedition, which would have affected morale. If nothing else, it might have a detrimental effect on recruitment.

Perhaps the most important form of paperwork was the indenture. The indenture was, essentially, a written agreement or contract for military service made between the recruiter, e.g., Edward III, and the captain, e.g., the Black Prince. It generally stipulated the rate of pay, regards (bonuses), the number of men the party was to provide, the period of service, sometimes the location of that service, and often that there would be compensation for lost horses.¹¹¹ If this last was not stipulated it was generally understood. In 1357, the earl of Salisbury negotiated for *restor* of his personal mount and his “horse-at-arms,” although usually a man only had one horse valued.¹¹²

There existed also a system of subcontracts. The contracted party would then subcontract as it were with the men he would provide and he would pay their wages out of the money he had received from the king.¹¹³ Salisbury, for example contracted with Roger Maltravers in 1371.¹¹⁴ The system of indentures, particularly for overseas service—given Edward III’s foreign policy, overseas deployment was highly likely—had

¹¹⁰BPR, III, 216.

¹¹¹Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, passim. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, 92–97.

¹¹²Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, 96.

¹¹³Hewitt, *Black Prince’s Expedition*, 19.

¹¹⁴Maltravers was to provide a set number of men, his own horses and equipment. The earl would pay shipping costs, wages, regard, and a fee of 20*l*. TNA, E 101/68/5/107.

replaced military service based on landed obligations before the 1350s.¹¹⁵ Furthermore, these indentures were widely used outside of the military sphere, so this form of paperwork would have been a familiar, usual, and indispensable aspect of the Prince's campaign. Indeed, the Prince himself was bound to the king by indenture for his service in Gascony, and the sources are full of similar documents.¹¹⁶

Of these, the most detailed, and certainly the most prominent, is the one dated 10 July 1355 between Edward III and the Prince, and it needs careful examination not only because of how it exemplifies the format of the typical indenture but also because of how it endows the Prince with royal authority in Gascony. It not only specified the number of men and archers the Prince was to provide as his personal retinue, discussed above, but it also detailed who would accompany the Prince and provide their own retinues: the earls of Warwick, Oxford, Salisbury, and Suffolk, of course, as well as John de Lisle and Reynold de Cobham.¹¹⁷ Each of these men would have made their own indentures, both with the Prince and also with the members of their own retinues, none of which are extant.

Unlike many indentures, the one between Edward III and the Prince does not

¹¹⁵Hewitt, *Black Prince's Expedition*, 18. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, 57–81. Edward III's sole use of the feudal summons to muster an army was in 1327.

¹¹⁶Edward III also used indentures to contract with foreign leaders for military service. For example, there is a 12 November 1355 indenture between Edward III and Henry, Count of Holstein. The count was to provide "centum helmes et centum pauners" and would "hospicijs" and "duo milia florenorum de scuto per annum." Rymer, Appendix C, 2. The original document is extant as Archives of Hamburg, 7 g (French) and 7 c (Latin). The Prince, it should be noted, also had ties to the Holy Roman Empire, particularly to the Burgrave of Nurenburg.

¹¹⁷BPR, IV, 143–44. TNA E36/278, f. 88r. For a published edition of the indenture, see, "The Indenture between Edward III and the Black Prince for the Prince's Expedition to Gascony, 10 July 1355," *Journal of Medieval Military History* 12 (2014): 165–71.

specify the Prince's wages or regard (bonus); it says only that "the king has paid him in advance war wages and reward for himself and the men of his retinue for a half year" from when the Prince reached Plymouth.¹¹⁸ More important, though, than the money were the powers and authority assigned to the Prince. He was granted "full power under the king's great seal" to remove and appoint ministers, make ordinances, oversee the collection and use of rents, mints, and customs, grant lands gained war, make truces, take ransoms (except that of John II—that ransom would go to Edward III who would recompense the Prince), and pass judgment on "any who are rebellious and disobedient (*des rebeux et desobeisantz*) in those parts, and to pardon them and grant them life and limb."¹¹⁹

Edward III's responsibilities included wages, sufficient shipping (see previous chapter), re-imbursing the Prince and others for the value of lost horses, and vicutalling the towns of Subise, Rocheford, Tanneye, and Talleburgh. He would also ensure that the Prince's interests in England did not suffer during his absence "on the king's service overseas."¹²⁰ This showed the same understanding of the potential harm, albeit on a different scale, service outside of England could do to the Prince's interests and the care taken to protect those interests that the Prince showed the men serving under him.

The Prince's powers as the king's lieutenant were quite broad and far-reaching; he was the King's representative, "as if the king were there in person,"¹²¹ and a representative of English royal authority—as well as the means to enforce it. The

¹¹⁸BPR, IV, 144. TNA E 36/278, f. 88r.

¹¹⁹BPR, IV, 144-5. TNA E 36/278, f. 88.

¹²⁰BPR, IV, 144. TNA E 36/278, f. 88r.

¹²¹BPR, IV, 144. TNA 3/36/278, f. 88r.

indenture makes it clear that the Prince's expedition was not just a simple raid. It was about restoring—and augmenting if possible—England's control in Gascony and by extension furthering Edward III's strategic goal of possessing Gascony in full sovereignty. These stated goals reflected the King's previously stated intentions in other documents, such as the 27 April orders to arrest ships and mariners for the Prince's passage, which state the expedition is “pro salvatione and defensione regni nostri Angliae ad partes Vasconiae.”¹²² The text of the indenture also bears a striking resemblance to another text, a ‘letter’ to the Prince, also dated 10 July 1355 and recorded in the Gascon Rolls, which states explicitly that Edward III is sending the Prince to Gascony “for the reformation of the situation and control of our duchy of Aquitaine and other lands and places in our kingdom of France, and for the recovery of our lands and rights, which have been wrongly occupied by our rebellious subjects.”¹²³ Thus, the indenture and this particular letter both describe Edward III's political strategy in addition to delineating the military obligations of the King and the Prince.

Even as the indenture anticipated the Prince's success, for example, by detailing how the Prince was to deal with captured castles and towns, it also acknowledged the possibility of failure. The King promised to rescue the Prince if he was “besieged or beset by so great a force that he cannot help himself.” The Duke of Lancaster, as well as

¹²²Rymer, III, I, 299. TNA C76/33, m. 12.

¹²³Rymer, III, I, 307. TNA C76/33, m. 6. “...pro reformatione statûs et regiminis ducatûs nostri Aquitainiae, et aliorum terrarum et locorum in regno nostro Francia, ac recuperatione terrarum et jurium nostrorum, quae sunt per rebelles nostros perperam occupata...” While the close parallels of this entry with the indenture might suggest that it is, in effect, a summary of the indenture, it fails to address the details of the campaign (e.g., the number of men-at-arms) and focuses instead on the Prince's actual authority. It is also a ‘letter’ to the Prince rather than a formal contract like the indenture.

the earls of Arundell, March, Stafford, and Northampton, also promised to aid with such a rescue. In the event that the Prince's person was "in peril" without hope of timely rescue, the indenture allowed for him to make a truce for his army or take other action to help himself.¹²⁴ The Prince's indenture with Edward III, then, provided the Prince with the means to rescue himself.

Pay

The rates of pay were standardized in the early thirteenth century. When the Hundred Years War began, Edward III doubled wages for overseas service in 1338. Wages reverted to the lower level in 1339.¹²⁵ Bannerets received 4*s* per day, knights 2*s*, a sergeant or man-at-arms 1*s*, infantryman 2*d*, mounted archers 6*d*.¹²⁶ In addition to wages, the Crown also paid regards, or bonuses, also at a standard rate of 100 (66.67*l*) marks per thirty men-at-arms, although the regard rate might be increased.¹²⁷

The Prince and the earls unsurprisingly received the highest pay. Oxford's wages and regard (bonus) came to 1174*l* 13*s* 10*d* (see Table 4.8).¹²⁸ John Beaupre received an advance of 50 marks "as his fee of war for a whole year."¹²⁹ Other men also received advances on their fees. "Ralph de Mobberley [*miles*], John Danyers [*miles*], William de Carenton, Hamon Masy [archer captain], John Danyers, Thomas de Stathum, Robert le Bruyn [archer captain], and Robert de Legh, 'le filz' [archer captain]" were all to receive

¹²⁴BPR, IV, 144. TNA, E36/278, f. 88.

¹²⁵Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, 84–85.

¹²⁶Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, 84. "Knights" is Prestwich's term; he uses it for *miles*, which he writes could apply to a large group of men and could mean simply a mounted soldier.

¹²⁷Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, 86.

¹²⁸TNA, E 402/377, m. 29.

¹²⁹BPR, II, 86.

“a moiety of their fees in hand” from the “moneys appointed for the prince’s chamber and wardrobe,”¹³⁰ according to an order of 21 May. Obviously, their fees for the war had *already* been negotiated, and those fees clearly show the differences in rank. Mobberley and Danyers both received 11*l* 13*s* 4*d* as partial payment of their fees; the archer captain Hamon Mascy received 100*s*, while Robert le Bruyn was paid only 66*s* 8*d*.¹³¹ The Gascon men-at-arms were paid on a scale similar to the English men-at-arms, and a number of the Gascons had their own retinues. The lord of Montferrand, for example, received wages for himself and his retinue.¹³²

Table 4.8: Army wages

Captain	Rank	Wages
Edward of Woodstock	Prince of Wales, Commander	8129 <i>l</i> 18 <i>s</i>
Thomas Beauchamp	Earl of Warwick, Constable of the army	2614 <i>l</i> 4 <i>s</i>
Robert Ufford	Earl of Suffolk	1428 <i>l</i> 6 <i>s</i> 8 <i>d</i>
John de Vere	Earl of Oxford	1174 <i>l</i> 13 <i>s</i> 10 <i>d</i>
William Montacute	Earl of Salisbury	1124 <i>l</i> 2 <i>s</i> 2 <i>d</i>
Sir Reginald de Cobham		652 <i>l</i> 0 <i>s</i> 8 <i>d</i>
Sir Ralph de Mobberley	Esquire	11 <i>l</i> 13 <i>s</i> 4 <i>d</i>
Sir John Daniers (Danyers)	Esquire	11 <i>l</i> 13 <i>s</i> 4 <i>d</i>
William de Karenton		10 marks
Hamon Mascy	Archer Captain, Broxen and Wirhale hundreds	100 <i>s</i>
John Danyers		100 <i>s</i>

¹³⁰BPR, III, 200.

¹³¹BPR, III, 200.

¹³²TNA, E 213/233.

Thomas de Stathum		100s
Robert le Bruyn	Archer Captain, Edesbury hundred	66s 8d
Robert de Legh, <i>filis</i>		66s 8d
Richard de Mascy		5 marks
Hamon de Asshelee		5 marks
Sir John de Hide	Archer Captain, Mackelsfeld hundred	
Hugh de Golbourn	Archer Captain, Broxen and Wirhale hundreds	
Sir John Griffyn	Archer Captain, Wych Malbank hundred	
John Breton	Gascon	9l 16s
Bertrand (Aymery), lord of Montferrand	Gascon	27l 12s (incl. retinue)

Furthermore, the captains of archers who had the rank of *miles* received a higher daily wage “from the time of his leaving home until his arrival at Plymmuth” of 2s; esquires received 1s per day.¹³³ Richard de Mascy and Hamon de Asshelee fees for the year were 10 marks each, half of which they received as an advance in late June or early July of 1355.¹³⁴ Pay also depended on whether a soldier brought others with him. John Griffyn, for example was to be paid 40 marks “if he is coming with two esquires” but only 23l 6s 8d “if he is coming with one.”¹³⁵

Archers from Chester were paid at a rate of 6d a day, while archers from Flint

¹³³BPR, III, 204.

¹³⁴BPR, III, 204.

¹³⁵BPR, III, 202.

(northeastern Wales next to Chester) received half that,¹³⁶ just as Welsh archers had in the 1260s.¹³⁷ This difference in pay suggests the Cheshire archers were mounted—based on the standard rates of pay. Like the rest of the soldiers, the archers were paid an advance for the journey to Plymouth. Obviously, the Cheshire archers' higher salary would make their shorter journey easier than that of the archers from Flint.

Wages were paid in advance for half a year's service, which the indenture between Edward III and the Prince specified.¹³⁸ John de Brunham, after bringing money to London, had "to return to Cestre before the octave of Midsummer to pay the archers' wages prior to their coming to the prince."¹³⁹ However, it was not unusual for wages to be late or left unpaid. Furthermore, as wages were calculated on a daily basis, payment was an administrative burden. During Edward I's major campaigns, the infantry was regularly mustered and counted; cavalry leaders accounted for the men under them.¹⁴⁰ The Prince had access to the Crown's clerical resources and also took John Henxteworth on the campaign; he performed the task of a paymaster with his staff.

The Prince's Command Staff and Advisors

The Prince's 1355 *chevauchée* to Narbonne and back in the late fall was highly successful.¹⁴¹ He and forces left England behind schedule, but only two weeks after

¹³⁶BPR, III, 204.

¹³⁷Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, 84; A. Lewis, "Roger Leyburn and the Pacification of England, 1265–67," *English Historical Review* 54, no. 214 (Apr., 1939): 193–214, at 204.

¹³⁸TNA, E 36/278, f. 88r. BPR, IV, 144.

¹³⁹BPR, III, 201.

¹⁴⁰Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, 88.

¹⁴¹For the campaign itself, see Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince* and Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*. There are also a number of smaller studies focusing on specific aspects of the campaign, such as Peter Hoskins' article on the question of

landing the Prince and his forces left Bordeaux. The campaign, was planned and executed quickly. The Prince *could* have considered the lateness of the season and waited until spring. He chose not to delay—perhaps he felt he had waited long enough on the weather, considering the long delay (some six weeks) in England on account of lack of ships and unfavorable winds.¹⁴² Instead, the Prince and his advisors finalized their campaign plans. The success of the campaign indicates that the Prince received excellent advice, suggesting that he had a strong, able staff of advisors.¹⁴³ Furthermore, it appears that his staff of magnates and soldier administrators worked well together and with the Prince, and their efforts on his behalf served him well.¹⁴⁴ This was a result of their collective expertise, the close ties that already connected them, and the prior experience all of them possessed, either as campaigners and or administrators.

The Prince's staff was extremely able and knowledgeable. Numbered among his

whether the Prince's army passed to the north or south of Narbonne; Hoskins, "The Itineraries of the Black Prince's *Chevauchées* of 1355 and 1356." His article is the latest contribution to this particular debate. There are also numerous French studies (discussed above), many of which deal with the French view of the raid. For a recent example, see Caille, "Nouveaux Regards." For discussion of the campaign's success, see the final chapter/conclusion.

¹⁴²BPR, III, 493.

¹⁴³For the Prince's retinue, see David S. Green, "The Military Personnel of Edward the Black Prince," *Medieval Prosopography: History and Collective Biography* 21 (2000): 133-152; Green, *Edward the Black Prince: Power in Medieval Europe*, particularly chapters three (Nobility and Chivalry) and four (A Prince's Household: Lordship and Status). See also Philip Morgan, *War and Society in Medieval Cheshire* (Manchester, 1987), 97-148.

¹⁴⁴I say 'appeared' to work well together and with the Prince rather than that they 'did' work well together because the sources do not mention any strife; however, just because it did not make the chronicles, does not mean we can assume there was no discord. In fact, it seems more likely that there were disagreements. That said, it seems safe to conclude that there was no major discord of the type and magnitude that would result in a leader withdrawing from the Prince's forces, an option more open to the Gascons than the English.

advisors were four magnates, all of whom had served at Crécy in 1346 (for discussion of the magnates see below), no fewer than eleven Knights of the Garter,¹⁴⁵ and a number of the Prince's personal—and professional—administrators from Wales and Chester, as well as some members of his household. His staff also included a few Gascon lords, such as the Captal de Buch (d. 1376), one of the original Knights of the Garter who also happened to be a cousin of the Count of Foix, who had not declared for either France or England and through whose lands the army would need to pass.

Aside from the locals who joined the Prince in Bordeaux, several of those who accompanied him had previously campaigned in Gascony. For example, John de Vere (Earl of Oxford, c. 1312–1360) served under Henry of Grosmont (Earl of Derby, Earl and later Duke of Lancaster, c. 1310–1361) on a raid through Languedoc in 1349.¹⁴⁶ Additionally, many of these men were united by existing (and the hope of future) ties of kinship and marriage; they moved in the same circles, and some had served together previously in Scotland, Gascony, and Brittany, such as Sir John Chandos and Sir Nigel Loring.¹⁴⁷ And even when they did not, they were united by their mutual goals, service, and role as the Prince's general staff in Gascony—and possibly continued service when the Prince's retinue became the *king's* retinue.¹⁴⁸ We can presume, then, a certain

¹⁴⁵A total of twelve of the original Knights of the Garter took part in this campaign; the Prince is the twelfth.

¹⁴⁶The initial route of Lancaster's campaign (Bordeaux to Langon) is mirrored by the Prince's campaign in 1355; after Langon, the Prince's forces continued south and then advanced toward Toulouse from the south while Lancaster's forces generally followed the Garonne river to approach Toulouse from the west.

¹⁴⁷Green, "The Military Personnel," 142.

¹⁴⁸The Prince's personal retinue should be understood as still developing, and the campaigns of 1355 and 1356 were a key part of that development. This is particularly

amount of cohesion among the Prince's command staff, and many of the men who served as advisors to the Prince came from a "family tradition of service" and there were "numerous family allegiances."¹⁴⁹

Magnates

Four earls served with the Prince in Gascony: William Montacute (Salisbury), Robert d'Ufford (Suffolk), Thomas Beauchamp (Warwick), and John de Vere (Oxford).¹⁵⁰

These men also brought their own companies. Warwick's company, for example, included Roger de Clifford,¹⁵¹ who married Warwick's daughter, Maude (d. 1403) and probably John Beauchamp, Baron Beauchamp of Somerset, who married Warwick's daughter Alice.¹⁵² The earls were also responsible for recruiting and paying (out of their wages and regards from the Prince) their own companies. The documentation concerning these retinues is not as complete as one would like.

significant because members of the Prince's retinue, guided by the command staff, not only "contributed to the victory at Crécy and formed the core of the armies that were victorious at Poitiers [1356] and Najera [1367]" (Green, 134); furthermore, these core members assisted with the Treaty of Brétigny (1359). As Green argues, the treaty was "largely negotiated and implemented by members of the prince's retinue," and as his work shows, Crécy and the intervening years—the years between Crécy and the Prince's investiture with the Principality of Aquitaine in 1362—provided the foundation for the later retinue and its successes (Green, 143). The *chevauchées* of 1355–1356 were part of that foundation; therefore, examining the Prince's core advisors for these two years will not only illuminate this administrative aspect of this particular campaign but also provide a basis from which to examine the later campaigns and the Prince's administration of the Principality of Aquitaine.

¹⁴⁹Green, "The Military Personnel," 142. See the same article for discussion of the later retinue and how its members may have been recruited.

¹⁵⁰Baker, *Chronicon*, 229.

¹⁵¹TNA, C 66/246, m. 26; CPR, X, 241. Clifford had also been Warwick's ward. His prior experience included the naval battle, Les Espagnols sur Mer in 1350.

¹⁵²Bernard Burke, *A genealogical history of the dormant, abeyant, forfeited, and extinct peerages of the British empire* (Baltimore, 1978), 30.

Suffolk (1298–1369) had signed on before 25 June.¹⁵³ He sailed with Warwick from Southampton.¹⁵⁴ Ufford had been in the Prince's service no later than 1337 and was head of the Prince's council in 1351,¹⁵⁵ so clearly he was well-known to members of the Prince's staff and household, such as Wengefeld and Henxteworth. When the army divided into three columns for the march, he was one of the leaders of the third column.¹⁵⁶ He, too, had significant experience in the field, had fought in Gascony in 1324, at Halidon Hill (1333) with Warwick and Oxford, and had served as a negotiator in Scotland.¹⁵⁷ Early in the Hundred Years War, Ufford served as an admiral (like many of the admirals, he was not a professional sailor) commanded the second battle at Crécy in 1346.¹⁵⁸ He received his earldom in 1337, before which he had been an important banneret in the royal household¹⁵⁹ and had been instrumental in Edward III's 1330 coup d'état against Mortimer and Isabella. Incidentally, the Prince was made Duke of Cornwall (England's first duke) at the same ceremony in which Ufford received the earldom.

Warwick was involved arguably before the Prince was given command. Warwick was part of the expedition no later than 10 March 1355, when the King gave orders to arrest ships and mariners to transport the earl of Warwick and other magnates and men-

¹⁵³TNA, C 66/245, m. 1; CPR, 10, 223.

¹⁵⁴TNA, C 76/33, m. 13; Rymer, III, I, 300. Incidentally, Ufford's son William later married Warwick's daughter Isabel sometime before 1376.

¹⁵⁵BPR, IV, 31.

¹⁵⁶Baker, *Chronicon*, 230–31.

¹⁵⁷Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 106.

¹⁵⁸He shared that command with the earl of Northampton and the bishop of Durham. Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, 160, 276. Jean le Bel, ii, 105–06. Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 104–05.

¹⁵⁹Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, 168,

at-arms to Gascony¹⁶⁰ and Edward III's attorney.¹⁶¹ As Lancaster did not return until 28 March and the council at which the Prince was officially appointed to lead the expedition was not until after 5 April (*post Pascha*),¹⁶² it is clear that the King already trusted in Warwick's abilities. He certainly had in the past. Warwick had served in Scotland—Halidon Hill (1333) and Brittany; he was a veteran of Sluys (1340).¹⁶³ Warwick, described as “the magnificent and powerful man and most energetic warrior,”¹⁶⁴ was known for his prowess and courage, such that the *Anonimale Chronicle* claims the duke of Burgundy and his troops retreated in darkness rather than face “the devil Warwick” upon his landing at Calais in 1369.¹⁶⁵

During the Crécy campaign, Warwick helped secure the landing at La Hogue and was the Marshall of the army and responsible for the Prince of Wales during that campaign.¹⁶⁶ He was also one of the commanders responsible for choosing the ground for the deployment of the English troops at Crécy.¹⁶⁷ The Prince, then, would have been accustomed to working with Warwick and listening to his advice, particularly as Warwick had been the marshal of England since 1344. During the expedition he was the

¹⁶⁰Rymer, *Foedera*, III, i, 297.

¹⁶¹Oxford, Corpus Christi College, MS 78, ed. and trans. Clifford J. Rogers, *Journal of Medieval Military History 7: The Age of the Hundred Years War* (2009): 168–75, at 173.

¹⁶²Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 423.

¹⁶³Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 191.

¹⁶⁴London, BL, Beauchamp cartulary, f. 49.

¹⁶⁵*Anonimale Chronicle, 1333–1381*, ed. V.H. Galbraith (Manchester, 1927), 61; Walsingham, *Thomae Walsingham, quondam monachi S. Albani, Historia Anglicana* (London, 1863–64), vo. I, 282.

¹⁶⁶Barber, *Life and Campaigns*, 29. Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 87, 98, 105.

¹⁶⁷Clifford Rogers, “Edward III and the Dialectics of Strategy, 1327–1360,” in *The Wars of Edward III, Sources and Interpretations*, ed. Clifford J. Rogers, 247–83 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1999), 274–75, n.47. Froissart, *Oeuvres*, V, 26.

constable of the army and led the first column.¹⁶⁸ Warwick went on to serve in the Rheims campaign (1350–1360), witnessed the Treaty of Brétigny (1360), returned to Gascony in the Prince's service in 1364, and served as a captain under John of Gaunt (1340–1399).¹⁶⁹

Oxford (1312–1360) was also an experienced soldier and was the Chamberlain of England. He fought at Halidon Hill with Warwick and Suffolk, and later in Brittany. He, too, served on the Crécy campaign with the Prince and participated in the siege of Calais.¹⁷⁰ During the 1355 campaign, his next campaign after 1348, he served in the middle column under the Prince's command.¹⁷¹ Following the Prince's expedition de Vere fought in the Rheims 1359–1360 campaign, during which he was killed.¹⁷²

Salisbury was the other leader of the Prince's third column in 1355.¹⁷³ His father, William Montacute (d. 1344), was the first earl of Salisbury (one of the 1337 earls who received his earldom when the Prince was made Duke of Cornwall) and was a key part of Edward III's 1330 coup d'état against Roger Mortimer (d. 1327), the coup d'état that placed Edward III definitively on the throne. The younger William and the Prince grew up together.¹⁷⁴ The former inherited the title in 1344 and later married Joan of Kent,

¹⁶⁸Baker, *Chronicon*, 230. Barber, *Life and Campaigns*, 61. Incidentally, his sons Guy (d. 1360) and Thomas (1337–1401), the next earl of Warwick, were both knighted in July 1355 and served in the northern campaign that year. DNB, vol. 4, 599.

¹⁶⁹DNB, V 4, 597–99.

¹⁷⁰Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 217.

¹⁷¹Baker, *Chronicon*, 230.

¹⁷²DNB, vol. 56, 304–05. His son Aubrey, the future earl of Oxford, was in the Prince's service in 1366 and was retained for life by the Prince. DNB, vol. 56, 280.

¹⁷³Baker, *Chronicon*, 230–31.

¹⁷⁴Yuval Noah Harari, *Special Operations in the Age of Chivalry, 1100–1550*, Warfare in History (Woodbridge, 2007), 1.

which marriage was annulled in 1349 after her husband Thomas Holland returned from overseas.¹⁷⁵ Salisbury participated in the Crécy campaign and was knighted at Lo Hogue in July 1346 by either the King or the Prince, newly knighted himself.¹⁷⁶ Hewitt lists a second William Montacute on the campaign, but this is not the earl's son William as Hewitt claims given that his son was not born until after 1349.¹⁷⁷ Montacute served again in 1357 and 1372.

All of the magnates, then, were experienced soldiers, veterans of the King's campaigns, and had fought beside the Prince before the 1355 expedition.

Administrators and other Professionals

A key member, if only a part-time member who did not accompany the expedition to Gascony, was John Beauchamp, a Knight of the Garter and the younger brother of the Earl of Warwick. He had also served at Crécy and the naval battle of Sluys; his other posts included captain of Calais, Constable of the Tower of London, Warden of the Cinque Ports, and Admiral of the Fleet. He was appointed admiral for the area east of the

¹⁷⁵After Holland's death, Joan married the Prince of Wales. Holland, incidentally, was at one time the seneschal of Salisbury's household.

¹⁷⁶John L. Leland, "Montagu, William, Second Earl of Salisbury (1328–1397)," *The Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); M. Warner, "The Montagu Earls of Salisbury, 1300–1428" (PhD diss., University of London, 1991); A. Grandsen, "The Alleged Rape by Edward III of the Countess of Salisbury," *English Historical Review* 87 (1972): 333–44; M. Galway, "Joan of Kent and the Order of the Garter," *University of Birmingham Historical Journal* 1, no. 1 (1947): 13–50.

¹⁷⁷Leland, "Montagu, William, Second Earl of Salisbury." Hewitt's list of men serving on the campaign includes a William Montacute (son of the earl), based on Rymer, E, 17. However, the list in Rymer lists the earl twice, and the name Hewitt has taken for the son of the second earl is, in fact, the second earl. Rymer reads: "...William de Montacute, earl of Salisbury, William de Montacute, son and heir of William de Montacute, the *late* earl of Salisbury..." [emphasis mine].

mouth of the Thames on 5 March 1355.¹⁷⁸ Many of the orders related to the preparation of ships and transport of the Prince's expedition, as well as Lancaster's concurrent expedition to Normandy, were given on his advice or information. Some of these were issued as early as January 1355, such as one to take mariners for the king's ships.¹⁷⁹ His knowledge of available ships and captains and his experience of naval operations and battles would have made him an invaluable staff member, particularly in the earliest stages of the campaign, namely the marshalling of ships for transport to Bordeaux and in any discussion of resupply by sea. His lieutenant, Thomas de Hoggeshawe, was assigned to the Prince's expedition, specifically to manage the maritime resources.¹⁸⁰

Reginald (Reynold) Cobham (c. 1295–1361) was another such professional. He fought in the Scottish campaigns, was at Sluys (1340), fought at Morlaix (1342), and like Warwick, helped determine the English ground at Crécy in 1346, where he also was a member of the Prince's guard.¹⁸¹ In addition to being a member of the command staff Cobham also served as the marshal of the Prince's army in 1355 and led the first column alongside the constable of the army, the earl of Warwick.¹⁸²

The Prince's staff also included soldier-administrators like John de Wengefeld. Wengefeld was clearly an able and trusted administrator. Many, if not most, of the Prince's orders and decisions are by the advice and or command of John de Wengefeld,

¹⁷⁸Rymer, *Foedera*, III, i, 296. The same day Robert Morley was appointed admiral "ab ore aquae Thamys versus partes borealis." Ibid.

¹⁷⁹TNA, C 66/244, m. 4; CPR, 10, 155.

¹⁸⁰Rymer, *Foedera*, III, i, 299, 300, 302.

¹⁸¹Rogers, "Edward III and the Dialectics of Strategy," 274–75, n. 47. Froissart, *Oeuvres*, V, 26. Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 69–70, n.139, 193.

¹⁸²Baker, *Chronicon*, 230; Barber, *Life and Campaigns*, 61. DNB, vol. 12, 291.

and these run the gamut from the payment of advance wages to giving gifts of wine to the administration of justice.¹⁸³ Wengefeld was intimately involved in the administration of the Prince's household and holdings. Sir Henry de Blakebourn was another important soldier-administrator. He served as the treasurer of the Prince's household and the keeper of the Prince's wardrobe.¹⁸⁴ As treasurer, he was allowed "all foreign expenses, such as gifts, alms, necessary messages, wages and fees of war....," with the expectation that he would have the accounts periodically reviewed.¹⁸⁵

Sir Edmund Wauncy was the steward of the Prince's household and had been as of 1352; incidentally, he received a bascinet (helmet) as a gift from the Prince just prior to the expedition's departure from Plymouth.¹⁸⁶ He was later commended in 1357 for his good service on the campaign and "the great position he held on the day of the battle of Poytiers [sic]."¹⁸⁷ Indeed, he may have captured Philip of France (later Philip the Bold, Duke of Burgundy), as the Prince arranged for the Cheshire exchequer to pay Wauncy 200*l* annually "until he [Wauncy] be satisfied of a sum of 4800 marks [3200*l*] due to him from the prince for the ransom of Sir Philip, son of the king of France."¹⁸⁸

Another man who cannot be excluded is Richard de Stafford (c. 1305–1380).

While he may not have been a 'permanent' member of the Prince's staff, he was a trusted agent of the Prince. He had fought in Gascony before under Lancaster (earl of Derby at

¹⁸³For single examples, see the following. Wages: BPR, II–IV, throughout. Wine: BPR, II, 39; Justice: BPR, III, 12.

¹⁸⁴BPR, IV, 139.

¹⁸⁵BPR, IV, 149.

¹⁸⁶BPR, IV, 149.

¹⁸⁷BPR, IV, 215.

¹⁸⁸BPR, III, 452.

the time) in 1345–1346, and had served the Prince in various capacities in the intervening years.¹⁸⁹ He had several brushes with the law and received a pardon of outlawry in 1326 to serve in the retinue of Ralph, Lord Basset,¹⁹⁰ another for being an accessory to murder in 1334 in exchange for service in Scotland, and in 1336 helped his older brother (the earl of Stafford) abduct Margaret Audley, one of the great heiresses of the day worth 2314/ a year.¹⁹¹ Later, the younger Stafford served on commissions of “oyer and terminer”¹⁹² and was part of several diplomatic missions for the King. He fought in France on multiple occasions and was in the van at Crécy, where he likely served the Prince for the first time. They clearly developed an important relationship: in 1347 Stafford became the steward and surveyor of the Prince’s Welsh and English estate, a council member, a justice in Cheshire, and a recruiter of soldiers for service abroad.¹⁹³ In March 1355 he and his fellow justices were charged with removing the sheriff of Oxford and Berkshire from office, an undoubtedly sensitive task.¹⁹⁴ Upon the conclusion of the 1355 *chevauchée*, the Prince sent de Stafford back to England with letters for the Bishop of Winchester, then head of the Prince’s council in England, and appointed him to recruit

¹⁸⁹Hewitt, *The Black Prince’s Expedition*, 22–23, 80–81.

¹⁹⁰Basset helped secure his second pardon and a Ralph Basset also served on the 1355 campaign.

¹⁹¹DNB, vol. 52, 61.

¹⁹²See TNA, C 66/244, m. 7d; CPR, X, 164–65 for an example of an instance involving “fur collar crime” and William de Menyll, “*chivaler*,” and his attacks on the abbot of Burton on Trent. He was also part of the commission charged with dealing with the riots at Oxford (TNA, C 66/245, m. 16d; CPR, X, 234).

¹⁹³DNB, vol. 52, 62.

¹⁹⁴TNA, C 66/245, m. 13; CPR, X, 200.

reinforcements.¹⁹⁵ In 1360, Stafford helped negotiate the Treaty of Brétigny, then in 1361 returned to Gascony with the Prince.¹⁹⁶

Among the professionals accompanying the Prince, although probably not one of the military advisors, was Master William Blackwater, the Prince's personal physician.¹⁹⁷ He served the Prince for many years before the expedition and until 1362, when he was granted "20 marks yearly in aid of his sustenance and 40s yearly towards his clothing" "for good service rendered."¹⁹⁸ He accompanied the Prince to Gascony, as he collected wages from Henxteworth and collected supplies through the office of the spicery (discussed below in Chapter 7).¹⁹⁹ Other members of the Prince's household include Geoffrey Hamelyn, yeoman and keeper of the Prince's armor.²⁰⁰

John Henxteworth was one of the Prince's yeomen and served as the Prince's paymaster on the 1355 campaign. His meticulous and detailed accounts indicate he ably fulfilled his task as paymaster. He was responsible for paying wages and paying for victuals and other supplies.²⁰¹

Gascons

The Gascons were an important aspect of the Prince's campaign, not merely because

¹⁹⁵BPR, III, 224. Barber, *Life and Times*, Chapter 4: "Campaign Letters: The Campaigns of 1355–56." Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 434–49.

¹⁹⁶His illegitimate son, Nicholas, and his legitimate sons, Richard and Edmond, accompanied him. A Nicholas Stafford served on the 1355 campaign. DCO, Henxteworth accounts, accounts for 2 October 1355. This same Nicholas served under Richard Stafford and was charged with receiving Stafford's wages and carrying same to him.

¹⁹⁷BPR, *passim*; Henxteworth, *passim*.

¹⁹⁸BPR, IV, 454.

¹⁹⁹DCO, Henxteworth accounts, throughout.

²⁰⁰BPR, IV, 149 and elsewhere. TNA E 403/389, m. 3.

²⁰¹DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 28 September 1355 through 30 June 1356.

many served under the Prince. The Gascons *invited* the expedition, specifically requested the Prince to lead the campaign, and welcomed him with open arms and celebrations. According to Knighton, the Gascons, particularly the magnates and bishops, “came to meet them and rejoiced at their coming, and received them with honor. And they offered themselves to the prince as their liege lord...to live and die with him in all his undertakings, if, at last, he would stay with them and protect them...”²⁰²

This account corresponds with the account in the *Livre de Coutumes*, according to which, after the Prince read aloud his letters patent establishing his authority and promised to uphold the urban privileges of Bordeaux, those present responded “that they shall be to the said lord good, loyal, and faithful, and obeidens, and guard his body, life, and limbs in good faith...and assist in his rightful conquest...in life and death, shall guard his rights without ceasing...as the faithful subjects of our lord the king.”²⁰³ Those present included the Constable of Bordeaux, John de Stretle, the archbishop of Bordeaux, Amanieu de La Mothe (archbishop 1351–1360), and the Captal de Buch, among others.²⁰⁴

Of these men, it is clear that some certainly served among the Prince’s key

²⁰²Knighton, *Knighton’s Chronicle*, 128–9. “Et magnates terre tam episcopi quam alii occurrerent eis obuam leti de aduentu eorum, et receperunt eos cum honore. Et optulerunt se principi tanquam domino suo legio, cum bonis et catallis, in omnibus suis agendis uiuere et mori cum illo, si tamen moram trahere uellet cum eis ad eorum defesionem. Et erant parati cum eo.”

²⁰³H. Barckaussen, ed., *Livre des Coutumes* (Bordeaux, 1890), no. XLVI, 443. “Que edz seran audit monsenor bon, leyaus, et fideus, e hobediens; e l’guarderan cors, vie e membres a bone fe et a lor leyal poder; e l’ajuderan a conquestar dreituras contra tots homes qui pusquan bivre e murir, e sas dreituras lo guarderan sens appetissar, saubant le fieutat de nostre senhor lo Rey.”

²⁰⁴*Livre de Coutumes*, no. XLVI, 444.

advisors. Jean (III) de Grailly (d. 1377), Captal de Buch, was undoubtedly numbered among the Prince's closer advisors. He came from a family tradition of service to the English crown; Jean (I) de Grailly had been lieutenant and seneschal of Aquitaine (1266–1268, 1278–1287) under Edward I. Upon his inheritance in 1343 he “became perhaps the foremost of those Gascon nobles whose loyalty to the English king-dukes of Aquitaine did much to maintain and further Edward III's war efforts against France.”²⁰⁵ Such was his influence that, upon being taken prisoner in 1364, he was released without being ransomed; Charles V, during Grailly's second imprisonment (1372–1377), offered him several financial inducements to change sides in the conflict.²⁰⁶ The Prince certainly knew him well.²⁰⁷ He was an original Knight of the Garter, had fought during the Crécy campaign, and in 1355 served in the middle column, which was led by the Prince.²⁰⁸ Of great significance for this campaign, aside from his knowledge of the area and experience on the earl of Derby's (later duke of Lancaster) Gascon campaign in the 1345, he was one of the three Gascon nobles who requested the Prince to lead the campaign and was also the cousin of Gaston Phoebus, count of Foix and Béarn. The expedition had to pass through Foix's lands and the Prince made every effort to protect those lands while the army traversed them. De Buch also held the important castle at Castets-en-Dorthe, where the army halted and purchased supplies (6–7 October). At Poitiers, de Buch led a

²⁰⁵DNB, vol. 23, 257.

²⁰⁶These were refused, and Grailly died in captivity.

²⁰⁷Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*, 44.

²⁰⁸Baker, *Chronicon*, 230.

decisive flanking movement. In 1371, Edward III named him Constable of Aquitaine.²⁰⁹

Bernard Ezii Lebret (lord of Albret) also likely was also an advisor. Like de Buch, Lebret had close ties to the English court.²¹⁰ In 1354 Edward III granted him “a yearly rent of 1000*l.*”²¹¹ Guillaume Pomiers must also be included. He was the leader of the Béarnaise forces in the third column of the Prince’s 1355 army and had ties to England.²¹² Bertrand de Montferrand had similar connections and held the *prévoté* of Entre Deux Mers, a wine-producing region upstream from Bordeaux and north of the Garonne, in Gascony.²¹³ His daughter Rose married de Buch.²¹⁴

A special group in Gascony deserves attention, too. These are the English officials in Gascony. While not all of them served on the campaign itself, their cooperation would have been essential to a smooth debarkation in Bordeaux, establishing advance supply depots, such as the one at St-Macaire, arranging accommodations and billeting in Bordeaux both before the fall campaign and after the return of the Prince’s army in December, and assisting with local suppliers, among other things. The first is the Constable of Bordeaux, John de Stretle. He provided the Prince’s army with several large loans;²¹⁵ it is unclear if these loans were personal or if the funds came from his

²⁰⁹Denis Blanchard-Dignac, *Le Captal de Buch: Jean de Grailly, 1331–1376* (Éditions de Sudouest, 2011), 233–50, 275.

²¹⁰TNA, C 66/245, m. 8; CPR, X, 274. For example, his aunt and others appointed an attorney in England to handle the execution of Bernard de Lebret’s (*père*) will in England and to handle any outstanding business related to his estate.

²¹¹TNA, C 54/192, m. 17. CCR, X, 27–28.

²¹²TNA, C 66/245, m. 8; CPR, X, 274.

²¹³TNA, C 54/192, m. 13; C 54/193, m. 26. CCR, X, 35, 130.

²¹⁴Blanchard-Dignac, *Le Captal de Buch*, genealogy tables.

²¹⁵DCO, Henxteworth accounts, throughout.

office. He was in regular contact with Edward III.²¹⁶ It was to him that at least some of the Gascon commanders presented their receipts for the payment of war wages, as others had done previously.²¹⁷ John Breton, *miles*, and Bertrand, lord of Montferrand both did so for their war wages of 9*l* 16*s* and 27*l* 12*s*, respectively.²¹⁸ In 1356, Raymond Everard, castellan of Limeuil's, request for payment was forwarded to Stretle,²¹⁹ and the lord of Ornon presented his receipt for war wages in 1358.²²⁰ John Tuscanan's request for his wages, payment for which was in arrears, also dates to 1358.²²¹

Another important figure in Bordeaux was John de Cheverston, the seneschal of Gascony. He was appointed seneschal on 20 March 1354, replacing James de Pipe.²²² De Pipe was to present Cheverston with "everything that pertains to the care and control of the seneschal of the duchy" by indentures.²²³ Based on the letters of protection and attorneys Cheverston had spent at least a year in office.²²⁴ Given that de Pipe had given all of his records to Cheverston and that he had held the office for a year and was re-appointed on 15 March 1355, it is reasonable to suppose that Cheverston and his staff were capable. Cheverston accompanied the Prince's 1355 campaign. In March 1356, a ship, *la Katerine*, was assigned to bring his (and the earl of Oxford's) horses and victuals

²¹⁶A brief look at the Patent Rolls alone reveals the extent of that correspondence.

²¹⁷For examples, see TNA, E 213/250; TNA, E 213/12; TNA, E 213/230.

²¹⁸TNA E 213/240; TNA E 213/233. Here, Montferrand's given name is written as Bertrand; in other sources it is written as Aymery.

²¹⁹TNA, SC 8/46/2254.

²²⁰TNA, E 213/246.

²²¹TNA, E 8/261/13026.

²²²Rymer, *Foedera*, III, I, 297; TNA C61/67, m. 14. "...omnia quis ad custodiam [et] regimen senescaltis Ducatus [...] pertinent..."

²²³TNA, C61/66, m. 14, 2nd item.

²²⁴*Ibid.*, items 3 and 4.

from England to Gascony.²²⁵ While that in and of itself is not conclusive of Cheverston's military service in the Prince's 1355 *chevauchée*, in 1359 Adam Bolehead, Simon Seint Geynes, and Richard de Cheverston received royal pardons for homicide at John de Cheverston's behest. Their pardons specifically cite their good service on the campaign in Cheverston's *comitina*.²²⁶ Cheverston's presence on the campaign would have been invaluable. John de Roos, the mayor of Bordeaux, also would have been a valuable member of the Prince's circle of advisors, and he, too, joined the Prince's army in 1355.

The fourth and final key official was Master Bernard Brocas (1330–1395), the controller of Gascony. His father's lineage was Gascon; as a younger son he pursued a military career and fought in Brittany, Scotland, Spain, and at Crécy. In 1354, he traveled to Avignon in Lancaster's retinue, which presented Edward III's position to the French envoys at Avignon.²²⁷ He had been an absentee official, but Edward III ordered him to accompany the Prince "so that the office may not be ruled by improvidence through his absence."²²⁸ This was a key financial post, necessary not only to the good governance of the duchy but also to the smooth operation of the Prince's expedition. Part of Edward III's complaint in 1355 was that bills were not being written out, thereby inflicting damage on the duchy's finances and the King.²²⁹ He fought at Poitiers and later served as the captain of Calais from 1377 to 1379.²³⁰

Mercenaries

²²⁵TNA, C 66/248, m. 19.

²²⁶TNA, C 66/257, m. 28.

²²⁷DN, vol .7, 740–41.

²²⁸TNA, C 54/193, m. 21. CCR, X, 140.

²²⁹TNA, C 54/193, m. 21. CCR, X, 140.

²³⁰DNB, vol. 7, 741.

The Prince's company was not made up solely of English, Welsh, and Gascon soldiers. There was also a corps of mercenaries. These professional soldiers had diverse origins. For example, a Tideric, likely Tideric van Dale, is identified as a "knight of the king of Crakowe" and as an "usher of the Prince's chamber."²³¹ Bernhard van Zedeles, one of eleven men clearly identified as Almain (Germans), brought with him three esquires.²³² At least five men appear in the documents as "Spaniards."²³³

One man does deserve special mention. Eustace d'Aubrichcourt, identified by Henxteworth as a Hainaulter,²³⁴ was a well known mercenary who had served Edward III for many years. He married Philippa of Hainault's niece, the earl of Kent's widow. He came from a tradition of service to the English crown and served after the 1355 campaign. The Low Countries also had a long tradition of supplying mercenaries to the English crown.²³⁵ Nearly 450 mercenaries from the Low Countries served on Edward III's 1359 campaign.²³⁶

Non-Combatants

Among the non-combatants that accompanied the army there were several individuals that appear in the documents.

One key group dealt with the care of the horses: grooms and farriers. Based on Henxteworth's accounts the wages of grooms and the shoeing of horses was stipulated in

²³¹BPR, IV, 165, 167.

²³²DCO, Henxteworth, 79.

²³³DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 16 February 1356 ; BPR, IV, 252 and 269.

²³⁴DCO, Henxteworth, 4.

²³⁵Prestwich, *Armies and Warfare*, 154–55; Fowler, *The King's Lieutenant*, 204; *Foedera*, III, ii, 745; CPR 1361–64, 317–18; CPR, 1367–70, 12; J.A.F. de Larrea Rojas, *Guerra y sociedad en Navarra durante la Edad Media* (Bilbao, 1992), 144.

²³⁶Froissart, V, 190, 195.

the indentures.²³⁷ There is no indication as to the number of grooms on the campaign.

Two farriers, Roger de Cornelee and John Doyly, are named in the sources, but given the number of horses, more than two farriers must have accompanied the expedition.²³⁸ John Musshon, the herald of arms, served on the campaign.²³⁹

The Prince's minstrels Jakelyn the Piper and Hankyn accompanied the army.²⁴⁰ That the Prince had entertainers is hardly surprising; he also lost considerable sums "at play," an activity that continued during the campaign.²⁴¹ Clergy also accompanied the expedition. At least two Friars Preachers were retained,²⁴² and several "parsons" accompanied the Prince: Thomas de Gerlethorpe, parson at Collesdone; Thomas de Rasene, parson at Scoter; Alexander de Aungre, parson at Wythingdon. There were also a number of clerks: William de Northwell, who was treasure of the Prince's household in 1354, Alan de Stokes, and the clerks Henxteworth identifies only as the clerk of the kitchen, spicery, marshalcy, and buttery, among others.²⁴³

Non-combatants included servants, although it appears that being a servant did not *ipso facto* preclude involvement in battle. Indeed, William Lenche, described as the Prince's servant and porter, received the rights to the profits of the ferry at Saltassh

²³⁷DCO, Henxteworth, *passim*. See especially the entries in December 1355.

²³⁸TNA, C 61/67, m. 10. Rymer, Appendix E, 16.

²³⁹BPR, IV, 167; DCO, Henxteworth, 7.

²⁴⁰Jakelyn the Piper and Hankyn, among others, receive payments from Henxteworth. DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 20 September 1355 through 6 October 1355 and 28 November 1355 through 30 December 1355.

²⁴¹BPR, IV, 74-75, 161. DCO, Henxteworth accounts.

²⁴²BPR, IV, 167.

²⁴³For de Northwell: BPR, II, 66; BPR, III, 83, 137, 147, and 186; BPR, IV, 66, 91, 102, *passim*; for de Stokes, BPR, II, 151, 184; BPR, III, 394 and 456; DCO, Henxteworth accounts, throughout every entry.

