

National Democratic Institute  
Political Party Program Country Context  
Analysis

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## **Memo**

To: National Democratic Institute (NDI)

From: Rima Kawas, Xiaoyun Shen, Abdou Diouf and Alex Khlebnikov

Date: May 19, 2014

Re: Conceptual Framework Country Context Analysis: South Africa and Turkey

### **Project Overview:**

This report was prepared for the National Democratic Institute (NDI) by a group of students from the Humphrey School of Public Affairs as part of a Capstone requirement. NDI is creating a Context Analysis Tool to provide a framework and guidelines for research it undertakes as part of the political party assistance programming it does around the world. The Humphrey students were asked to test the draft Context Analysis tool by using it to conduct research on a group of countries in which NDI has worked. Since NDI is in the process of finalizing the Context Analysis tool we were also asked to provide feedback on both the strengths and opportunities we discovered in using the tool to conduct research, so that NDI might make improvements in the tool for other users.

It is important to note that the research conducted on each country is not the final product, but rather will be further modified by NDI in order to be applied to their broader political parties training manual. Further desk research along with interview components will likely be needed in order to continue to gain an overall understanding of the political environments in the select countries and in order for broader recommendations about opportunities for programming.

### **Project Objective:**

Test and provide input on the draft Context Analysis tool by conducting research on political party systems in select countries.

### **Project Process:**

The Humphrey Students worked with Nic Benson, Senior Program Officer at NDI to help with their implementation of a new approach to on-the-ground work in countries around the world. With the Context Analysis tool as a guide, the students utilized it to research the political environment, political party system, and political behaviors in specific countries.

The first step was to select countries for analysis. NDI provided a list of countries with differing political party systems and regimes and from that list, Turkey, South Africa, and Russia were chosen to execute further analysis. These countries were selected because they represent three different types of government structures in different regions of the world. Turkey is considered a transitional government; South Africa, a single party dominant government; and Russia, an authoritarian/semi-authoritarian government.

The students conducted desk research, following the research guidelines in the draft Context Analysis Tool and drawing upon research methodologies learned at the Humphrey School. They examined the historical, institutional, formal and informal contexts within the operations of the parties, as well as associated implications for NDI's political party assistance programming. In addition, a particular focus on implications for the current strengths and weaknesses of the political party system and the parties operating within the system were also examined.

This paper contains desk research that was conducted on South Africa and Turkey.

It should be noted that Russia is not included in the final project, even though a draft research document was created on Russia. The students ran into difficulty in obtaining information on Russia's political party structure and also discovered that there was extensive information on President Putin, but not as much on political party structures and operations. The other hurdle that was encountered was finding information in English. However, a draft research product that was completed will be provided to NDI.

During the research, the students kept in regular communication with the client by reviewing various drafts to ensure it met NDI's expectations. During the final week of the project, the students met with the client in Washington D.C. to finalize the product and the present key findings.

#### **Feedback on the Context Analysis Tool for NDI:**

1. The guide was easy to use, easy to read and well written. The length of the guide was perfect, giving researchers thorough, but not overly long guidance for the kind of research NDI needs for its political party programming.
2. The guide recommends desk research and interview research as its main methodologies. Using these recommendations, and in accordance with agreement with NDI, we focused on desk research. However, we found it difficult to completely understand a country's political dynamic and ultimately provide an in-depth analysis of the political party context using only desk research. Therefore, our recommendation is to incorporate some interview options within the desk research phase. This could include interviewing experts who produced or are named in the sources we used. For example, staff at Freedom House or professors at various universities could be valuable in obtaining additional knowledge of the country's political context.
3. As discussed in our presentation to NDI, in order for the research to be more valuable for programming, the context analysis should include research on and a discussion of impediments that political parties face. This would include both impediments created by

the government or ruling party (such as restrictions on their activities, limitations on the funding they can receive, etc.) and impediments that are of the parties' own making, such as restricting their appeal to a narrow slice of the population or internal fights within the parties.

4. In some cases (such as in Russia), it is difficult to find specific information on how parties operate, which is important to programming, even though there has been a considerable amount written about the political situation in the country. Consideration should be given to how the tool should handle this kind of situation.
5. Another observation while doing desk research is the limitations in finding sources in English. For example, the group encountered difficulty in obtaining information on Russia that was not in Russian. It would be interesting to also be able to obtain research from primary sources in the language of the country.
6. There was an opportunity in the guide to call out specific opportunities to take into account cultural aspects of a country when doing research and analysis.

### **Key Findings**

**South Africa:** South Africa is a single-party dominant government, with the African National Congress (ANC) as the lead political party. The ANC is the party that led the fight against Apartheid. It has been only 20 years since the Apartheid officially ended; a relatively short amount of time for a robust democracy to become fully established, especially in a country with deep discrimination, a divided people and a large economically marginalized population. The wounds of Apartheid are still fresh and the key leaders in the fight against it are still politically involved and respected by most people. With the recent death of Nelson Mandela, the ANC should reassess its original focus developed 20 years ago and begin to reform. The largest opposition party, Democratic Alliance (DA), is impeded by its image as a party for white citizens, an image it is working to overcome. Other parties that have emerged and disappeared have been splinters of the ANC.

**Turkey:** Turkey has a history of party transitions, change in government structure and military coups. Currently, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is the ruling political party and the government is increasingly limiting the rights of opposition parties and infringing on individual rights. The current ruling party is engulfed in corruption scandals. The government reaction to these issues is troubling, marked by infringements on individual rights and the adoption of new laws to censor social media and the internet. The AKP solidified its competitive advantages by appointing its members to different influential government positions and adopted new laws that unfairly benefit the party. For its part, the larger opposition parties have not reached out beyond their traditional middle class constituency.

**Key Recommendation:****South Africa:**

- There is a relatively open political space for South African political parties. However, the small parties usually lack capacity to compete with the dominant ANC.
- Enhance and build capacity for the small parties. Training could be focused on campaign outreach, utilizing social media and obtaining the youth vote.

**Turkey:**

- The AKP does not have good party accountability, as evidenced by recent corruption scandal and transparency and political party accountability should be implemented in order to address the current corruption crisis.
- Smaller Parties need to build and strengthen their currently weak capacity.

# South Africa

## Political Party Country Analysis



## Country Facts: CIA World Fact Book<sup>1</sup>

**Independence:** May 31, 1910; May 31, 1961 a Republic was declared; and in April 27, 1994 majority rule occurred.

**Legal System:**

Based off of a Roman-Dutch civil, English common and customary laws

**President:** Jacob Zuma (ANC Party) and elected by the National Assembly

**Legislative Branch:**

*Bicameral Parliament*

- National Council of Provinces with 90 seats total with 10 members elected from each of the provinces to five-year terms.
- National Assembly has 400 seats, each member is elected by popular vote to serve five-year terms.

**Political Parties and Leaders:**

African National Congress - ANC (Leader: Jacob Zuma)

Democratic Alliance - DA (Leader: Helen Zille)

Economic Freedom Fighters- EFF (Leader: Julius Malema)

Congress of the People - COPE (Leader: Mosiuoa Lekota)

African Christian Democratic Party- ACDP (Leader: Kenneth Meshoe)

Freedom Front Plus-FF+ (Leader: Pieter Mulder)

Inkatha Freedom Party - IFP (Leader: Mangosuthu Buthe)

Pan-Africanist Congress - PAC (Leader: Alton Mphethi)

United Christian Democratic Party- UCDP (Leader: Lucas Mangope)

United Democratic Movement - UDM (Leader: Bantu Holomisa)

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<sup>1</sup> CIA, World Fact Book <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html> Accessed May 4, 2014

## **Part 1: Political Environment**

### **Brief Historical Background**

In 1910, the Union of South Africa was created as a self-governing territory of the British Empire. During this time a number of laws were passed that discriminated against Africans and other non-white residents of South Africa. Most notable was the 1913 Natives Land Act, which reserved the majority of the land for the white minority. In 1914, the National Party (NP), was founded, representing the Afrikaner nationalist movement. In 1923, the African National Congress (ANC) was created as a political party with a platform based on opposition to discriminatory laws and to majority white rule.<sup>2</sup> In 1924, a Nationalist-Labour coalition came to power for two terms until 1939.<sup>3</sup>

In 1948, the Afrikaner-dominated NP was elected based on the policies of strict racial segregation and classification. The NP led government, enacted several laws that created a white dominated political, economic and social environment known as Apartheid. In 1960, the ANC which had mounted a "Defiance Campaign" movement, a mass movement of resistance to apartheid, was banned after which the ANC operated underground. Faced with an increased government crackdown, Nelson Mandela launched the military wing of the ANC and the armed struggle began. In 1962, Mandela was charged with treason and sentenced to life in prison.<sup>4</sup> Over the next two decades the NP-controlled government made the Apartheid regime more extensive and rigid, including eventually declaring all black South Africans non-citizens and harshly cracking down on all protest movements.

Gradually, facing increasing domestic and international political and economic pressure, the NP began to make concessions. In 1984, a new constitution was adopted granting limited political power to blacks. In 1990, Mandela was released from prison and the ban on the ANC was lifted. The following years saw the rapid dismantlement of Apartheid-related legislation and an interim democratic constitution enacted.<sup>5</sup>

On April 27, 1994, after winning South Africa's first democratic election by a landslide, the ANC became the new party in power and Nelson Mandela became South Africa's first black president. The NP received 20% of the vote, with the majority of its votes coming from the Western Cape Province, where the party gained control of the provincial legislature. As required by the interim constitution, a national unity government was formed, which included the ANC, the NP, and the Zulu-nationalist Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). A new constitution was signed into law by President Mandela in December 1996. In the 1999 general election, the ANC

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<sup>2</sup> South African History Online, <http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/union-south-africa-1910>, Accessed May 1, 2014

<sup>3</sup> Encyclopaedia Britannica, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/405219/National-Party-NP> Accessed May 2, 104

<sup>4</sup> Freedom House <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/south-africa-0#.UzSpVlfdXME>; Accessed May 7, 2014

<sup>5</sup> Freedom House <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/south-africa-0#.UzSpVlfdXME> Accessed May 7, 2014



received two-thirds of the national vote and, with Mandela declining to run for another term, elected a new President Thabo Mbeki. Because of its historical importance and legacy as the party that defeated Apartheid, it has won every subsequent national election, with over 65% of the votes at both the national and provincial levels.<sup>6</sup> The May 7, 2014, election was no different with the ANC winning by a landslide of 62.2% of the vote; however, it is important to note that this was a drop of 3.7% from the 2009 election.<sup>7</sup> The NP has effectively departed, with Democratic Alliance (DA), a successor of the liberal white anti-Apartheid progressive movement, the largest opposition party.

