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NST

a Journal of Dialectical and Historical Materialism

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VOL. 19, NO. 4 (OCTOBER 2006) Sent to press January 2, 2008

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Cover design by Prockat

NST: NATURE, SOCIETY, AND THOUGHT (ISSN 0890-6130). Published quarterly in January, April, July, and October by MEP Publications, University of Minnesota, Physics Building, 116 Church Street S.E., Minneapolis, MN 55455-0112. Periodicals postage paid at Minneapolis, Minnesota. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to *NST: Nature, Society, and Thought*, University of Minnesota, Physics Building, 116 Church St. S.E., Minneapolis, MN 55455-0112.

Subscriptions. Individuals, one year: U.S.A. \$20, Canada and Mexico \$31, other countries \$45; two years: U.S.A. \$35, Canada and Mexico \$57, other countries \$80. Institutions, one year: U.S.A. \$50, Canada and Mexico \$61, other countries \$80.

Subscription and editorial address: *NST*, University of Minnesota, Physics Building, 116 Church Street S.E., Minneapolis, MN 55455-0112 (tel. 612-922-7993).

Contents are indexed in *Sociological Abstracts* and *Alternative Press Index*. A complete index of all articles published in *Nature, Society, and Thought* is given on <http://www.umn.edu/home/marqu002/nst>.

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Political and Economic Consequences of the Attempted Socialization of Agriculture in the Soviet Union

Erwin Marquit

Introduction

The shift from a centrally planned socialist economy to a socialist-oriented market economy by China and Vietnam is viewed by some in the Communist movement as a partial retreat, made necessary by the demise of the Soviet Union and contemporary conditions of economic globalization, from the path of socialist development. Others even regard this shift as a complete abandonment of the socialist path due to dominance of rightist forces within specific Communist parties. Those who hold the latter view tend to view the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) as a history of struggle of the Left against the Right, with Lenin and Stalin being the standard bearers of the Left. In this view, Bukharin, Khrushchev, and Gorbachev represent the rightist forces, advocating increasing use of market forces, and ultimately opening the path for the counterrevolutionary overthrow of the socialist system.

This view, with which I disagree, was clearly expressed in *Socialism Betrayed: Behind the Collapse of the Soviet Union* by Roger Keeran and Thomas Kenny, published in 2004 by International Publishers (the publishing house associated with the Communist Party USA) in the interest of open discussion, although its views were not in line with those of the current CPUSA leadership.

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The course of my own thinking on this contentious history may be instructive. Publication of *Socialism Betrayed* by International Publishers led me reconsider my past hesitance to delve more deeply into this period of Soviet history. I had avoided works on the Soviet Union by anti-Soviet bourgeois scholars such as Robert Conquest. I had also been reluctant to read books by Soviet scholars such as Roy Medvedev,¹ characterized as dissidents in Soviet times, since the accuracy of their information could not be verified. Even Khrushchev's memoirs seemed to me suspect, since he had publicly dissociated himself from them. (In this case, as increasing amounts of previously withheld archival material became available, Khrushchev's authorship of the memoirs and the details of how they came to be published became part of the public record.)

The cumulative effect of these historiographic developments led me to embark on an extensive review of this period of history. I wrote a critical review of the Keeran and Kenny book for *Nature, Society, and Thought* (2003). Keeran and Kenny's rejoinder to this critique, as well as my response, were published the following year. I continued my exploration and incorporated the results in an article published in German with the title *Politische und ökonomische Folgen der verfrühten Vergesellschaftung der Landwirtschaft in der Sowjetunion* as a contribution to a *Festschrift* in honor of the philosopher Robert Steigerwald, a leading ideological figure in the German Communist Party (Marquit 2005). Except for an abridged version published by the *Communist Review*, a journal of the Communist Party of Britain, that article has not been published in English.

For a single coherent account, I give here a slightly revised and expanded version of my article in the Steigerwald *Festschrift*, repeating some material from my published critique of Keeran and Kenny's book and my subsequent exchange with them.

Initial stages of transition from capitalism to socialism

The shift to a socialist-oriented market economy (the term used by the Communist Party of Vietnam) may be considered not a retreat from socialism, but a necessary path toward the goal of a communist society. How do we explain, then, the fact that a somewhat similar,

but more limited, course was attempted in the Soviet Union in the late 1920s and dropped? Was this abandonment premature? What were its consequences?

Marx and Engels foresaw the transition from capitalism to the communist socioeconomic system as a relatively long process in the course of which the productive capacity of the society would grow to the point where the distribution would be on the basis of need and independent of the participation of individuals in the labor force. They made no effort to spell out the details of the transition process, apparently recognizing that such details would depend on how the revolutionary process would unfold under given levels of economic development. Marx did foresee, however, that during the initial phase of the transition from a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie to a dictatorship of the proletariat, the distribution principle would be on the basis of the current bourgeois principle of distribution (*bourgeois right*). In his *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, Marx described this as follows:

The same principle prevails as in the exchange of commodity-equivalents: a given amount of labour in one form is exchanged for an equal amount of labour in another form.

Hence *equal right* here is still in principle—*bourgeois right*, although principle and practice are no longer at loggerheads, while the exchange of equivalents in commodity exchange only exists *on the average* and not in the individual case. (1989, 86)

In his *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, Marx made no attempt to outline the process by which the relations of production would be transformed from bourgeois relations of production to cooperative or collective production. He seems to assume that the first phase is characterized by cooperative or collective relations of production, which would be in line with the statement in the *Communist Manifesto*:

The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organised as the ruling class; and to increase

the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible. (Marx and Engels 1976, 504)

It should not be surprising, therefore, that the Russian revolutionary proletariat, upon seizing state power, was eager to effect this transformation as quickly as possible. In May 1918, Lenin called for a slowdown in the process of nationalization that was in full force early in 1918. To the call of the Left Communists that “the systematic use of the remaining means of production is conceivable only if a most determined policy of socialisation is pursued,” Lenin replied:

Yesterday, the main task of the moment was, as determinedly as possible, to nationalise, confiscate, beat down and crush the bourgeoisie, and put down sabotage. Today, only a blind man could fail to see that we have nationalised, confiscated, beaten down and put down more *that we have had time to count*. The difference between socialisation and simple confiscations is that confiscation can be carried out by “determination” alone, without the ability to calculate and distribute properly, *whereas socialisation cannot be brought about without this ability*. (1974a, 333–34)

Lenin noted that the socioeconomic structures of the Russian economy at that time consisted of the following elements: patriarchal (mainly natural—that is, subsistence—peasant farming), small commodity production (which includes the majority of those peasants who sell their grain), private capitalism, state capitalism, and socialism (335–36). Lenin later (in 1921) described the essence of state capitalism as an economic relationship between the Soviet government and a capitalist under which

the latter is provided with certain things: raw materials, mines, oilfields, minerals, or . . . even a special factory (the ball-bearing project of a Swedish enterprise). The socialist state gives the capitalist its means of production such as factories, mines and materials. The capitalist operates as a contractor leasing socialist means of production, making a profit on his capital and delivering a part of his output to the socialist state. (1973b, 297)

In his 1918 argument with the Left Communists, he cited Germany as “the most concrete example of state capitalism.”

Here we have “the last word” in modern large-scale capitalist engineering and planned organisation, *subordinated to Junker-bourgeois imperialism*. Cross out the words in italics, and in place of the militarist, Junker, bourgeois, imperialist state put *also a state* but of a different social type, of a different class content—a *Soviet* state, that is, a proletarian state, and you will have the *sum total* of the conditions necessary for socialism.

Socialism is inconceivable without large-scale capitalists engineering based on the latest discoveries of modern science. It is inconceivable without planned state organisation, which keeps tens of millions of people to the strictest observance of a unified standard in production and distribution. (1974a, 339)

Shortly after this was written, the civil war forced a switch in economic organization to what became known as “war communism.” In 1921, Lenin put forth the New Economic Policy (NEP), under which market relations were restored. The requisition (that is, seizure) of grain from the peasants was replaced by a tax in kind. The peasants were then allowed to market any surplus that remained after the tax. Lenin hoped that under NEP the process of industrialization would be accelerated by a significant influx of capital from abroad, but conditioned on the controlling dominance of the state sector, as implied by his use of the term *concessions*. He repeated what he had written back in 1917 when Kerensky was in power:

“State-monopoly capitalism is a complete material preparation for socialism, the threshold of socialism, a rung on the ladder of history between which and the rung called socialism there are no intermediate rungs.”

. . . Is it not clear that the *higher* we stand on this political ladder, *the more completely* we incorporate the socialist state and the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviets, *the less* ought we to fear “state capitalism?” (1973c, 336)

While he saw NEP as a short-term measure, he made no predictions regarding its duration. Earlier, in 1918, after first projecting the utilization of state capitalism for socialist development, he reminded his Left Communist critics that

the teachers of socialism spoke of a whole period of transition from capitalism to socialism and emphasised the “prolonged birth pangs” of the new society. An this new society is again an abstraction which can come into being only by passing through a series of varied, imperfect and concrete attempts to create this or that socialist state. (1974a, 341)

NEP’s mixed economy consisted of state ownership of the basic large-scale means of industrial production, mineral resources and means for their extraction and transport. Concessions to foreign firms would be limited to contractual lease-like arrangements under which the state retained ultimate control of the means of production. Private capital could be tolerated in smaller-scale industrial production and trade. Although the land was nationalized, the peasant families would retain the right to work the land and ownership of their means of production and the right to retain or market agricultural products produced on their land after paying a tax in kind. Moreover, the wealthier peasants (kulaks) would continue to be able to employ restricted amounts of peasant labor. Because the peasants constituted the majority of the population, Lenin continually stressed that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the direction of policy by the proletariat in alliance with the middle and poor peasants (1973b)

Lenin’s New Economic Policy bears only a very limited resemblance to the socialist-oriented market economies of China and Vietnam, under which large-scale enterprises can be under full control of domestic or foreign capitalists in parallel and in competition with state-owned enterprises. In putting forth the NEP, he was cautious to make no long-term projections for the future development of the Soviet economy in regard to the way market relations would unfold within the state sector of the economy.

His long-term projections for agriculture included cooperative associations but he did not attempt to detail the manner in which the cooperation would take place.

Lenin's brief "Ideas about a State Economic 'Plan'" illustrates the scope of state economic planning for 1 October 1921 to 1 October 1922. The note begins:

The principal mistake we have all been making up to now is too much optimism; as a result, we succumbed to bureaucratic utopias. Only a very small part of our plan has been realised. (1973a, 497)

He projected that 700 "large establishments, enterprises, depots (railways), state farms, etc." must be started up and kept running for the year in question and the some thirty persons from the State Planning Commission should be assigned with primary responsibility for the task and supervised "*unremittingly*." Another 30 to 70 less important persons about whom he adds "don't keep them under constant observation, but *make inquiries* in passing from time to time" (498).

Stalin and the Left Opposition

After Lenin's death, the CPSU, under Stalin's leadership, pursued Lenin's moderate course of implementing the dictatorship of the proletariat in the framework of alliance of the working class with the middle and poor peasants. It successfully resisted the demands of the Left Opposition, led initially by Trotsky, later joined by Zinoviev, for large-scale expropriation of the grain from the peasants to provide resources for a policy of superindustrialization on the one hand and diversion of resources on the other to increase material support for revolutionary movements abroad on the grounds that it was impossible to build socialism in one country.

The Central Committee continued the tradition established by Lenin that those taking a position strongly opposed by the majority should continue to retain positions of responsibility as long as they were willing to implement Party policies. In July 1927, Stalin placed the question of the expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev on the agenda of a Central Committee meeting, but lacked the votes and had to settle for a warning to them (McNeal 1988, 104). He raised the question again in October in view of their continued factional activity. Trotsky and Zinoviev were then removed from the Central Committee, but

not from Party membership (105). In November, Stalin claimed that reliable evidence showed the opposition had been planning a coup for 7 November—during the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution—but called it off because the Party was ready to deal with it. The Trotskyites and Zinovievites did, however, join the main street demonstrations on 7 November, both groups bearing their own slogans (Conquest 1991, 139; *History of the CPSU* 1939, 285). On 14 November, the Central Committee expelled Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Party; Kamenov and other members of the opposition were expelled from the Central Committee. Later in November or early December, the Politburo rejected Stalin's subsequent call for their arrest (McNeal 1989, 105–6).

The Fifteenth Party Congress in December 1927 again overwhelmingly rejected the position of the Left Opposition. Seventy-five leading members of the opposition (including Kamenov) were expelled from the Party. The next day, the Zinoviev group, but not Trotsky and his supporters, submitted a statement in which they acknowledged their violation of party discipline and the incorrectness of the view that denied the socialist character of the revolution, the socialist character of state industry, the socialist path of development of the countryside under the conditions of the proletarian dictatorship, and the policy of the alliance of the proletariat with the great masses of the peasantry on the basis of socialist construction and proletarian dictatorship in the USSR. They did not, however, say that these were their views (Popov 1934, 327–38).

The Congress replied that reinstatement to Party membership would require individual statements, after which six months time must pass to ensure that they were conforming to pledges of compliance with Party policy (328).

In 1928 Trotsky and many of his supporters who did not request readmission under these terms were deported to Siberia and other regions of the USSR (Trotsky to Kazakhstan). In 1929 Trotsky, not abandoning his efforts to maintain an organized opposition from afar, was expelled from the USSR.

As one can see from these events, there was still collective leadership on the level of the Politburo, which was still accountable to the Central Committee in a meaningful way. Strong disagreements

were tolerated without personal recrimination. Within the Party, Stalin's emerging tendency to physical repression of opposition was constrained by the Politburo.

The scissors crisis

The Fifteenth Party Congress took two major steps that were to form the basis for socialist development of the economy: acceleration of collectivization of agriculture and the introduction of five-year plans for economic development in a framework of centralized economic planning.

In view of their consequences, the rationale for these two measures needs further discussion. I will begin with the question of collectivization of agriculture.

The transition from capitalism to socialism is unlike all previous transitions from one socioeconomic system to another in that it does occur spontaneously, but requires a conscious theoretical understanding of the sociohistorical process that is unfolding. The socialization of the labor process under capitalism leads spontaneously to a class consciousness, but not to a socialist consciousness. It was the task of the Bolsheviks to transform the class consciousness of the working class into a socialist consciousness. The workers' experience with socialized labor under capitalism is key to their ability to develop the socialist consciousness to the level needed for the revolutionary process.

The Russian peasants wanted the land nationalized so that it would not be taken away from them as it had been under the feudal-landlord system that was overthrown. They did not, however, want it to be converted into state farms on which they would be employed as wage workers on a par with the urban workers. They wanted the land divided among the peasant families with perpetual usage rights through inheritance. Among the first decrees of the revolutionary government was the Decree on Land, according to which all land was nationalized. The peasants were accorded use of one hundred and fifty million hectares of land confiscated from the royal family, landowners, monasteries, etc. The decree established egalitarian land-use rights for peasants with periodic redistribution based largely on the size of the family (Kim et al., 1974, 64)

In 1917, the Bolshevik program had not provided for distribution of the land to peasant families, but the Bolsheviks, although preferring socialization of agriculture acceded to the peasants' wishes. Nevertheless, the land socialization law of 19 February 1918, although granting use of agricultural land to "individual families and persons," also prescribed:

the development of collective farming as more advantageous from the point of view of economy of labour and produce, at the expense of individual farming, with a view to transition to socialist farming (Article 11, paragraph *e*). (quoted by Lenin [1974c, 308])

Lenin exercised extreme caution on the question, preferring to use the term *cooperatives* rather than *collective farming*:

NEP is an advance, because it is adjustable to the level of the most ordinary peasant and does not demand anything higher of him. But it will take a whole historical epoch to get the entire population into the work of the co-operatives through NEP. At best we can achieve this in one or two decades. Nevertheless, it will be a distinct historical epoch, and without this historical epoch, without universal literacy, without a proper degree of efficiency, without training the population sufficiently to acquire the habit of book-reading, and without the material basis for this, without a certain sufficiency to safeguard against, say, bad harvests, famine, etc.—without this we shall not achieve our object. (1974b, 470)

The Fourteenth Party Congress in 1925, set socialist industrialization as the focus for the next state of socialist construction. The next three years saw the beginning of many major construction projects, including the world's largest hydroelectric dam (on the Dniepr), the Turkestan-Siberian Railway, the Stalingrad Tractor Works, and ZIS automobile works.

