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

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

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PREFATORY NOTE

The *Centrum* Speech-Act Theory Bibliography

Robert L. Brown, Jr., Editor

In *Centrum* 2.2, Professor Marcia Eaton provided the first published bibliography of speech-act theory. Arranged chronologically, and covering works published from the theory's beginning in Austin's *How To Do Things With Words* through 1975, the bibliography allows readers to trace the rise of the theory in literary and linguistic theory. Professor Robert Meyers's expanded bibliography in this issue continues this project.

But valuable as these bibliographical studies may be, they probably are not the most valuable use of journal space. For this reason, we have initiated the *Centrum* speech-act theory computer bibliography. We have combined the entries from the Eaton and Meyers's bibliographies in a computer file which will be continuously updated with entries submitted by our editorial board and our readers. Once a year, the entire bibliography will be re-alphabetized, and printed. Copies will be available for $3.00 each, beginning in June of 1979.

And so, two invitations: Interested readers are invited to submit entries for the bibliography, particularly citations of very current work which might escape the attention of the average reader. And beginning in June of 1979, readers are invited to order and enjoy copies of our current bibliography in this important area of language theory.

Robert B. Meyers
Karen Hopkins

A Speech-Act Theory Bibliography

Since the publication of Marcia Eaton's "Speech Acts: A Bibliography" in *Centrum* several years ago, the number of books and articles employing Austin's theory of speech acts has more than doubled. Furthermore, the influence of the theory has spread beyond philosophy, linguistics and literary theory to fields as diverse as political science, legal studies, education, sociology and theology. The purpose of this bibliography is to expand the Eaton bibliography to include this growing body of work, as well as to add the most recent contributions in philosophy, linguistics and literary theory.

The rationale for the inclusion of material in this bibliography is simple and strict; reference is made only to work which explicitly employs Austin's theory and its major concepts. To have included parallel work – work pursuing problems and considerations similar to those entertained by Austin – would have resulted in a much longer bibliography.

Because the theory's influence is spreading to so many scholarly fields, any claim concerning the degree of this bibliography's completeness would be a mere guess. All that can be safely said is that it continues the excellent start provided by Eaton.

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George L. Dillon

There is No Dictionary in the Head

> It is surely ironic that the K-F (Katz-Fodor) theory, for all its transformationalist invective about the productiveness of language, should erect a semantic theory which elevates the commonplace to a standard of propriety, and denies the creativity of the word.
>
> – Edward Kelly & Philip Stone, *Computer Recognition of English Word Senses*

Probably every literary critic you could find would want to uphold the creativity of the word and to shun a theory which denied it, but you would have to search to find a critic as sure as Messrs. Kelly and Stone that the Katz-Fodor theory is wicked, or why it is wicked, or indeed, what it is and hence what is to be avoided, or whether there are other, more adequate semantic theories around that do more justice to the creativity of the word. This is not a wholesome situation, for the troublesome aspects of the Katz-Fodor and other current theories are those that appear to be most squarely based in common sense: an analysis of the difficulties of current semantic models thus may lay bare some misleading assumptions very common among literary critics. In particular, if you believe that knowledge of words consists of one or more senses for each rather like those described in dictionaries and that in reading we recall what we can remember of the various senses of each word and select the likeliest one, then you are, perhaps without knowing it, of the devil's party. The creativity at issue includes such things as the capacity for understanding metaphors, and at least one linguist-critic has recently acknowledged the inadequacy of Katzian semantics in this area: "The important fact to emerge from the preceding discussion is that metaphoric construal frequently requires for its execution knowledge of more than just meaning taken in the narrow sense.... Therefore, a fully comprehensive theory of metaphor cannot be restricted to semantic processes. Just how the nonsemantic, i.e., the encyclopedic, element might be incorporated in such a theory is not clear, however."[1] Basing my analysis on much neglected notions developed from the Gestalt psychologists by Gustaf Stern and William Empson a generation ago, I will sketch a model of how word-meaning works as we read, which is more natural and illuminating than the model inherent in "K-F" and many other semantic theories. This model will clarify the role of encyclopedic knowledge in metaphor and other interpretive processes, though not, as Levin suggests, by adding it on, but rather by eliminating the effective distinction of semantics and knowledge of the world.

[*Centrum,* 5:2 (Autumn 1977), pp. 109-121.]

On the traditional lexicographic, and now linguistic, view, a word designates (or denotes, or refers to) (a class of) entities, but not all properties of the entities in this class are equally relevant to the sense of the word. The word selects from all of the properties of the entities a subset of properties which are criterial for its application or differentiate it from other words. These criterial properties, or diagnostic components, constitute the core of meaning of the term; other associated or supplemental properties/components may cluster on the periphery of the sense of the word. The set of defining properties is commonly said to constitute the sense of the word, and the sense of the word is said to determine its designation. Recent work in semantics has pointed out areas of vocabulary where sense may not give a complete, necessary and sufficient set of conditions to determine designation[2] and where designation may be governed more by proto- or stereotypical exemplars than by a set of necessary and sufficient properties.[3] Even with these modifications, or with the further notion that the criterial properties of a sense exhibit a complexive organization (a "family resemblance"),[4] semantic theorists are inclined to preserve the basic distinction between sense ("knowledge of the meaning of the word") and knowledge of the world. We have already seen S. R. Levin, working in the framework of Jerrold Katz, take it as inherent in the definition of semantics itself. What is crucial for our purposes is that the sense does not immediately represent all that we know about the designatum. Eugene Nida, working within the framework of field theory, is explicit on this (as is, inter alia, Levin, p. 92):

> Componential analysis does not attempt to describe in detail all the various features or characteristics of each type of related event, but only to point distinctive contrasts which serve to separate one meaning or set of meanings from the others. Meaning must be regarded as serving primarily a negative role in setting boundaries to semantic territories rather than as specifying all the variations of events which may occur within the area of a single lexical unit.[5]

It is also widely supposed that in constructing readings for sentences, we call up the senses of the component words but do not immediately call up all that we know or believe about the designatum. If indeed the sense of a word represents the way it is understood, then any change or shifting (broadening, narrowing) in the way it is understood must be represented as a difference in sense.

Consider now how we understand *actor* in each of the following sentences:

We need actors, not actresses.
We need actors, not hacks.
We need actors, not comedians.
We need actors, not stars.
We need actors, not hams.
We need actors, not robots.

It seems to me that in each sentence certain properties that actors might have are highlighted by the contrasting term, but that these are not exactly what one thinks of as parts of the sense of *actor.* The highlighting consists of finding some property associable (even on a somewhat ad hoc basis) with actors which contrasts with some salient property of the other term. The first contrast has been used to argue that *actor* has one sense which includes the component MALE and another sense which lacks it.[6] This is perhaps the only way the conventional semantic model could represent what goes on here. We could improve on this statement somewhat by saying that "the sense" of *actor* acquires the component MALE temporarily when contrasted with *actresses* (which does contain FEMALE as part of its sense), but that *actor* does not manage to carry off MALE with it outside of the contrast. We would be using the temporary adding of a component to keep track of the way our view of the designatum is altered in the construction – it isn't really the sense of the word *actor* that is altered here.

In a rather similar fashion, James McCawley argues that nouns designating works of art or scholarship (*score, thesis, book, treatise,* etc.) have each at least two senses, one meaning the work itself and one the physical embodiment of the work, so that there is a "difference in meaning" with *dissertation* in the first pair of sentences and a difference in "normalness" in the second pair:

John's dissertation deals with premarital sex among the Incas.
John's dissertation weighs five pounds.