(Cornwall) on account of his service and “the great hurt which he received in the Prince’s service at the battle of Poyters, where he lost an eye.”²⁴⁴

The Army’s Structure

The Prince’s army was highly organized and structured, and there was a chain of command. At the head of the army, of course, was the Prince of Wales. His company is the best documented, allowing a rough delineation of its structure.

The men who served under the Prince also had their own, smaller companies. Richard de Stafford, brother of the earl of Stafford and the Prince’s right-hand-man for special tasks (see above), had his own men, including one Thomas Darden.²⁴⁵ When Stafford returned to England following the conclusion of the 1355 *chevauchée* his men were reassigned to Chandos’ and Audley’s companies.²⁴⁶ While the exact numbers of their companies are unknown, Audley’s accounts for his service in Gascony in 1345 show that he had then forty men-at-arms and forty archers in his service.²⁴⁷ John de Lisle’s company had fifty-nine men-at-arms and sixty archers.²⁴⁸ It seems like that Audley and Chandos had companies of similar size.

There were at least six archer companies. Each unit had twenty men led by a vintemar. Five of these smaller units were united into a unit of one hundred men and was led by a mounted constable. This structure continued during the Hundred Years War, particularly for the arrayed archers. In this campaign, then, the Prince’s archers were

²⁴⁴BPR, III, 194; BPR, II, 98.

²⁴⁵BPR, II, 202–03, 212.

²⁴⁶Letter from John Wengefeld to the bishop of Winchester, Avesbury, *Gestis*, 439–445.

²⁴⁷Gribbit, “Accounting for Service at war,” 167.

²⁴⁸TNA, E 372/200, m. 43.

organized in this manner. The units of Welsh archers were likely accompanied by additional officers: chaplain, standard-bearer, doctor, and an interpreter. This was the case in campaigns in 1339, 1342, and 1359.²⁴⁹

The scant extant evidence for the earls' retinues makes it more difficult to sketch out the structure of their companies, although the overall structure was probably similar. The earl of Warwick's company included Roger de Clifford,²⁵⁰ John Beauchamp, Baron Beauchamp of Somerset,²⁵¹ and John Tochet.²⁵²

More broadly, the army on the march was divided into three columns. According to Baker's diary, this division occurred *after* the initial march through the Landes (see next chapter), so days seven and eight of the campaign. At this point, "two miles from the village of Areule [Arouille]" the standards were unfurled and "exercitus in turmas divisas."²⁵³ The Earl of Warwick, constable, and Reginald de Cobham, marshal, commanded the first column of, Baker claims, 3000 men-at-arms. With them were John de Beauchamp (1329–1361), baron Beauchamp de Somerset, later Warden of the Cinque Ports and married to Warwick's daughter Alice (in Warwick's company), Roger de Clifford (also in Warwick's company), Thomas de Hampton, *miles* and the standard bearer. Seven un-named Gascon barons accompanied the first column.²⁵⁴ The middle

²⁴⁹Prestwich, *Armies and Infantry*, 127–28.

²⁵⁰His daughter Philippa married William Ferrers, Baron Groby, whose father, also William Ferrers, coincidentally served on the 1355–1356 campaign. Eric Acheson, "Ferrers family (per c. 1240–1445), *ODNB* (2004).

²⁵¹Baker, *Chronicon*, 230.

²⁵²BPR, III, 208.

²⁵³Baker, *Chronicon*, 230.

²⁵⁴Baker, *Chronicon*, 230. The position of standard-bearer was not insignificant and was strenuous. Richard de la Vache, who carried the King's standard received 100 marks per

column—7000 men-at-arms according to Baker—was led by the Prince, and his sizable retinue would have formed a large part of this column. Accompanying him were the “earl of Oxford, lord Bartholomew de Burghersh, lord John de l’Isle, lord [John] Willoughby, lord [Roger] de la Ware, lord Maurice Berkeley...lord John Bouchier, lord John de Roos, mayor of Bordeaux, [John de Grailly] the Captal de Buch, the lord of Caumont, [and Aymery de Biron] lord of Montferrand, the standard bearer.”²⁵⁵ The third column was led by Suffolk and Salisbury, as well as Guillaume de Pomiers, “who led the Béarnaise,” and had 4000 men-at-arms.²⁵⁶

This, then, was the Prince’s army: 8000 strong (including non-combatants) and 13,000–14,000 horses divided among three columns or battles. It left Bordeaux and marched to Narbonne and back again. It did not run out of supplies; there are no reports of soldiers going without food—although the horses supposedly had to drink wine. On the campaign, the Prince and his army had to navigate the waterless Landes southeast of Bordeaux (see Chapter Five), cross the Garonne, and accommodate a baggage train increased by loot, among other logistical challenges. How the army accomplished this and how the logistics adapted to the needs of the expedition are the subjects of the next two chapters.

annum for life “for good service in the strenuous bearing of the king’s standard in his wars.” TNA, C 66/248, m.13; CPR, X, 360.

²⁵⁵Baker, *Chronicon*, 230.

²⁵⁶Bakers, *Chronicon*, 231.

Chapter Five: The Campaign to Narbonne

The preparations in England complete and a favorable wind at long last obtained, the Prince and his company finally set sail from Plymouth to England on 9 September 1355 and arrived in the Gironde on 20 September.¹ The eleven day passage seems to have been moderately uneventful, although several horses were lost during the voyage.² At least one ship was lost, and the owner, Nicholas de Rothum, was compensated for it through a pardon of 100 marks that he owed and “the goods in a ship of Scotland arrested by him in the Tyne and the ransoms of the Scots therein,” and an unnamed shipmaster received 13s 9d as a reimbursement for repairs to his ship.³ Several Cheshire archers belonging to the companies of Hamon Masey and Robert Brun lost their horses during the voyage and received 12l 18s 8d as a “gift in aid of expenditures for...horses lost at sea.”⁴

Upon landing in Bordeaux, final preparations for the fall *chevauchée* began and must have proceeded quickly, given that the campaign set out within two weeks of dropping anchor in Bordeaux. The rapidity with which these last preparations were made suggests that the Gascons had already been preparing for the expedition. On the whole, the expedition was well-organized, prepared for the logistical challenges of the march, and flexible enough to pursue what Yuval Harari terms a radical raiding strategy through

¹Sumption, *Trial by Fire*, 175.

²DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 20 September.

³TNA, C 66/249, m. 22. CPR, X, 403. DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 20 September. The recipient is unnamed, but Henxteworth specifies that the Prince’s physician Blackwater “carried” the money to the unnamed recipient.

⁴DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 1 October.

southern France. The first section of the march was probably pre-scouted, almost certainly to Arouille [81 miles (130 km)] where the banners were unfurled and the army divided into three columns, and possibly as far as Toulouse, about 153 miles (246 km) following a mostly direct route but about 186 miles (300 km) following the route taken by the army.

This chapter, then, covers the first half of the Prince's campaign: the march from Bordeaux to Narbonne. The army left Bordeaux and its environs on 5 October and reached Narbonne on 8 November. During these five weeks they marched approximately 300 miles (480 km), or an average of 14.5 miles (23 km) per day on those days the army actually marched. The purpose of the march, at least initially, was to invade Armagnac's lands south and east of Gascony and lay waste to them in retaliation for Armagnac's depredations in Gascony in 1354. After accomplishing this aim, the Anglo-Gascon force, some six thousand combatants and two thousand non-combatants who may also have been armed, then turned to Edward III's secondary strategic aim: demonstrating the power and authority of the English king and the inability of the French king to protect his kingdom and people from attack.

Final Preparations at Bordeaux

When the ships docked at Bordeaux the first order of business was disembarkation. Presumably, the men managed this without undue incident as there are no records of problems. Disembarking the horses from the ships, however, would have been just as complex a task as loading them onto the ships had been in Plymouth and Southampton. Not all of the docks were able to accommodate special gangways, and some of the horses

were unloaded via windage. John Henxteworth, the Prince's cashier, re-imbursed the clerk of the Marshalcy more than 1*l* was spent on windage upon the Prince's arrival in Bordeaux.⁵ Aside from offloading the horses, the animals needed special care and rest to help them recover from the voyage, and fresh supplies had to be purchased over and above what may, and likely was, already stored. For example, 6*l* 14*s* were spent on herbage and hay. Comestibles were also unloaded at Bordeaux,⁶ which does suggest that extra supplies were transported across the Channel. Incomestibles also had been transported across the Channel and had to be removed from the ships. Harnesses, for example, were carried from the ships by carts to Bordeaux, and thence to an advance supply depot established at St-Macaire, about thirty miles upstream from Bordeaux.⁷ New saddle pads were purchased, too.⁸ In addition to these expenses, Henxteworth paid out 16*l* 4*s* 4*d* in the wages of grooms of the stables for the month of September.⁹ The grooms' rate of pay is nowhere specified, so it is impossible to determine the precise number of grooms.

Aside from the supplies for the horses, there was considerable activity purchasing comestibles for the men. The officers responsible for purveyance purchased an unspecified quantity of wine and two pipes (a cask holding approximately 120 gal) of cider. A considerable amount of provisions was purchased. Henxteworth records 48*s* 10*d* for general provisions. Specifically, the purveyors bought 53 quarters 4 bushels of

⁵DCO, Henxteworth accounts, two entries for 20 September.

⁶DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 20 September.

⁷DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 20 September and 30 September.

⁸DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 20 September and 6 October.

⁹DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 30 September. Wages and advances, not to mention gifts, were paid out to the soldiers and men-at-arms, too.

wheat (by three tallies) for 12*l* 9*s* 8*d*; more wheat for 8*s*; fish for 7*l* 3*s* 6*d*, along with a 4*l* 7*s* 11*d* purchase of fish and salt; flesh for 4*l* 18*s* 6*d*; 3.5 quarters of salt (for the horses, for preservation—Henxteworth does not specify) for 23*s* 4*d*; 4.5 lbs of fine herbs for 12*s* 8*d*; and general food for 3*l* 19*s* 6*d*.¹⁰ At least 2*l*, and likely considerably more, was spent on the carriage of victuals to St-Macaire.¹¹ Henxteworth does not specify the means of transport for these entries, although on the return to Bordeaux supplies were transported via the Garonne River to Bordeaux.¹² Given the later use of river transport and the common use of same by wine producers, it reasonable to suppose that the army used the Garonne to transport supplies from Bordeaux to St-Macaire.¹³

Additional incomedible supplies were purchased. William Giles, attached to the office of the spicery, for example, bought candles, among other things.¹⁴ A further 450 lbs of wax candles were bought in Bordeaux.¹⁵ Two buckles were purchased for the Prince's helmet, and William de Stratton received a 9*s* advance for the two lances.¹⁶ He also spent 7*l* 10*s* for "120 ells of linen cloth bought from Vifyan de Vilers at Bordeaux."¹⁷ Cloth for the livery of 100 Welshman cost 16*l* 13*s* 4*d*, likely sewn by

¹⁰DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 20 September through 4 October.

¹¹DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 2 October.

¹²DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 29 November.

¹³Turgeon, "Bacchus and Bellum," 51, 60–65; Fowler, *Age of Plantagenet and Valois*, 41–42.

¹⁴DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 6 October. The entry specifies that Giles made the purchases in Bordeaux.

¹⁵DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 4 October.

¹⁶DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 3 October.

¹⁷DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 1 October.

William de Statton, tailor, who collected the money and oversaw the purchases.¹⁸ A further 22s 8d was spent on canvas,¹⁹ possibly for tents although Henxteworth does not specify in his accounts. These inestimable supplies were also transported to St-Macaire. Robert Pipot, for example, was reimbursed 8s 9d for carriage of bows and arrows to St-Macaire.²⁰ Related to the cost of carriage was the cost for containers for the carriage of specific items. For example, the dozen pewter bottles bought by Master William Blackwater, the Prince's physician, for the Prince's medicines, wooden containers for the transport of salt, and a dozen coffers for the carriage of confections.²¹

The establishment of the advanced supply depot was necessary. First, it would have been impossible to amass the supplies, muster the army, and assemble the supply train within Bordeaux itself. Bordeaux was approximately as populous as London with a population of 30,000 and was about 400 acres within the walls completed in 1327, although the city had expanded beyond the walls by 1355.²² St-Macaire was upstream, and transporting supplies there would have been a simple matter, given the long use of

¹⁸DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 4 October. Presumably this suggests a considerable amount of work for the tailor and his assistants. William de Statton was not the only tailor on the expeditions; Henry de Aldrington, the Prince's personal tailor, also accompanied the army.

¹⁹DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 4 October.

²⁰DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 3 October. This date does not mean the bows and arrows were taken to St-Macaire on 3 October, only two days before the army set out from Bordeaux, but is simply the date on which Henxteworth gave the clerk of the spicery the money to re-imburse Pipot.

²¹DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 20 September, 2–4 October.

²²Malcolm Vale, *The Origins of the Hundred Years War: The Angevin Legacy, 1250–1340* (Oxford, 1996), 144. This corresponds with the figures at the Musée d'Aquitaine in Bordeaux. Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 22. George Unwin, ed., *Finance and Trade under Edward III* (New York, 1962), 43.

river transport along the Garonne.²³ This advance supply depot would also ease the logistical challenges of the first couple days' marches, as well as provide a possible mustering location for the Gascon troops that would be joining the English force. It is unlikely that these troops, coming from diverse parts of Gascony, would all muster in Bordeaux, then march back out of the city. It would be more practical for them to muster outside of the city and join up with the English force there.

The Gascons ostensibly had only two weeks to outfit themselves and reach the mustering point. However, as discussed in Chapter Four, the Gascon leadership *knew* there would be an expedition that fall. Granted, they probably believed it would have begun earlier in the season and could not have controlled for the contrary winds that prevented the Prince's force from sailing as planned, but they were expecting the Prince, an English force, and an expedition. Given that, the logic of military logistics and preparedness suggests that the Gascons, just like the English, were making preparations in the spring and summer of 1355. Chapter Three demonstrated how involved and complex the preparations for a campaign were—and how much time was involved—therefore, the Gascon troops could not have been recruited and equipped and provisioned in the two weeks between the Prince's arrival in Bordeaux and the departure of the army from the city. English or Gascon—or French—the basic logistical realities of supply apply equally.

That the Gascon nobles were in Bordeaux when the Prince arrived is not in doubt. On the morning of 21 September, the Prince greeted the Gascons in the square of the

²³Turgeon, "Bacchus and Bellum."

cathedral of St-André. There, the Prince read aloud the letters patent from Edward III.²⁴ The text of the letters is recorded in Latin, while the Prince's speech following the reading is recorded in French. These letters established Prince Edward's authority as the King's lieutenant in the duchy. His powers, as defined by the letters patent, mirror those powers delineated in the indenture made between Edward III and the Prince: making truces, accepting homages, dismissing ministers, punishing rebels. The proclamation of the letters patent would have also made clear the purpose of the Prince's presence in Bordeaux and the goals of the upcoming campaign—if those were not readily apparent.²⁵

Baker records that the Prince was “received with honor by the bishop and clergy and together with all those in holy orders, with the whole populace running to meet him.”²⁶ Many prominent Gascons were witnesses to the reading of the letters patent. Among them were “Bernard Ezii, lord of Lebret (l’Albret);²⁷ Pey (II) de Grailly (d.1357),²⁸ viscount Benauges and Castillon; Jean (III) de Grailly, captal de Buch;²⁹

²⁴*Livre de Coutumes*, 439. “...Édouard, prince de Galles, a fait lire...” The notary who recorded the event wrote the text of the letter in Latin but the response of the Gascons, and the Prince's reply, are recorded in Anglo-Norman.

²⁵*Livre des Coutumes publié avec des variantes et des notes*, Item XLVI, 439–44. For the practice of reading aloud, see Thomas Clanchy, *From Memory to Written Record, 1066–1307* (Oxford, 1993).

²⁶Baker, *Chronicon*, 229. “...applicans Burdegalim, receptus est cum honore, episcopo et clero atque religiosis universaliter sacra induit, cum toto populo ipsi occurrentibus.”

²⁷He married Jean (III) de Grailly's aunt Brunissende in 1336. He and his sons served on the campaign. See Baker, *Chronicon*, 132, 140.

²⁸He was the grandfather of Jean (III) de Grailly, the Captal de Buch who served on the Prince's campaign, and had significant ties to England. He had served as the seneschal of Gascony, as had his father, Pey (I) de Grailly, and grandfather, Jean (I) de Grailly. See Blanchard-Dignac, *Le captal de Buch*, 24–27.

²⁹He served on the campaign and was an original Knight of the Garter.

Sénebrun (V), lord of Lesparre;³⁰ Bertrand, lord of Montferrand;³¹ Amaniu d'Albret, lord of Langoiran; Guillaume-Sancii, lord of Pommiers;³² Auger de Montaut, lord of Mussidan;³³ Amaniu de Fossade, lord of Madaillan;³⁴ Arnaut-Gassie de Foussat, lord of Thouars;" all are listed as *militēs* and *nobiles viri*.³⁵ Among the *venerabiles viri*, also described as *militēs*, are lord Raymond de Landirania; Gerald de Podio [a lawyer]; Bertrand Ferrand,³⁶ Pey de Calonges, canons of Bordeaux; lord Johan and Amaniu Colom, brothers; Arnald Monetarii."³⁷ Representing Bordeaux's citizenry were "Johan Colom [possibly the same man as above]; Johan Tostanan; Johan de Born [a merchant and burgess of Bordeaux];³⁸ Geraldus Cambon [possibly Guiraut de Cambon, a burgess]; Guilhem Guiraudon; Johan and Pey Guarcie, brothers; Johan de Porta; Pey Maurin."³⁹

³⁰The lord of Lesparre served on the campaign; however, there is some discrepancy as to his name. The *Livre de Coutumes* lists the lord of Lesparre in attendance at the cathedral for the reading of the letters patent as Sénebrunus (V), which is the name given in the Gascon rolls. Hewitt's list of Gascons serving on the campaign names the lord of Lesparre as Guillaume Sans. His notes list the *BPR* and *CCR*, but these entries merely say 'the lord of Lesparre,' with no given name. Perhaps Sénebrunus was the father of Guillaume Sans and lord of Lesparre in 1355 and the son, Guillaume Sans, served on the campaign, then between the beginning of the expedition and the bestowing of rewards Guillaume Sans had inherited the lordship. That Sénebrunus was lord of Lesparre is indisputable. He was married to Jean (III) de Grailly's aunt, Jeanne, in 1331, the year Jean (III) de Grailly was born, so their son would have been of an age to serve on the campaign.

³¹An Aymery de Biron is named lord of Montferrand in Henxteworth's accounts.

³²He served on the campaign and was the leader of the Béarnaise contingent.

³³He served on the campaign.

³⁴He served on the campaign. Henxteworth lists his name as Aymeric and does not mention his title. DCO, Henxteworth accounts, 83.

³⁵*Livres de Coutumes*, 444.

³⁶He appears several times in the Gascon Rolls, often described as a king's clerk.

³⁷*Livre de Coutumes*, 444.

³⁸TNA, C 61/87. He was involved in the transport and trade of wheat and other goods (primarily foodstuffs like oats and beans) from Plymouth, Southampton, and Dartmouth

These men were all prominent figures, and those who served on the campaign would have been actively involved in the planning in Gascony. It should be remembered that of those listed as witnesses Bernard Ezi, lord of Albret; Guillaume de Pommiers; Bertrand, lord of Montferrand; and Magister Gerard de Podio, “*juris periti*,” were part of the failed negotiations at Avignon in late 1354 and early 1355 and would have known what Lancaster would report to Edward III.⁴⁰ De Buch, of course, was one of the Gascons who requested the Prince and his army in Gascony. Thus, the Gascons who would be joining the Prince’s army had to have known and have already begun their preparations for the campaign *before* the Prince’s arrival in Bordeaux.

Furthermore, given their firsthand knowledge of the territory the army would shortly traverse and the presence of de Buch, de Pommiers, Montferrand, and Albret on the Prince’s staff suggests that these men joined the Prince’s staff from England in the campaign planning at Bordeaux in the council held “concerning these matters,” following the reading of the letters patent.⁴¹ Their knowledge of their lands and people, the productive capacity of the land, the location of strongholds and unfortified towns, would have been invaluable. Perhaps it was one of these men who suggested establishing the

to Bordeaux. The trade between England and Gascony was dominated by the eastward flow of wheat and the westward flow of wine.

³⁹*Livre de Coutumes*, 444. The notaries who recorded the Prince’s words, the ceremony, and the witnesses were Bartholomew de Fayette and Martin de Fontanis.

⁴⁰TNA, C 76/32. *Foedera*, III, I, 289. This is dated 30 October 1354. Albret, Pommiers, and Aymery, lord of Montferrand, all served during the Black Prince’s campaign. Their presence among the delegation is indicative of their status and that they were known to Edward III, certainly through the mayor and constable of Bordeaux if not personally.

⁴¹“Oxford, Corpus Christi College, MS 78,” ed. and trans. Clifford J. Rogers, *Journal of Medieval Military History 7: The Age of the Hundred Years War* (2009): 168–75, at 173.

advance supply depot at St-Macaire.⁴² At any rate, all of them would have been familiar with campaigning in Gascony and the logistics of the effort to be undertaken.

Once the final preparations were made, the Anglo-Gascon force began the *chevauchée*. Contrary to earlier assumptions about *chevauchées*, this was an organized campaign, such that, while local sources of supply were used, the army did not solely “live off the land;” nor was the campaign “marked by an absence of strategy.” Contrary to Hewitt’s statements, there was an able staff and real knowledge of available resources.⁴³ Overall, the Prince’s *chevauchée* was well-organized and efficient, with a capable command staff, which made it possible for the Anglo-Gascon force to meet the logistical challenges it would face on the campaign.

General Logistics

Before examining specific logistical challenges, it is necessary to establish the general parameters of the army’s logistical needs. This includes its consumption rate, the size of the baggage train, and the average speed of march. After establishing these fundamentals, they should be applied to the information provided by Baker, as he is the only chronicler to provide a detailed, day-to-day account of the campaign (for more on Baker, who did not serve on the campaign but may have had access to a campaign diary, see Chapter Two).

Consumption Rate

⁴²St-Macaire had been in French hands in 1296, and the expedition Edward I sent from England did not succeed in re-taking the town. Prestwich, *Edward I*, 384.

⁴³Hewitt, *The Black Prince’s Expedition*, 13.

The army's consumption rate is fundamental to everything the army does; it determines to a very large extent what is and is not possible because it deals with the ineluctable reality that men and animals must eat and drink at least minimum quantities of food and water. When they are campaigning, they must carry that food—and water when necessary—with them. As discussed in Chapter Four, the army would need pack animals to carry supplies, in addition to the baggage animals carrying non-comestible supplies.

The Prince's force, as established in Chapter Four, was roughly 8000 including non-combatants. This would mean a total of 160 baggage animals using Engels's ratio of one baggage animal per fifty men; Roth's ratio of one animal to every 3.4 men gives a total of more than 2300 animals.⁴⁴ The Prince's army did not carry siege equipment with them, but they did carry tools.⁴⁵ Even so, a significant number of carts would not be needed. Furthermore, some of the territory through which the Prince's army travelled would be incredibly difficult for horse-drawn carts. That said, the army did have some carts with it, as Baker reports the loss of some while the army was at Narbonne.⁴⁶ The single largest contributor, though, to the army's consumption rate was the number of horses, those of the cavalry and the mounted archers. This was a *chevauchée*, and the rate of march (discussed below) indicates that most members of the force were mounted.

⁴⁴This is based on the Roman data. See Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army*, 18; James McYntire and I.A. Richmond, "Tents of the Roman Army and Leather from Birdoswald," *Transactions of the Cumberland and Westmoreland Antiquarian and Archaeological Society* 34 (1934): 62–90; Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War*, 82–84

⁴⁵Henxte worth makes no mention of any siege equipment, nor do any other documents. The chronicles and letters also make no mention of sieges or siege works.

⁴⁶Baker, 237.

Per the Prince's indenture, he had 433 men-at-arms and 700 archers in his retinue,⁴⁷ and Knighton claims there were 800 men-at-arms and 1400 archers. As the ratio of men-at-arms to archers is roughly the same (4.33:7 and 4:7 respectively, or 2:3.5 more simply), that is the ratio applied to the entire army (combatants only) to determine the number of men-at-arms and archers. This is in line with armies of the period. By the end of the fourteenth century, the ratio of men-at-arms to archers was roughly 1:1, and many of the retinues of the 1359–1360 campaigns contained equal numbers of men-at-arms and mounted archers. Based on the above ratio, then, for an army of 6000, the Prince would have approximately 2200 men-at-arms and 3800 archers. Granted, in the absence of data about the composition of the Gascon companies, this is, at best, informed guesswork.⁴⁸

Table 5.1: Ratio of men-at-arms to archers in the Prince's force.

	Indenture	Knighton	Total in the Army
Men-at-arms	433	800	2200
Archers	700	1400	3800
Total	1133	2200	6000

Once the ratio of men-at-arms to archers has been established, it is possible to infer the number of horses necessary for the combatants. Depending on rank, the horse passage allowance could vary from one to five horses. Andrew Ayton has shown that a

⁴⁷BPR, IV, 143-145.

⁴⁸See Andrew Ayton, "English Armies in the Fourteenth Century," in *The Wars of Edward III, Sources and Interpretations*, ed. Clifford J. Rogers, 303–19 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1999), at 314.

banneret was allowed five horses, “four for knights and three for esquires;” each mounted archer would have had a single horse.⁴⁹ This scale from the 1340 campaign was also in force in 1346, the 1360s, and more significantly for this study, in 1345 for Sir James Audley’s outbound voyage to Gascony.⁵⁰ It seems safe to assume that a similar policy applied to the Prince’s outbound force. For the purposes of simplification, and given that it is often impossible to ascertain the rank of every man-at-arms, let us assume four horses for each man-at-arms, thus accounting for those with as many as five and those with as few as three. With approximately 2200 men-at-arms, this would come to 8800 horses. There would be an additional 3800 horses for the archers, for a total of 12,600 horses for the combatants. Add in the 160 baggage horses, and that indicates an approximate total of 12,760 horses not including pack animals. All further calculations will be based on 13,000 horses.

With the size of the Prince’s force now estimated, it is possible to calculate the army’s consumption rate. This can be done using Engels’ basic equation, discussed fully in Chapter Two, but with more nuanced values for the caloric needs of the men and animals and accounting for the varied needs of same under different circumstances, e.g., in desert conditions. Engels’ model, while useful, does not sufficiently take into account these variations and nuances; that said, the equation itself is sound. It is merely the values he supplies, e.g., 3 lbs of grain for the caloric needs of a soldier or 10 lbs of grain for a horse, that do not accurately reflect the needs of a man likely in his mid twenties to

⁴⁹Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, 58.

⁵⁰Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses*, 58, esp. n. 50 and n. 51.

late thirties and engaging in intense physical activity or those of a horse in desert conditions.

According to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (1912) a pack horse needs 9.25 lbs grain and 14 lbs forage. That ration would need to be increased depending on the work load.⁵¹ Alternatively, non-working horses fed by feeding weight would need 14–16 lbs forage and 7–13 lbs grain, for an average ration of 15 lbs forage and 10 lbs grain, with the grain ration not to exceed 40 percent of the total ration at the risk of horses foundering.⁵² The risk is, essentially, over consumption of carbohydrates, which results in the sugars not being properly digested, leading to inflammation throughout the body but particularly in the lamina (the structure that suspends the bones of the foot) of the feet.⁵³ This ration increases in the field to 12 lbs of grain and 14 lbs fodder—numbers higher than those supplied by Engels—and 8 gal (80 lbs) of water, which must be increased under arid conditions. Under such conditions the provision of water must be carefully regulated.⁵⁴ Foraging is highly encouraged in the field as it reduces the amount of supplies the army must carry. Another option for reducing the train is establishing advance supply depots and caching supplies.⁵⁵

⁵¹Professional Papers, No. 29, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, Fourth (Revised) Edition, with Addenda. Engineer Field Manual, Pts. 1–4. Prepared under direction of Brig. General A. MacKenzie, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1912. War Department Document 355, 428–31; see also, Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War*, 9–13.

⁵²FM31–27, 2–12.

⁵³Doug Butler and Frank Gravlee, *Laminitis & Founder: Prevention and Treatment for the Greatest Chance of Success* (Cherokee, AL: Life Data Labs, Inc., 2007), 26.

⁵⁴FM31–27, 2–50, 2–71, 2–82. It should be noted that the animals should be watered three times daily and not at the same time as feeding.

⁵⁵FM31–27, 2-67.

An alternative method for determining the army's consumption rate is to look at the consumption rate of a unit. For example, in 1938 a cavalry unit of 5 officers, 127 enlisted men, and 153 horses required 1876 lbs of grain daily.⁵⁶ Thus for every 132 men and 153 horses the army would need 1876 lbs of grain, for an army of 8000 (including non-combatants) and 13,000 horses, 114,436 lbs of grain for 61 units of the above configuration. However, there would still be the matter of the addition 24 units of 153 horses which would require another 1480 lbs of grain per unit, so an additions 35,520 lbs of grain per day. The total grain needs, then, would be 149,956 lbs daily.

Size of the Baggage Train

The Prince's campaign was indisputably a *chevauchée*. The Prince chose to pursue a radical raiding strategy. This entailed considerable movement, no sieges, and no stops of any significant duration.⁵⁷ There was no intent to occupy territory, but rather to lay waste to Armagnac and the Languedoc and thus punish the duke of Armagnac for his encroachments on Gascony. It has generally been assumed that a raiding army lived entirely off the land, although recently military historians have come to understand that local supply was not the only source of provisions. That said, these same historians continue to over-emphasize the "living off the land" model of supply.⁵⁸ And, as Yuval Harari has pointed out, the relationship between supply and strategy has been too often ignored.⁵⁹ Of course, it is also easy to over-emphasize that relationship and focus on supply as the only determining factor, when, in fact, the Prince—or the King—decided

⁵⁶Cavalry Field Manual (1938), 183.

⁵⁷Harari, "Supply and Strategy," 300. The longest stop was three days.

⁵⁸Harari, "Supply and Strategy," 299.

⁵⁹Harari, "Supply and Strategy," 299.

upon a *chevauchée* for strategic purposes unconnected to, although not uninfluenced by, the question of supply.

The Prince's raiding strategy determined what kind of supply system he needed, just as his supply system ensured he had to pursue a highly mobile strategy. The Prince's campaign matches Harari's definition of a radical raiding strategy: rapid movement (9–15.5 miles per day [15–25 km]), no sieges, no long stops, and lasting several weeks.⁶⁰ That he needed a supply system is not in doubt. Relying on local supply was both untenable and would have put the army at considerable risk of starvation, not to mention that it would seriously limit the options for campaigns. For one thing, an army pursuing this kind of raiding strategy did not have the time to stay in one place long enough to be thorough in foraging—assuming the local inhabitants had not already destroyed or hidden everything as word of the Prince's advance spread. Living off the land would have been problematic in the face of an active enemy harassing foragers or pursuing a scorched earth policy. Troop behavior could also be an issue. Troops sacking a town or village easily could destroy the food that could have been used to feed the army.⁶¹ Therefore, an army that intended to rely upon local supply *had* to pursue a raiding strategy, yet given the above difficulties, even a raiding army could not depend solely on local supply for adequate provisions. Some type of supply system was necessary beyond the establishment of a supply depot at St-Macaire.⁶²

In order to remain mobile and pursue the kind of raiding strategy that the army

⁶⁰Harari, "Supply and Strategy," 301.

⁶¹Harari, "Supply and Strategy," 306–10.

⁶²DCO, Henxte worth accounts, entries for 20 September–4 October. Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 23–26.

used, the Prince could not have used supply lines once the army left Gascony. The army intended to raid too deeply into enemy territory to make that feasible. The march to Arouille, where the army left friendly territory and the first hostilities occurred, alone was a march of 81 miles (130 km). The carts shuttling back and forth between the army would not have been able to keep pace with that army, and the carts would have been without protection in enemy territory unless such protection had been pre-arranged.⁶³ There are no indications that such was the case. Therefore, the Prince had to have a supply train that accompanied the army.

The most recent work on fourteenth-century logistics and baggage trains is Yuval Harari's article, "Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion Campaigns," and his *Special Operations in the Age of Chivalry, 1100–1550* (2007). In his article, Harari posits an (imaginary) army of 15,000 (including 5,000 non-combatants) and 20,000 horses with about 100 carts and 850 pack horses to carry the grain supply for the entire army for 50 days and assumes a (very high) 50 percent spoilage rate (a rate he admits is arbitrary).⁶⁴ This army, if subsisting solely on grain, would require 469–937 tons of grain for a 50 day campaign.⁶⁵ However, as he assumes a rate of spoilage of 50 percent, the army would have less than 937 tons of grain upon which to subsist. This means the army would be marching, if not at half rations (469 tons of grain would be half rations), on less than full rations, as the 937 tons would meet the normal needs of the

⁶³Harari, "Supply and Strategy," 324–25.

⁶⁴Harari, "Supply and Strategy," 314, 319.

⁶⁵Harari, "Supply and Strategy," 314.

soldiers.⁶⁶ If half of that, per Harari, is lost to wastage, that means that the soldiers would receive 0.62 kg of grain per day, not enough to meet their real needs. That said, this imagined army of 15,000 men would need 937–1874 carts, each carrying 500–1000 kg.⁶⁷ Based on these numbers, this army could be carrying with it anywhere from 468.5 tons at the low end, which would put the men at half rations, to 1874 tons at the high end, twice the grain needed by the army. According to Harari, “[i]t seems, then, that theoretically even large fourteenth-century raiding armies could have carried their entire food supply with them.”⁶⁸

While that may theoretically be the case, there are several problems, including the “private” ownership of supplies and the financial cost. That said, Harari shows that these are false problems, particularly the question of cost. Providing supplies was actually very cost effective for the king,⁶⁹ and, as discussed in Chapter Three, the English system of purveyance was highly developed and efficient.⁷⁰ The third problem, however, is a real though not insurmountable one: Carts limit the army’s freedom of movement. While this is the case, Harari warns that it should not be exaggerated and cites the Prince’s 1355 campaign as an example.⁷¹

⁶⁶Harari claims that the men would need the daily caloric equivalent of 1.25 kg of grain. For 15,000 men this would be 18,750 kg of grain per day and 9,375,000 kg (937.5 metric tons).

⁶⁷Harari, “Supply and Strategy,” 312.

⁶⁸Harari, “Supply and Strategy,” 314.

⁶⁹Harari, “Supply and Strategy,” 315.

⁷⁰Ilana Krug, “Royal Prerogative Gone Astray,” Ilana Krug, “Peasants and Purveyance at the Beginning of the Hundred Years War.”

⁷¹Harari, “Supply and Strategy,” 316. “The achievement of the cart train which accompanied the Black Prince in 1355 should also warn us against exaggerating the mobility problems of supply trains. This train—which for most the way was packed with

That the Prince's supply train included carts is not in doubt, as some of them were attacked and plundered during the crossing of the Aude river at Carcassonne.⁷² Peter Hoskins, using Harari's figures and methodology, determines that the Prince's supply train included 70 carts (1200–3000 lbs in each) and 550 pack animals (he uses Spufford's data for pack horses: 400 lbs per animal, 150 lbs higher than suggested by Engels and the US Army Corp of Engineers in 1912), plus about 300 horses for the carts (280 to be exact).⁷³ Using Spufford's figures as to the carrying capacity of medieval carts and pack horses, these 70 carts and 550 animals could have carried 304,000lbs (137,892kg) of grain.⁷⁴ The pack animals and cart horses would consume 78,850 lbs (35766kg) of grain over ten days. The baggage train thus constituted would easily have been able to carry ten days' worth of supplies for itself, with some 225,150 lbs (102,126kg) of grain to spare. However, as Table 5.2 makes clear, it would be impossible for the baggage train to carry ten days' supplies for the entire army. Even if every cart had a carrying capacity of 3000 lbs (1.5 tons), it would still be insufficient.⁷⁵

an enormous amount of spoils—travelled from Bordeaux to Narbonne and back in two months, fording several rivers on the way.”

⁷²Baker, *Chronicon*, 238. “...in quo transitu duae quadrigae domini principis fuerunt per cives defractae, et ad magnum damnun depraedatae.” The potential of breakdowns was one of the reasons commanders like Philip of Macedon, Alexander the Great, and Xenophon, among others, limited the use of baggage carts. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army*, 15.

⁷³Harari's calculations for an army of 15,000 men: 100 carts and 850 pack animals, as well as 520 head of cattle for ten days. Harari, “Strategy and Supply,” 318–19 and passim. For the carrying capacity of medieval carts, see Peter Spufford, *Power and Profit: The Merchant in Medieval Europe* (London: Thames and Hudson, 2002), 199. As Harari suggests, Hoskins has assumed an average of four horses per cart.

⁷⁴I have used the minimum of 1200lbs for the carts.

⁷⁵Harari makes the point that it would be impossible to feed the horses with a horse-powered train; therefore, local supply is necessary. Harari, “Supply and Strategy,” 320.

Table 5.2: Carrying capacity of the Prince's baggage train based on Hoskins' and Harari's figures and using a carrying capacity of 1200 lbs per cart and 400 lbs per pack horse. As it shows, the train would be insufficient to carry 10 days' grain ration.

Category	Numbers	10 days' ration	Starting carrying capacity: 304,000 lbs (137,892 kg) grain
Cart horses	280	26,600 lbs (12,066 kg)	278,000 lbs (126,099 kg) grain left
Pack horses	550	52,250 lbs (23,700 kg)	224,750 lbs (101,945 kg) grain left
Soldiers	6000	210,000 lbs (95,254 kg)	14,750 lbs (6690.5 kg) grain left
Non-combatants	2000	70,000 lbs (31,751 kg)	-55,250 lbs (-25,061 kg) needed
Cavalry horses	13,000 ⁷⁶	1,202,500 lbs (545,455 kg)	-1,257,750 (-570,506 kg) needed

He does not discuss other animals, such as oxen, as their use in fourteenth-century armies was limited. Harari, "Supply and Strategy," 305, n. 18.

⁷⁶This is the number Hoskins gives. Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 21.

Table 5.3: Carrying capacity of the Prince's baggage train based on Hoskins' and Harari's figures and using a carrying capacity of 3000 lbs per cart and 400 lbs per pack horse. As it shows, the train would be insufficient to carry 10 days' grain ration.

Category	Numbers	10 days' ration	Starting carrying capacity: 430,000 lbs (195,045 kg) grain
Cart horses	280	26,600 lbs (12,066 kg)	403,400 lbs (182,979 kg) grain left
Pack horses	550	52,250 lbs (23,700 kg)	351,150 lbs (159,279 kg) grain left
Soldiers	6000	210,000 lbs (95,254 kg)	141,150 lbs (64,025) grain left
Non-combatants	2000	70,000 lbs (31,751 kg)	71,150 lbs (32,273 kg) grain left
Cavalry horses	13,000	1,202,500 lbs (545,455 kg)	-1,131,350 lbs (-513,172 kg) needed

Given the above numbers, the army's daily grain ration would be 159,385 lbs (72,296 kg). At most, the baggage train thus envisioned by Hoskins could carry 2.7 days' grain ration for the entire army, assuming each cart carried 3000 lbs. This, then, would be the maximum number of days the army could go without restocking the grain supply. If the army also had to carry forage, the baggage train would need to carry 352,985 lbs of grain and forage, which means it could carry only one day's ration. Even at half rations, the train could still only carry two days' rations. If the army had to carry potable water, it would be impossible for the baggage train to carry even one day's ration of grain, forage, and water.

Clearly, local supply was necessary for the horses. This need for local forage also meant the army had to move frequently, as the horses would consume the available resources. If the army relied solely upon local supply to feed the horses, the animals would have each required the forage from an area of 1614.6 ft² (150 m²).⁷⁷ The Prince's roughly 14,000 horses (including pack animals and cart horses)⁷⁸ would thus need the forage of more than 500,000 acres (roughly 800 square miles), or any forage within a 9000 yd (700 m) radius. In the unlikely event that the army could proceed along a broad front, relying upon local supply to feed the horses should have been possible—in theory. The Prince could not count on the availability of local supply. The issue is not necessarily one of actual resources; given the season there likely would have been sufficient forage (grass, hay). However, the Prince had to be concerned with a possible enemy presence—he could not have predicted that the French forces would remain behind the walls of Toulouse—, not to mention the possibility of the local inhabitants pursuing a scorched earth policy.⁷⁹ Therefore, the Prince's army had to carry with it at least some supplies for the horses and pursue a radical raiding strategy in order to avoid starvation.⁸⁰

The baggage train itself consisted of pack animals and some carts. The carts, of course, had the advantage of being able to carry a significantly larger amount of supplies with many fewer horses—approximately three times as many pack animals as wagons or

⁷⁷Harari, "Supply and Strategy," 310.

⁷⁸The number of horses for the soldiers is based on Ayton's numbers: 1 horse for each mounted archer and 3–5 horses for men-at-arms.

⁷⁹Harari, "Strategy and Supply," 310–11.

⁸⁰Harari, "Strategy and supply," 311.

carts would be needed to transport the same amount of freight.⁸¹ Pack animals, however, increased the army's mobility.⁸² According to the US Army's Field Manual for Special Forces on the use of pack animals, pack horses can cover any terrain passable on foot and maintain the speed of 15–20 miles per day without reducing the amount carried, which should be roughly 20 percent of their body weight (150–300 lbs),⁸³ or an average load of 225 lbs—the figure provided in the US Army's Corps of Engineers Field Manual in 1912.⁸⁴ In 1938 the US War Department's Cavalry Field Manual suggests a load of 250 lbs total, with 200 lbs being actual cargo.⁸⁵ This figure is lower than Engels' 250 lbs and certainly lower than Spufford's 400 lbs; it is also less than Roth's Roman data indicates. He finds that a single mule carried a load of 145 kg, i.e., 320 pounds.⁸⁶

Speed of March

Pack animals could manage 15–20 miles per day even in mountainous terrain,⁸⁷ although 10–12 miles would be good going for the baggage train.⁸⁸ On good roads and in ideal conditions the carts could possibly manage 2.5 miles an hour for 10 hours, or 25 miles

⁸¹Professional Papers, No. 29, 477.

⁸²Professional Papers, No. 29. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. Fourth (Revised) Edition, with Addenda. Engineer Field Manual, Pts. 1–4. Prepared under direction of Brig. General A. MacKenzie, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1912. War Department Document 355, 427.

⁸³FM31–27, 1–4.

⁸⁴Professional Papers, No. 29, 429. This source gives 225 lbs as the net load for mules and a gross load of 300 lbs.

⁸⁵Cavalry Field Manual (1938), 171.

⁸⁶Roth, *The Logistics of the Roman Army at War*, 77–79.

⁸⁷FM31–27, 1–4.

⁸⁸Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 25. Hoskins' figures are based on Hewitt, *The Horse in Mediaeval England* (London, 1983), 38, 59.

per day⁸⁹—the campaign did have six marches of twenty or more miles; the average speed was fourteen-and-a-half miles per day. This rate of 25 miles per day, of course, is predicated on the existence of good roads—not guaranteed in the fourteenth century.⁹⁰ Oxen were not a viable option, given that their fastest speed was 2 miles per hour; they can only work five hours per day, and their hooves are unsuited for long distance travel.⁹¹

The men on horseback, moving independently of the pack train, could easily exceed 25 miles per day,⁹² 35 miles per day under favorable conditions and could maintain an average speed of 6 miles per hour six days a week—the longest single march was twenty-eight miles early in the campaign—and the army’s average speed was fourteen-and-a-half miles per day. A rest day after the sixth day was necessary. These rates assume the pack train is moving at a slower pace behind the mounted soldiers, who would also need to be seasoned troops to maintain the pace. That said, the pack train *could* keep up if the pace was kept to 5 miles per hour or slower.⁹³ The mounted soldiers on a forced march could achieve and maintain a speed of less than or equal to 50 miles per day for 3 days and 100 miles in 24 hours if absolutely necessary.⁹⁴ The Prince’s cavalry would not have moved at this speed in order to keep horses in combat-ready condition. Clearly, under such forced-march conditions, the army would have to leave the pack train and baggage train behind, then wait for it to catch up. Furthermore, given

⁸⁹Professional Papers, No. 29, 437.

⁹⁰Professional Papers, No. 29, 438.

⁹¹Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army*,” 15–16.

⁹²Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 25.

⁹³War Department Cavalry Field Manual. Vol. III. Prepared under direction of Chief of Cavalry. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1938, 145, 176.

⁹⁴Cavalry Field Manual (1938), 150.

the time it would take for the train to arrive—one to three days if the train moves at 2.5 miles an hour—, which means the soldiers would have to carry rations with them (13–40 lbs of grain). Soldiers on foot could achieve 20 miles per day under normal conditions.⁹⁵

With these factors in mind, then, how quickly did the Prince’s army move? Using Baker’s diary and the distances between the places he mentions, as well as Hoskins’ itinerary,⁹⁶ the average speed of march was almost 14.5 miles per day over 42 march days and 17 rest days.⁹⁷ Pack animals could certainly keep up with the army, and likely the baggage train could, too, if conditions were decent. The length of the army’s marches varied from as short as 4 miles to 28 miles, both of which occurred in the first two days of the campaign, for a two day average of 16 miles.

The Prince’s Route

On Monday 5 October (the first day of the march) the English forces left Bordeaux and marched the four miles to Urnoun/Villenave-d’Ornon (see Map 2),⁹⁸ downstream from the supply depot at St-Macaire. It may be that the pack and baggage train mustered at St-Macaire, while the army marshaled at Urnoun/Villenave-d’Ornon.⁹⁹ There appear, based on Henxteworth’s accounts, to have been a few more supply purchases (vinegar and salt), a couple horses were bought, and several men received advances on their wages. These

⁹⁵Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 25.

⁹⁶Hoskins, for his book *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, walked the route taken by the Prince’s army in 1355 and 1356. He found Baker to be fairly accurate even though he could not always find the exact places mentioned in Baker due to changes in the human topography.

⁹⁷Hoskins agrees with this rate of march and has shown that a man on foot could certainly achieve it.

⁹⁸I am providing the place names as given by Baker and the identifications made by Hoskins.

⁹⁹Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 22–26.

men included soldiers and servants, indicating that the non-combatants also received advance wages. Of particular interest for the Prince's supply train, Henxteworth recorded a deposit of *6l 13s 4d* from the clerk of the kitchen. The money came from the "issue of beasts,"¹⁰⁰ which presumably were sold. This is the only evidence that the Prince's supply train contained live animals. The presence of cattle, in the general sense of the word, would have slowed the supply train's progress and complicated the issue of supply, as the cattle would need to graze, as would horses. A herd would not have noticeably slowed the march, as a herd moved at approximately 15 miles a day.¹⁰¹ The Prince also had advance parties purchasing supplies, as in the case of oats purchased at Castets-en-Dorte. Henxteworth records the purchase on 6 October, but the main force did not reach Castets-en-Dorthe, just east of Langon and the advance supply depot at St-Macaire, until 8 October.¹⁰²

The longest march was 28 miles along the Garonne on Tuesday 6 October from Urnouvillan/Villeneuve-d'Ornon to Audert/Castets-en-Dorthe (see Map 2), after which the army rested for a day—probably waiting for the baggage train to catch up as the train, even under ideal conditions, would have had difficulty making a march of 28 miles. Much, if not all, of this distance was along the Roman Via Aquitania,¹⁰³ although Baker writes that the army took "a narrow, wooded road" and passed "through the walled town

¹⁰⁰DCO, Henxteworth, entry for 5 October. The Latin is "exut. animalium," which was used—if rarely—for the young of beasts.