By 1926–27, the main indicators for Soviet agricultural production exceeded the prewar level, the standard of living of the peasantry greatly improved, and the number of middle peasants rose to 63 percent of the peasant population. Despite the overall gain in agricultural production, the gross yield of grain was 91 percent of

the prewar level. while the market share of the grain was a mere 37 percent of the prewar figure (*History of the CPSU* 1939, 256). Despite the growth of industrial production, the growing peasant demand for textiles, shoes, agricultural tools, and other products could not be satisfied because the industrial investments were tilted in favor of heavy industry and national industrial infrastructure (electrification, transport, etc.). At the end of 1927, the manufacture of consumer goods was 1 to 2 percent higher than the previous year, while the after-tax peasant income from the sale of grain sold to the state was up by 31 percent (Medvedev 1989, 216). The well-to-do elements in the countryside accumulated a great deal of currency, which could not be use for the purchase of the goods that they needed. These principal producers of marketable grain—the kulaks and richer middle peasants—had no need to accumulate banknotes and either stored their grain while waiting for higher prices or reduced the acreage of sown grain. The poorer peasants preferred to increase their own personal consumption in face of the lack of products to buy. As a result, there was not enough grain to satisfy the demand for feeding the urban population and for export abroad to provide foreign funds for importing machinery needed for industrialization. The high price of industrial goods needed by the peasants and the low price that they received for their grain was termed the “the scissors crisis.” To solve the crisis, that is, to close the scissors, Bukharin argued that it was necessary to lower the cost of industrial goods increase the amount the peasants received for the grain.

In December 1927, in his report to the Fifteenth Party Congress, Stalin, however, declared that the way out

is to turn the small and scattered peasant farms into large united farms based on the common cultivation of the soil, to introduce collective cultivation of the soil on the basis the of a new and higher technique. The way out is to unite the small and dwarf peasant farms gradually but surely, not by pressure, but by example and persuasion, into large farms based on common, operative, collective cultivation of the soil with the use of agricultural machines and tractors and scientific methods of intensive agriculture. There is no other way out. (*History of the CPSU* 1939, 288)

Was this really the only way out for an agricultural economy that still lacked the means for mechanization? Toward the end of the 1970s, Vietnam, concerned about the slow growth of agricultural production in the absence of mechanized agriculture, gave its peasants, then organized into collective farms, the right to return to family farming. The peasants overwhelmingly chose this option (Marquit 2002). In 1981, China reorganized its agriculture from the collective farming in the communes to family farming. Even in the most highly industrialized capitalist countries with their highly mechanized agriculture, family farms, rather than corporate farms predominate in grain production. The reason for this is both economic and cultural.

Marxist theory traditionally viewed peasants, once they move from subsistence farming to the production of a surplus for the market, as petty bourgeois. Trotsky even considered the peasants as natural enemies of socialism. There is, however, a fundamental difference between the peasants as a petty bourgeoisie and the urban petty bourgeoisie. The peasants have deep cultural-historical roots in their attachment to the land that they have traditionally tilled. They do not view themselves as entrepreneurs. In this sense they are a class in themselves. When under conditions of capitalism, they produce a surplus for the market, their economic role is similar to the urban bourgeoisie. Insofar as their incomes depend on their own labor, their class interests are with alliance with the working class. For example, in the United States, right-wing political leaders raise arguments against farm subsidies on the grounds that the government has no business in subsidizing business people who cannot make a profit. Marxists and other progressives, however, argue that, that farmers, who are forced by the agribusiness monopolies to sell their grain at prices below the cost of production, are not failed business people, but are victims of capitalist exploitation. In my home state of Minnesota, where we have 100,000 family farmers, the Minnesota Farmers Union, a progressive farmers organization, is closely allied politically with the state's labor movement, which, in turn, supports (as does the Communist Party USA) federal subsidies for the farmers as long as the price the farmers receive for their products is below the cost of production.

Why is grain being produced by 100,000 highly mechanized family farms in Minnesota, rather than by corporate farms? The primary reason for this is that despite the mechanization, grain farming requires dawn-to-dusk labor that can be organized more cost-effectively by putting the family that is culturally and historically attached to the land to work than by a rural proletariat hired for wage labor on land in which they have no material interest.

While collective labor is a necessary precondition for the development of a truly socialist consciousness, it did not follow that collectivization of agriculture was the best path to increase grain production.

The decision of the Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU to accelerate the process of collectivization was based on other factors than ensuring an increase in grain production. One factor, of course, was the anticipated ideological impact of developing a socialist consciousness among the peasants. The second, and no doubt more important factor, was that it would facilitate making grain available for purchase by eliminating the hoarding of grain by individual peasants for later sale at higher prices and make it more difficult to deceive tax collectors on the size of the harvest.

A Fifteenth Party Congress resolution also gave the following directive:

To develop further the offensive against the kulaks and to adopt a number of new measures which would restrict the development of capitalism in the countryside and guide peasant farming towards Socialism. (*History of the CPSU* 1939, 189)

The collectivization was to proceed voluntarily by the peasants. The peasants were to be offered inducements of loans and promises of machinery and other aid for joining the collectives. It was not to be an excuse for reverting to the forcible requisitioning of grain that had been advocated by the Left Opposition. Vyacheslav Molotov, the closest person to Stalin on the Politburo, "declared that those who proposed a 'forced loan' from the peasantry were enemies of the alliance between the workers and peasants; they

were proposing the ‘destruction of the Soviet Union.’ At that point Stalin called out “Correct!” (Medvedev 1989, 218). Referring to the resolution on restricting the kulaks, Stalin cautioned:

Those comrades are wrong who think that we can and should do away with the kulaks by administrative fiat, by the GPU: write the decree, seal it, period. That’s an easy method, but it won’t work. The kulak must be taken by economic measures, in accordance with Soviet legality. And Soviet legality is not an empty phrase. Of course, this does not rule out the application of some administrative measures against the kulaks. But administrative measures must not replace economic ones. (quoted in Medvedev 1989, 217)

The proposal by another Stalin supporter, Anastas Mikoyan, for increasing grain procurement was to correct the imbalance between prices for manufactured goods and those for agricultural products and deliver large supplies of low-priced manufactured goods to villages even if it produced temporary shortages in the cities. Mikoyan’s proposals were incorporated into the resolutions (218).

Extermination of the Old Bolsheviks

But flushed with the victory of having defeated the challenge to his leadership from the Left Opposition, Stalin immediately reversed course.

Stalin made a sudden sharp turn “to the left” in agricultural policy. He began to put into effect the forced requisition of grain that the entire party had just rejected as “adventurist.” In late December, Stalin sent out instructions for the application of extraordinary measures against the kulaks. . . . Then on January 6, 1928, Stalin issued a new directive, extremely harsh in tone and content, which ended with threats against local party leaders if they failed to achieve a decisive breakthrough in grain procurements in the shortest possible time. There followed a wave of confiscations and violence toward wealthy peasants throughout the entire country. (218)

According to Molotov's recollections, the extraordinary measures were not directed just against the kulaks.

On January 1, 1928, I had to go to Melitopol on the grain procurement drive. In the Ukraine. To extort grain. . . .

From everyone who had grain. Industrial workers and the army were in a desperate situation. Grain was all in private hands, and the task was to seize it from them. Each farmstead clung to its stock of grain. . . .

. . . We took away the grain. We paid them in cash, but of course at miserably low prices. They gained nothing. I told them that for the present the peasants had to give us grain on loan. Industry had to be restored and the army maintained.

. . . I applied the utmost pressure to extort the grain. All kinds of rather harsh methods of persuasion had to be applied. . . .

Soon I returned to Moscow. Stalin met with the most experienced grain collectors. I reported on how I used pressure tactics and other ruses. . . .

. . . He said then, "I will cover you with kisses in gratitude for your action down there!" I committed these words to memory . . . for your action." He wanted that experience, and soon afterward set off for Siberia. . . . After that we went out seeking grain every year. Stalin no longer made the trips. But we went out for grain five years in a row. We pumped out the grain. (Chuev 1993, 241–42)

Medvedev writes that the extraordinary measures adopted immediately after the Fifteenth Party Congress led to a significant increase in grain procurements, but only briefly. In the spring of 1928, the sale of grain to the state dropped sharply. He cites Stalin's explanation:

If we were able to collect almost 300 million poods of grain from January to March, it was because we were dealing with the peasants' reserves that had been saved for bargaining. From April to May we could not collect even 100 million poods because we had to touch the peasants' insurance

reserves, in conditions when the outlook for the harvest was still unclear. Well, the grain still had to be collected. So we fell once again into extraordinary measures, administrative willfulness, the violation of revolutionary legality, going around to farms, making illegal searches, and so on, which have caused the political situation in the country to deteriorate. (218–19)

In the spring and summer of 1928, new directives went out to back off from the “extraordinary measures”; grain prices were raised 15 to 20 percent and more manufactured goods were made available for purchase by the peasants. These new measures proved to be too late since less grain had been sown, and many kulaks liquidated their holdings by selling off their means of production. Middle peasants, fearful of being labeled as kulaks, were hesitant to increase their production. Grain procurement in the fall of 1928 again fell short and the extraordinary measures were again repeated (220), which is why Molotov and other Party leaders had to go again on their grain “extorting” missions. In 1929, despite a good harvest, rationing of grain in the cities was introduced.

To deal with this continuing debacle of his agricultural policies, Stalin once again reversed his agricultural strategy. Quotas were established region by region to drive the peasants into the collective farms despite the fact that the original Five-Year Plan, which officially went into effect in 1929, envisaged that 17.5 percent of the total sowing area would become part of the socialized sector by 1934 (Kim et al, 1982, 261). By 1931, in the principal grain growing districts, “80 per cent of the peasant farms had already amalgamated to form collective farms”; 200,000 collective and 4,000 state farms “cultivated two-thirds of the total crop area of the country” (*History of the CPSU* 1939, 315). By the end of 1934, collective farms “had embraced about three-quarters of all peasant households in the Soviet Union and about 90 percent of the total crop area” (318).

On 30 January 1930, a Central Committee resolution endorsed Stalin’s proposal to change the decision of the Fifteenth Party Congress from restricting the kulaks by economic rather than by administrative means to the elimination of the kulaks by

administrative means. Their property was confiscated and their fates were determined by how their attitudes toward collectivization were assessed. Those who were accused of engaging in terroristic acts or sabotage were imprisoned or shot and their families exiled; others were exiled to distant lands with their families, still others were resettled in nearby regions or allowed to farm on land outside the collective, retaining only the necessary implements and possessions (for a more detailed account, see Medvedev, 1989, 230–40). Molotov boasted,

I personally designated districts where kulaks were to be removed. . . .

We exiled 400,000 kulaks. My commission did its job. (Chuev 1993, 148)

Medvedev gives the official figures for deportations in 1930–31 to distant regions as 381,000—close enough to Molotov’s figures (234).

The violence with which the peasants were herded into the collective farms immediately produced such negative affects on the grain-procurement that Stalin, in his “Dizzy with Success” article published on 2 March 1930, denounced the local officials for carrying out the excesses that he had ordered. Denouncing local officials for excesses that he himself ordered became a pattern of behavior that he repeatedly employed during the purges of 1935–38. As the forced collectivization continued, increasingly draconian measures had to be taken to prevent the collapse of agricultural production. A feudal system for binding the peasants to the land was introduced by the mechanism of requiring passports for internal travel. Only industrial and office workers had the right to carry passports. The “Red militia” was given the task of catching and returning starving peasants from railroad stations and cities to their farms (Medvedev 1989, 246–47).

The next result of this forced collectivization was a drop in gross agricultural output from 16.6 billion rubles in 1927–28 to 13.1 billion in 1933. Livestock production dropped to 65 percent of the 1913 level (227). The published figures on the fulfillment of the plan, as Khrushchev was later to reveal, had been falsified by a change in the way agricultural statistics were handled, and even

through the early 1950s, grain production had barely risen above the pre-Revolutionary level.

Stalin's measures to solve the grain-procurement speedily by forcible collectivization would obviously arouse concern among large numbers of Communists. In 1928–29, three Politburo members, Nicolai Bukharin, Mikhail Tomsky, and Alexei Rykov wanted to continue the NEP policy of using market forces to stimulate grain production, but were unsuccessful in their efforts to sway the majority of the Politburo and the Central Committee. The three were promptly labeled *Right Opposition*. They warned about the consequences of rupturing the alliance between the working class and the peasantry. They knew that forced collectivization would encounter peasant resistance. And the peasants indeed resisted seizure by every means possible, including planting less grain. The consequences were disastrous for the peasants and the urban workers, worsening the grain shortage as physical force against the peasants escalated as Stalin abruptly ended the alliance between workers and peasants on which Lenin's conception of NEP was based.

Judging from the subsequent events, it is apparent that many of the Old Bolsheviks, that is, Communist veterans of the October Revolution and the Civil War, shared their concern. Except for an unsuccessful movement to replace Stalin by Kirov as general secretary at the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934, a move rejected by Kirov, who was an ally of Stalin (Chuev 1993, 218), there were no signs of a continuing organized opposition to Stalin's leadership. Stalin, however, was able to sense the growth of widespread concern among the Old Bolsheviks. His response was to physically exterminate them. Stalin used the (still unresolved) assassination of Kirov in 1934 to unleash his mass exterminations of the Old Bolsheviks. He used the reign of terror to establish his unbridled personal power, including power over the life and death of any person in the Soviet Union. Both Molotov—who, even as he was about to fall victim himself in 1953, never lost his admiration of Stalin—and Khrushchev have described how the life of every member of the Politburo was at the mercy of Stalin's perception of him at any moment.

In his report to the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev disclosed that 70 percent of the members of the Central Committee

of 1934 were executed. Of the 1,966 delegates to the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934, 1,108 were arrested on charges of counter-revolutionary crimes (Khrushchev 1962). Medvedev cites additional evidence that the Old Bolsheviks were particularly targeted by the purges. At the Sixteenth Party Congress in 1930 and Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934, some 80 percent of the delegates had joined the party before 1920; the figure was only 19 percent at the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939 (1989, 450).

The background for the large-scale executions of the Old Bolsheviks was provided by show trials of former Soviet leaders that were held in Moscow in 1936, 1937, and 1938 and ended with execution of almost every defendant, including Bukharin and Rykov—Tomsky committed suicide before being arrested. A secret trial of military leaders followed in later in 1938. In the wake of that trial, almost all the military commanders of the Red Army, Navy, and Air Force were executed.

Examination of the now available Soviet archives has established that 681,692, largely political, executions were carried out during the years 1937–38 (Getty et al. 1993, 1022). In his secret report to the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev discussed only the cases in which nonpublic trials were held, so as not to embarrass the leaders of the Communist parties of other countries who had defended the handful of public trials. One such nonpublic trial was that of Marshall Michail Tuchachevsky and other high-ranking military officials on the charge of conspiring with German, Poland, and Japan to give those countries Soviet territory in exchange for their support for a military coup. In discussing the grounds for the rehabilitation of Tuchachevsky and others, Khrushchev cited the text of authorization sent by Stalin to the NKVD to authorizing the use of physical torture to extract confessions (1962). No documentary evidence was presented at any of the trials. In his memoirs, Khrushchev explained why the victims of the public trials had not been rehabilitated:

The reason for our decision was that there had been representatives of the fraternal Communist parties present when Rykov, Bukharin, and other leaders of the people were tried and sentenced. These representatives had then

gone home and testified in their own countries to the justice of the sentences. We didn't want to discredit the fraternal Party representatives who had attended the open trials, so we indefinitely postponed the rehabilitation of Bukharin, Zinoviev, Rykov. (1970, 352–53)

For details on the trials, I again refer readers to Medvedev (1989).

What then was the net effect of Stalin's rush to collectivization? Had Lenin's policy adhering to the alliance of the workers and peasants been continued by allowing the peasants, including the kulaks, to market their surplus at reasonable prices, while providing a greater supply of manufactured goods, a greater amount of grain would have been available for the food for the urban workers and as a resource for industrialization. This would have allowed a faster rate of industrialization than had been achieved in the course of the first two five-year plans. The kulaks never represented a coherent counterrevolutionary force committed to the overthrow of Soviet power.

A most negative consequence of the forced collectivization was the fear that it generated in Stalin and those closest to him that it would give rise to a challenge to their leadership from those Communists who wanted to continue on Lenin's course—the Communists who Stalin arbitrarily labeled "Rightists." In his conversations with Chuev in 1973, Molotov, makes it clear that the executions were not for crimes committed but were preemptive executions to cleanse the Soviet Union from anyone questioning Stalin's policies: "The confessions seemed artificial and exaggerated. I consider it inconceivable that Rykov, Bukharin, and even Trotsky agreed to cede the Soviet far east, the Ukraine, and even the Caucasus to a foreign power. I rule that out" (1993, 264). But this was precisely the main basis for the execution Bukharin and Rykov in 1938. This nonexistent plot was also the basis for the execution of Tuchachevsky and almost all of the military commanders. It is clear from other comments by Molotov that the only real reason for the executions was that Stalin considered the victims rightists who might challenge his leadership:

"We could have suffered greater losses in the war—perhaps even defeat—if the leadership had flinched and allowed internal disagreements like cracks in a rock. . . .

. . . Had no brutal measures been used, there would surely have been a danger of splits within the party.” (256–57).