I am halfway finished with writing my dissertation, which deals with premarital sex among the Incas.
*I am halfway finished with writing my dissertation, which weighs five pounds.[7]

Again, I think it is a matter of highlighting different properties of dissertations – the different predicates *(deals with premarital sex among the Incas/weighs five pounds)* allow us (or induce us) to focus on different properties of the designatum. We think of the dissertation in different ways, but not because *dissertation* has two different senses. The impression of incongruity in the second sentence of the second pair can be traced to the rapid shift in the properties of dissertations that are highlighted (or, the ways dissertations are viewed).

The process I have called highlighting was taken as central to the account of meaning by Gustav Stern, who gave it the name I will hereafter use: specialization.[8] We say that in the first sentence, the predicate induces us to specialize on the physical properties of dissertations (i.e., dissertation-qua-stack-of-typed-paper) and in the second sentence on the properties of dissertations as learned discussions. If we specialize on attributes of the designatum that are taken to be essential and typical then we have what Stern and others called a

pregnancy, translating the German term *Praegnanz* used by gestalt psychologists among others. One construction often used to illustrate this notion is the contrast of a word with itself, as it were, always with extra ("emphatic") stress on the second occurrence:

> An explosive is an explosive, it should be surrounded with precautions....
> A man's a man for a'that. (Stern, p. 410)

The process by which we concentrate on the meaning of the repeated word is not just a device for deriving some meaning from a tautology; rather, it applies, to some degree at least, whenever a word becomes a kind of key or central term, and can pick out (or highlight) almost any "essential" or (stereo) typical property of the designatum. In *The Structure of Complex Words,* William Empson discusses Hamlet's use of *man* in his speech concerning his father:

He was a man, take him for all in all.

Out of context, it is hard to be sure what aspects of the designation of *man* are being highlighted, but the preceding lines help to direct our attention in an evaluative or normative direction[9]:

> Hor.: I saw him once; he was a goodly king.
> Ham.: He was a man, take him for all in all, I shall not look upon his like again.

I agree with Empson that a plausible interpretation involves the calling up of a "manly man" (or "compleat man") stereotype, so that *man* is not meant as a contrast to "goodly king" (i.e., a levelling sentiment) but is rather the culmination of the evaluation ("not just a goodly king but a man without parallel"). Quite a different stereotype is called up when sexism is at issue and one says "That's the way a man would put it," or consider *man* in the slogan "We are men, not machines" – the last could take a couple of pregnancies. In speaking of *the* stereotype associated with a word we are greatly oversimplifying: we can associate several stereotypes with many terms. It appears, just to cite a minor example, that there are at least three "behavior" stereotypes associated with pigs, one centered on gluttony (but extending to our trying to get more than one needs or than is one's share), another on messiness and sloth, and one on indelicacy and uncleanliness.

In this discussion of specialization I have begun (unobtrusively, I hope) to use the phrases "understanding a word" and "view of the designatum" – these appear to be needed in any model of what we do with words. It seems that what words call up is our knowledge and beliefs about their designata, and we make a selection from that knowledge of the parts that are most salient in the context, that come the closest to the probable intention of the speaker/writer. One thus constructs an understanding of what the speaker/writer means (intends) by the word. In none of this do the properties of the thing consti-

tuting the sense of the word have any special priority – they only, as it were, gain us access to the thing. Thus words are "processed" in relation to the inferred intention of the speaker/hearer and "lexical processing" is much more an interpretive act than has been generally recognized. On most usual models, interpretive choice is confined to selection of the sense of a word that gives the best or most congruent reading for the phrase and sentence. But this gives much too much importance to the senses of words. Recently a number of psycholinguists have suggested that "senses may be built on the spot" or particularized in contexts according to some processes as yet unspecified.[10] This view appears compatible with my own and worth pursuing, as long as the terminology is cleared up: it would be better to speak of *understandings* as "built" on the spot. We might then return to Nida's image of the features of sense as boundaries of semantic territories and add to it that interpretation is concerned with specifying the particular event which is meant in the individual instance. The most significant work by psycholinguists on this point has been done by Richard C. Anderson and his associates who have produced experimental evidence that subjects particularize ("instantiate") and elaborate senses of words according to their contexts. Anderson and Andrew comment on one of these studies:

> The present research suggests that sentence comprehension and memory involve constructing particularized representations whose sense cannot be reliably predicted from the dictionary readings of the constituent words (see also Anderson & McGraw, 1973). In our view, the most plausible explanation for the results is that words loosely and flexibly constrain the building of a representation; that intimately involved in language comprehension is knowledge of the world as well as knowledge of the language (assuming one wishes to make this distinction at all); and that an essential process is analysis of context.[11]

Another interpretive process which requires free access to all our knowledge about the designatum of a word is that involved in understanding a transferred usage. Consider how many different senses of *bridge* are present in the following phrases and contexts:

suspension bridge

bridge of the nose
bridge of eyeglasses
bridge (on a violin)
bridge (in music)
bridge (in billiards)
bridge (in wrestling)

One could of course say that the word has a different sense in each case, but that would miss both the way each (or most) of these usages pick out one or more properties of "literal" bridges and the semi-open-endedness of the list.

There is, in other words, the possibility of transferring *bridge* to yet another situation or domain and of being correctly interpreted by one's hearer/reader. Dictionaries do often attempt to capture the relatedness and open-endedness in such situations by grouping some of the more common, established transfers under a special "sense" while indicating that these transfers are merely illustrative. Consider the following partial subentry for *bridge* from *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary* (8th ed., 1973):

> **2**: something resembling a bridge in form or function: as **a**: the upper bony part of the nose; *also:* the part of a pair of glasses that rests upon it **b**: an arch serving to raise the strings of a musical instrument....

The subentry goes on through "f" and is followed by a third sense which collects some of the senses based on bridges as connections. Understanding an individual instance of a transfer involves finding a match between some properties of something in the sphere of things that otherwise appears to be designated and some properties of (designatum of) the primary (or "literal") term. It thus involves a matching of things (a bridge on the eyeglasses is a bridge insofar as it is a narrow connection between two major masses...). Thus, as Stern emphasizes, each transfer involves a specialization on some properties of the primary designatum and the ignoring of others. And, as the qualification in the following subentry from *Webster's New Collegiate* for *tree* reminds us, it may also involve an adjustment in the way the intended designatum is viewed:

> **3**: something in the form of or felt to resemble a tree: as **a**: a diagram or graph that branches usu. from a simple stem without forming loops or polygons....

That is, viewing a diagram of geneological descent or phrase structure as having any properties of a tree at all involves viewing them in a special way (i.e., specializing on certain of their properties, which the dictionary here very kindly enumerates). We glimpse here the way "imagery" affects thought: the beginning linguistics student who draws phrase structure trees with reconverging branches is not taking the term *tree diagram* very seriously (or in the right way). On the other side, how many students have been able to pick up the "nonreconverging" property of tree diagrams without ever thinking about it consciously as a result of this felicitous transfer! These later"senses" in the entries for *bridge* and *tree* are pretty clearly not senses as we initially defined them: they are more a suggestion of the directions in which these words tend to transfer with illustrations of some of the more established ones. As such, these subentries are probably a better reflection of what we know about these words than the senses in a semanticist's lexicon would be. On this point there is something more like a dictionary than a lexicon in the head.