### **Institutional Context**

After years of minority rule, a parliamentary democracy was created by the adoption of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.<sup>8</sup> The new constitution established an executive, legislative and judiciary branch; a structure replicated at the provincial and municipal levels. In order to ensure that each of the branches had oversight over the others, the constitution provides for a “checks and balances” system. For example, the head of state who is the legislatively elected president holds the executive power. The national legislature has oversight and approval powers over the executive. The judicial branch plays a key role, with legislative actions subject to review by the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeals.<sup>9</sup>

South Africa's Parliament is made up of two bodies: the National Assembly (the lower chamber) and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP—the upper chamber).<sup>10</sup> The NCOP's role is to ensure the interests of the provinces are represented in Parliament. The members of the NCOP are selected by the provincial legislatures. Each province has equal representation, with 10 delegates from each of the nine provinces.<sup>11</sup>

In contrast, the National Assembly's primary role is to pass legislation, oversee the executive branch, and ratify international agreements.<sup>12</sup> The Assembly consists of 400 members elected to five-year-terms through party-list proportional representation, which means citizens vote for a party and not for individual candidates, these party lists are closed lists. It should be noted that there is also a 5% minimum party threshold in order to secure a seat in parliament.<sup>13</sup> The National Assembly elects the president, who may serve a maximum of two consecutive five-year terms.

### **Concerns about the ANC's Power:**

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<sup>6</sup> Freedom House <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/south-africa-0#.UzSpVlFDXME> Accessed May 7, 2014

<sup>7</sup> Electoral Commission of South Africa, <http://www.elections.org.za/resultsNPE2014/> (accessed May 13, 2014).

<sup>8</sup> Freedom House, South Africa <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/south-africa-0#.U2md6I0o85s> Accessed May 7, 2014

<sup>9</sup> Freedom House, South Africa <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/south-africa-0#.U2md6I0o85s> Accessed May 5, 2014

<sup>10</sup> SouthAfrica.info, published on *February 2014* <http://www.southafrica.info/about/democracy/polparties.htm#.U2T5to0o85s>

<sup>11</sup> Parliament of South Africa, [http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Category\\_ID=27](http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Category_ID=27) Accessed May 4, 2014

<sup>12</sup> Parliament of South Africa, [http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Category\\_ID=27](http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Category_ID=27) Accessed May 4, 2014

<sup>13</sup> Parliament of South Africa, [http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Category\\_ID=26](http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Category_ID=26) Accessed May 3, 2014

After the recent May 7, 2014 election, South Africa's multi-party political system consists of 13 parties represented in the National Assembly of Parliament; this number did not change from the 2009 election. The ANC is by far the strongest party in South Africa, holding 249 of the 400 seats (this is down from 264 seats from the last election).<sup>14</sup> The leading opposition party is the DA, as mentioned above, which received over 22% of the vote, an increase of over 2% from the previous election and now holds 89 seats and controls the Western Cape region.<sup>15</sup>

Although there is a constitutional checks-and-balance system, the ANC's control of nearly every level of government could undermine the strength of these intended guarantees. According to Freedom House, "In practice, the ANC's overwhelming control of the executive and the legislature (at both the national and provincial levels) undermines South Africa's institutional checks and inter-branch accountability."<sup>16</sup>

Some have cited the following examples of concerns over the impact of the ANC's dominance in government, politics and corruption concerns:

- The constitution protects judicial independence through the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court. However, the level of judicial and prosecutorial independence has come under scrutiny. For example, there were charges against President Zuma in the recent corruption case regarding his use of \$23 million of government money to upgrade his private home. These charges were not investigated and eventually dropped in court which shows potential bias toward the president by the judicial branch.<sup>17</sup>
- Campaign finance transparency is also an issue. Political parties are able to receive public funding through the Represented Political Parties' Fund. The Fund is regulated by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and subject to auditing and public disclosure. In contrast, private contributions are unregulated and parties are not required to report on the amount they raised or the specific donors. According to Freedom House, "this system has elicited criticism from both elected officials and civil society as a major source of political corruption." As an example, there are well-documented cases that members of the ANC have awarded public contracts to leading private campaign supporters.<sup>18</sup>
- Although freedom of expression and of the press are protected in the constitution, restrictions have been implemented in recent years. For example, the 2009 Film and Publications Amendment Act, require some material to be approved by the government

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<sup>14</sup> Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2014 National and Provincial Results, <http://www.elections.org.za/resultsNPE2014/> Accessed May 13, 2014

<sup>15</sup> SouthAfrica.info, published February 2014 <http://www.southafrica.info/about/democracy/polparties.htm#nnp>

<sup>16</sup> Freedom House, 2012 South Africa Report, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/south-africa-0#.U2md6I0o85s> Accessed May 11, 2014

<sup>17</sup> Anita Powell, *Voice of America, Presidential Scandal Overshadows Major South African Election*, April 14, 2014

<http://www.voanews.com/content/presidential-scandal-overshadows-major-south-african-election/1893081.html>

<sup>18</sup> Freedom House, 2012 South Africa Report, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/south-africa-0#.U2md6I0o85s>

before publication. In 2010, President Zuma filed a lawsuit against a *Sunday Times* political cartoonist for slander. Lastly, in November 2011, the Protection of Information act was passed. This strengthened the government's ability to restrict publications when it deems it for the security of the state. It should be noted that because of public opposition, President Zuma did not sign the bill and this is still a key political issue.<sup>19</sup>

## **Social Context**

The legacy of the Apartheid continues to influence civil society as well as the political party system. Key issues facing South Africa include the lack of economic development, poverty, crime and unemployment. Apartheid-based economic divisions along racial lines remain strong and the basic needs of the black population are not being met.<sup>20</sup> Approximately, 85% of black South Africans are poor, while 87% of white South Africans are upper-middle class.<sup>21 22</sup>

The ANC's inability to address these issues is reflected in dissatisfaction amongst its membership, especially among the youth.<sup>23</sup> Youth are concerned because they believe government fails to acknowledge many of the struggles young South Africans face: poor quality of education and unemployment.<sup>24</sup>

Crime is also a huge issue in South Africa and its crime rate ranks among the highest in the world. Recent data shows the crime rate increasing. For example, in 2012, the murder rate increased by 0.6% and attempted murders increased by 6.5%, violent household robberies rose by 3.6% while carjacking increased by 5.4%. The most common crimes are drug-related which increased over 13.5%. South Africans continue to criticize the government and the police for the increase in crime and lack of safety in the country. Last year, the killing by police officers of 34 striking miners received particular focus. The police report mentions self-defense to justify the action, but this clearly reflects the cultural of violence in South Africa.<sup>25</sup>

Lastly, another key economic issue is access to land for the black population. At the end of apartheid, the white population (which is only 10% of the total population) owned approximately 90% of the land in large part because of restrictions dating back to the beginning of the twentieth century. The ANC vowed to address this inequality and pledged redistribution of land through land reform policies. These policies included a commitment to shift one-third of the land from white farmers to black residents by 2014; the ANC-led government has thus far failed to implement this policy and has been postponed its implementation to 2025.

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<sup>19</sup> Freedom House, 2012 South Africa Report, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/south-africa-0#.U2md6I0o85s>

<sup>20</sup> SouthAfrica.info [http://www.southafrica.info/about/people/nation-making\\_260606.htm#.U0cP6fDXME#ixzz2yWUA5Ocf](http://www.southafrica.info/about/people/nation-making_260606.htm#.U0cP6fDXME#ixzz2yWUA5Ocf)

<sup>21</sup> South Africa's Future: reflecting two decades of democracy, Chatham House

<sup>22</sup> *Carlene Van Der Westhuizen*, SOUTH AFRICA: ECONOMIC GROWTH, POVERTY AND INEQUALITY, Brookings Institute

<sup>23</sup> Fiona Forde, President Zuma's Second Term and Prospects for Post-Transition Africa, Chatham House

<sup>24</sup> Greg Nicolson, *Analysis: Desperate youth of South Africa* June 17, 2013, <http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-06-17-analysis-desperate-youth-of-south-africa/#.U3VkrRCgRJ9k>

<sup>25</sup> Robyn Dixon, Los Angeles Times, Violent Crime on the rise again in South Africa, September 19, 2013 <http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-south-africa-crime-20130919-story.html>

Among the key issues impeding effective land reform are lack of skill among the black population in knowing how to farm the land, lack of effective planning for use of the land, and lack of support services from government agencies, to name a few.<sup>26</sup> Some have argued that land transfers could also help political allies of the ANC, which some fear would be used as a political tool to increase its supporters. Forced land redistribution in Zimbabwe caused a lot of controversy, so this is a highly discussed topic in South Africa. In Zimbabwe the land redistribution resulted in low efficiency of unskilled workers, losses in income due to the significant drop in harvest, and at times redistribution of the land to the loyalist of the President, and these kinds of issues that would need to be addressed in South Africa for land reform to go forward. This issue and potential concern over land redistributed to ANC supporters, merits further exploration; a key way to understand this dynamic would be to interview farmers and understand their relationship with the ANC.

## **Part II Political Parties and Function System**

### **Principles**

#### ***Party Structures, Member Engagement and Key Opposition Parties***

According to the ANC's website, the ANC party structure is headed by the National Executive Committee (NEC), which is elected by the National Conference; the Provincial Executive Committees, which are elected by Provincial Conferences; and Regional Executive Committees, elected by the Regional Conferences. In order to become a member of the ANC, a citizen must be 19 years or older, complete an application, and pay a membership fee, a typical membership practice in most countries. They must accept the ANC's principles, policies and programs.<sup>27</sup> Although the ANC's manifesto claims there is no material benefit to becoming a member, membership does provide the ability to take part in party elections and contribute to the formulation of party policy. Because the ANC is the dominant party in government and there seems to be a blurred line between the government and politics, one may argue that by becoming an ANC member, this could also help an individual secure a leadership position in the government. The mutual beneficial relationship between government and politics will be further discussed.

It is important to note that there are two other political organizations closely associated with the ANC, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). These organizations represent a 'tripartite' governing alliance headed by the ANC. This alliance works within the ANC for representation in elections and government. However, recently, there has been considerable friction between the organizations.