Further:

To have done all this smoothly and graciously would have been very bad. After all, it is interesting that we went on living with the oppositionists and oppositionist factions until the events of the late 1930s. After the war there were no oppositionist factions, a relief which enabled us to set a good, correct policy. But if most of these people had remained alive, I don’t know whether we would have been able firmly to stand our ground. It was mainly Stalin who took upon himself this difficult task, but we helped correctly. I do mean correctly. Without a man like Stalin it would have been very, very difficult, especially during the war. There would no longer have been teamwork. We would have had splits in the party. It would have been nothing but one against another. Then what? (258)

In a subsequent interview with Chuev, Molotov states, ” It is indeed sad that so many innocent people perished. But I believe the terror of the late 1930s was necessary. . . . Stalin insisted on making doubly sure: spare no one, but guarantee absolute stability for a long period of time. . . . It was difficult to draw a precise line where to stop” (278).

Nikolai Yezhov was put at the head of the NKVD by Stalin in 1936. Molotov states that Yezhov “set arrest quotas by region, on down to districts. No fewer than two thousand must be liquidated in such and such region, no fewer than fifty in such and such district. . . . He just overdid it because Stalin demanded greater repression” (262–63). After uneasiness over the executions began to surface, Stalin had Yezhov executed for the excesses that he, Stalin, had demanded. Molotov states that Stalin, as head of the party, would sign the lists of people to be arrested, and that he, as head of the government, would sign whatever lists Stalin signed. “I signed lists containing the names of people who could have been straightforward and dedicated citizens. The Central Committee was

also to blame for running careless checks on some of the accused. But no one could prove to me that all these actions should never have been undertaken” (297). Other members of the Politburo also signed lists. Davies cites an example of death warrants for 36,000 people countersigned by Politburo member Lazar Kaganovich (Davies et al. 2003, 35).

When one member of a family was shot, it was common practice to send the other family members into exile. “They had to be isolated somehow. Otherwise they would have served as conduits of all kinds of complaints. And a certain amount of demoralization” (Chuev 1993, 277–78).

It again must be stressed, that almost all of the executions were without trials. No material evidence of conspiracy was introduced at any of the trials—only confessions obtained by torture and beatings.

In a personal letter to Stalin just before his trial and kept secret until 1993, Bukharin wrote that he had no intention of recanting to the world at large at his public trial (he still wished to preserve the image of the Party he had served) the confessions he had signed during his interrogations, but that he was in fact innocent of the crimes to which he had confessed (Getty and Naumov, 1999, 556). Defendants were denied defense counsel, the right to cross examine witnesses, and any appeal. Most of those executed did not even have trials, but were executed after being brought before three individuals—the local Party secretary, procurator, and NKVD chief—working from lists often countersigned by Stalin and other members of the Politburo.

It is beyond the scope of this commentary to go into the extension of the arrests and executions beyond the Party. Suffice it to say that outstanding scientists, scholars, engineers and other technical personnel, artists, and cultural workers were also enmeshed by the terror.

Stalin was nevertheless able to convince the bulk of the urban population that these measures were necessary to protect the Soviet Union from the domestic enemies of the people that had been corrupted and bribed by imperialism to destroy the achievements of the October revolution, the benefits of which the population was

just beginning to enjoy as the industrialization began to improve the living conditions of the urban population toward the end of the thirties.

Had a Leninist course been pursued in agriculture and in Party governance, industrialization could have moved ahead at a faster pace, the military forces would have been better equipped and better commanded so that the Nazi blitzkrieg could have stopped well before it reached the outskirts of Moscow.

Stalin's great skill in political intrigue and his brutality of character enabled him to use the political and economic problems unavoidable in the creation of a new socioeconomic system to ascend to a level of state and Party leadership with unchallenged personal power. The socialization of agriculture is, of course, a necessary step on the path to a communist society. Experience in the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, and Cuba has shown that it is worth experimenting with a variety of organizational structures on the basis of a substantial level of mechanization. Premature attempts at socialization amount to a form of voluntarism that borders on utopian socialism.

Stalin used the victory of the proletariat in the October Revolution as a vehicle to satisfy his desire to go down in history as an adulated god-like figure. He was determined that the benefits anticipated by the working class from social ownership of the means of production be attributed to his great genius. In doing so, he abrogated the political function of the Communist Party. The Party, instead of fulfilling its historic task of guiding the course of socialist transformation, was turned into an appendage of the state and an administrative organ of his personal power. During the second five-year plan, the Soviet media consistently credited Stalin's masterful leadership for the rise in living standards and social welfare resulting from the progress of industrialization. The gains were indeed impressive, but they could have been far greater had the Leninist collective leadership of the Party and the principle of "All Power to the Soviets" not been abrogated by Stalin's unbridled lust for personal power.

Far more severe in its consequences was Stalin's destruction of two of the main precepts of the Leninist concept of democratic centralism as the organizational basis of the Communist Party:

the leadership of the higher bodies being elected by lower bodies, and accountability of the leadership to the bodies that elected it. With the terror that he unleashed, Stalin succeeded in institutionalizing a self-perpetuating Party leadership not accountable to the Central Committee that had supposedly elected it. This distortion of Lenin's concept of democratic centralism continued in the decades after Stalin's death, with no criticism from below tolerated. A consequence of this was the lack of internal mechanisms to force timely corrections to the faulty model of economic planning that ultimately led to economic implosion, the signs of which began to manifest themselves in all of the socialist economies already in the mid 1970s.

Assessment of Stalin's historical role in historical context

One of the principal reasons for being concerned today with the assessment of the role of Joseph Stalin is the connection between such assessment and the current ideological differences among Communist parties in the industrialized capitalist countries as well as differences within the individual parties. In the wake of the collapse of the socialist systems in Europe, the ruling classes of the industrialized capitalist countries, no longer seeing themselves threatened by an alternative economic system, began to unravel the social welfare system that had been forced upon them by long years of struggle by the working class in defense of its class interests. Trade-union rights also have come under fierce attack. While the immediate danger is not the imposition of fascist regimes, which would be the case if the capitalist system itself was threatened, the right-wing assault on people's rights and welfare in order to maximize capitalist profits gives rise to the need for the working class to form broad-based multiclass political alliances directed against the most reactionary right-wing forces. Ultraleftists within the communist movements reject such alliances as revisionist reformism. Invariably, they see no problem with Stalin's destruction of the worker-peasant alliance, which Lenin saw as the necessary foundation for the construction of socialism in the USSR. Similarly, they are quick to condemn the defense of the worker-peasant alliance by Bukharin and others as rightist revisionism, and have no problem with justifying the mass

execution of over 600,000 Communists as right-wing conspirators. They can express outrage at the confessions extracted by torture of prisoners by the CIA as well as confessions extracted during “interrogations” at local police stations, yet are quick to accept the confessions at the Moscow purge trials of the 1930s extracted by torture and beatings and explain the absence of material evidence at the trials by stating that conspirators do not put their plans on paper. For most of them, the only basis for their belief that those executed were guilty of crimes is their naïve dogmatic conviction that Stalin would not have violated Soviet legality. Like Herr Palmstroem, in Christian Morganstern’s poem, they believe “that which must not, cannot be.”²² For others, however, their extreme dogmatism leads to an indifference to questions of socialist legality—destroy what stands in the way, real or potential—a mentality that led Pol Pot to murder some 20 percent of his people. Some years ago, Ludo Martens, leader of the ultraleftist Workers Party of Belgium, sent me copy of his book, *Another View of Stalin* (Antwerp EPO, 1994). When I met him in Havana in 1997 at a conference on socialism, he asked me, “How did you like my book?” I replied, “Wasn’t the execution of 70 percent of the members of the Central Committee of 1934 a violation of democratic centralism?” He hesitated before responding, and after some thought replied, “Yes, but it had to be done.”

Their dogmatic inability to think rationally about the past carries over to their inability to apply Marxist analysis to the strategy of class struggle in the current situation, which calls for the formation of broad alliances to defend democratic rights against fascist-like attempts to destroy opposition to corporate rule. The attempts by Communist parties in the bourgeois parliamentary democracies in the twentieth century to go it alone to socialism bore no fruit. The only electoral victories won by Communists were in alliance with social democrats and progressive bourgeois or petty bourgeois strata during the period of the Popular Front. The only real parliamentary transition to socialism in Europe was in Czechoslovakia in 1948, and was made possible only by an alliance of Communists and Social Democrats.

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NOTE

1. The draft of the first edition of *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism*, in most respects a Marxist-Leninist critique of the Stalin period by Soviet historian Roy Medvedev, then a member of the CPSU, began circulating informally in the USSR in 1964. After Brezhnev replaced Khrushchev as leader of the CPSU in 1964, criticism of Stalin was limited to the phrase *cult of the individual*; no details about the terror of the 1930s were permitted, nor criticism of forced collectivization other than what had been allowed in Stalin's time. Stalin was, in effect, rehabilitated. Soviet publications such as *History of the USSR*, written in 1974, again justified the excesses—for example, the 1928 Shakhty frame-up trials in the course of which confessions were beaten out of members of fictitious organizations of wreckers and saboteurs “in the service of Russian and foreign capitalists and foreign intelligence;” Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsy were again referred to as leaders of the Right Opposition, who “expressed the interests of the kulaks and other well-off elements in the villages that were opposed to the socialist reconstruction of agriculture” (Kim et al. 1982, 252, 259). Medvedev was expelled from the CPSU in 1969 after his book was published in the West. His Party membership was restored in 1988.

2. The Impossible Fact

Palmstroem, old, an aimless rover,
walking in the wrong direction
at a busy intersection
is run over.

“How,” he says, his life restoring
and with pluck his death ignoring,
“can an accident like this
ever happen? What’s amiss?”

“Did the state administration
fail in motor transportation?
Did police ignore the need
for reducing driving speed?”

“Isn’t there a prohibition,
barring motorized transmission
of the living to the dead?
Was the driver right who sped . . . ?”

Tightly swathed in dampened tissues
he explores the legal issues,
and it soon is clear as air:
Cars were not permitted there!

And he comes to the conclusion:
His mishap was an illusion,
for, he reasons pointedly,
that which must not, cannot be.

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Anxieties of Empire in Doyle's Tales of Sherlock Holmes

Lauren Raheja

The theme of contamination from the colonies is ubiquitous throughout the Sherlock Holmes canon. Doyle seems to construct three categories of such contamination into Victorian society, all of which are represented as posing significant threats to the nation: British characters who are portrayed as having become morally bankrupt, corrupt, and greedy as a result of their time in the colonies; British characters who have become physically deformed or financially ruined during their colonial ventures; and lastly people and things originating in the colonies, such as a poisoned-dart-throwing cannibal and a mysterious hysteria-inducing powder, that travel to the colonial center and threaten its well-being. Doyle's colonial others serve to justify Britain's imperial expansion by conjuring images of Anglo cultural superiority, but also express anxiety about the supposed danger surrounding contact with non-Western cultures. Despite this anxiety, inextricably linked with the Indian Rebellion of 1857, Doyle reassures his audience that in the end, Britain can prevail, constructing Holmes as the defender of the empire who is almost always successful in bringing exotic colonials to "justice" and restoring the peace in the British empire.

Grimesby Roylott ("The Adventure of the Speckled Band") and Leon Sterndale ("The Adventure of the Devil's Foot") are characters who return home to Britain after venturing into India or

Nature, Society, and Thought, vol. 19, no. 4 (2006)

West Africa as doctors. Both show dramatic changes after having come into contact with foreign lands and the people of the British colonies.

After Grimesby Roylott returned to Britain, it becomes clear that he had undergone frightening transformations during his stay in Calcutta, according to his stepdaughter, Helen Stoner. A “terrible change” came over him, Miss Stoner explains to Holmes and Watson:

He shut himself up in his house and seldom came out save to indulge in ferocious quarrels with whoever might cross his path. Violence of temper approaching to mania had been hereditary in the men of the family, and in my stepfather’s case it had, I believe, been intensified by his long residence in the tropics. (Doyle 2003, 310)

Helen Stoner portrays India (more generally, “the tropics”) as a corrupting force that causes moral degradation. At the culmination of “The Adventure of The Speckled Band,” we learn that India had turned Roylott not only into an eccentric and hot-headed unemployed widower living off his late wife’s fortune, but also into a man who attempts to murder both of his stepdaughters, and is successful in killing Julia, Helen’s sister. According to Harris, in many cases “not only the manner of the crime but also the inclination to commit it are attributed to the criminal’s contact with an alien culture” (Harris 2003, 452). The “passion for Indian animals” (Doyle 2003, 310) that Grimesby Roylott had developed in Calcutta facilitated his crimes; Julia’s death was linked to a snake that he had passed through a ventilator, knowing its poisonous venom would be lethal. His motive was to inherit the entirety of the family’s wealth, which would have been passed on to Julia and Helen upon their marriages.

Doyle’s message seems to be that the colonies (India, in this case) were so backward and immoral that these qualities could rub off on any English man or woman who ventured into them, and that these tainted individuals would inevitably endanger the imperial center, including the realm of domesticity, represented by Julia and Helen Stoner. Moreover, the snake eventually kills its master, Roylott. The snake and everything it represents, therefore,

seem able to threaten not only the domestic sphere, but also the colonialist himself. Doyle expresses "the British fear that, like the Indian snake that sinks its fangs into Dr. Roylott, the Empire sometimes strikes back" (Harris 2003, 452).

In "The Speckled Band," Doyle offers a justification for imperialism by portraying India as a place that, if left to its own devices, is morally corrupt and capable of turning a civilized man into a savage one; it is, in short, an inferior land fit for colonization. At the same time, Doyle presents the common Victorian fear (especially in the years following the 1857 Rebellion) that foreign savagery could come back to haunt the imperial center. Holmes is nonetheless successful in preventing the death of the young Helen Stoner, restoring order after a brief period of savagery and *disorder*. Moreover, the death of Roylott, a result of the investigation by Holmes and Watson, offers a reassurance that Roylott and his barbarism will not be back, although it is entirely possible that other colonial threats may penetrate the nation.

Dr. Leon Sterndale, "the great lion-hunter and explorer," who brings a deadly substance from West Africa to England, is just such a threat in "The Devil's Foot" (Doyle 2003, 469). Like Dr. Roylott, Sterndale had become a violent and isolated man after returning from a British colony. He had a "love of seclusion" and "lived an absolutely lonely life, attending to his own simple wants and paying little apparent heed to the affairs of his neighbours" (469). Perhaps Doyle means to imply, in both "The Adventure of the Speckled Band" and "The Adventure of the Devil's Foot," that Englishmen who spend too much time with the supposedly savage colonial natives may be rendered incapable of maintaining relationships with friends and relatives at home.

Sterndale, like Roylott, is certainly a formidable character. "For a moment I wished that I were armed," says Watson of Holmes's confrontation with Sterndale over the murder of Mortimer Tregennis. "Sterndale's fierce face turned to a dusky red, his eyes glared, and the knotted, passionate veins started out in his forehead, while he sprang forward with clenched hands toward my companion" (Doyle 200, 475). Sterndale's fierceness and anger seem to be outward expressions of his moral corruption.

As another indication of the corruption brought on by the empire, Sterndale asserts that his venture into West Africa had provoked an utter disregard for the law. "I have lived so long among savages and beyond the law," he says, "that I have got into the way of being a law to myself" (475). The lawless Dr. Sterndale brings back a threatening relic from his travels, as Dr. Roylott does. The powdery substance that Sterndale brings home from West Africa and distributes to Mortimer Tregennis is used as a murder weapon by both Tregennis and Sterndale, taking two lives during the course of "The Adventure of the Devil's Foot." His use of the Devil's-foot root "brings African ritual practice into English society and has the effect of spreading the contagion represented by the mysterious poison," contends Harris (2003, 459). Holmes is, of course, the one who eradicates this contagion; he deduces that Sterndale is the source of all the turmoil and sends him off to West Africa, along with his "savage" ways and his poisonous substance. Sterndale's lawlessness, if taken as a symbol of the colonies, provides justification for British imperialism, but also offers a cautionary note against contact with supposedly savage places such as West Africa. Like "The Speckled Band," "The Devil's Foot" concludes with Holmes banishing the foreign threat.

Thaddeus Sholto of *The Sign of Four* and Henry Wood of "The Crooked Man" are two examples of characters who become physically repulsive, pathetic men as a result of their contact with foreign lands.

It was Major John Sholto, not Thaddeus himself, who had spent time in India. Yet the importation of foreign goods such as "a large collection of valuable curiosities and a staff of native servants" into the Sholto London home was enough to turn Thaddeus into a weak, pathetic man (Doyle 2003, 115). He is portrayed as having become a slave to his opium habit, puffing compulsively from the elaborate hookah in his den even as he recounts the story of his father and Captain Morstan to his guests. According to McLaughlin, Doyle's illustration of Holmes's cocaine use serves as a contrast to Thaddeus's very different relationship with his drug of choice, opium. Although Holmes's cocaine, like Thaddeus's opium, are imports from foreign lands, Thaddeus becomes a slave

to the drug, while Holmes, the defender of empire throughout the stories, brings his own drug under his control. Unlike Sholto, Holmes can abandon his drug for weeks if he has other sources of stimulation; Sholto lacks the will power to turn his addiction on and off. He is at the mercy of his opium.