If we take the basic definition of metaphor to be the use of a word to designate something other than it is usually used to designate, we clearly

include transfers in the category of metaphors. Stern, however, suggests that there are two major differences. For one thing, the designatum of the primary term may be quite unlike the actual intended designatum, whereas the things must share significant similarities in the case of transfer. This is the primary criterion for the *OED* in distinguishing *transf* from *fig* senses: there is usually a transfer from a primary designation in the domain of physical objects to an actual designation in the domain of abstracts involved in extensions which they label fig. One result of adopting this criterion is that most of the actual designata of metaphors are clearly not members of the primary designata. So for example the sense of *burn* that appears in

> Dry ice will burn you.
> Too much fertilizer will burn the grass.

they label transf, but the sense of *burn* operative in contexts dealing with the fires of lust or wrath are labelled fig. The second difference is more important for our purposes: a transfer establishes its designation via the common property and the other, non-common properties simply fall out. With metaphor there may be many points of likeness (or unlikeness), and all that carry over from the primary into the actual domain are meant. Further, even the discordant properties of the primary term may be reinterpreted. Consider the interpretation of a string of metaphors instanced by Geoffrey Leech:

> Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested.[12]

Said at a convention of book-eating caterpillars, this would occasion no metaphoric interpretation at all, but in its context, Bacon's essay "Of Studies," it does occur to one that a metaphoric interpretation might well be sought in which the designata of *tasted, swallowed, chewed,* and *digested* are not activities in the area of mastication, grinding, and other alimentary processes but in the area of the usual transactions with books. Stern emphasizes that we need some context to provide a sense of the domain of the actual designation (his *referent* is our *designatum*):

> The degree of "preparation" necessary for the comprehension of a metaphor varies with the degree of similarity or intimacy of relation between primary and secondary meaning. Even if it is of the most elusive kind, the hearer will make a correct reference, he will understand it correctly, *en fonction du schema d'ensemble,* but a correspondingly definite preparation is then required. Thus the metaphors in the first lines of Keats's *Ode on a Grecian Urn* would be incomprehensible if the heading had not previously informed the reader what referent the phrases were intended to designate. (p. 305)

One could of course scurry off to the *OED* to see whether these words had in Bacon's time metaphoric senses which could be plugged in (which is really to

let one's fingers do the work) or construct them oneself. Interpreting a metaphor has two aspects: first, one must identify the new designatum by matching various possible action-stereotypes from the target domain with the various possible ways of viewing or stereotyping chewing ("What sort of dealings with books would be designated by *chewing?"*); second, one may judge of the aptness of the metaphor on one or another interpretation by seeing how many elements of the primary stereotype can be made to hold of a proposed interpretation. So Stern:

> The actual referent itself is present to the mind, the awareness of the primary referent is present in so far as it is necessary for the right comprehension of the metaphor; and for the full comprehension to develop the listener relies chiefly on the whole import of the word and of the two referents, not on any one element of meaning of the word. The hearer must himself educe the relations between actual and primary referent if they are to affect him. (pp. 306-7)

This is so close to being completely right that it seems mean to enter any qualifications, but, if we consider the example from Bacon, it does appear that Stern is simplifying in regarding the interpretation as determined just by the two designata: the interpretation of *chew,* for example, is controlled throughout by its position in the series of metaphors *taste/swallow/chew and digest.* Suppose one were to project as the intended designatum of *chew* that which is the straightforward designatum of *criticize severely.* We should judge this as somewhat "off," I think, if only because "chewing" is treated as preliminary to some further action of "digesting", and it is hard to work out a new designatum for *digest* in the domain of dealings with books that both completes "criticize severely" and receives support from a stereotype of *digest.* Further, such an interpretation of *chew* makes no use of the "derive nourishment" property attached to these actions, and a better interpretation would give a designatum which has a correlate for "nourishment" in it. I am suggesting that a metaphor can be carried various distances. Some are virtually "throw aways" like many transfers in that once the designatum has been identified, the essential value of the metaphor is spent (these would include relatively hackneyed, "dead," pointless, and stupid metaphors); others may bear greater expressive weight and suggest a complex and multifaceted parallelism of things. As it happens, Bacon "explicates" these metaphors: "That is, some bookes are to be read only in partes; others to be read, but cursorily; and some few to be read wholly and with diligence and attention." In giving a non-metaphorical version of their designations, he in effect dismisses them by terminating the search for resonances and overtones, a best or fullest interpretation.

The way *le schema d'ensemble* can shape or focus our understanding of particular metaphors is perhaps worth illustrating further with a small Emily Dickinson poem (no. 1412 in the Johnson edition):

Shame is the shawl of Pink
In which we wrap the Soul
To keep it from infesting Eyes –
The elemental Veil
Which helpless Nature drops
When pushed upon a scene
Repugnant to her probity –
Shame is the tint divine.

Citing only the first line, Owen Thomas tries to describe what happens to our understanding of the words in terms of transfer of criterial components (features) from *shawl* to *shame:* "we are assuming, at least in part, that "shame" is concrete rather than abstract (or has at least acquired some of the features that we normally associate with concrete objects) – that we can wrap "shame" around our bodies, that it has a specific color (a "pink blush" is a necessary feature of shame," and so on."[13] It is not clear to me what Thomas means by *shame* being given concrete properties, unless he means to give it a kind of metonymic interpretation when it stands for its physical symptom (i.e., blushing). That shift can be gotten at without the mediation of "concreteness" however, if we simply look for some designatum in the domain of shame which has some of the properties of "shawl of Pink." The mediation of concreteness may indeed have misled Thomas into wrapping shame around the body. Surely *wrap* is to be interpreted here in the shame-domain in terms of a self-protective "motion" in the direction of concealment which, as the poem develops, links "shrinking away from the looks of others" with "trying not to look" on something shameful – neither Veil nor shawl are concrete in the final reading, though one could not be sure about this just from the first line. The main difficulty with constructing an understanding of metaphor from the senses of words is not so much that it is misleading as that it is irrelevant; it does not model what actually goes on and instead points one in inconsequential directions. This irrelevance is inevitable once we limit the information on which the interpreting process draws to the sense of the word and reaches fatal proportions when we restrict the amount of context that may be brought to bear, since it is the requirements of the *schema d'ensemble* that determine how far and in what direction we pursue the interpretation.

We must conclude that the innocent-seeming assumption that metaphor takes the senses of words and alters them cannot be right and that the interpretation of metaphor and transfer proceeds by considering the designata (both of primary word and probable intended designatum) not the "literal" sense of the term. Leech recognized this some time ago and concluded that the interpretation of metaphor is a matter beyond the scope of linguistic semantics: "Plainly the means by which we arrive at the appropriate ground of a metaphor take us away from the study of meaning to a study of systems of belief, social institutions, and imponderable factors of individual psychology" (p. 92). We can, of course, express the *results* of interpreting a metaphor in terms of semantic components being added or shifted around, as for example if we

described the way that *chew* is interpreted as involving cancellation of the CRUSH/GRIND/GNAW components in the sense of *chew* in the rather tedious fashion that I and others have described and that is most fully elaborated in Levin's *Semantics of Metaphor.*[14] But such a modeling would miss the actual interpretive process by a country mile. The relevant properties of the primary designatum (the "ground") cannot be specified ahead of time, nor is there any guarantee that they will be mentioned in the "sense" of the primary term. This is the case with *chew,* where the relevant properties emerge in contrast with *taste* and *digest* and in application to the domain of reading. It is even the case, as Levin himself notes, with one of Aristotle's basic examples:

Indeed ten thousand noble things Odysseus did

where *ten thousand* must be interpreted as "a very great number," yet it is so only in some contexts (not, for example, as the number of microbes that could dance on the head of a pin). Levin considers this to be a restricted type, but I believe it only appears to be so because the actual interpretive process is obscured in such accounts. For example, Levin cites as a simple example the possible construal of *The rose melted* either by taking *rose* "as comprising a feature [+Liquid], transferred from *melted,* yielding a reading, say, of its dew evaporating, or one can construe *melted* as comprising a feature [+Plant], transferred from *rose,* and yielding a reading in which the rose is losing its leaves or petals" (*Semantics of Metaphor,* p. 24). Again, the process to be explicated is how we get from a liquid rose melting to dew etc., and how we get from a melting plant to losing leaves – surely knowledge and experience of roses is as critical here as in the earlier case.