¹⁰¹This is the average speed achieved by nineteenth-century cattle drives. Jimmy M. Skaggs, *The Cattle-Trailing Industry: Between Supply and Demand, 1866–1890* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1973).

¹⁰²DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 6 October.

¹⁰³Raymond Chevallier, *Roman Roads* (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976) 36–37 and illustration 4.

of Langon.”¹⁰⁴ Langon stood directly across the river from St.-Macaire, where the supplies had been shipped upriver from Bordeaux.¹⁰⁵ In order to make the 28 mile march the army did not and could not stop to take on supplies.¹⁰⁶ The long march, following so close on the sea voyage, was not without consequences, and “many horses were lost.”¹⁰⁷ It is possible these horses contracted fevers, as they would have been susceptible to it after the voyage.¹⁰⁸ Given the loss of these horses—and the ones lost on the voyage—it is hardly surprising that Henxteworth advanced 27*l* to Reynold son of Reymund Sigyn to purchase horses for the Cheshire archers at Urnoun/Villenave-d’Ornon,¹⁰⁹ although Henxteworth gives no indication as to when and where the actual horses were purchased. They may have been purchased in Urnoun/Villenave-d’Ornon, so that the Cheshire archers who had lost horses on the sea voyage would be mounted. The Prince also acquired a new courser from Aymeric de Fossade, one of the Gascon lords.¹¹⁰ Hoskins speculates that one reason the army made such a grueling march in friendly territory was that the Gascons may have marshaled at Castets-en-Dorthe and that the Prince wished to meet them. That may be, particularly as the castle had been taken by the English during the earl of Derby’s raid in 1345 and Jean de Grailly, the captal de Buch, held it in 1355.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁴Baker, *Chronicon*, 229.

¹⁰⁵Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 25–26.

¹⁰⁶Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 26.

¹⁰⁷Baker, *Chronicon*, 229. “...longa dieta, in perditionem multorum equorum...”

¹⁰⁸Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 26.

¹⁰⁹DCO, Henxteworth, entry for 6 October.

¹¹⁰DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 6 October. The courser was brought to the Prince by Godfrey, one Fossade’s grooms, who received a gift of 20s for doing so.

¹¹¹Drouyn, *La Guyenne militaire*, 270–76.

During the one day halt at Audert/Castets-en-Dorthe¹¹² on 7 October the army, while waiting for the train to arrive, took the opportunity to purchase supplies and likely inspected equipment after one day on the road. The largest purchases were 31 quarters of wheat, 71 quarters, 10 bushels of oats, and an unspecified quantity of hay. Many of these supplies were purchased from the constable of the town.¹¹³ The purchase of hay suggests that the army was carrying forage for the horses, at least for the next legs of the march which would take them across the Landes (see below). Other purchases included meat, fuel, fish, and beans.¹¹⁴ The final, major purchase was a large quantity of wine that was distributed to the Welsh and Gascon soldiers. This may have been intended to boost morale. A good time appears to have been had by all, with the predictable amount of damage as a result. The Prince “gave” 11*l* 5*s* as “a gift” “to divers men of the town of Tendorte” “in recompense for damage done by divers Welshman and other retainers.”¹¹⁵

Fortunately for those still hungover, the march to Besashuntoun/Bazas (see Map 2) on 8 October was an easy 11 miles. At this point the army left the Garonne and headed south through land that became undulating.¹¹⁶ Although the advance continued along the route of the Via Aquitania, the Prince hired two men described as “varlets” and who must have been locals as guides. They were handsomely rewarded for it. They received 22*s* 6*d*,¹¹⁷ considerably more than the 6*d* per day wage received by the Cheshire

¹¹²Henxteworth calls it Andorte and Epundorte.

¹¹³DCO, Henxteworth, entry for 6 October.

¹¹⁴DCO, Henxteworth, entry for 6 October. The account for the fish and some of the meat was recorded on tallies.

¹¹⁵DCO, Henxteworth, entry for 6 October.

¹¹⁶Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 26.

¹¹⁷DCO, Henxteworth, entry for 6 October.

archers or the 3d per day for the archers from Flynt. This suggests that, even in friendly territory, English armies used local guides. The Prince also took advantage of the halt and friendly territory to write letters. William, a groom of Bartholomew de Burghersh, received 110s for carrying the letters back to England.¹¹⁸ The only thing Baker notes is the cathedral and a convent of Friars Minor in Besashuntoun/Bazas.¹¹⁹ That said, Besashuntoun/Bazas was an important town in Aquitaine and had changed hands several times between the French and the English. Thanks to the earl of Derby's efforts in 1347 and reinforcements from Bordeaux in 1352, the town was in English hands in 1355.¹²⁰ Hoskins describes the town as "striking," positioned "on a steep rocky promontory between two valleys," and walled.¹²¹

The army stayed at Besashuntoun/Basaz two nights. The Prince gave orders that the soldiers "should wear the arms of Saint George."¹²² More wheat and wine were purchased.¹²³ Even though the army had just purchased supplies 1–2 days before they needed to take on additional supplies. First, Besashuntoun/Basaz was the last large town

¹¹⁸DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 10 December.

¹¹⁹Baker, *Chronicon*, 229. For a history of Bazas and how it originally became part of English Gascony, as well as the military service of the town in the thirteenth century, see Jean-Bernard Marquette, "Notes sur l'histoire de la ville Bazas au XIII siècle," *Les cahiers du Bazadais* 24, no. 65 (1984): 3–47. There was an Anglo-Gascon garrison of at least twenty men there during the reign of Henry III (1207–1272).

¹²⁰Sumption, *Trial by Fire*, 26; Fowler, *The King's Lieutenant*, 64–65, 67.

¹²¹Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 27. The walls date no later than the early fourteenth century, so they would have been extant in 1355, as was the cathedral and episcopal palace.

¹²²Baker, *Chronicon*, 230. This was not yet standard practice, but by Richard II's reign (1377–1399) the practice was described and its purpose explained in the 1385 Ordinances of War. See Matthew Strickland and Robert Hardy, *The Great War Bow: From Hastings to the Mary Rose* (Stroud, 2005), 201.

¹²³DCO, Henxteworth, entry for 6 October.

in friendly territory, which also made it a good place to rest. Second, the next two days' marches would take the army through the Landes, where the army would have difficulty finding forage and water. The residents would certainly have been able to provide information in addition to what the Prince already knew from pilgrim itineraries and reports from previous campaigns, not to mention those of his advisors who had served in Gascony or were Gascons. The Prince and his staff clearly knew what the coming march would be like and purposefully rested and took on supplies and possibly some water before heading south through the Landes to Arouille, where they would cross from friendly to enemy territory.

Crossing the Landes

Crossing the Landes presented the Prince's army with a logistical challenge. While it is now a maritime pine forest thanks to nineteenth-century forestation efforts,¹²⁴ in the fourteenth century it was a sparsely populated moor or heath land. It supported some trees but mostly heather and gorse; it was marshy in winter and in summer a sandy plain. Quicksand was a real hazard.¹²⁵ Finding potable water would have been difficult. Frost came early in the fall and lasted late into the spring. It was certainly possible that the Prince and his army had to contend with an early frost on 10–11 October.¹²⁶ The early frost would have been a concern had the army returned through the Landes. They likely

¹²⁴J. Guinaudeau, *La Forêt Landaise* (I.N.R.A.: Station de recherches forestières de Bordeaux, 1964), 2.

¹²⁵Jacques Sargos, *Histoire de forêt Landaise* (Bordeaux, 1997), 39–43.

¹²⁶Guinaudeau, *La forêt Landaise*, 8 and temperature chart. A decade-long study of the relative temperature in the Landes shows frost as early as 17 September in 1963, although the average seems to be mid-October.

had to contend with precipitation given that October is one of the rainiest months of the year in the Landes.¹²⁷ All in all, the Landes were most inhospitable.

This was certainly known to the Prince and his staff, as the conditions were described in a *Pilgrim's Guide* in the twelfth century:

This is a desolate country lacking in everything: neither bread nor wine nor fish nor water nor any springs. There are few villages on this sandy plain, though it has honey, millet and pigs [which the army could have eaten] in plenty. If you are going through the Landes in summer be sure to protect your face from wasps and horse flies which are particularly abundant in this region. And if you do not watch your feet carefully you will sink up to your knees in the sea sand which is found everywhere here.¹²⁸

Furthermore, key members of the Prince's staff, like de Grailly and Bernard d'Albret held lands in and around the Landes, and he and the others may have provided supplies, although there is no record of them having done so. The Prince also employed local guides. There is no doubt the Prince had sufficient and reliable information about the conditions in and paths through the Landes.

The first day's march through the Landes took the army thirteen miles south to Nau/Castelnau (see Map 2).¹²⁹ The exact location is unknown. A *castelnau* was similar to a motte and bailey castle and, as such, is added to many village and town names in

¹²⁷Guinaudeau, *La forêt Landaise*, precipitation chart. Sargos, *Histoire de forêt Landaise*, 39–43 for the historical climate of the Landes during the fourteenth century.

¹²⁸*The Pilgrim's Guide: A 12th Century Guide for the Pilgrim to St James de Compostella*, trans. James Hogarth (London, 1992), 18.

¹²⁹Baker, *Chronicon*, 230; Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 27–28, 207.

southern France;¹³⁰ therefore, Castelnau could be a number of different places. Hoskins identifies two possible locations: The first is now a very small village, near the north-south route between Bazas and Arouille. The second is only a mile south-east of the first location: St-Michel-de-Castelnau, which was larger than Castelnau. There was a castle of some 40m by 60m near Castlenau but only some cellars remain.¹³¹ Baker writes that three castles were visible,¹³² but only that one castle, belonging to an ally of the Albret family, is known to have actually existed and may have been a source of supplies.¹³³

A large water supply would have been essential at the end of the day, and the Ciron River does run near the castle ruins, lending weight to Hoskins' conclusion that the army camped at St-Michel-de-Castelnau.¹³⁴ The horses would have had to have been well-watered at Bazas in the morning and some water must have been carried with the army, as "only a few very minor streams" were along the route to Castelnau,¹³⁵ and the animals ideally should have been watered three times daily.¹³⁶ The army would have needed 116,000 gallons of water, not counting the water needed by the pack and cart horses. Carrying all the grain, forage, and water needed by the army for that day would have required almost 10,000 pack horses or more than 600 carts (with the addition of more than 2000 cart horses). The Prince did not have this large of a supply train; therefore, the army did not carry all the supplies needed for the day. They depended on

¹³⁰Henri Denifle, *La désolation des monastères, églises, et hôpitaux en France pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans* (Paris, 1889), vol. 2–1, 87, n. 5.

¹³¹Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 28–29.

¹³²Baker, *Chronicon*, 230.

¹³³Denifle, *La désolation*, vol. 2–1, 87.

¹³⁴Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 29.

¹³⁵Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 29. See

¹³⁶FM31–27, 2–50, 2–71, 2–82.

the available water supplies. The army did carry forage with them, and they would have needed to do so given that the most common vegetation in the Landes was heather and gorse. However, carrying one day's ration of grain and forage would have required 1300 pack animals or just over 100 carts. A supply train of this size, made up of a combination of pack animals and carts, would have been able to transport the needed supplies. Hoskins' numbers of 70 carts and 550 pack animals would have easily been able to transport the supplies for the one day.¹³⁷

More meat and wine were purchased in castrum Nau/Castelnau. While this was not the last place where supplies could be purchased, it was the last place in truly friendly territory until the conclusion of the campaign. After the festivities at Endorthe/Castets-en-Dorthe, the wine supply doubtlessly needed to be replenished. The meat supply, too, probably needed adding to as it would spoil unless the army had a way of preserving it. 3s worth of salt had been purchased on 5 October,¹³⁸ but at least in friendly territory the army seems to have enjoyed fresh meat. The many purchases of meat suggest that the Prince's army did not have a large number of beasts with them, probably not more than a few hundred head.¹³⁹

The following day, 11 October,¹⁴⁰ the army marched to Areule/Arouille (see Map 2), a grueling march of 25 miles through the Landes. Baker describes the march as long

¹³⁷Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 22. That said, Hoskins claims that this number of horses and carts would be sufficient for ten days, which is not the case.

¹³⁸DCO, Henxte worth accounts, entry for 5 October.

¹³⁹Hoskins, using the figures given by Harari, suggests 350 head of cattle for ten days' worth of meat.

¹⁴⁰Baker claims it is 12 October, although the first Monday of October was the 5th, which would make Sunday 11 October. Henxte worth also states that Sunday was 11 October,

and difficult, and many horses died.¹⁴¹ It is possible that the army ate the dead horses, but no source alludes to this practice. He specifically states the army marched through the Landes, “which are part of the count of Foix’s lands.”¹⁴² Thus, even though the land itself was inhospitable, the army remained in relatively neutral territory given the count of Foix’s strained relations with Jean II and his family ties with de Grailly (Foix and de Grailly were cousins).

This was a forced march through what Baker—and *The Pilgrim’s Guide*—describes as a wasteland. This was likely not a tactical decision, e.g., trying for surprise, but was a decision based on the army’s needs. The lack of suitable forage and the dearth of potable water sources undoubtedly explains the length of the day’s march. Crossing the Landes in two days, instead of the three days mentioned in *The Pilgrim’s Guide*, meant pushing the army but the complications of transporting three days worth of supplies outweighed that. The army likely carried some forage with them from Besashuntoun/Bazas as they could not count on finding sufficient forage until they reached Arule/Arouille. If water was in such short supply, the army must have transported some water and must have had the vessels to hold it. The army did have experience transporting liquids, given the large amounts of wine, cider, and vinegar they were already carrying. That said, most supplies would have had to have been transported from Besashuntoun/Bazas, as there were few options for resupply at castrum Nau/Castelnau.

¹⁴¹Baker, *Chronicon*, 230. longa, vasta et mala, multos perdidit equos

¹⁴²Baker, *Chronicon*, 230.

For the two days' march through the Landes the army would have needed 328,000 lbs of grain, 280,000 lbs of forage, and 232,000 gallons or 2,320,000 lbs of water. To transport the full ration of food, forage, and water for men and horses would have required more than 58,000 pack animals or more than 1300 carts, both of which are too large to be realistic. The army, then, could not have carried with it all the grain, forage, and water it would need for the two day, 38 mile march. The army could have marched on half rations, which would have necessitated almost 10,000 pack animals or 600 carts, both of which are still larger than the Prince's supply train. Thus, the army could not have transported even half-rations of grain, forage, and water. Clearly, then, the army had no choice but to push through the Landes in two days.

It is possible that the personnel carried water for the long march, as that would have increased the army's carrying capacity by some 240,000 lbs if each man carried 30 lbs. This would mean each man could carry 3 gallons of water for a total of 24,000 gallons of water. If each man consumed half a gallon—the same 64 oz daily the Institute of Medicine currently recommends—(4,000 gallons total), there would be 20,000 gallons left for the horses, barely more than a gallon per horse. A half ration of water per man—32 oz or 4 8oz glasses—(2,000 gallons total) would leave 22,000 gallons for the horses, i.e., 1.6 gallons per horse during the day, which is not even half of the 8 gallons recommended for working horses to prevent dehydration in non-arid conditions.¹⁴³

¹⁴³Professional Papers, No. 29. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. Fourth (Revised) Edition, with Addenda. Engineer Field Manual, Pts. 1–4. Prepared under direction of Brig. General A. MacKenzie, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1912. War Department Document 355, 431. In arid conditions, the recommendation is to double or even triple the water ration.

Horses would have been watered in the morning and certainly upon reaching their destination, but some water would have been needed during the day. It seems the only way to have accomplished this was to have personnel carry some supplies. Regardless, though, of any measures the army took, they still lost many horses—on top of the horses lost on the 28 mile march of 6 October.

In Enemy Territory

Despite the hard march on 11 October the army stopped “two miles from the town of Areule/Arouille” and unfurled the standards just inside Armagnac’s territory.¹⁴⁴

According to Baker, this is where the army divided into three battles. The constable and the marshal of the army, Warwick and Reynold Cobham respectively, led the van; the Prince commanded the center—along with Oxford and de Buch, among others—, and Suffolk and Salisbury had the rear.¹⁴⁵ In addition to the marching order, Baker provides valuable information on its composition. It contained “men-at-arms, clerks, serjeants, archers, brigancium and bidners,” although not 60,000 of them as he claims.¹⁴⁶ If the Prince’s force waited until this point to divide into three battles one does wonder how the army was organized for the first week of the campaign. On the march, clearly, it was not a disorganized, amorphous mass of soldiers and non-combatants, especially considering the two forced marches of 6 October and 11 October. It is possible the army was *already* divided into battles but did not unfurl the standards until Arule/Arouille and that Baker considered this the appropriate place to discuss the leadership of the army.

¹⁴⁴Baker, *Chronicon*, 230; Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 29.

¹⁴⁵Baker, *Chronicon*, 230–31.

¹⁴⁶Baker, *Chronicon*, 231.

It is clear that 11 October demarcated the early march through friendly territory and the start of the campaign in unfriendly territory, Armagnac in this case. The unfurling of the standards, the knighting of Jankinus de Berafort and others, Arule/Arouille and three other towns (see Map 3) surrendered to the Prince and became loyal to England again,¹⁴⁷ which may have been pre-arranged.¹⁴⁸ The captain, one William de Reymon, apparently welcomed the English and surrendered to the Prince's army without much ado. The army camped at Arule/Arouille.¹⁴⁹ Arule/Arouille was a *bastide* town and almost certainly fortified by 1355. It was built on a grid and had a central market and church.¹⁵⁰ While Arule/Arouille was not a large *bastide* town, the Prince's army would have been able to purchase supplies.

Clearly, the soldiers engaged in pillaging supplies, but it would have been prudent also for the army to have purchased supplies, at least in Arule/Arouille, given the captain of the *bastide* had undoubtedly surrendered in order to prevent the plundering of the town, which likely would not have been able to withstand an assault. At the very least, that had to factor into his decision, whether it was a prudent decision made when faced with the Prince's army or one previously negotiated.¹⁵¹ It is entirely plausible that the surrender was negotiated ahead of time, as that was the simplest, least expensive way of

¹⁴⁷“et illo die fuerunt Janekinus de Berafort et alii milites ordinati...” Baker, *Chronicon*, 231.

¹⁴⁸Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 307. He suggests that Reymon had already negotiated the surrender prior to the army's arrival.

¹⁴⁹Baker, *Chronicon*, 231.

¹⁵⁰Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 31–33.

¹⁵¹Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 33. Clifford Rogers is a proponent of this view. Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 307.

acquiring a town.¹⁵² It precluded the need for an expensive, possibly protracted siege—the antithesis of a *chevauchée*—besides which, the Prince’s army did not carry any siege equipment or contain any siege specialists or engineers. Negotiation, then, was the Prince’s only viable option if a town could not be taken quickly.

Hoskins, following Rogers, identifies the other three towns as Juliac, Mauvezin-d’Armagnac (5 miles east of Arule/Arouille), and Créon-d’Armagnac (5 miles southeast of Arule/Arouille), although Hoskins adds additional possibilities, including La Bastide d’Armagnac, held by the count of Armagnac and two and a half miles south of Arule/Arouille. As he points out that would have been a tempting prize for the Prince, given the stated goal of punishing Armagnac.¹⁵³ All of these towns were well within the raiding range of the Prince’s army and given their proximity to the base camp at Arule/Arouille, the small raiding detachments would not have needed to carry supplies.¹⁵⁴

These smaller operations, while conducted under the Prince’s aegis, seem to have been somewhat independent, small scale offensives. Baker writes “those who wished to do so went out...,”¹⁵⁵ and presumably those who did not rested at Arule/Arouille. This clearly indicates that these activities were at most a loosely co-ordinated operation and that the disparate retinues within the army could and did operate somewhat independently

¹⁵²Harari, *Special Operations in the Age of Chivalry*, passim. Prior negotiation seems to have been quite common.

¹⁵³Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 33. See also Maurice Romieu, *Histoire de la vicomté de Juliac* (Pau, 2005), 459–71.

¹⁵⁴It is possible that soldiers carried an “emergency ration.” Standard practice in the United States cavalry was for men to carry a reserve ration. War Department Cavalry Field Manual. Vol. III. Prepared under direction of Chief of Cavalry. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1938. It would not have been a bad idea to have done so, but there is no evidence that they did.

¹⁵⁵Baker, *Chronicon*, 231. “exierunt qui volebant”

of the whole to forage. Was the Prince personally involved in the co-ordinating of these offensives? If not, his able and experienced staff certainly was and knew to whom in their retinues they could entrust the operations.

The Road to Toulouse

After the forced march through the Landes, the army rested on 12 October. While the army rested, small detachments saw to replenishing the army's supplies by "taking victuals and forage" and then burning the enemy's lands—and some of the towns above—, thereby disrupting Armagnac's ability to supply troops, adversely affecting the French king's ability to collect taxes to support troops in other parts of France, and frightening the populace. The Prince understood this part of his mission and its place in Edward III's campaign strategy for 1355. In his letter to the bishop of Winchester, the Prince describes Armagnac as the "leader of the wars of our adversary [Jean II] and his lieutenant in all the land of Languedoc." He "had more oppressed and destroyed the liegeman" of the King. Therefore, "by advice and counsel of all the lords being with us and of the lords and barons of Gascony," "we rode...through the land of Armagnac, harrying and wasting the country, whereby the lieges of our most honoured lord, whom the count had before oppressed, were much comforted."¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁶Edward, Prince of Wales, "Letter to the Bishop of Winchester," December 1355, in Avesbury, *Gesta Edwardi Terti*, 434, 437. "...par avys et conseil de toutz lez siegnurs esteauntz entour nous et de seignurs et barons de Gascoigne...le counte Dermynak estoit chevetein des guerres nostre adversairie et soen lieutenaunt en tout le pais de Lange de ok, et plus avoit greve et destruit les liege gentz nostre tres honure seignur et pierre le roy et son pais qe nulle autre en ycelles parties...Si chivachasmes apres parmy la pays Dermynak, grevantz et destrautz le pais, de qoi lez lieges nostre dit tres honure seignur, as queux il avoit devaunt greve, estoient mult recomfortez."

This last, the “comfort” of the beset lieges, at the very least relieving the pressure Armagnac’s activities placed on them, was one of the official reasons for sending the Prince and an army to Gascony. One way to do so was through this show of force and devastation, demonstrating to *both* Armagnac and the said lieges that the English king protected—and avenged—his loyal subjects.

This was the first instance—according to Baker—of the army turning to pillaging supplies from the local populace rather than purchasing said supplies. That said, the army also continued to purchase supplies as needed on the campaign and continued to carry some rations—the grain certainly—with them, as they could not count on finding supplies everywhere. As the march continued, word spread throughout the area, and the Prince and his staff might reasonably have been concerned about a scorched earth policy. The Prince’s advisors were certainly experienced enough not to trust the entirety of the army’s provisioning to “living off the land,” which Harari has shown was untenable as the sole source of supply for an army.¹⁵⁷ Yet, for an army pursuing a radical raiding strategy like a *chevauchée*, a large supply train was equally problematic. Thus, the Prince’s army had a small supply train while gathering a large portion, if not the majority, of provisions from local sources.

The short time it would take, though, to strip an area of its resources prevented the army from staying too long in one place. Harari writes that twenty thousand horses could consume the forage within a 1 km radius in a single day; thirteen thousand horses would do that same within a 650m radius. For this reason—and possibly on account of the

¹⁵⁷Harari, “Strategy and Supply,” 197–311.

newly re-established loyalty of Arule/Arouille—the army rested only one day despite the grueling march the previous day.

The march of Tuesday 13 October was an easy eight miles to Montclar (see Map 3). After the march through the desolate Landes the many streams and small rivers that wove through the open, undulating county of Armagnac must have been a welcome change.¹⁵⁸ If nothing else, the abundance of fresh water sources certainly eased the earlier supply difficulties. The eight mile march could have been easily accomplished, even by the supply train. The cavalry could have covered the distance in less than two hours if trotting for 28 minutes per hour. Even at a walk of only 4 miles per hour,¹⁵⁹ the cavalry would have reached Montclar before noon, with fresh horses and plenty of time to raid the surrounding area.

The combatants indisputably reached Montclar early in the day, as they had time to affect the surrender of the castle, take and burn three towns—Hoskins identifies Géou, Gabarret, and Panjas as the most likely.¹⁶⁰ There was also time to knight (*facti milites*) the Prince's tailor and others, and attack the fortress at Astang/Estang.¹⁶¹ Astang/Estang was on a steep escarpment and well-fortified in 1355.¹⁶² It was here, on 13 October, that Baker records the first casualty: John de Lisle, one of the magnates mentioned in the Prince's indenture with the King and who supplied his own retinue, was wounded by a

¹⁵⁸See Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 31, for his description of the land.

¹⁵⁹Average trot speed is 9 miles per hour; average walk/lead speed is 4 miles per hour. War Department Cavalry Field Manual. Vol. III. Prepared under direction of Chief of Cavalry. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1938.

¹⁶⁰Hoskins, *in the Steps of the Black Prince*, 34.

¹⁶¹Baker, *Chronicon*, 231.

¹⁶²Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 34.

crossbow bolt and died the next day which the army spent encamped at Montclar.¹⁶³

Wengefeld describes de Lisle's death as taking place on 15 October after he "was slain right wonderfully by a quarrel on the third day [14 October] that we entered into the land of our enemies."¹⁶⁴

De Lisle's wound probably explains the two days of rest at Montclar, although the army possibly needed the additional day to recover after the march through the Landes, as they only halted one day at Arule/Arouille after the two-day and thirty-eight mile march from Bazas to Arouille (13 miles from Bazas to Castelnau; 25 miles from Castelnau to Arouille). What seems to have happened is that de Lisle received his wound on 13 October and died on 14 October, while the army camped outside Montclar, then on 15 October the staff and de Lisle's retinue dealt with the necessary issues attendant upon his death; the sources do not speak to any arrangements regarding the body. His accounts were tallied and reveal that his retinue contained "20 knights, 39 esquires, and 60 mounted archers."¹⁶⁵ Presumably, the members of his retinue continued on the campaign and continued to serve in the Prince's company and middle battle, where they had been before de Lisle's death.¹⁶⁶

The Prince also learned an important lesson the first night at Montclar. The Prince set up his sleeping quarters in the town that first night. A fire broke out in the

¹⁶³Baker, *Chronicon*, 231.

¹⁶⁴John de Wengefeld, Letter to the bishop of Winchester," December 1355, recorded in Avesbury, *Gesta Edwardi Tertii*, 440, 443. "qu feust tuez mult merveilusement dun quarel le tierce jour qu nous entrasmes en les terres de noz enemys, et morust le XV^{me} jour Doctobre." "Wonderfully" is the translation given in the Avesbury edition. Perhaps a better choice would be marvelously.

¹⁶⁵TNA, E372/200, m. 43.

¹⁶⁶Baker, *Chronicon*, 230.

town, either accidentally or as an act of defiance, and the Prince had to flee the town.

After this incident, the Prince removed to the camp outside the town and slept in tents—if a castle or monastery was not available—for the remainder of the campaign.¹⁶⁷

Like Astang/Estang, the towns Hoskins identifies were all within a ten mile radius of Montclar. Panjas would have been an important target, given its commanding position in the Midour valley. It was fortified. The church certainly existed in 1355. The nave was rebuilt at the end of the fifteenth or beginning of the sixteenth century after being destroyed at an unknown date during the Hundred Years War.¹⁶⁸ One important reason for taking Panjas was the route the army took on 16 October to Logeron/Nogaro, which took the army along the Midour, across its floodplain, then up the river valley's southern side to reach Logeron/Nogaro (see Map 3), another fortified town.¹⁶⁹ This would have been a relatively easy march, only fourteen miles. Even the baggage and supply train would have had little difficulty keeping pace.

There is some dispute as to what happened at Logeron/Nogaro. Baker's account simply has the Prince's army spending the night outside the town.¹⁷⁰ while French historians J. Moissant and S. Dejean claim the Prince's army spent three days trying to take the fortified town without success.¹⁷¹ Hoskins's interpretation is that the army

¹⁶⁷Baker, *Chronicon*, 231.

¹⁶⁸Baker, *Chronicon*, 231; Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 34.

¹⁶⁹Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 35.

¹⁷⁰Baker, *Chronicon*, 231.

¹⁷¹Neither offers any evidence for the claim. J. Moissant, *Le Prince Noir en Aquitaine* (Paris: Alphonse Picard et Fils, Étudiers, 1894), 34; S. Dejean, "L'incursion du Prince Noir en Agenais et en Toulousain (1355)," in *La Guerre au Moyen-Age*, fiftieth anniversary compilation by the Académie Toulousaine d'Histoire et d'Arts Militaires, 36–53 (Toulouse, 1994).

remained encamped at Montclar (while de Lisle succumbed to his wound) and that small contingents launched attacks on Logeron/Nogaro to probe the defenses and then reported to the Prince, either through a messenger or upon the main army's arrival at Logeron/Nogaro.¹⁷² That seems plausible *if* those contingents camped near Logeron/Nogaro. It was fourteen miles one way; twenty-eight miles and attacking a town would have been difficult for soldiers and horses to accomplish in a single day. A mounted messenger using more than one horse, though, certainly could have covered the 28 miles rapidly and thus facilitated communications between the army and the smaller, advance force.

Logistically speaking, a small contingent could have managed the three days away from the main supply train. Pack animals could certainly have transported the necessary supplies, as water and forage were available. A contingent of fifty men and one hundred horses would require only 16 pack animals. If there were a hundred men with 120 horse, they would have needed only 21 pack horses. Alternatively, two to three large carts could have easily transported the minimum amount of supplies for a detachment of this size. Carts could easily have reached Logeron/Nogaro by the end of the day, even with the reduced speed—2.5 miles per hour was possible only on flat, good roads—resulting from the climb out of the river valley; however, pack animals would have been more mobile, despite the larger numbers, and could have kept pace with the soldiers as long as the rate of march did not exceed five miles per hour.¹⁷³ Even more

¹⁷²Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 35.

¹⁷³War Department Cavalry Field Manual. Vol. III. Prepared under direction of Chief of Cavalry. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1938, 176.

efficient would have been to have some of the horses carry supplies, as that would have eliminated the need for pack animals or carts entirely for a small force of fifty to one hundred men and 100 to 120 horses.

In light of these facts, Hoskins' interpretation could be correct. If this was, indeed, what happened, the advance party reported the difficulties of taking Logeron/Nogaro and the Prince chose to leave the town untaken rather than spend valuable time and resources, not to mention the risk of allowing an army with a supply train designed for a *chevauchée* not a siege to become stationary for any length of time. The Prince also knew the army did not need to reduce every town in Armagnac to send the message that Jean II and his deputy, the count of Armagnac, could not prevent the depredations of the Anglo-Gascon army.

The army left Logeron/Nogaro behind it on Saturday 17 October and marched thirteen miles southeast to Plasence/Plaisance (see Map 3), a town Baker describes as “a fine, strong town,”¹⁷⁴ located on the Arros river's west bank.¹⁷⁵ Both the Prince and Wengefeld describe it as “the chief town of the land.”¹⁷⁶ The likely route, which parallels the modern roads, continued to climb gently from Logeron/Nogaro for two miles, then crested the ridge. The army was now far enough south they would have been able to see the Pyrenees. They also would have seen the castle of Termes-d'Armagnac, although Baker does not comment on it, suggesting that the army bypassed it regardless of its

¹⁷⁴Baker, *Chronicon*, 232. “villam pulcram et fortem.” See also Barber's translation in Barber, *Life and Campaigns of the Black Prince*, 62.

¹⁷⁵Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 35.

¹⁷⁶Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 437; John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 443.

significant position on the ridge.¹⁷⁷ As with Logeron/Nogaro, the Prince did not need to take Termes-d'Armagnac. In a way, showing the local populace that the lord in the castle was unable to protect them was a more powerful message than reducing the castle. The residents clearly received and understood the intended message. Reportedly, “all the inhabitants fled” Plasence/Plaisance.¹⁷⁸

The approach to Plasence/Plaisance left Termes-d'Armagnac behind and descended into the Arros river valley. The army could have crossed to the west bank of the Arros immediately, then approached the town on that side of the river. Alternatively, the army could have advanced along the east bank of the Arros and crossed the river at Plasence/Plaisance.¹⁷⁹ Remaining on the east bank would have been logistically easier. The banks of the river were steep, making the land approach more difficult. Waiting until reaching Plasence/Plaisance would have allowed the army to make use of the ford south of the town, as well as the wooden bridge.¹⁸⁰ Furthermore, the army continued marching east from Plasence/Plaisance, so crossing the Arros twice would have made little sense. It was more logical to advance along the eastern bank, set up camp there, then use that camp as a base to ford the river and attack the town and surrounding area,

¹⁷⁷For the route, see Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 35–36. For the castle of Termes-d'Armagnac, see Jean Henri Ducos and Jacques Gardelles, *Le guide des châteaux de France 32, Gers* (Paris, 1900), 150.

¹⁷⁸Baker, *Chronicon*, 232. “omnes incolae fugerunt.”

¹⁷⁹Ministère des Travaux Publics et des Transports, Institut Géographique National (Paris), map of Pau-Toulouse (originally created by the Service Géographique de l'Armée in 1934), hereafter, Pau-Toulouse Map; Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 36.

¹⁸⁰Alain Lagors, *Les étapes de l'évolution de Plaisance au Moyen Age*, *Bulletin de la Société Archéologique, Historique, Littéraire et Scientifique du Gers / Société Archéologique, Historique, Littéraire et Scientifique du Gers* (1985): 34–45.

such as the fortress at Galiaun/Galiac two miles to the west.¹⁸¹ It does seem clear that a relatively small detachment from the central battle, rather than the entire army, initially attacked Plasence/Plaisance. The captal de Buch, the lord of Montferrand, and Adam de Louches, one of the Prince's bachelors, led the attack on the town and the castle, which was guarded by a garrison led by the count of Montluzon. The defenders were captured.¹⁸²

The army spent the next day, 18 October, encamped at Plasence/Plaisance. It was on this day, according to Baker, that Galiaun/Galiac was attacked. Aignan, a town seven miles northeast, may also have been attacked, as the Prince's army "destroyed...all the country round about" Plasence/Plaisance.¹⁸³ The following day, the army fired Plasence/Plaisance and destroyed it completely—although not before William Brun and another Cheshire archer purchased a white sumpter horse.¹⁸⁴ The march to Basse/Bassoues (see Map 3) was twelve miles, and Baker writes, the army "left the town of Bealmarchie/Beaumarchés on the right."¹⁸⁵ Such a route means the army climbed 300 feet out of the Arros river valley, descended into the Midour river valley before a steep 250 foot climb to Mondebat, a small village, then proceeded along the narrow ridge

¹⁸¹Map; Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 36.

¹⁸²Baker, *Chronicon*, 232; Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 36–37.

¹⁸³Jean-Justin Monlezun, *Histoire de la Gascogne depuis les temps le plus reculés jusqu'à nos jours*, vol. 3 (Auch, 1846–1850), 319. This is a local tradition. Prince of Wales, "Letter to the bishop of Winchester," in Avesbury, *Gestis Edward Tertii*, 437; John de Wengefeld, "Letter to the bishop of Winchester," in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 443.

¹⁸⁴Alain Lagors, *Les étapes de l'évolution de Plaisance au Moyen Age*, as cited and discussed in Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 37; for the horse, see DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 31 October.

¹⁸⁵Baker, *Chronicon*, 232.

between the Midour and Riberette rivers.¹⁸⁶ This route was also the only option for the baggage and supply train, which meant it would have had to advance in a narrow column for several miles in the middle of the march. The climbs would have been difficult for the carts, but they could have managed it with rest periods after each climb.¹⁸⁷ The rest of the march was over undulating ground up to the *bastide* town.¹⁸⁸

The army camped at Basse/Bassoues and spent the next day, 20 October, there as well. Richard de Stafford was promoted to knight banneret and “raised his banner for the first time.”¹⁸⁹ Stafford, of course, was a key member of the Prince’s retinue and staff, and this may have been a recognition of his past service. The day of rest would have been necessary to allow the supply train to recover. The town surrendered without a fight, and the army took the day to resupply. This was an orderly procedure as only the provisioning officers were allowed into the town while the majority of the army remained outside the walls; the officers may have paid for supplies although Henxte worth does not record any debits. The official reason given by Baker was that the town belonged to the Archbishopric of Auch.¹⁹⁰ While the Prince made a point about protecting the Church’s

¹⁸⁶Pau-Toulouse Map; see Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 37, for the precise climb data. Portions of this route parallel the modern road system.

¹⁸⁷Professional Papers, No. 29. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. Fourth (Revised) Edition, with Addenda. Engineer Field Manual, Pts. 1–4. Prepared under direction of Brig. General A. MacKenzie, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1912. War Department Document 355. P. 438.

¹⁸⁸Baker, *Chronicon*, 232; Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 37–38. The castle there was not built until the 1360s, after the Prince’s raid.

¹⁸⁹Baker, *Chronicon*, 232. “et illo die dominus Ricardus de Stafforde, germanus comitis Stafforde primo ad vexillum suos duxit.”

¹⁹⁰Baker, *Chronicon*, 232. “et quia pertinuit sanctae ecclesiae, princeps non permisit aliquem intrare praeterquam personas certas ordinatas ad liberationem victualium.”

property, keeping the army out of the town also made good sense. It was both possible and common for soldiers to destroy supplies accidentally.¹⁹¹

The march of 21 October covered eleven miles to Miraude/Mirande (see Map 3), which belonged to the lordship of the count of Comminges, Pierre Raymond IV, and was the most populous town since Logeron/Nogaro.¹⁹² Escamont/Montesquiou was on the army's left and seems to have been left alone. The line of march clearly indicated the Prince's intentions to punish the count of Armagnac by devastating the territory. The army could have marched on Auch, which was a major town, but the Prince clearly had no intention of marching north and instead continued southeast to Miraude/Mirande.¹⁹³ The march, while not long, would have been difficult for the vehicles as it crossed four rivers: Guiroue, Baradée, Osse, and Lizet.¹⁹⁴ The pack animals should have had no difficulty keeping pace, but the narrow ridge and the elongation of the vehicle train may have made it necessary for the carts to take a second day to make the eleven mile march. The pack animals (550 of them), if travelling two abreast, would stretch just over three-fourths of a mile.¹⁹⁵

The army stayed two nights at the abandoned and "large Cistercian monastery of Bertones/Berdoues."¹⁹⁶ The inhabitants fled before the Prince's army, and the Prince

¹⁹¹Harari, "Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion Campaigns," 308.

¹⁹²Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 39.

¹⁹³Baker, *Chronicon*, 232; Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 38–39.

¹⁹⁴Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 38–39.

¹⁹⁵The standard march spacing is 5 yards. F. Maurice, "The Size of the Army of Xerxes in the Invasion of Greece, 480 B.C.," *JHS* 50 (1930): 210–35, at 223.

¹⁹⁶Baker, *Chronicon*, 232. "et princeps hospitabatur in monasterio grandi de Bertones, ordinis Cisterciensis, in quo nullus vivens fuerat repertus."

took advantage of the empty buildings. No attempt was made to take Miraude/Mirande, which was defended by “many men-at-arms.”¹⁹⁷ The Prince doubtless did not wish to risk the time or the casualties, especially if he already knew that the count of Armagnac and the constable of France were fewer than fifty miles away—close enough to relieve the town. The two-day halt at Miraude/Mirande was likely needed for the cart and pack horses after the previous day’s climbing down and up river valleys; it was also the last rest day for the next four days and allowed the army to resupply and prepare for the next day’s (23 October) difficult march.

Over the next four days the army covered 47 miles of difficult terrain with the Pyrenees visible to the south. The march of 23 October took the army out of Armagnac and into the territory of Astarique/Astarac.¹⁹⁸ This was a conscious decision made by the Prince and his staff. They certainly knew they had left Armagnac. They easily could have turned west and continued to devastate Armagnac in retaliation for the count’s raids on Gascony. That would certainly have been an easier march than the approach to Toulouse. Why the Prince chose to continue east is unclear, but his letter to the bishop of Winchester offers at least some hint. He specifically mentions the presence of the count of Armagnac (1311–1373) and “other great men of our enemies” at Toulouse, which included “the constable of France the marshal Clermont (marshal 1352–1356)” according to John de Wengefeld (one of the Prince’s close advisors who served on the campaign,

¹⁹⁷Baker, *Chronicon*, 232. “plena viris armorum.”

¹⁹⁸Baker, *Chronicon*, 232.

see Chapter Four) and the information in his letter to the bishop of Winchester.¹⁹⁹ The Prince often employed local guides, and in this instance these guides may have provided intelligence about the French forces at Toulouse. Baker does indicate that French scouts were captured at various times during the campaign,²⁰⁰ and these scouts were possible sources of information.

These two men, along with the Constable of France, Jacques de Bourbon (1321–1362), were responsible for the defenses of Toulouse and southwestern France. Each member of this “quarrelsome triumvirate” had his own troops. Armagnac’s men were locals, summoned into service upon word of the Prince’s arrival in Bordeaux. Marshal de Clermont’s men, from north of the Dordogne, accompanied him south to Toulouse, and Constable likely had his own northern retinues. Substantial reinforcements were expected under the Dauphin’s command, but these were sent to Picardy—presumably to counter Edward III’s invasion there. Armagnac’s strategy had been one of battle avoidance and defending larger towns, river crossings, and castles. Although there was tension between Armagnac and Marshal de Clermont, they seemed to have been in agreement about what they thought the Prince would do next: lay siege to Toulouse.²⁰¹

Perhaps the Prince had local intelligence that the count of Armagnac was nearby, relatively speaking, and decided to pursue him. The count had to have heard of the

¹⁹⁹Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 437; John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 443.

²⁰⁰Baker, *Chronicon*, 131–32.

²⁰¹*Histoire générale de Languedoc*, ix, 653; Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 434; John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 440; *Grand chronique*, III, 69.

devastation of his territory but had yet to offer a response. By marching on Toulouse, the Prince may have intended to force the count of Armagnac to battle—or to look even more impotent by remaining behind the walls of Toulouse. It may also have been an effort to bring the war to part of France thus far unaffected by it, an area that furthermore was prosperous and provided Jean II with money and supplies “to maintain his war.”²⁰² A combination of factors likely influenced the Prince’s decision, a decision that clearly was well-considered.

The first stop on the way to Toulouse was the *bastide* town of Saxante/Seisan (see Map 4) eleven miles east Miraude/Mirande. It was “a difficult march, narrow and mountainous” according to Baker.²⁰³ While there were no major rivers to cross, the army did have to cross a large number of smaller rivers. The first was the Grande Baïse, which involved a steep 300 foot climb up the eastern escarpment.²⁰⁴ Then the army repeated the process with the Petite Baïse, the Sousson, the Cédon, then a final descent to the Gers river valley.²⁰⁵ While none of these were major rivers, indeed Hoskins described the Soussan and the Cédon as “little more than wide streams,” albeit in deep ravines, the army had to find fords or bridges, preferably more than one crossing point at each river to avoid choke points.²⁰⁶ The constant climbing would have been difficult for the vehicles, and the army—or at least the carts—would have needed to stop before each crossing to

²⁰²John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 445.

²⁰³Baker, *Chronicon*, 232. Hoskins disputes this description but concedes that it would have been difficult for anyone on foot.

²⁰⁴Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 40.

²⁰⁵Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 40.

²⁰⁶Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 40.

water the horses to prevent the animals from becoming distracted and again after each climb to rest the animals.²⁰⁷ The army camped only one night at Saxante/Seisan, which was burned “against the Prince’s orders.”²⁰⁸

The next day, 24 October, took the army ten miles and across the Gers and three other rivers to Seint Morre/Simorre (see Map 4). Like the day before, this march followed the pattern of climbing out of and descending into river valleys, and multiple fords would have eased the army’s passage. The first climb out of the Gers valley was 400 feet and steep,²⁰⁹ and the horses would have needed a rest upon reaching the ridge. This was followed by the steep-banked Arras and Lauze river valleys, then down into the Gimone river valley and to Seint Morre/Simorre.²¹⁰ This was a *sauveté*, or fortified village built around a church or monastery. The town had two gates and had earth ramparts and a moat (at least it should have had such fortifications according to the town’s charter); the church itself may have been fortified.²¹¹ The Dominican Abbey was abandoned when the Prince’s army arrived, and the rear battle camped there. The middle camped two miles south at the *bastide* town of Villefrancke/Villefranche, and the van three miles southeast at Turmayn/Tournan. All three, Baker describes as “wealthy and

207 Professional Papers, No. 29. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. Fourth (Revised) Edition, with Addenda. Engineer Field Manual, Pts. 1–4. Prepared under direction of Brig. General A. MacKenzie, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1912. War Department Document 355, 432, 438.

²⁰⁸Baker, *Chronicon*, 232–33. “contra prohibitionem praeconis principalis incensam.”

²⁰⁹Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 41.

²¹⁰Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 41.

²¹¹Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 41. Hoskins writes that only the abbey’s church remains after the rest of the abbey was destroyed during the Revolution. Based on the charter, the villagers were required to build these fortifications.

full of victuals,” although all the inhabitants had fled.²¹² All three were likely burnt after being pillaged.²¹³ Resupply would have been necessary as the officers in charge of purveyance had no way of knowing what they would find as they neared Toulouse.

The next night (25 October) saw the Prince’s army at Socamon/Samatan (see Map 4) after a twelve mile march through “the lands of the count of Comminges, which extended to Toulouse, but they were destroyed by fire and sword.”²¹⁴ This perhaps suggests a scorched earth policy on the part of the local inhabitants, who according to local tradition fled to Lombez.²¹⁵ The Prince does write that those “within [Samatan] deserted at the coming of our people.”²¹⁶ There is no indication that this was more than a local decision, although it is possible it was part of a larger strategy co-ordinated out of Toulouse, if it was, indeed, an action taken by the locals. If it were a local action, it demonstrates the wisdom of carrying at least some supplies with the army and replenishing those supplies when the opportunity presented itself, as it had the day before at Seint Morre/Simorre.

Granted, the interpretation of Baker is open to some debate, particularly the following phrase: “sed fuerunt ignibus et gladio depastae [the lands were wasted by fires and sword].” Barber translates the last clause “but they [the lands] had been laid waste,” suggesting that the Prince’s army found the lands already devastated. M. L. de Santi,

²¹²Baker, *Chronicon*, 233. “villas quidem opulentas et victualibus refertas, sed incolis fugitivis desolatas.”

²¹³Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 308.

²¹⁴Baker, *Chronicon*, 233. “in terras comitis de Comenge, quae extendebatur usque Tolosam, quae fuerunt ignibus et gladio depastae.”

²¹⁵Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 44, 218, no. 10.

²¹⁶Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 437. “la quele ceaux [qe] dedeinz estoient voideront a la venue de noz gentz.”

however, interprets it as “they [the lands] were ravaged by sword and fire [Elles furent ravagées par la fer et par la flamme].”²¹⁷ Hewitt does the same.²¹⁸ Hoskins favors Santi’s interpretation as “more logical.”²¹⁹ Why, precisely, Hoskins thinks it more logical than the possibility that the inhabitants burned the land is unclear. “Ignibus et gladio” does not necessarily imply the army took the actions. It is a cliché, reminiscent of the classical “ignis et ferre.” Either interpretation is logical, given the army’s actions of the previous day. The Prince and his staff—particularly the officers in charge of victualling—would have known about any destruction ahead of them, especially as it was only a few miles march from where they camped and resupplied. Lending weight to the latter interpretation—that the destruction was caused by the Prince’s army—is John de Wengefeld’s letter to the bishop of Winchester. He writes “[a]nd then into the county of Cominges, and [the Prince] took there many towns and burned and destroyed them and all the country.”²²⁰

The army certainly would have been able to carry out such raids. Once they climbed the 300 feet out of the Gimone river valley, they had a relatively easy march compared to the previous two days through rich and fertile country.²²¹ They passed Sauneterre/Sauveterre on the left and then next to Wynbers/Lombez, a strongly fortified

²¹⁷Santi, “L’expédition du Prince Noir en 1355,” 19–20.