When Holmes carefully measures his 7 percent solution, he subordinates the substance to his will and pleasure. Sholto's unregulated inhalation of smoke separates Sholto's dependence from Holmes's mastery. Sholto is a sign of Watson's typical late-Victorian fears—"permanent weakness" and degeneration. . . . The grotesque Sholto is a product of Britain's imperial mission, not simply as a drug user but, as we shall see, also as the beneficiary of tainted, ill-gotten wealth. (McLaughlin 2000, 59)

In *The Sign of Four*, opium is a symbol of the contamination that comes from Eastern colonies, and Thaddeus Sholto is the victim of that contamination. Like other characters that appear in the Holmes canon, Thaddeus is depicted as having become a physically and mentally weaker person, lacking self-control and discipline. The contrast between Holmes's domination of the cocaine that he injects into his veins and Sholto's resignation to his opium addiction provides justification for colonial rule. Both drugs, emanating from India, China, and South America, represent foreign lands, and Thaddeus's weakness serves as a warning of the threat that the East may pose to the West. Holmes's control of his cocaine use provides reassurance that the West is capable of bringing the East under its control, and that it must do so.

Henry Wood, the title character in "The Crooked Man," is another example of a physically deformed, weakened returned British colonial. "Doyle depicts the return of colonials in an ambivalent way," asserts Yumna Siddiqi, "portraying some colonials as marginal, physically ravaged characters who threaten the peace, while characterizing others as their counterparts who attain social status by virtue of their colonial wealth" (2006, 236). Unlike Grimesby Roylott and Leon Sterndale, who return from the colonies with wealth and power (despite their newfound amorality), Henry Wood becomes a poor and physically repulsive man during

his time in India and Afghanistan. Years before the story takes place, Wood served in the British army in India and was betrayed by his friend and sergeant, James Barclay, when Barclay sent him into the arms of the enemy in order to eliminate his competition for the woman both he and Henry Wood desired. As a result of Barclay's betrayal, Wood spent years traveling as a slave and prisoner from India to Nepal to Afghanistan and back to India again, before finally returning to England. Doyle seems to indicate that Wood had become savage and inhuman during his time with the "natives." Wood himself seems to be ashamed of the person he has become. "I had rather that Nancy and my old pals should think of [Henry] Wood as having died with a straight back, than see him living and crawling with a stick like a chimpanzee" (Doyle 2003, 502). The message here seems to be that spending time with the natives of India and Afghanistan is enough to turn a respectable Englishman into an ape-like human being. When Wood finally does return to London and encounters Barclay, the sight of Wood's deformed figure, compounded with Barclay's guilt, is enough to literally frighten Barclay to death. "At the sight of me he looked as I have never seen a man look before" says Wood of the encounter between the two men. "[T]he bare sight of me was like a bullet through his guilty heart" (502). The deformed Henry Wood is an embodiment of all that is savage in the East, and all that must be controlled. His transformation also alludes, as Siddiqi puts it, to the threats posed by the colonies to the "imperial body":

English people believed that imperial location had harmful effects upon European bodies, passions, and intellects. Writers of colonial fiction would have us believe that dangerous beasts . . . menaced Europeans. Though on the one hand writers celebrate the power and strength of the imperial body in narratives of extension, traversal, and endurance; on the other hand descriptions of evisceration, emaciation, exhaustion, and disease suggest the vulnerability of the imperial body. (Siddiqi 2006, 241)

Henry Wood, like so many characters who appear throughout the Holmes canon, is an expression not only of the British feeling that colonialism was a necessity, but also, paradoxically, of the

anxiety about the contamination of British men and women emanating from the foreign lands as a result of colonial contact.

Tonga, the villainous Andaman Islander who appears in *The Sign of Four*, and the lethal Devil's-foot root that makes its way into London in "The Adventure of the Devil's Foot," are just two examples of the people and things in Doyle's stories *native* to foreign lands (rather than Europeans who travel to the colonies and later return to Europe) that threaten the imperial center after arriving in London.

This Andaman Islander "ally" of Jonathan Small in *The Sign of Four*, murders Bartholomew Sholto with a poisoned dart in his room at Pondicherry Lodge. Tonga is perhaps the most grotesquely depicted character in the Holmes stories, and is the character who, according to Holmes, lifts the case out of the realm of the ordinary into the realm of the extraordinary. Referred to as "the ally" throughout much of the story, Tonga is an object of intense fascination; he is also the element that draws Holmes into the case surrounding Miss Morstan, the Sholtos, and the Agra treasure. Holmes's fascination with Tonga, a native of a site of a colonial penal colony, may be read as a metaphor for Britain's general fascination with the "exotic natives," who inhabit their colonies. Watson initially takes Tonga's footprint at the scene of the crime for a child's footprint, and this mistake seems to fit the common Victorian portrayal of the inhabitants of the colonies as infantile and childish. (It is also reminiscent of the discovery of Friday's footprint in Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*). Unlike most children, Tonga commits murder and is supposedly a cannibal. This latter characterization echoes Victorian feelings of superiority over their subjects and fears of colonial insurrection. Watson describes Tonga as a

little black man . . . with a great, misshapen head and a shock of tangled, disheveled hair . . . [and] features deeply marked with all bestiality and cruelty. His small eyes glowed and burned with a sombre light, and his thick lips were writhed back from his teeth, which grinned and chattered with half animal fury." (Doyle 2003, 161–62)

Tonga comes across as an utterly despicable, subhuman creature. According to the gazetteer article that Holmes reads aloud

to Watson—according to McBratney, completely falsified (2005, 154)—the Andaman Islanders have, by nature “always been a terror to shipwrecked crews, braining the survivors with their stone-headed clubs or shooting them with their poisoned arrows” (147). Holmes and Watson seem to take Tonga as a representative of all Andaman Islanders, and perhaps of all other foreign threats, as well; his violence is presented as unfounded and savage. According to McBratney, “Doyle’s narrative ascribes the Islander’s violence not to any legitimate resentment of British invasions of the archipelago but to his race’s innate proclivity for monstrous aggression” (156). In *The Sign of Four*, Tonga is the ultimate terror, a foreign invader who penetrates Victorian society and poses the threat of “reverse colonization.” The scene of Tonga’s gruesome crime is set against the image of a peaceful moment of Victorian domesticity that Watson describes after leaving Pondicherry Lodge to escort Mary Morstan back to her home. As his carriage pulls away from Miss Morstan’s dwelling, he looks back to see “the two graceful, clinging figures, the half-opened door, the hall light shining through the stained glass . . . it was soothing,” he says “to catch even the passing glimpse of a tranquil English home in the midst of the wild, dark business which had absorbed us” (132). Perhaps this scene is meant to illustrate what Holmes and Watson are supposedly fighting for: the peace and stability of Victorian society. Although Holmes does not succeed in returning the stolen treasure to Mary Morstan and Thaddeus Sholto, where it is thought to belong, he does successfully do away with Tonga, sending him to the bottom of the Thames, where he is thought to belong. According to McBratney, the common line of thinking in Victorian London was that “colonial criminals who trespass[ed] against English values and institutions [were] simply persons who [did] not belong in English society” (2005, 157). Holmes and Watson do indeed banish Tonga from English society, shooting him dead as the boat chase at the end of the story comes to a close. “Somewhere in the dark ooze at the bottom of the Thames,” narrates Watson, “lie the bones of that strange visitor to our shores” (Doyle 2003, 162). Holmes, defender of the empire once again, succeeds in doing away with the foreign threat that briefly

penetrated Victorian society. As he so often seems to do, Holmes converts savagery back to order.

The Devil's-foot root, another foreign invader, is a powdery substance that Dr. Leon Sterndale brings back from West Africa. It causes not only two deaths in "The Adventure of the Devil's Foot," but also, more alarmingly, utter insanity. The substance leaves two brothers "driven clean mad," perhaps reflecting the barbarism thought to be present in colonial spaces such as Africa and India (Doyle 2003, 464).

The Holmes stories reflect a contemporary rhetorical trend that lumped drugs, organic toxins, and infectious agents together as foreign-born biocontaminants returning from the colonies to afflict the English. . . . Poison in the Holmes tales thus becomes a metaphor for the physical, moral, and cultural contamination that Britain feared as its empire brought it into closer contact with Asian and African peoples, cultures, and climates. (Harris 2003, 449)

The madness induced by the Devil's-foot root, then, may be seen as a contamination resulting from contact with West Africa. When Watson experiences the drug, he describes "a thick, black cloud" within which "lurked all that was vaguely horrible, all that was monstrous and inconceivably wicked in the universe" (Doyle 2003, 473). Like so many other Holmes stories, "The Devil's Foot" can be read not only as an indictment of colonialism and the contamination that foreign contact brings, but also as an endorsement of colonialism as a means of bringing the "wickedness" of foreign cultures under control. In the end, of course, Holmes restores order to the empire when he discovers the mysterious poison that even European science would have been powerless to detect (477) and allows Sterndale and the Devil's foot to return to Africa, where he seems to think they belong.

The message that comes across over and over again in the Holmes canon is that British colonialism is a double-edged sword. Cultures exist on the other side of the world that must be conquered, the stories seem to say, but the people of these cultures may very well rise up against their colonizers. Doyle's stories do bring both of these ideas to the surface, but as the stories that

deal with empire conclude, Sherlock Holmes succeeds in defending the empire and restoring order to a world that is sometimes fraught with threats from abroad. “Doyle’s readers want to be pardoned for their theft and murder in the colonies,” says Otis, “and, simultaneously, they want to see themselves as living in a land of law and order” (1999, 116–17). The Holmes stories seem to offer reassurance to the Victorian society for which they were written that the British can, in fact, maintain control over their colonies in faraway places, and, despite the troubles that may confront them on their own shores, maintain law and order at home.

Paper presented at convention and celebration, “English 3020-101: The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes,” Kate Hannah, instructor, Elmer L. Anderson Library, University of Minnesota, 7 June 2007.

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The Boy Scouts Association of Greece and Ecological Action as a Conservative Practice

Stratos Georgoulas

Introduction

The Boy Scouts in Greece, I argue here, acted in accordance with a system of which they were direct products. The appearance and activities of scouting were by no means accidental in the historical and social framework in which they took shape. According to its principles and operational terms, scouting contributed to the preservation, maintenance, reproduction, and legitimation of the capitalist system in Greece for over half of the twentieth century. When pressing economic and social conditions, however, brought the whole system of social discrimination into decline, scouting itself declined. The emergence of new social strata and their integration into the status quo led to a change in paradigm as expressed in the appearance of modern nongovernmental youth ecological organizations.

It is interesting to note that while the discourse of these organizations is considered reformist with respect to the existing social system, their activity is not only explained in terms of domination, but also preserves legitimacy for any “radicalism” their theoretical framework may contain. That is why the status quo safeguards their existence. It appears that the Boy Scouts, having grown up, can no longer protect nature and preserve the

dominant ideology, but their successors today have proven themselves up to the task.

Greek scouting: A historical account

Scouting in Greece became an institution through the Greek Boy Scouts Association Royal Decree of 12 May 1912. Attempts had already started, however, to introduce it into Greece in accordance with the Baden-Powell principles in connection with the 1908 Olympics by Athanasios Lefkaditis, a gymnast at the Makris private school. Lefkaditis, with a group of upper-class students from Athens, frequently went on school trips on Sundays to the mountains in Attica, where he expounded the meaning of scouting. As mentioned on the official Web site of GBSA (Greek Boys Scouts Association) “the Greek students had few opportunities for activities and initiatives beyond the limits of family shelter and school, so outings in the countryside and mental and physical exercises were possible only for a precious few” (www.sep.org.gr).¹ It was then the prerogative of the offspring of the leisure class—in Veblen’s words (1899)—people exempt from productive activities able to devote their time to excursions in nature. This nonproductive occupation of privileged students was an activity upon which a degree of honor was bestowed. Even prior to the Royal Decree that founded the institution of scouting, Greek scouts marched alongside army units in the great military parade on the 25 March 1912 in front of officials’ podium, the Royal Family, and political authorities. The First Directorate consisted of three officers from the Royal Navy and a banker.

Another element of this nonproductive but honorable occupation serving the need to exhibit one’s wealth or power is that it does not yield a material product, but a deed. In this sense, while such an “occupation” leans toward a nonproductive direction, it presumably abets a mentality that is socially useful. The scouts’ camps were a model for the state-sponsored camps created later for the proper socialization of the youth, to the point of using scout cadres to organize and administer the state camps. In addition, the scouts function as relief workers in cases of natural disasters, censuses, charity funds, and as executives of governmental

agencies. For these services, the state honored them by bestowing the military medal of the highest order in 1922; and after 1913, the Association was funded by expatriates and state agencies that promoted its status by organizing a show at Panathinaiko Stadium.

By supporting and participating in state-led activities, the scouts served a useful function for the Greek state. One such mission was the “correct” nationalist education² of three hundred children of seamen who participated in the left-wing movement of the Greek Army in Egypt in the Second World War, in a camp set up in Quasfaret, Suez. So strong was the integration of the scouts into the Greek framework status quo that the GBSA was directly integrated in any political change either institutionally or symbolically. Two such examples are the merging of the scouts with the National Organization of Youth during the Metaxas dictatorship (1936–1940), and also the appointment by the Greek government-in-exile in Alexandria during World War II of Paul, the successor to the throne, as President Emeritus of the Greek Scouts.

Greek scouting and environmental protection

One of the basic activities of the scouts as deed or accomplishment—a “useful social activity”—is harmonious coexistence with nature through activities that bring one into contact with nature.³

Natural balance is what is sought in an era when such questions as the internal way that biocommunities function and the exact nature of the interaction between organizations that constitute them are of great importance to the dominant upper class, which profits by utilizing agrosystems, managing primitive peoples, and succeeding in the struggle against harmful plants and insects. Again, what is sought is the most favorable tension of exploitation but also the protection of nature through the control of harmful plants and insects.

This natural balance as a result of human activities was considered to constitute socially useful “deeds.” Human beings are part of nature, not absent from it, and it is their duty to protect it since they are a beneficiary of such protection. This also means that we should view human products as part of the physical environment, and we should approach them ecologically, linking

ecology with society as the Chicago school of sociology aimed to do.⁴

In the eighteenth century, the practical aspect of the relationship between humans and nature is described by Carl von Linné (Linnaeus) in these terms: “whole nature strives to make man happy and it is man’s authority that spreads to the whole universe and it is man who can appropriate every product” (cited by Acot [1988,30]). In the next century, we see emerging the demand to support the possibility and the meaning of the rehabilitation of altered harmonies and the material improvement of exhausted regions. Harmony, balance, and effort are the main demands, because the field of agriculture is dangerously charged due to monocultures and the multiplication of native or imported harmful agents, and as a consequence we see a reduction in profits yielded by agriculture. In the cities, the increase in industrial and urban pollution creates insecurity in living conditions as well as in the working population’s labor. It also increases indirect labor cost to employers, thus reducing the potential of overexploitation and, therefore, of surplus value.

This concern for the potential destruction of nature is expressed differently by the Scouts Association than in the political suggestions of environmental sensitization by nongovernmental organizations at the end of the twentieth century. The main concern that defines the scouts’ action framework is the preservation of nature. This is connected on the one hand with international agreements for the protection of species,⁵ and on the other hand with nostalgic attempts to preserve remnants of a paradise lost.

In this last case, the discourse of those who feel nostalgic is about the disturbance of the natural order because of the beauty that emanates from order, that everything be where it belongs. It is nothing more than an aesthetic type of argument, which, according to Veblen, is another characteristic of the apparent occupation of the leisure class (1899/1902, 287). The natural product is more beautiful than the produced one, as all handmade products are more attractive than the mass-produced, industrial ones.

In the era of industrial mass production, however, these handmade natural products are consumed and admired as a conspicuous

waste with honorable flaws that reveal the manual labor from which they come as a more wasteful hod of production. Organic products, other than being healthier, are more beautiful and tastier, because they are “perfectly harmonious with nature.” Finally, it goes without saying, they are also more expensive.

Who is to blame for this disturbance of the natural order? People, by and large. This abstract discourse demonizes the issue, because basically it does not wish to confront it, since a more exhaustive research will show that this specific model of economic development disturbs natural balances; a model that strives for harmony in nature, while supporting class dominance. This model of economic development had not been questioned, because it did foresee the major problems that became apparent in the second half of the twentieth century.