It is a somewhat melancholy reflection that Empson realized the interest and importance of the Gestalt notions of specialization and pregnancy thirty years ago and that he made this discovery just as psychology and semantics were parting company. Semantics since the early sixties has been vehemently structuralist, concerned with characterizing and describing meaning without any subjective element, and central to this elimination of the subject is the distinction of sense and knowledge: each person will differ in knowledge and beliefs, and we cannot tie the meaning of words *in abstracto* to the beliefs of particular individuals at particular times. Be that as it may, our concern has been with the understanding of words in contexts of actual use; our argument has been that here we cannot avoid knowledge and beliefs, interpretive choices, and inferred intentions; and our conclusion is that you may have your semantics pure if you want, but it will be pretty abstract, dull and insipid stuff.

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NOTES

1 Samuel R. Levin, *The Semantics of Metaphor* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1977), pp. 94-5.

2 Areas of vocabulary where designation seems shaped by considerations and processes other than the checking off of criterial properties include terms differentiated by attitude or mood (miserly/thrifty, deprive/spare, half full/half empty) and terms for natural kinds which are understood conventionally to designate the types or kinds of things after the fashion of proper names – i.e., not by virtue of any properties associated with the term but by virtue of the speaker/writer's intention to refer to the kind.

3 Hiliary Putnam has advanced this notion to account for the way designation of natural kind terms and other terms may be practically determined. See especially his "Is Semantics Possible?" and "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" in *Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 139-52 and pp. 215-71, respectively. Eleanor Rosch and associates have attempted to find evidence that stereotypes are in fact psychologically real. See for example E. Rosch and C. B. Mervis, "Family Resemblances: Studies in the Internal Structure of Categories," *Cognitive Psychology,* 7 (1975), 573-605; and E. Rosch, C. B. Mervis, W. Gray, D. Johnson, and P. Boyes-Braem, "Basic Objects in Natural Categories," *Cognitive Psychology,* 8 (1976), 382-439.

4 The notion that the designata of certain terms exhibit only a family resemblance emerges to prominence in Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (paragraphs 66-71 et passim). John Searle employed it in his account of the meaning of proper names ("Proper Names," *Mind,* 67 [1958], 166-73) but was severely criticized for doing so by Saul Kripke ("Naming and Necessity," in *The Semantics of Natural Language,* ed. Donald Davison and Gilbert Harmon, [Dordrecht: D. Reidel publishing Company, 1972], pp. 253-355.) It also figures in the article by E. Rosch and C. B. Mervis cited in the previous note.

5 Eugene A. Nida, *Componential Analysis of Meaning* (The Hague: Mouton, 1975), pp. 60-1. This echoes a point made, surprisingly, in Uriel Weinreich's "Lexicographic Definition in Descriptive Semantics," in *Problems in Lexicography,* ed. Fred W. Householder and Sol Saporta, Indiana University Research Center in Anthropology, Folklore, and Linguistics, Publication 21 (Indiana University and Mouton, 1967), p. 30.

6 Herbert H. Clark and Eve V. Clark, *Psychology and Language* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1977), p. 445.

7 James D. McCawley, "The Role of Semantics in a Grammar," in *Universals in Linguistic Theory,* ed. Emmon Bach and Robert T. Harms (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1968), p. 131.

8 Gustaf Stern, *Meaning and Change of Meaning* (1931; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), p. 31 et passim. Note that specialization as used here is a process in concentrating or directing the attention, not a historical process of narrowing (e.g., the standard example of *deer*), although it may be considered, as by Stern, to underlie historical sense change.

9 Stern observes that pregnant usage very often involves valuation of the designation intended (pp. 404-5).

10 Alfonso Caramazza and Ellen Grober, "Polysemy and the Structure of the Subjective Lexicon," in *Semantics: Theory and Application* (GURT 1976) ed. Clea Rameh (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1976), pp. 181-206; also George A. Miller and Philip Johnson-Laird, *Language and Perception* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976); also Edward Kelly and Philip Stone, *Computer Recognition of English Word Senses* (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1975), esp. pp. 50-81.

11 Richard C. Anderson and Andrew Ortony, "On Putting Apples into Bottles – A Problem of Polysemy," *Cognitive Psychology,* 7 (1975), p. 176; see also Richard C. Anderson and B. McGraw, "On the Representation of the Meanings of General Terms," *Journal of Experimental Psychology,* 101 (1973), pp. 301-06; and Richard C. Anderson, James W. Pichert, Ernest T. Goetz, Diane L. Schallert, Kathleen V. Stevens, and Stanley R. Trollip, "Instantiation of General Terms," *Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior,* 15 (1976), pp. 667-80.

12 Geoffrey N. Leech, *Towards a Semantic Description of English* (London: Longman, 1969), p. 90.

13 Owen Thomas, *Metaphor (and related subjects)* (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 40.

14 This notion appears under the terminology of "transfer features" in Uriel Weinreich's "Explorations in Semantic Theory," in *Current Trends in Linguistics,* Vol. III, ed T. A. Sebeok (The Hague: Mouton, 1966), pp. 395-478. It is presented in semi-popular fashion in Owen Thomas's *Metaphor* (New York: Random House, 1969) and now appears in more and more introductory texts, as indeed my own text *Introduction to Contemporary Linguistic Semantics* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977). This sort of model has actually been advanced as a model of processing by Edward E. Smith, Lance J. Rips, and Edward J. Shoben in "Semantic

Memory and Psychological Semantics," in *The Psychology of Learning and Motivation,* Vol 8, ed. Gordon H. Bower (New York: Academic Press, 1974), pp. 1-45. Charles J. Fillmore has indicated his doubts: "A common approach in linguistics to an explanation of the metaphoring process has been to determine the criterial features of a word and to devise a formalism for showing how the features appropriate for one word can be superimposed on the collection of features associated with a second word or group of words in the same construction. I believe that most cases of metaphor, including the most interesting ones, are not like that at all" ("Topics in Lexical Semantics," in *Current Issues in Linguistic Theory,* ed. Roger Cole [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977], p. 134).

REVIEW ARTICLE

R.A. Hudson, *Arguments for a Nontransformational Grammar.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. 1976. Pp. 214+x. $9.00.

The nontransformational grammatical model proposed in this book is called daughter-dependency grammar, for reasons to become clear presently, and is claimed to be able to accommodate all of the kinds of facts which are typically taken as motivation for TG without requiring either transformational rules or the distinction between 'deep' and 'surface' levels of syntactic structure. As a preliminary to this review, I would like to briefly summarize two main reasons for preferring nontransformational grammars to TG's, all else being equal:

(a) As even committed transformationalists readily admit, TG is 'too powerful,' a criticism which can be interpreted both on a highly technical level (at which it is necessary to confront an imaginary demon called a Universal Turing Machine) but also on a relatively nontechnical one. Part of what is involved is that since virtually any formal operation can be performed by transformations, the door is open to all sorts of hocus-pocus in generating languages via grammars which include transformational rules.[1] Most particularly, since the deep structures generated by the base component of a TG may bear only marginal resemblances to well-formed sentences, serious questions of empirical accountability arise.[2] The case is particularly clearly put by Braine (1967:277) as follows:

> [The] distinction between manifest and underlying structure. . .creates a special kind of methodological difficulty in assessing the validity of generative grammars. . . .If the terminal strings generated by the phrase structure component are permitted to be arbitrarily different from any actual sentence structures, there are no independent data against which the phrase structure and the transformational rules can be separately tested. Since transformational rules provide an extraordinarily powerful tool for mapping one structure onto another, the grammarian can write the phrase structure kernel partly on the basis of his convenience, free to correct any poor fit with the manifest structure of the language by using [transformations] to reshuffle the elements. This methodological looseness makes it impossible to accept empirical claims about the properties of phrase structure grammars of natural language.

[*Centrum,* 5:2 (Autumn 1977), pp. 122-142.]