²¹⁸Hewitt, *The Black Prince’s Expedition*, 55.

²¹⁹Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 215–16, no. 5.

²²⁰John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 443. “Et puis en la countee de Comenge, et prist illesqes plusours villes et lez fist ardre et destruire et tout le pays.”

²²¹Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 43, for the climb and his discussion of why the army did not cross the Save, contrary to de Santi’s and Hewitt’s interpretations.

city, which is probably why the army bypassed it.²²² Samatan, itself, was a large and prosperous town, “the best town of the county” and was “as great a town as Norwich,”²²³ the 2.5 miles of which enclosed an area of one square mile.²²⁴ The town was burned the next day (26 October), including the Minorite convent, and the army caused such damage it took the town twenty years to begin recovering.²²⁵ The destruction of the Minorite house was likely against the Prince’s command, given previous orders on multiple occasions to respect Church properties and the payment of 110s to friars of the order.²²⁶

Despite the three days of marching, the army pressed onward toward Toulouse on 26 October. This was a fourteen mile march through land that was “spacious, flat, and beautiful,” which was accurate after the army passed Ste-Foy.²²⁷ Although Baker does not mention it, the army likely laid waste the countryside and destroyed Salvetat, which was a village only two and half miles from Ste-Foy.²²⁸ That was well within the army’s reach. The army camped at Seint Litz/St-Lys (see Map 4) and halted there the next day

²²²Baker, *Chronicon*, 233. “dimiserunt a sinistris ville vocatam Saunetere en Asturake, et transierunt juxta fortem civitatem vocatam Wynbers.”

²²³Baker, *Chronicon*, 233. “magna et divite villa vocata Socamon.” Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 437. “questoit le meilour ville du dit countee.” John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 443. “et est ausi graunt ville come Norwich.”

²²⁴Elizabeth Rutledge, “Immigration and population growth in early fourteenth-century Norwich: evidence from the tithing roll,” *Urban History Yearbook* (1988): 15–30, at 16.

²²⁵Baker, *Chronicon*, 233. “Socamon...ubi fuerat conventus Minorum sed cum villa incrematus.” Dossat et al, *Languedoc et le Rouergue dans la Trésor des Chartes*, Items 1770 and 1775. Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 44.

²²⁶DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 31 October.

²²⁷Baker, *Chronicon*, 233. “patriam amplam, planam, et pulcram.” Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 44.

²²⁸Jean Contrasty, *Histoire de Sainte-Foy-de-Peyrolières, Ancien Prieuré du Moyen-Age et de la Renaissance uni en 1606 au Collège de Toulouse* (Toulouse, 1917), 131.

(27 October), too. At this point, the horses, particularly the cart horses, would have needed the rest. They had worked hard over the previous few days, hauling carts and supplies up and down river valleys.²²⁹

The Decision at Toulouse

The other key reason for halting a day at Seint Litz/St-Lys was tactical. The army was only fifteen miles from Toulouse, although the Prince writes that the army was only a league (three miles) from Toulouse.²³⁰ This discrepancy could have been reflective of the camps of the three battles.²³¹ The army could easily reach the city in a single day's march; conversely, the count of Armagnac and the marshal of France and their soldiers could reach the Anglo-Gascon army with equal ease—and would not have the added burden of a supply train. Armagnac's force was recruited locally and probably numbered at least 3000 men, the number he had raised in 1349 to counter a potential attack by the earl of Lancaster, then stationed in Gascony.²³²

Toulouse was a large city of more than 30,000 inhabitants.²³³ Froissart described it as “very great and strong and fair and well fenced.”²³⁴ The Garonne ran through the

²²⁹Professional papers, No. 29. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. Fourth (Revised) Edition, with Addenda. Engineer Field Manual, Pts. 1–4. Prepared under direction of Brig. General A. MacKenzie, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1912. War Department Document 355, 437–38.

²³⁰Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 437.

²³¹Hoskins, *in the Steps of the Black Prince*, 47.

²³²Sumption, *Trial by Fire*, 60.

²³³Vale, *The Origins of the Hundred Years War*, 144. Sumption gives a figure of 20,000 residents. Sumption, *Trial by Fire*, 58.

²³⁴John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 443. “car noz enemys avoyent debrusee toutz les pountz dune part Tholouse et daultre, forsqe pris lez pountz en Tholouse, qe la ryver va parmy la ville. Et le conestable

city, both parts of the city were walled—there were three miles of walls in 1218 when Simon de Montfort (1165–1218) unsuccessfully besieged the city²³⁵ and by 1550 the walls enclosed some 140 hectares and were 6.5 ft (2 m) thick and 30 ft (9 m) high, but the perimeter remained just over 3 miles (5 km)²³⁶—and the repair and raising of the height of the ramparts begun in 1345 had been completed in 1347. The seneschal invested in war machines and munitions.²³⁷ There must have been several, as four machines were taken from Toulouse for use by French forces at English-held Auberoche in 1345.²³⁸ The garrison was not made up of professional soldiers but was assembled on an ad hoc basis; nor did the city have a “designated military commander.” The city also had an arms industry and stocked an arsenal that included both individual arms and “engines of war.”²³⁹

At this point, the Prince and his staff had decent intelligence. They knew “the constable of France, the marshal Clermont, the count of Armagnac, were, with a great power, in the said city at that same time.” They knew “our enemies had broken down all the bridges in Toulouse on the one side of Toulouse and the other, save only the bridges in Toulouse, for the river goeth through the midst of the city.”

de Fraunce, le marschal de Clermound, le counte Dermynak, estoient, od graunt poari, en la dite ville a mesme le heur. Et la ville de Tholouse est mult graunt, fort, et beale, et bien enclose.”

²³⁵Jim Bradbury, *The Medieval Siege* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1992), 135–36. Montfort did not have enough men to cover the walls.

²³⁶Solon, “*Tholosanna Fides*,” 282.

²³⁷Gratien Leblanc, “Toulouse, les remparts du faubourg Saint-Cyprien,” *Mémoires de la Société Archéologique du Midi de la France* XLV (1983–1984): 19–137, at 31–35

²³⁸Bradbury, *The Medieval Siege*, 257–58; Sir R. Payne-Gallwey, *The Crossbow* (London: 1903), 272.

²³⁹Solon, “*Tholosanna Fides*,” 275.

The chronicler Jean le Bel wrote that the French had four times more men-at-arms than the Prince.²⁴⁰ Those inside the city clearly also had intelligence about the Prince's movements—why else destroy the bridges?—and had taken appropriate actions to stop the army, either by forcing them to turn back or to besiege the city.

With the bridges across the Garonne broken, those were the two main options open to the Anglo-Gascon army; assaulting the city or trying to draw the defenders out were also options. At least, that was how it must have appeared. The Prince and his staff chose a different option, an option that likely had not occurred to the defenders within Toulouse because it had never been done before: cross the river and continue east with Toulouse at its back. Why did they choose this option? Before discussing what the Anglo-Gascon army did do, though, the other options not taken need examining because those choices would have been considered. The quality and collective experience of the Prince's staff ensures that the options would have been considered.

The first option was perhaps the most obvious: turn back and return to Bordeaux. Logistically speaking, this was probably also the easiest option. While the army could not return by the same exact route it had taken—if nothing else, fresh forage would be needed—they could proceed toward Auch, which would take them across territory similar to that which they had just traversed or followed the Garonne valley and the Via Aquitania or taken some other path. Any way they chose would see the Anglo-Gascon army back in friendly territory just over two weeks with some pushing. There would be ample opportunity to pursue the stated aim of punishing the count of Armagnac by

²⁴⁰Jean le Bel, 220. Barber suggests a much smaller force supplemented by mercenaries and untrained militia. Barber, *Edward, Prince of Wales and Aquitaine*, 121.

spreading further destruction in the county's countryside. A major disadvantage was the French force at Toulouse, which would be well-positioned to attack the rear of the Anglo-Gascon army. If the French chose not to force a battle or launch a major assault on the retreating army, they could certainly harass the army with small-scale attacks and disrupt—or perhaps capture—the baggage and supply train. The French would not have been slowed by a baggage train. However, any force following in the wake of the Anglo-Gascon army would have faced the potential problem of finding supplies and forage for themselves. The retreating army likely would have destroyed whatever it did not take for itself, partly as part of its mission and partly to hinder the pursuit.

Returning to Bordeaux would have been a practical decision. It was almost November. The Prince had accomplished the aim of punishing the count of Armagnac and had demonstrated the will and ability of the English king to defend his subjects and their lands. The lack of response by the local French lords and, perhaps more significantly, by the representatives of Jean II's authority and power in the region also helped underscore English power and the impotence of the French king in the face of that English military power. By that measure, the Prince had already achieved a measurable level of success, had already done enough to convince Gascons whose loyalties were wavering just where their best interests lay. Thus, returning to Bordeaux was certainly a sensible, logical option that military experience would have suggested had a reasonable chance of success. In this sense, then, the first option was the most likely choice and possibly what Armagnac and Clermont expected.

The second, related option, was to try to draw the defenders out and force a battle. The Prince's staff would likely have found the odds favorable. Many of these men were, after all, veterans of several campaigns. The army had been on campaign three weeks, had had time to form unit cohesion, and its inexperienced members had gained some seasoning. Yes, the Anglo-Gascon commanders would have liked the odds in the right circumstances. That the Prince himself may have welcomed such a battle is not unlikely, especially given his decisions on the eventual return to Bordeaux when Armagnac finally emerged to harry the Anglo-Gascon army.²⁴¹

The third option was to besiege Toulouse. This would have entailed a shift from a radical raiding strategy to a persisting strategy and remaining stationary for an extended period of time.²⁴² Toulouse was not going to fall without a protracted siege. Even if the Anglo-Gascon army was able to persuade someone in Toulouse—preferably a member of the garrison—to betray the city, wooing a traitor would take some time and finesse.²⁴³ In the event a receptive ear could be found in Toulouse, the Prince did have a large amount of money on hand. Officially, it was for “for the prince's profit in making payments beyond seas.”²⁴⁴ While that most likely meant ‘purchasing’ allies and loyalty, it could also be used to buy the army's way inside the walls of a besieged city. Even with the cash on hand, though, it would still take time to find someone who could be bought. Then, of course, there was the problem of making sure he or she stayed bought. The

²⁴¹For a similar interpretation, see Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 46.

²⁴²Harari, “Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion Campaigns,” 301.

²⁴³Harari, *Special Operations in the Age of Chivalry*, 10–16.

²⁴⁴BPR, IV, 134.

Prince himself was well aware of the possibility of a traitor turning into a double-agent.²⁴⁵

Time, of course, was an issue. For every day spent on a siege the army would continue to consume supplies at the same rate. If the 15,000 horses consumed the forage within a 750 m radius each day it would be only a matter of days before the horses had consumed all the forage within a mile of the camp, more considering the forage needs of any livestock with the army. Within three weeks the forage within a 10 mile radius (the maximum distance away from camp the carts could hope to travel to get forage and return to camp in a single day) would have been consumed—assumed the enemy had not burned it. Further than 10 miles out, and even within a smaller radius, the risk of attacks on the foragers would have been a real concern. Forage aside, the army likely had only a few days' worth of grain supplies. With each additional day of the siege, the foragers would have had to range further and further afield to find supplies. They would have been unable to rely on local source of supply for more than a week.²⁴⁶

²⁴⁵Harari, *Special Operations in the Age of Chivalry*, Chapter 5, passim. In essence, the French led by Geoffrey de Charney purchased their way into Calais—except the negotiations were not as secret as they could have been, and Edward III found out. He and a small force, which included the Prince, covertly entered Calais. They allowed the original plan to proceed, dealt with the small party of French soldiers, then the main force sortied out of the gate to attack the French army waiting to be let into the city. The Prince led a smaller force out of another gate and attacked the French flank. Thus, the Prince was well aware of the fraught nature of this kind of negotiation.

²⁴⁶Harari, “Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion Campaigns,” 310.

It would have been imperative to find another source of supply or risk starvation.²⁴⁷ The area to the south-west of Toulouse had already been stripped as the army passed through on its march of the previous few days, and south was not an option since the count of Foix was, if not an ally, a friend and a cousin of the captal de Buch.²⁴⁸ The bridges across the Garonne were broken, which would have made gathering supplies from the other side of the Garonne virtually impossible. That would have left the foragers with more limited options for acquiring supplies. Of course, it was technically possible for the Prince's army to have received supplies from Bordeaux via river transport,²⁴⁹ although the army would have to allow time for messengers to reach Bordeaux, supplies to be purveyed, and then transported. Indeed, the army would have been dependent on water transport if the siege became protracted.²⁵⁰ If river transport could be arranged, it would be sensible to ship horses back to Bordeaux; however, that would make it extremely difficult for the army to lift the siege and continue the *chevauchée*. Furthermore, the Garonne for at least 100 miles downstream was in enemy territory and guarded at key points by fortifications,²⁵¹ which would have made using it to transport supplies most difficult and unreliable if not impossible. Moreover, navigating the river between Castets-en-Dorthe and Toulouse could be problematic (river shipping

²⁴⁷Harari, "Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion Campaigns," 311.

²⁴⁸Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 46.

²⁴⁹Harari, "Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion Campaigns," 312. River transport of a few dozen tuns to more than 150 tuns were used on the Seine on several occasions.

²⁵⁰Harari, "Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion Campaigns," 321.

²⁵¹Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 309.

now uses the locks in the Garonne Lateral Canal), and the Prince and his advisors could not ignore the possibility that the enemy had river vessels that could blockade the river and thus prevent resupply by river transport.

Aside from the issue of supply, which was a real and significant problem, the Prince also did not have any siege equipment or siege specialists with him. Furthermore, surrounding the entire city would have also required at least some part of the army to cross the Garonne, not to mention blockading the Garonne upstream from Toulouse to prevent supplies from reaching the city via the river. Yet, even if the army had the necessary equipment and specialist personnel, time was still the enemy, and the arrival of a relieving force was a real danger. Given that the Prince's army had no way to control access to Toulouse on the east, a messenger would have had absolutely no difficulty in leaving the city.

Moreover, the Prince had only 6000 combatants, not nearly enough men to surround the city effectively. Toulouse, as discussed above, was moated and surrounded by three miles of walls. With a population of 30,000, there would have been at least 8000 adult males.²⁵² Additionally, there was the hastily assembled garrison and the troops of Armagnac (at least 3000 men), Clermont (Marshal of France), and Bourbon (Constable of France). All told, the defending force at Toulouse probably numbered at least 11,000 men, almost twice the number of Anglo-Gascon combatants. Taking Toulouse would have required a prolonged siege.²⁵³

²⁵²Solon, "Tholosanna Fides," 281. Malcolm Vale suggests a population of 34,000. Vale, *Origins of the Hundred Years War*, 144.

²⁵³Solon, "Tholosanna Fides," 281.

In light of these considerations and given the experience of the Prince's staff, especially those veterans of the siege of Calais, the Prince and his staff knew laying siege to Toulouse was not a viable option for the Anglo-Gascon army. Nor were the count of Armagnac or Clermont ignorant of the considerations the Prince and his staff had to consider. It is likely the French commanders came to the same conclusion: that an Anglo-Gascon siege of Toulouse was not feasible, especially not a siege of the length needed to force the surrender of the city. Of course, the Prince could have simply ordered an assault on the city, although given the strength of the city's walls and the number of war machines and defenders that had little hope of success and promised heavy casualties. Armagnac and Clermont knew this, too. Therefore, the French leaders could reasonably have assumed that the Anglo-Gascon force would turn back to Bordeaux. It must have been quite a surprise to the residents of Toulouse and the French military leaders when the Prince elected to pursue a different option. They chose to continue their eastward march.

From a supply standpoint this was certainly doable. The land east of the Garonne "was very rich and plenteous."²⁵⁴ Baker describes the people as in "a state of terror, not knowing what to do and unable to flee, because they had believed that they were safe because of the rivers [the Garonne and Ariège]. Nor did they know how to fight back, since they had never been involved in warfare before"²⁵⁵ Therefore, the Anglo-Gascon

²⁵⁴Prince of Wales, "Letter to the bishop of Winchester," in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 437. "car la terre estoit mult riche et plentenouse."

²⁵⁵Baker, *Chronicon*, 233–34. "unde territae gentes illius terrae, nescii quid facerent, nec poterant fugere praecoccupati, prius se putantes per aquas illas securos, neque sciverunt rebellare, quos nunquam prius furor bellicus invasit." For the translation, see Barber, *Life*

army could have reasonably expected to purvey, forage, and pillage supplies from local sources. Leaving Toulouse behind unsubdued would mean leaving an armed force at the army's rear—an armed force that thus far had made no move to engage the Anglo-Gascon army.

The real challenge was crossing the Garonne and the Ariège (see Map 4). The bridges were broken. The crossings downstream as far as Tonneins, roughly 100 miles away, were not in friendly territory.²⁵⁶ According to John de Wengefeld, a key member of the Prince's staff, no one in the Prince's army knew where the fords were, "yet by the grace of God, they found it,"²⁵⁷ and all the bridges outside the walls of Toulouse had been broken. The Prince had in the past—and would later in the campaign—hired locals to guide the army, but there is no evidence in the accounts that such happened in this instance, although it is possible. The crossing point certainly had to be chosen with great care. The Prince describes the rivers as "very stiff and strong to pass."²⁵⁸ Baker's description is more elaborate: The Garonne was "rough, rocky, and most frightening," and the Ariège was even "more dangerous." "The said rivers had never before been crossed by any horse."²⁵⁹

and Campaigns of the Black Prince, 63. Incidentally, Baker identifies the river as the Gironde, but both the Prince and John de Wengefeld say that it is the Garonne.

²⁵⁶Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 309.

²⁵⁷John de Wengefeld, "Letter to the bishop of Winchester," in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 443.

²⁵⁸Prince of Wales, "Letter to the bishop of Winchester," in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 437. "qe sount assez reddez et fortes a passer."

²⁵⁹Baker, *Chronicon*, 233. "...exercitus transmeavit aquam de Geroude, rigidam, petrosam, et mirabiliter terribilem; et iterum eodem die Aquam de Arage, illa de Geroude plus periculosam, et descenderunt ad Tolosam. Prædictas aquas nunquam aliquis equus ante transivit..."

Both Wengefeld and the Prince claim the crossing took place about one league (three miles) upstream from Toulouse, although Hoskins has shown that these distances are incorrect. If the army crossed the river that close to Toulouse they would have needed only to cross the Garonne not both the Garonne and the Ariège. Therefore, Hoskins is correct when he writes that the crossing had to take place upstream of the confluence of the two rivers, about seven miles (just over two leagues) from Toulouse, near Pinsaugel.²⁶⁰ Most likely the army made its Garonne crossing roughly a mile upstream of the confluence. Any further upstream the river banks rise to 50–60 feet, which would have added a considerable level of difficulty to an already difficult crossing and would have been both impractical and ill-advised. Near Pinsaugel, the river is about 140 yards wide, the banks are less steep, the water shallower, and Cassini’s eighteenth-century map seems to indicate a ford in this location.²⁶¹ As for the Ariège crossing, Hoskins rightly views this as part of the same operation, given that the most likely place—“between the confluence and Lacroix-Falgarde”—to cross the second river was only a mile’s march from the ford at Pinsaugel. The van would have completed the 80 yard crossing of the Ariège while troops in the rear were still on the far bank of the Garonne.²⁶² Logistically speaking, the army, already experienced in crossing rivers thanks to their passage of the previous few days, could have managed the crossings with proper care and planning and kept the grain dry, which would have been a key

²⁶⁰Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 49. Both Hewitt and Rogers argue for almost the exact same location. Hewitt, *Black Prince’s Expedition*, 56. Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 310, n. 127.

²⁶¹Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 49–50; Cassini, CD-ROM, France Sud, sheet 38.

²⁶²Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 50–51.

consideration. They did so “without losing scarce any of our people.”²⁶³ It does appear that they lost some horses, as Henxteworth paid out 13s to the clerk of the pantry for the purchase of “two mares for carrying bread” at Monte Giscard/Montgiscard, where the army camped on 29 October (the day after the river crossing).²⁶⁴

The logistical and physical difficulties of crossing the Garonne and Ariège aside, the army also had to be concerned about harassment from French forces. Froissart describes active skirmishing between the Anglo-Gascon army and the French defenders, the destruction of the suburbs, and the Anglo-Gascons arrayed in battle lines—after the crossing—while the French wanted to give battle but were forbidden to do so by the count of Armagnac.²⁶⁵ Given Froissart’s reputation for embellishment, this likely is exaggerated. Armagnac probably *did* order the destruction of the suburbs, which was a common practice. The forbidding of a sortie is in line with Armagnac’s approach.²⁶⁶ As for the skirmishing, drawing the troops up in battle lines *after* crossing the rivers makes no sense, so Froissart is wrong on that account. He is also wrong in stating that the army crossed at Port-Ste-Marie, about eighty-five miles downstream.²⁶⁷ Furthermore, the Prince, Wengefeld, and Baker all fail to mention any engagement with enemy troops. That said, some skirmishing probably did occur. If nothing else, if the army crossed at

²⁶³Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 437. “saunz gaires perde de noz gentz.”

²⁶⁴DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 31 October.

²⁶⁵Froissart, *Oeuvres*, vol. 5, 339, 344–45.

²⁶⁶Breuil, “Jean Ier, Comte d’Armagnac,” 57.

²⁶⁷Froissart, *Oeuvres*, vol. 5, 339, 344–45.

known fords, these place were likely guarded.²⁶⁸ If not, that begs the question of why not. Perhaps Armagnac simply did not consider that the Anglo-Gascon army *could* cross the river and failed to have the possible crossings heavily guarded. Regardless, Armagnac, Clermont, and the residents of Toulouse were undoubtedly surprised at the Prince's decision and the success of the maneuver, which, while perhaps not quite "audacious to the point of foolhardy,"²⁶⁹ was an impressive feat and opened up a new—and rich—field of operations for the Anglo-Gascon armies.

The way forward to Narbonne was filled with prosperous and ill-defended towns and villages. It was harvest; there were cattle and sheep. The army would have an easy time of it under these conditions and have a deep impact, economic and psychological, on the Languedoc.²⁷⁰

Toulouse to Narbonne

Despite the fourteen-mile march and hazardous crossing, the army camped only one night at Falgarde/Lacroix-Falgarde. They pressed on to Monte Giscard/Montgiscard (see Map 4) the next day (29 October). Even though this was the first English army to campaign in this part of France, the Prince and his staff would have known at least part of the directions to Monte Giscard/Montgiscard. Castanet, which was pillaged and burned as

²⁶⁸For Hoskins' interpretation of the discrepancies, see Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 47–52

²⁶⁹Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*, 56. Rogers disagrees with Hewitt's assessment because the Prince had no communication and supply lines that could be cut. Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 310.

²⁷⁰Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 54. While the Prince obviously was unfamiliar with Clausewitz, he would have recognized the truth of his words: "If the enemy country is rather loosely knit, if its people are soft and have forgotten what war is like, a triumphant invader will have no great difficulty in leaving a wide swath of country safely in his rear." Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 621.

part of the army passed through the town, was on the pilgrim route to Santiago de Compostela and on the old Roman road, the Via Aquitania.²⁷¹ The army likely followed the road—perhaps the carts took advantage of it—while it had the chance. Monte Giscard/Montgiscard was “a large and fine town, part of the inheritance of lord Almeric de la Fossade, which was confiscated by the French king [in 1356] because he [Fossade] was loyal to king of England.”²⁷²

The army burned twelve windmills. One does wonder if that was against orders. The Prince had been careful during the early days of the campaign to protect—or at least order the protection of—the lands and buildings of allies and the church. Furthermore, Aymeric de la Fossade was on the campaign and undoubtedly provided excellent local knowledge of the area. It is possible that Fossade knew of the crossings for the Garonne and Ariège, although that does not fit with Wengefeld’s statement that no one in the army knew of any crossings.²⁷³ Fossade’s presence meant he was also in a position to object, if not strenuously, to the destruction. While he may not have approved the action, Fossade must have understood the strategic import of doing so. It would disrupt considerably the area’s ability to supply itself let alone provide victuals for French forces. Given that

²⁷¹Dom Claude de Vic and Dom Joseph Vaissete, *Histoire générale de Languedoc*, vol. 7, 191. The Via Aquitania was built in 118 BCE to link Narbonne and the Via Domitia to Toulouse and Bordeaux. Incidentally, the modern N113 and D33 follow the same route as the Roman roads. See also, Chevallier, *Roman Roads*, 160–61.

²⁷²Baker, *Chronicon*, 234. “villam magnam et pulcram de Monte Giscard, partem hereditatis domini Almerici de la Fossade, quam sibi abstulit coronatus Francorum, quia fuit fidelis regi Angliae.”

²⁷³DCO, Henxteworth accounts; Yves Dossat, Anne-Marie Lemasson, Philippe Wolff, eds., *Le Languedoc et la Rouergue dans le Trésor des Chartres*, Item 1735; Barber, *Edward, Prince of Wales and Aquitaine*, 122; Hewitt, *The Black Prince’s Expedition*, 215; Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 55.

Fossade's lands in the *sénéchaussée* of Toulouse were confiscated in 1356,²⁷⁴ probably because of his participation in the Anglo-Gascon campaign, the strategic value of the destruction is clear.

Froissart claims that the residents of Monte Giscard/Montgiscard resisted with arrows and stones and wounded some soldiers.²⁷⁵ Consequently, the army destroyed the town and its environs, which probably supported about 2500 people.²⁷⁶ The fortifications, probably made from a mixture of earth, sand, and straw (essentially, adobe), would not have offered much of an obstacle for the Anglo-Gascon army. The town was, indeed, destroyed to the point where tax exemptions, granted by Jean II, were confirmed in 1357 to help the town rebuild.²⁷⁷

The other major event during the march of 29 October was the capture of two French spies, who revealed that Armagnac remained in Toulouse and “the constable of France was in Montmaban, four leagues from Toulouse, expecting the army's arrival to besiege Toulouse.”²⁷⁸ Hoskins identifies Baker's Montmaban as Mountauban, some thirty-five miles north of Toulouse and argues that this does not fit with the earlier information as to Baker's earlier claims that the constable was at Toulouse. He resolves

²⁷⁴Yves Dossat, Anne-Marie Lemasson, and Philippe Wolff, eds., *Le Languedoc et le Rouergue dans le Trésor des Chartes*, Item 1735.

²⁷⁵Froissart, *Oeuvres*, vol. 5, 345–46.

²⁷⁶Hoskins bases this number on the assessment that a single mill could provide for 200 people; therefore, twelve mills could support a population of 2400.

²⁷⁷Dossat, *Le Languedoc dans le Trésor des Chartes*, Item 1766. The exemptions were confirmed in 1357.

²⁷⁸Baker, *Chronicon*, 234. “Ibi capiebantur duo spies exploratores, qui dixerunt comitem Arminiensem fuisse Tolosae, et constabularium Franciae apud Montmaban, quator leucas a Tolosa, suspicatos adventum exercitus ad obsidionem Tolosæ.”

this discrepancy by suggesting that the constable had perhaps left some troops in Montauban.²⁷⁹ This depends on his identification of Montmaban as Montauban.

Perhaps Baker's Montmaban is Montrabé, only six miles slightly north-east of Toulouse. It would not be unreasonable to move some of the defenders out of Toulouse and to another, nearby location, which could then allow that force to relieve the besieged town should the Anglo-Gascon army turn back to besiege Toulouse. Perhaps the constable took troops and did march north toward Montauban, which could have been reached in an easy two day march. There is, of course, another possibility: spies lied about the constable's location, perhaps to make the Prince and his staff think Toulouse was not as well-defended as it had been. If nothing else, the capture of the spies indicates that, although Armagnac remained in Toulouse, he was not idly sitting by. He was taking steps to gather intelligence about the Anglo-Gascon army, an action in keeping with his steady and cautious approach.

Thus, apprised of the French position, the Prince's army continued its march through Languedoc, camping at Anionet/Avignonet (see Map 5), fourteen miles southeast, a large, well-fortified merchant town of 1500 houses (households),²⁸⁰ at least 6000 people. Following the road, broadly speaking, the army marched through Basige/Baziege and Villefranke/Villefranche and burned twenty windmills, which likely supported a population of roughly 4000. The route the army followed took them through

²⁷⁹Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 55.

²⁸⁰The Prince describes it as "very great and strong." Prince of Wales, "Letter to the bishop of Winchester," in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 437. *Froissart, Oeuvres*, vol. 5, 346. Froissart implies that the town was unfortified, but Hoskins' research shows that Froissart was wrong and had stone fortifications dating to the twelfth-century. Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 58.

a rich and fertile country, and they took full advantage of that. Several towns, including Montesquieu, within a couple miles of the Via Aquitania were destroyed.²⁸¹ In 1378, Montesquieu had only forty taxable households, a reduction clearly worthy of mentioning in the records.²⁸² The swath the army cut was somewhat restricted south of the route, as the count of Foix's lands were only ten miles south and the Prince had thus far made a concerted effort not to harm the lands of allies or potential allies. Foix, it should be remembered, was also a first cousin of Jean de Grailly, the captal de Buch, a member of the Prince's staff.

At Avionet/Avignonet the army maintained its battles in camp, although there was some division along regional lines within the camps: "The entire army stayed at the large town called Anionet/Avignonet...the middle and third battles quietly in the suburbs, and the first in another part of the suburbs, the Gascons and Béarnaise within the town, from which all the residents had fled."²⁸³ One assumes the news of events at Montgiscard had spread and the inhabitants made an informed decision to flee to a nearby hill fort. That did not save them. "It was taken by storm" on Friday²⁸⁴ and thoroughly destroyed on Saturday (31 October) before the army left. While the early fourteenth-century church seems to have escaped most of the destruction, which was significant, the town did not. This seems clear in the measures Jean II authorized on 28 August 1356 (before Poitiers)

²⁸¹For the distance of the towns from the Via Aquitania, see Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 57–58.

²⁸²Antoine-Lucien Cazals, *L'Histoire de la Ville et de la Communauté de Montesquieu-sur-Canal* (Toulouse, 1883), 32.

²⁸³Baker, *Chronicon*, 234.

²⁸⁴Prince of Wales, "Letter to the bishop of Winchester," in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 437. "et fust pris par force; dedeinz quele estoient logges toutz noz batailles."

to stimulate construction and rebuilding. The measures included exemptions from taxes for three years and exemptions from war taxes for seven years—if the rebuilding happened within the year.²⁸⁵

Taking the time to destroy Avionet/Avignonet in the morning probably explains the short march of only nine miles on 31 September. They marched first to a small town “called Manus de Pucels/Mas-Stes-Puelles (see Map 5), with an Augustinian convent.”²⁸⁶ Both town and convent—and presumably the town’s two windmills—were burned and the damage must have been extensive, given that the town received exemptions similar to Avionet/Avignonet to encourage rebuilding.²⁸⁷ Then the army moved on to a richer, larger prize: Chastelnavenareo/Castelnaudery (see Map 5). This was a large town on the Via Aquitania, populous and rich, and defended with fortifications, even though they were of poor quality.²⁸⁸ The town was taken by storm, and Froissart gives a dramatic version of events: killing, pillaging, looting, holding residents to ransom.²⁸⁹

The army camped the next day (1 November) at Chastelnavenareo/Castelnaudery and also celebrated All Saints Day there. There was no choice but to take this day of rest as the army had marched the previous four days without interruption. The horses had to

²⁸⁵*Ordonnances des roys de France de la troisième race*, vol. 3, ed. Mr. Secousse, 73–74. The measures also allowed the consuls to compel labor and threatened residents with a two-mark fine—to help pay for rebuilding the walls—if they failed to build a new home within the year.

²⁸⁶Baker, *Chronicon*, 235. “et villa vocata les Manus de Pucels, cum conventu Augustiniensium.”

²⁸⁷Baker, *Chronicon*, 235. Dossat et al., *Languedoc et le Rouergue dans le Trésor des Chartres*, Items 1770 and 1775.

²⁸⁸Froissart, *Oeuvres*, vol. 5, 346–47; Henri Mullet and Joseph Poux, *Nouvelles recherches sur l’itinéraire du Prince Noir à travers le pays de l’Aude*, 2, n. 3.

²⁸⁹Froissart, *Oeuvres*, vol. 5, 346–47. While Froissart tends toward the dramatic, his account of the army’s actions after taking the town is probably accurate.

be rested. Henxteworth took advantage of the halt to catch up on his accounting. Several men received advances on their wages, others were re-imbursed for purchases of horses, wine, and wax.²⁹⁰ Four Cheshire archers received 8*s* as a “gift” to cover the purchase of “shoes and breeches bought for them.”²⁹¹ The accounts also suggest that the Prince had advance scouts and purveyors. Thomas, the oven keeper, was given 3*s* 4*d* to carry to the clerk of the spicery for “wax purchased at Carcassonne,” which was twenty-four miles southeast.²⁹² This indicates that some members of the Anglo-Gascon army had ranged at least twenty-four miles ahead of the main force and returned.

Given that distance and the capabilities of men and horses, the round trip from Chastelnavenareo/Castelnaudary of fifty miles minimum (the advance purveyors could have left the army at Anionet/Avignonet, for example, then returned to meet the army at Chastelnavenareo/Castelnaudary) would have taken at least two days, most likely three. It would depend on whether carts were taken along or a pack train was used. Given that the only purchase Henxteworth re-imbursed was wax, it is possible a couple pack horses—or even the purveyors and their personal mounts—could have carried the wax. This purchase of wax was not the only one. The clerk of the spicery was reimbursed a further 7*s* 9*d* for wax purchased by Thomas of the chandlery and Thomas the baker (perhaps the same Thomas the oven keeper mentioned above). While Henxteworth balanced his accounts, a small force took an unnamed nearby town, the residents of

²⁹⁰DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 31 October.

²⁹¹DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 31 October.

²⁹²DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 31 October.

which paid the army 10,000 gold florins (1420*l*)²⁹³ to spare the town and its wealth.

Hoskins suggests this town may have been Pexiora, five miles southeast of where the army was encamped.²⁹⁴

The next morning (2 November) the army departed Chastelnavenareo/Castelnaudary, but not before burning the town, the church of St Michael and its archives, the hospital of St Antoine, and the Minorite and Carmelite convents.²⁹⁵ The destruction of the church and convents does raise a question: had the Prince changed his previous orders not to harm church lands and property or were those orders forgotten—or ignored—in the heat of the moment. The destruction was significant, as indicated by a royal charter of August 1356 and a 1357 confirmation of tax exemptions. The new Carmelite convent was granted an exemption regarding the separation distance between their convent and that of the Minorites from the pope in 1363, allowing it to be rebuilt inside the new walls.²⁹⁶ Leaving the burning town at its rear the army marched forward, through two towns two miles north of the Via Aquitania: St Marthae le Port/St-Martin-Lalande and Vilkapinche/Villepinte.²⁹⁷

²⁹³Baker, *Chronicon*, 235. “a quo quidam exeuntes conquisierunt unam villam, cui ut parcerent et catallis eorum, oppidani dederunt decem millia florentium aureorum.”

²⁹⁴Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 60. The order of St John of Jerusalem had its seat there.

²⁹⁵Baker, *Chronicon*, 235; Froissart, *Oeuvres*, 5, 346–47; Mullet and Poux, *Nouvelles recherches*, 2, n. 3.

²⁹⁶J.F. Jeanjean, *La Guerre de Cent Ans en pays audois: Incursion du Prince Noir en 1355*, 50–51, nn. 71–74; Dossat et al., *Le Languedoc et le Rouergue dans le Trésor des Chartres*, Item 1764. The Carmelites needed the exemption from rules that governed the distance that had to separate their convent from that of the Minorites.

²⁹⁷Baker, *Chronicon*, 235. “Die Lunae transierunt per villas sanctae Marthae le Port, et oppidum grande vocatum Vilkapinche...” Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 60.

Both Hewitt and Hoskins add a third town, Las Bordes/Lasbordes.²⁹⁸ Baker describes Vilkapinche/Villepinte as an “oppidum grande.” The fifteen mile march ended at Alse (see Map 5). There is some debate about the modern location of “Alse.” Hewitt and de Santi, for example, as well as Barber in his translation of Baker, identify it as modern Alzonne.²⁹⁹ Mullot and Poux and Jeanjean prefer Alzau.³⁰⁰ Hoskins seems to favor Alzau, which would better fit Baker’s description of Alse as a “*viculum*,” than Alzonne. Alzau was only two and a half miles from Alzone and given that the Prince chose not to camp within towns after his unfortunate experience at Montclar, Alzau seems a more credible location than Alzonne.³⁰¹ Alzone, whether the army camped there or elsewhere, did not survive the proximity of the Anglo-Gascon force. It was destroyed. The inhabitants, like those of the towns discussed above, later received privileges from the king, tax exemptions, and various immunities to compensate for their losses.³⁰²

The next day (3 November) took the Anglo-Gascon army nine miles down the Via Aquitania to Carcassonne (see Map 5). It was an easy march over flat ground. Carcassonne was a rich prize, “fine, richly supplied, and well built, larger than London

²⁹⁸Hewitt, *The Black Prince’s Expedition*, 58. He cites Avesbury as his source, but the Prince’s letter does not actually mention the town. Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 60. He cites De Santi, *L’Expedition du Prince Noir en 1355*, 22, as the source for the inclusion of Lasbordes.

²⁹⁹Hewitt, *The Black Prince’s Expedition*, 58; de Santi, *L’expedition du Prince Noir en 1355*, 22; Barber, *Life and Campaigns*, 64.

³⁰⁰Mullot and Poux, *Nouvelles recherches sur l’itinéraire du Prince Noir*, 3; Jeanjean, *La Guerre de Cent Ans en pays audois*, 23.

³⁰¹I follow Hoskins here. See his discussion *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 61.

³⁰²Jeanjean, *La Guerre de Cent Ans en pay audois*, 51; Dossat, et al., *Languedoc et le Rouergue dans le Trésor des Chartres*, Items 1737.

within its walls.”³⁰³ The Prince describes it as “a fair city and great” with an “old city, which was a very strong castle.”³⁰⁴ Wengefeld claims it was “greater, stronger, and fairer than York.”³⁰⁵ The comparison with York was probably more accurate. The rest of Baker’s description of Carcassonne is precise. There were two parts, the *bourg* and the *cit  *. A double curtain wall surrounded the *cit  *, and the Aude river flowed between them. A single stone bridge of 270 meters, the Pont Vieux, had fourteen arches and connected the two parts of Carcassonne, although much of the bridge does not actually span the river Aude. The *cit  * end of the bridge is 250 meters from the walls, which meant troops who crossed the river would be within missile range of the castle.³⁰⁶ Within the *bourg* “at the foot of [the bridge] was a fine hospital” and “four convents of the four orders of friars. The friars did not flee; the residents of the *bourg* and the minoresses [Poor Clares]...fled to the *cit  *.”³⁰⁷ The Prince’s account is similar to Baker’s. He adds that “great captains [*cheveteyns*] were therein and men of arms and commons in great number; for all the greater part of the people of the land of Toulouse were fled thither, but

³⁰³Baker, *Chronicon*, 235. “villam pulcram, praedivitem, et bene aedificatam, ampliorem Londoniis infra muros.”

³⁰⁴Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 438. “gestoit bial ville et graunt.” “al auncien ville, gestoit mult fort chastiel.”

³⁰⁵John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 443. “qest plus grande, plus forte, et plus beale qest Everwyk.”

³⁰⁶Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 62.

³⁰⁷Baker, *Chronicon*, 235. “ad cujus pedem pulcrum hospitale fuit situatum. In burgo fuerunt quator conventus quator pauperum religiosorum, quorum ministri, scilicet fratres, non fugerunt, burgensibus et minorissis quae ilic etiam habitabant, in civitatem fugientibus.”

at the sight of us they forsook the city [the *bourg*] and fled to the old city [the *cit *], which was a very strong castle.”³⁰⁸

Given that intelligence, it is hardly surprising that the Prince and his staff chose not to assault the *cit *. They stayed in the *bourg*, which was large enough to accommodate the entire army in three-fourths of the *bourg*. There the army found “an abundance of muscat wine and other victuals both delicacies and essentials.”³⁰⁹

The army stayed three days in Carcassonne. The first day (3 November), presumably after the residents fled, Lebret’s sons were knighted, as were several English soldiers: the lord Basset of Drayton was promoted to banneret, too, Roland Daneys, and others.³¹⁰ The next two days (4–5 November) the army rested. At some point during those two days, the residents offered the Prince a truce and 250,000 gold  cus to spare the town. Baker, in unusually dramatic fashion, records the Prince’s reaction: “He had not come for gold but for justice, not to buy but to take cities.”³¹¹ The Prince clearly rejected

³⁰⁸Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 438. “...et grauntz cheveteyns dedeinz et des geants darmes et comunes a graunt nombre; car tout le plus de geantz de pays de Thoulousane tanqe la estoient fuiz, meas a nostre venue ils guerperont la ville et sen fuerent al auncien ville, qestoit mult fort chastiel.”

³⁰⁹Baker, *Chronicon*, 235. “In burgo totus exercitus bene et laute hospitatus, vix occupavit tres ejus quartas, abundans vino muscato et caeteris victualibus tam delicatis quam necessariis.”

³¹⁰Baker, *Chronicon*, 236. “et effecti milites filii domini de Libreto, et dominus de Basset Dreitone, qui incontinenti cum erecto proprio vexillo militavit. Item Rolandus Daneys et plures ad ordinem militare promovabantur.”

³¹¹Baker, *Chronicon*, 236. “Offerentibus aurum princeps respondit, quod huc non venit pro auro sed justitia prosequenda, nec ut venderet sed caperet civitates.” See also, Barber, *Life and Campaigns*, 65. Baker does not usually fall into such dramatic language in his account of the 1355 campaign, although he does indulge in dramatic speeches in his account of the 1356 campaign. Jeanjean suggests a lower figure of 25,000  cus based

the terms, at least as far as sparing the town is concerned—the town was indisputably burned, although the religious houses were spared.³¹² Wengefeld adds that “all the other towns in the country were burned and destroyed” in addition to Carcassonne.³¹³ The Prince provides more detail, namely that “the whole of the third day we remained for burning of the said city, so that it was clean destroyed and undone.”³¹⁴

Based on Froissart’s more colorful account this took some effort, as the town was defended: as many as ten to twelve chains across the street, for example. The Anglo-Gascon forces dismounted and drove the defenders out of the *bourg*, with Eustace Daubriggecourt, *miles* and mercenary (see Chapter Four), at the front.³¹⁵ Local sources, though, suggest that the *bourg* was undefended.³¹⁶ Nor do Baker, the Prince, or Wengefeld mention any fighting. A letter from the city’s clergy to the Prince indicates that perhaps there were some minor incidents: “the *bourg* is not burnt or that another *new damage be added* to that which it has already suffered [emphasis mine].”³¹⁷ The clergy’s letter begged the Prince to spare the *bourg*.

on the town’s ability to pay, although provides no evidence for the figure. Jeanjean, *La Guerre to Cent Ans en pays audois*, 31.

³¹²Baker, *Chronicon*, 236. “princeps die crastina jussit burgum ita incendi, quod domibus religiosis parceretur.”

³¹³John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 443. “Et tout cele ville et toutz lez aultrez villes el pays fusrent ara et destruitz.”

³¹⁴Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 438. “et ꝑe tierce jour entier demurrasmes sur lardour de le dit ville, si qu lestoit nettement destruit et defait.”

³¹⁵Froissart, *Oeuvres* vol. 5, 347–49.

³¹⁶Jeanjean, *La Guerre de Cent Ans en pays audois*, 26–31.

³¹⁷For the text of the clergy’s letter, see Thomas Augustin Bouges, *Histoire ecclésiastique et civile de la ville et diocèse de Carcassonne* (Marseille, 1978 [1741]), 241; Jeanjean, *La Guerre de Cent Ans en pays audois*, 31–32. For his discussion of the letter, see Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 63–64, no. 28.

If your excellency refuses us this grace, by necessity the houses will be burnt, the churches abandoned and divine services cease. We do not believe that a heart as noble and religious as yours should consent to this. Poor wretches that we are, we dare to make this humble plea to your Excellency, because we are persuaded of your clemency, that you love Jesus Christ and his servants, that you and yours seek only to defend and support the Church and to search for justice.³¹⁸

It was signed by an impressive list of senior representatives of a variety of religious orders: Dominicans, Carmelites, Hermits of St Augustin, Franciscans, Commanders of St Eulalie and St Antoine, churches of St Michel and St Vincent, Penitent Sisters of Ste Marie Madeleine, and Sisters of Ste Clare and St Augustin.³¹⁹ The letter failed to save the *bourg* but perhaps it helped save the churches and convents, although the Dominican and Franciscan convents and the Chapel of Notre Dame did sustain some fire damage.³²⁰

After the plundering of Carcassonne's *bourg*, the Anglo-Gascon army would have been amply resupplied, and the Prince would have been assured that the effects of his campaign would have significant repercussions for Jean II. In addition to the spoils, the army also took records (*remembraunces*), which Wengefeld explicitly mentions in his report to the bishop of Winchester. The Prince and his staff—and later Edward III and his advisors—would have gained valuable knowledge of the productive capacity of the

³¹⁸Bouges, *Histoire ecclésiastique et civile de la ville et diocèse de Carcassonne*, 241; Jeanjean, *La Guerre de Cent Ans en pays audois*, 31–32. I have used Hoskins' translation. Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 64.

³¹⁹Bouges, *Histoire ecclésiastique et civile de la ville et diocèse de Carcassonne*, 241; Jeanjean, *La Guerre de Cent Ans en pays audois*, 31–32.

³²⁰Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 64. He cites his correspondence with Jean-Louis Bonnet, a local historian of Carcassonne.

Languedoc, of its contributions to Jean II's war efforts, and been able to extrapolate the long-term consequences for that war effort.

The destruction was such that Jean II personally wrote to Carcassonne's residents on 22 November 1355. He, the letter explains, remains in the north to counter the threat of the other English army and expresses his wish to avenge the town. He even offers to send his son—for similar reasons that Edward III sent his heir—to lead the army, "God willing," of course. The letter further orders Armagnac to see to the *bourg*'s repair and defenses,³²¹ and by 1359 the *bourg* was walled and efforts underway to prepare lists of households,³²² presumably for the purpose of taxation. Six royal sergeants were also to be appointed and charged with the collection of taxes.³²³ While it took longer for most towns to recover, the pace of the *bourg*'s reconstruction and the attention given to better defenses suggests that Wengefeld's estimation³²⁴ of the city's importance to the French economy and royal tax base was accurate and that the people of the Languedoc had learned from the Prince's *chevauchée* that they were not immune from attack.

With considerably more baggage in tow, which the supply train seemed to accommodate with little incident—an indication of the army's logistical capabilities—the Anglo-Gascon army moved onward toward Narbonne, fewer than fifty miles away, on 6 November. The march took the army past the castle of Botenake/Bouilhonnac on the left.

³²¹Bouges, *Histoire ecclésiastique et civile de la ville et diocèse de Carcassonne*, 242–43.

³²²Alphonse Mahul, *Cartulaire et archives des communes de l'ancien diocèse et de l'arrondissement administratif de Carcassonne*, vol. 6, pt. 1 (London, 1956), 21; Bouges, *Histoire ecclésiastique et civile de la ville et diocèse de Carcassonne*, 242–43.