In 1928, an international bureau for the protection of nature was set up, the activities of which were funded by patrons and state agencies of Western European countries. At the same time, the GBSA in Greece was funded by wealthy expatriates and the state. They funded activities that did not constitute an alternative policy, but shifted responsibility for the protection of nature to the individual. The GBSA’s official website mentions that scouting is a life code, a commitment to seek the spiritual value of life beyond the material world. The social dimension of scouting is concerned with participation, the development of society, respect for other people’s dignity, and the wholeness of the natural physical world. The most important thing is, however, the personal dimension of scouting.

This dimension is about the development of the feeling of personal responsibility and the desire for responsible self-expression. Scouting, according to its explicit principles in my example—the case of Greece—has a common framework with the liberal values that also define the theoretical framework of support for the dominant bourgeois ideology. In this way, while the scouts’ activities are not productive, they abet a mentality that is useful for a social purpose, namely, personal responsibility.

In addition to promoting a certain social attitude, however, scouting involves other characteristics as well. On the one hand the scouts express themselves; they become active observing rules with

a religious devotion. According to the official website, every scout is aware that, first and foremost, scouting is a way of self-commitment to a simple way of life; the “Scout’s Promise” and the “Law.” Every violation of these, every refusal to conform to the letter of the law, is an unforgivable sin, punishable by expulsion. Moreover, any deviation from the letter of the law leads to an instinctive repulsion—the way one wears the scout’s scarf around the one’s neck, whether one can recite the words to a slogan and shout it loudly enough, and whether one’s shorts are clean enough.

And when self-commitment is not strong enough, there is always a strict administration system of social control, full of sanctions explicitly codified.⁶

Another characteristic is the conspicuous consumption connected with the conspicuous leisure of this group. It is not only the consumption of more expensive products that are identified as “natural” as shown above, but also the consumption of clothing and tools as well as the establishment of costly institutions (camping, jamborees) that acquire the quality of a pious conspicuous consumption—a consumption of products according to a conventionally acceptable and honorable prospect and hod that has the characteristics of a civilizing missionary expedition.⁷ It is an effort to popularize the cultural elements of the bourgeoisie as a model of daily life for the lower classes and thereby open up the scouting association to the working strata. Today, it exists along with the “civilizing campaign” in the developing countries of the Third World. According to the official website, the Scouts Association has doubled its membership during the past twenty years, mainly because of its growing influence in the developing world.

This pious observance reveals the conformism, obedience, and the acceptance of supervision; the pious consumption reveals the conformity and reproduction of established rules and habits; the civilizing mission reveals the legitimacy of domination; the personal responsibility for the protection of nature reveals the content of a socially useful purpose; and the history reveals the social origin of the scouts. All the above highlight the limits of scouting, which aims to constrain the process of social evolution.

***Scouting successors at the turn of the century:
Youth environmental NGOs***

The Boy Scouts Association has “grown up,” or, more precisely, its activities as well as its beliefs have ceased to be socially useful to the status quo. Especially after the oil crisis in the early seventies, it became widely understood that this current way of economic development is endangering the future of biological and social life on the planet. The need that emerges then can be nothing else than the emergence of an alternative model of economic development that will replace the overexploitation of resources for direct and short-term profit. The invention of a model must be accomplished without threatening the structure of the social system, without a rift, but to its advantage—a model that preserves it by reform.

Do contemporary youth environmental groups possess the characteristics that will allow them to play a role similar to the one played by the scouts in the historical and social framework in the prewar years? In other words, do environmental nongovernment organizations (ENGOS) function autonomously and oppositionally in relation to the material base of society in which they act, or are they its legitimate expression? This is a question of grave importance when the discourse of these agencies refers to a social rift and when this discourse is not self-referential, but is legitimized in society in everyday practices and policies. The protection of the environment from an elite discourse and practice (as it was regarded by the upper class) became the gospel of the left progressives, an alternative way of life in the capitalist vein. It was the time when Bosquet wrote that the ecological movement could play the role of the implacable enemy of capitalism, a role that the proletariat has not played successfully (cited by Acot [1988, 190]). Guattari projected that the true answer to the ecological crisis lies in an authentic policy, social and cultural, that will disorient the goals of the production of material as well as nonmaterial products (1991, 11).

In August 1989, Gorz published an article concerning the political platform of Social Democratic Party of Germany on the renewal of the Left and on broadening the spectrum of political struggle. He notes that

a society becomes socialist when the social relations that are formed by the economic logic of the capital will no longer be able to retain its superior position, compared to uncountable values and uncountable goals. . . . [S]ocial aims must have a priority in relation to the demands of utilizing capital. . . . [I]n a few words the economic criteria of maximum efficiency and maximum progress become subordinate to socioecological criteria. (1991, 81–83)

Do this *green political thought*, as it was named by Dobson (1990), and the socialist vision have any connection with the green social movement or is it a symbolic practice whose aim is to obscure the real essence of the NGOs' environmental sensitizing, the preservation of the existing social system's structures and practice without supporting any social demands for the priority of social relations in accordance with the wishes of capital?

In support of my view, I will present a series of theoretical arguments and support them with examples from the way NGOs function.

The first argument concerns youth ENGOS' discourse. The second refers to their structure, mainly their support network, consisting mainly of state agencies. Finally, the last argument concerns their operation and their connection with big business as shown through the concept of biopolitical and green development.

ENGOS' discourse

More specifically, at first I see a remarkable differentiation in the aims of the youth environmental organizations as shown through their discourse. As we have seen during the scouts' peak period, they argue for the protection and preservation of the harmony of the natural environment, and this was connected with the wishes and principles of the status quo. Today, however, almost all youth environmental organizations, in their foundation manifestos and declarations of basic principles, mention problems and threats, the most common of which are pollution and resources waste. In Greece, almost all such organizations are active on the local level, and their demands are about local problems, without written reference to international global demands such as nuclear disarmament.

According to Guattari, new ecological thinking calls, on the one hand, for a reworking of problems differently from the past, and, on the other hand, such reworking supersedes local limitations: “The pollution caused by the electrical grid concerns everyone who lives here” (1991, 18). Even when, in the final analysis, those calling for new ecological thinking invoke arguments of a holistic type—we are a new and green world—this is not observable in the discourse in support of a local campaign because it is thought that it may be an obstacle to attracting new members to the organization. In the rare cases when this holistic approach is not superficial but is a new paradigm, as in the case of deep ecology, the proposal is neo-Malthusian, as Shantz has argued (2003). The analysis of deep ecology does not take into account the power relations as a consequence of social inequality, thus transferring the responsibility for an ecological crisis from the capitalist structure to individual consumption practices. The failure to understand the moral dimension of the ecological issue and its connection with power relations results in limited social participation.

The reason that the discourse of these organizations focuses mainly on problems and threats is due to the proposed solution that these organizations find of paramount importance. When there is a problem, especially a local one, criticism is instrumentalized. If arguments of a holistic nature were used, then the only possible solution would be a total critique of the industrial culture that destroys the harmonious character of nature.

When the departure from the norm caused by ecological thinking is oblique and on a local scale, then the end result of such a discourse will be of an oblique and local nature. It may be an alternative form of energy recycling or consumption of environmentally friendly products. In this way, we see the mode of environmental education that takes place in secondary education schools as well as in environmental volunteer organizations, mainly through discussion groups for new members and events open to the public, conferences, and the like.

In contrast with the teaching of other scientific subjects, where emphasis is placed mainly on acquiring knowledge, here an environment of involvement for dealing with environmental problems has to

be created, and, more importantly, creative answers to situations in the everyday life “of this world,” have to be sought, rather than focusing on the theoretical side (Georgopoulos and Tsaliki 1993).

At a next stage, through discussion and dialogue, an attempt is made to find an ecologically, socially, and economically more desirable solution, while at the very final stages the participants are asked to form various task groups and choose the most appropriate forms for social activism according to criteria of cost, predicted efficiency, required time for its application, personal preference, and appropriateness.

ENGOS' structure

Berger argues that environmental NGOs come mainly from the “knowledge class” (1986), whose professional careers deal with the production and provision of knowledge, a class that came of age after World War II. This is an upper middle class that does not wish to overthrow capitalism. On the other hand, it has a stake in the development of the welfare state that supports it. When this begins to decline, and a third dimension between state and market emerges as the answer to that decline, the knowledge class organizes itself in the form of volunteer NGOs.

While the welfare state could not deal with the postmaterialist demands anymore because of financial strains, the market did not initially pay attention to this class, so the volunteer environmental movements, consisting mainly but not completely of members of the knowledge class, took it upon themselves to persuade the public of the danger to the environment (Cotgrove and Duff 1980). Corresponding research in Greece has shown that these environmental groups have as members people of ages 15–34, of secondary or tertiary education, mostly single students, or civil servants living in urban areas with high incomes and often using various forms of new technologies (Panagiotopoulou 2000). The members of the NGOs belong to the knowledge class of above average economic and cultural capital, and their political views are either non-existent (54 percent) or leaning towards the left or the center-left (31.8 percent). The increase in productivity during the thirty years that followed World War II shifted toward the development of a service class. These services cover needs that do not arise from

economic criteria and cannot be evaluated in economic terms. The human contribution to the protection of the environment cannot at this stage be evaluated so as to be integrated into directly commercialized relations. The knowledge class that reigns supreme in this contribution is outside the market and cannot support itself from its contribution. The state supports the knowledge class as it embraces the youth environmental movement in Greece. An office of the deputy minister for the volunteer movement at the ministry of education has been established and several laws for the support and funding of these organizations have been passed.

ENGOS' appeal to the market

The embrace between the state and environmental NGOs proves to be only a safety net. To support themselves, the environmental movement volunteers have no choice but to commercialize their social contributions, even risking doing what Gorz feared would be the case: "The expansion of commercialized relations and money-making to offered services makes them poorer and depersonalizes the tissue of exchange based on feeling and personal relationships" (1991, 43).

To make the connection between the market and the environmental volunteer organizations possible, prominent businessmen and industrialists need to be persuaded that these organizations—their members, their activities, and their views—do not threaten the capitalist establishment's goals.

There are indications of such goodwill. Their social origin dictates their political activities. Emerging from the middle classes and supported by the service sector, they would not see it to their advantage to support an anticapitalist political action as it might be expressed by a political party or movement. In Greece, 50 percent of such young people are politically indifferent. Those who claim to be on the left lean toward the center-to-left parties—Pasok and Synaspismos—without feeling the need to form an alternative political agency, let alone one that confronts the status quo.⁸ Even if such an organization is formed in the future, it is certain that it will follow a reformist path without resorting to radicalism. The reason for this, as Lowe and Flynn explain in the English political context, is that these environmental groups have

easy access to government and the political system (1989). As I have shown, this is the case in Greece.

Another indication is the *raison d'être* of these organizations. They can deal with problems on a local level that can be resolved locally⁹. Even when this is not so, it does not mean, as Yearly indicates, that they have accepted the need to confront current social conventions (1992). They have opposed a number of things but they have not made the leap toward a critique of our mainly capitalist industrial culture. For example, they supported the replacement of cosmetic sprays harmful to the ozone layer with others that do not deplete ozone, instead of fighting for the abolition of aerosols. Another reading of their main proposal suggests that it has to do with the development of new industrial branches (production of new products, cleaning the air and water) in which investments have already been made, workers employed, and surplus value being produced—therefore in which capitalism is being renewed and strengthened. The danger is even bigger if we agree with Kitsuse and Spector that the problem stressed by pressure groups is not only the reflection of existing real problems, but to some extent socially constructed (1977).

Some environmental problems have elicited more attention than others because they are brought up by pressure groups and are supported by the media. In this case, two preconditions exist: the solution has to be practical and directly applicable (and therefore preceded by a marketing strategy) and the problem has to be ideologically neutral. Such a solution, if not supported by the state, is put forward by NGOs and applied by businesses. The proposal for cooperation is already being put into practice.¹⁰ In this, too, the inviolate term is the obsession to expand the industrial culture. Porritt suggests that while the green expansion may lead to less pollution, its supporters adhere to the omnipotent goal of the economic dogma that human relations must be based on a permanent process of production and consumption (1988). The worst thing is that they legitimize the consumption expansion by protecting it as the final goal of the ecological struggle that will bring about the desirable development and balance. To achieve this goal, any means is acceptable. Even cooperation with market forces or, as Pezzey says, “the use of

market forces in order to encourage green expansion is a well-paved way to move in the direction of sustainability in relation to the radical social and political changes” (1989).

The market’s indication of acceptance

The proposal for cooperation by the youth NGOs of environmental sensitization have reached the market leaders. And, it seems, they are beginning to be receptive to it. At the end of 1995, an international conference was held at the Greek Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The chairman of the International Organization of Biopolitics put forward the proposal for cooperation, saying, among other things:

The challenge is to expand development on the basis of biocentral parameters and to extend our vision for the next millennium. We live in a small and fragile planet. Securing the continuation of the life-chain on our planet should be our main goal. . . . [U]ncontrollable development leads to the maximization of the entropy, that is to say, to a tendency toward disorder.¹¹ The lack of balance in society caused by the uncontrollable application of technology leads to the destruction of a bioenvironment, to the depletion of natural resources, and to the explosive economic problems of the developing countries. . . . In contrast to our current experience in the application of programs for cleaner production, this process, besides reducing the environmental load, results in, the reduction of the cost of waste management as well as the cost of production, and therefore the indirect increase in profits. (Vlavianou- Arvaniti 1996, 16–19)

The best hod for the practical application of such collaboration is the search for new technologies, green consumption, and reductions for businesses that employ young unemployed people in environmental programs and biotourism.

The moneyed elites are gradually and steadily beginning to move in this direction. In 1994, the International Environmental Union of Banks was established in order to create appropriate funding institutions to give priority to environmental issues through

investments. Panourgia-Kloni, the Counselor for Environmental Issues of the World Bank, notes that the representatives of NGOs are a link in the chain that will provide the solution to the problem of the environment, since they will influence the consumption models of many states, and in this way they will be the links connecting the goals and strategies of businesses. For this reason, over 50 percent of the projects approved by the World Bank in 1994 (150 out of 229) are likely to be implemented by NGOs. These groups are funded by the World Bank in other ways, too, through special funding projects for new initiatives, for conferences, publications, etc. They can also be used as executive agents for other projects (Vlavianou-Arvaniti 1996, 71–78).

Since 1992, according to a study, the environmental protection is a very serious goal for 92 percent of the leaders of the business community (Vatimbella 1992). Businesses use tools such as product analysis to analyze decisions, while they collaborate with environmental NGOs. This collaboration has three kinds of advantages:

They play the game better by becoming “green,” so they maximize their profits. By changing the rules of the game, they gain the advantages of development and strategic influence.

They create a totally new game (reinvention of firms) leading to a renewal of the entrepreneurial core (Ashford in Vlavianou-Arvaniti 1996, 165). We could also see the beginnings of such collaboration in Greece. It is not accidental that in a research by ICAP in 1992 the environmental expenses constituted 12.8 percent of the total investments’ expenditure (D. Maniatakis in Vlavianou-Arvanitis, 1996, 180), while at the same time well-known Greek businesses, such as Suzuki Hellas, Zeneca, 3E, put into action similar programs, proving that the management of the environment is an opportunity and not a burden: an opportunity for cost reduction, sharing part of the increase in the purchase of environmental products, and the creation of competitive advantages through the promotion of the environmental image (184).

Conclusion

The Boy Scouts Association for three quarters of the twentieth century has shaped the socialization of the youth to serve dominant

social goals, functioning like another leisure-class—to use Veblen’s term and concept—elite. When, however, in the last two decades, the Boy Scouts “grew up” in the sense that their type of contribution was made redundant by the new economic developments, the environmental NGOs took the lead as the main links connecting the environmental movement to the aspirations and the strategies of the economic leaders of the market. The organs of the status quo are quite satisfied with this arrangement, despite the fact that the discourse of these organizations may sometimes appear unconventional.¹²

The activism of the dominant groups that strive for ecological sensitization remains compatible with the ambitions of market forces in modern Greece. This does not mean devaluation of ecological sensitization as such, but only of the ways and means that it instrumentalizes and uses them. Guattari is right: the real solution to the ecological problem is to be found on the global level. So the paradigm of the aforementioned activism must change. Several writers have stressed the need for cooperation between Marxism and ecology (Benton 1989; Grundmann 1991); a cooperation based on the main principles of historical materialism, the epistemological perspective of determinism, and the concept of class. If we wish to deal with the interaction between society and nature, we will clearly see that it is determined by labor performed in the context of class relations. If one attempts to propose solutions that do not take into consideration the material base of contemporary society, one perpetuates the problem *de facto* and sustains the structure that causes it.