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<sup>26</sup>Dr. Edward Lahiff, Q&A: Land Reform in South Africa, POV, July 6, 2010 [http://www.pbs.org/pov/promisedland/land\\_reform.php](http://www.pbs.org/pov/promisedland/land_reform.php)

<sup>27</sup> ANC Kids, <http://www.anc.org.za/kids/main.php?id=22> Accessed May 1, 2014

These tensions may result in the dissolution of this partnership and as a result the formation of a new opposition party.<sup>28</sup>

The leading opposition party is the DA, as stated above, which has its roots within the progressive anti-apartheid white political party of the 1970s and 1980s. The DA was able to gain seats in the National Assembly after the May 7, 2014 election and now holds 89 seats, increased from 67.<sup>29</sup> The DA's party platform focuses on liberal democracy and free market principles.<sup>30</sup>

Reflecting some dissatisfaction from the ANC's policies, a newcomer party which was established only 10 months ago, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), is led by a former leader of the ANC's with a focus on nationalizing the mining and banking industries. Another key opposition party is the Congress of the People (COPE), a party split from leaders within the ANC as they did not agree with the 2008 decision to recall President Thabo Mbeki. With the recent May 7, 2014, elections, other opposition parties increased their margins. The notable one is the EFF won 6.2% vote, as a result, the EFF is now holding 25 seats in the Assembly and became the third influential party in South Africa. On the other hand, the COPE party lost its previous 30 seats, now holding only three in the National Assembly. Although EFF was a new party, they were very successful in winning over COPE supporters.<sup>31</sup>

### **Party Ideology and Motivation**

Since its founding, the ANC's key party platform focused on its nationalist struggle against apartheid and on advocating for economic and democratic reforms. While it still receives the majority of votes, in the near future, it will be important for the ANC to begin to shift its brand from that of a party focused on apartheid to one focused on current issues facing the country. The public seems to be increasingly frustrated over unemployment, poverty and crime issues which have created almost daily protests.<sup>32</sup> With 73% of the population under the age of 39 unemployed, the younger population is particularly vocal on the issues.

The DA party, on the contrary, as the leading opposition party, seems to have strategically focused on these issues in hope to gain the younger vote. It claims to be the most diverse party in South Africa, with a goal of representing the new generation. The DA's campaign message was clear; focused on economic issues in hopes of gaining the black vote.<sup>33</sup> Its campaign also painted the ANC leaders as self-serving and criticizing the lack of transparency and accountability in government. Its strategy seems to have slightly worked with the recent election: the DA increased its share of the vote from 20% to 22%. While the DA improved their standing in this recent election, they did not make a serious dent in the ANC's majority. The difficulty that the

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<sup>28</sup> SouthAfrica.info, <http://www.southafrica.info/about/democracy/polparties.htm#U3GK0PldXCM> Accessed April 21, 2014

<sup>29</sup> SouthAfrica.info <http://www.southafrica.info/about/democracy/polparties.htm#U2T5to0o85s> Accessed April 21, 2014

<sup>30</sup> SouthAfrica.info <http://www.southafrica.info/about/democracy/polparties.htm#U2T5to0o85s> Accessed April 21, 2014

<sup>31</sup> Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2014 National and Provincial Elections Results <http://www.elections.org.za/resultsNPE2014/> Accessed May 13, 2014

<sup>32</sup> Africa Development Institute, <http://www.africaecon.org/index.php/news/show/71>

<sup>33</sup> DA Party Website, <http://www.da.org.za/about.htm?action=view-page&category=383> Accessed April 29, 2014

DA faces is that its messaging continues to just focus on what is wrong with the ANC versus focusing on what the party supports.<sup>34</sup>

The other opposition party, COPE, does not have much to distinguish itself from the ANC, accounting for its poor showing in the 2014 elections.<sup>35</sup> Lastly, the surprise of the recent election is the newly formed ETT party. Based on the party's website, the party platform seems to be focused on protectionist policies and to have more of Marxist leaning.<sup>36</sup>

### ***Policy Development and Formulation***

Our research shows that ANC policy development is a top down process, which could be one of the reasons for various opposition parties coming out of the ANC. According to the ANC's manifesto, "an ANC member has the ability to participate in the discussion, formulation and implementation of the policy of the ANC." However, the manifesto does not specifically explain how policy is formulated, how decisions are made, or how members participate. It seems that policy proposals submitted by members can be vetoed by the leadership of the ANC.<sup>37</sup>

The ANC uses a variety of mechanisms to bring issues and accomplishments to the members of the party. For example, the ANC hosts a weekly policy briefing breakfast either by the President or senior government officials, focused on showcasing the party's accomplishments with a goal to build the party's reputation and mobilize support. Many of the breakfasts are recorded and available to the public via the party website and YouTube.<sup>38</sup> In addition, this strategy is also a way to attract voters, but critics argue that the government uses these breakfasts as a way to promote their ideas and plans, but they do not take action on the priorities outlined.

The ANC also began utilizing social media to connect with the youth and encourage their involvement in the party. For example, on January 20, 2014, ANC announced the nationwide availability of its "My ANC" app across all nine of South Africa's provinces and the "My ANC Western Cape" app, which has more than 400,000 subscribers, majority of them between the ages of 17-25. According to the ANC, the app provides young South Africans with the opportunity to actively engage with the ANC.<sup>39</sup>

Because we used the party website as a key source to understand the formation of policy, it would be interesting to take this research further and interview both current and past ANC

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<sup>34</sup> DA Party Website, [http://www.da.org.za/our\\_policies.htm?action=view-policy&policy=608](http://www.da.org.za/our_policies.htm?action=view-policy&policy=608) Accessed April 29, 2014

<sup>35</sup> COPE website, <http://www.congressofthepeople.org.za/content/page/origins-of-our-name> Accessed May 1, 2014

<sup>36</sup> The Economic Freedom Fighters, Party Website <http://www.economicfreedomfighters.org/> Accessed May 13, 2014

<sup>37</sup> ANC Website <http://www.anc.org.za/2014/manifesto/>

<sup>38</sup> Youtube, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HF7m2Bf0BaM>

<sup>39</sup> Jamie-Leigh Matroos, *ANC Reach SA Youth With Mobile App*, January 20, 2014 <http://www.sabreakingnews.co.za/2014/01/20/anc-reach-sa-youth-with-mobile-app/>

members to obtain a better understanding how policy is developed and how members gain a voice within the party.

### **Party Accountability**

Accountability within the ANC is questionable due to recent corruption issues, as stated above. Some complain that local ANC offices are used to secure control of local government institutions in order to use financial resources to support the party. As mentioned above, critics also argue that there is a blurring of the lines between the political activity and government function. According to Anthony Butler of the Wits University, currently, there is “a blurring of authority between party and state in all three tiers of government. Relationships of authority between mayors, municipal managers, and regional ANC barons are mediated through contested conceptions of seniority.”<sup>40</sup> Therefore, it seems that the ANC has focused on ensuring control of all three levels of government. The ANC is able to appoint various local leaders and in return able to control the resources at the local level. This blurring of authority places the party obligations before the state.<sup>41</sup>

### **Interparty relations**

The ANC, has maintained a “Tripartite Alliance” with the SACP and COSATU, as described above. The members of this alliance have dual membership and some of the members occupy seats in Parliament. The ANC and SACP have a long history of working together dating back to the anti-apartheid movement. It is important to note that COSATU, is a trade union and does not have a separate political party. There have been open disagreements with the ANC in particular regarding economics issues such as privatization of the state economy. The alliance is beginning to be tested, recently, the National Union of Metalworkers announced its plan to split from the ANC with a goal to create a socialist workers party. However, COSATU did not follow their lead and continues to be an ally with the ANC. It will be interesting to observe this dynamic in the near future and to see if a new opposition party emerges.<sup>42</sup>

Another example of a split within the ANC is the COPE party. In 2009, former ANC member, Mosiuoa Lekota, broke with the ANC because of conflict over the decision to recall former President Thabo Mbeki.<sup>43</sup> As a result, in the 2009 election Cope won 7.4% of the vote in 2009, but it did not build a strong structure and only received .67% of the vote in the 2014 election, which could mean the potential demise of the party. As a result of the recent election, it seems that the COPE supporters have shifted their support to the newly created EFF party, which won

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<sup>40</sup> Anthony Butler (Wits University), The Politics of the Public Sector: Political accountability in post-apartheid South Africa, 19 January 2011

<sup>41</sup> Anthony Butler (Wits University), The Politics of the Public Sector: Political accountability in post-apartheid South Africa, 19 January 2011

<sup>42</sup> Liberation Newspaper, The major split in the African National Congress South Africa’s largest union announces new direction to fight for socialism, January 26, 2014 <http://www.pslweb.org/liberationnews/newspaper/vol-8-no-2/the-major-split-in-the-african-congress.html>

<sup>43</sup> International Harvard Review, South Africa’s ANC Split, July 6, 2009 <http://hir.harvard.edu/frontiers-of-conflict/south-africas-anc-split>

6.35% of the vote; similar to COPE previous results. Notably, the EFF party was also created by a former leader in the ANC, who broke with it over economic policies.<sup>44</sup>

### ***Competencies***

In 1998, when ANC leaders were concerned that the party's branch organizations were becoming ineffective, the National Executive Committee (NEC) developed and implemented a comprehensive program to revitalize them. The party transformed the ANC's positions of secretary-general (Kgalema Motlanthe), deputy-general treasurer into full-time positions.<sup>45</sup> In addition, the party's deployed many of its prominent politicians to ANC headquarters. The bold move was considered a paradigm shift from President Mandela's era because it started involving the party more in the governing of South Africa. Having senior party members strategically positioned throughout government helped strengthen the ANC's grip on the country, reducing the separation between the party's political activity and the role of governing.<sup>46</sup>

As the major opposition party in South Africa, the DA invests in the training of its public representatives to equip them with the tools they need to help formulate policies and engage their constituencies. The members of the DA leadership are expected to attend and to actively be involved in every training session the party organizes on their behalf. Furthermore, DA representative are expected to dedicate enough time to ready themselves to fully participate in the House or Councilor Committee proceedings and they are expected to master the issues relating to public policy and be able to effectively articulate the party's views when called upon. Last but not least, the DA public representatives are required to attend seminars on public policy and to maintain ties with networks of professional associations, faculties and institutes that have the expertise in the area of public policy.<sup>47</sup>

### ***Increasing and Sustaining its Base***

During the first decade after its ascension to power, the ANC's major concern was, with the end of the unifying fight against apartheid, to avoid losing power and to maintain its supporters. The ANC took strategic steps to prevent the emergence of any political party which could become a viable alternative to the ANC.