³²³Bouges, *Histoire ecclésiastique et civile de la ville et diocèse de Carcassonne*, 242–43.

³²⁴John de Wengefeld, "Letter to the bishop of Winchester," in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 442.

The ten mile march to Rustican/Rustiques (see Map 5) was “difficult, rocky, and crossed by rivers.”³²⁵ Such a road would have taken the army south along the left bank of Aude, and is directly contrary to Froissart’s account, which claims the army crossed the Aude at Carcassonne and continued onto the Via Aquitania on the other side of the *cit *.³²⁶ This, however, would have placed the army within range of the *cit *’s cannons and springbalds,³²⁷ not to mention bow range. It would have been a great risk with no real tactical advantage, and the Prince was too intelligent a commander to make such a poor decision.³²⁸ And even if he was not, Warwick and the other magnates certainly were. Furthermore, such a route would not fit Baker’s description of the route. Following the left bank of the Aude south, though, meant the army would have had to cross the Fresquel and Orbiel rivers, as well as several other of the Aude’s tributary streams, and the terrain also resembles Baker’s description.³²⁹ The first river crossing was the Fresquel, two miles southeast from Carcassonne; then the army turned east again. The small castle of Botenake/Bouilhonnac was half a mile east of the Orbiel river. There is no evidence that the castle was assaulted. Rustican/Roustiques was only another two miles southeast of the castle.³³⁰

³²⁵Baker, *Chronicon*, 236. “transierunt iter laboriosum, petrosum, et aquosum, dimisso a sinistris castro de Botenake intacto, per campestria et villas vocata la Rustican...” See also, Barber, *Life and Campaigns*, 65.

³²⁶Froissart, *Oeuvres*, vol. 5, 347–49.

³²⁷Froissart, *Oeuvres*, vol. 5, 349.

³²⁸Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 65; Mullet and Poux, *Nouvelles recherches sur l’itin raire du Prince Noir*, 5.

³²⁹Hewitt, *The Black Prince’s Expedition*, 60; Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 65.

³³⁰Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 66.

Baker makes no mention of any towns, although he does tell us that “the whole area was burned,”³³¹ nor do the Prince or Wengefeld mention any towns specifically. The Prince writes only that they “rode through all the land of Carcassonne,” and Wengefeld writes that “all the other towns in the country were burnt and destroyed.”³³² Froissart suggests that the town of Trèbes, two miles south of Botenake/Bouilhonnac and commanding the confluence of the Aude and Orbiel rivers, was ransomed,³³³ although the more likely scenario is that it was burned considering the fate of other towns. Millan, a nearby hamlet, was burned, as indicated by Géraud de Barbairan who declared that he could not confirm the taxes on the land he held—because the passage of the Anglo-Gascon army had destroyed the records.³³⁴ As discussed above, the Anglo-Gascon force did take and destroy records.

Even with a difficult march and accounting for the time necessary to burn a pair of small towns, the army, including the supply and baggage train, would have reached Rustican/Roustiques in good time to set up camp. The army camped one night there and the next day (7 November) marched twenty-one miles to Canet (see Map 5). The march was “wearisome and the army was afflicted by wind and noxious dust.” On the left was Esebon, a fresh-water lake of 20 leagues [60 miles] in circumference, four miles from

³³¹Baker, *Chronicon*, 236. “et totam patriam combustam.”

³³²Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 433. “Et puis chivachasmes tut le pays de Carcasees...” John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 443. “...et toutz lez aultres villes el pays fusrent ars et destruitz.”

³³³Froissart, *Oeuvres*, vol. 5, 350.

³³⁴Froissart, *Oeuvres*, vol. 5, 350. For the burning of Trèbes, see Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*, 60 and Jeanjean, *La Guerre de Cent Ans en pays audois*, 34. For the burning of Millan, see Jeanjean, *La Guerre de Cent Ans en pays audois*, 34 and Mullet and Pous, *Nouvelles recherches sur l'itinéraire du Prince Noir*, 6, n. 3.

Rustican/Roustiques.³³⁵ Fresh water would not have been a difficulty, which was fortunate given the increasing weight of the booty the army was collecting and the space it must have taken up in the carts. They passed by Sylome, which was left intact because it belonged to the Prince's friend Isodo de Bretagne, often identified as the large town of Lézignan or the hamlet and royal fief Sérame.³³⁶ The route through Sérame to the Orbieu river crossings was more direct and through easier terrain than going through Lézignan. Based on Hoskins's itinerary, the most likely route took the army through Puchéric, which is on the Aude river, and Castelnau-d'Aude, two miles east of Puchéric, crossing the Aude, then camping at Canet, ten miles from Narbonne.³³⁷

The Anglo-Gascon force would have needed to cross the Orbieu river (see Map 6) the following day (8 November) and did so in two groups. One group used a ford at Chastel de Terre, and the rest of the army used a bridge.³³⁸ There are two probable sites for the bridge. The first is La Rougeante, where the Via Aquitania is believed to have crossed the Orbieu and only five miles south of Canet. Given the relative frequency with

³³⁵Baker, *Chronicon*, 236–37. “Sabbato per iter tœdiosum, vento et pulvere exercitui nocivis, dimiserunt a sinistris piscinam aquarum recentium, habentem in circuitu 20 leucas...et vocatur Esebon..” Barber, *Life and Campaigns*, 65. Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 67. Modern maps show the lake, dried-up now, as Marseillette, which is much smaller than Baker's described lake of 60 miles in circumference.

³³⁶Baker, *Chronicon*, 237. “...atque venerunt ad villam vocatam Sylome, redditam princeps sed intactam, ratione dominae Isidis de Britannia amicœ principis...” Mullet and Poux, *Nouvelle recherches sur l'itinéraire du Prince Noir*, 7, and Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*, 61, for Sérame. Jean le Bel, *Chronique*, 221, identifies Sylome as “Lesignen.” Barber, *Life and Campaigns*, 65, in his translation of Baker chooses Lézignan as Sylome.

³³⁷Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 67–68. Hoskins, rather than choose either Sérame or Lézignan, suggests that the army, if spread along a broad front, could have passed through both.

³³⁸Baker, *Chronicon*, 237. “...transierunt aquam de Sande, partim apud vadum vocatum Chastel de terre, et partim trans pontem...”

which bridges were washed away, it is entirely possible that a bridge was being constructed, as Baker indicates.³³⁹ The second possible location is Villedaigne, only a mile distant from Canet. Cassini's eighteenth-century map shows the road from Narbonne to Carcassonne going through Villedaigne.³⁴⁰ It is unclear when the preferred route shifted. Granted, if the route through Villedaigne was experiencing increased traffic, this could be the site of Baker's bridge construction, placing the ford at Le Gué de l'Homme, three miles to the northeast.³⁴¹ The rest of the march was "between steep mountains,"³⁴² which corresponds with the route through Villedaigne, where the hills on both sides of the route rise 300 feet.³⁴³ Thus the army came out of the mountains and had their first sight of Narbonne (see Map 5).

³³⁹Baker, *Chronicon*, 237. "...et partim trans pontem novum sed imperfectum..."
Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 69.

³⁴⁰Cassini, CD-ROM, France Sud, sheet 58.

³⁴¹Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 69.

³⁴²Baker, *Chronicon*, 237. "...inter arduos montes..."

³⁴³Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*, 60. Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 69. This route also follows the modern N113.

Chapter Six: The Return to Bordeaux

The Prince's army halted at Narbonne (see Map 6), about 114 miles (184 km) from Toulouse, most of which was along the Via Aquitania. This was the furthest east the army marched, although a few raiding parties did venture a bit farther. After the halt at Narbonne, the Anglo-Gascon army turned for Bordeaux. The return march, which this chapter discusses, was more arduous than the outward march from Bordeaux to Narbonne. The days grew shorter: only 9.7 hours of daylight in Narbonne on 10 November and 8.9 daylight hours by the time the army reached La Réole on 2 December.¹ The speed was faster, the rests were fewer, and the French forces were in pursuit.

The Anglo-Gascon army reached Narbonne on Sunday 8 November. It had covered an impressive distance (300 miles) in the thirty-five days since leaving Bordeaux on 5 October. Of those days, twelve of them were rest days, some of which were necessary for both men and horses. For example, the army rested a day after the long marches from Villenave-d'Ornon to Castets-en-Dorthe (6 October, 28 miles) and Castelnau to Arouille (11 October, 25 miles). The army, then, marched only twenty-three days during the campaign to Narbonne. The army had moved at an average speed of 8.5 miles per day, although if the rest days are not included in the average, then the army had

¹Hours of day light determined by using the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Daylight Hours Explorer, which is part of the Astronomy Education at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln program.
<http://astro.unl.edu/classaction/animations/coordsmotion/daylighthoursexplorer.html>
Accessed 4 November 2013.

maintained an average rate of thirteen miles per march day during the first half of the campaign, with a ratio of about one rest day for every two march days.

The return to Bordeaux proceeded at an accelerated pace. The army marched 289 miles in twenty-four days total, nineteen marching days and five halts. Their rate of march accelerated to an average of fifteen miles per day, and the ratio of rest to march decreased to one rest day for almost every four days of marching. This acceleration was despite of the increased baggage and had several causes, not least of which were the lateness of the season—it was already November and the army was 300 miles from Bordeaux and about 200 miles from friendly territory—and the pursuit by French forces.

The Anglo-Gascon Army at Narbonne

The Prince and his army halted at Narbonne on 8 November. They remained encamped at Narbonne on the following day. Narbonne was “a noble city and of fair size, greater than Carcassonne.” Narbonne itself had some 30,000 residents and was 88 acres within the walls.² According to Froissart there were 3000 plus “fine houses” in the walled *bourg*.³ Like Carcassonne, Narbonne also had a fortified *cit *, which housed the

² Jacqueline Caille, “Urban expansion in the region of Languedoc from the eleventh to the fourteenth century: the examples of Narbonne and Montpellier,” in *Urban and Rural Communities in Medieval France*, ed. Kathryn L. Reyerson and John Drendel, 51–72 (Leiden: Brill, 1998), at 54, 56, 60–61. Jacques Dup quier and Jean-Pierre Bardet, eds., *Histoire de la population fran aise*, vol. 1 (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1988), 304.

³ Froissart, *Oeuvres*, vol. 5, 351–52; Paul Carbonel, *Histoire de Narbonne, d s origines   l’ poque contemporaine* (Narbonne, 1956), 193. Baker, *Chronicon*, 237. “...habuit ecclesiam magnam cathedralem sancti Justini, item eximium castrum episcopi, et turrim fortissimam pro vicecomite illius villae.” Baker describes the *bourg* as “revera majorem et melius aedificatum quam illud de Carkosona.”

viscount's tower, the bishop's castle, and the (unfinished) cathedral.⁴ Viscount Aimeri VI (1348–1388) of Narbonne had “five hundred men of arms,”⁵ presumably in the garrison, although the Prince does not specify. Two stone bridges and one wooden bridge spanned what was then a branch of the River Aude (the Canal de la Robine now) and connected the *bourg* and the *cit *, and the central bridge—the Pont des Marchands—went through the gates in both the *bourg* and *cit * walls.⁶ The *cit *'s walls were intact as a result of the city's consuls refusal to demolish part of the wall in order to complete the cathedral of St. Just and St. Pasteur, which brought construction of the cathedral to a halt in 1344.⁷ Their refusal was a direct result of instructions issued by King Philip IV (1293–1350) of France in 1344. Per these instructions, the consuls were to ensure the province's defenses were in suitable condition. Whatever motivations the consuls may have had, the residents of Narbonne were fortunate that the consuls had followed the king's directive.

Wengefeld provides a fuller description in his letter than the Prince and includes information on Narbonne's location relative to French cities and towns, thus providing

⁴Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 71. Part of the *cit * encompassed the original Roman site.

⁵ Edward of Woodstock, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 438. “qestoit noble ville et graunt assez, plus qe nestoit Carcasone... en chastiel, dedeinz quele estoit le viscounte de Nerbone od D. hommes darmes...”

⁶Baker, *Chronicon*, 237. “Inter civitatem et burgum sunt duo pontes petrini et tertius de merennio, altero petrino pro vecturis diversorum mercimoniorum bene aedificato.”

⁷The cathedral remains unfinished. According to a plaque on the cathedral, this is a result of the economic toll caused by the devastation wrought by the Prince's campaign and the silting up of the river. The dispute between the consuls and the clergy was upheld by the *vigue]ier royal de B ziers*, even after the archbishop of Narbonne made a personal plea. Paul Carbonel, *Histoire de Narbonne* (Marseille, 1988 [1956]), 194; Jacques Michaud and Andr  Cabanis, *Histoire de Narbonne* (Toulouse, 1981), 194; Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 71–72.

the letter's recipients with helpful details about the city: "And the said city is a little smaller than London [probably around 50,000 people before the plague⁸], and it is on the Greek sea, and from the said city to the high sea of Greece is but two short leagues [6 miles]. And there is a haven and landing place, the water whereof cometh into Narbonne. And Narbonne is but fifteen leagues [45 miles] from Montpellier, and eighteen [54 miles] from Aigues-Mortes, and thirty from Avignon."⁹ Wengefeld's description is not entirely accurate—Montpellier is about 60 miles and Avignon is 118 rather than 45 miles and 90 miles respectively.¹⁰ Nevertheless, the bishop of Winchester would have had a good idea of where the Anglo-Gascon army was and how far they had travelled.

Just as at Carcassonne, at Narbonne, too, "the people...did forsake [the *bourg*] and betook them to the castle."¹¹ The *cit * was well defended with walls—thanks to the consuls' actions—and artillery, which Baker specifies as "ballistas and other machines" (*balistis et aliis machinis*).¹² The Prince's army remained under fire "through the entire night and into the following day."¹³ In light of that, the decision to camp within the

⁸Sumption, *Trial by Battle*, 39–40.

⁹John de Wengefeld, "Letter to the bishop of Winchester," in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 444. "Et la dit ville est poy meindre de Loundres, et est sur la meer de Grece, et y naad de la dite ville a la haut eer de Grece qe ii petitz lieues. Et il y aad port de meer et arivaille, dount la eawe vient a Nerboun. Et Nerbon nest qe xv. Lieues de Mountpellers, xviii. De Egemort, et xxx. De Avinoun."

¹⁰I have used the measure of three miles per league, as in Zupko, *A Dictionary of English Weights and Measures*, "league."

¹¹Prince of Wales, "Letter to the bishop of Winchester," in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 433. "la geule lez geantz dycelle guerperont et mistrent en chastiel..."

¹²Baker, *Chronicon*, 237. "fortis et bene murata..."

¹³Baker, *Chronicon*, 237–38. The original construction is an ablative absolute: "sed per totam noctem et in crastino sequenti civibus cum exercitu balistis et aliis machinis dimicantibus..." A literal translation would be "the army having been in peril from the

bourg—the Prince chose the Carmelite convent—and clearly within range of the *cit * was not well considered. The army suffered many wounded, and Jean de Pommiers, one of the Gascon leaders, was among them. None were killed according to Baker.¹⁴ This is the first mention Baker makes of the army taking artillery fire. Neither the Prince nor Wengefeld mention artillery, although Wengefeld writes “the city of Narbonne held out and was taken by storm.”¹⁵ Likely he is referring to the *bourg* not the *cit *.

The Anglo-Gascon army spent two nights at Narbonne. The *bourg* was set on fire, either by the army or the defenders of the *cit * “with flaming crossbow bolts.”¹⁶ Given the Anglo-Gascon army’s previous actions, and the vigorous defense of the residents, either or both are possible. Hostages were taken.¹⁷ During the retreat from Narbonne, the army crossed the river in several places but not without incident. Two of the Prince’s baggage carts were plundered by residents of Narbonne and greatly

residents fighting with ballistas and other machines through the entire night and into the following day...”

¹⁴Baker, *Chronicon*, 238. “...multis ex utraque parte sauciatis, nonulli interierunt.” Jeanjean, *La Guerre de Cent Ans en Pays Audois*, 38, for the wounding of Pommiers. According to a conflicting report, Pommiers and nine other Anglo-Gascons were killed. See *Thalamus parvus: Le petit thalamus de Montpellier*, ed. Ferdinand Pegat and Eug ne Thomas, 351.

¹⁵John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 444. “Et la ville de Nerbon se tenoit et feust gaigne par force.”

¹⁶Baker, *Chronicon*, 238. “Die Martis burgo per ignem inflammato, per cararias ardentis, exercitus profectus ad torrentem...” Sumption, *Trial by Fire*, 181. Cararias is an alternative spelling of the Anglo-Norman word for the bolts: “harreaus.” “Cararias” and other plural forms appear in a variety of sources. Both Hewitt and Hoskins write that the Anglo-Gascon army set the *bourg* on fire, while Sumption suggests that the *cit * defenders were the ones who started the fire.

¹⁷Jeanjean, *La Guerre de Cent Ans en pays audois*, 38.

damaged.¹⁸ The English and Gascons probably forded the river near Cuxac-d'Aude, which was fortified by the French.¹⁹ Here, the hostages taken at Narbonne either paid their ransoms or were executed,²⁰ most likely to teach an object lesson to the local populace. After fording the river Aude, the army marched nine miles northward to the town and castle at Ambian/Aubian (see Map 6).

Hoskins posits three possible locations for the castle. The first is Ambian/Aubian, itself. While the town is located near a saltwater lagoon it is on the Via Domitia, which would make it a logical location for a castle to control the flow of traffic. The second is the fortified abbey grange Fontcalvy, which supplied the Cistercian abbey Fontfroide, two miles west of Ambian/Aubian. The third possibility is Ouveillan, which had two castles. Ouveillan was destroyed by the Prince's army, which prompted the construction of new fortifications in the fifteenth century. The damage caused was significant, as the population was reduced from about 1000 to 400 people. The plague was certainly a factor, but the Anglo-Gascon army's actions undoubtedly contributed to the reduced population.²¹

The Decision to Return to Bordeaux

At this point in the campaign, the Anglo-Gascon army reached the furthest eastward point

¹⁸Baker, *Chronicon*, 238. "...in quo transitu duae quadrigae domini principis fuerunt per cives defractae, et ad magnum damnum depraedatae."

¹⁹Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 72. See also, *Cassini*, CD-ROM, France Sud, sheet 58.

²⁰Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 72; Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*, 60–61; Jeanjean, *La Guerre de Cent Ans en Pays Audois*, 38

²¹Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 72–73. His information about Oiveillan is drawn from conversations with local historian Julien Aussenac and the Archives Communales, Ouveillan, Series GG.

of the *chevauchée*. There is some debate as to what that point was: Béziers, St-Thibéry,²² or Capestang (see Map 6).²³ Logistically, Capestang, only five miles northeast of Ouveillan, is the most reasonable. If the army marched toward Homps, where they halted on 12 November, the route via Capestang was thirty-three miles. The army could easily have covered that distance in three days at eleven miles each day. Had the army marched via Béziers, which was walled, the army would have had to march sixteen miles each day to cover the forty-eight miles. Hoskins suggests that perhaps a small, mounted unit went as far as Béziers but the main force went no further than the rich town of Capestang, which was on a saltwater lagoon and had 4000 residents.²⁴ The town at first negotiated to pay a ransom but the consuls stopped negotiating upon receiving intelligence that a militia was marching from Avignon and that the count of Armagnac had (finally) left Toulouse.²⁵

The Prince and his staff were also aware of the count of Armagnac's movements, as well as the approaching militia. The Prince writes that "there we took our counsel whither we might best draw; and by reason that we had news from prisoners and others that our enemies were gathered together and were coming after us to fight us, we turned

²²Le Bel, 221.

²³Froissart, *Oeuvres*, vol. 5, 350–52. Froissart, though, has the Anglo-Gascon army reaching Capestang before marching on Narbonne.

²⁴Monique Bourin, Michel Adgé, Yves Rouquette, and Bernard Nayral, *L'imagier et les poètes au château de Capestang* (Portet-sur-Garonne, 1991),

²⁵Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 73–74. Capestang's wealth was based on salt production. For Capestang, see Jeanjean, *La Guerre de Cent Ans en pays audois*, 38–41; Mullot and Poux, *Nouvelle recherches sur l'itinéraire du Prince Noir*, 9; de Vic and Vaissete, *L'histoire générale de Languedoc*, vol. 7, 191.

again to meet them, and thought to have had the battle in the three days next following.”²⁶

The Prince and his staff had to consider their options. It was possible the Anglo-Gascon army could have defeated the militia, then turned to meet Armagnac and his force. Given Armagnac’s caution and previous actions, the Prince’s staff could reasonably have assumed they would have the time to fight the first army before Armagnac arrived. The drawback to such a plan, of course, was the risk of being trapped between two hostile forces and being outnumbered.

The army could have continued to march northeast toward Montpellier; however, the news of the Prince’s progress had reached Montpellier. The residents had already taken their goods to Avignon for protection and destroyed the outer suburbs.²⁷ The residents were no doubt attempting to make Montpellier a less attractive target. Even more than the potential prizes that Montpellier might yield, the Prince and his staff had to consider the season. It was almost mid-November, and the army was deep in French territory. Marching further away from Gascony would delay the army’s return to safety and increased the risk of Armagnac’s forces cutting off the return to Gascony. In light of that consideration, there was nothing to be gained by continuing the march. Thus, the Anglo-Gascon army turned to face Armagnac, the marshal Jean de Clermont, and the

²⁶Edward of Woodstock, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 438. “Et illesques preismes nostre counsail vers ou nous purrons mieltz trere; et, par cause qe nous avons novels de prisoners et aultres qe noz enemys estoient assemblez et venoient apres quidasmes daver eu la bataille deinz les trois jours ensuantz.”

²⁷Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 433. “...inhabitanes villam de Mounpelers, hoc audientes et timentes ne consimilia paterentur, omnia aedificia in suburbio ejusdem villae demoliri fecerunt et meremium hujusmodi aedificiorum infra muros deferri.”

constable Jacques de Bourbon, expecting contact and battle within three days.²⁸

On 11 November the army marched approximately 12 miles westward from Ambian/Aubian to the vicinity of Ulmes/Homps (see Map 6), which the army marched through the following day. The army probably advanced along the path of the Chemin Romieu, an old Roman road that connected Béziers and Homps.²⁹ Baker describes the march as “long and difficult, but especially injurious to the horses, because of the rocky terrain, and [they were] furthermore without water or other victuals, the horses drank wine for water, and the food was cooked in wine, [and] no liquid except wine or oil was found.”³⁰ The water shortage was real. The march west took the army through uneven, undulating land that was crossed with several streams. At this point in the year, though, those streams most likely were dry and would present difficulties for the march while providing little to no water. The only certain water source was the Cesse River, only three miles from Ouvellian, where part of the army camped on 10 November. Assuming the river still had a reasonable amount of water flowing in it, the army still had the majority of the march ahead.

Considering that the Anglo-Gascon army had managed to cross the Landes—even though they lost many horses—they were capable of transporting at least minimal amounts of water. Logically, then, the army would have done what it could to carry

²⁸Edward of Woodstock, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 438; John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 444.

²⁹Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 75.

³⁰Baker, *Chronicon*, 238. “...per longum iter et malum, sed equis praecipue nocivum, quia petrosum, et sine aquis potarunt vinum, et in vino cibis coctis, nihil liquidum nisi vinum aut oleum reperiebatur.”

water with them on this march, which was considerably shorter than the two-day crossing of the Landes. If the horses were truly drinking wine and Baker is not exaggerating, then there was an inadequate water supply to meet the army's needs. This would have been a problem in the morning, when it was time to water the horses. Given the lack of water, though, it is possible that the army marched first, then stopped to water the horses after the first hour of march.³¹

The march of 12 November took the Anglo-Gascon army near Homps, where some of Armagnac's officers had planned to camp on the night of 11 November. They probably learned this information from locals, who were undoubtedly concerned about the proximity of two military forces.³² Given that the Prince and Wengefeld both write that they expected contact with French forces, Froissart is likely correct that some of Armagnac's soldiers could have chosen Homps as a camp. Baker confirms that some of Armagnac's officers did stay there.³³

The French force was clearly nearby, and yet the Anglo-Gascon army had no contact with them. Wengefeld writes "when we ought to have come upon them, they had news of us before day, and they drew away and disappeared towards the mountains and the strong places, and went by long marches toward Toulouse."³⁴ He adds that some of

³¹Horses should be watered 2–3 times per day, but it can be done only once. If not watering the horses before marching, it needs to be done after the first hour of march. See Professional Papers 29, 431–32.

³²Froissart, *Oeuvres*, vol. 5, 350.

³³Baker, *Chronicon*, 238. "...ubi praecedenti nocte fuerunt hospitati officarii comitis Arminiacensis..."

³⁴John de Wengefeld, "Letter to the bishop of Winchester," in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 444. "...qaunt nous deveroms avoir venir sur eaux, ils avoient novels de nous

the French army's local guides, including the constable of France's personal guide, were captured; Wengefeld seems to have overseen the examination of these guides with the aid of a papal sergeant-at-arms, who was with the army to arrange for conducts for two papal nuncios for the purpose of negotiating a truce. The sergeant "was in my keeping" and "I made him examine the guides which were thus taken; for the guide that he examined was the guide of the constable of France, of that country, and he could well see and know the countenance of the Frenchmen by examination."³⁵ The Prince and his staff, then, would have had detailed intelligence—if accurate—about the movement of the French forces and the upcoming marches.

The Papal Messengers

It was during this time, 10–12 November, envoys from the pope at Avignon reached the Prince. The pope clearly had his own sources of intelligence and was well-informed about the Prince's movements. Innocent VI's letters and offer of the papal nuncios as negotiators indicate the level of his concern about the Anglo-Gascon campaign and its effects on the population.³⁶ In addition to the messengers sent to the Prince, the pope sent a message to Jacques de Bourbon, count of Ponthieu and constable of France (1319–1362); Robert de Duras (1326–1356); Jean de Clermont, marshal of France; Jean d'Armagnac; Pierre Raymond II (c. 1325–1375), count of Comminges; Jean, count of

devaunt le jour, et lour retreerent et disparierent devers les montaynes et les forces, et alerent as graundes journess devers Tholouse."

³⁵John de Wengefeld, "Letter to the bishop of Winchester," in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 444. "Et purceo qe le serjaunt darmes le seint piere feust en ma garde, jeo luy fice examiner les guydes qe feurent ensi prisez; car le guyde qil examina feust le guyde le conestable de Fraunce, celle native, et il purroit bein veer et conustre le countenance de lez Fraunceis par lexamination."

³⁶*Innocent VI*, Letter 1804.

Lisle, and Jean de Levis, lord of the city of Mirepoix. In the message, Innocent VI describes the effects of the Prince's actions, namely the "many difficulties and tribulations" being suffered by the population and his concern that a battle between the Anglo-Gascon and French forces could result in a large loss of life (*magna strages*).³⁷ He calls on the constable and the others to meet with the appointed papal nuncios—Jean, archbishop of Capua, and Peter, bishop of Turiaso—and the Prince to negotiate a truce.³⁸

The Prince also received a letter of introduction for the two nuncios from the pope, and his own letter to the bishop of Winchester indicates that he knew of the nuncios' status. While the Prince does not give the names, he does specify that the messengers were bishops. The Prince was not the only person to receive a letter. The pope had good information about the Prince's officers, and several members of his command staff also received a letter: Warwick; Guy de Beauchamp (Warwick's second son); Suffolk; Oxford; Salisbury; Nigel Loryng; Bartholomew de Burghersh; Stephen de Cussington; Robert de Stretton, canon of Lincoln; Bernard Ezii d'Albret; Pierre de Grailly, *capitain de Buch*;³⁹ Selebrun, lord of Lesparre; Guillaume-Sanci, lord of Pommiers; and Robert de Clifford.⁴⁰ The letters of introduction addressed begin with a request for peace.⁴¹ This list includes key members of the Prince's staff and suggests that Innocent VI had good intelligence about the Anglo-Gascon army and its command structure, as

³⁷*Innocent VI*, Letter 1800. "...angustiis et tribulationibus multis..."

³⁸*Innocent VI*, Letters 1800–01. The letter to Jacques de Bourbon is given in full; the letters to the other men are recorded with the following formula: "Item in e. m. *dilecto filio nobile viri...*" with the name of the man thus addressed.

³⁹This is an error, Jean (III) de Grailly was *capitain de Buch*.

⁴⁰*Innocent VI*, Letters 1802–03.

⁴¹*Innocent VI*, Letter 1802. "Licet pro pace inter carissimos..."

well as about the French force.

Baker makes no mention of the papal messengers, but both the Prince and Wengefeld specifically discuss the messengers, the message, and the Prince's response.

The Prince writes:

the holy father sent to meet us two bishops, which sent unto us to have conduct, which we could not grant unto them. For we would enter into no treaty, until we should know the will of our much honored lord and father the king, and specially by reason that we had news that our lord was passed the sea with his power. But we sent back word to them by our letters that, if they should wish to treat, they should draw towards him, and that which we he would command us, we would do it, and in such manner they turned back.⁴²

Wengefeld's letter concurs that messengers from the pope arrived for the purpose of "treat[ing] between my lord [the Prince] and his adversaries of France," although he adds that the papal messengers "were but seven leagues" (21 miles) from the army and sent their letters with a sergeant-at-arms, who was placed under Wengefeld's guard. He continues, "the said messenger was two days in the host before my lord would see him or

⁴²Edward of Woodstock, "Letter to the bishop of Winchester," in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 438. "A quele heure le seint piere manda devers nous ij. Evesques, lez queuz manderent a nous pur conduyt avoir, le quele nous ne lour vodrons ottoier. Car nous ne vorrons entrer en treetee nulle, tantqe nous seoussiens la volente nostre tres honure seigneur et piere le roy, et nomement par cause qe nous avons nouvelles qe nostre seigneur estoit passe la meer ovesque soen poair. Einz lour remandasmes par noz lettres qe, sils vorront treetee, ils se treassent devers luy, et ceo qil nous vorroit comander nous le ferrons; et en tiel manere ils se retournerent."

receive his letters.”⁴³ The Prince “would in no wise suffer the said messengers to com[e] nearer to him; but, if they would treat at all, they should send to my lord the king, and that my lord [the Prince] would do nothing except by command of my lord the king, nor listen to any treaty without his order.”⁴⁴

The Prince clearly had no more interest in the pope’s offer to negotiate a truce than Edward III had in April 1355. Like his father, the Prince kept the papal representatives waiting. His indenture with Edward III (discussed in Chapter Four) granted the Prince the power to negotiate truces. He could have received the papal nuncios, could have accepted the pope’s offer of arbitration, and could have accepted a truce—which presumably would have included safe conduct for his army’s return to Bordeaux. Yet, the Prince chose not to receive even the letters carried by the sergent-at-arms whose task was to arrange safe conducts for the nuncios to the Anglo-Gascon army. Ostensibly, his reason was Edward III’s presence in France, but the tone of the Prince’s letter—and Wengefeld’s description of the Prince’s response—suggests that the Prince was using this fact as a convenient excuse not to make a truce. He purposefully chose to ignore the nuncios and pursue his own objectives, namely the continued devastation of the Languedoc and possibly bringing Armagnac and the French forces to battle.

⁴³John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 444. “...qe feust pur treter entre mounseignur et ses adversaries de Fraunce. Et le deit messenger estoit ij. Jours en lost avaunt qe mounseignur lui voleit veer od resevre ses lettres.”

⁴⁴John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 444. “Car il ne voleit seoffrir en nul manere les dits messages venir plus pres de luy; meas, sils voudront reins treter, qils mandassent au roy mounseignur, et qe mounseignur ne voleit rien feare si ne soit par comaundement du roy mounseignur, ne oyer nul treetee sauntz son maundement.”

Given that the Prince was aware that a papal messenger had arrived and knew Edward III was in France, the delay in receiving the sergeant-at-arms is interesting. The Prince was possibly stalling while he and his command staff met to consider their options. About the time the papal messenger arrived, the Prince received intelligence that the French forces at Toulouse had left that city and were near Carcassonne, about 41 miles west of Narbonne. The Anglo-Gascon force had covered that distance in three days. The French army could certainly match that speed and perhaps could exceed it. If the supply train were left to catch up in its own time, the French combatants, particularly those on horseback, could have reached Narbonne in three days at a rate of 13.6 miles per day—roughly the same rate at which the Anglo-Gascon army had marched during the first half of the campaign. The delay in receiving the intelligence must also be considered. The Prince and his staff had to account for the fact that their intelligence was at least a day old, which meant the French forces could be a day's march closer. The army expected to meet the French forces in the next couple days but then received additional intelligence that the French had turned back toward Toulouse (see above).

Aside from the content of the messages and the interplay between the Prince and the papal messengers, there are several important items to note about the intelligence available to the Prince, Armagnac, and Pope Innocent VI. First, the pope was clearly aware of the Prince's progress through the Languedoc and had accurate information.

Both the Prince and Wengefeld indicate that the messengers from the pope reached the army at Narbonne or shortly after the army left the city, although it is possible that the envoys met the army as it marched north. The papal missives are dated 5

November,⁴⁵ when the Anglo-Gascon army was three days' march from Narbonne, which would have been enough time for a messenger to reach Narbonne from Avignon before the Anglo-Gascon army departed on 10 November and certainly before the army marched from the vicinity of Homps on 12 November. This indicates that Innocent VI knew not only about the Prince's progress through the Languedoc but also had enough information to extrapolate that the Anglo-Gascon army was marching toward Narbonne and then north.

Innocent VI also had enough knowledge of both the Anglo-Gascon and French forces to know the major captains. Consider the list of men who received individual letters from the pope. The French command, then, includes: Jacques de Bourbon, the count of Ponthieu and constable of France; Robert de Duras; Jean de Clermont, marshal of France; Jean, count of Armagnac; Peter Raymond, count of Comminges; Jean, count of Lyle; and Jean de Levis, lord of the city of Mirepoix.

The English command according to the Pope's intelligence included: Edward, Prince of Wales; Thomas Beauchamp, earl of Warwick; Guy de Beauchamp, Warwick's second son; Robert d'Ufford, earl of Suffolk; Thomas de Vere, earl of Oxford; William de Montague, earl of Salisbury; Nigel de Lorying; Bartholomew de Burghersh; Stephan de Cusyngton; Robert de Stretton, canon of Lincoln; Bernard, lord of Albret; Pierre de Greilly, captal de Buch; Selebrun, lord of Lesparre; Guillaume, lord of Pommiers; and Robert de Clifford. Clearly, the pope had good information about the Anglo-Gascons, even if it was not entirely accurate. For example, the letter to the Captal de Buch is

⁴⁵*Innocent VI (1352–1362): Lettres Secrètes et Curiales*, ed. Pierre Gasnault, vol. III, 209–11, Letters 1800–1808.

addressed to “Petro de Grelino,” when, in fact, it was Jean de Grailly who was the *capitain de Buch*, a title inherited through the maternal line.

The French command likely had the same intelligence about the Anglo-Gascon army that the pope did. They certainly knew where the Prince and his forces were—the papal nuncios approached the French, too, and the French had their own local guides—and what the Prince’s options would have been. Armagnac, Clermont, and Bourbon probably were aware of Lancaster’s activities in Normandy and of Edward III’s arrival in Picardy, although their information would have been out-of date given a messenger would have needed at least a couple days to cover the distance. Nevertheless, the French commanders likely knew the general position of Lancaster’s and Edward III’s actions if not the most current details about their movements. Additionally, the French knew the Anglo-Gascon army had turned toward them and likely intended to force a battle. Armagnac, in keeping with his policy of avoiding battle, retreated toward Toulouse.

The Prince and his staff knew the French had drawn “away and disappeared towards the mountains and the strong places, and went by long marches toward Toulouse.”⁴⁶ They learned of the French movements from local guides returning from their service to the French forces. The Prince cites the arrival of Edward III in France as his reason for not meeting with the papal nuncios, which indicates that the Prince was aware of Edward III’s movements. This awareness, though, would have been general rather than specific because communication between the English forces would not have

⁴⁶John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 444. “...et lour retreerent et disparierent devers les montaynes et les forces, et alerent as garundes journees devers Tholouse.”

been reliable due to the distance, the time it would take the message to reach the Prince, which likely would have made the information on the King's position outdated, and the chances of interception.

While a messenger relay could cover 100km in a day, there was the very real risk of interception. It could have taken sixty days or more for the Prince in Gascony to communicate—initial message and its response—with Edward III in Picardy. Therefore, “any practical coordination between the fronts was well-nigh impossible” and Edward III could only “make an initial overall plan giving each local commander a certain role to play.”⁴⁷

In light of that, the Prince knew what his role was and agreeing to a negotiation might not have been part of it, particularly when he was enjoying considerable success. Given the distances and time involved, the Prince and his army could be safely back in Gascony before Edward III's wishes were known. It is likely the Prince knew that Edward III had landed in Calais in late October—the King and his force marched out of Calais on 2 November—, but any close cooperation between the three English forces would have been impossible. The Prince, Edward III, and Lancaster had to trust that the commanders were following the broad outlines of the initial plan, but within that plan each commander had the freedom to pursue his objectives as he deemed best. In this instance, the Prince chose not to negotiate.

Seeking Battle?

The Anglo-Gascon army camped at Aryle/Azille (see Map 6) on 12 November. The ten-

⁴⁷Yuval Harari, “Inter-frontal Cooperation in the Fourteenth Century and Edward III's 1346 Campaign,” *War in History* 6, no. 4 (1996): 379–95, at 380–83.

mile march took the army near Homps, which escaped destruction. Whether this was a result of the town offering the Prince a ransom of 12,000 *écus* (1200*l*), as Froissart indicates,⁴⁸ or a decision to bypass the town rather than take the time to destroy is unclear. The central Anglo-Gascon column camped at Aryle/Azille, which Baker describes as a “pleasant town belonging to the count of l’Isle,”⁴⁹ who was on the French side. The other two columns possibly stayed at the town of Pépieux and the castle and village of La Redorte, two miles north and south respectively of Aryle/Azille.⁵⁰

Both Pépieux and La Redorte were destroyed.⁵¹ Pépieux’s thirteenth-century church was destroyed by the Anglo-Gascon force, and was rebuilt in 1379.⁵² Aryle/Azille itself was fortified long before the arrival of the Prince’s army, but these fortifications were augmented after 1355. The church of St. Julien and St. Balisses survived; the town also had two convents: the Cordeliers in a northern, unwallled suburb and the Poor Clares within the walls in the northwest part of the town.⁵³ The Prince spent the night in one of the convents, in which there was “a great abundance of muscat wine

⁴⁸Froissart, *Oeuvres*, vol. 5, 350. Froissart’s account may be suspect, given that he has the army marching from Carcassonne to Narbonne via Capestang, rather than Carcassonne to Narbonne and thence to Capestang and Homps. See Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 76, for his discussion of the problems with Froissart’s accounts.

⁴⁹Baker, *Chronicon*, 238. “...bonam villam comities de Insula, vocatam Aryle hospitata.”

⁵⁰Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 76.

⁵¹Baker, *Chronicon*, 238. “Illo die fuerant destructa bona villa de Pypions, et ejus castrum vocatum Redote.”

⁵²Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 76. Hoskins cites an account located in the church of St. Etienne in the text but not in the notes.

⁵³Mahul, *Cartulaire et archives des communes*, vol. 4, 8 and 257; Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 76.

deposited in the cellar for the countess of l'Isle.”⁵⁴ Baker adds that the wine “was wasted [destroyed]” (*fueraſt vastata*)—presumably after the Prince and his men had sampled it.

The French were nearby, likely just across the river Aude and south of La Redorte. Baker claims the Prince’s men captured enemy scouts, who revealed “that the constable of France and the count of Armagnac intended to spend the night in the same towns where the [Anglo-Gascon] army spent the [previous] night.”⁵⁵ Thus, the Prince and his staff had good intelligence about the position of the French forces and could reasonably have expected a battle, as both the Prince and John de Wengefeld indicated in their letters to the bishop of Winchester. Perhaps this is why the “Almain,” Theoderic Dale, “an usher of the Prince’s chamber, was made a knight” at this time.⁵⁶

North or South?

This intelligence about the French movements must have influenced the decision-making of the Prince and his staff. The location of enemy forces—and the desire either to meet or to avoid them—would have been a factor in choosing the route by which the army continued marching west on 13 November. Our knowledge of the route for the next few days—13 November through 15 November—is confused and has been interpreted in two distinct ways, which relates directly to the Prince’s motives and the larger objectives of

⁵⁴Baker, *Chronicon*, 238. “...ubi magna abundantia vini muscati pro comitissa de Insula in cellariis reposita...”

⁵⁵Baker, *Chronicon*, 238. “...et discooperatores inimicorum capti retulerunt quod Francorum constabularius et comes Arminiensis in eadem villa, ubi exercitus pernoctavit, intendebant pernoctasse.”

⁵⁶Baker, *Chronicon*, 238. “...Theodoricus Dale, ostiarius camerae domini principis, fiebat miles...” Dale is described as an “Almain” in the *BPR*, and he continued in the Prince’s service for several years and received annuities and other rewards for his service. For the annuities, see *BPR*, IV, 207 and 218.

the *chevauchée*. These two interpretations center on two key questions: Did the Anglo-Gascon army march north or south of Carcassonne? Was the Prince seeking battle with Armagnac or seeking to avoid battle?

Those favoring the northern route argue for a battle-avoidance strategy. Henry Mullet and Joseph Poux⁵⁷ argue for the northern route. It has been accepted by J.F. Jeanjean,⁵⁸ Tourneur-Aumont,⁵⁹ and H.J. Hewitt.⁶⁰ In all cases, the northern route is linked to battle-avoidance, as the French forces were known to be south of the Anglo-Gascon army. The southern route, in contrast, is tied to a battle-seeking strategy. This view is adopted by Clifford Rogers, who sees a battle-seeking strategy underlying the entire campaign, and Hoskins follows Rogers' interpretation.⁶¹ The route proposed by Rogers and Hoskins has the advantage of following the line of march delineated by Baker. Indeed, Rogers specifically addresses the importance of Baker's account, which was "clearly based on a campaign diary written during the *chevauchée*" and "provides by far the most detailed and accurate narrative...of the expedition;" therefore, "any proposed route which directly contradicts its statements" should not be accepted.⁶²

Baker's description of the route for these few days, then, needs careful examination, which Hoskins has ably accomplished in both his article in the *Journal of Medieval Military History* and his book, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*. As Hoskins

⁵⁷Mullet and Poux, *Nouvelles recherches sur l'itinéraire du Prince Noir à travers les pays de l'Aude*, 14

⁵⁸Jeanjean, *La Guerre de Cent Ans en pays audois*, 42

⁵⁹Tourneur-Aumont, *La Bataille de Poitiers*, 85–87

⁶⁰Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*, 63.

⁶¹Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 305; Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 78–82; Hoskins, "The Itineraries of the Black Prince's *Chevauchées* of 1355 and 1356."

⁶²Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 317.

shows, “the topography, toponymy and an assessment of time and distance all point to the prince...in pursuit of Armagnac.”⁶³ Adding the logistical constraints—the ineluctable needs of men and animals for provisions and water, the consumption rate, the speed of march, the physical and human topography—within which the Anglo-Gascon army had to operate confirms that the Prince and his staff chose the more difficult route—south—and sought to meet the French forces.

The route of 13 November was “long, rocky, and lacking water.” The army camped “at Lamyane,” which was “poor with few houses and little water.”⁶⁴ On 14 November, the Anglo-Gascon army marched with “the lake of Esebon and Carcassonne and the whole of the previous march” on the right (to the north).⁶⁵ The third column camped at Aliere, the center at Puchsiaucies, “where a fortified tower was taken, but the Prince lay beyond the bridge next to a beautiful river,” and the first column at Pezence, which had been burned along with the surrounding countryside.⁶⁶ The 15 November march was through “pleasant countryside” and long because the army pressed onward, “because the Prince would lodge at the large abbey of Mary at Prolian,” which housed more than 200 men and women “in separate houses.” The Prince was admitted into the “spiritual brotherhood.” The army burned Lemoyns, where there was a large convent of

⁶³Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 82.

⁶⁴Baker, *Chronicon*, 238–39. “Die Veneris exercitus profectus per longum iter petrosum et inaquosum, hospitabatur apud Lamyane, sed male pro penuria domuum et aquarum.”

⁶⁵Baker, *Chronicon*, 239. “...reliquerunt a dextris piscinam de Esebon, et Carcasonam et totum iter pristinum...”

⁶⁶Baker, *Chronicon*, 239. “...et retro custodia hospitabatur apud bonam villam vocatam Alieire, et media apud Puchsiaucies, ubi turris defensa fuit conquista, sed princeps jacuit ultra pontem, juxta pulcrum rivum aquarum, ex cujus utraque parte patria ignibus vastabatur, cum bona villa de Pezence, ubi prima custodia fuit hospitata.”

friars; Falanges, with its twenty-one windmills; the towns of Vularde and Serre; along with the whole countryside.⁶⁷

Baker's place-names are obscure and the two interpretations depend on the identification of the various towns. The proponents of the northern, battle-avoiding route identify Baker's "Lamayne" as Lamignan.⁶⁸ It matches Baker's description of "poor with few houses and little water." However, it is but seven miles from Azille, which hardly seems like a "long" march.⁶⁹ Both Rogers and Hoskins identify La Mayne as Villemagne (see Map 6).⁷⁰ Villemagne was twenty miles distant, and the march would have involved an 800 foot climb across the Montagne d'Alaric. The Anglo-Gascon army would have crossed the Aude river early in the day, after which there would have been few if any water sources.⁷¹ Furthermore, the summer had been dry.⁷²

⁶⁷Baker, *Chronicon*, 239. "...intraverunt per patriam pulcram, longam et latam, itinere magno, et exercitus acceleravit ad hoc, quod princeps foret hospitatus in abbatia magna beatae Mariae de Prolian, ubi in distictis claustris vivunt de possessionibus 100 Praedicatores, et 140 dominae reclusae, vocatae Praedicatrices, ubi dominus princeps in spiritualem confraternitatem domus cum multis aliis devote fuerat receptus. Illo die exercitus succendit inter caetera villam de Lemoyns, ubi fuerunt conventus quorumlibet fratrum, majorem Carkasona, et pulcrum oppidum vocatum Falanges, cui pertinebant 21 molendinae ventosae, et villas de Vuladre et Serre, cum tota patria."

⁶⁸Mullot and Poux, *Nouvelles recherches*, 10–11. The argument is that "Lemayne" is a corruption of La Méjane, which was how Lamignan was often written.

⁶⁹Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 78.

⁷⁰Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 318, n. 165; Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 78. This town was often written as Villa Magna, Villare, De Villamanha, and Villamagnha, so Lemayne is a realistic corruption. Hoskins eliminates Comigne, another suggestion for Lemayne on the southern route because it is only ten miles from Azille and within a couple miles of the river Aude, which hardly meets Baker's description of lacking water.

⁷¹Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 78–79; Hoskins, "Itineraries," 18; Topographical Map, Pau-Toulouse. For discussion of the geology, see *La Montagne d'Alaric-Aude-et ses entours. Étude géologique*, Bulletin des services de la carte

A twenty-mile march with an 800-foot climb, without water, would have been difficult and would have required several stops to rest the horses. Baker makes no mention of any horses lost that day, but it is certainly possible that some were, as was the case in other marches Baker describes as long and rocky. What Hoskins fails to elaborate on is the grade of the climb. If the army climbed 800 feet over the course of the entire twenty-mile march, that is a long, continuous climb, the grade would have been a gentle, easy 0.75 degrees. If the climb began after Comigne, two miles from the river Aude and ten miles from Azille, the grade would have increased to 1.5 percent, still not steep enough to require any adjustments for the supply and baggage train. However, if the climb was in the last five miles, the grade would have been 3 percent and would have required the load to be reduced to maintain distance, i.e., the weight in the carts would need to be lightened if the army wished to cover the same distance as it could on a less than 3 percent grade. If the majority of the climb was in the last few miles, the grade would have been approximately 7 percent. The army could have done it, could have maintained the load over the shorter distance, but it would have been difficult.⁷³

The march, though, was twenty miles, not two, and the climb came at the end of the day, on the fourth consecutive day of marching. It was also the second day that Baker

géologique de la France et des topographies souterraines 47, no. 224 (1949). The maps, in particular, are helpful.