I am grateful to my colleague Manousos Marangudakis, Assistant Professor, for looking at the final draft and for giving valuable feedback

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NOTES

1. All translations from non-English sources were made by the author.
2. Even today, in the organization of the Association of Greek Boy Scouts that was ratified by presidential decree on the 17 February 1999, it is explicitly

stated that the association aims to contribute to the moral edification of a person, within the frameworks of education and edification as defined by the constitution. To understand this framework, article 3 of the aforementioned presidential decree states that the members of the association have a duty to God, and must accept every obligation and duty that comes from religion: a duty to the country, to the family, to fellow human beings, to the society, love for the family, a duty to one's self, and development of personal responsibility. In the next paragraph we have "convention to any dogma, to any political party or philosophical view is not allowed". Apparently this means that no other philosophy is tolerated except of course the ideology that the scout is obliged to follow.

3. To better understand the link between the association's activities aiming at a peaceful coexistence with nature with the expediency of this nonmaterially productive deed, we should examine the theoretical framework that honors in this way such activities of the dominant bourgeoisie during the first half of the twentieth century in Western Europe and the United States. Even before the second half of the nineteenth century, Lyell, laying the foundation of the discipline of geology (1843), notes that natural balances are the sensitive component of opposing factors and not the expression of wisdom by some god, while Marsh a some years afterwards, writes about the real or the potential disorders of natural balances, produced by human acts upon physical geography (1864). Warming (1895) says that plants and plant communities adapt their types and behaviors to the really energetic environmental factors like the quantity of heat, light, food, and water available, while on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, McMillan defines economic ecology as a science dealing with the adjustments, relations with human interests (1897). In 1866, Haeckel coins the term ecology.

4. Such a consummate ecological thought is found in Park, Burgess, and Mckenzie (1925).

5. The first international agreement was drawn up in 1883 about the seal in the Bering Sea (Asia-America).

6. A more detailed structural analysis supports my thesis. The scouts' dens have three ranks in Greece: the wolf cubs (7–11 years old), scouts (11–15), and trackers (15–18). Each group and their rank officers make up a system. Responsible for each system is the leader who has assistant leaders under his command. These rank officers must be over eighteen years old. The command to administer the system comes from the Administration Board of the Greek Boys Scouts Association. Of interest are the reasons for the suspension of the command of a rank officer. This occurs when the rank officer does not take part regularly in the activities of the group; when his service is not deemed satisfactory; when his overall behavior and attitude is improper, either within the scouting movement in his "civilian" life; or when he does not obey rules and orders coming from his superiors. The decisions of the Organizing Committee determine the code of behavior of the scouts—the rules, the vow of the scouts, the uniform, the accessories, the budgets, and so on. The hierarchy follows the scheme: local, regional, national Eforos (head).

7. This is supported by the organizational structure of the Association. It calls for the creation of a group consisting of older scouts, which has representatives

in the General Assembly and quite likely in the Administration Board. Most indicative of this is the fact that when a system does not operate in cooperation with a committee of social solidarity, then its operation may be suspended. This committee, whose operation is obligatory, consists of older scouts, scouts' friends, or parents. Its purpose is to interest the local public in scouting; find resources, materials, and facilities for the operation of the system; and to assist in its administration.

8. One such organization, Alternative Ecology, existed in Greece only for a short time, electing a woman MP. Since then, the movement fell into obscurity. It was active from 1989 to 1993, when it disbanded. The highest vote it received in national elections was 1.11 percent, in the elections for the European Parliament. In two other national elections, in November 1989 and April 1990, it received 0.58 percent and 0.77 percent of the vote, respectively. The profile of the people who voted for it is no different from the one presented in our analysis of the NGOs (Botegazias 2001). The electoral tank of Greek ecologists were people 18–26 years of age, of well above average education (mostly higher), who lived and voted in the center of the two biggest cities in Greece, Athens and Thessaloniki. Another indication is that the reason the movement fell apart was the great ideological differences among its members and the charge that its major decisions had predominantly Athenocentric tendencies, while a few member-groups stressed their autonomy, which came from their allegiance to the area where they lived and operated.

9. Exactly because of their circumstantial nature they lack a solid foundation, so they remain passive.

10. Botegazias comments that NGOs in Greece were looking for patrons instead of for members or comrades (2001, 258).

11. For a theoretical support of this see Georgescu-Roegen (1971)


12. From my discussion, it should be obvious that I disagree with analyses that interpret the organized youth environmental sensitization as a weak form of a left-wing movement. This view, which arose in the 1970s, sees actions taken by some activists of the nonparliamentarian left as weak, semi-organized actions, with no impact on public opinion; and after the 1970s, the organized activism is legal actions supported by self-funding or contributions from abroad. Without disregarding such an analysis, I believe that it does not take into consideration the organized ecological activism throughout the twentieth century that was supportive of the right-wing political system. Is it not a fact then that the ecological action in Greece is of an ideologically based conservative practice?

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A Marxist Analysis of Present-Day Globalization

Henri Houben

In treating the question of present-day globalization, it is important, in my opinion, to avoid two mistakes.

The first, and undoubtedly the most important, is not beginning with Lenin's crucially topical study of imperialism.

The second is not taking into account the changes and adaptations which have occurred since Lenin's time. Present-day globalization is first and foremost the situation of imperialism in our age.

1. The current relevance of Lenin's analysis of imperialism

Lenin wrote his book on imperialism in 1916, in the middle of World War I. His point of view was that the war was the result of imperialist policies carried out by each of the belligerent European states and that those policies were in turn the consequence of the strategies of large firms in their pursuit of markets.

He emphasized that a qualitative change in capitalism had taken place in the passage from a situation dominated by free enterprise and small or middle-sized firms to the age of monopoly. Where the "free market" and competition—especially economic competition—had reigned, it was now competition between giants at every level. Where the state had served above all to ensure the framework of economic development, by investment, by controlling workers and by monetary unification, there was

now an imperialist state ready for anything to defend its monopolies. Where contradictions had set workers and bosses and firms in opposition among themselves, the antagonisms now took on a worldwide character and set not only social classes into opposition among themselves, but also states. Where capitalism had been able to bring technical and scientific development and represented progress with regard to feudalism, there arose a rentier, parasitic, and voracious capitalism, for which the ultimate criterion was a maximum rise in profits.

Today, the age of imperialism is far from over. On the contrary, it is more present than ever. What has changed above all is the broadened scope of the characteristics of imperialism.

1.1. A world dominated by monopolies

In 1916, monopolies operating directly on a worldwide scale were rather rare, existing above all in the field of raw materials, particularly oil, with Royal Dutch/Shell soon followed by the Anglo-Iranian Petroleum Company (later to become BP) and Rockefeller's Standard Oil (today ExxonMobil and in part, Chevron).

At present, it is roughly the opposite. The sectors not governed by world giants not having a production basis more or less all over the world are rare. Only two commercial aircraft manufacturers—Boeing and Airbus—are left. Only a dozen transnational automobile firms remain. In 2004, they covered 90 percent of world production, as shown in table 1. In 1990, to obtain a similar proportion, twenty-five firms were necessary. Most of them have merged or have been bought up by more powerful firms.

Even if the sector has changed a lot there are three big oil companies: Royal Dutch/Shell, BP and ExxonMobil. Three other firms are also very important, but are half the size of the first three: Chevron, Total, and PhillipsConoco.

Another sector affected by the wave of mergers is the pharmaceutical industry. Once scattered because of its many products, it is today united under the aegis of a dozen firms that control 60 percent of world sales, as indicated in table 2.

We could go on citing the different industries.

Table 1. World production of motor vehicles by manufacturers in 2004 (in units and percentage)

	Manufacturer	Country	Units	%
	<i>General Motors</i>	<i>USA</i>	8,965,476	14.0
	<i>Suzuki</i>	<i>Japan</i>	1,976,824	3.1
	<i>Isuzu</i>	<i>Japan</i>	500,337	0.8
1	Great GM	USA	11,442,637	17.8
	<i>Ford</i>	<i>USA</i>	6,644,024	10.4
	<i>Mazda</i>	<i>Japan</i>	1,275,080	2.0
2	Ford-Mazda	USA	7,919,104	12.3
3	Toyota	Japan	7,874,694	12.3
	<i>Nissan</i>	<i>Japan</i>	3,230,326	5.0
	<i>Renault</i>	<i>France</i>	2,663,008	4.2
4	Alliance Renault-Nissan	France	5,893,334	9.2
5	Volkswagen	Germany	5,095,480	7.9
6	DaimlerChrysler	Germany	4,627,883	7.2
7	Peugeot	France	3,405,245	5.3
8	Honda	Japan	3,237,434	5.0
9	Hyundai	Korea	2,766,321	4.3
10	Fiat	Italy	2,119,717	3.3
11	Mitsubishi	Japan	1,428,563	2.2
12	BMW	Germany	1,250,345	1.9
	Others		7,104,498	11.1
	Total		64,165,255	100.0

Source: OICA (International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers).

The wave of mergers and acquisitions was very important in the 1990s, quite unprecedented in fact, as table 3 shows.

It can be seen that mergers and acquisitions have gone from 1,719 in 1985 to 11,169 in 2000, and that at the level of the sums involved, they have increased twentyfold in this period, from 150 billion dollars in 1985 to 3,400 billions in 2000. In ten years, from 1991 to 2000, the total amounts to 14,099 billion dollars for almost 65,000 transactions. Later, with the stock-exchange crash of 2001, the statistics dropped. But operations, worthy of a gigantic game of Monopoly on a world scale, have picked up since 2004.

Table 2. World sales of pharmaceutical products by companies in 2004 (in millions of dollars and percentage)

Company	Country	Sales	%
Pfizer	USA	52,921	9.6
Johnson & Johnson	USA	47,348	8.6
Glaxosmithkline	UK	37,304	6.8
Novartis	Swiss	28,247	5.1
Roche	Swiss	25,166	4.6
Merck	USA	22,939	4.2
Bristol Myers	USA	21,886	4.0
AstraZeneca	UK	21,426	3.9
Abott Laboratories	USA	20,473	3.7
Sanofi-Aventis	France	18,710	3.4
Wyeth	USA	17,358	3.2
Eli Lilly	USA	13,858	2.5
Others		222,364	40.4
Total		550,000	100.0

Source: *Fortune*, Global 500, 25 July 2005, for company sales, EFPIA (European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations) for world sales.

Table 3. Number and amount (in billions of dollars) of mergers and acquisitions in the world 1985–2002

Mergers	1985	1990	1995	2000	2002	1991–2000
Number	1,719	4,239	4,981	11,169	7,032	64,845
Amount	150	206	896	3,440	1,185	14,099

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (Washington, DC: GPO, for the years cited).

1.2. The development of financial markets

This game of capital has gone along with a development, also enormous, of financial markets. In Lenin's day, banks were used as centers of management for capital, which gave them considerable power. Today they are caught up with all kinds of financial firms of various origins: pension funds, mutual funds, hedge funds, insurance companies, etc.

It is possible to use many indicators for this phenomenon. We shall limit ourselves to market capitalization, whose development is given in table 4.

Table 4. Market capitalisation by country 1990-2004 (in billions of dollars)

Country	1990	1995	1999	2002	2004
USA	3,059	6,858	16,635	11,055	16,324
Japan	2,918	3,667	4,547	2,069	3,558
EU	2,170	3,779	9,117	5,580	9,321
Others	1,253	3,485	5,849	4,567	7,966
World	9,400	17,788	36,149	23,271	37,168

Source: World Federation of Exchanges

Very important growth can be seen: 16 percent on average per year from 1990 to 1999 for the whole world and 20.7 percent for U.S. market capitalization. It is much faster than GDP (gross domestic product) growth, which has an annual average rise of only 3.3 percent. Hence, market capitalization represented about 40 percent of the world GDP in 1990. It overtook the GDP in 1999 and 2004. In the United States, it is greater than the national GDP by 39 percent.

1.3. Exports of capital for international production

Exports of capital have grown to gigantic proportions, as shown in table 5.

Table 5. Evolution of world FDI outward stock and world GDP 1980–2004 (in billions of dollars)

	1980	1990	2000	2004
FDI stock (1)	524	1,785	6,148	9,732
GDP (2)	11,808	22,519	31,647	40,671
Ratio (1)/(2) (%)	4.4	7.9	19.4	23.9

Source: UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2005: Transnational Corporations and the Internationalization of R&D*, pp.14 and 308.

In 1980, the stock of foreign direct investments (FDI outward stock) was the equivalent of 4.4 percent of the world GDP. The percentage has been rising continuously since then, reaching 23.9 percent in 2004.

In 1914, the direction taken by these investments was primarily the raw-materials sector:

About 55 per cent of the total capital stake was directed to the primary product sector, 20 per cent to railways, 15

per cent to manufacturing activities, 10 per cent to trade and distribution and the balance to public utilities, banking and the like. Manufacturing investments, which were largely oriented toward local markets, were mainly concentrated in Europe, the USA, the UK Dominions and Russia; while, apart from iron ore, coal and bauxite, almost all mineral investments were located in the British Empire or in developing countries. (Dunning 1988, 73)

At that time, Britain represented about 45.5 percent of FDI outward stock.

It was only after World War II that a notable change occurred. Britain gave up its place to the United States, which provided the greater part of investments: 44.9% in 1960, 44% in 1975, and 42% in 1980, according to UNCTAD. Manufacturing production increased its part continuously:

In 1960, about 35 per cent of the US and UK accumulated investment was in manufacturing, comparing with about 25 per cent in 1938 and 15 per cent in 1914. (Dunning, 1988, 80)

The share of manufacturing in U.S. investments even reached 45% in 1975 (Hackman, 1997, 15).

A change occurred in this sector. Previously, investments by transnational firms aimed at supplying local markets. After 1960, firms invested in a foreign country, generally in the Third World and above all in South-East Asia, which developed free zones, in order to supply the home countries. The first "screwdriver" factories appeared at the beginning of the sixties in the electronics industry:

The first offshore assembly plant in the semiconductor industry was set up by Fairchild in Hong Kong in 1962. In 1964 General Instruments transferred some of its micro-electronics assembly to Taiwan. In 1966 Fairchild opened a plant in South Korea. Around the same time, several US manufacturers set up semiconductor assembly plants in the Mexican Border Zone. In the later 1960s US firms moved into Singapore and subsequently into Malaysia. (Dicken 1992, 332)

It was a departure point for expanding production abroad.

For example, in 1966, United States TNCs employed a mere 1,750 manufacturing workers in Malaysia, 1,232 in Singapore and 4,804 in Taiwan. By 1987 Malaysia's employment in US manufacturing firms had grown to 54,000, Singapore's to 38,400 and Taiwan's to 49,100. Each experienced rates of increase well in excess of 1,000 per cent—in the cases of Malaysia and Singapore the increase was around 3,000 per cent. (67)

The automobile industry developed identically. The departure point seems to have been the restructuring of Ford's European activities in 1980. Before that, each European subsidiary aimed mainly at its own local market. In 1980, Ford decided to redirect them for a single integrated regional market, Europe. Production units were specialized: assembly operations by model and the factories producing motors or other parts were concentrated in a few places that supplied all the factories of the continent. Ford was followed by General Motors in 1985: the latter set up its decision center for Europe in Switzerland. Soon the other European manufacturers did the same. Manufacturers in the United States set up units in Mexico and included them in their productive structure for North America. In Southeast Asia, Toyota was in the forefront, concentrating assembly units in Thailand, motor production in Thailand and Indonesia, and transmission systems in the Philippines.

It is interesting to note that in 1980 Ford also developed the concept of the world car. The aim was to build a vehicle from parts coming from all over the world. However, the operation failed, and both production and conception remain to all intents and purposes continental (until now).

Robert Reich, ex-U.S. labor secretary, gives another example in his book on globalization—that of Pontiac Le Mans. He explains that today production is globalized:

When an American buys a Pontiac Le Mans from General Motors, for example, he or she engages unwittingly in an international transaction. Of the \$10,000 paid to GM, about

\$3,000 goes to South Korea for routine labor and assembly operations, \$1,750 to Japan for advanced components (engines, transaxles, and electronics), \$750 to West Germany for styling and design engineering, \$400 to Taiwan, Singapore, and Japan for small components, \$250 to Britain for advertising and marketing services, and about \$50 to Ireland and Barbados for data processing. The rest—less than \$4,000—goes to strategists in Detroit, lawyers and bankers in New York, lobbyists in Washington, insurance and health-care workers all over the country, and General Motors shareholders—most of whom live in the United States, but an increasing number of whom are foreign nationals. (Reich, 1992, 113).

He wants to prove his point that the interests of transnational corporations, which act at world level are different from those that act at the state level and therefore remain national. Times have supposedly changed since Charles Wilson, chairman of General Motors, on becoming secretary of defense in 1953 declared to journalists who had asked him if there was no incompatibility between the two jobs, “I cannot conceive of one because for years I thought what was good for our country was good for General Motors, and vice versa. The difference did not exist. Our company is too big. It goes with the welfare of the country” (48).

Unfortunately for Robert Reich, the demonstration comes up short. In fact, the example given does not work. It is based on the cooperation agreement between General Motors and Daewoo, but was not implemented at the latter, and the Pontiac Le Mans is not selling. The automobile industry remains basically organized at continental and not world level.