To do so, the party developed and implemented a variety of formal and informal mechanisms geared towards protecting its base.<sup>48</sup>

- The ANC was adamant that the election system be based on a proportional representation system with closed candidate lists—meaning the party determines the lists. The lack of

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<sup>44</sup> Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2014 National and Provincial Elections, <http://www.elections.org.za/resultsNPE2014/> Accessed on May 13, 2014

<sup>45</sup> The African National Congress <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=10177>  
<http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=220501>

<sup>46</sup> The African National Congress <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=10177>  
<http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=220501>

<sup>47</sup> DA Party Website <http://www.da.org.za/about.htm?action=view-page&category=472>

<sup>48</sup> Piombo, Jession. 2009 *Institutions, Ethnicity, and Political Mobilization in South Africa*, New York NY: Palgrave MacMillan



transparency could be incentive to for the ANC leadership keep a strong hold on the party base.<sup>49</sup>

- In early 2001 the ANC began a process of reorganizing its branches to align them with the new ward boundaries, reducing them in number from 5,500 to 3,788. The ANC's National Executive Committee (NEC) realigned the party's headquarters to match the country's nine provinces. The NEC ensures rules and regulations are carried out by party members. To ensure a better functioning of the ANC around the country, Provincial Executive Committees (PEC) may adopt their own regional rules and regulations, but all rules and regulations must conform to the constitutional norms of the ANC.<sup>50</sup>
- To make sure the ANC's Constitution is followed all members, government officials and public representatives must familiarize themselves with the contents of the party's Constitution. Failure to abide by the party's Constitution is subject to disciplinary action.<sup>51</sup>

The party has the flexibility to merge branches together into certain zones, which in turn can be subdivided for better coordination into smaller units such as street committees. The voting district and the zones can be grouped to form sub-regions with voting powers similar to that of the branches.<sup>52</sup>

As a party whose stated ultimate objective is to construct a united, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous South African society, the ANC takes steps to be more inclusive. The empowerment of women is among its priorities. The Women's League is embedded within the party's organizational structure at the national, provincial and branch level to defend women's rights. Similar to the Women's League, the ANC also has a Youth League. The Youth League is open to any individuals between the ages of 14-35, with a requirement that individuals be over 18 to be an active member. Lastly, the ANC also has a Veterans League for individuals 60 years or older with more than 40 years of membership to the ANC.<sup>53</sup>

The ANC implements various strategies to create a grassroots mobilization to reach voters. Below are key examples of this strategy:

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<sup>49</sup> Piombo, Jession. 2009 *Institutions, Ethnicity, and Political Mobilization in South Africa*, New York NY: Palgrave MacMillan

<sup>50</sup> The ANC <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=10177> <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=220501>

<sup>51</sup> The African National Congress <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=10177>

Tom Lodge (2004). The ANC and the development of party politics in modern South Africa. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 42, pp 189-219. doi:10.1017/S0022278X04000096. <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=220501>

<sup>52</sup> The African National Congress <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=10177>

Tom Lodge (2004). The ANC and the development of party politics in modern South Africa. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 42, pp 189-219. doi:10.1017/S0022278X04000096. <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=220501>

<sup>53</sup> The African National Congress <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=10177>

<http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=220501>

- The realignment of branches with municipal boundaries in 2001 was a way to renew a sense of purpose for the branches and to enable them to play a central role in the ANC's attempt outreach to communities. In 2002, branch activism was reformed by sending delegates to workshops for training. The party organized 97 regional and sub-regional workshops; approximately 3,000 delegates participated. The ANC initiated the branch annual Achievement Award to maintain enthusiasm.<sup>54</sup>
- The ANC used the president's weekly online Newsletters to respond to attacks from opposition parties. During the 2004 election, the ANC used a new strategy more focused on grassroots efforts by sending officials out to meet the people where they lived. The cabinet ministers and senior party officials around the country met went door to door to meet constituents. In addition, the ANC utilized media ads to invite people to share their concerns with the party officials. The shift in campaign methods away from speeches at large gatherings to more of a grassroots approach was very effective in getting their message out throughout the country.<sup>55</sup> As a result, in 2014 election the ANC's messaging was still effective, although the ANC did lose some seats, the party still won the election by a landslide.

### **Access to Financial Resources:**

Hoping to create a political environment conducive to free and fair elections, the South African Constitution set out to level the playing field for all South African political parties with the creation of a public fund managed by the South African Independent Electoral Commission. This fund was created to make sure that all political parties in South Africa that are represented in all levels of government have resources to fund their political activities. The fund has grown to accommodate the increasing demand for financial support by an increasingly mature multi-party system. Ten percent of the fund is divided equally among all registered parties and the remaining 90%, however, is divided proportionally based on the percentage of votes each party received in the last election. Because the ANC receives the most votes, it receives the majority of the fund and opposition parties are at a financial disadvantage.<sup>56</sup>

A final issue regarding party funding is that political parties are allowed to receive private donations. Private donors account for the majority of parties' funds. Parties are not required to disclose the names of the donors, which causes a problem of transparency. In order to resolve this issue, stronger laws and better enforcement of existing laws may be necessary. Even though the ANC uses membership fees as part of its funding sources, those membership payments are modest compared to the funding assistance it receives from the state and from private donors.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> The African National Congress <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=10177>

Tom Lodge (2004). The ANC and the development of party politics in modern South Africa. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 42, pp 189-219. doi:10.1017/S0022278X04000096. <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=220501>

<sup>55</sup> Piombo, Jession. 2009 *Institutions, Ethnicity, and Political Mobilization in South Africa*, New York NY: Palgrave MacMillan

<sup>56</sup> Piombo, Jession, and Lia Nijzink. 2005 *Electoral Politics in South Africa*, New York NY: Palgrave MacMillan

<sup>57</sup> The African National Congress <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=10177> Accessed on April 23, 2014

## RECOMMENDATIONS

It is only 20 years since Apartheid officially ended and the ANC first came to power. This is a short amount of time for a robust democracy to be fully established within a country that historically has deep discrimination, a divided people and a large economically marginalized population. The wounds of Apartheid are still fresh and the key leaders in the fight against it are still politically involved. With the recent death of the world-revered leader, Nelson Mandela, the ANC should reassess its original focus 20 years ago and begin to reform.

However, the ANC is doing the opposite and is ruling a country with a tighter grip, with increase in corruption and increasing divisions between wealthy and poor. According to the World Bank's Good Governance Indicators, South Africa's ranking in good governance has declined. Corruption is on the rise with examples such as several highly publicized cases of state contracts provided to companies that have contributed to ANC's campaigns. Since 2006, President Zuma has been charged on three separate accounts for corruption and there are recent examples of other elected officials involved in these type of scandals.

Along with corruption, poverty, crime and unemployment are key issues facing the citizens of South Africa. According to the BBC, public opinion polls indicate that the number one concern for South Africans is jobs and the second is education.<sup>58</sup> South Africans frequently express their dissatisfaction over these issues by taking to the streets in protest – sometimes daily. Nevertheless, despite all these serious issues facing the country the ANC kept its majority with the May 7, 2014 elections.

One may ask, how can the ANC still stay in power with all these issues? The answer lies within the opposition parties. Opposition parties in South Africa are divided into small factions with many of the parties being splinters of the ANC. These small and divided factions have created a weak opposition party system.

The DA is the strongest opposition party. The key barrier to its ability to get serious traction with voters is the perception that it is mainly focused on being the “defender of the privileges white people gained during Apartheid.”<sup>59</sup> For example, the DA opposed affirmative action, a key ANC policy. The DA seems to recognize this brand issue and has toned down its opposition to this popular policy.

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Tom Lodge (2004). The ANC and the development of party politics in modern South Africa. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 42, pp 189-219. doi:10.1017/S0022278X04000096. <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=220501>

<sup>58</sup> Andrew Massiah, BBC, South Africa election: Mixt poll says jobs biggest issue, May 2, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27236598>

<sup>59</sup> Farouk Chothia, BBC, South Africa: Has democracy delivered? May 1, 2014 <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27119251>

The weakness of opposition parties is not the only reason why the ANC continues to stay in power. The power of the ANC's legacy as the party that defeated Apartheid cannot be overstated, and this makes it difficult for opposition parties to gain similar popularity. Nelson Mandela predicted that the ANC would be the majority power till 2025, a prediction that seems on track to becoming true.<sup>60</sup>

Therefore, below are three long-term recommendations to help both the ANC and opposition parties.

### 1. **Focus on the Younger Generation**

Currently, 40% of the population was born after the end of the Apartheid. Therefore, we recommend that the parties focus on the next generation in South Africa by introducing these future voters to their parties.

- Parties could replicate ANC's Youth Committee and create opportunities for youth to get involved in the party even before they have the right to vote.
- Parties can also take a more vocal lead on issues of importance to youth, such as educational reform and unemployment. The parties can work with youth to encourage them to become more involved in the political system by staging rallies, activating social media around key issues, and holding town hall meetings in particularly dense youth areas to discuss issues and create a personal connection between the youth and party.

### 2. **Bridge Builder**

- Since the DA party has close ties to both business and media, this may be the most likely party to lead opposition unity. The DA could shift its current strategy of appearing to simply be "against the ANC" and rather shift to a strategy of being a bridge builder within the country.
- The DA also needs to shift its brand of being the party of the 'white-elitist' and may want to focus on ensuring more diversity within the party as well as analyze its current position on issues such as its stance on affirmative action policy in order to rebrand its image.

### 3. **ANC Brand Reform**

Although the ANC still won the 2014 election by a landslide, they did lose seats in Parliament. It seems that the ANC is at a pivotal point to make decisions that could ensure their reelection in the next election.

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<sup>60</sup> Farouk Chothia, BBC, South Africa: Has democracy delivered? May 1, 2014 <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27119251>

- The ANC should focus on issues of the youth and begin to rebrand their party that is focused on the future issues of the country and not just a party of the past. ANC could revamp its Youth Committee within the party to ensure that the youth have a key role within the party as well as have exposure to government.
- With the recent corruption issues with the ANC leaders, it is important for the ANC to begin to focus on more transparency both within government as well as within the party.
- Political finance reform and the concern of the source of the funds continues to be a concern. The ANC may want to revisit the current campaign finance laws to determine if more transparency may help dispel the corruption perception.

# Turkey

## Political Party Country Analysis



## Country Facts: CIA World Fact Book<sup>61</sup>

**Government Type:** Republican Parliamentary Democracy

**President:** Abdullah Gul (since August 28, 2007)

**Prime Minister:** Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (since March 14, 2003), appointed by the president.

**Legislative Branch:** Unicameral Grand National Assembly, has 550 seats and members elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms.