⁷²L. Fédié, *Histoire de Carcassonne* (1886), 448–49; Étienne Baluze, *Vitae paparum avinionensium*, ed. G. Mollat (Paris, 1914–1927), 314; Richard Barber, *Edward, Prince of Wales and Aquitaine* (London: Allen Lane, 1978), 123; Bouges, *Histoire ecclesiastique et civile de la ville et diocèse de Carcassonne*, 242.

⁷³Professional Papers, No. 29. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. Fourth (Revised) Edition, with Addenda. Engineer Field Manual, Pts. 1–4. Prepared under direction of Brig. General A. MacKenzie, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1912. War Department Document 355, 438.

describes as difficult, rocky, and waterless. The horses, and soldiers, were in danger of being overworked and needed rest. They would not get it for another five days on 19 November, and the march of 14 November was twenty-three miles. Based on Baker's description, with the lake Esebon, which Hoskins identifies as the now dry lake of Marseillette,⁷⁴ on the right (north) means the army was heading south.⁷⁵ Mullot and Poux, the principal advocates of the northern route, argue the Anglo-Gascon army saw the lake as a river with the north shore as the river's right bank.⁷⁶ This seems rather convoluted and unlikely given Baker's description of the lake on the eastward march: a freshwater mountain tarn with no water flowing into or out of the lake. The Anglo-Gascony army passed Esebon on the march toward Narbonne and the lake was then on the left (north).⁷⁷ If Baker's description is accurate on the march east, it seems unlikely that he would be inaccurate on the return. The lake, even now, "is clearly visible from higher ground, and is less than a mile from the Aude."⁷⁸ It is unlikely that the Prince and his able staff did *not* know where they were in relation to such important topographical features.

Further evidence for a southern route are the letters of John de Wengefeld and the Prince himself. Wengefeld specifically states that the French "drew away and

⁷⁴Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 79; Hoskins, "Itineraries."

⁷⁵Baker, *Chronicon*, 239. Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 79; Hoskins, "Itineraries," 18.

⁷⁶Mullot and Poux, *Nouvelles recherches sur l'itinéraire du Prince Noir*, 13.

⁷⁷Baker, *Chronicon*, 336. "...dimiserunt a sinistris piscinam aquarum recentium... quae nec recipit nec emittit aquas aliunde, nisi pluviales aut scaturientes, et vocatur Esebon." See also Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 79; Hoskins, "Itineraries."

⁷⁸Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 79.

disappeared towards the mountains and the strong places,”⁷⁹ i.e., the Montagne d’Alaric.⁸⁰ The destruction of towns, of course, is also evidence of the Anglo-Gascon army’s passage, and the advocates of both the northern and southern routes point to destroyed towns in support of their arguments. Hoskins has shown that the evidence for the towns Mullot and Poux cite—Peyriac-Minervois, Buadelle, Villepeyroux, and Conques⁸¹—either is erroneous or has been mis-interpreted.⁸² Rogers suggests Siran and La Livinière were sacked by the Anglo-Gascon army, and Hoskins’ experience of walking the route indicates the feasibility of Rogers’ argument as both towns are within easy distance—three miles—of Pépieux, near where the army camped at Azille.⁸³ Therefore, outriders, particularly from the rearguard, easily could have attacked the towns on the morning during the march.

On the night of 14 November the army rearguard camped at Aliere/St-Hilaire, the center at Puchsiaucies/Pennautier,⁸⁴ and the vanguard at Pezence/Pezens (see Map 6).⁸⁵ Puchsiaucies/Pennautier and Pezence/Pezens are both within a day’s march of

⁷⁹John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 444. “...et lour rereerent et disparierent devers les montaynes et les forces...”

⁸⁰See Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 79–80; Hoskins, “Itineraries,” for his discussion of the identification of the mountains as the Montagne d’Alaric as opposed to the Minervois.

⁸¹Mullot and Poux, *Nouvelle Recherches*, 14. See also Jeanjean, *La Guerre de Cent Ans*, 43–44; Hewitt, *The Black Prince’s Expedition*, 63; Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 318, nn. 163–66.

⁸²Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 79–80; Hoskins, “Itineraries.” For example, the evidence for Conques is local tradition that the English sacked the town, which could have happened at several points during the Hundred Years War. See Denis Pébernard, *Histoire de Conques-sur-Orvieil et de la Manufacture des Saptés* (S.I., 1899), 250.

⁸³Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 318, n. 164; Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 80; Hoskins, “Itineraries.”

⁸⁴Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 80.

⁸⁵Baker, *Chronicon*, 239.

Villemagne and Lamignan, At Pezens, for example, Julien Courtieu's excavations uncovered a hill that commanded the Fresquell valley and uncovered pottery, coins, and "*un boulet de bombe, envoyé par les Anglais.*"⁸⁶ The location proposed by the northern-route advocates for the army's halt on 13 November. From Villemagne, the center column would have had a twenty-three mile march, while the vanguard had a slightly longer march of twenty-six miles, which was within the capabilities of the army based on previous distances. The supply and baggage train, though, would have been unable to keep up with the vanguard and would have had difficulty matching the rate of march of the center column.

As for the rearguard, Aliere has been identified as Villalier—northern route—and St-Hilaire—southern route. Hoskins' analysis of the distances shows that Villalier is not a feasible location. If the rearguard stayed at Villalier they would have had a thirty-four mile march minimum to Prouille the next day (15 November).⁸⁷ Such a march would have been nearly ten miles longer than any other march of the campaign; the supply and baggage train could not possibly have completed such a march—the maximum distance the supply train could have achieved was twenty-five miles *on good roads*.⁸⁸ The cavalry could have marched thirty-five miles under favorable conditions and *without* a supply or pack train if they pushed,⁸⁹ but this would have left the supply and baggage carts—and loot—vulnerable. If the rearguard camped at St-Hilaire they would have had a twenty

⁸⁶Mazieres, "Faits et gestes," 126.

⁸⁷Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 80–81; Hoskins, "Itineraries."

⁸⁸Professional Papers, 437.

⁸⁹War Department Cavalry Field Manual. Vol. III. Prepared under direction of Chief of Cavalry. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1938, 145.

mile march on 15 November, a much more manageable distance which the supply train could have also completed. St-Hilaire is thirteen miles distant from Pezence/Pezens and Puchiaucies/Pennautier. Hoskins suggests that this should not exclude St-Hilaire even though the other dates for which Baker provides locations for all three columns indicate the columns encamped within three miles of each other; however, at one point during the 1356 campaign the rearguard camped thirty miles from the other columns.⁹⁰

Furthermore, coins found at St-Hilaire are suggestive. These coins were French in origin but no longer in use in Languedoc in 1355.⁹¹ Given Henxteworth's use of multiple specie it is possible that members of the Prince's company could have carried these. The coin finds add weight to the identification of St-Hilaire as Baker's Aliere, though, is the distance and rearguard's marching capabilities.

One further factor in considering the Prince's choice between the northern and southern routes is an option that has not been discussed. No examination of the 1355 *chevauchée* argues that the Prince took the simplest path to Bordeaux: the central route along the Aude river valley. This would have left Carcassonne and the lake north of the army's route and the Montagne d'Alaric to the south. The Prince and his army could have avoided a "long, rocky, waterless march,"⁹² could have spared themselves and their

⁹⁰Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 81; Hoskins, "Itineraries."

⁹¹Jean Sarrand, "La chevauchée du Prince Noir dans la region de Carcassonne, novembre 1355," *Mémoires de la Société des arts et des sciences de Carcassonne*, series 4, vol. 5 (1963–1967): 155–58, at 158. The dating of the coinage was determined by Maurice Nogué.

⁹²Baker, *Chronicon*, 238–39. "...longum iter petrosum et inaquosum..."

horses the climbs and narrow passes of the route through the Montagne d'Alaric.⁹³ If the Prince sought to avoid battle this would have been the easiest, most logical path, not the northern route. Yet, the army clearly did not choose the path of least resistance to return to Bordeaux as quickly as possible, which would have been practical considering the lateness of the season. Given the collective military experience and acumen of the Prince's staff this was a considered decision made for clear reasons to achieve specific objectives. Instead, the Anglo-Gascon army moved south in pursuit of the French.

The Push to the Garonne

Thus, the night of 14 November, the Anglo-Gascon army camped in three locations: the rearguard at Aliere/St-Hilaire, the center at Puchsiaucies/Penaultier, and the vanguard at Pezence/Pezens. On 15 November the army camped at Prolian/Prouille (see Map 6), a march of sixteen miles for the center column. This march was a significantly easier march through "fair, open country,"⁹⁴ most likely along the Via Aquitania for some distance, then southwest to Montréal and west to Prolian/Prouille. Baker calls it a long march, although compared to other marches the army had completed, it does not seem long. However, this was the sixth day of march without rest and followed a couple very long, arduous, and waterless marches. No doubt the march felt long, and the Prince welcomed the opportunity to take advantage of the brothers' hospitality. The vanguard marched about twenty miles, and the rearguard, marching from St-Hilaire, would have

⁹³For his discussion, see Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 81–82; Hoskins, "Itineraries."

⁹⁴Baker, *Chronicon*, 239. "...intraverunt per patriam pulcram, longam et latam..."

had a longer march of roughly twenty-five miles.⁹⁵

During their march toward Prolian/Prouille the rearguard destroyed Limoux,⁹⁶ Routier, and Villar-St-Anselm. Limoux was a large town of about 15,000, making it larger than Carcassonne, and it was wealthy thanks to viticulture, agriculture—both cultivation and milling—cloth manufacture, tanning, and dressing furs. The Aude river flowed through the town, with the larger and fortified part of the town on the west bank of the river. Two bridges connected this part of Limoux to the unfortified, eastern suburbs. Limoux boasted three religious houses: Dominican inside the walls and Franciscan and Augustinian outside the walls, at least one of which was on the east bank of the Aude.⁹⁷ Limoux would thus have been a rich prize for the Anglo-Gascon army, and Hoskins suggests that the allure of Limoux might be one of the reasons the rearguard was stationed thirteen miles from the center and vanguard on the night of 14 November.⁹⁸ The army certainly understood Limoux's importance; Wingefeld told the bishop of Winchester that Limoux, along with Carcassonne and two other nearby towns, "found each year for the king of France the wages of a thousand men of arms and, besides, one hundred thousand old crowns, to maintain his war."⁹⁹

Given Limoux's importance as a center of cultivation and milling and viticulture,

⁹⁵Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 81–83; Hoskins, "Itineraries."

⁹⁶Baker, *Chronicon*, 239.

⁹⁷Denifle, *La désolation des monastères*, vol. 2, pt. 1, 91–92; Fonds-Lamothe, *Notices historiques sur la ville de Limoux* (Limoux, 1838), 93.

⁹⁸Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 83.

⁹⁹John de Wengefeld, "Letter to the bishop of Winchester," in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 445. "Car Carcasoun et Lemoignes, qest ausi graunt come Carcasoun, et ij. Aultres villes de coste de Carcasoun, troveront chescun an au roy de Fraunce lez gages de mil hommes darmes et, outre ceo, c. mil escutz veux, pur maintenir de guerre."

it also is reasonable to suppose that the rearguard hoped to find ample supplies—and had to hope the town had not destroyed them. The rate of march over the previous days would have made gathering supplies somewhat difficult, and the army would have taken the opportunity to replenish its supplies. The monasteries did not escape destruction, and Limoux's walls were destroyed,¹⁰⁰ a not inconsiderable task. Given the time this operation likely would have taken, it is possible that the majority of the rearguard continued the advance while a small party remained behind to effect the destruction.

The destruction was clearly extensive given the reconstruction measures authorized: tax and service exemptions; permission to use wood from royal forests for rebuilding; power to compel skilled labor—masons and carpenters, for example—from nearby towns; no export taxes on grain and cloth under a certain amount; a grace period for debtors; taxes on goods purchased at the fair were reduced; tolls were increased. Of particular importance was the reconstruction of the fortifications and written records.¹⁰¹

The rearguard, unlike the Prince and the center, did not march through “fair, open country.” Instead, the march from St-Hilaire to Prouille was through land that rose and fell steeply, so it would have been another difficult day for the soldiers under the command of the earls of Salisbury and Suffolk and the lord of Pommiers. There were

¹⁰⁰A 1356 letter of Jean d'Armagnac discusses the destruction of the walls; see Fonds-Lamothe, *Notices historiques*, 141, for Armagnac's letter. Innocent VI addresses the reconstruction of a monastery outside Limoux's wall. For the text of the papal letter, see Denifle, *La désolation des monastères*, vol. 2, pt. 1, 92, n. 1.

¹⁰¹Fonds-Lamothe, *Notices historiques sur la ville de Limoux*, 141–47. See also Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 85.

many mills and hilltop villages, of which Routier was one.¹⁰² The presence of the mill ruins indicates that the route was through cultivated land, and the lateness of the season meant that the crops—if it had not been destroyed to deny supplies to the Anglo-Gascon army—would have been harvested, making it easy for the force to purvey supplies.

The relatively autonomous activity of the rearguard over these two days indicates not only that the Prince trusted his commanders to pursue independent action, but also that there must have been a plan to regroup in the vicinity of Prolian/Prouille. Thus, there was a designated route of march, which must have been pre-planned at least a few days in advance, i.e., before the Anglo-Gascon army marched from Lamayne/Villemagne on 14 November.

The vanguard, under the command of Warwick and de Cobham, marched from Pezence/Pezens to the vicinity of Prolian/Prouille and Fanjeaux, about twenty miles. Their route went slightly north and took them through Montréal, Villasavary, and Lasserre-de-Prouille. By the time the vanguard reached Montréal it would have been roughly five miles from the rearguard, as the forces converged. The vanguard pillaged Montréal and burned the Carmelite convent.¹⁰³ Like the rearguard to the south, the vanguard was not sparing ecclesiastical property. Lasserre-de-Prouille was a *circulade* town and so would have had a defensive perimeter, but it did not save the town.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰²Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 86. The town likely had only primitive fortifications in 1355. See Dominique Baudreu and Frédéric Loppe, “Types de forts villageois dans le bassin moyen de l’Aude durant la Guerre de Cent Ans,” *Archéologie du Midi Médiéval* 22 (2004): 103–40, at 116.

¹⁰³Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 86.

¹⁰⁴See Mahul, *Cartulaire et archives des communes*, vol. 3, 257, 311, 340 for Montréal; and *Circulades, sur la route d’un urbansime de 1000 Ans* for Lasserre-de-Prouille.

The center marched along a relatively straight and easy route close to the vanguard's route. Both center and vanguard had camped near each other on the night of 14 November with the rearguard thirteen miles south. The march on 15 November proceeded along a broad front of thirteen miles, wreaking considerable destruction, that narrowed to five miles near Montréal, and converged in the vicinity of Prolian/Prouille (see Map 7) and Fanjeaux. The Prince stayed at the Dominican abbey, where the brothers admitted him to "the spiritual brotherhood of the house."¹⁰⁵ Whether this was a carefully considered move on the part of the brothers to preserve the abbey from destruction or not, the abbey survived the Anglo-Gascons' visit to receive 32*l* in alms from the Prince and delivered by Richard of Leominster, a Dominican with the Prince's army.¹⁰⁶

Fanjeaux was a mile further down the road from the Dominican abbey, on a hill 450 feet above Prolian/Prouille. It was fortified with ramparts and a castle, but these were insufficient.¹⁰⁷ The town and its twenty-one windmills were burned.¹⁰⁸ The fires would have been clearly visible at the abbey. Perhaps that view was a factor in the Prince's admission to the brotherhood. One could wonder what the brothers thought about the Prince staying with them while the Anglo-Gascon army burned the nearby town, even if, as Hewitt states, such a situation "was not incongruous to the mind of

¹⁰⁵ Barber, *Life and Campaigns*, 66.

¹⁰⁶ Baker, *Chronicon*, 239; DCO, Henxteworth accounts, 28 November 1355.

¹⁰⁷ Hoskins states there are two castles in Fanjeaux but second one likely did not exist in 1355. Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 86.

¹⁰⁸ Baker, *Chronicon*, 239.

1355.”¹⁰⁹ Based on Baker’s description of events, it seems the brothers expected the Prince. The army, he writes, pressed, “because the Prince was to stay in the abbey...,”¹¹⁰ suggesting that scouts and or messengers had already preceded the Prince and either made arrangements or reported back to the Prince that the abbey would make a comfortable place to spend the night.

The following day, Monday 16 November, the army marched seventeen miles to Ayollpuhbone/Belpech (see Map 7),¹¹¹ which was a pleasant town with a castle outside the town. The residents mounted a stout defense, but the town fell during an assault with no noteworthy casualties, i.e., no one any of the sources felt compelled to mention [John de Lisle was the only squire, knight (*chivaler*) killed on the campaign according to Wengefeld]. As for Belpech, itself, the town was walled and the castle was a square tower. There were three bridges across the river, as well as two fords. Thus, the river would have presented no obstacle to the Anglo-Gascon army, just as the fortifications did not withstand the army’s assault.¹¹² However, the castle and town were spared from being burned because they belonged to the count of Foix’s lordship.¹¹³ Gaston Phoebus,

¹⁰⁹Hewitt, *The Black Prince’s Expedition*, 72.

¹¹⁰Baker, *Chronicon*, 239. “...et exercitus acceleravit ad hoc, quo princeps foret hospitatus in abbatia...”

¹¹¹Baker’s Ayollpuhbone has been identified as either Belpech or Pech-Luna. I have followed Hoskins here, who writes Belpech “is more likely” because of the terrain, the path of the forward march on Tuesday 17 November, and the consistency with Baker, who specifically mentions a castle outside the town. Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 87.

¹¹²Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 87–88.

¹¹³Baker, *Chronicon*, 239–40. “Die Lunae media custodia hospitabatur apud bonam villam vocatam Ayollpuhbone, diu defensam, sed conquistam per insultum; cujus castrum adextremum se reddidit, quibus princeps jussit nihil noceri per ignam, ratione comitis Fluxensis, cujus dominio pertinebant.”

the count of Foix, it should be remembered was a first cousin of Jean de Grailley, the captal de Buch, who was a key member of the Prince's staff. However, Belpech's lord did not owe his allegiance to the count of Foix but rather to the archbishop of Toulouse.¹¹⁴ Perhaps Baker meant the town and castle were under Foix's protection, as the count "was always ready to defend neighbors in return for a financial consideration..."¹¹⁵ Yet, why attack a town that belonged to Foix or was under his protection? Was the Prince demonstrating his army's abilities prior to his meeting with Foix?¹¹⁶

The Prince and the count of Foix met the next day, 17 November, at the large Cistercian Abbey of Burgbone/Boulbonne, five miles northwest of Ayollpuhbone/Belpech.¹¹⁷ To reach the Cistercian Abbey, the army had to cross the river Hers, probably "at the Gué de Mourgail, 150 yards upstream from the" confluence of the Hers and Vixiège, as the bridge was not built until the fifteenth century.¹¹⁸ One of Foix's ancestors founded the monastery in 1129, and the Abbey of Boubonne was the counts of Foix's spiritual home.¹¹⁹

Baker describes Foix as the "greatest magnate in all of Aquitaine," young (twenty-one), a prisoner of the French king for two years, and well pleased to meet the

¹¹⁴J. de Lahondès, *Belpech de Garnagois* (Toulouse, 1886), 1–7.

¹¹⁵Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 88.

¹¹⁶This is one of Hoskins' suggestions. Idem.

¹¹⁷Baker, *Chronicon*, 240.

¹¹⁸Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 88.

¹¹⁹Baker, *Chronicon*, 240. "...fundato per album comitis Fluxensis..."; Pierre Duffaut, *Histoire de Mazères, ville maîtress et capitale des Comtes de Foix* (Mazères, 1988), 120. In 1567 the abbey was burned during the Wars of Religion.

Prince. From this meeting onward he remained loyal to the Prince.¹²⁰ This, then, was a successful meeting for the Prince—let us remember one of his key stated aims was to secure allies—and demonstrated how the Prince could take advantage of the mis-steps of the French king in handling the count of Foix. It also *should have* demonstrated to the Prince—and undoubtedly did demonstrate to his staff—the importance of not alienating a magnate of Foix’s importance. At the very least, the Prince and his staff would have recognized the role of Jean II’s imprisonment of Foix, the struggle between Jean II and Gaston Phoebus over Béarn,¹²¹ and Jean II’s choice of Armagnac as his lieutenant in Languedoc in the count of Foix’s decision to meet with and ally himself with the Anglo-Gascons—“the enemy of my enemy” as it were.

In addition to his enjoyment of the meeting with the Prince and (presumably) his cousin, the captal de Buch—and whatever pleasure Gaston Phoebus may have derived from demonstrating his independence and displeasure to Jean II—, Foix presumably benefitted in more material ways. For example, his squire Richard received a gift of 9s and Bernard Dassatz, described as a swineherd (*porcarius*) of Foix’s, received a gift of 54s from the Prince.¹²² A more long-term benefit for Foix was that the Anglo-Gascon army refrained from burning, pillaging, and destroying his land.¹²³

Gaston Phoebus rode with the Anglo-Gascon forces for about fifteen miles of the

¹²⁰Baker, *Chronicon*, 240. “comes praefatus, major scilicet totius linguae Doxitanæ, obviavit cum magna laetitia domino principi, evasus de carcere coronati Francorum, in quo Parisiis jacuit duobus annis, et mansit ex tunc cum principe fidelis.”

¹²¹This was a dispute over homage similar to the dispute between Edward III and Jean II about Aquitaine.

¹²²DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 28–29 November.

¹²³Baker, *Chronicon*, 240.

remaining twenty miles of the day's march to Miremont (see Map 7). They rode through "Maselle/Mazères [a *bastide* town that was the count of Foix's main residence]¹²⁴ and Calmon/Calmont [four miles from Maselle/Mazères],¹²⁵ which were divided by a river. A ruined castle was on the far bank. The army left the large town of Seint Canele/Cintagabelle on the right..."¹²⁶ The army likely did not enter Calmon/Calmont, as the terrain was easier if they remained on the left bank of the Grand Hers river, the same bank upon which Maselle/Mazères stood. The count of Foix parted from the Prince's company just downstream from where the Grand Hers met the Ariège at Tramesaygues. The army marched a further two miles from the hamlet to Seint Canele/Cintegabelle (see Map 7), where the Prince's men camped that night.¹²⁷

Seint Canele/Cintegabelle did not belong to Foix¹²⁸ and was burned, as was Hautripe/Auterive. Baker describes Seint Canele/Cintegabelle as a "large town" (*magnam villam*) and Hautripe/Auterive as a "powerful castle" (*adrium castrum*), both "of which are French."¹²⁹ Baker's statement indicates that the army knew these two places were not Foix's. It is reasonable to suppose that the towns and lands belonging to Foix were discussed during his meeting with the Prince and provided information about

¹²⁴Roger Armengaud, *Boulbonne, le Saint Deni des Comtes de Foix* (Mazères, 1993), 165–71.

¹²⁵Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 89.

¹²⁶Baker, *Chronicon*, 240. "Illo die equitarunt in dominio illius comitis per villas de Maselle et Calmon, quam dividit aqua, ex cuius parte ulteriori fuit antiquitus castrum destructum, et dimiserunt a dextris magnam villam de Seint Canele..."

¹²⁷Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 89.

¹²⁸It had been part of Foix's lordship in the twelfth century but had become a royal domain in 1271; ergo, Foix would have had no interest in protecting the town and actually attacked it himself in 1359. See Roger Ycart, *Cintegabelle, Un village dans l'histoire* (Cintegabelle, 1998), 19–20, 69.

¹²⁹Baker, *Chronicon*, 240. "...quae sunt Gallicorum..."

the nearby places. Seint Canele/Cintegabelle would have been tempting, with a population of almost 1200 households¹³⁰ and wealth from its fairs and markets, which provided sufficient funds to pay for the maintenance of the bridge and fortifications.¹³¹ Baker writes that the army left Seint Canele/Cintegabelle and Hautripe/Auterive to their right, then “crossed the dangerous Ariège river, just as they had done previously” on 28 October.¹³²

Hoskins, though, has shown that Baker’s description does not match the geographic reality. Seint Canele/Cintegabelle and Hautrive/Auterive are on the right bank of the Ariège, a mile downstream from the convergence of the Grand Hers and Ariège. Thus, in order to march with the town and castle on the right, the army marching on the left bank of the river had to cross the Ariège *before* reaching Seint Canele/Cintegabelle, probably at the ford La Muraillette “one mile south of the confluence.” To attack the town, the army would have had to recross the Ariège and approach across a narrow bridge under the shadow of the castle Fort Montmerle; the town’s gate on the river was guarded by a drawbridge. Marching on the right bank, the same bank upon which Seint Canele/Cintegabelle stands, from Caumon/Caumont and approaching the town this way via the Porte Calmontaise would have been less difficult.¹³³ The castle put up significant resistance, but the town was sacked and the crops destroyed, presumably after the army resupplied itself. The destruction was

¹³⁰An enquiry in 1425 put the population at 1200 households.

¹³¹Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 89–90.

¹³²Baker, *Chronicon*, 240. “...dimiserunt a dextris...transierunt iterum aquam periculosam de Arage, sicut prius in die sanctorum Simonis et Judae.”

¹³³Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 90. This route follows the modern D35 from Caumont.

considerable, as many witnesses confirmed as part of an inquiry in 1423, including one witness who was over one hundred who claimed to have personally witnessed the Anglo-Gascon army's attack.¹³⁴

Seint Canele/Cintegabelle is five miles upstream from Hautrive/Auterive. The best march from Seint Canele/Cintegabelle was to leave the river to the right, given the steeply rising escarpment in places between the two towns. Some hills rose 300 feet above the river valley.¹³⁵ Baker mentions only the castle, but there was also a town. The larger, fortified part with an undefended suburb was on the right bank, and another, unfortified suburb on the left bank. The town was supposed to destroy the fortifications according to the 1229 Treaty of Paris; whether the town did or not in the thirteenth century, the town was fortified in 1355. There were also two monasteries outside the walls, which were 150 yards from the river, leaving the suburbs and religious houses exposed to attack with no need to assault the town or castle. Thus, the town and castle survived, but the monasteries and suburbs did not.¹³⁶ After destroying Hautrive/Auterive's suburbs, the army continued west, marching toward the Garonne and leaving Toulouse untouched twelve miles to the north. The army clearly had a good grasp of where they were. "The middle column spent the night at the large town of

¹³⁴C. Barrière-Flavy, *Cintegabelle au XV siècle*, 4–5, 7–9; Roger Armengaud, "Le Passage du Prince Noir," *La Croix du Midi*, 9 February 1967.

¹³⁵Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 91.

¹³⁶Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 92; Louis Latour, "Le grand pont romain d'Auterive," *Mémoires* 51 (1991); Louis Latour, "Le castrum d'Auterive: Ses origines, son histoire, ses fortifications," *Mémoires* 54 (1994).

Miremont.”¹³⁷

The next day, 18 November, the Anglo-Gascon army marched fourteen miles to Carbone/Carbonne (see Map 7) and, most significantly, re-crossed the Garonne, which was important both militarily and psychologically. Before leaving Miremont, the town and its castle were both burned.¹³⁸ The town covered seven acres within the 1.6-meter thick walls, had two suburbs and a windmill outside the walls. There was also a ditch that in places was filled with water. The motte and bailey castle had underground passages that led from the castle to the valley. The town also had three large underground grain silos, each able to hold eleven tons of wheat, as well as smaller individual silos in houses.¹³⁹ The Prince’s army would have searched for such hidden supplies and the loss of same would have been serious for the town. The Prince and his staff understood the implications well.

The march from Miremont began with a 400-foot climb out of the Ariège river valley, then a descent into and 300 foot climb out of the Lèze river valley. This climb culminated at Mounthaut/Montaut, a small village, which belonged to the count of Foix,¹⁴⁰ on the bluff above the Garonne.¹⁴¹ Baker describes the crossing of the Garonne as follows:

¹³⁷Baker, *Chronicon*, 240. “...et media custodia fuit hospitata in magna villa de Miremont...”

¹³⁸Baker, *Chronicon*, 240.

¹³⁹Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 92–93, based on interviews with Jean-Yves Canal and Francis Bop; on the silos, see also Catherine Poulain-Martel and Jean-Yves Cana, “Des silos médiévaux à Miremont,” *Gardarem Miremont*, Bulletin No. 4 (2002).

¹⁴⁰Baker, *Chronicon*, 241; Baker calls Mounthaut/Montaut a “castrum.” “Die Mercurii transierunt per castrum comitis Fluxensis, vocatum Mounthaut...”

¹⁴¹Baker, *Chronicon*, 241; Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 93.

At the foot of which [the bluff] the cavalry crossed the wide river Garonne in single file to the surprise of the country people. Throughout the year boats are kept here for people to cross, but these had been removed by men from Noé in order to hold up the army. When, by God's grace, they had crossed the Garonne, according to men captured afterwards in enemy castles, no-one was able to cross the river because of floods caused by days of rain [November rain is typical], so that their crossing was justly ascribed to the hand of God.¹⁴²

After crossing the river

Noé was taken by assault, and the castle surrendered; the rearguard spent the night in the latter. They left the Garonne to the left, and came to the town of Marquefave, which was marvelously [*mirabiliter*] captured. Then the centre crossed the said river yet again, to the amazement of the countrymen, to the strong town of Carbonne, defended on one side and the river on the other. It was taken by assault before the prince arrived, so that the victors were able to lodge there; the prince, as was his invariable custom, encamped outside.¹⁴³

¹⁴²Baker, *Chronicon*, 241. "...ad cuius pedem equites singuli successive, cum stupore illorum de patria, transierunt aquam magnam de Geroude, ubi continue per totum annum sunt navicellae paratae pro transitu indigenarum, quae tunc ad exercitus impedimentum per villanos vicinos de North fuerant subtractae. Aquam de Geroude cum gratia Dei pertansitam, relatione castellanorum nullus potuisset pertransivisse post inundationem louviae diurnae, unde ejus transitus Dei virtuti juste fuerat ascriptus." Barber, *Life and Campaigns*, 67.

¹⁴³Baker, *Chronicon*, 241. "Prefata villa de North fuerat per insultum conquisita, in cuius castro reddito retrocustodia pernoctavit. Ex tunc dimiserunt rivum de Geroude a sinistris, contra cuius cursum adiverunt villam de Markonaw, quae mirabiliter fuit conquisita: transivit enim iterum ibidem aquam praedicta cum admiratione villanorum media custodia, et tunc ad fortem villam de Carbone, muro ex una parte, et aqua ex alia bene munitam, tamen ante adventum principis per insultum conquisitam, ita quod hospitium

Even though the Garonne is not as wide here as at the initial crossing in October, this would still have been an impressive feat, especially given that at least some part of the Anglo-Gascony army recrossed it in order to take Carbonne.

While Baker states the cavalry forded the Garonne at Mounthaut/Montaut, the Prince tells the bishop of Winchester that the army “took our road to pass the Garonne at a town called Carbonne, at three leagues from Toulouse.”¹⁴⁴ What perhaps happened is this. The cavalry of the rearguard and center used the ford at North/Noé, took the town and effected the castle’s surrender, then left the rearguard at Noé while the center’s cavalry rode three miles upstream, recrossed the Garonne, and took the village of Markonaw/Marqufaw. After that, they continued upstream, recrossed the river at Carbonne, and took the town before the Prince, the infantry, the vanguard, and the baggage train arrived.¹⁴⁵

Baker’s emphasis on the grace of God and the amazement of the local populace suggests that the river was judged impassable.¹⁴⁶ Given the astonishment that the passage of mounted men caused, it is likely that the river *would* have been uncrossable for men on

praebuit victoribus, principe ad extra, ut ubique fere solebat, hospitato.” Barber, *Life and Campaigns*, 67.

¹⁴⁴Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 438. “...od nous preismes nostre chemyn a passer Gerounde a une vill appelle Carboun, a iij. Lieues de Tholouse...”

¹⁴⁵Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 94–97.

¹⁴⁶Baker’s use of the subjunctive (*potuissent pertransivisse post inundationem pluviae diurnae*) and the possible translations of *diurnae* (daily, of the day) does make the text somewhat ambiguous. Does he mean that the army had to cross before it would have been impossible due to the daily rain or that the army crossed after floods caused by daily rains should have made it impossible? For discussion of this issue, see Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 224–25, n. 32. See also De Santi, “L’expédition du Prince Noir en 1355, d’après le journal d’un de ses compagnons,” *Mémoires de l’Académie des Sciences, Inscriptions, et Belles-Lettres de Toulouse*, series 10 4 (1904): 181–223.

foot and carts. The army needed a bridge. The Prince and his staff would certainly have been aware of the conditions through their scouts and likely knew that the nearest bridge was at Carbonne, a bridge neither Baker nor the Prince mention.¹⁴⁷

The bridge at Carbonne appears in an account in which the town's residents abandoned the town, crossed the bridge with their families, and planned to defend the bridgehead against the Anglo-Gascon army.¹⁴⁸ If that was the case, the locals had not been paying attention to the events in Languedoc. As for the bridge itself, it was possibly Roman in origin or built in the mid thirteenth century and south of the town, where it allowed passage between Carbonne and the abbey of Bonnefont.¹⁴⁹ After the cavalry secured the bridge, the rest of the army, including the Prince, could cross the Garonne in safety.

Regardless of river conditions, the movement of the French forces would have added urgency to the army's need to cross the Garonne. The French had left Toulouse and by 19 November (the next day) were within six miles of the rearguard. Undoubtedly, the Prince and his staff were aware of these movements before 19 November. The tactics used—the cavalry crossing at Noé to provide a covering force and securing the bridge at Carbonne—would have ensured a safe crossing. The Garonne was the last significant obstacle facing the Anglo-Gascon force on the return march to Gascony—the army would be back in friendly territory within ten days—, and thus this crossing would have had a significant psychological impact, both for the Anglo-Gascon force and its pursuers.

¹⁴⁷Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 96.

¹⁴⁸Blaise Binet, *Mémoire de Blaise Binet* (1768), quoted in Henri Ménard, *Carbonne: Huit siècles d'histoire* (Saint-Girons, 1985), 36.

¹⁴⁹Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 96; see also Ménard, *Carbonne*, 142.

The army had already crossed the Garonne once during the campaign, which had amazed the local populace, and they had done so again. For a populace that had believed itself safe from attack east of the Garonne, an army that appeared able to cross the Garonne at will must have been a shock and must have seriously shaken their sense of security. The crossing of the Garonne, as well as the depredation that followed, sent a clear message to France that the English could strike into the heart of Languedoc and to the people of Languedoc that the power of France could not protect them from English attack.

Back in Friendly Territory

The next day, 19 November, the army and the very tired horses rested for the first time in nine days and 146 miles. Men and horses would have been in serious need of rest. The horses, for example, had been pushed three days past the recommended maximum of six days for the cavalry horses. The pack and carthorses had also been worked hard over the previous marches but it was unlikely that the horses had been seriously overworked, as a day's rest would have been insufficient rest. The horses would have needed a week's rest to recover from two to three days' overwork.¹⁵⁰ Thus, the rest would have been welcome "after the continuous exertions of the previous days." The weather was "calm and enjoyable" (*quieto et delectabili*).¹⁵¹ It is possible that the farriers took advantage of the rest and the weather to re-shoe horses as horseshoes needed replacing every six to eight

¹⁵⁰Professional Papers, No. 29. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. Fourth (Revised) Edition, with Addenda. Engineer Field Manual, Pts. 1–4. Prepared under direction of Brig. General A. MacKenzie, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1912. War Department Document 355, 438; War Department Cavalry Field Manual. Vol. III. Prepared under direction of Chief of Cavalry. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1938, 145.

¹⁵¹Baker, *Chronicon*, 241. "Die Jovis, tempore quieto et delectabili, quievit exercitus ad magnam recreationem post labores diebus pristinis continuatos."

weeks, especially considering the distance travelled and the resulting wear on the horseshoes.

It appears that the army truly rested after the crossing and did not engage in any major military operations. Defensive measures had to be taken, and the army was undoubtedly prepared for an engagement with the French, which were roughly six miles away.¹⁵² The Prince and his staff knew the French position. “Before midnight there came unto us [the Prince] news that the enemy with all their power, to wit, the count of Armagnac, the constable of France, the marshal Clermont, and the prince of Orange, together with many other great men of those parts, were come from Toulouse and were camped at two leagues distance from our rear guard; and there they [the French] lost some of their men and waggons at their camping. And upon this news we drew towards them...”¹⁵³ The Prince thus had detailed information upon which to base decisions.

To confirm the scouts’ reports, the Prince sent Bartholomew de Burghersh, John Chandos, James Audley, Baldwin Botour, Thomas Felton, and others “to the number of thirty lances, to certify to us of the certainty of the said enemy”¹⁵⁴ the next morning (20 November). They found a force of about

two hundred men of arms of their [the French] side, with whom they fought and

¹⁵²Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 98.

¹⁵³Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 438–39. “Devant la mynuyt nous vindrent novels qe les enemys od tut lor poair, cest assaver, le counte Derminak, le conestable de Fraunce, le marschal Clermound et le prince Dorenge, ensemblement od plusors aultres grauntz de ycelles parties, estoient venuz de Tholouse es se loggerent a ij. Lieues pres de nostre arrer gard, od ils perdrent de lour geantz et cariages sur lour loggier. Sur queles novels nous treismes devers eaux...”

¹⁵⁴Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 439. “...a la mountance de xxx. Gleyves, de noz certefier de certainete des dits enemis.”

took of them five and thirty men of arms. Upon which doings the enemy hasted sore afraid to their quarters, and held their road right to the cities of Lombez and Sauveterre, which towns were distant the one from the other only half an English league [1.5 miles]; and before them we encamped that same night so near to the enemy that we could see their fires in their quarters. But there was between them and us a great deep river, and on the night before our coming they broke down the bridges, so that we might not pass over until on the morrow we sent out people on before to remake the said bridges.¹⁵⁵

Baker provides a somewhat different account. Upon

learning that the French were nearby, grouped in five large battles, our men left their encampment and drew themselves up in battle order about a mile away.

When the army was drawn up someone hallooed at a hare; the enemy heard this and sent forty lances, who retreated in haste as soon as they saw the army drawn up in order, and the whole enemy army fled in confusion, so prisoners taken during the pursuit reported. That day Bartholomew Burghersh, John Chandos and James Audley, at the head of eighty lances, set out on a scouting mission and, reaching the tail of the French army, they captured thirty-two knights and squires,

¹⁵⁵Prince of Wales, "Letter to the bishop of Winchester," in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 439. "Les queux chivachoient devers eaux, tantqe ils vindrent a une ville ou ils troverent cc. homes darmes de lour, ou les queux ils avoient affaire et pristerount de eaux xxxv. hommes darmes. Sur quele busoigne les enemys se hastoient mult affraement a lour logge, et tindrent lour chemyn tut droit a les villes de Lombeys et Sauvetre, les queles villes nestoient lun del autre qe demy lieu Engleys; devaunt quels nous nous loggasmes mesme la nuyt si pres de eaux qe nous purrons veer lor feues en lor logges. Mes il y avoit entre eaux et nous une graunde profonde river, et de nuyt devaunt nostre venue ils ount debruse les pountz, si qe nous ne purrons passer tauntqe lendemayn qe nous mandasmes noz gentz devaunt pur refraire les dits pountz."

among them the lord of Romery; they also killed many carters and destroyed the enemy's provisions. In the evening the prince lodged at Mauvesin, and four French men at arms, taking refuge in the church there from the English, only lost their horses and armour.¹⁵⁶

The two armies most likely faced each other northwest of Carbonne, which would have been downstream from the town in the direction of Toulouse. The ground here is flat, and the French retreated northwest to Lombez, twenty miles away.¹⁵⁷

Despite the discrepancies of the Prince's and Baker's accounts, one thing is clear. The Anglo-Gascon army once again expected battle, and the French withdrew. Based on the Prince's account, Hoskins has identified the town where the advance party found 200 French men-at-arms as either Bérat or Longages, either of which would have been a strong position for the French.¹⁵⁸ It is unclear why the French would have abandoned such a position especially given their superior numbers—possibly three times as large as the Anglo-Gascon army—,¹⁵⁹ although it is in keeping with Armagnac's strategy of battle

¹⁵⁶Baker, *Chronicon*, 240. “Die Veneris certificato quod Gallici in acies quinque magnas fuerant divisi, progressi, de prope existentes, nostri ad spatium unius milliaris de hospicio seipso in campo apto ordinarunt ad proeliandum. Itaque exercitu ordinato, quidam suscitatum leporem exclamarunt, quod audientes inimici emiserunt 40 lanceatos, per quos viso exercitu ordinato reversosque celeriter haec nuntiantes, omnes fugerunt cum magno pavore, sicut retulerunt capti ex eis in persecutione. Illo die Bartholomaeus de Burghasche, Johannes Chandos, et Jacobus D'Andeleye, ad summam quater viginti lanceatorum ordinati discooperatores, accedentes ad caudam exercitus Galicorum, captivarunt triginta duos milites et domicellos, et inter eos dominum comitem de Romenie: item multos bigarios occiderunt, destruentes eorum victualia. Sero principe hospitato in villa de Muwos, quatuor Gallici armorum Anglicos fugitivi in ecclesiam illius villae, equos et arma duntaxat perdiderunt.”

¹⁵⁷Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 98–99.

¹⁵⁸Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 99.

¹⁵⁹Le Bel, *Chronique*, vol. 2, 222; Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 320, n. 174.

avoidance. Granted, Armagnac may have presented a different account to Jean II. The French king, understandably displeased, seems to have been under the impression that the Anglo-Gascon force had managed to avoid battle rather than that the French forces had retreated.¹⁶⁰

Another point of agreement between the two accounts is the number of prisoners taken: 32 (Baker) and 35 (Prince). The size of the scouting party, though, is different: 80 lances (Baker) and 30 (Prince). A party of thirty lances seems a bit small to take more than thirty prisoners, although there is no evidence other than Baker's account that the group numbered eighty lances. Thirty lances, of course, could be a group of more than one hundred men; likely, the number was between fifty and eighty men. Both accounts agree that the Anglo-Gascon army pursued the French.

Their pursuit took the army from Carbonne, but only after setting fire to the town, the archives, and the bridge.¹⁶¹ From Carbonne, the army left the Garonne river valley and marched nineteen miles to Muwos/Mauvezin (see Map 8), a town with a substantial church. The French were at Lombez and Sauveterre, six miles to the north. In order for

¹⁶⁰For Jean II's letter, see Delachenal, *Histoire de Charles V*, vol. 1, 130, n. 1. "...quod numerus gencium nostrorum in armis numerum hostium nostrorum ibidem multiper excedbat, nec poterant evadere sine bello."

¹⁶¹Jean II extended the town's privileges in August 1356 to assist with the rebuilding houses and the bridge. The town was so completely destroyed that the residents rebuilt on a new site, which was easier to fortify; the new walls were nearly twenty-three feet high and complete by 1362. Jean-Pierre Dehoey, "Carbonne sous l'Ancien Régime," in *Histoire et traditions carbonnaises*, vol. 4, 59–61; Ménard, *Carbonne: Huit siècles d'histoire*, 37–39, 142; Joseph Dedieu, *Histoire de Carbonne: Les institutions communales d'une bastide sous l'Ancien Régime* (Nîmes, 2004 [1953]), 33, 53; *Ordonnances des Roys de France de la Troisième Race*, vol. 382. See also Hoskins, *In Steps of the Black Prince*, 98–100, for his summary of the events at Carbonne and its rebuilding.

the Anglo-Gascon army to be able to see the French campfires, they had to be camped on the ridge two miles north of the town. This position would have provided them an unobstructed view of the Save river valley and the French camps.¹⁶²

Just as the Prince and his staff knew the French position, Armagnac and his staff also knew that the Anglo-Gascon army was in close pursuit. One option for delaying that chase was to destroy the bridges across the Save, which the Prince reports the French did.¹⁶³ The Prince sent men ahead to repair the bridges while the army continued the pursuit on 21 November. The fifteen-mile march along the Save's east bank to Oradrie/Auradé must have been difficult and muddy. The road was narrow and in poor condition, and it rained.¹⁶⁴

The next morning, 22 November, the army burned the castle (*castrum*) in which the Prince had slept the previous night, then moved west. First, they had to cross the Save. The most likely place to do so near Oradrie/Auradé is the ford northeast of Marestaing, although some part of the Anglo-Gascon army may have used the repaired bridges.¹⁶⁵ Thus far, the events of 22 November are clear. As for the rest of the day's march, part of the army engaged in combat with the enemy. The Prince writes only "the enemy drew to the town of Gimont, whither we came the day that they came; and, before that they could enter the said town, our people took and slew full plenty of them. And on

¹⁶²Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 101.

¹⁶³Prince of Wales, "Letter to the bishop of Winchester," in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 439.

¹⁶⁴Baker, *Chronicon*, 242. "Sabbato pluvioso carpserunt malum iter et strictum ad castrum de Oradrie, in quo princeps pernoctavit..."

¹⁶⁵Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 101, for the suggestion of the ford. For the ford and its use since ancient times, see Jean Castan, *Marestaing: Ancienne commanderie des Templiers* (Marestaing, 2005), 17–19.

that same night we camped before the said town...¹⁶⁶ Baker provides more description. He writes that the army made a long march, after which it was discovered “that the enemy were on the far side of a large hill, near and below the town of Gimont, so that the English, delayed until midnight, sent in the meanwhile sixty lances with some archers to the right, to the town of Aurimont, where they found four hundred men-at-arms of the constable of France’s company, and forced them to abandon the town, killing, and capturing some of them as they pursued them toward Gimont.”¹⁶⁷ The center camped uncomfortably at Auremont/Aurimont (see Map 8), the vanguard at Celymont/Selont about a mile from the enemy, and Baker does not specify where the rearguard camped.¹⁶⁸

The long march and delay Baker mentions make little sense given that the march from Muwoz/Mauvezin was only twenty miles, only twelve miles by the most direct route.¹⁶⁹ Even given the hilly terrain, the cavalry could have covered the distance in a

¹⁶⁶Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 439. “...lez enemys se treerent a la ville de Gymount, od nous venismes le jour qils y vindront; et, devaunt qils purroient entrer la dite ville, noz geantz pristrent et tuerent tut plain de lour. Et mesme cele nuyt nous loggeasmes devaunt la dite ville...”

¹⁶⁷Baker, *Chronicon*, 242–43. “...circa vesperum perceperunt quod hostes fuerunt ex altera parte grossi montis, juxta et infra villam de Gemount, ita quod Anglici tardati usque ad mediam noctem, emiserunt interim sexaginta lanceas cum sagittariis ad dexteram villae de Auremont, ubi inventos 440 viros armorum constabularii Francorum, compulerunt villam evacuare, quibusdam occisis et captis nonnullis in persequendo usque Gemont.” See also, Barber, *Life and Campaigns*, 68.

¹⁶⁸Baker, *Chronicon*, 243. “...ita quod media custodia apud Auremont hospitata non bene; prima custodia apud Celymont, parvam villam ab hostibus uno milliari distantem, pernoctavit.” Hoskins identifies Celymont as Selont, a small town about two miles from Aurimont. It is on high ground, which would fit Baker’s description of the Anglo-Gascon army’s position. Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 102.