(b) The second major objection to TG is based on an appeal to psychology. Despite strong claims by its proponents that TG has an important part to play in shaping our understanding of cognitive processes, it has been argued (perhaps most extensively by Derwing (1973)) that its underlying assumptions render it psychologically most implausible. For, as the argument goes, it seems very odd on the face of it to claim that one of the things a language learner does is to concoct rules for generating deep structures, when deep structures are themselves so unlike the actual linguistic objects to which the learner is actually exposed. How seriously one chooses to take this objection depends, of course, on how seriously one chooses to take contemporary psychology; if one is convinced that only a TG could give an adequate account of the structure of natural languages, then so much the worse for psychology if it is not up to the task of accounting for how such a grammar could be learned. But one does not have to be a committed empiricist to believe that in the best of all possible worlds, linguistic structure could be treated in a theoretical framework more austere than that provided by orthodox transformationalism; any proposal to the effect that it can thus deserves the most serious consideration.[3]

We are now ready to address the merits of Hudson's proposal. I think that in principle it is a sound one, but I also think that a much better case could be made for it than is made in this book. The most serious flaw is that the exposition is so disordered and unsystematic that the reader's initial response is likely to be one of complete bafflement; repeated readings and much reflection ultimately yield understanding, but it ought not to have to be left to the reader to weave a tangle of individual threads into a coherent fabric. The difficulties in making sense of the presentation arise, oddly enough, despite the author's adoption of a loose, chatty style that would be expected under normal circumstances to contribute to clarity. Part of the job of this review will thus have to be to provide exegesis; the interested reader is also referred to Schachter 1978.

Central to the model are two fundamental notions, called daughter-dependency and sister-dependency. Here we already encounter an expository problem since the terms 'daughter' and 'sister' have clearly defined meanings in the theory of phrase structure grammar, but are used by Hudson with quite different senses. Matters are also not helped by the fact that Hudson does not define them formally, though definitions are not difficult to provide. Daughter-dependency is the relationship between A (the mother) and B (the daughter) in statements of the form

(1) Every expression of Type A may/must contain a B.

while sister-dependency is the relationship between C and D in statements of the form

(2) If a sentence contains a C, then it may/must contain a D.

in which case D is said to be a sister of C. There is an obvious infelicity in this terminology, however, since we are forced to use 'sisterhood' to describe a nonsymmetric (and perhaps even asymmetric) relation.

Rules of the two types just described are given in the following abbreviatory notation:

(3) a. A $\longrightarrow$ B
    b. C $\longrightarrow$ D

As stated, (3a,b) do not distinguish between 'may' and 'must' statements; by convention, they are given the latter interpretation unless explicitly marked as optional, in which case they have the former. Diagrammatically, daughter-dependencies are represented by up-and-down connections from mother to daughter; thus (3a) defines a structural configuration of the form:

Sister-dependency is represented by curved lines running sideways with an arrow leading from the governor to the dependent:

or, if the elements are in the opposite order,

I think it best to illustrate the operation of daughter- and sister-dependency rules with a simple hypothetical language before bringing real language data into consideration. Therefore, consider a language with two lexical categories X = $\{a,b,c\}$ and Y = $\{d,e\}$ and S as its only nonlexical category; suppose further that all grammatical sentences must be in the form XY or XS, and that all instances of the former are of the form **b**Y while all instances of the latter are in the form **a**S or **c**S. This establishes the need for subcategorization of X, which in a DDG would be done by 'classification rules' analogous to the lexical redundancy rules of a TG. Each such rule is of the form F : G, where F defines the matrix to be subcategorized and G is a series of features specifications for which are to be assigned to F. Thus, for the present case, we would have

(4) a. +X : ±Y-comp
    b. -Y-comp : +S-comp

and the lexicon is as follows:

(5) *a:* +X, +S-comp
b: +X, +Y-comp
c: +X, +S-comp
d: +Y
e: +Y

The language has one daughter-dependency rule and one sister-dependency rule:

(6) a. S ⟶ X
b. +a-comp ⟶ a, where a = X or S

We now generate the sentence *be.* Rules like (6) may be interpreted either as well-formedness conditions on structures, or, alternatively, as instructions in a structure-building process. For ease of exposition, we will adopt the latter interpretation. The first step is to select S as the start symbol and then to apply (6a) to obtain

Having introduced X, we go to the classification rules. Suppose we pick [+Y-comp] as an additional feature; no further classification rules are applicable, so the next step is to apply (6b) and we obtain



The order of elements at this point is arbitrary. To obtain the correct sequence, we make use of the following rule:

(7) If D is a sister of C, then C precedes D.

In Hudson's notation, this would translate into

(8) C ⟶ [D ⟵ C]

where the large arrow means 'precedes.' This accordingly orders Y after X. No further rules are applicable, so lexical insertion takes place based on a

matching of lexical entries with the features of lexical nodes, just as in TG. We can thus obtain



Consider now the more complex sentence *cacdb,* whose structure is



We are now ready to consider a fragment of English, but before doing so, some prefatory remarks. In addition to classification, daughter-dependency, sister-dependency, and sequence rules, we will encounter two more species, namely feature-addition and function-assignment rules.[4] The former are like classification rules in that they add features to matrices, but unlike them in that they can make reference to structure. Each such rule states that if an element E occurs in a particular structural relation to some other element, then it must bear a given feature marking. In principle, it might have already acquired this marking from prior application of classification rules, in which case the feature-addition rule does not actually add the required feature, or does so vacuously; by the same token, if E already has a feature incompatible with one added by a feature-addition rule, the derivation blocks. Function-assignment rules place functional labels (e.g., SUBJECT, TOPIC) in matrices under appropriately specified structural conditions.

I also want to make it clear that in what is to follow, the rules I will give do not always match Hudson's. I have tried to do as little violence to his formulation as possible, but have not hesitated to take liberties where, in my

opinion, there is some advantage of either an expository or a substantive nature to be gained thereby. I apologize both to Hudson and to the reader for being so presumptuous as to rewrite the book in this review, but I feel that my exegetical purpose is best served by doing so in places. I introduce each set of rules separately with commentary, beginning with the following classification rules:

(9) a. +sentence : ±imperative, ±interrogative
b. +imperative : -finite
c. +predicate : ±verb
d. +verb : ±aux
e. +verb, -aux : ±transitive
f. +nominal : ±phrase

These rules reflect the fact that in a DDG, nonlexical as well as lexical nodes may be specified via complexes of features. Note also that (9a) allows for sentences to be [+imperative, +interrogative], which seems acceptable given that there are sentences with imperative force in interrogative form – e.g., *Will you please shut that window!* The specification [-imperative, -interrogative] defines declarative sentences. The significance of (9b) will become clear when the feature-addition rules are introduced below; the remaining rules are, I think, self-explanatory or nearly so. The class of adjectives corresponds to [+predicate, -verb] and auxiliaries are treated as a subclass of the class of verbs.

We next give one daughter-dependency and two sister-dependency rules:

(10) a. +sentence ——→ +predicate
b. +predicate ——→ +nominal
c. +transitive ——→ +nominal

The rules (10b,c) are taken directly from Hudson, and reflect his assumption that, strictly speaking, daughter- and sister-dependency rules relate specific FEATURES of nodes. His structural diagrams, however, do not indicate feature-feature connections, another expository problem. I would like to propose an additional diagramming convention, namely that in cases where it is crucial to show feature-to-feature connections, the relevant features be numbered and the line relating them be labelled with appropriate numbers, as in



We will put this convention to good use later.