We will discuss later the links between transnational corporations and their country of origin. We can affirm, however, that there is not yet really globalized production, because the creation of value does not exist at the world level. Each national system subsists with its specificities and its own development. An hour of work in one country is not (necessarily) worth an hour of work in another. Working conditions are in sharp contrast among the regions of the world. In particular, workers are paid very differently

and valued differently by function and relationships in production. What is called globalization in this framework bears on the fact that the transnational corporations take advantage of these differences, with the help of their respective states and of international institutions like the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, to extract the largest possible profits. In this way, even if no world value is created, a transfer of surplus value occurs from workers of the whole world—and, in particular, from the Third World—to these capitalist centers of power.¹

Today, capital export affects all sectors, the services having caught up these last years, as can be seen in table 6, which concerns only the United States, for which we have detailed statistics.

Table 6. U.S. FDI outward stock by sector 1970–2004 (in per cent)

Sector	1970	1980	1990	2000	2004
Mining	27.8	22.1	13.3	7.1	4.9
Manufacturing	41.3	41.4	38.8	26.1	20.7
Services	31.0	36.6	47.9	66.8	74.3

Source U.S. Department of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business* (Washington, DC: GPO, for years cited).

The service sector grew from 31 percent in 1970 to 74.3 percent in 2004. It replaced parts of the primary sector from 1970 and of the industrial sector especially since 1990. A new way of counting, including certain elements that were previously attributed to production in the service sector, partly, but not entirely, explains this drop.

1.4. Division of the world among imperialists

The monopolies, acting on a world scale, have divided the world among themselves. This division is endlessly being contested. If the transnational corporations are giants, they nonetheless wage fierce competition with each other. The waves of mergers and acquisitions are proof of this. It is a question of who will gobble up the other first, who will win the most market shares, who will snatch the most profits (surplus value).

In this struggle, the states are far from inactive. Although the manner of state intervention is not identical with what it was

in 1953, it remains important. Thus the United States promotes free trade and intellectual property rights in order to support its corporations that are involved in the development of new technologies. In addition the Defense Department actively supports U.S. firms, regularly placing orders with them.² The creation of a large integrated market on the European continent benefits the firms situated in the region, therefore, primarily European businesses. To win the world competition, a firm must first be strong in its own domestic market. What more need be said about Japan, whose powerful Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) regularly establishes plans to favor Japanese firms in world competition?

Acquiring zones where their influence is preponderant remains a permanent aim of these imperialist states. The world is divided up. The United States has unchallenged global leadership. In certain regions, however, because of past and of current interests, disputes or disagreements arise between the United States on the one hand and the European Union or Japan on the other, even if these antagonisms have not thus far taken on large-scale violent character. Thus West Africa brings together Europe—the traditional colonial power—and the United States, prospecting for oil resources for its economy. Latin America, long the exclusive preserve and industrial backyard of the United States, is subject to European incursions. Asia is coveted above all by the U.S. and Japanese transnational corporations (and in some sectors European firms).

2. The contribution of socialism

The most important change since Lenin's analysis of imperialism was the appearance of socialism in 1917. It was a revolution not only in Czarist Russia but also for the whole world.

First of all, it showed in practical terms that there was an alternative to capitalism and imperialism, and indicated that capitalism was condemned in the end by history. After the World War I, revolutionary forces, betrayed by the leaders of the Social-Democratic parties (the German SPD among others) were unable to win over large parts of the European continent. After the World War II, a

whole series of revolutions broke out in Europe and Asia. A large part of humankind freed itself from the imperialist yoke with the victories of the Communist parties in Eastern Europe, China, Korea, and Vietnam.

World War II, initiated by the most nationalist, racist, and criminal bourgeois trends (fascists and Nazis), showed to what degree of barbarity capitalism was prepared to stoop. Socialism appeared to a majority of the population as a liberating system. And that was actually the case, allowing millions of people who had been subject to hunger, poverty, and deprivation under capitalism to harvest the fruits of their labor. The United States replaced the fascists as the rampart of imperialism against the progress of socialism. It launched the Marshall plan to divide Europe. It actively took part in the reconquest of Greece. It participated actively in the Korean War. It then replaced the colonialists in Vietnam to prevent the reunification of the country.

The United States suffered defeats or setbacks in several cases. In 1959, it was driven out of Cuba, the small Caribbean island that served as a paradise for the U.S. ruling class. In 1975, it was turned out of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, after endless butcheries for which it was responsible.

The emergence of socialism also encouraged the development of liberation movements in the Third World. The socialist victory in China undoubtedly served as an example for many Third World peoples. It showed that liberation was possible, that economic development was possible, and that people could take their future in hand under the leadership of a Communist party.

Third Worldism expanded rapidly. In 1955, the Bandung Conference took place, bringing together the great majority of Third World countries, including China. In 1956, the Suez crisis showed that a country that had been colonized—Egypt— could successfully resist the provocations of the ex-colonizers. In the sixties, most African countries underwent decolonization, often formal, but their theoretical political independence was recognized. These developments led to the blossoming of national revolutions as in Algeria, in the Middle East, in Nicaragua. The United States was even driven out of some countries, as in Iran.

Since then the imperialist powers have taken up the offensive under the aegis of the policies carried out by Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the United States. In spite of this effort to impose new forms of colonialism, the big Third World countries like China, India, Brazil, and others have increasing weight in the current international context .

Finally, the appearance and the development of socialism led to the emergence of social rights in the imperialist countries, particularly in Europe. These rights are the outcome of long struggles by workers, such as social security, wage increases, and reduction of working hours. After leading to pitiless wars, after basing itself on working-class poverty for its own development, capitalism had to take a softer, more social road in Europe, of which the social-democratic parties were the expression. This was in large part due to the victory of socialism in the USSR and East Europe. If the workers had not obtained certain advantages, they would have chosen to struggle directly in favor of the socialism that was developing.

Socialism and its international consequences are major changes that any analysis of globalization today must take into account. A study of globalization cannot be limited to the economic field, it has to be global as Lenin himself noted in his day.

3. The two essential changes in present-day imperialism

To analyze present-day globalization, two essential changes have to be taken into account.

First, a structural economic crisis broke out in 1973, with the price of a barrel of oil increasing fourfold. Structurally it was based on the slowing-down of increases in productivity arising from the tendency of the falling rate of profit. To counter the diminishing income and wealth of holders of capital, a broad counteroffensive was launched by the employers, often described as neoliberal policy and identified with those who governed Britain and the United States at the time, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. Their aim was at one and the same time to reduce the power gained by the Third World countries and by working people and to redistribute in favor of the capitalists the wealth that was being created.

These policies succeeded. Thus, the richest people in the United States have seen their share of national wealth evolve favorably since 1980. This can be seen in table 7.

Table 7. Proportion of wealth ownership of the 1% richest people of the United States (in per cent)

1958	30.4	1976	21.9	1995	38.5
1962	32.2	1983	33.8	1998	38.1
1969	31.3	1989	37.4	2001	36.8
1972	31.6	1992	38.2		

Source: Calculations based on Edward Wolff, "Estimates of Household Wealth Inequality in the US 1962–1983," *Review of Income and Wealth*, no. 3 (September 1973), and Edward Wolff, "Recent Trends in Wealth Ownership," Jerome Levy Economics Institute, Working Paper no. 300, April 2000.

In the 1960s, this share was relatively stable, around 30 percent. With the economic crisis of 1973, it dropped to 21.9 percent. Reagan's policies allowed the richest people to win back rapidly the wealth they had lost in the stock exchange crashes of 1973–74 and 1979–81. And even more. In 1995, it reached a level never attained since World War II: 38.5 percent. The new crash of 2001 reduced their wealth once again, because the wealth of the richest one percent is largely in equities.

The second element of change is precisely the blow struck by the victory of counterrevolution in the USSR and Eastern Europe that resulted in the collapse of those countries and their partial breakup—the unprecedented regression that Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel prize laureate in economics, ex-chief economist of the Clinton administration, and, at the time, vice-president and chief economist at the World Bank, characterized as "the largest increase in poverty in history in such a short span in time (outside war and famine)" (Stiglitz 2002, 182–82).

This situation in the country that inaugurated the socialist revolution and the construction of an alternative system to capitalism has had a phenomenal effect on the rest of the globe. The capitalist counteroffensive has been strengthened and accentuated. Workers' benefits have been rapidly reduced. The pressure on the Third World has increased. The room for maneuver has been diminished.

The world has been “united” in the framework of imperialism, under the leadership of the United States, the clearly dominant imperialist power since World War II. The WTO was created to establish this domination. Some neoconservatives have entitled this phase of what they call the final victory of capitalism over socialism as the “end of history.” There can, of course, be no question of success. It indicates, however, the arrogance of imperialism.

4. *The United States: Toward global hegemony*

Since 1990, the United States has taken the offensive with regard to its imperialist ex-allies. Previously the leader of the so-called “free world,” it has become, with the disappearance of the USSR, the main imperialist power. It quickly set its aim as preventing any other power from being capable of rivaling it. This can be observed in a document entitled Defense Planning Guidance and drawn up in 1992 by Paul Wolfowitz and Lewis Libby. The report was ordered by the Defense Secretary of the time, Dick Cheney.

The main problem, however, was the economy. The United States was being gradually caught up with by Europe and Japan as far as productivity was concerned. This is clearly visible in table 8.

Table 8. Evolution of real per capita GDP (in PPP) compared with the United States 1950–1998 (USA=100)

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	1998
USA	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
EU	47.2	60.4	67.8	70.6	68.3	65.1
Japan	20.1	35.2	64.6	72.3	80.9	74.7

Source: Based on Angus Maddison, *L'économie mondiale. Une perspective millénaire*, OCDE, 2001. The amounts are calculated in dollars PPP (purchasing-power-parity) Geary-Khamis dollars of 1990.

In 1950, the European economy was at half the level of the United States. Japan was at a fifth of the U.S. level. The catching-up process was complete. It reached a high point for Europe in 1980 and for Japan in 1990. In 1989, the Japanese MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity published the book *Made in America*, in which it showed that in eight industrial sectors Japanese firms had

higher productivity than in the United States and even predicted a manufacturing decline in the United States.

Once rid of the struggle against the USSR, the United States launched into an offensive to regain its position as economic leader of the world. It set up the National Economic Council. It transformed its “cold war” diplomacy into commercial actions in favor of U.S. transnational corporations. It directed the activities of the CIA and the National Security Agency toward economic aims. And the effort paid off. It can be seen from table 8 that after 1990 not only the European Union but also Japan lost ground again.

Under the Clinton administration, a new economic policy was defined. It was based on the Information Age, the knowledge society. A major innovation based on techniques used by the military was launched: the Internet. The “new American competitiveness,” however, has many other foundations.

First of all, there was the relocation of basic value-creating (that is, surplus value) manufacturing production to the Third World, especially Mexico, Central America, and East Asia. This concerned mostly mass consumption electronics and the textile and clothing industries.

The evolution of this phenomenon can be seen, if value added in manufacturing and imports to the United States of manufactured goods are added together. Some things could be counted twice if, for example, machines or parts are manufactured in the United States, exported abroad, and used to make goods for import to the US. We can assume that these amounts are small. In any case, they cannot change the picture given by table 9.

Growth of both value added in manufacturing and imports can be observed, but the latter is greater. Until about 1990, imports from developed capitalist countries were more important. Those from the Third World progress rapidly, overtaking the others in 2004.

This is even more obvious in table 10, which uses the same data as the preceding table but is expressed in percentages.

The share of U.S. manufacturing is falling continuously. That of imports never stops rising. That indicates the increased importance of foreign manufacturing for U.S. consumption.

Table 9. Growth of productive structure of the United States 1973–2004 (in billions of dollars)

	1973	1980	1990	1995	2000	2004
U.S. manufacturing	321.9	587.5	1,040.6	1,289.1	1,566.6	1,545.4
Imports from EU, Japan, and Canada	34.5	90.4	243.6	350.2	506.5	683.9
Imports from Third World countries	8.0	33.8	132.0	257.7	462.7	841.3
Total imports	42.5	124.2	375.7	607.8	989.1	1,525.3
Total Productive Structure	364.4	711.7	1,416.3	1,896.9	2,535.7	3,070.7

Source: Survey of Current Business for value added in manufacturing, and WTO, annual report, different years for imports.

Table 10. Growth of productive structure of the United States 1973–2004 (in percent)

	1973	1980	1990	1995	2000	2004
U.S. manufacturing	88.3	82.5	73.5	68.0	61.8	50.3
Imports from EU, Japan, and Canada	9.5	12.7	17.2	18.5	20.0	22.3
Imports from Third World countries	2.2	4.7	9.3	13.6	18.2	27.4
Total imports	11.7	17.5	26.5	32.0	38.2	49.7
Total Productive Structure	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: See table 9.

In 1990, however, the share of imports from capitalist countries was still double that of the Third World. In 2004, the share of the Third World is the most important. In 1973, imports were limited; everything or almost everything was manufactured in the United States itself. In 2004, manufacturing provided only half of the production necessary for the United States, imports from the Third World accounting for more than a quarter and those from Europe, Japan and Canada for a little less than a quarter.

What does this mean? First of all it is an indication of the growing dependence of the U.S. economy on goods manufactured in the

Third World, which must be controlled, otherwise an interruption in supply could have nasty consequences for the first economy of the world. It effectively allows the United States to take advantage of international transfers of surplus value arising from foreign production. These transfers can have several facets: low prices for imported goods, textiles, television sets, radios, etc., as well as repatriation of profits made abroad and royalties on patents and payments for other services. Finally, it makes it possible to pay lower wages in the United States itself, because the value of labor power can be reduced by the low price of imported goods.

The second foundation of the “new American competitiveness” is the development of financial markets, which we have already seen in point 1.2. It is estimated that every 10 percent gain in capital in the stock market creates a growth in consumption by U.S. households of between 0.5 and 1 percent (Brender and Pisani 1999, 132n7). If we take the upper limit of this estimate and observe that stock ownership by households increased by 200% from 1990 to 1999, we can evaluate the growth of U.S. consumption at 770 billion dollars. As the U.S. GDP increased during this period by 3,465 trillion dollars, we can estimate that owing to the rise in stock assets, household consumption rose by about 22%—hardly a negligible figure.

To this must be added the fact that capitalists put their funds into the U.S. economy principally through securities.

Table 11. Average annual GDP growth, annual capital net accounts, and annual portfolio foreign investments in the United States 1991–2004 (in billions of dollars and percent)

	1991–1994	1995–1999	2000–2004
GDP growth (1)	317.3	439.2	493.2
Capital net accounts (2)	63.4	178.7	493.7
Difference (1) – (2)	253.9	260.5	-0.5
Percentage of GDP (2)/(1)	20.0	40.7	100.1
Portfolio foreign investments	111.3	274.1	535.6
Percentage of GDP	35.1	62.4	108.6

Source: Based on Bureau of Economic Analysis, “U.S. International Transactions Accounts Data”, 16 December 2005.

Note : Capital net accounts are the reverse of the current balance.

Consider the average annual GDP growth, capital net accounts, and foreign investment portfolios shown in table 11. The average annual GDP growth increased in the two periods 1991–94 and 1995–99 and continued to do so in 2000–2004 despite a stock market crash. The net capital brought in from abroad, however, increased even faster. In the later periods, various economic crises in Southeast Asia, Russia, Brazil, Argentina, and Turkey and the slow growth in Europe and Japan led the bourgeoisie worldwide to put their money into that economy judged to be the safest in the world, namely the United States (emphasized by “portfolio foreign investments” in table 11). In fact, for the last period, U.S. growth appears to have been completely stimulated by the foreign capital brought in, since its average amount corresponds to the average annual rise in GDP.

Once again the U.S. dependence on these funds must be emphasized. If they had not been available—and in 2005, the total amount is estimated at more than 6 percent of the GDP (between 700 and 800 billion dollars)—U.S. foreign accounts would be completely unbalanced, with the risk of provoking a fall in the dollar, and therefore of the worldwide monetary system, bringing down the entire global economy.

Finally, the fourth element of the “new American competitiveness,” is that the United States concentrates on services and high tech that it can sell dear abroad or whose patents it can sell dear thanks to the rules about intellectual property. That is the case for Microsoft, Intel, and other firms. While foreigners possess assets worth 2,500 trillion dollars more than what the United States holds in the rest of the world, the income generated by these U.S. investments is greater than what the others earn in the United States: “Each dollar invested by an agent of the United States abroad brings in on average 8% (taking into account the depreciation of debts by inflation). By way of comparison, when a foreigner invests in the United States he receives on average 4%” (Duménil and Lévy (2003, 119n7; my translation). It is a conclusion U.S. experts draw themselves: “Between 1995 and 2004, the United States earned over \$200 billion in net foreign income despite current account deficits that totaled more than

\$3 trillion during this period” (Council of Economic Advisors 2006, 145).