**Elections:** Last election held on June 12, 2011 (Next June 2015)

**Election Results:** AKP 49.8%, CHP 25.9%, MHP 13%, Independents 6.6%, Other 4.7%

**Parliamentary Seats by Party:** AKP 326, CHP 135, MHP 53, Independents 36. Only parties surpassing the 10% threshold are entitled to parliamentary seats

### **Key Political Parties:**

Justice and Development Party - AKP (Leader: Recep Tayyip Erdogan)

Republican People's Party - CHP (Leader: Kemal Kilicdaroglu)

Nationalist Movement Party - MHP (Leader: Devlet Bahçeli)

Democratic Left Party – DSP (Leader: Masum Turker)

Democratic Party - DP (Leader: Namik Kemal Zeybek)

Equality and Democracy Party - EDP (Leader: Ziva Halis)

Felicity Party - SP (Leader: Mustafa Kamalak)

Freedom and Solidarity Party - ODP (Leader: Alper Tas)

Grand Unity Party - BBP (Leader: Yalcin Topcu)

Peace and Democracy Party - BDP (Leader: Selahattin Demirtas)

Turkey Party - TP (Leader: Abdullatif Sener)

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<sup>61</sup>The Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Fact Book*, The Central Intelligence Agency Library, April 25 2014, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html>

## Part I: Political Environment

### Historical Context

The Republic of Turkey was established on October 29, 1923, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the election of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) as the first official president.<sup>62</sup> Prior to 1923, Mustafa Kemal was one of the leaders of the Turkish War of Independence and was focused on creating a new Turkey with a goal to create a modern, secular and democratic style government.<sup>63</sup> The adoption of the second constitution on April 20, 1924 was the beginning of the implementation of this new government focused on transforming the new Republic to a more democratic and western style of governing.<sup>64</sup> Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Turkey underwent various reforms with a focus on creating a secular government. These reforms included closure of Islamic courts and removal of Islamic law along with increased rights for women. It is important to note that during this time, the focus was on ensuring a secular government with exclusion of religion from politics and government; this strict separation is being debated today.<sup>65</sup>

In order for Turkey to focus on creating a democratic country, Atatürk laid out six guiding principles that formed the core of what is known in Turkey as *Kemalism*; these are still key drivers in politics and government today.<sup>66</sup> These principles include republicanism, nationalism, populism, laicism/secularism<sup>67</sup>, statism<sup>68</sup> and revolutionism.<sup>69</sup> Of these principles, two principles are key in order to understand political divisions in Turkey; secularism and statism. The principle of secularism is at the core of political divisions and is deeply rooted within Turkish history, because secularism focuses on a separation of religion from government. For the military, protecting Turkish citizens from government leaders that may infringe on secularism has been a key role, as a result when the military has determined that this principle has been threatened, military coups took place to overthrow the government.<sup>70</sup> The other key principle in regard to political division is statism, which focuses on more of a government led economy.

### 1923- 1945: The Single-Party Period of the Republic of Turkey

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<sup>62</sup> Princeton University, *History of the Republic of Turkey*, Princeton University Press, [http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/History\\_of\\_the\\_Republic\\_of\\_Turkey.html](http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/History_of_the_Republic_of_Turkey.html)

<sup>63</sup> Princeton University, *History of the Republic of Turkey*, Princeton University Press, [http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/History\\_of\\_the\\_Republic\\_of\\_Turkey.html](http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/History_of_the_Republic_of_Turkey.html)

<sup>64</sup> ECO Geoscience Database, *History of Turkey*, ECO Geoscience Database website, [http://www.ecogeodb.com/ECO\\_Detail.asp?P=History&CN=Turkey&C=TUR](http://www.ecogeodb.com/ECO_Detail.asp?P=History&CN=Turkey&C=TUR) and the Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/constitution-of-the-republic-of-turkey.en.mfa>

<sup>65</sup> Princeton University, *History of the Republic of Turkey*, Princeton University Press, [http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/History\\_of\\_the\\_Republic\\_of\\_Turkey.html](http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/History_of_the_Republic_of_Turkey.html)

<sup>66</sup> *Kemalism*, also known as Atatürkism, or the Six Arrows is the founding ideology of Turkey

<sup>67</sup> *Laicism* – the nonclerical, or secular, control of political and social institutions in a society.

<sup>68</sup> *Statism* – meant the collaboration of state enterprises and private enterprises however strategic enterprises such as in communication, transportation, energy sectors must be held by the state and never be sold to either local or foreign entrepreneurs.

<sup>69</sup> Study Mustafa Kemal Atatürk <http://theaturksocietyofcanada.ca/mka/revolutions/ataturks-principles/> Accessed May 18, 2014

<sup>70</sup> Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/constitution-of-the-republic-of-turkey.en.mfa>



For more than 20 years, Turkey was ruled under a single-political party system; the CHP was the ruling party during this time. Recognizing the importance opposition parties play in a democracy, Atatürk encouraged the establishment of opposition parties, but when these parties started to form, the CHP lead government did not provide the political space needed for them to thrive. For example, during this time, various parties had been banned because of their more Islamist leanings, such as the Progressive Republican Party because of its involvement in the 1925 Sheikh Said rebellion, which was the first large scale uprising by the Kurdish population. Another party that was banned was the Liberal Republican Party, because of its party platform of reversing secularism in government.<sup>71</sup> Therefore, although Atatürk's goal was to establish a multi-party system, he quickly realized the risk in allowing opposition parties to thrive was also risking his core six principles, especially the principle of secularism. As a result of a strict ban on Islamism, Turkish citizens that supported these views were disenfranchised, which created resentment against the government.<sup>72</sup>

### **1946 – 2014: Multi-Party System**

From its beginning, the multi-party system era in Turkey has been represented by many forms. In 1945, opposition parties began to form and put pressure on the ruling CHP party. The pressure seemed to work as in 1950 the Democratic Party (DP) won the parliamentary majority and a new party was in power. Because the DP was created from former CHP members, its party platform was closely aligned with the CHP party, but the difference was its position on the economy; the DP supported a more privatized economy while the CHP was a strong advocate of statism.<sup>73</sup>

The author of *Party Politics and Social Cleavages in Turkey*, points out some key factors that played a part in the creation of the multi-party system. One of those factors was the increase in social and ideological diversification within society, this diversification resulted in fluctuations of numerous parties along with civil unrest within the country. Along with civil unrest came military intervention and this intervention was a key factor in the political fluidity of the country. For example, The DP was ousted from government during the 1960-61 military coup; the military intervened again in 1971-1973 and political parties were dissolved because of their Islamist leanings.<sup>74</sup>

The military continued to play a key role in politics intervening again in the early 1980s, and ruling Turkey under a military junta, the National Security Council. During this time, the military banned all political parties that existed prior to the coup and also adopted a new constitution in 1982. Since the military crafted the new constitution, some argued that the "the primary objective of the . . . [1982] Constitution was to protect the state from the actions of its

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<sup>71</sup> History of Turkish political life, AINA News, <http://www.aina.org/news/20070524131254.htm>

<sup>72</sup> History of Turkish political life, AINA News, <http://www.aina.org/news/20070524131254.htm>

<sup>73</sup> Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, *Turkey*, U.S. Department of the Army, <http://countrystudies.us/turkey/15.htm>

<sup>74</sup> Ergun Oxbudun, *Party Politics and Social Cleavages in Turkey*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, April 1, 2013

citizens, rather than protecting the individual liberties from the encroachments of the state."<sup>75</sup> Therefore, many see the current constitution which was created by the military government as too authoritarian in nature.

Turkey returned to civilian rule after the 1983 election. The Motherland Party (ANAP) which won that election is based on a platform focused on a privatization of the economy and increased religious freedom. During this era, further political transformation took place. An amendment to the constitution in 1987 allowed political parties the right to participate in elections; as a result politicians banned from politics during the military regime reentered politics and created more political divisions which lead to the decrease in support for the for ANAP in the 1990s.<sup>76</sup> The reengagement of previously banned politicians caused more division within the country and increased Islamist inspired parties. In 1995, the Welfare Party (RP), which was known for its Islamic focus, won approximately one-third of the seats in Parliament. Its Islamic leanings created tensions between the military and the RP. This lead to what is known as the *postmodern coup* of February 28, 1997, during which a time the military was running the government without a formal takeover. The RP was forced to resign and was eventually banned by the Constitutional Court on grounds of the preservation of secularism.<sup>77</sup>

The postmodern coup government stayed in power until the 2002 election when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power by a landslide victory changing Turkey's government back to civilian control. Currently, the AKP has dominated the political environment in Turkey and continues to win the majority of seats in parliament.<sup>78</sup> The AKP has more of an Islamist leaning and is an interesting case study of how successful Islamists have been in Turkey. Ömer Taşpınar, author of *Beyond Military Tutelage? Turkish Military Politics and the AKP Government* notes,

“The victory for the AKP was historic. It was only the second time since the beginning of Turkey's multiparty democracy in 1946 that a political party had won three consecutive elections. And it was the first time that a party actually increased its percentage of the vote at each succeeding election...It was a striking reversal. All previous Islamist parties in Turkey had been shut down by either military intervention or rulings by the constitutional court: The National Order Party, founded in 1970, was banned by the Constitutional Court in 1971. The National Salvation Party, founded in 1972, was outlawed after the 1980 military coup. The Welfare Party, founded in 1983, was banned

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<sup>75</sup>Michael M. Gunter, Turkey: The Politics of a New Democratic Constitution, Spring 2012, Volume XIX, Number 1,

<http://mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/turkey-politics-new-democratic-constitution?print>

<sup>76</sup>Ergun Özbudun, *Party Politics and Social Cleavages in Turkey*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, April 1, 2013

<sup>77</sup>William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East* 5th Edition, Westview Press, Dec 4, 2012, page 265

<sup>78</sup>Ergun Özbudun, *Party Politics and Social Cleavages in Turkey* <https://www.rienner.com/uploads/513663b2a80d1.pdf>

by the Constitutional Court in 1998. The Virtue Party, founded in 1997, was banned in 2001.”<sup>79</sup>

Taşpınar continues to note the uniqueness to Turkey’s Islamist political parties, and refers to the Economists observation, “Autocratic regimes in the Muslim world often ban religious parties, which then go underground and turn violent. Turkey’s Islamists have taken a different path. Despite being repeatedly outlawed and ejected from power, pious politicians have shunned violence, embraced democracy, and moved into the mainstream.”<sup>80</sup>

### **Formal Institutional Context**

It is important to note that the current constitution was drafted by the military during their regime and adopted on November 7, 1982. While the AKP has been in power, significant amendments to the constitution have been adopted as part of Turkey’s preparation to eventually join the European Union (EU) and in order to conform its civil rights guarantees to the European Convention on Human Rights, which Turkey has adopted. Some of the key reforms included the adoption of a liberal penal code, increased civilian control of the military and improving the democratic process.<sup>81</sup>

The changes that are occurring do not only reflect Turkey’s interest in EU membership, but also showcases the goal of the AKP to continue to gain more control of government. For example, in 2010, a constitutional change increased the number of members of the Constitutional Court from 11 to 17 with three of the individuals elected by parliament and 14 appointed by the president. The importance of this reform is that it gives the AKP even more power; the Constitutional Court is the key decider in regards to the political parties that participate in Turkey.<sup>82</sup>

Another key area that the AKP is focused on is in regard to the constitution’s strict separation of religion in politics, government and civil society. The AKP views this law as not representing the increasingly religious Turkish population. Therefore, the AKP is seeking to provide more opportunity for religion to play a part of civil society, but critics fear the AKP’s underlying goal is to institute religious law. For example, Prime Minister Erdoğan introduced legislation to criminalize adultery and introduced ‘alcohol free zones.’ Critics argued that these proposals are steps in his agenda to create a less secular society.<sup>83</sup> Other key issues are being considered for reform such as the role of the military and judiciary in government.<sup>84</sup> However, religion appears to be the fundamental and most divisive reform issue for Turkey.