¹⁶⁹Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 101–02.

matter of hours with no ill effects on the horses. Even at a walk (4 mph),¹⁷⁰ the distance of twelve miles could have been covered in 3–4 hours, even accounting for rests and the hills. The pack train could have easily managed twelve miles, and twenty would have certainly been within its capabilities.¹⁷¹ Even the carts travelling at 2.5 mph could have covered twelve miles in six hours without difficulty, twenty miles in nine hours accounting for rest periods.¹⁷² Why, then, was the army delayed until midnight? The direct route is also inconsistent with the locations of Gemont/Gimont and Auremont/Aurimont. Had the army approached Gemont/Gimont along the direct route, troops dispatched to Auremont/Aurimont would have been sent left, not right as Baker writes.¹⁷³

The discrepancies have been interpreted in different ways. Hewitt explains it thusly: The French “offered sufficient resistance to hold the English force at bay until midnight.” Meanwhile, some troops were sent upstream and took Auremont/Aurimont.¹⁷⁴ Rogers explains the delay as follows. The Anglo-Gascon army crossed the Save river, then marched southwest in the direction of Lombez and Sauveterre, where the most recent information placed the French army, only to learn that the French had withdrawn toward Gemont/Gimont. The Prince then sent out a scouting

¹⁷⁰War Department Cavalry Field Manual. Vol. III. Prepared under direction of Chief of Cavalry. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1938, 145.

¹⁷¹FM31–27, 1.4.

¹⁷²Professional Papers, No. 29. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. Fourth (Revised) Edition, with Addenda. Engineer Field Manual, Pts. 1–4. Prepared under direction of Brig. General A. MacKenzie, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1912. War Department Document 355, 437.

¹⁷³Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 102.

¹⁷⁴Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*, 67,

party and waited for confirmation before changing the line of march, upon receipt of which the army turned north.¹⁷⁵ Hoskins finds Rogers' interpretation more convincing, as the only way to reconcile Baker's account with Hewitt's explanation is if the army had already marched past Auremont/Aurimont, then turned back toward Gemont/Gimont. He also sees no reason for a French detachment at Auremont/Aurimont during a confrontation, or why the Prince would send soldiers there.¹⁷⁶

A third possible cause of the delay could have been the crossing of the Save. The Prince sent men ahead to repair the bridges on 21 November, so presumably the bridges had been fixed. Depending on how long it took the advance repair party to reach the bridges and how extensive the repairs were, there may still have been work to do the morning of 22 November, thus delaying the Prince. Also, it had been raining, which may have made the ford more difficult to use.

Once the Anglo-Gascon army crossed the river, the force initially advanced to the southwest, in the direction of Lombez and Sauveterre. Based on the information the Prince had about the position of the French forces, especially if the Prince was, indeed, seeking to bring Armagnac and the French army to battle, this direction is likely.

Battle was clearly expected on 23 November. "[T]he carters and officials were ordered to stay at Aurimont; the fighting men were drawn up in order and awaited the enemy in the open field but in vain."¹⁷⁷ The Prince and his army "abode there [Aurimont]

¹⁷⁵Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 321, n. 179.

¹⁷⁶Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 102.

¹⁷⁷Baker, *Chronicon*, 243. "...jussis bigariis et officiariis remanere in villa de Aruemont, caeteri pugnantes in cohortes divisi hostes in campo expectarunt, sed incassum, nempe..."

on the morrow the whole day, thinking to have had battle. And the same day we stood in arms, with all our battles, in the fields before sunrise; where there came unto us the news that before daylight the greater part of their host had gone away...¹⁷⁸ Once again, the French, despite their superior numbers, had retreated rather than face the Anglo-Gascon army in battle. This action is consistent with Armagnac's actions throughout the campaign. Although it has been suggested that Armagnac's army suffered from a series of defections,¹⁷⁹ Armagnac, not to mention the marshal Clermont and the Constable Bourbon, undoubtedly weighed the risks and rewards of an engagement at this point, i.e., the Anglo-Gascon army was clearly heading back to Bordeaux. Perhaps, as Hoskins suggests, Armagnac lacked confidence in his ability to defeat the Prince's army in a battle.¹⁸⁰ However historians have interpreted Armagnac's actions, Baker leaves little doubt as to his opinion: "...they fled from their adversary (the English) out of sheer terror, when the latter had sought them for a long while, after long and bad marches, and had several times found them nearby."¹⁸¹

Based on the Prince's account, though, the entire army had not fled. "The leaders remained in quiet in the said town [Gemont/Gimont], which was great and strong to hold

¹⁷⁸Prince of Wales, "Letter to the bishop of Winchester," in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 439. "...et demurrasmes illeesqes lendemeyne tut le jour, entendantz daver eu la bataille. Et le dit jour, estoions armes, od toutz nous batailles, es champs devaunt le solail leant; ou nous vindrent novels qe devaunt jour la plus graunt partie de lor host estoient departiez..."

¹⁷⁹Breuil, "Jean 1er, Comte d'Armagnac," 58.

¹⁸⁰Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 103.

¹⁸¹Baker, *Chronicon*, 243. "...ita quod respectione armorum fuerant disconfecti, praesertim quum sui adversarii, scilicet Anglici, ipsos per itinera longa et mala diu quaesitos et pluries e vicino pertos solo terrore profectus fugaverint." See also, Barber, *Life and Campaigns*, 68.

against much people.”¹⁸² The Prince had a choice: attack Gemont/Gimont or leave the French commanders at his rear and return to Gascony. This would have been a central issue when the Anglo-Gascon army returned to camp “and took counsel what were best for us to do. And, forasmuch as we perceived that they would not have fighting, it was agreed that we ought to draw toward our marches...”¹⁸³ The command staff would have weighed the likelihood of taking Gemont/Gimont.

Gemont/Gimont was a *bastide* town. The Cistercians founded it in 1265, and it had ditches and walls, as well a perimeter road outside of the walls.¹⁸⁴ Clearly, it was strong and well-fortified and could have withstood an assault. Given the lateness of the season and the proximity of the French forces, a siege would have been unadvisable even if the army had siege equipment. The Prince’s staff would have also considered Armagnac’s past actions and the probability of French pursuit. Concluding that the French might pursue and harry the army but not force them to a pitched battle was reasonable. Leaving the French at Gemont/Gimont was a calculated risk, but all things considered heading back to Gascony was probably the safest decision.

The final push toward Gascony began with a fourteen-mile march from Auremont/Aurimont to Montaut-les-Crénaux, (see Map 8) a small *castelnau* village. The march was long, in terms of time more so than distance, through hilly country; roads

¹⁸²Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 439. “...meas lez cheventeynes demurrerent en pees en la dite ville, qestoit graund et forte pur tenir encontre multz des geantz.”

¹⁸³Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 439. “Et apres celles novels nous retournasmes a noz logges, et preismes conseil qe mieltz nous serroit affeare. Sur qoi nous nentendismes pas qils vorront aver le bataille, accordeux estoit qe nous nous deveroms trere devers noz marches...”

¹⁸⁴Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 103.

were narrow and winding; there was very little water despite the previous rainfall.¹⁸⁵ The route crossed two rivers; the river Gimone at the beginning of the march and the river Arrats, also early in the day. After the Arrats there were no rivers or other bodies of water along the line of march.¹⁸⁶ Supposedly the waterless conditions prompted the army to give the horses wine to drink, on account of which “the following day they were drunk, and could not keep a steady footing, with the result that many horses were lost.”¹⁸⁷

While it is doubtful that the horses were drunk, it is possible—if the horses were, indeed, given wine—that the wine did have a deleterious affect. The precise impact of the wine on the horses is unknown. Given the sensitivity of horses’ gastro-intestinal tracts, it is certainly possible that the wine affected the horses adversely. A horse accidentally given 2L of isopropyl alcohol showed signs of disorientation, depression, and a reluctance to move. The horse then collapsed and fell into a semi-comatose state. After an initial recovery, the horse’s condition worsened and it showed signs of colic.¹⁸⁸ Given that description, it is possible that Baker’s account is not impossible. There are may also be other causes of equine death related to but not caused by the wine itself. If the march were waterless, dehydration would have been a factor, particularly as it may not have been possible to get the horses to drink enough wine to relieve dehydration. It could have caused losses. Dehydration can cause impactions, the pain of which may lead to the

¹⁸⁵Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 103.

¹⁸⁶Topographical map, Pau-Toulouse.

¹⁸⁷Baker, *Chronicon*, 243. “...quod defectu aquarum potarunt equos vinum, unde in crastino debriati non poterant recto passu incedere, et multi ex eis perierunt.” See also Barber, *Life and Campaigns*, 68–69.

¹⁸⁸Bruce A. Somerville and Konnie H. Plumlee, “Acute isopropyl alcohol intoxication in a horse,” Brief Communications/Communications Brèves, *Canadian Veterinary Journal* 37 (June, 1996): 359–60.

horses lying down, rolling, kicking at their bellies, all of which would fit Baker's description of the horses' actions. Intestinal spasms resulting from dehydration could also lead to displaced and twisted intestines, which can cause death. Dehydration could potentially lead to renal failure, which would cause the wine's effects to be more severe.¹⁸⁹

This was not the first time the horses had been given wine to drink due to a shortage of water—it had occurred on 11 November, also with the loss of horses—, which indicates that the army was not transporting water, or not enough of it to meet the horses' needs. Additionally, any problems caused by the first waterless march, e.g., impactions, would have been exacerbated by this second march. While the route of 11 November truly was waterless, on 23 November the Anglo-Gascon army camped on an open plain only four miles from the river Gers. Scouts certainly would have found the river, yet the army did not push on toward it. Given the shorter days and the hilly terrain, it may very well have been too dark to press forward without significant risks to the horses and the baggage train, which would also have been exposed to French harrying.¹⁹⁰

The first order of business on 25 November would have been reaching water. It would have been essential to water the horses after the first hour of march,¹⁹¹ since it is unlikely that the army gave the horses more wine in the morning when the Gers was so

¹⁸⁹Correspondence with Dr. Erin Malone, University of Minnesota Veterinary College, 9 January 2014.

¹⁹⁰Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 103. For the risks of harrying, see Harari, "Supply and Strategy," *passim*.

¹⁹¹Professional Papers, No. 29. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. Fourth (Revised) Edition, with Addenda. Engineer Field Manual, Pts. 1–4. Prepared under direction of Brig. General A. MacKenzie, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1912. War Department Document 355, 431–32.

close. The four-mile march to the Gers could have been accomplished in an hour's time. After crossing the river, the Anglo-Gascon force marched along a broad front, "where they expected to meet the enemy."¹⁹² The French army did not offer battle. The Anglo-Gascons marched onward, "leaving the walled town of Florenciae/Fleurance, which had once been English, to the right."¹⁹³ Their route took them through Silarde, described as a "large town" (*grandem villam*) and ended, at least for the Prince's division, at Realmont/Réjaumont, "ten miles southwest of Fleurance."¹⁹⁴ Hoskins identifies Silarde as St-Lary near Ste-Radegund, about three miles west of Fleurance.¹⁹⁵

Realmont/Réjaumont (see Map 8), where the Prince and his division spent the night of 25 November, resisted and was taken by assault and burned.¹⁹⁶ It was a sizeable fortified town with a castle. While the town had been both French and English at various points, in 1355 it was under French jurisdiction.¹⁹⁷ The army halted there on 26 November. During the day of rest "a wandering [French] man-at-arms was captured." His intelligence must have been welcome to the Prince and his staff. He reported "that a great quarrel had sprung up between the constable of France and the count of Armagnac because the count had promised to fight a battle for them, but had done nothing. They [the French forces] had dishonorably fled many times." The man-at-arms added "that the

¹⁹²Baker, *Chronicon*, 243. "...cum districtione magna praeterierunt aquam, ubi sperabant inimicis obviare..."

¹⁹³Baker, *Chronicon*, 243. "...et dimittentes a dextris villam Florenciae muratam, aliquando Anglicam..."

¹⁹⁴Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 103.

¹⁹⁵Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 103–05.

¹⁹⁶Baker, *Chronicon*, 243.

¹⁹⁷Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 105. There is also debate about whether the French or English founded the town, and Bentley, *Fort Towns of France*, 196, argues that the Cistercians founded it.

count was blamed for this.”¹⁹⁸ This dissension between the two French commanders is plausible, especially in light of Jean II’s later dissatisfaction.¹⁹⁹ The Prince had already decided to return to Gascony, but this information would have confirmed the choice. The French clearly had no intention of offering battle. The disagreement among the commanders also lessened the likelihood of co-ordinated pursuit and harrying.

The order of march on 27 November suggests that the Prince was not overly concerned about a French attack. The terrain was similar to the previous few days—gentle hills and rivers, most running north to south—and the twenty-mile march would have been easily accomplished. Even crossing the Baïse river, which Baker describes as “a great river,” would have caused little delay. The army “crossed in scattered groups,” then “marched for the rest of the day between walled towns and strong castles,”²⁰⁰ such as Valence-sur-Baïse. Despite tempting targets, such as the abbey of Floran, there is no evidence that the army attacked or pillaged further, or at least nothing Baker deemed noteworthy.

The Prince’s division camped at le Serde (see Map 9).²⁰¹ This has been identified as Lagardère (Hoskins, Hewitt, Thompson), Lasserre (Rogers), and La Ressingle (De

¹⁹⁸Baker, *Chronicon*, 243–44. “.et captus errantius armorum, retulit quod inter constabularium Francorum et comitem Aminiencensem lis non modica fuit exorta, pro eo quod comite promittente bellum ad illorum utilitatem ineundum, nihilo facto cum dedecore pluries fugerunt, quod eidem comiti fuit imputatum.”

¹⁹⁹Delachanel, vol. 1, 130, n.1.

²⁰⁰Baker, *Chronicon*, 244. “. . . transierunt, sed districte, magnam aquam, et residuo diei inter villas muratas et castra fortia. . .” See also, Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 105, for his description of the terrain.

²⁰¹Baker, *Chronicon*, 244.

Santi).²⁰² Baker describes le Serde as being one league (3 miles) from Condone/Condom and as having been destroyed by Lancaster (during his 1349 *chevauchée*). Neither Lagardère nor Lasserre are within a league of Condone/Condom. La Ressingle fits the geographic description, is twenty miles from Realmont/Réjaumont and ten miles from Meysin/Mézin, and has the army crossing the Baïse near Valance-sur-Baïse; however, its walls are still intact and the town supposedly escaped destruction during the Hundred Years War, which does not fit Baker's description. Lasserre makes little sense: The army would have a twenty-five mile march on 27 November, then a ten mile march the next day. The route also would not require the army to cross the Baïse river, which would not fit with Baker's account. Lagardère would be a fourteen-mile march on 27 November, followed by eighteen miles the next day. That would be a more reasonable division of the march, especially considering the decreasing hours of daylight.²⁰³

La Ressingle, however, seems the most likely choice, despite its supposed escape from destruction.²⁰⁴ A twenty-mile march was within the capabilities of the army. Part of the march would have been conducted in darkness for the baggage train, although it is possible that the baggage caught up to the main army the following day at Meysin/Mézin. Aside from Laressingle's position on the route, the army could have marched north along the Auloue river valley, would have had an easier crossing at Valance-sur-Baïse (see Cassini map), and would have only needed to make one river crossing. The route to

²⁰²Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 106; Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*, 51; Thompson, ed., *Chronicon Galfridi le Baker*, 296; Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 322, n. 184; De Santi, "L'expédition de Prince Noir," 31. Barber opts for Lasserre in *Life and Campaigns*, 69, and Lagardère in *Edward, Prince of Wales and Aquitaine*, 118.

²⁰³Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 106, for the distances.

²⁰⁴The source for this is a tourist guide, *Laressingle en Condomois*.

Lagardère would have entailed two river crossings, the Baïse and the Auloue.

The army reached Meysin/Mézin (see Map 9) on 28 November after an easy march of ten miles. They crossed the Osse in groups—one likely crossing point was the Pont d'Artigues, which was only a mile southwest from Leressingle and on the route to Santiago de Compostela—, then they “entered a narrow forest road.” At this juncture many of the Gascons and all of the Béarnaise troops departed, having been given leave to return to their homes. The banners were furled.²⁰⁵ The army had entered the lands of Albret, who served with the Prince’s army and whose family had a long history of loyalty to England. Meysin/Mézin “was always English” and very involved in the Anglo-Gascon wine trade.²⁰⁶

The army rested the next day (29 November) at Meysin/Mézin, perhaps to give the baggage train time to catch up to the army. The Prince “received the homage and oaths of the town’s residents.”²⁰⁷ Henxteworth finally had the opportunity to bring his accounts up to date, and supplies were purchased. Oats, hay, and vetch were purchased on 28 November; wheat, firewood, fish, and salt on 29 November. Advance wages were again paid, as were reparations: 18s to Gerard de Rynaly in recompense for the burning of his house.²⁰⁸ The army had entered friendly territory, and the resumption of account keeping confirms that. The absence of accounts from the time the army left Narbonne until it reached Meysin/Mézin further indicates the pace at which the army was moving. On the outward advance Henxteworth kept regular accounts, but on the return he did not,

²⁰⁵Baker, *Chronicon*, 244.

²⁰⁶Baker, *Chronicon*, 244. “...quae semper fuit Anglicorum...”

²⁰⁷Baker, *Chronicon*, 244. “...recepturus homagium et sacramenta illorum de villa.”

²⁰⁸DCO, Henxteworth accounts, accounts for 28 and 29 November 1355.

which suggests he may not have had the opportunity to do so. The longer marches during the day likely would have left him little time to balance the accounts in the evening.

The army left Meysin/Mézin on 30 November and marched twenty-two miles through the Landes to Gelons/Casteljaloux (see Map 9), which had three castles.²⁰⁹ It was a large town with paper and glass industries.²¹⁰ On 1 December the Prince's division marched fifteen miles to Melan/Meilhan-sur-Garonne (see Map 9), while other parts of the army marched an additional six miles “through desolate forest next to the Cistercian monastery of Montguilliam, and crossed the English royal forest of Boismajour” to La Réole (see Map 9), “which the earl of Derby [duke of Lancaster] had captured in the past.”²¹¹ The march took the army up onto a ridge between the Landes and the Garonne river valley and past several small villages in French hands on the Garonne's western bank, which the army did not attempt to take at this time—that would wait until early 1356.²¹² From the ridge, the route descends to the Garonne's flood plain. The town, itself, is 150 feet above the river, had been English, fallen into French hands, and re-taken by Lancaster in 1349.²¹³

La Réole had also been re-taken by Lancaster with the help of its residents, who

²⁰⁹Baker, *Chronicon*, 244.

²¹⁰J. Queyrou, *Casteljaloux et sa région* (Casteljaloux, 1982), 4 and 8.

²¹¹Baker, *Chronicon*, 244–45. “...transierunt patriam silvestrem et vastam juxta monasterium Cisterciense vocatum Montguilliam, et trans forestam regis Angliae nuncupatam Bois majour, ad villam de Regula grandem et bene munitam, quam comes Derby dudum conquisivit...”

²¹²Rogers, *War Cruel and Sharp*, 326–27.

²¹³*Oeuvres*, vol. 4, 278–79; Henri Ribadieu, *Les campagnes du Comte Derby en Guyenne* (Pau, 2006), 41.

understood that the association with the English benefited them.²¹⁴ After the final march of six miles, the Prince and his troops reached the town and entered through its gates. They remained there until 5 December, passed that night at St-Macaire—the advance supply depot—, and were back in Bordeaux by 9 December, which is when Henxteworth’s accounts resume in Bordeaux. Clearly, the Prince and his army covered the approximately thirty miles at a leisurely pace.²¹⁵

At St-Macaire the army began the process of standing down and preparing for the winter. Supplies were purchased and transported, along with the Prince’s harness, back to Bordeaux, much of it via river transport.²¹⁶ In Bordeaux, the army took stock of its accomplishments, settled in for the winter, and prepared for the 1356 campaign season. In a council at La Réole it had been determined “that the magnates and barons should spend the winter at different places on the border, to protect the Gascon lands from the inroads of the French.”²¹⁷ The Prince and his command staff understood what they had accomplished during their two-month campaign and clearly meant to hold on to their gains and to maintain English authority along the marches.

The return to Bordeaux continued the pattern of the initial advance to Narbonne: destroying infrastructure, burning, pillaging. The Anglo-Gascon army effectively demonstrated that even the presence of a numerically superior French force—led by Armagnac and the Marshal de Clermont—could neither prevent the depredations nor

²¹⁴Sumption, *Trial by Battle*, 474–45; Fowler, *The King’s Lieutenant*, 62.

²¹⁵DCO, Henxteworth accounts, account for 9 December.

²¹⁶DCO, Henxteworth accounts, account for 5 December 1355.

²¹⁷Baker, *Chronicon*, 245. “In Regula concilio principis consulto, ordinati fuerunt principes et barones ad hiemandum in distinctis locis super Marchiam, partiam intrinseam Gasconiae contra versutias Gallicorum protecturi...”

protect the populace. The Prince's army wrought considerable destruction, and despite the sometimes arduous conditions and the loss of many horses, the army returned safely to Bordeaux. The Prince may have failed to bring Armagnac to battle. Even so, he judged his first solo command a success and looked to the future. The subject of the next chapter, then, is the contemporary assessment of the campaign and the Prince's future plans for his tenure as the King's lieutenant in Gascony.

Chapter Seven: After the Campaign

Between the conclusion of the 1355 raid (2 December 1355) and the beginning of the Poitiers campaign (4 August 1356), the Prince's army went to winter quarters and the business of repairs and resupply began. The first task was to establish winter quarters, which would be used to protect the marches from the French and to serve as bases for small-scale winter operations. The second task was taking care of "paperwork" and administrative tasks. This involved payment of advance wages, re-imburements for a number of items, shoeing horses, making repairs, and determining what supplies were needed from England. Thirdly, then, resupply was a critical activity during the months between the conclusion of the 1355 campaign and the start of the 1356 campaign. Finally, the Prince reported the success of the former in a letter to the bishop of Winchester, the head of his council in England. John de Wengefeld also wrote to the bishop. The Prince waited to write his letter until 25 December, after the army was established in their winter encampments and the supply needs had been determined. Richard de Stafford, a key member of the Prince's household and often charged with specific missions, carried the letters to England—he left after 25 December and arrived sometime after 6 January 1356¹—and oversaw the resupply mission.

Wengefeld and, one assumes, the Prince's staff thought the war in Gascony could be continued. He wrote in his letter to the bishop of Winchester, "[a]nd, by the help of God, if my lord had wherewithal to maintain this war and to do the king's profit and his

¹Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 432, 437.

own honour, he would easily enlarge the marches and would win many places; for our enemies are sore astonished.”² At the time Wengefeld wrote to the bishop it was clear that the Prince and the earls had already taken steps to guard the marches and further the war: “And at the writing hereof my lord hath ordained to send all the earls and all the bannerets to abide in certain places on the marches, in order to make raids and harass his enemies.”³ Thus, in Wengefeld’s assessment, the Prince’s forces could—and should?—take advantage of the momentum of the fall *chevauchée* and pressure the count of Armagnac and expand the frontiers of the duchy. Moreover, he makes it clear that the Prince and his staff had already taken steps to do so.

Winter Quarters and Interim Operations

The weather in late December and into January was cold and damp.⁴ The Prince and his commanders set up winter quarters in various locations. The Prince himself established his headquarters at Libourne. There he “watcheth for news which he ought to have there, and, according to the news that he shall have, he will dispose himself as seemeth best for

²John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 445. “Et, par laide de Dieu, si mounseignur eust de qoi maintenir ceste guerre et de faire le profit le roy et son honur, il enlargisseroit bein lez marches etgaigneroit plusors lieus; car noz enemys sount mult estonez.”

³John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 445. “Et a fesaunce du cestes monseignur avoit ordeyne de maunder toutes lez countes et totes les banertz a demeorer a diverses lieus sur les marches, pur feare chicaches et grever ses enemys.”

⁴Current winters are chilly, damp, and rainy. Due to the Little Ice Age, the winter was colder than at present. Bordeaux was probably inland far enough to escape the worst of any Atlantic storms during the winter. For discussion of the climate, see Brian M. Fagan, *The Little Ice Age: how climate made history* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 49, 66.

his honour.”⁵ Given that the earls, certain Gascon lords, and others were raiding in the early weeks of 1356, the news the Prince awaited likely involved the results of those raids. He may also have been awaiting information from England as to the upcoming campaign. Edward III planned (again) a tri-partite campaign: The Prince should attack from Gascony, Lancaster in Normandy, and the King in Brittany. Wengefeld remained in Libourne with the Prince, as did Bernard Ezii, lord of Albret—a key Gascon member of the Prince’s staff with long-standing ties to England. The lord of Pommiers was a league (three miles) away at Fronsac. Those of the Prince’s retinue who were not participating on raids were stationed at Libourne and Saint-Emilion.⁶

Given the plans for the 1356 campaigns, loose as those plans must have been in January, the Prince needed to secure the duchy and firmly establish an English presence along the Gascon Marches. While the Prince remained at Libourne, he delegated the tasks to his subordinates. The earls, Chandos, Audley, the Captal de Buch, and others launched several small raids that solidified England’s hold on the marches and strengthened the security of Gascony. The Gascons, particularly those who had long-standing ties to England, also participated in the raids. The Prince and John de Wengefeld received reports of their activities, and the latter wrote to Richard de Stafford in England on 22 January 1356 and provided him with the details, as well as instructions to pass along the intelligence to the relevant parties, e.g., the Prince’s council in England

⁵John de Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 449. “Et mounseignur gaite novells le quels y deyt aver, et, solonc lez novels qil avera, il se tretera od il semble qe mieltz soit pur son honur.”

⁶John de Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 449.

and the King.⁷

As of 22 January 1356, the Anglo-Gascon forces had enjoyed a good deal of success. Five walled towns—“Port-Sainte-Marie, Clairac, Tonneins, Bourg-Saint-Pierre, Castelsagrat, and Brassac”—and seventeen castles had surrendered.⁸ John Chandos, James Audley, Baldwin Botetort, and Reginald de Cobham raided 100 miles upstream along the Garonne⁹ and “took the said town...Castelsagrat by assault, and the bastard of l’Isle, who was captain of the said town, was slain, as they were assaulting and was stricken with an arrow through the head.”¹⁰ Cobham returned to “Landedac” and Botetort returned to Brassac, while Chandos and Audley remained in Castelsgarat, presumably to secure it.¹¹

Wengefeld’s letter to de Stafford is quite friendly and familiar. He assures de Stafford that his men, who were with Chandos and Audley, were well and in Castelsgarat with “more than three hundred men-at-arms and three hundred foot soldiers and one hundred and fifty archers.”¹² Wengefeld continues: “[They] have enough of victuals between this [22 January] and St. John’s day [24 June], save fresh fish and greens, as

⁷John de Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 449.

⁸John de Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 448.

⁹Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 118.

¹⁰John de Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 448. “...pristrent la dite ville qad a noun Chastel Satrat par assaunt, et le bastard de Lyle, qe feust capitan de la dite ville, feust tue, auxi come ils assaillerent, qe feust ferru od une saete parmy la teste.”

¹¹John de Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 448.

¹²John de Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 448. “Et sount en celle ville plus qe ccc. Gleyves et de ccc. servauntz et cl. archiers.”

they have sent us word by their letters. Wherefore you need not concern yourself about your good folk.”¹³ From their new base at Castelsgarat, Chandos, Audley, and their men raided the area around Agen, burning mills and bridges. According to Wengefeld’s intelligence, the count of Armagnac and the seneschal of Agenais were both in Agen, but “would not once put out their heads, nor any of their men.”¹⁴ If Agen was as well supplied as Castelsgarat, the count and the seneschal had no reason to fight or venture without the walls. They were secure for the winter and clearly had no intention of risking a loss in battle or losing the town. Presumably, they would have mounted a defense in the event of an assault on the town walls. The presence of lord Boucicaut, lord Ernard of Spain [Despaigne is what Wengefeld writes in the letter], and Grismouton of Chambly, and their three hundred men-at-arms and three hundred Lombard mercenaries at Moissac, three miles from Castelsagrat, likely also influenced Armagnac’s decision to remain safely behind the walls of Agen. Despite the presence of the Anglo-Gascons, Armagnac did manage to leave Agen. As of 22 January, the date of the letter, Wengefeld reported that Armagnac was in Avignon, as was the king of Aragon.¹⁵

Suffolk, Oxford, and Salisbury also contributed to the security of the duchy, raiding as far as Rocamadour more than 100 miles along the lower course of the

¹³John de Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 448. “...et ount assetz de toutes maners vivres entre cy et le Seint Johan, si ne soit de pessoun fres et chowes, com nous ount mande par lour lettres. Sur quey y ne coent pas qe vous pensez de voz bones geantz.”

¹⁴John de Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 448. “Et mounsire Johan Dermynak et le seneschal Dagenoys, gestoient en la ville Dagate, ne voillent une foitz butere hors lour teste ne nules de lor geantz...”

¹⁵John de Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 449.

Dordogne. As of 22 January they had been raiding twelve days and had not yet returned. Like Chandos and Audley, they, too, had Gascons in their company, including the lords of Mussidan and Pommiers. Their company was of similar size, too: “more than five hundred men-at-arms, and two hundred soldiers and three hundred archers.”¹⁶ Warwick had been present at Clairac and Tonneins on the Lot and Garonne, and was presently raiding around Marmand with the express purpose of “destroy[ing] their victuals and all other things of theirs that he can destroy.”¹⁷ Later that spring, some time after April, Warwick took the walled town of Mirabeau in Quercy, as well as its strong castle.¹⁸

As for the other members of the command staff entrusted with winter operations, they were disposed as follows: Bartholomew de Burghersh and 120 men-at-arms and 120 archers were at Cognac; de Buch, the lord of Montferrand, and the lord of Curton, along with three hundred lances and 120 archers and some troops drawn from the garrisons at Taillebourg, Rochefort, and Tonnay.¹⁹ It is likely they took supplies from these towns, too. Per the Prince’s indenture with the King, Edward III was responsible for victualling these towns and their garrisons.²⁰ De Buch and his men raided north toward Saintonge. Reginald de Cobham, members of the Prince’s household, and “the Gascons which are in their company” had ridden out to join Suffolk, Salisbury, and Oxford along the

¹⁶John de Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 449. “...qe sont bien plus qe D. gleyves, et cc. servauntz et ccc. archiers...”

¹⁷John de Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 449. “...et est a fesaunce du cestes devers Mermande, pur destruire lours vives et tout aultre chose qil purra destruire de eaux.”

¹⁸Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 450.

¹⁹These three towns may have provided victuals. Per the Prince’s indenture with Edward III, the King was responsible for supplying these towns with victuals. For the garrisons, see DCO, Henxtewort, throughout.

²⁰TNA, E 36/278, f. 88; BPR, IV, 144.

Dordogne.²¹ De Buch, as part of his winter activities, garrisoned several towns in Saintonge. During his raid, his troops took Périgueux's *cité* by escalade, then turned it over to Auger de Montaut, lord of Mussidan.²² Later in the spring, an Anglo-Gascon force, possibly under the Prince's direct command, took Le Mas, which was situated on the Gironde.²³

During these operations the Prince was in contact with his captains. In addition to his letters to Richard De Stafford and the bishop of Winchester, the Prince sent letters (no longer extant) to the earl of Warwick on 7 January 1356, while the latter was campaigning along the Garonne, and to the earls of Oxford and Suffolk at Bergerac on 10 January 1356.²⁴ These letters possibly contained instructions for the earls as contrasted to the letter-report the Prince sent to the bishop of Winchester in England. The Prince also received communiqués from his captains. Both the captal de Buch and the lord of Montferrand sent messengers and New Year's gifts.²⁵

The Prince's captains were clearly busy on his behalf, and it is apparent that he trusted his subordinates to carry out their pre-assigned missions. Given their success in securing the borders and the gains the Anglo-Gascon army had made and extending the frontiers of Gascony, he was right to do so. Edward III had chosen well when he selected the men who would accompany the Prince to Gascony. In addition to making militarily

²¹John de Wengefeld, "Letter to Richard Destafford," in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 448–49.

²²Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 456–57; Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 118; Sumption, *Trial by Fire*, 192; DCO, Henxteworth accounts; Villepelet, 233.

²³Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 450. "Item, villa quadam, vocata la Masse, situata juxta flumen de Gerounde, reddita fuit dominoi principi Walliae."

²⁴DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 7 and 10 January 1356.

²⁵DCO, Henxteworth accounts, account for 30 December 1355.

secure the lands gained in war, these operations not only established the foundation for the campaigns of 1356 but also had important political ramifications.

Homages

On 24 April, the Prince received the oaths of several Gascon lords who returned to their allegiance to Edward III. These included Guiscard lord of Camound (Caumont), Jean le Galard lord of Leymulle (Limeuil)—his lands were confiscated by the French king in 1357 and given to Jean la Maingre²⁶—, Gaillard Durfort lord of Greynoles (Grignols), and lord Bertrand Dureford, among others. In addition to their submissions, the Prince also accepted the surrender of “30 castles, walled towns, and small fortresses.”²⁷ In some cases, it appears that financial motives also were involved, as Henxteworth records a number of instances in which a Gascon submitted to the Prince for a monetary inducement.²⁸ Stretle’s accounts reveal additional payments for losses resulting from continued service to Edward III and expenses tied to leading others “to the king’s obedience.”²⁹

Winter Supplies

Given that the Prince and the troops under his personal command remained relatively stationary throughout the winter, supplies had to be transported from the countryside to the winter quarters. One key item was fuel, which was transported from Langon and St.

²⁶Dossat, *Le Languedoc dans le Trésor des Chartes*, item 1776.

²⁷Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 449–50. “...in Vasconia venerunt ad ligeanciam regis Angliae dominus de Camound, dominus Johannes Callard, dominus de Leymulle, dominus Gaillardus Durfort, dominus de Greynoles, et dominus Bertrandus Dureford, cum xxx castris, villis clausis, et fortaleciis.” See also Moissant, 47–48.

²⁸DCO, Henxteworth accounts, 101, 109. “causa adventus sui ad obedientiam domini Regis Anglie.”

²⁹TNA, Pipe Roll, Edward III 36, m. xv.

Macaire via the Garonne.³⁰ Food, obviously, was another, and the soldiers enjoyed an increased variety in their diet as compared to field rations. After the return to Bordeaux, Henxteworth recorded a significantly larger number of purchases of meat, fish, poultry, grains, e.g., rice, and vegetables, such as onions and garlic, than he did during the campaign,³¹ although it is likely soldiers found a variety of foods while raiding to supplement their diets.

Aside from these more mundane necessities, the Prince also indulged himself with a few luxuries: almonds; oysters; fruit; honey; and eels.³² Many of these purchases appear to be connected to the Prince's Christmas celebrations. The Prince and his army did, indeed, celebrate. The *Annonimale Chronicle* states the Prince "command[ed] his lords...to have ease and refreshment for themselves," and Chandos Herald writes the Prince "and his noble knights were there in great joy and solace. There was gaiety, noblesse, courtesy, goodness, and largesse."³³

Financial Matters

Henxteworth's accounts show a flurry of activity upon the conclusion of the campaign and the Prince's return to Bordeaux. In addition to the expenses attendant upon the conclusion of the campaign, his ledger shows the recurring costs of maintaining troops in Gascony. The records begin the day the army arrived in Bordeaux in September 1355 and conclude the last day of June 1356, thirty-five days before the Anglo-Gascon army

³⁰DCO, Henxteworth Accounts, 30 December 1355 and other dates.

³¹DCO, Henxteworth Accounts, 9 December 1355 and after.

³²DCO, Henxteworth Accounts, 21–30 December 1355.

³³*The Anonimale Chronicle*, 35; *Chandos Herald*, lines 657–64; Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*, 84.

left on the 1356 campaign that would culminate at Poitiers. Thus, Henxteworth's accounts provide an overall financial picture of the campaign, as the expenditures can be tracked over time and by large general categories, such as horses, provisions, and transport, which nicely underscores the logistical priorities of medieval warfare.

Before proceeding, however, there are some pertinent facts about the larger financial picture that require some airing. Between 20 September 1355 and 29 December 1355, Henxteworth paid out a total of *3706l 17s 4.92d*, which is impressive considering the opening balance of the accounts was only *2595l 7s 6.25d* and there remained *2377l 7d* on 30 December. This campaign clearly depended on the *3886l 5s 0.96d* in loans from the treasurer, John de Stretle, Constable of Bordeaux, and a few other individuals. The Constable of Bordeaux, John de Stretle, loaned the prince *1,538l* in the first few days of October as the army was preparing for the campaign by transporting supplies to an advance depot at St. Macaire, further up the Garonne River.

Within Henxteworth's accounts there are several offices, or 'departments,' and administrators through which provisioning and purveying tasks were funneled. First, there was the marshalcy. The clerk of the marshalcy handled payments for the shoeing of horses and the wages of grooms. The office of the poultry oversaw the purveyance of poultry and eggs, while the office of the buttery managed the purchase and transport of wine, as well as related incomedibles, such as bowls. The clerk of the kitchen and the office of the kitchen, as well as the office of the pantry, were responsible for other comestible provisions, e.g., fish, meat, wheat, and cheese; the office of the saucery dealt

with spices and vegetables, such as onions and garlic;³⁴ and the office of the scullery handled the purchase and transport of fuel (Henxteworth specifies both firewood and coal), herbage (grass, pasture), locks, and other incombustibles, such as wooden vessels. The office of the hall oversaw various tasks, including the repair of the Prince's standards, the carriage of the Prince's personal items, such as his harness, and the building of the cabin for Richard de Stafford. The purchase of medicines was overseen by the office of the spicery. Henxteworth, in his capacity as the cashier, personally handled the payment of wages, the Prince's personal expenses, gifts and reparations, and the payment of money owed to individuals.

Henxteworth records almost 900 entries for the period of 20 September 1355 through 30 December 1355. Nearly half of the entries went through the above offices, and payments to individuals account for the remainder. Of the various offices, the office of the Marshalcy was by far the most active, followed distantly by the office of the kitchen. The offices through which the most cash flowed were direct payments to individuals (70.2%), the marshalcy (10.0%), and the kitchen (4.9%). (See Appendix E). The combined total of the offices that handled provisioning (151 of the known entries) is roughly equal to the total entries for the office of the Marshalcy.

Looking at the amount spent by category, e.g., wages or transport, and office reveals that payments to individuals (wages and money owed in the book of memoranda, 53.7%) were the largest budget item, followed by victuals (15.3%) and horses (both the animals themselves and related expenses, 10.4 %) (See Appendix E). Dividing the

³⁴DCO, Henxteworth accounts, account for 21 December 1355.

budget items up via office demonstrates how the various expenditures of the campaign were spread among the offices and which offices were responsible for specific functions (see Appendix E). Thus, it is clear that the Marshalcy's primary responsibility was the horses and related expenses, and the pantry, kitchen, buttery, poultry, and saucery handled the provisioning. Yet it is also apparent that the various offices handled expenses not normally within their purview. For example, Henxteworth clearly grouped the wages of grooms with the shoeing of horses, and the clerk of the Marshalcy was responsible for the disbursement of said wages. All in all, the accounts reveal a highly organized system for the distribution of funds and the organization of provisioning.

In addition to the organization of the finances, the accounts show that the financial activity of the campaign was concentrated prior to the army's departure on the raid and upon the army's return to Bordeaux for the winter. Mapping the expenses over time shows that certain expenses were tied to specific events in the campaign. Prior to the army's departure from Bordeaux, the largest single category of expenditures was payments to individuals, either in advances on wages or in payment of money owed to individuals.³⁵ Upon the army's return, the largest expenses were, once again, wages—advances for the next half-year, as specified in the Prince's indenture with Edward III—and the expenses related to horses, in particular shoeing and the wages of grooms. A number of purchases were made during the campaign, primarily victuals and incomedible supplies. The other key expenditures during the campaign were gifts and

³⁵It is unclear in the Henxteworth accounts what, exactly, the "money owing as written in the book of memoranda" is. Given that Henxteworth specifies when he paid advance wages, I have separated the two as discrete items but considered both as payments made to individuals.

reparations for destroyed houses—in towns in friendly territory.

The majority of expenses are clustered in late September and early October, and there is another cluster at the end of November, then a steady stream of debits through December as the army returned to Bordeaux and moved to winter quarters. The first group of debits reflects the activities associated with disembarking, for example the 24s 8d paid to the clerk of the Marshalcy for “windage of the lord’s horses in two ships” and another 3s on the carriage of harness from ships to Bordeaux, and preparing for the upcoming expedition. Thus, the Clerk of the Marshalcy also received 37s 2d as an advance to pay for the removal and transport of oats. The clerk of the pantry received 33s 4d for carriage of victuals from Bordeaux to St. Macaire, indicating the establishment of that advance depot.³⁶ In December, the accounts demonstrate the flurry of shoeing and repairs, such as the repairs to the Prince’s standards, associated with the end of a campaign.³⁷

The other matter associated with the end of the campaign, of course, was resupply.

Resupply from England

Richard de Stafford, a key member of the Prince’s staff and household, was charged with delivering the Prince’s and Wengefeld’s letters to the bishop of Winchester, orally reporting to the bishop, and overseeing the resupply mission. William Burton

³⁶DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 20 September and 1 October.

³⁷DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 28 November–30 December.

accompanied him.³⁸ The two men left Bordeaux after 25 December—and after a ship cabin was built for de Stafford’s use—³⁹ and would have reached England within approximately two weeks. By the time the Prince and Wengefeld wrote their letters, the army had already settled into their winter quarters and the winter needs of the army had been established.

A significant part of that resupply was done by sea and included victuals, horses, and men. The mechanics of resupply were similar to the original purveyance of 1355, i.e., orders were issued to purveyance officers and carried out by the sheriffs and their bailiffs. The primary difference was the scale of the resupply operation. Rather than recruiting men and purveying supplies for an entirely new operation, the Prince’s officers were seeking to fill precise needs, such as archers.⁴⁰

A critical aspect of Richard de Stafford’s mission to England was recruiting reinforcements. Of the 300 new archers the King promised, the Prince ordered that “200 of the best mounted archers they can find” come from Chester. The chamberlain was to appoint their leaders, provide the archers with livery and advance wages (12*d* per day for the leaders and 6*d* per day for the archers) for their journey to Plymouth, and make sure they are at the port, ready to sail by 17 April 1356 with de Stafford.⁴¹ The number of archers to be arrayed in Chester was increased to 500, per a subsequent order of 26 March, only eleven days after the chamberlain received the first order, which raised the

³⁸Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” and John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 439 and 444.

³⁹DCO, Henxteworth Accounts, 29 December 1335.

⁴⁰BPR, III, 224.

⁴¹BPR, III, 224.

number of archers to be arrayed to 600. These additional Cheshire archers, too, were to receive livery and advance wages. Significantly, the chamberlain was instructed to pay them only for eight days, as the Prince's officers at Plymouth would "pay them their wages there."⁴² This differs from both the immediately preceding order and the practice of 1355, in which the archers received twenty-one days' pay in advance. This may indicate that the chamberlain did not have enough cash on hand to pay such a large advance or that he lacked sufficient time to amass the sum given that the archers' skills needed to be tested⁴³ and the men themselves had to be arrayed and ready to sail at Plymouth by 17 April. If nothing else, it is clear that the Prince's officers at Plymouth *did* have cash on hand.

Stafford was not the only one recruiting additional archers. Thomas de Berkeley, sheriff of Gloucester, and his sergeants-at-arms Simon Basset, William atte Mershe, and John de Cornwaille arrayed one hundred mounted archers and provided them with one suit of clothes, as well as the bows, and John de Cornwaille accompanied them to Plymouth.⁴⁴ These archers were the final 100 to make the full complement of 600 archers.⁴⁵

One crucial aspect of resupply was a shipment of new baggage horses. Per the orders of letters received as of 27 March 1356, John Kendale, receiver of Cornwall, was

⁴²BPR, III, 224.

⁴³Robert Hardy, *Longbow: A Social and Military History* (New York, 1977).

⁴⁴TNA, C61/68, mm. 4–6.

⁴⁵Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*, 92. Interestingly, archers for the Prince's company were not arrayed in Flint or North Wales, as they had been in 1355. Instead, the Prince was required to provide 160 men and 50 Welshmen from Flint and North Wales respective, half archers and half lancers. TNA, C 76/34, m. 11

to “purvey...thirty of the best and strongest baggage-horses that he can find, with saddles and other baggage harness,” as well as suitable grooms. He was to be reimbursed for the horses, wages of grooms, and the cost of victuals and other necessities. Roger Ragas bought sumpter (pack) horses, and those horses and the baggage horses purveyed by Kendal were to join “the other horses and grooms which are waiting for shipment.”⁴⁶ The sheriff of Devon purveyed 400 hurdles for shipping horses to the Prince. These were for the same ships that Stafford and the additional archers would be sailing in to Gascony.⁴⁷ Baker’s *Chronicle* mentions several marches on which horses were lost, and these orders indicate that more horses were clearly needed.⁴⁸

Comestibles were also purveyed and sent to Gascony. John de Kendale, the Prince’s received in Cornwall, was to purvey and send to the Bordeaux “500 cod fish (whereof 300 are to be dried and 200 powdered, if the latter can be carried without being spoilt, and if not, all of them dried), and 400 salt congers...200 salted salmon.” These orders date to 11 August, and Kendale was to send the supplies when “the ships sail at the present vintage season.”⁴⁹ Thomas de Drayton, Hugh Fastolf, and Adam Kentishe received a similar commission to purvey salted fish and herrings and to transport it to Gascony.⁵⁰

Arrows and bows were sorely needed. Robert Pipot was sent to England, likely on the same ship as de Stafford, with orders to “purvey for [the Prince’s] use 1000 bows,

⁴⁶BPR, II, 94.

⁴⁷TNA, C 54/194, m. 19. CCR, X, 256.

⁴⁸Baker, *Chronicon*, 230–44; DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 1 October 1355.

⁴⁹BPR, II, 98.

⁵⁰TNA, C 66/250, m. 18. CPR, X, 468.

2000 sheaves of arrows and 400 gross of bowstrings.” Citing both an “urgent need of bows, arrows and bowstrings” and a dearth of arrows in England, the Prince sent Pipot to Chester, there to “take all the arrows he can find...and to arrest the fletchers themselves to continue working at their craft...until [the Prince’s] need is satisfied.”⁵¹ According to the 29 February 1356 order to John de Brunham, chamberlain of Chester, the shortage was due to the King’s own demand for arrows. Further underscoring the Prince’s need, Brunham is to help Pipot and pay the fletchers “such sums as he thinks will serve to encourage them in their work.”⁵² This last was altered to “to pay the said fletchers what is due to them for their labour.”⁵³

The Prince’s council was still contracting for the production of arrows as late as July, which indicates that more arrows were clearly needed. Kendale was ordered “to pay the said fletchers from time to time” in July 1356.⁵⁴ These orders reveal both the pressing need for a fresh, large supply of arrows and the strain such high demand placed on the productive capacities of England’s fletchers. Brunham paid for the equipment, then paid by indenture Little John of Berkhamsted for the carriage of the supplies by land—the order specifies carriage by land—at the rate of 6*d* per day, the same rate of pay archers received.⁵⁵ Pipot himself was in charge of the carriage of the bows, arrows, and strings purveyed in Lincolnshire and had permission to “tak[e] up on the way any bows

⁵¹BPR, III, 223–24.

⁵²BPR, III, 224.

⁵³BPR, III, 224.

⁵⁴BPR, II, 98.