The feature-addition rules given below specify, in part, the conditions under which a verb occurs in finite (i.e., inflected) form. Such rules are organized in blocks, each block consisting of rules applicable to a particular type of matrix, and the rules within each block are extrinsically ordered. The first applicable rule in the block is the one which must apply, and the last rule consititutes the 'otherwise' or 'elsewhere' case. The rules are as follows:

(11) a. [+verb ← -finite] : -finite
b. [+verb] : +finite

Recall from (9b) that imperative clauses are [-finite]; thus, according to (11a), any verb which is a daughter of such a clause must also be [-finite]. This guarantees that the verb of an imperative will occur in noninflected form and, given the function-assignment rule (12) below, also allows for the possibility of Subjectless imperative clauses. Since (11b) is ordered second, it assigns the feature [+finite] to any verb to which (11a) does not apply. Needless to say, there are many other conditions under which verbs in English are nonfinite, but all rules stating these conditions would be introduced at higher points in the ordering than (11b).

For the moment, we will have only one function-assignment rule, though another will be introduced later.

(12) SUBJECT is present as a daughter of all finite clauses, and is assigned to [+nominal ← +predicate].

This formulation differs from Hudson's principally in assigning SUBJECT on the basis of sister-dependency rather than peripherality (see n. 4). According to this rule, finite clauses must have Subjects, and it is left to other rules to determine when, if at all, Subjects occur in nonfinite clauses.

Finally, we come to the sequence rules, of which there are two, also extrinsically ordered:

(13) a. Items with function labels precede items without.
b. C → [D ← C]

We now trace the derivation of a simple SVO sentence, say, *Harry likes Maxine.* As in our hypothetical example from before, we first generate a sentence node and a daughter thereof. Thus we will have initially



Further classification rules can apply to [+predicate], and one sister is introduced by (10b), to yield



Since [+transitive] appears in the predicate matrix, another nominal must be introduced, and we obtain



If both nominals are assigned the feature [-phrase], we complete the generation of the structure insofar as classification, sister-dependency, and daughter-dependency rules are involved. Since the sentence node does not contain [-finite], (11a) will be inapplicable and (11b) will thus add [+finite] to the predicate node. Because we have a finite clause, SUBJECT must be a daughter of the clause, and must be assigned to [+nominal (3)]. By the sequence rule (13a), SUBJECT must precede both the predicate and the non-Subject nominal since the latter two do not have function labels; then, by (13b), the predicate is ordered before [+nominal (4)]. Recall that the last of a set of ordered rules is the 'elsewhere' case; thus the ordering of the Subject before the predicate does not contradict (13b) despite the fact that the Subject is a sister of the predicate. After lexical insertion, the structure (minus subcategorial information) is



One process that we have left out of account so far is agreement, but it is clear how this is to be handled. In essence, what we have is a feature-addition

mechanism the rule for which may be given as

(14) [+verb, +finite ⟶ SUBJECT, α person, β number] :
α person, β number

We have also said nothing about selectional restrictions, though they too can be formulated with reference to sister-dependency should we want to include them in the syntax at all. For example, *like* could be lexically marked as [+animate-Subject], which would trigger a sister-dependency-based feature-addition rule

(15) [+nominal, SUBJECT ⟵ +animate-Subject] : +animate

We could, in fact, adopt a general convention such that if any verb is marked [F-ARGUMENT] where F is some feature and ARGUMENT denotes either Subject or Object, then F is assigned to the argument in question by the rule

(16) [ARGUMENT ⟵ F-ARGUMENT] : F

Notice further that a single statement of any selectional restriction is possible even when a verb and one of its arguments can occur in more than one order with respect to each other since dependency structure can be determined independently of relative order. An analogous observation holds for agreement.

To treat imperatives, we need to modify (10b) slightly, making it optional in imperative clauses. Other facts about imperatives, particularly the ones given in the well-known paradigm with pronouns and reflexives, i.e.,

(17) a. Wash yourself!
b. *Wash himself!
c. *Wash you!
d. *Wash him!

would apparently have to be dealt with in the semantics rather than the syntax. Though Hudson says next to nothing about the kinds of semantic rules that would accompany the syntactic part of a DDG, it is easy to see in outline what would be required for imperatives. First, there would have to be a principle stating that the 'logical' or 'semantic' Subject of an imperative must be second person, and that this term of an imperative predication is manifested on the surface by the NP labelled SUBJECT if it is overt. Two general principles can be given governing reflexive pronouns, namely that if a non-Subject in a predication is coreferential with the Subject of that predication, it must be in reflexive form, and that if a reflexive pronoun occurs within a predication, it must be coreferential with the Subject of its clause. These are essentially analogues to the transformational reflexivization rule and the accompanying clause-mate condition on pronominal anaphora. Thus (17b) would be ill-formed on semantic grounds since *himself*, as a third person

pronoun, could not be coreferential with a second person Subject, while (17c) would be ill-formed since *you* would be coreferential with the Subject of the clause and thus ought to be in reflexive form. Whether the Subject is overt or not is of no consequence since, if non-overt, its properties may nonetheless be recovered from the semantic representation. Hudson also leaves it to the semantics to account for the active-passive relation, at least insofar as predicate-argument relations are concerned. He assumes, for example, that there will be a semantic interpretation rule to assign those properties to the nominal of the *by*-phrase that it has in common with the Subject nominal of the coresponding active.

Before discussing questions, I would like to extend somewhat the apparatus introduced above so as to make it possible to generate poly-clausal sentences – complement constructions in particular. We first add the classification rules

(18) a. +predicate : ±S-Subject
b. +transitive : ±S-Object
c. -S-ARGUMENT : +nominal-ARGUMENT

A sample lexicon follows.

hit : -S-Subject, -S-Object
know : -S-Subject, ±S-Object
intend : -S-Subject, +S-Object
annoy : ±S-Subject, -S-Object
prove : ±S-Subject, ±S-Object

Because both Subjects and Objects may be either sentential or nominal, we need to modify the sister-dependency rules (10b,c). Instead of saying that predicates and transitive verbs take nominal sisters, we must somehow re-render the rules so that they say only that predicates take sisters of some kind, leaving it to the feature-addition rules to specify exactly what kind of element each sister is on the basis of features of the predicate. We do this by introducing the 'empty' category symbol [item], and rewrite (10b,c) thus:

(19) a. +predicate $\longrightarrow$ item (OPT if +predicate $\underleftarrow{\quad}$ +imperative)
b. +transitive $\longrightarrow$ item

We also replace [+nominal] in (12) by [item]. The relevant feature-addition rules are

(20) a. [item $\longleftarrow$ +predicate, α S-Subject] : α sentence, -α nominal
b. [item $\longleftarrow$ +transitive, α S-Object] : α sentence, -α nominal

We now take up interrogative sentences, using the following corpus:

(21) a. Who did Maxine kiss?
b. Who kissed Maxine?
c. Who does Harry think Maxine kissed?
d. Who does Harry think kissed Maxine?
e. Did Harry kiss Maxine?

It is, of course, possible for any question to occur in the same syntactic form as a declarative, distinguished only by intonation. Such questions may be distinguished by a feature [+echo] assigned to the sentence node; the rules to be given below (with the exception of (21a)) should be understood as applying only to non-echo questions.