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<sup>79</sup> Ömer Taşpınar, *Turkey: The New Model?*, April 2012 <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/04/24-turkey-new-model-taspinar>  
<sup>80</sup> <http://www.economist.com/node/10881280>

<sup>81</sup> Gagaptay Soner, *The E.U. Needs Turkey*, The Opinion Pages, The New York Times, Dec 20 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/opinion/the-eu-needs-turkey.html>

<sup>82</sup> Wrhola, James, *Reform of the Turkish Constitution: A Step Forward or Backward*, E-International Relations, May 23, 2012, <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/05/23/reform-of-the-turkish-constitution-a-step-forward-or-backward/>

<sup>83</sup> BBC Article, June 4, 2013 <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13746679>

<sup>84</sup> Wrhola, James, *Reform of the Turkish Constitution: A Step Forward or Backward*, E-International Relations, May 23, 2012, <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/05/23/reform-of-the-turkish-constitution-a-step-forward-or-backward/>

Another focus of reform for the AKP is to increase presidential power. The AKP is focused on amendments that would empower the president and diminish the power of the military.<sup>85</sup> <sup>86</sup> For example, the AKP focused on allowing for a direct election for the presidency (verses the president being appointed by parliament). They were successful in this reform and Turkey will experience its first direct presidential election in August 2014. Critics argue that the reason the AKP's focus on strengthening the presidency is because of Prime Minister Erdoğan's plan to run for president.<sup>87</sup> The AKP's reforms have polarized Turkey. Opposition parties see the AKP and Prime Minister Erdoğan's program as moving the country closer to decreased secularism; some call the government a civilian dictatorship with its move to weaken the military and control the media.<sup>88</sup>

### **Informal Institutional Context**

The informal institutional context within Turkey currently revolve around three key factors that are all interrelated; the role of the military, the role of secularism and the increase polarization within the country. It cannot be emphasized enough the key role the military has played in the development of Turkish political system. As stated above, historically, the military has been perceived by the public as the protector of Turkey's domestic stability and secularism.<sup>89</sup> It seems that the military's historical tactics such as organizing protests as well as attempted coups, are not working as they had in the past. According the authors of *Beyond Military Tutelage? Turkish Military Politics and the AKP Government* the authors make an interesting observation to this transformation. "However, having a narrow internal social base and hardly any international support, these attempts by the military have failed, and the balance of forces in Turkish civil military relations has been gradually trans-formed in favor of the civilian government." The military is losing ground and the AKP is strategically taking advantage of this opportunity by implementing policies to further weaken the military's role.<sup>90</sup>

For example the author of *The Islamists Are Coming: Who They Really Are* pointed this very issue out:

"The AKP also consolidated its supremacy over the military—a first since the creation of the modern state. On July 29, 2011, the military's chief of staff resigned after a disagreement with Erdoğan about staff promotions. The same day, the heads of the army, navy, and air force requested early retirement. By early 2012, half of all Turkish admirals and one out of ten active-duty generals were in jail for plotting against the government. It

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<sup>85</sup> Wrhola, James, *Reform of the Turkish Constitution: A Step Forward or Backward*, E-International Relations, May 23, 2012, <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/05/23/reform-of-the-turkish-constitution-a-step-forward-or-backward/>

<sup>86</sup> <http://www.gloria-center.org/2011/10/turkey%E2%80%99s-2011-elections-an-emerging-dominant-party-system/>

<sup>87</sup> Geyikei Sebnem, *The Impact of Parties and Party Systems on Democratic Consolidation: The Case of Turkey*, Department of Government, University of Essex, January 2011, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeaninstitute/research/contemporaryturkishstudies/papersyg2011.pdf>

<sup>88</sup> Wrhola, James, *Reform of the Turkish Constitution: A Step Forward or Backward*, E-International Relations, May 23, 2012, <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/05/23/reform-of-the-turkish-constitution-a-step-forward-or-backward/>

<sup>89</sup> Capezza David, *Turkey's Military Is a Catalyst for Reform*, Middle East Quarterly Volume XVI Number 3, Summer 2009, pp. 13-23

<sup>90</sup> İsmet Akça and Evren Balta-Paker, *Beyond Military Tutelage? Turkish Military Politics and the AKP Government*, Chapter 4 [http://www.academia.edu/3426148/Beyond\\_Military\\_Tutelage\\_Turkish\\_Military\\_Politics\\_and\\_the\\_AKP\\_Government](http://www.academia.edu/3426148/Beyond_Military_Tutelage_Turkish_Military_Politics_and_the_AKP_Government)

was a paradigm shift for a country that had experienced three military coups and constant military meddling for almost a century.”<sup>91</sup>

At the heart of the friction between the AKP and military is the role of secularism. The military views the AKP as shifting away from this deep tradition of the importance of secularism within Turkey. Therefore, the differing views of the role of secularism are increasing the polarization within the country. The Turkish opposition parties consider the AKP increasingly ruling the country in a more authoritarian manner.<sup>92</sup> Although there is an increase in polarization, the AKP does have a lot of support and is assumed to be the party that will remain in power for the near future.

### **Social Context**

Several aspects of a party system are impacted by social context and various social divisions can create a variety of political parties. Various divisions are rooted in Turkey’s history, but the divisions were suppressed in the political system for over two decades during the CHP power. Therefore, because it was not long ago that Turkey had a single-party system, it continues to undergo an “identity crisis” shifting between a single-party system, multi-party system, military coups and civil unrest. According to the author of *The Islamists Are Coming: Who They Really Are*, this identity crisis dates back to the Cold War.

“But in 1991, after the Cold War ended and communism collapsed, Turkey’s identity problems rapidly resurfaced. The right and left were no longer able to absorb the passions of Kurdish and Islamic dissent. Turkey was polarized along two axes: Turkish versus Kurdish identity on the one hand, and Islamic versus secular identity on the other. The result was the “lost decade” of the 1990s—a decade of war with Kurdish separatists, polarization over the role of religious values, economic turmoil, and unstable coalition governments.”<sup>93</sup>

Another example of these divisions is the concept in Turkey of “White Turks” and “Black Turks,” that is used to explain the political and social divide in the country.<sup>94</sup> White Turks are considered to be elitist and upper-middle class and the Black Turks are categorized as a lower economic class. The Black Turks have been major supporters of the AKP and have experienced an increase in economic growth during the AKP’s power.<sup>95</sup> A black Turk was recently interviewed by the Guardian newspaper regarding his support for the AKP, and he stated, “I am voting for the AKP because I'm terrified of what will happen if the CHP came back to power.

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<sup>91</sup> Ömer Taşpınar, *The Islamists Are Coming: Who They Really Are*, April 2012, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/04/24-turkey-new-model-taspinar>

<sup>92</sup> <http://demdigest.net/blog/turkeys-soft-power-more-soft-than-powerful-alcohol-curbs-raise-fears-of-creeping-islamization/>

<sup>93</sup> Taşpınar Ömer, *Turkey: The New Model*, The Woodrow Wilson Center, The Brookings Institute, April 2012,

<sup>94</sup> Ayoob Mohammed, *Erdogan's Election Victory Could Be Good News For Turkish Democracy*, the Guardian, March 31 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/31/erdogan-election-victory-turkish-democracy>

<sup>95</sup> Ferguson Michael, *White Turks, Black Turks, and Negroes: The Politics of Polarization*, the Jadaliyya news website, June 29 2013, [http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/12484/white-turks-black-turks-and-negroes\\_the-politics-o](http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/12484/white-turks-black-turks-and-negroes_the-politics-o)

We lived like peasants under their rule, walking on streets cleaning rubbish, hiding our wives at home because they wear head scarves. I don't think the AKP is perfect, but there is a future under their rule for my grandchildren." <sup>96</sup>

## Part II: Political Parties and System

### Principles

#### *Party Structures and Member Engagement*

The April 22, 1983 Turkish Political Parties Law, has impacted the political party structure and system within Turkey.<sup>97</sup> The law was created during the time of military rule in order to control the operation of political parties. As a result, all Turkish political parties have very similar organizational structures. The law states that all party chairpersons and executive committees are elected by the party congresses composed of delegates chosen by registered party members. The Grand Congress is the highest decision-making authority, because of its responsibility to elect the party president, the central executive committee and the central disciplinary committee. The political party's local organization structures comprises of province, sub-province and municipal levels. According to Article 37, the Parliamentary candidates must be nominated but the law allows for the option to conduct primary elections.<sup>98</sup> However, the majority of Turkish parties currently chose to have the central executive committee select the parliamentary candidates.<sup>99</sup>

Compared to other parties, the AKP has better-structured and more clearly outlined the responsibilities of each of the party's governing bodies and is one of the few parties that has translated its bylaws into other languages. The AKP's Congress has the authority to elect the Party Leader, the Central Decision-Making and Executive Committee and the Intra-Party Democracy Arbitration Committee.<sup>100</sup> Representing the second highest authority in the party, the Central Decision-Making and Executive Committee has 50 members and is under the leadership of the party president. It decides on party policies and organizational matters including the decisions to form a government.<sup>101</sup> The AKP limits a leader's tenure to four terms. The AKP created a smaller body called the Central Executive Committee to be in charge of handling the party's daily functions.<sup>102</sup> The Intra-Party Democracy and Arbitration Committee is another example that illustrates how the AKP's organizational structure differs from that of the other