⁵⁵BPR, III, 224–25. An indenture between Brunham and Pipot, which is not extant, specified the number of bows, arrows, and strings purchased and at what prices.

or arrows he can find in the hands of craftsmen between Cestre and Lincoln.”⁵⁶ As this shows, the Prince’s purveyors were casting a wide net and were still actively looking for equipment.

The earls’ companies were also in need of resupply, both of horses and victuals. As their indentures likely specified, the King provided the shipping, just as he had done in 1355. The council assigned *la Katherine atte Melle*, based in Ipswich, to transport the required horses and victuals for John de Vere, earl of Oxford, and John de Cheverston, seneschal of Gascony.⁵⁷ *La Godale* of Gosford carried the horses and victuals for Robert de Ufford and William de Montacute, earls of Suffolk and Salisbury.⁵⁸ These are the only two named ships, but more would have been required.

Philip de Whitone was responsible for arresting the necessary ships. They were to be at Plymouth by 1 May for Stafford, his retinue, and the other troops and supplies going with him to Gascony.⁵⁹ This is two weeks later than the 17 April date by which the archers were to be at Plymouth ready to sail. Indeed, the relevant letters patent are dated 16 April. While Whitone was likely already at work procuring the necessary shipping, it is clear that the reinforcements and additional supplies were not sailing from Plymouth on 17 April.⁶⁰

In addition to the letters detailing the raid’s success, the Prince’s administration handled other paperwork. For example, the earl of Salisbury’s letters of protection were

⁵⁶BPR, III, 225.

⁵⁷TNA, C 66/248, m. 19. CPR, X, 348.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹TNA, C 61/68, m. 4. Rymer, Appendix E, 20.

⁶⁰Ibid.

renewed until February 1357.⁶¹ Salisbury was clearly in contact with England, as he complained to the King that, despite the earlier letters of protection, men had broken into some of his houses, stolen his property, abducted two bondsmen, and “assaulted his men and servants.”⁶² The King appointed a commission to look into the matter. The other administrative matter taken up was the issuing of pardons. Only a few were issued upon the conclusion of the 1355 *chevauchée*,⁶³ especially compared to the rush of pardons issued in the twelve months following Poitiers and the end of the 1356 campaign.⁶⁴ The same pattern applies to the granting of rewards.⁶⁵

The French Response

The French, of course, responded and made their own adjustments following the Prince’s return to English Gascony. French forces had hardly covered themselves in glory, and the English troops had wreaked economic havoc throughout the French countryside, particularly in parts of France that had had little experience of the war and the inhabitants of which had believed themselves to be beyond the reach of English depredations. Aside from the economic implications and the necessary repairs and rebuilding, there were also political repercussions.

Just as the Prince had officially set out to punish rebels and to convince them to become loyal to the English king again, as well as woo new allies, the King of France still had to respond to all of those newly loyal to Edward III. He had to reverse the new

⁶¹BPR, III, 226.

⁶²TNA, C 66/249, m. 7v. CPR, X, 452.

⁶³TNA, C 66/248, *passim*.

⁶⁴TNA, C 66/243–261; BPR, II, III, and IV, throughout years 1356–1360.

⁶⁵*Ibid*.

trend, the changing opinion of the Gascons that loyalty to the English king would best serve their interests. For example, Amanieu de Fossat (Aymeric de Fossade according to Henxteworth's spelling), served in the Prince's company.⁶⁶ In June 1356, John II declared him a rebel.⁶⁷

Armagnac did not sit idly through the winter. He began rebuilding destroyed towns and strengthened western garrisons and outposts.⁶⁸ The pope wrote him, beseeching him not to invade English-held territory. Granted, he was actually in Béziers, then Avignon to meet with the pope. The man left in charge of the French forces was Jean de Boucicaut, who was based at Moissac. While he was certainly an able man, he had but 600 men at his disposal.⁶⁹ Thus, Boucicaut was unable to mount a successful defense against the winter raiding of the English.

These defensive actions, though, were all after the fact. The question is why was there so little response. Jean II deemed the Prince's activities in Gascony less of a threat than Lancaster's raid in the north, and much less of a threat than Edward III's presence in Picardy—closer to Paris. Another problem that undoubtedly had a larger claim on the French king's attention was his son-in-law, Charles the Bad of Navarre, who frequently changed his loyalties. Furthermore, Jean II lacked the high level of administration and military organization that Edward III had in England; nor did he have the money with

⁶⁶DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 18 April 1356.

⁶⁷AN, JJ, 84, no. 569, fol. 294v. Charles Samaran, ed., *La Gascoigne dans les Registres du Trésor des Chartres* (Paris: Bibliothèque National, 1966), 96.

⁶⁸Breuils, 58–59. See also, Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*, 87.

⁶⁹Wengefeld, "Letter to Richard Destafford," in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 446–47; Sumption, *Trial by Fire*, 193.

which to develop and maintain one.⁷⁰ In this respect, then, the French king did not have the resources to respond effectively to the multi-pronged invasion of France.

The Prince's Report

By any measure the Prince's 1355 campaign was a success for the Anglo-Gascon force and Edward III. Armagnac had been punished for his encroachments on the Gascon marches; war had been carried to parts of France that had not seen war; loot and ransoms had been taken. Reportedly so much booty had been taken it would have filled 1000 carts,⁷¹ which seems to be hyperbole and makes no sense in practical terms. Given that the carts likely held 1000–3000lbs, this would amount to 1–3 million pounds of booty. One does wonder how the Prince's 70–100 carts multiplied to 1000 and how he fed the additional 2000–3000 horses necessary to haul those thousand carts of booty. Furthermore, such an enormous baggage train could not have kept pace with the army and would have slowed the rearguard considerably. Thus, the 1000 carts are a gross exaggeration.

That said, the army did loot extensively. Wengefeld estimated—based on the “good records which were found in divers towns in the houses of receivers”⁷²—that the lands and towns destroyed by the English provided the French king yearly with more to maintain his war than half of France.

...Carcassonne and Limoux, which is as large as Carcassonne, and two other

⁷⁰Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition*, 94–98.

⁷¹Matteo and Filippo Villani, *Historia universalis*, ed. L.A. Muratori (1729), 353; Le Bel, *Chronicon*, ii, 222.

⁷²John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 445. “...par bon remembraunce qe fusrent trovez en diverse villes en les hostez de reseceivours.”

towns near to Carcassonne, found each year for the king of France the wages of a thousand men of arms and, besides, one hundred thousand old crowns, to maintain his war. And know that, by the records which we found the towns in the county of Toulouse which are destroyed and the towns in Carcassonne and the city and country of Narbonne found, each year, over and above the aforesaid sum, in aid of his war, four hundred thousand gold crowns, as the citizens of the large towns and other folk of the country, that ought to have good knowledge, told us.⁷³

Given that the army had taken the records, the Prince and his staff had the material needed to make a reasonable estimate as to the damage they had caused the French king's war efforts. By this measure, indeed by any measure, the Prince's campaign was a success.

It is likely that these letters from the Prince and Wengefeld were not the first news England had of the Prince's campaign. Early autumn would have seen many ships in the wine trade sailing between Bordeaux and England, and the two sub-admirals (Hoggeshaw and Deyncourt), both of whom had sailed to Gascony with the Prince, returned to England in October and November respectively.⁷⁴ They could have provided accurate

⁷³Wengefeld, "Letter to the bishop of Winchester," in Avesbury, *Gestis Edwardi Tertii*, 445. "Car Carcassonne et Lemoignes, qest ausi graunt come Carcasoun, et ij. aultres villes de coste Carcasoun, troveront chescun an au roy de Fraunce lez gages de mil hommes dames et, oultre ceo, c. mil escutz veux, pur maintenir sa guerre. Et entenke, par lez remembraunces qe nous trovastes, qe les villes en Tholousane qe sont destruitz et lez villes en Carcasoun et la ville de Nerbon et de Nerbendoys troverent chescun an, ou la summe susdite, en eaide de sa guerre, cccc. Mil escutz veux, come bourgeois de les grandes villes et aultres geantz du pays, qe deveroient avoir bone conissaunce, nous out dit.

⁷⁴TNA, E 101/26/32, E 101/26/34; Pipe roll, Edward III 29, m. 4; Issue Roll, Edward III 29, m. 8.

information about the start of the campaign, and the Prince's and Wengefeld's letters and de Stafford's oral report would have covered events through the end of the campaign.

There is no doubt that the Prince was pleased with the outcome of the raid, no doubt he considered it a success. Moreover, he capitalized on that success to request reinforcements and argue for the continuation of the war.

Chapter Eight: Conclusion

When the Prince and his forces set out on 4 August 1356 on the Poitiers campaign, he and the army had the success of 1355 to build upon. And the 1355 *chevauchée* was, in the estimation of the English anyway, a success. The Anglo-Gascon army marched 606 miles from Bordeaux to Narbonne and back again in fifty-nine days with minimal logistical difficulties. They crossed the Garonne river and carried the war to parts of France that had not seen war for some time, destroyed towns, infrastructure, and economic resources, and returned to Bordeaux laden with booty and records. The logistics of the Anglo-Gascon army were up to the task, even when faced with long and arduous marches, some of which had little available water along the way. A number of horses undoubtedly perished. Despite that difficulty—the loss of some horses was no doubt anticipated—, however, the army's progress was not slowed, which is further evidence of the organization and excellent advanced planning of the campaign. The planning, the organized system of supply during the campaign, enabled the Prince to succeed in his first solo command and to achieve the stated goals of the expedition.

According to the documentary evidence, the purpose of this campaign was nothing short of the (re)establishment of the full sovereignty and authority of the English crown in Gascony. Over and over, Edward III stated that his aim was the restoration of his status and control, reclaiming his lands and rights, in Gascony. Following the conclusion of the campaign, the Prince's letters, and the letters of Wingefeld, claim success based on this criterion: they had reclaimed lands, punished rebels, disrupted

France's ability to fight against the English, and persuaded some Gascons lords to return to their allegiance to Edward III. The campaign itself backs their words; the stated goals were more than rhetorical cover for plundering. They were specific, achievable goals, and based on those aims, which should be accepted as real, the campaign was nothing short of a success for the Prince personally, for the army, and for Edward III and the future of English royal authority in Gascony.

Towns, such as Arouille, that had once been English but had fallen to the French were brought back under English control,¹ and the lands belonging to Armagnac were devastated. The success of the 1355 raid, moreover, strengthened the loyalty of the Gascons, which stood the Prince in good stead the following year.² As discussed in Chapter Seven, a number of Gascon lords formally changed their allegiance in April 1356. The fact that these men switched sides following the 1355 *chevauchée* suggests a connection between the Prince's expedition and their decisions. In other words, the application of force and coercive power convinced these men that their best interests would be served by denying the authority of the French king and submitting to the authority of Edward III, suggesting in this case that military success had re-established, if not created, English royal authority in Gascony. More cynically, it suggests that these Gascon nobles may have considered continued loyalty to the French crown a losing proposition and therefore chose to submit to English authority, hoping to further their

¹Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince* (see note 37), 33.

²Hewitt, *The Black Prince's Expedition* (see note 36), 71.

own interests.³ Regardless, the Prince's 1355 campaign achieved the aim of returning rebels to obedience.

The Prince also remembered another goal of this expedition: wooing new allies—or at least not offending neutral powers like the powerful count of Foix. Three times during the campaign, the Prince's army entered the territory of the count of Foix, and on 17 November 1355 the Prince and Foix had a conference. Whatever understanding the Prince may have had with Foix, the army refrained from plunder and destruction.⁴ By ensuring the safety of Foix's lands, the Prince furthered the larger goal of the expedition: restoring and enlarging Edward III's authority in Gascony and in France by establishing friendly relations with potential allies.

The underlying purpose of the Prince's expedition was the assertion of English royal authority in Gascony, not only to bring disloyal subjects back to their obedience but also to impress upon the French king and his officers, such as the count of Armagnac, that Edward III was committed to maintaining his sovereignty and authority in Gascony. This was an important strategic goal for the English king because sovereignty was at the heart of the conflict between France and England.

In order to accomplish that goal Edward III bestowed royal authority on the Prince. This was done through the use of symbols (seals, indentures, soldiers, etc.) and the provision of soldiers, themselves a symbol of that obliging authority as well as the coercive power available to enforce it. The Prince's expedition, his use of coercive power

³Such actions were not without precedent throughout the period of English rule in Gascony.

⁴Baker, 128, 135, 138.

and manipulation of symbols, compelled obedience, buttressed the legitimacy of Edward III's position in Gascony, and furthered the English king's efforts to claim full sovereignty in Gascony. The 1355 expedition did not succeed in forcing Jean II to relinquish his ultimate sovereignty over France, nor did he cede sovereignty over any other part of France through which the Anglo-Gascon army campaigned. It did, however, succeed in calling the authority and power of the French king into question, enough so that Gascon nobles turned back to Edward III and places in France that had thus far been spared from the ravages of war learned that the French king and his lieutenants could not protect them from English incursions. In that respect, the expedition was a definite success and the Prince effectively re-established royal authority over the Gascons—at least for the moment.

In what was ultimately a contest for the loyalty of elites, the assertion of English royal authority and power, obliging those elites to respect both, was a necessary facet of Edward III's strategy to extend his authority and establish his uncontested sovereignty over Gascony. The Prince's expedition effectively demonstrated not only the reach of England's power but also the limits of France's power, and power, in this instance, was the foundation of authority. Where power led, authority—it was hoped—would follow.

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Appendix A: Ships of the Prince's Fleet

	Home Port	Master	Ship	Tunnage	Mariners	Muster Port
1		William Baret	<i>La Juliane</i>		36	
2		John Gobet	<i>La Margarete</i>		26	
3		William Henry	<i>La Nicholas</i>		24	
4		William May	<i>La James</i>		26	
5		John Burges	<i>La Gregory</i>		20	
6		Stephen Stonyng	<i>La Seinte Mariebote</i>		15	
7		Simon Steven	<i>La Mighel</i>		26	
8		John Lewe	<i>La Cogg Johan de Jernemuth</i>		26	
9	Winchelsea	John Wilydon	<i>La Seinte Maricog</i>	200	50	
10		John Clerke ²	<i>La Cristofre</i> *		100	Plymouth
11			<i>La James</i>			
12			<i>La Gilane</i>			
13			<i>La Margaret of the Tower</i>			
14	Bayonne	John Loyas	<i>La Seint Espirit</i>			
15	Fowey	John Tegyn	<i>La Cog Johan</i>			
16		William Pierres ²	<i>La Seint Marie</i>			
17	Fowey		<i>La Seint Sauveours cog</i>			
18	Dartmouth		<i>La Seintmary cog</i>			
19	Sidemouth		<i>La George</i>			
20	Polruan		<i>La</i>			

0			<i>Seintemariecog</i>			
2 1	Seaton		<i>La Margaret</i>	30	14	
2 2	Lynn		<i>La Saint Mary Cog</i>	80	22	
2 3	Lynn		<i>La Michael</i>	50	14	
2 4	Weymouth/Melcombe		<i>La Margaret</i>	80	22	
2 5	Weymouth/Melcombe		<i>La Peter</i>	90	24	
2 6	Weymouth/Melcombe		<i>La Clement</i>	70	20	
2 7	Weymouth/Melcombe		<i>La Saint Mary Cog</i>	90	24	
2 8	Warham		<i>La Saint Mary Cog</i>	80	26	
2 9	Lymington		<i>La Saint Mary Cog</i>	70	24	
3 0	Lymington		<i>La Nicholas</i>	60	22	
3 1	Hamelhoke		<i>La Gracedieu</i>	160	42	
3 2	Hamelhoke		<i>La Katerine</i>	120	32	
3 3	Hamelhoke		<i>La Welifare</i>	70	22	
3 4	Hamelhoke		<i>La Saint Esprit</i>	100	30	
3 5	Southampton		<i>La Trinity</i>	100		
3 6	Southampton		?	70	22	
3 7	Southampton		<i>La Margaret</i>	30	14	
3 8	Shoreham		<i>La Welifare</i>		22	
3 9	Shoreham		<i>La Welifare</i>		18	
4 0	Shoreham		<i>La Welifare</i>	50	16	
4	Shoreham		<i>La Katherine</i>	50	16	

1						
4 2	Hamelhoke		<i>La Nicholas</i>	70	24	
4 3	Shoreham		<i>La Benedict</i>	60	18	
4 4	Shoreham		<i>La Godier</i>	40	18	
4 5	Rye		<i>La Nicholas</i>	120	22	
4 6	Rye		<i>La Jonette</i>	40	18	
4 7	Rye		<i>La Dieulavance</i>	66	18	
4 8	Hythe		<i>La Margaret</i>	50	14	
4 9	Hythe		<i>La Saint Mary Boat</i>		14	
5 0	Hythe		<i>La Alice</i>	30	14	
5 1	Hythe		<i>La Saint Mary Boat of Rudynge</i>	30	14	
5 2	Hythe		<i>La Godier</i>	38	14	
5 3	Hythe		<i>La Godbiete</i>	38	14	
5 4	Hythe		<i>La Christiane of Poole</i>	30	14	
5 5	Winchelsea		<i>La Jonette</i>	120	30	
5 6	Dover		<i>La Glythe</i>	50	20	
5 7	Dover		<i>La Croniper</i>	50	20	
5 8	Dover		<i>La Lancaster</i>		20	
5 9	Dover		<i>La Navdieu</i>	50	20	
6 0	Dover		<i>La Faucon</i>	40	20	
6 1	Sandwich		<i>La Blison</i>	110	30	
6	Sandwich		<i>La Cog John</i>	140	36	

2						
6 3	Sandwich		<i>La Margaret</i>	120	30	
6 4		William Ashenden	<i>La Cristofre</i>		80	
6 5		Robert Gofair	<i>La New Saint Marie</i>		80	
6 6		William Passelewe ²	<i>La Jerusalem</i>		70	
6 7		Thomas Clerk ^{1,2}	<i>La Edward</i>		60	
6 8		John Blossse ²	<i>La Claws</i>		60	
6 9		John Horset	<i>La Holk</i>		60	
7 0		John Ram ^{1,2}	<i>La Alice</i>		45	
7 1		John Wille ²	<i>La Thomas</i>		40	
7 2		Robert Andrew ²	<i>La John</i>		40	
7 3		Walter de Manthrop	<i>La Trinity</i>		130	
7 4		John Sperman ^{1,2}	<i>La Rodecog</i>		35	
7 5		Paul Portsmouth ²	<i>La Edmond</i>		35	
7 6		John Rok ²	<i>La Anne</i>		30	
7 7		Hamond Lovetoft ^{1,2}	<i>La Faucon</i>		30	
7 8		Robert Hull ^{1,2}	<i>La Isabelle</i>		30	
7 9		Robert Fikeys ²	<i>La Saint Marybote</i>		25	
8 0		Thomas Ram ¹	<i>La Mariote</i>		25	
8 1		Bartholomew Stigeyn ^{1,2}	<i>La Welifare</i>		42	
8 2		John Maikyn ²	<i>La Plenty</i>		35	
8 3		William Odam ^{1,2}	<i>La Gabriel</i>		50	

8		Sir Reymund	<i>Le Bastide</i>			
4		de Grusynak				

[^]Mayor of Southampton.

* The Prince's ship.

¹These shipmasters all received royal pardons (14 June 1355) for "the account which he should render of moneys and profits taken by him of the freight of his said ship." CPR, X, 280.

²These shipmasters were commissioned 15 March 1356 impress mariners and report to Sandwich on 24 April "for the service of the king."

Data from BPR, passim; TNA E 101/26/37; TNA C 61/67, m. 11; Rymer, Appendix E, 13–14. TNA E 101/26/36 is too badly damaged to make out names of individual ships; however, Lambert's work on the document has shown that the eastern ports mentioned provided 49 ships and more than 250 mariners.

Appendix B: Edward of Woodstock's Army

The data below is drawn from Baker's *Chronicon*, *The Black Prince's Register*, Rymer's *Foedera* the patent and calendar rolls, and The Soldier in later medieval England project, particularly the searchable database (<http://www.medievalsoldier.org>). This is an example of what can be done; the list is by no means exhaustive.

First Column

Commanders:

Tomas Beauchamp, KG*, Earl of Warwick, Constable of the army
 John Beauchamp, *miles*¹
 Roger de Clifford, *miles*²
 John Tochet, *miles*
 Guy de Beauchamp, Warwick's second son

Reginald de Cobham, KG, Marshall of the army

Soldiers/*miles*

Thomas de Hampton, *miles*, standard bearer

Gascons

7 unnamed barons

Middle Column

Commander:

Edward of Woodstock, KG*, Prince of Wales

Prince's Retinue

Thomas de Barnardstone, *miles*

Richard de Baskerville, *miles*

Lauton, squire

Ralph Basset, Baron Draytone

John Beaupre, *miles*

John Maynard, squire/esquire

Baldwin de Bereford, *miles*

Maurice Berkeley, *miles*

Thomas Blount, *miles*

John Bouchier, Baron Bouchier

Maurice le Brun, *miles*

*Original Knight of the Garter, 1348.

¹He married Warwick's daughter Alice. It is likely that he served under Warwick's command, although there is no direct evidence of that. Given the family ties and Clifford's presence in Warwick's company, I have placed Beauchamp in the same company.

²He married Warwick's daughter, and the evidence conclusively states that he served under Warwick's command.

Bartholomew de Burghersh, KG*
 Richard, chamberlain
 William, valetus
 groom
 John Chandos, KG*
 Philip, chaplain
 John, chaplain
 Stephen Cusyngton, *miles*
 Thomas de Hardres, squire/esquire
 John Dargentein, *miles*
 John Dasseles, *miles*
 William Daubeneye, *miles*
 Thomas Fychet, *miles*
 Squire/esquire
 James de Hanville, *miles*
 John de Haveryngge, *miles*
 Nicholas de Hotoft, *miles*
 Squire/esquire
 Nigel Loring, KG*
 Peter Riche, squire/esquire
 Thomas Madefrey, *miles*
 William Moigne, *miles*
 Squire/esquire
 Walter Paveley, KG,* *miles*
 Richard de Stafford, *miles* and trusted with special, specific tasks
 Thomas Dardern, *miles*
 Thomas de Styuecle, *miles*
 John Sully, *miles*
 Richard le Baker, esquire
 William Trussel, *miles*³
 Roger Meyuw, squire/esquire
 Peter de Veel, *pere, miles*
 Peter de Veel, *filis, miles*
 Roger de la Ware, *miles*
 Robert Mounteny, squire/esquire
 Edward Wauncy, *miles*
 John de Willoughby, *miles*
 Walter de Wodeland, *miles*

 William Bisshop, sergeant at arms

³ He was already in Gascony. BPR, III, 217.

Archer Captains

John de Hyde, *miles*, Captain of Macklesfeld hundred's archers

John Griffyn, *miles*, Captain of Wych Malbank hundred's archers

Hamon de Mascy, Captain of Wirhale and Broxen hundreds'

archers

Hugh de Golbourn, Captain of Wirhale and Broxen hundreds'

archers

Robert Bruyn, Captain of Edesbury hundred's archers

Robert de Legh, *filis*

Thomas of Stathow

Archers

John de Neuton

Geoffrey de Stanlegh

William de Chorlegh

Simon de Grimesdich

John Starky

John de Merbury

Robert of Hale

Grooms

Richard Bekeinsfeld

Guides

Office of the Buttery

Office of the Chamber and Hall

Office of the Kitchen

Edward of the Kitchen

Thomas the ovenkeeper

Office of the Marshalcy

Vincent de Gloucester

Office of the Pantry

Thomas, groom of the Pantry

Office of the Poultry

Walter the Poulter

Office of the Saucery

John of the Saucery

Thomas, page of the Saucery

Office of the Scullery

John, boy of the Scullery

Other

Robert de Acton

John de Alnewyk

William Bakepins

John le Baltere of Wottone

John de Benstede

Richard de Bentone of London

John Bereford, son of Edward Bereford

Richard de Berewyk

Nicholas de Berkeley

Thomas de Bernardstone

John Bishop

Richard Blake of London

Hugh Bon-hominis

William Boulge

Richard Bowere of Knotesford

Thomas de Brewes

Peter de Burle

Thomas Capel

Thomas Chamberleyn

Thomas Charnels

John de la Chaumbre

William Cifrewaz

Peter Coke

Adam Cole of Tamere

Richard Colle

Richard le Cook of Poselyngworth

John Cornwall

Hugh Coursoun

Theobald Dalkwyne of Outheby

Gilber Dele

Richard Dockseye

Richard Ede

John de Etone

John Ferour of Bomstede

Walter Forest de Lee of Gainsborough

Thomas Harewold, citizen of London

John de la Haye

John de Hoghtone

Roger Holefold of Coggeshale
Thomas, son of Adam Kydale of Barton
Roger de Lathum
Walter Laurence
William Lenche
Simon de Lincoln
Nicholas de Lomere
John de Louches
Edmund de Malyns, *filis*
William de Murens
John Palington
William de Penreth
William de Pesydenne
Thomas Peytevin
William de Pomeray?
William de Pountfreyt
Richard Raven
John de St. Andrew
Thomas de St. Edmunds
Thomas de St. Omer
John Saltere
Francis Sarazin
Gilbert de Stanford
William de Synthwaite
Thomas de Thoraldby
Richard de Thorpe
John Traily
John Tryvet
Thomas Tuwe (Tuey)
Matthew Uwyn
William le Vernoun
Thomas Walssh of Halstede
Edmond Wancy
Simon le Webbe of Wandlesworth
John le Werselee
Hugh de Wesenham
Walter Wyght of Gainsborough
William la Zouche of Lobesthorpe

Prince's Household and Administrators

Henry de Aldrington
Alexander de Aungre, parson at Wythyngdone
William Blackwater, Prince's personal physician

Roger le Cornlee, farrier
 John Doyly, farrier
 Robert Egremont, tentmaker
 John of Hampton, servant
 Thomas de Gerlesthorpe, parson at Collesdone
 Geoffrey Hamelyn
 Hankyn, goldsmith
 Hankyn, minstrel
 Hanz, taborer
 John Henxteworth, yeoman, keeper of the accounts
 Hervey (Harvey) Hewe, yeoman of the scullery
 John de Ipswich, clerk
 Jakelyn, minstrel
 Keyfer, minstrel
 Musshonte, herald
 William de Northwelle, clerk
 Hankin the Piper, minstrel
 Thomas Rasene, parson at Scoter
 John Sauter, crier
 William Stratton, tailor
 John de Wengegeld, *miles*
 Edmond
 Wengfeld, squire/esquire

Other Companies

John de Vere, earl of Oxford
 John de Lisle, KG*
 Hugh Casom, squire/esquire

Gascons

Jean de Grailly, KG*, Captal de Buch⁴
 Lord of Caumont
 Aymery de Biron, lord of Montferrand and the standard bearer
 Guillaume de Pommiers?

Third Column

Commanders:

Robert de Ufford, KG, earl of Suffolk
 William de Montacute, KG*, earl of Salisbury
 John Blaunkminster, *miles*
 Roger Loring, *miles*⁵

⁴ He was married to Rose, the daughter of Bertrand de Montferrand.

John de Roos, mayor of Bordeaux

Other

Ralph Berne
 John Camel
 John de Cauntelough
 Edmund de Clivedon
 Nicholas de Dagworth
 Edmond Domere
 Nicholas Gouleshulle
 Walter Guphey
 Richard Hamsted
 Edmund de Hethersiud
 John de Hoo of Tepcroft
 John de Kirkeby
 Walter Lodelowe
 John Lodelowe⁶
 Henry de Lucy
 Edward de Montacute
 Thomas Moraunt
 William de Morlee
 Robert de Musseldene
 Nicholas Panes
 Walter de Petrestree
 Nicholas de Pointz
 Matthew de Poudreham
 Bartholomew Pygot
 Gregory de Rokeslee
 Thomas de Salesbirs
 Curius le Spicer
 Brian de Stapleton
 John Stone
 Bonaldus Stormy
 Geoffrey Walssh

Gascons

⁵ Loring held the manor of Dounheved in Somerset of Salisbury and was to “render a lance of war yearly at midsummer.” TNA, C 54/192, m. 28v. CCR, X, 58. Salisbury also owed Loring 500*l.* TNA, C 54/193, m. 24v. CCR, X, 198.

⁶ Walter Lodelowe, as per his 6 September 1357 pardon, served under Salisbury. As John Lodelowe was also from Staffordshire and pardoned with Walter for the same crimes, it is clear that they knew each other and likely that they served together.

Guillaume (Sancii), lord of Pommiers, leader of the Bearnais

Other⁷

Walter Dufford, *miles*
 John Norwich, squire/esquire
 John Mohun, KG*
 Thomas Chanderler
 John Tirel, squire/esquire
 Edward Berkeley
 William Colkardon, groom
 Matthew Gourney (Gurney)
 Gentilthorpe
 James Audley, KG*
 Laurence Pecche, squire/esquire
 Alan Cheyne, *miles*
 Richard de St. John, squire/esquire
 chamberlain
 Roland Daneys, *miles*
 Selby, chamberlain
 Thomas Felton, *miles*
 William Somertone, squire/esquire
 William Skrop, *miles*
 Thomas Sutton, squire/esquire
 John Whalesbrew, *miles*
 Squire/esquire
 Roger Daudley
 Geoffrey, chamberlain
 John Botourt
 William Wingefeld, squire/esquire
 Edward Despenser
 John, Chamberlain
 Stephen de Hales
 Squire/esquire
 Warin de Bassingbourne
 Roger Lagele, squire/esquire
 John Sharmesfeld (Sarnesfeld)
 John, chamberlain
 Howell ap Griffith, *miles*
 Squire/esquire
 John Dymmok, *miles*
 Roger de la Ware, *miles*

⁷ I have been unable to determine in which company these men served. It is most likely that they served in the Prince's retinue.

Robert Mounteny, squire

Other Gascons (company undetermined)

Bernard Ezi, lord of Albret and his sons
 Lord of Capene
 Petiton Curton
 Aymeric de Fossade
 Godfrey, groom
 Bertrand Frank
 Guillaume Sans, lord of Lesparre
 Bascot Mauleon
 Lord of Monte Pesato
 Reymond de Montbaden
 Auger de Montaut, lord of Mussidan
 Raymond de Pelagria
 Amanieu de Pommiers
 Elie de Pommiers
 Eustace de Pommiers
 Jean de Pommiers
 Arnold Raymond
 Emericus Sonynyak
 Gerard de Tartas
 Aymeric de Tastes
 Soldan de Trau
 Bernard de Troyes
 Vicomte de Urtria

Mercenaries

Tiderick van Dale, Alamain
 John Gunsals, Spaniard
 Benedict Lopes, Spaniard
 Ferrand Martyn, Spaniard
 Daniel van Pesse, Alamain
 Gotherin Pipard, Alamain
 William Qwad, Alamain
 John Rays, Spaniard
 John Rode, Alamain
 Deossant of Spain, Spaniard
 John Strenckin, Alamain
 Hans Trouer, Alamain
 Bernard van Zedeles, Alamain, *miles*
 Fromaldo, Alamain, squire/esquire
 Seyner Gransekyn, Alamain, squire/esquire
 John de Landestrene, Alamain, squire/esquire
 Ingelbrith Zobbe, Alamain, *miles*

Rankin, squire/esquire

Men contracted/arrayed who did NOT serve for a reason other than desertion

Chester

Roger de Bechyngton, ill
 Richard de Codyngton, ill
 Richard de Caldecote, ill
 William Bakere, ill
 Utrich' de Huxlegh, ill
 Ken' Seys, ill
 Howel ap Ll', ill
 Thomas, ill
 John Boidel of Lymme
 David de Overton
 Randolf de Baggelegh

North Wales

Howel Duy ap Tuder, ill
 John Steel, ill
 Atha ap Guyn, ill
 Gwynnagh ap Ll', ill
 David de Ardudo, ill

Flynt

Atha Loit ap Mad' ap Thom', ill
 Jor' ap Bleth' ap David, ill
 Ken' ap Jor' ap David, ill
 Bled' Arow, ill

Deserters

Flynt Archers

John ap Oweyn
 Bleth' ap Mad' ap Heilyn
 David ap Madok ap Heilyn
 David ap Jor' ap Phil'
 Yevan ap Ririth of Kilkeyn
 Yevan ap Madok ap Th'
 Gr'ap Eignon Penbras
 David ap Bleth' Gam
 Ken' ap Mad' ap Eign'
 Thomas Brand
 Yevan Vaghan
 Gruff' ap Grogh
 Jor' ap Eign' Gogh
 Eden' ap Wilyn Gogh
 Eign' Vaghan ap Eign' ap Yevan
 Ken' ap Jor' ap Ll'

Eden' ap Yevan ap Ririth
Jor' ap Gron' Vaughan
David ap Mad' ap Bleth'
Yokyn Gogh ap Yevan ap Howel
Margant ap Gruffuth
Madok Sair

Chester Archers

William Dodefyn
Thomas de Brescy
Richard de Wynstanston
John de Pulford

North Wales Archers

Yevan ap Yokyn Gogh
Ken' ap Madok ap Howel
Mad' Lispa
Eden', brother of Mad' Lispa
Yevan Moil ap Yevan
Yevan ap David Gogh
Yevan ap Mad' White
Yevan Hardy
Gron' Pistodor
Eign' ap Mad' ap Ken'
Jor' Duy ap Rees
Ken' ap Howel ap Madok
Yevan ap Yevan Bole
David ap Madok ap Cadugan

Appendix C: The Prince's March

(Data compiled from Baker, *Chronicon*, and Hoskins, *In the Steps of the Black Prince*, 207–08)

Monday, 5 October	Bordeaux—Villeneuve-d'Ornon	4 miles (6.4km)
Tuesday, 6 October	Villeneuve-d'Ornon—Castets-en-Dorthe	28 miles (45.1km)
Wednesday, 7 October	Rest	
Thursday, 8 October	Castets-en-Dorthe—Bazas	11 miles (17.7km)
Friday, 9 October	Rest	
Saturday, 10 October	Bazas—Castelnau	13 miles (20.9km)
Sunday, 11 October	Castelnau—Arouille	25 miles (40.2km)
Monday, 12 October	Rest	
Tuesday, 13 October	Arouille—Monclar	8 miles (12.9km)
Wednesday, 14 October	Rest	
Thursday, 15 October	Rest	
Friday, 16 October	Monclar—Nogaro	14 miles (22.5km)

Saturday, 17 October	Nogaro—Plaisance	13 miles (20.9km)
Sunday, 18 October	Rest	
Monday, 19 October	Plaisance—Bassoues	12 miles (19.3km)
Tuesday, 20 October	Rest	
Wednesday, 21 October	Bassoues—Mirande	11 miles (17.7km)
Thursday, 22 October	Rest	
Friday, 23 October	Mirande—Seissan	11 miles (17.7km)
Saturday, 24 October	Seissan—Simorre	10 miles (16.1km)
Sunday, 25 October	Simorre—Samatan	12 miles (19.3km)
Monday, 26 October	Samatan—St-Lys	14 miles (22.5km)
Tuesday, 27 October	Rest	
Wednesday, 28 October	St-Lys—Lacroix-Falgarde	14 miles (22.5km)
Thursday, 29 October	Lacroix-Falgarde—Montgiscard	12 miles (19.3km)

Friday, 30 October	Montgiscard—Avignonet	14 miles (22.5km)
Saturday, 31 October	Avignonet—Castelnaudary	9 miles (14.5km)
Sunday, 1 November	Rest	
Monday, 2 November	Castelnaudary—Alzau	15 miles (24.1km)
Tuesday, 3 November	Alzau—Carcassonne	9 miles (14.5km)
Wednesday, 4 November	Rest	
Thursday, 5 November	Rest	
Friday, 6 November	Carcassonne—Rustiques	10 miles (16.1km)
Saturday, 7 November	Rustiques—Canet	21 miles (33.8km)
Sunday, 8 November	Canet—Narbonne	10 miles (16.1km)
Monday, 9 November	Rest	
Tuesday, 10 November	Narbonne—Aubian	9 miles (14.5km)
Wednesday, 11 November	Aubian—Homps (or its vicinity)	12 miles (19.3km)

Thursday, 12 November	Homps—Azille	10 miles (16.1km)
Friday, 13 November	Azille—Villemagne	20 miles (32.2km)
Saturday, 14 November	Villemagne—Pennautier	23 miles (37.0km)
Sunday, 15 November	Pennautier—Prouille	16 miles (25.7km)
Monday, 16 November	Prouille—Belpech	17 miles (27.4km)
Tuesday, 17 November	Belpech—Miremont	25 miles (40.2km)
Wednesday, 18 November	Miremont—Carbonne	14 miles (22.5km)
Thursday, 19 November	Rest	
Friday, 20 November	Carbonne—Mauvezin	19 miles (30.6km)
Saturday, 21 November	Mauvezin—Auradé	19 miles (30.6km)
Sunday, 22 November	Auradé—Aurimont	20 miles (32.2km)
Monday, 23 November	Rest	

Tuesday, 24 November	Aurimont—Montaut-les-Crénaux	14 miles (22.5km)
Wednesday, 25 November	Montaut-les-Crénaux—Réjaumont	12 miles (19.3km)
Thursday, 26 November	Rest	
Friday, 27 November	Réjaumont—Lagardère	15 miles (24.1km)
Saturday, 28 November	Lagardère—Mézin	18 miles (29.0km)
Sunday, 29 November	Rest	
Monday, 30 November	Mézin—Casteljaloux	22 miles (35.4km)
Tuesday, 1 December	Casteljaloux—Meilhan-sur-Garonne	15 miles (24.1km)
Wednesday, 2 December	Meilhan-sur-Garonne—La Réole	6 miles (9.7km)

Appendix D: Glossary

Bachelor (knight bachelor): military rank below that of a banneret

Ballinger: oared vessel; small, light weight; sea-going; often referred to as a barge in Middle English

Banneret (knight banneret): military rank, a knight with his own banner

Bascinet: helmet type, very popular in the late Middle Ages; by 1350, most were tight-fitting, conical, covered the back of the neck and cheeks; some had a moveable visor and or a mail coif

Bushel: unit of weight, defined in the Middle Ages as equal in volume to eight wine gallons and weighing 64 tower pounds; the Winchester bushel weighed 35.238 lbs

Caracal/Carrack: large transport ship, often fitted out for war

Cog: one-masted ship with a flush-laid keel and a stern rudder; built high fore and aft; often used for transport and outfitted for war

Corder: rope-maker

Galley: low, oared vessel with one deck

Havener: harbor master

Hulk: large, unwieldy transport vessel

Indenture (1): contract for military service that specified the terms of service, including wages and regard, the duration of service, *restor*, and the responsibilities of the contracting parties, e.g., transport

Indenture (2): contract for goods and/or services

League: a unit of distance equal to three miles

Quarter: a unit of measurement, particularly for grain; equal to eight bushels

Receiver: official appointed to receive rents, tolls, and other monies, funds, or goods;
similar to a treasurer

Regard: bonus payment on top of wages

Tonne: a unit of weight equal to 2240 lbs or 1000 kg

Tun: a unit of measurement for a ship's carrying capacity; based on the wine tun of 252
gallons

Water bailiff: officer in a port responsible for enforcing shipping regulations, collecting
customs, and searching ships as necessary.

Appendix E: Financial Tables

Table E.1: Henxteworth entries by office, 20 September 1355 through 30 December 1355. Data from DCO, Henxteworth Accounts, 20 September–30 December 1355.

Office	Count	Percentage
Individuals*	509	57.0%
Marshalcy	141	15.8%
Kitchen	52	5.8%
Unknown	40	4.5%
Spicery	26	2.9%
Hall and Chamber	25	2.8%
Pantry	24	2.7%
Poultry	23	2.6%
Scullery	21	2.4%
Buttery	20	2.2%
Saucery	6	0.7%
Church	5	0.6%
Wardrobe	1	0.1%

*Including loans from individuals.

Table E.2: Offices and amounts spent by each office. Data drawn from DCO, Henxteworth accounts, 20 September 1355–30 December 1355.

Office	Amount
Kitchen	183L 12s 0.12d 4.9%
Buttery	102L 3s 9.96d 2.8%
Pantry	50L 12s 9.48d 1.4%
Marshaley	371L 4s 7.8d 10.0%
Scullery	24L 12s 0.7%
Hall	20L 8s 2.16d 0.5%
Saucery	3L 7s 2.04d 0.1%
Spicery	34L 15s 8.04d 0.9%
Unknown	238L 8.16d 6.4%
Wardrobe	3s 0.004%
Poultry	40L 12.6s 10.68d 1.1%
Church/Religious Institution	37L 10s 1.0%
Individual	2605L 9s 10.56d 70.2%
Total	3712L 13s 9d

Table E.3: Henxteworth entries by budget item. Data drawn from DCO, Henxteworth accounts, 20 September 1355–30 December 1355.

Item	Amount
Wages	497L 9s 6.84d 12.7%
Victuals and Wine	568L 17s 2.76d 15.3%
Horses	38L 14s 9.96d 1.0%
Horse Expenses	344L 17s 0.6d 9.3%
Transport	166L 11s 6.12d 4.5%
Gifts and Rewards	228L 11s 11.76d 6.2%
Alms and Donations to Churches	87L 7s 2.64d 2.4%
Prince's Personal Expenses	20L 6s 8.04d 0.5%
Livery	74L 4s 4.92d 2.0%
Incomestibles	45L 10s 1.2%
Unknown	101L 11s 2.4d 2.7%
Other	7L 13s 7.44d 0.2%
Reparations	23L 8s 0.6%
Guides	10L 11s 6d 0.3%
Money owed*	1521L 18s 11.52d 41.0%
Total	3712L 13s 9d

*This may include wages, but Henxteworth writes only that the payments are for money owing according to the book of memoranda. In the case of wages, he generally specifies that the payment is an advance on the recipient's wages and or fee.

Table E.4: Expenses by Office

Office	Budget Item	Entries	Amount	52109.88
Payments to Individuals*	Money Owed	272 (61.3%)	1519L 7s	58.3%
	Wages	108 (24.3%)	11.52d	13.3%
	Gifts	38 (8.6%)	347L 15s 1.92d	8.8%
	Unknown	16 (3.6%)	228L 1s 11.76d	1.4%
	Prince's Expenses	8 (1.8%)	35L 7s 3.96d	0.7%
	Horses	6 (1.4%)	17L 16s 8.04d	1.3%
	Reparations	4 (0.9%)	34L 16s 9.96d	0.9%
	Guides	3 (0.7%)	23L 8s	0.4%
	Transport	3 (0.7%)	10L 11s 6d	5.1%
	Victuals and Wine	2 (0.5%)	133L 6s	8.3%
	Religious Donations	2 (0.5%)	216L 14s 3.96d	1.4%
	Other	1 (0.2%)	36L 17s 6d	0.05%
	Total	444	1L 6s 7.44d 2605L 9s 10.56d	
Kitchen	Victuals and Wine	38 (74.5%)	162L 16s 0.12d	88.7%

	Unknown	8 (15.7%)	5L 10s	3.0%
	Transport	2 (3.9%)	5L	2.7%
	Horse Expense	1 (2.0%)	2s	0.05%
	Incomestibles	1 (2.0%)	9L 18s	5.4%
	Other	1 (2.0%)	6s	0.2%
	Total	51	183L 12s 0.12d	
Buttery	Victuals and Wine	13 (65.0%)	95L 12s	93.5%
	Unknown	4 (20.0%)	2L 16s	2.7%
	Transport	3 (15.0%)	3L 15s 9.96d	3.7%
	Total	20	102L 3s 9.96d	
Pantry	Victuals and Wine	15 (62.5%)	44L 14s 0.48d	88.3%
	Transport	4 (16.7%)	2L 7s 9.96d	4.7%
	Unknown	2 (8.3%)	1L 4s 6.96d	2.4%
	Horses	1 (4.2%)	13s	1.3%
	Horse Expenses	1 (4.2%)	1L 6s 8.04d	2.6%
	Incomestibles	1 (4.2%)	6s 8.04d	0.7%
	Total	24	50L 12s 9.48d	
Marshalcy	Horse Expenses	103 (73.0%)	320L 14s 7.56d	86.4%
	Unknown	17 (12.1%)	21L 8s 6.96d	5.8%
	Transport	6 (4/3%)	6L 4s	1.7%
	Horses	4 (2.8%)	3L 5s	0.9%
	Wages	4 (2.8%)	7L 19s 7.32d	2.1%

	Other	4 (2.8%)	5L 16s 9.96d	1.6%
	Victuals and Wine	2 (1.4%)	5L 6s	1.4%
	Gifts and Rewards	1 (0.7%)	10s	0.1%
	Total	141	371L 4s 7.8d	
Scullery	Incomestibles	11 (52.3%)	13L 18s 6d	56.6%
	Transport	5 (23.8%)	8L 19s	36.4%
	Unknown	4 (19.0%)	1L 8s 6d	5.8%
	Horse Expenses	1 (4.8%)	6s	1.2%
	Total	21	24L 12s	
Hall and Chamber	Transport	11 (44.0%)	7L 17s 5.16d	38.6%
	Unknown	5 (20.0%)	3L 18s 9d	19.2%
	Religious Donations	4 (16.0%)	4L 10s 3.96d	22.1%
	Horse Expenses	3 (12.0%)	18s 2.04d	4.5%
	Wages	1 (4.0%)	2L 10s	12.2%
	Victuals and Wine	1 (4.0%)	13s 6d	3.3%
	Total	25	20L 8s 2.16d	
Saucery	Victuals and Wine	3 (50.0%)	2L 17s 8.04d	85.9%
	Horse Expenses	1 (16.7%)	6s	8.9%
	Transport	1 (16.7%)	2s	3.0%
	Unknown	1 (16.7%)	1s 6d	2.2%
	Total	6	3L 7s 2.04d	
Spicery	Incomestibles	9 (34.6%)	22L 4s 9d	63.9%

	Victuals and Wine	8 (23.6%)	8L 4s 6.96d	23.7%
	Transport	3 (11.5%)	3s 9d	0.5%
	Unknown	3 (11.5%)	1L 3s 6d	3.4%
	Wages	1 (3.8%)	1L 15s 11.04d	5.2%
	Prince's Expenses	1 (3.8%)	19s	2.6%
	Other	1 (3.8%)	4s 2.04d	0.6%
	Total	26	34L 15s 8.04d	
Wardrobe	Transport	1 (100%)	3s	100%
	Total	1	3s	
Poultry	Victuals and Wine	21 (91.3%)	38L 5s 9.12d	94.1%
	Wages	2 (8.7%)	2L 8s 1.56d	5.9%
	Total	23	40L 13s 10.68d	
Churches, Convents	Religious Donations	5 (100%)	37L 10s	100%
	Total	5	37L 10s	
Unknown	Unknown	19 (95.0%)	203L 12s 5.52d	85.5%
	Wages	7 (17.5%)	9L 6s 8.64d	3.9%
	Victuals and Wine	3 (7.5%)	6s 8.04d	0.1%
	Religious Donations	3 (7.5%)	6L 6s 3.96d	2.7%
	Livery+	3 (7.5%)	10L 16s	4.5%
	Horse Expenses	2 (5.0%)	3L 1s 6d	1.3%
	Prince's Expenses	1 (2.5%)	2L	0.8%
	Incomestibles	1 (2.5%) [^]		

	Money Owed	1 (2.5%)	2L 11s	1.1%
	Total	40	238L 8.16d	

*Including only payments made to individuals and excluding loans from individuals.

+The other payments related to livery are included in payments for individuals, as the money was granted expressly to the tailor. In these three cases, the money likely was given to the tailor or other individual, but the folio here is torn.

^There is an entry here, but the amount is missing due to the poor condition of the folio.