(22) a. +interrogative : ±WH-question, +echo
b. +WH-question : ±Subject-questioned

The motivation for (21b) is that the verb which occurs as daughter of the sentence node in a WH question depends on whether a Subject or a non-Subject is questioned; thus (20a) has an obligatory auxiliary as the first verb whereas (20b) does not. The relevant feature-addition rule is as follows:

(23) [+predicate ⟵ +sentence, -Subject-questioned] : +aux

Accordingly, the first step in the generation of (21a) will be to obtain

via (10a) and (23). The main verb is introduced by the sister-dependency rule

(24) +aux ⟶ +verb

Notice that this rule could in principle introduce another auxiliary, since in our classification scheme – and Hudson's – all auxiliaries are [+verb]. Suppose that we generate the partial structure



Since the topmost S is [+WH-question], we must somehow introduce a WH-word into the sentence. Where it goes, clearly, depends on what is questioned; thus we need a block of feature-addition rules such as

(25) a. [SUBJECT ← +Subject-questioned] : +WH
b. [item, +Q] : +WH / [item] ≠ SUBJECT

The feature [+Q] is assigned to constituent types that can be questioned, e.g., nominals and manner adverbials. Recall that blocks of feature-additional rules are ordered. The actual introduction of a WH-word into the questioned constitute is accomplished by the daughter-dependency rule

(26) +WH → +pro-form, +interrogative

In Hudson's grammar, a function-assignment rule is relevant to all WH-questions, namely

(27) TOPIC is present as a daughter of [+sentence] if it is also [+WH-question], and is assigned to the node which bears the feature [+WH].

Thus the next step in the generation of (21a) is



To assign sequence, we invoke the following rules, ordered as given and ordered before (13):

(28) a. TOPIC → SUBJECT / TOPIC ≠ SUBJECT
b. [+aux ← -Subject-questioned] → SUBJECT

The first two rules place TOPIC and AUX before SUBJECT, but do not order them with respect to each other; (13a) then places TOPIC before AUX since the former has a function label and the latter does not. Note that despite (13a), the auxiliary precedes SUBJECT since even though the latter has a function label, (27b) takes priority over (13a) in the ordering. That the verb must come last follows not only from (27c) but also from (13b), and we thus obtain



following lexical insertion. For the sake of readability, we have left out some structure, i.e., the sister-dependency lines from *kiss* to *who* and Harry. (Though we have not explicitly stated a rule to this effect, any verbal sister of an auxiliary must take the Subject as the sister instantiating [item] in (19a).)

In the case of (21b), the sentence node will be [+Subject-questioned] so the verbal daughter thereof need not be an auxiliary; TOPIC will be assigned to the same matrix as SUBJECT (since this is where [+WH] is to be found) and the relative order of elements is thus SVO just as in declaratives. Of special interest are sentences like (21c,d). We begin in essentially the same way we did with (21a), with minor differences. Since the sentence node is [+WH-question], it must have TOPIC as a daughter, and [+WH] must be assigned to the same matrix as TOPIC. But since the sentence is [-Subject-questioned], TOPIC and SUBJECT must be distinct. Moreover, in this case, the main verb is marked [+S-Object], so its second sister cannot be the questioned element since sentences are [-Q]. Thus we have



prior to the generation of arguments for the verb of the subordinate clause. At this point we introduce a principle as yet unstated, but necessary for cases such as this; it says that TOPIC must always be assigned as a sister to some predicate via (19a) or (19b). We know already that it cannot be a sister of V_1, but we can satisfy the principle by assigning it to V_2. If we do so via (19a), then we introduce a second sister for V_2 via (19b), but we could also do the reverse. If we do the former, then by (13) we must also assign SUBJECT to TOPIC and we obtain



leaving out the sister-dependency line from the subordinate predicate to TOPIC, on the basis of which we determine that this is the element to which SUBJECT is assigned for the subordinate clause. The labelling of the daughter-dependency line 1-3 indicates that TOPIC acts as SUBJECT only with respect to the subordinate clause. An analogous result will obtain if we link TOPIC to the subordinate predicate via (19b):



In complex sentences such as this, sequencing follows a top-down protocol; thus the sequence rules apply first to order elements of the main S, giving the order TOPIC-AUX-SUBJ-V-S, and then to the subordinate S; the position of TOPIC already having been fixed, the Object of the subordinate verb precedes the Subject if identical with TOPIC and follows if not.

Sentences like the ones under consideration are of special importance in grammatical theory since they involve discontinuous dependency across a variable. Such sentences are beyond the scope of phrase structure grammars since under the most plausible assumptions about their structure, there is no way to recursively specify the range of strings which may intervene between the elements of the dependency since there are infinitely many and they are not constituents. This is commonly taken as evidence for the need for transformations, but such constructions pose no special problems for DDG either since the dependencies in question are specified by sister-dependency rules, and such rules can relate elements at any remove from each other in a sentence. In the cases under discussion, as long as TOPIC ultimately gets tied, via (19a) or (19b), to some predicate in the structure, it does not matter how deeply embedded that predicate is.

We turn finally to yes-no questions, e.g., (21e). Like WH-questions in which a non-Subject is questioned, these require a pre-Subject auxiliary as the verbal daughter of [+sentence]. In fact, there are also noninterrogative structures which require such an auxiliary – e.g.,

(29) a. Never did he falter.
b. Seldom have I seen such cruelty.
c. Not only are you beautiful, you're intelligent.

In all such cases, there is an initial adverbial whose position is evidently responsible both for the presence and the front-shifting of the auxiliary; thus, auxiliaries are not obligatory when these adverbials occur in other positions, as shown by

(30) a. He never faltered. / He never did falter.
b. I seldom saw such cruelty. / I have seldom seen such cruelty.
c. I not only saw him. . . / I not only have seen him. . .

Moreover, even if an auxiliary occurs, it cannot be front-shifted if the adverbial is non-initial:

(31) a. *Did he never falter.
b. *Have I seldom seen such cruelty.
c. *Have I not only seen him. . .

I suggest, therefore, the following elaboration of the grammar. First, we posit a feature [±aux-forward], assigned to the S-node of all sentences. For interrogatives, we will have the classification rules

(32) a. -WH-question ; +aux-forward
b. +WH-question, -Subject-questioned : +aux-forward

and the feature-addition rule

(33) [+predicate ← +aux-forward] : +aux

Finally, we posit the sequence rule

(34) [+aux ← +aux-forward] ⟶ SUBJECT

which replaces (27b).

For noninterrogative sentences with front-shifted auxiliaries, we adopt a classification of adverbials with regard to whether or not they require such auxiliaries in initial position; call such adverbials [+aux-shifting]. Given a sequence rule which allows adverbs to occur in clause-initial position (which we will not bother to state formally) we then posit a feature-addition rule

(35) [+sentence → [+aux-shifting ⟶ item]] : +aux-forward

(This rule is unlike any other feature-addition rule making reference to daughter-dependency that we have considered so far, since it adds a feature to a mother on the basis of a feature on the daughter rather than the other way around. It is also the only one we have seen so far which makes crucial reference to sequence; the use of [item] here is intended to indicate that (34) applies when the [+aux-shifting] adverbial precedes all the other elements of the clause in which it appears. This rule presupposes that adverbs are daughters of [+sentence], a supposition also made by Hudson.)

We are thus led naturally to a more detailed consideration of the syntax of English auxiliaries, Chomsky's treatment thereof (1957: Ch. 5) being generally considered one of the early triumphs of transformational description. While