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<sup>96</sup> Acemoglu Daron & Robinson James, *Black Turks, White Turks*, Why Nations Fail blog, February 20, 2013 <http://whynationsfail.com/blog/2013/2/20/black-turks-white-turks.html>

<sup>97</sup> Turkish Consulate General <http://www.turkishconsulategeneral.us/abtturkey/govt/elec.shtml>

<sup>98</sup> OSMAN KAŞIKÇI, W&H, [http://www.turkishreview.org/newsDetail\\_getNewsById.action?newsId=223249](http://www.turkishreview.org/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=223249)

<sup>99</sup> Hale William, *Turkey's Domestic Political Landscape: A Glance at the Past and the Future*, The International Spectator Volume XXXIV, No.1 January-March, <http://www.iai.it/pdf/articles/hale.pdf>

<sup>100</sup> Hale William, *Turkey's Domestic Political Landscape: A Glance at the Past and the Future*, The International Spectator Volume XXXIV, No.1 January-March, <http://www.iai.it/pdf/articles/hale.pdf>

<sup>101</sup> Hale William, *Turkey's Domestic Political Landscape: A Glance at the Past and the Future*, The International Spectator Volume XXXIV, No.1 January-March, <http://www.iai.it/pdf/articles/hale.pdf>

<sup>102</sup> Hale William, *Turkey's Domestic Political Landscape: A Glance at the Past and the Future*, The International Spectator Volume XXXIV, No.1 January-March, <http://www.iai.it/pdf/articles/hale.pdf>

Turkish political parties. This body is in charge of resolving conflicts among members.<sup>103</sup> Similarly to other Turkish political parties at the local level, the AKP has municipal, provincial and sub-provincial congresses and executive committees.

To understand how AKP actually represents party members' interests in policy decision-making, it is important to look at the motivation of Prime Minister Erdoğan, the leader of the party. Most critics see his goal to remain in power, especially after the 2013 corruption scandal that involved ministers and business leaders. As a result, according to the report by the Bipartisan Center,

“this decreased the public’s trust of the party and as therefore has increased Erdoğan ambition to be the sole and unchallenged ruler of Turkey, in order to further the AKP’s ideological aims; but now, this urge is motivated not simply by ambition, but by fear of the consequences of losing power.”<sup>104</sup>

Erdoğan has control over various levels of government, for example, during the recent corruption crisis, Erdoğan used his power by reassigning and firing police officers as a way of eliminating any opposition. His authoritarian response also impacted his reputation as a democratic leader both domestically and internationally. Despite this potential image crisis, it very likely that he will win his next election.<sup>105</sup> Although Turkish citizens takes corruption very seriously, it does not have faith that other parties are not corrupt. And according to the Economist, more importantly, the AKP is perceived as the only party that has the capacity to create economic stability.<sup>106</sup>

According to the authors of, *Turkey's Local Elections: Actors, Factors, and Implications*, from the beginning, the AKP was "an alliance of Islamists, conservatives, nationalists and liberals, who came together largely as a result of their common interest in confronting the military regime and military “tutelage” of Turkish politics.”<sup>107</sup> But under Erdoğan, the Islamist and authoritarian drift has alienated key constituencies from this original coalition. "Senior figures within the AKP – such as Deputy Prime Ministers Ali Babacan and Bülent Arınç – have clearly tried to distance themselves from Erdoğan’s rashness, authoritarianism, and Islamism.”<sup>108</sup> The AKP is a strong party and at least for the foreseeable future, will endure the resentment between its leaders, even

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<sup>103</sup> Hale William, *Turkey's Domestic Political Landscape: A Glance at the Past and the Future*, The International Spectator Volume XXXIV, No.1 January-March, <http://www.iai.it/pdf/articles/hale.pdf>

<sup>104</sup> Barkey, Cornell, Dobriansky, et, *Turkey's Local Elections: Actors, Factors, and Implications*, National Security Program, Bipartisan Policy Center, March 14 <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Turkey%20Elections%20Report.pdf>

<sup>105</sup> <sup>105</sup> Barkey, Cornell, Dobriansky, et, *Turkey's Local Elections: Actors, Factors, and Implications*, National Security Program, Bipartisan Policy Center, March 14 <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Turkey%20Elections%20Report.pdf>

<sup>106</sup> *Erdogan on a roll*, The Economist, Apr 5th 2014, <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21600161-ak-party-wins-convincingly-what-next-erdogan-roll>

<sup>107</sup> Barkey, Cornell, Dobriansky, et, *Turkey's Local Elections: Actors, Factors, and Implications*, National Security Program, Bipartisan Policy Center, March 14, <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Turkey%20Elections%20Report.pdf>

<sup>108</sup> Barkey, Cornell, Dobriansky, et, *Turkey's Local Elections: Actors, Factors, and Implications*, National Security Program, Bipartisan Policy Center, March 14, <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Turkey%20Elections%20Report.pdf>

with the increase of the number of party members leaving. As tensions rise within the AKP, Erdoğan is beginning to be viewed as a potential liability.<sup>109</sup>

For example, in March 2014, more than 1,000 members of AKP resigned to join the opposition Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).<sup>110</sup> The members resigned in a show of resistance and dissatisfaction against the corruption scandals and the members issued a joint statement regarding their decision to leave the AKP:

“We want to share a decision which carries great significance in terms of our political future. Up till now, we have never been involved in any kind of dishonesty in either our political or private lives. We have considered politics to be a tool for serving our citizens. We have given priority to the benefit of the nation instead of our own. ... However, the things that we have witnessed recently regarding the government have made it impossible for us to continue with the AK Party.”<sup>111</sup>

However, even with these internal conflicts it is unlikely that the party would seriously fracture because of its many loyal followers, however if the divisions within the AKP continue to increase, the party may need to make a decision if Erdoğan’s leadership is sustainable for the future of the party.

### ***Example of Party Accountability***

The AKP party has detailed offences that would merit disciplinary action and punishments including warning, reprimand, and temporary and permanent dismissal in accordance with their principles and rules.<sup>112</sup> However, party supporters find it hard to hold their leaders accountable. All the power resides with the parties’ top leaders. It’s strongly centralized structure constitutes a mechanism used almost by all Turkish political parties to maintain tight control over the more radicalized elements within their organization as well their party activists.

In 2013, several allegations against Prime Minister Erdoğan tested the party’s sense of accountability to the public and its members. A study done by the Bipartisan Policy Center analyzed these accusations:

"The allegations against Erdoğan are serious: after using excessive force against protesters last summer, and government ministers and other close associates of the Prime Minister have been found to have laundered Iranian money, stash millions of dollars in

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<sup>109</sup> Barkey, Cornell, Dobriansky, et, *Turkey’s Local Elections: Actors, Factors, and Implications*, National Security Program, Bipartisan Policy Center, March 14 <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Turkey%20Elections%20Report.pdf>

<sup>110</sup> *Over 1,000 AK Party Members resign, Join MHP in Ankara*, Today’s Zaman, March 28, 2014, <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-343300-over-1000-ak-party-members-resign-join-mhp-in-ankara.html>

<sup>111</sup> *Over 1,000 AK Party Members resign, Join MHP in Ankara*, Today’s Zaman, March 28, 2014, <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-343300-over-1000-ak-party-members-resign-join-mhp-in-ankara.html>

<sup>112</sup> The AKP Party, Disciplinary Offences and Punishments, Party By-laws, Section Three Part One, pp 64, <http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-tuzugu>



cash in their houses, and illegally alter zoning laws to benefit the party, among other accusations. The prime minister himself has been credibly accused of collusion with a Saudi terrorist financier, Yasin Al Qadi; of interfering directly with media outlets, demanding the removal of news he disagreed with; and, most recently, of conspiring with his son and other family members to hide tens of millions of dollars in cash when the corruption probe started."<sup>113</sup>

A public opinion poll indicated that 60% of the respondents believed the allegations are true and that the government is involved in the cover-up.<sup>114</sup> With such serious accusations, it may seem that the public is accurate that the government is involved in the cover-up because as of May 2014, there has been no formal or even informal investigation of Erdoğan's involvement in these alleged offenses.

### ***Interparty Relations***

Relations among parties in Turkey are hostile and polarized. The AKP proclaims that it is focused on democracy, but, as stated above, opposition parties are ever more concerned with the AKP's undemocratic practices.<sup>115</sup>

The CHP is the main opposition party, which was the party in power during the single-political party period. The party is focused on a clear separation of religion and government and has criticized the AKP for its move toward undemocratic practices such as the recent ban placed on Youtube and Twitter during the local elections.<sup>116</sup> The party focuses on a clear separation of religion and government, however, because of this strict position, with the increase of religious activists in Turkey, this position does not help the party gain more supporters. The CHP is trying to change this image, and is trying to rebrand the party with a focus on its 'social democratic legacy,' but this will take time especially since the CHP has historically been such a vocal advocate on secularism and its connection with the military.<sup>117</sup>

The other opposition party is the Nationalist Movement Party, which is considered a far right conservative party. The party has similar views of religion in government as the AKP which allows it to be a competition to the AKP's religious base, but its leadership is less focused on democracy and makes it even less appealing to voters.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> Barkey, Cornell, Dobriansky, et, *Turkey's Local Elections: Actors, Factors, and Implications*, National Security Program, Bipartisan Policy Center, March 14

<sup>114</sup> Barkey, Cornell, Dobriansky, et, *Turkey's Local Elections: Actors, Factors, and Implications*, National Security Program, Bipartisan Policy Center, March 14

<sup>115</sup> Taspinar Omer, *Turkey: The New Model*, The Woodrow Wilson Center, The Brookings Institute, April 2012,

<http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/04/24-turkey-new-model-taspinar>

<sup>116</sup> Turkey's Main Opposition Party CHP Lose Ruling on Ankara Recount, April 4, 2014 <http://www.dw.de/turkeys-main-opposition-party-chp-lose-ruling-on-ankara-recount/a-17545163>

<sup>117</sup> Barkey, Cornell, Dobriansky, et, *Turkey's Local Elections: Actors, Factors, and Implications*, National Security Program, Bipartisan Policy Center, March 14

<sup>118</sup> Barkey, Cornell, Dobriansky, et, *Turkey's Local Elections: Actors, Factors, and Implications*, National Security Program, Bipartisan Policy Center, March 14

Another main player worth mentioning is the Kurdish Nationalists, which is not a political party but has influence on a number of political parties especially in the southeast of the country, where they dominate. The Kurdish Nationalists are supporters of Prime Minister Erdoğan, much of this support has to do with the AKP's focus in 2009, on starting a peace process.<sup>119</sup> According to the author of *Turkey: The New Model*, the author observes this very point about the reason for the Kurdish support of Erdoğan. "This process has gone further than any earlier attempt to resolve the conflict as well as the broader question about the place of Kurds in Turkey. The prospect of achieving their political demands and freeing their imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan, will prove incentive enough to keep most Kurdish nationalists in Erdoğan's column."<sup>120</sup> However, they also have their own political agenda, and could someday become an opposition to the AKP.