Chomsky's approach clearly scores over a phrase structure treatment, which would have to simply list all of the various possibilities despite the existence of clear generalizations which ought to contribute to a much simpler description, there are drawbacks as well. One is that the phrase structure rules must be allowed to generate fictitious underlying structures – e.g., *Harry-have-en-be-ing-swim* for *Harry has been swimming;* another is that the phrase structure rules must treat auxiliaries and nonauxiliary verbs as members of unrelated categories – indeed, individual auxiliaries belong to no category at all in Chomsky's grammar. (In the statement of the affix-shifting transformation, Chomsky must, in order to unify auxiliaries and other verbs, adduce an ad hoc variable *v* – which should have been seen as an indication that something was wrong.) This problem can be obviated in the alternative treatment proposed in Ross 1969, where auxiliaries are treated as ordinary verbs with sentential complements – so that a sentence like *Harry can go* is analogous, at the level of underlying structure, to one like *Harry wants to go.* But as Hudson points out, on p. 145, Ross cannot account via the phrase structure rules for the restrictions on the order of auxiliaries that follow automatically from Chomsky's grammar; this is because, in Ross's treatment, the base rules generate trees of the form



and there is no way through phrase structure rules to control the order of elements that are directly dominated by different nodes. In DDG, however, we can have the best of both worlds: we can subsume all auxiliaries under the category of verbs, and we can also account for their relative order via a simple and natural rule when there is more than one per clause. As noted previously, any auxiliary can take a verb as a sister, whether it is an auxiliary or not – see rule (23); thus, it is possible to introduce strings of verbal elements solely through the application of this rule, e.g.,

where the first is always a daughter of the sentence node of the clause. Moreover, if we say nothing to the contrary, the order in which these elements occur will follow the order in which they are introduced, (13b). We must, however, guarantee that there is a prioritization with respect to the

order of introduction of auxiliaries – e.g., that if *have* is the first to be introduced (as a daughter of [+sentence]) then a modal is not subsequently introduced, or that if *be* is introduced this does not lead to subsequent introduction of *have,* and so on. We can do this quite simply with a rule based on a natural classification of auxiliaries as shown in the following tree:



(There is one auxiliary, namely *do,* which apparently has no place in this scheme, but see below.) Now, let F = {modal, perfect, progressive} ; then the desired prioritization is determined by the feature-addition rule

(36) [+aux ⟵ +F] : -F

What this means is that if the verbal sister of a modal is another auxiliary, it must be nonmodal, that an auxiliary sister of *have* must be non-perfect, etc.[5] The actual lexicon, for nonmodals, is

have : +perfect
be : ±progressive

where [-progressive] defines the *be* of passive constructions. The morphology of verbal sisters of auxiliaries is controlled by the feature-addition rules

(37) a. [+verbal ⟵ +modal] : -finite, +bare
b. [+verb ⟵ +perfect] : +participle, +past
c. [+verb ⟵ +progressive] : +participle, -past
d. [+verb ⟵ -progressive] : +participle, +past

accompanied by spellout rules of the sort also employed in TG, e.g.,

(38) $\begin{bmatrix}\text{+participle} \\ \text{-past}\end{bmatrix} \longrightarrow$ V stem+**ing**

Consider now the special case of *do.* In TG, this is treated as the auxiliary introduced as the bearer of TNS should the tense morpheme be separated from the element of the auxiliary phrase that follows it in deep structure. The idea behind this approach is that *do* is the item that always appears in cases where, if there had been an auxiliary in deep structure, this auxiliary would be found. So, for example, if yes-no questions involve fronting of an auxiliary and the yes-no question corresponding to, e.g., *Harry came* is *Did Harry*

come?, the interpretation of the facts is that the interrogative sentence was derived by fronting the first element of the auxiliary phrase (in this case TNS), and that *do* is added as the bearer of TNS under such circumstances. In a DDG, by contrast, nothing special has to be said about *do* in this respect; yes-no questions require an auxiliary, and *do* just happens to be one of the choices. But *do* has one special property about which something must be said, namely that it cannot take another auxiliary as a sister, nor can it be a sister to any other auxiliary. In this latter respect it behaves like a modal, but notice that it also behaves like a modal in one other crucial respect: it takes a bare infintive as a verbal sister. This suggests that *do* should be analyzed as a modal, but also marked with a special feature [-aux-comp] to which the following feature-addition rule, ordered before (36), makes reference:

(39) [+verb ⟵ -aux-comp] : -aux

Given the ordering, (36) will apply only to auxiliaries other than *do.*

The last matter to be considered here involves passive constructions. One of the problems that must be solved in generating passives is that of making sure that sentences like

(40) *Maxine was kissed Harry.

are blocked, while sentences like

(41) a. Maxine was kissed by Harry.
b. Maxine was kissed.

are allowed. This can be done only very inelegantly by a phrase structure grammar, but the facts are accounted for straightforwardly in a transformational grammar since sequences of the form *be*-V-*en* can be generated only via the passive transformation, which also introduces a *by* at the same time; the *by*-phrase can then be optionally deleted by a further transformation which applies only to passive constructions. The passive transformation also accounts automatically for the inability of intransitive verbs to occur in passive contexts since it is so formulated as to apply only to transitive structures. In a DDG with the rules already proposed, we could achieve the desired results via the following rules:

(42) a. [+transitive ⟵ -progressive] : +passive
b. [item ⟵ -transitive, +passive] : +prepositional phrases (ordered before (20))
c. +prepositional phrase ⟶ +preposition
d. +preposition ⟶ +nominal

We also add to (19b) the condition that the rule is optional if [+passive] co-occurs with [+transitive], and specify in the lexicon that *by* is the appro-

priate preposition in prepositional phrase sisters of [+passive]. The latter may be done with the feature specification

[+[+preposition ← [+prepositional phrase ← +passive]]]

This approach does not seem any more ad hoc than a transformational one since corresponding to the two rules (42a,b) there must be transformations for passive formation and *by*-phrase deletion, and (42c,d) would be needed in any case. Moreover, this treatment has the advantage of entirely circumventing the problem of specifying a derived constituent structure for passives which, in standard TG at any rate, has never been adequately solved. (See, however, the discussion of this problem in Kac 1972). The problem is that a prepositional phrase cannot be built up ex nihilo, and unless one is willing to build the derived constituent structure into the underlying structures, no pre-existing prepositional phrase node can serve as the basis for the *by*-phrase created by the passive transformation.

With the discussion of passives, I conclude the substantive portion of this review. There is more that could be said both about DDG in general and about the particulars of Hudson's grammar of English, but I think that in what has been covered already the most significant and important points have been made. Much more research will be necessary to assess the full capabilities of the model, but it ought nonetheless to be clear that it holds considerable promise of fulfilling the goals set for it. Whether any committed transformationalists will be swayed cannot be predicted, but I suspect that among those who are actively seeking an alternative to TG the daughter-dependency approach will attract its share of adherents. It has in its favor a straightforward set of underlying assumptions rooted in simple common sense, and that alone justifies its being taken seriously, as I hope it will be.

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NOTES

1 Another part of the criticism is that since a TG could in principle generate any recursively enumerable set, the claim that natural languages have a transformational structure turns out to be nothing more than the claim that they have a structure; thus, transformational description per se does nothing toward establishing what is unique about the structure of natural languages as opposed to any of the myriad other kinds of formal systems that also lend themselves to description in transformational terms. However, it is worth noting that the problem of delineating the class of

possible human languages cannot be viewed solely as one of limiting the formal power of generative grammars; for example, the a^nb^n language described in Chomsky 1957:21 is generable by a simple context-free phrase structure grammar but is obviously not a possible human language.

2 For discussion of the status of 'abstract' underlying structures, and arguments to the effect that they fail to constitute legitimate hypothetical constructs, see Kac 1976 and 1977.

3 The issue, in fact, is not really one of empiricism vs. rationalism/innatism since there is nothing in nontransformational linguistic description to necessarily commit one to the view that there cannot be innate predispositions toward acquiring certain kinds of symbolic systems and not others. (Indeed, Hudson himself, on p. 179, makes this very point.) One could legitimately ask, however, as does Derwing (op. cit.), whether transformationalists do not employ the innateness hypothesis as an escape device from the responsibility of having to actually explain language acquisition given their underlying assumptions.

4 Hudson actually assumes the existence of one other kind of rule, for so-called peripherality assignment. These rules rank elements in terms of their closeness to the edges of a clause, and provide information on which some of the constituent ordering is based. But Hudson does not actually give any such rules, and the interest and usefulness of the notion of peripherality do not seem to be established in any event, so I will say nothing more on the matter here.

5 Hudson might take objection to this rule since F denotes a disjunction of features, something which he argues ought to be disallowed (p. 32). The possibility of the kind of neat formulation provided by (35), however, would militate against this view.

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

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