The opposition party efforts have not, translated into any success in eliminating the AKP from power or their ability to influence legislation. It seems that in the near future the AKP will continue to be the party in power even in light the corruption accusations.

## **Part III: Competencies**

### **Political Party Financing**

The main source of revenue for political parties is through state financial assistance. However, a party must secure a minimum of 7% of the votes in the general parliamentary election in order to qualify for financial assistance; this law creates a disadvantage to parties that don't meet this threshold. The AKP's published financial information shows that in 2004 and 2006 the party received over 85% of its revenue from state aid.<sup>121</sup> The other sources of funding for political parties are membership dues, and donations from both corporate and legal bodies. However, restrictions include: real estate, movable assets, cash or granting privileges and rights to political parties by public institutions. In addition, the Turkish Political Parties Law bans foreign contributions. Foreign contributions can include: foreign states, international organizations, foreign individuals, and institutions in foreign countries. Parties in violation are dissolved permanently.

Although lacking transparency, to ensure compliance, political parties are audited by the Turkish Constitutional Court.<sup>122</sup> The large parties in Turkey have the capacity to obtain enough donations and contributions to sustain their party's finances; even though corruption is a sensitive issue for civil society and has political consequences.

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<sup>119</sup> Barkey, Cornell, Dobriansky, et, *Turkey's Local Elections: Actors, Factors, and Implications*, National Security Program, Bipartisan Policy Center, March 14

<sup>120</sup> Taspinar Omer, *Turkey: The New Model*, The Woodrow Wilson Center, The Brookings Institute, April 2012, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/04/24-turkey-new-model-taspinar>

<sup>121</sup> Kumbaracibasi, Arda C. *Turkish Politics And The Rise of The AKP*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2009.

<sup>122</sup> Barkey, Cornell, Dobriansky, et, *Turkey's Local Elections: Actors, Factors, and Implications*, National Security Program, Bipartisan Policy Center, March 14

## Outreach and Campaign Effectiveness

The AKP utilizes a local approach by using its local organization. For instance, in the case of the 2002 and 2007 elections within the sub-province of Gaziosmanpasa; a poor populated area of the sub-provinces of Istanbul with more than 527,000 registered voters, 5 municipalities, 29 neighborhoods and 1,726 polling booth districts, the AKP won well above their national average receiving over 45% of the votes.<sup>123</sup> To achieve these results the AKP implemented a grassroots approach by establishing three organizational levels below the sub-province executive committee: the municipalities, the neighborhoods, and the polling districts.

The neighborhood executive committee has 11 members; the polling district committee has 9 members from the women's and from the youth organizations. This gives the AKP about 15,000 actively working members, with about 85,000 registered members in the sub-province. Each committee member has 30 to 35 voters to manage.<sup>124</sup> This well-orchestrated organizational structure also has sub-committees at the sub-province level in areas of health, education, social affairs, economy, civil society organization, and disabled persons.<sup>125</sup> The AKP succeeded in helping 2,500 families receive daily meals from the municipalities and 85,000 families receive green card to receive free medical care.<sup>126</sup>

To broaden their reach to a wider electorate, AKP leaders aimed at capturing the center-right vote. The AKP leaders understood how damaging it would be if the party only tried to appeal to those who embrace the Islamist values while ignoring the other parts of the Turkish population who may have different values. For that reason, the AKP adopted a more inclusive strategy. The party seems to be doing a better job of positioning itself at the center of the Turkish society in terms of popularity, which contributes to its dominance of the opposition parties in Turkey. The AKP also invested in sophisticated campaign strategies such as hiring professional public relations experts, poll-takers and using technology effectively to reach a wider audience.<sup>127</sup>

The opposition parties, on the other hand, struggle to reach out to a wider range of voters, and each tends to focus on their base. For example, the CHP focuses on the secular-minded middle class voter and fails to engage the poor. They are also viewed as not focused in promoting minority rights, strong supporters of the military, and failing to accommodate voters with strong religious beliefs. This image crisis hampers their popularity despite the scandal around

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<sup>123</sup> Hale William, *Turkey's Domestic Political Landscape: A Glance at the Past and the Future*, The International Spectator Volume XXXIV, No.1 January-March, <http://www.iai.it/pdf/articles/hale.pdf>

<sup>124</sup> Hale William, *Turkey's Domestic Political Landscape: A Glance at the Past and the Future*, The International Spectator Volume XXXIV, No.1 January-March, <http://www.iai.it/pdf/articles/hale.pdf>

<sup>125</sup> Hale William, *Turkey's Domestic Political Landscape: A Glance at the Past and the Future*, The International Spectator Volume XXXIV, No.1 January-March, <http://www.iai.it/pdf/articles/hale.pdf>

<sup>126</sup> Hale William, *Turkey's Domestic Political Landscape: A Glance at the Past and the Future*, The International Spectator Volume XXXIV, No.1 January-March, <http://www.iai.it/pdf/articles/hale.pdf>

<sup>127</sup> Hale William, *Turkey's Domestic Political Landscape: A Glance at the Past and the Future*, The International Spectator Volume XXXIV, No.1 January-March, <http://www.iai.it/pdf/articles/hale.pdf>

Erdoğan.<sup>128</sup> Another factor that makes it difficult for opposition parties is the large AKP presence locally elected level. For instance, 300,000 AKP officials hold public office such as Mayor or city councilmembers.<sup>129</sup> The ability for the AKP to maintain representation at the local level allows them to stay connected with the community and in turn secure strategic relationships with voters. In addition, the AKP ensures it trains its members in policy formulation.<sup>130</sup>

It is important for an opposition party to be capable of presenting alternative solutions to the Turkish electorate to reduce corruption and ensure citizens' voices are heard in government. A more constructive opposition is needed to replace today's, which is engaged only in antagonistic behavior. This was the case during the recent March 2014 municipal elections. A coalition of parties, including the MHP, CHP and the Gülen Movement, which have nothing in common, came together to topple the AKP. However, the opposition parties failed to inspire the Turkish electorate because they did not adopt a policy agenda that would motivate Turkish voters and unite them behind a message of hope for the future.<sup>131</sup>

## Recommendations for Reform

In summary, although the "10% vote threshold" limits the possibility for new or small parties to be on the ballot, the political space is still open for most major parties. Based on our analysis, the main problem is that the large parties, including the AKP, do not stick to political party principles. This is especially true in regards to the party accountability principle; as evidenced by recent corruption scandals. The government reaction to these issues is troubling by infringing on individual rights and the adoption of new laws to censor social media/internet.<sup>132</sup>

According to Transparency International, 66% of Turkish people think their political parties are corrupt; clearly making it an issue that needs to be addressed.<sup>133</sup> Along with corruption, freedom of expression is also jeopardized. According to Freedom House, "Freedom of expression is guaranteed in the constitution but restricted by law and in practice." It is reported that 40 journalists were incarcerated in Turkey as of December 2013; this is more than in any other country.<sup>134</sup> Historically, Turkey is at a pivotal point, it needs to decide if it will move toward democracy or authoritarianism. Recommendations below would allow citizens to begin to trust

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<sup>128</sup> Yackley Ayla, Turkish Opposition Struggles to Close Gap with scandal-hit Erdogan, The Reuters News, March 28 2014, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/28/uk-turkey-election-opposition-idUKBREA2R1KH20140328>

<sup>129</sup> Hale William, *Turkey's Domestic Political Landscape: A Glance at the Past and the Future*, The International Spectator Volume XXXIV, No.1 January-March, <http://www.iai.it/pdf/articles/hale.pdf>

<sup>130</sup> Hale William, *Turkey's Domestic Political Landscape: A Glance at the Past and the Future*, The International Spectator Volume XXXIV, No.1 January-March, <http://www.iai.it/pdf/articles/hale.pdf>

<sup>131</sup> Zilan Bayram, *Thrukey's Opposition Party Problem*, Daily Sabah, Apr 22 2014, <http://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/2014/04/23/turkeys-opposition-party-problem>

<sup>132</sup> Transparency International, *Five Reforms to Restore Faith in Turkey*, Transparency International Website, Feb 10 2014, [http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/five\\_reforms\\_to\\_restore\\_faith\\_in\\_turkish\\_politics](http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/five_reforms_to_restore_faith_in_turkish_politics)

<sup>133</sup> Freedom House, *Turkey-Freedom in the World Report 2014*, 2014, [http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/turkey-0?gclid=COzKtsHKgb4CFbQWMgodb1YAMA#.U11yy\\_ldXIR](http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/turkey-0?gclid=COzKtsHKgb4CFbQWMgodb1YAMA#.U11yy_ldXIR)

<sup>134</sup> Freedom House, *Turkey-Freedom in the World Report 2014*, 2014, [http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/turkey-0?gclid=COzKtsHKgb4CFbQWMgodb1YAMA#.U11yy\\_ldXIR](http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/turkey-0?gclid=COzKtsHKgb4CFbQWMgodb1YAMA#.U11yy_ldXIR)

the government and allow them to become more transparent. These initial recommendations are key components to ensure Turkish citizens are represented in their government.

**1. Partner with civil society to advocate a more transparent campaign finance environment:**

- Increase party accountability by executing campaign finance reform with a special emphasis on transparency.
- Provide information to the public regarding political party funding to enable the ability for the Turkish people to hold elected officials accountable.
- Eliminate the 7% threshold of state funding of political parties or replace it with a threshold that all parties receive from the state to eliminate the current disadvantage experienced by smaller parties.

**2. Ethics in Law and Enforcement:**

- Transparency International recommended ethics law that would create standards for members of elected officials.<sup>135</sup> Turkey currently does not have laws governing what elected officials can and cannot do.
- Therefore, the ethics law would create standards such a codes of conduct, rules on gifts, requirements to record contact with lobbyist and conflicts of interest policies for elected officials. In addition, it will also be important for transparency of the law as well as enforcement in order to ensure compliance.

**3. Smaller Parties Build Capacity:**

- Building capacity within small parties will facilitate their improved function and force major parties to be more accountable and representative of their members.

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<sup>135</sup> Transparency International, *Five Reforms to Restore Faith in Turkey*, Transparency International Website, Feb 10 2014, Thttp://www.transparency.org/news/feature/five\_reforms\_to\_restore\_faith\_in\_turkish\_politics