The percentage of profits coming from abroad has been increasing the income of U.S. firms, as can be seen in table 12.

Table 12. Percentage of foreign profits in U.S. corporate profits 1960–2004

1960–1969	1970–1979	1980–1989	1990–1999	2000–2004
6.3	11.4	15.8	15.0	19.9

Source: Based on *The Economic Report of the President together with the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisors* (2006), 388.

In the 1960s, these foreign profits represented 6.3 percent of the total profits of U.S. firms. They were 11.4 percent in the 1970s, and then 15 percent in the 1980s. The stagnation of the 1990s was mostly due to stronger growth in the United States itself. However, as soon as the growth began to misfire, the share of foreign profits rose again, reaching nearly 20 percent in the latest years.

The United States is taking advantage of an international transfer of surplus value that boosts both its economy and the income and wealth of the richest capitalists. If U.S. growth since 1991 is judged exceptional, it is because it is based on the expansion of financial markets, foreign support, and the extortion of funds from the rest of the world. These sums could enable Third World countries or regions to develop, but they are generally used for luxury purposes by the rich people in the United States or to increase still further the wealth and financial power of this parasitic class.

To support this economic strength, the United States is acquiring military capacities far in excess of what is being done elsewhere. After a short period of reduction of its military budget, it relaunched the arms race at the end of the decade. The U.S. military budget today is almost half of the world’s military expenditures.

5. Globalization and ultra-imperialism

In 1916, Lenin defended the thesis of imperialism as opposed to Kautsky’s conceptions. In particular, he criticized the notion of ultra-imperialism developed by the latter. According to Kautsky, capitalist

competition would result in the creation of a single monopoly that would dominate the world and lead to an understanding among imperialist powers that would ensure this supremacy.

Lenin's criticism was scathing. He wrote:

Kautsky's theoretical analysis of imperialism, as well as his economic and political critique of imperialism, are permeated *through and through* with a spirit, absolutely irreconcilable with Marxism, of obscuring and glossing over the fundamental contradictions of imperialism and with a striving to preserve at all costs the crumbling unity with opportunism in the European working-class movement. (1964, 298)

Today similar ideas flourish among the theses on globalization. The most famous are those of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000). According to them, imperialism has been replaced by empire, which, in turn, is a global domination by the interests of a more or less unified ruling class. The United States is not the leader but the armed force. All states, including China, take part in this domination. War between imperialist powers is a thing of the past. Only police operations survive to punish refractory states or rebel peoples. The national-democratic revolution sets up a "nationalist" state which inevitably enters the framework of imperial domination. It would no longer be revolutionary. The working-class would no longer be the vanguard class of socialist revolution. These ideas circulate, in particular, in the antiglobalization movement, though not always in these cut-and-dried forms.

Like Lenin, eye to eye with Kautsky, we must criticize these points of view for they blur and tone down the most basic contradictions of our society.

In fact, unity and pacification among capitalists is never more than a façade. Competition between firms, between giants, is ferocious. The waves of mergers and acquisitions are the proof of that. Each firm tries to eliminate its competitors. Alain Minc, French management guru, describes this capitalist universe:

It is a war which is being waged, with its front, the battle for the big world positions, its breakthroughs, the big export

contracts, and its rear—the domestic market—as decisive as in all wars. This conflictual dimension of economic confrontation is not new, but it has become ever sharper from the moment the disappearance of growth reduced the size of the battlefield and increased at the same time the appetite of the actors, or rather their sense of survival. In this war, which does not dare say its name, mobilization is also, of course, decisive, and takes the form of the state-industrial complex. The vocabulary, the customs, the habits of the business world scarcely represent more than the courtesy code of the wars of the past, thin film of sociability that hides the brutality of the facts and the blows. (1982, 258)

The economic crisis and the development of financial markets sharpen, rather than blur, antagonisms. The need for returns and profitability is being imposed more strongly. The usual criterion for returns for these financial firms is 15 percent minimum. To achieve that, jobs have to be destroyed, competitors eliminated or absorbed. It is thus an intense competition that is being played out and not a tendency to pacification.

The imperialist states are led to defend their transnational corporations, and thus to enter into competition with one another, despite their apparent identity of views. This is clearly the case in the energy field, in defense, and in the conquest of space.

For instance, U.S. projects in the Middle East disturb European interests. The White House wants to establish its control over oil resources in order to have a lever that would prevent the emergence of a competing power. The United States is not very dependent on the Persian Gulf for its supplies. Only Saudi Arabia massively exports oil to it. On the other hand, the European Union depends much more on the Middle East and would like to bypass U.S. recommendations in order to increase this share, in particular, in countries considered to be untrustworthy by Washington, such as Iran, Syria, and Libya. For the United States, hegemony can be ensured by war and by declaring openly that it wants to reform the region according to its views. For the Europeans, a more supple policy must be developed, based on some concessions to the Arab population. These two orientations are not compatible in the long run.

It is the same with space policy. United States strategy is founded on the monopoly or exclusivity of the United States for all aspects of aircraft construction. The European Union for example, is developing a space industry in competition with that of the United States. It has roughly 33 percent of the market as opposed to 50 percent for the United States, and it clearly wishes to overtake the latter. Once again, the projects are not compatible. The aircraft industry is also directly connected to the state, which gives orders to the firms in the industry. Civil and military aspects are closely linked : Boeing and Airbus, which vie for first place in the construction of commercial aircraft, are also important manufacturers of military equipment.

The European plan to relaunch competitiveness in Europe is in conflict with that of the U.S. desire to remain the only hegemonic power and prevent any rival from emerging. From this point of view, the European Union, whether under liberal or social-democratic guise, does not represent an alternative to the imperialist domination of the United States. There can be no question of replacing one unbridled capitalism, that of the United States, by another that might be more civilized, that of Europe. It is a question of replacing one dominating hegemonic class by another. In the past, the European elite has already shown itself capable of the worst: colonialism, fascism, and Nazism, setting off two world wars.

Relations are not fixed. Today, the United States is ahead on every level. But what about in ten years' time? Can current U.S. economic growth continue? Will it not trigger off crises and crashes that will overthrow the present-day relations of forces?

In 1916, Lenin wrote, "Is it 'conceivable' that in ten or twenty years' time the relative strength of the imperialist powers will have remained unchanged? It is out of the question" (1964, 295). And in fact, twenty years ago the collapse of the USSR was unimaginable, as was the U.S. economic spurt in relation to Japan for instance.

6. The General crisis of capitalism

The present-day world imperialist globalization is built on a gigantic bomb. United States growth, which is the element

underlying imperialist arrogance, is dangerous, risky, parasitic, and disastrous on a human level.

On the economic level, the development of financial markets cannot exceed for long developments in the real economy. An adjustment is necessary, and it risks being a brutal one. In the same way, what is brought in from abroad, which today is crucial, creates a virtuous circle of rising consumption by U.S. households, pulling in imports. That, however, could rapidly turn into a vicious circle. A stock-market collapse could bring household consumption to a grinding halt. Households are currently in debt to the tune of 80% of the U.S. GDP, twice as much as the rate of indebtedness observed on the eve of the 1929 crash.

This growth is based on U.S. supremacy at economic, monetary, political, and military levels. It is thanks to that that the United States attracts the foreign capital it so badly needs. If this “confidence” in U.S. supremacy is shaken, it could stir international capitalists not to invest in Uncle Sam any longer, which would precipitate an economic crisis.

This is why the assertion of hegemony by Washington is necessary for U.S. growth and thus the control over strategic materials such as raw materials, oil, microprocessors, or the conquest of space. Hence the struggle against opponents or even independent countries; hence the obligation of almost all states to participate in globalization and its control by the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank; hence the necessity of waging military operations of control or punishment against rebel regions; hence the necessity also of unendingly enlarging markets for U.S. transnational corporations. On the one hand, the contradictions in the U.S. economic system push Washington to advance further the assertion of hegemony, without which economic supremacy risks being put in question, and with it put in danger the income and wealth of the U.S. bourgeoisie. On the other hand, this is contrary to the entire development of the twentieth century up to 1990—decolonization and the assertion of independence by the different states of the Third World. This is also contrary to the will and organizational capacity of the people to resist. A multipolar and pluralist world, resulting from centuries

old aspirations of the populations of the world, is developing and runs counter to the unilateral hegemonic ambition of the United States.

From that point of view, Washington sees in China the enemy number one of its ambitions. It is opposed in particular to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, which ensures the orientation of China to a socialist road. Washington is also worried by the scale of Chinese development. On the basis of current growth differentials, China could overtake the United States in terms of GDP between 2030 and 2040. Chinese growth is therefore superior to that of the United States, which is also true of its Asian neighbors, with which China is also linked. Chinese development and the concomitant development of Asia could mean that there would be a zone—most important in terms of population and economic growth—that would escape U.S. control. For the White House this would be unbearable.

This capitalist economic growth of which the United States is the center is unstable. The hegemonic will of the United States, linked to this growth, comes up against the will of peoples to develop in a free and independent way, allowing them (and not a handful of shareholders of U.S. transnational corporations) to benefit. The United States sees in China first a socialist power, then the competitor that it is trying by all means to prevent from emerging. All these elements, linked to imperialism and characterizing present-day globalization, make the world profoundly unstable and can result in ever more violent wars spreading over the whole planet.

7. Conclusions

Lenin explained that world war was the consequence of imperialist policies. This fact, he added, indicates more than anything else that the capitalist system is condemned by history, that the impossibility of escaping this tendency—except by the setting off of socialist revolutions preventing the warlike tendencies of capitalism coming to their term—indicated that this system was plunged in an inexorable crisis, a general crisis incorporating all aspects, economic, political, and ideological. “Imperialism is the

eve of the social revolution of the proletariat,” he wrote in the preface to this essential work (1964, 194).

Today, after the years of triumphant capitalism that followed the victory of the counterrevolution in the USSR, we should return to these fundamental Marxist analyses, which are more relevant than ever.

Presented at the First Forum of the World Association for Political Economy, “Economic Globalization and Modern Marxist Economics,” Shanghai, 2–3 April 2006.

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NOTES

1. We could also consider this question from the example of Third World debt, which is chargeable to local populations and which also benefits imperialist financial centers by international transfer of surplus value.

2. To be allowed to supply the Pentagon, a firm must be either a U.S. firm or be on a favored list of “friendly” nations, such as Britain, Canada, or Australia.

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A New Marxist Neoclassical Modeling of Capitalism

Hiroshi Ohnishi

What was “socialism”?

A most important problem for us is to understand so-called “socialism” that existed in the Soviet Union before 1991 and in Eastern Europe before 1989. Or in other words, was their collapse the end of socialism? Without answering this question, we Marxists cannot say anything, and I answered this question clearly soon after the collapse (Ohnishi 1992).

My answer was that that collapse was a progression from state capitalism to private capitalism (or market capitalism), because state-led capital accumulation is quite general in the world, as is shown in table 1—that is, state capitalism in Japan before 1945, in Germany before 1945, in Indonesia before 1967, in Egypt before 1970, in the Soviet Union before 1991, in India before 1991, and in China before 1978. And all of these countries became private capitalist after these years. Although there were some differences among them, Japan, Germany, Indonesia, Egypt, India, China, and the Soviet Union all accumulated capital more rapidly than during the period of private-capitalism. This was clear in the USSR and was shown to be the case in China by Chow (1993).

Some people may insist that England and the United States did not have this type of state capitalism. In regard to England, we should

note that the English government used the second enclosure period to help its new entrepreneur class push out peasants from the land. And also, its first version of the Factory Act enabled the capitalists to force workers to work longer. In these two instances, the role of the state was entirely the same as in state capitalism.

The same can be said in regard to the United States. I think that its slavery system in the nineteenth century had precisely the same role as state capitalism, and that system was, of course,

Table 1. Two Stages of Capitalism and Their Leading Political Parties

	State Capitalism	Turning Point	Private Capitalism
Japan	Taiseiyokusankai	1945	LDP
Germany	National Socialist (Nazi)	1945	CDU
Indonesia	National Party (Sukarno)	1967	Gorkal (Suharto)
Egypt	Nassar	1970	Sadat
China	CPC (Mao)	1978	CPC (Deng)
Russia	CPSU	1991	Yeltsin
India	National Congress (Nehru)	1991	National Congress (Rao)

maintained by a series of state laws. Furthermore, several governmental intervention policies prepared for market-oriented economic development in the later periods.

What is “capitalism”?

To confirm the above understanding, however, we should redefine *capitalism*, because we cannot use the term *state capitalism* without knowing what capitalism is. Therefore, in this section, I will explain my understanding of *capitalism* as clearly based on its technological foundation, because *capitalism* or *socialism* are categories of historical materialism.

First, let me explain *feudalism* in order to identify *capitalism* from its predecessor society. In my opinion, the society that

preceded the industrial revolution did not have any *machines*; it had only *tools*, and the craftspeople made different kinds of products by using the same kind of tools. If so, what was the source of this difference? I think the difference came from the difference in skill, and in this sense the most important task for that type of society was to upgrade the skill on the national level. A seniority system was introduced for this purpose, because senior craftspeople were more skilled and productive. Under this system, craftspeople could work in same workshops through their lifetimes and bring their skill to a high level. Under this condition, human relationships became an apprenticeship that was translated into philosophy as Confucianism.

This was not the only necessary characteristic of that society. Another characteristic was the limited size of the workshops, because a large number of craftspeople could not learn from one master in one workshop. This was a characteristic of the type of skills employed. Modern types of skill can be taught in a large class, but the feudal type of skill was hidden and could be learned only by closely observing and imitating the masters' methods. Therefore, the markets of that society had to be divided town by town in order to restrict the size of workshops. That system was the guild system.

All these necessities, however, were lost after the industrial revolution because of appearance of the machine. In this new society, quality and quantity of products are decided by quality and quantity of machine, and workers become unskilled appendages. And the most important change from the former system was the weak bargaining power of the workers in relation to the capitalists, because now the capitalists can gather unskilled workers easily from labor market. Anyone in labor market is now able to replace workers in the factories.

In this situation, workers' wages become lower and profits grow higher; the greater part of the profits are reinvested and the number of machines increases. In the wake of the industrial revolution, the increase in the number of machines leads to an increase in the quantity of products, so that this reinvestment means economic development. This is the capitalist way of economic development!

At this point, we should consider some questions. The first one concerns our attitude toward capitalism—that is, we are not criticizing capitalism, but just explaining why we need capitalism after the industrial revolution. In other words, when capitalism should be introduced, capitalism should be introduced by Marxists. It is entirely same as the fact when socialism should be introduced, socialism should be introduced by Marxists. This must be the only attitude that true Marxists should have on this problem.

Second, this understanding is very historical and materialistic, because in my framework technologies decide superstructures and they change historically. I think that even if my understanding is very different from existing type of Marxist understanding, “historical” and “materialistic” are the most decisive characteristics, and so my understanding must then be a Marxist understanding.

Third, my understanding about the society after the industrial revolution is that it is properly called *capitalism*, because capital is the primary feature of this society, and the entire social system is oriented on furthering the accumulation of capital. For example, Protestantism served this purpose in the Western world, while Confucianism and Buddhism were changed for same reason in the Edo era in Japan. The national governments moulded the educational system to satisfy different types of needs in the modern era, and gathered the social surplus in order to build social infrastructures.

Neoclassical way of modeling capitalism

As I already mentioned, this understanding of capitalism can be understood as a kind of Marxist understanding. However, same understanding also can be understood by a neoclassical type of model. By showing it, I would like to confirm and strengthen our understanding. To do so, I will first formalize an economy by the following two production functions.¹

$$Y(t) = [s(t)L]^{1-\alpha} K(t)^\alpha \quad (1)$$

$$\dot{K}(t) = [1 - s(t)]L \quad (2)$$

Here, Y , K , L , s , and α respectively express the production of consumption goods, capital stock, total labor, ratio of total

labor used for production of consumption goods, and capital share. Note that s can be understood as the share for people in the short term, and $1-s$ can be understood as the share for capital. We assume constant return to scale in the production function of consumption goods. Here, this economy maximizes its total utility² by maximizing consumption during an unlimited period—that is:

$$\max \quad U = \int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} \log Y(t) \quad (3)$$

$$\text{s. t.} \quad \dot{K}(t) = [1 - s(t)]L \quad (4)^3$$

Here, ρ represents the time preference of a representative individual. Solutions of this maximization problem can be expressed by figures 1 and 2. As is shown in figure 2, the optimal ratio (we can interpret it as a savings or investment ratio) of total labor used for production goods has jumped at the time of the industrial revolution,⁴ because capital accumulation was of no use before the industrial revolution and became critical after that. This ratio then becomes smaller gradually, and ultimately it falls almost to zero (ignoring depreciation) when the capital-labor ratio reaches its ultimate equilibrium value. Therefore, in the feudal era, we could use all the labor for near-term consumption, not for capital, but after that, and until its ultimate value is reached, we should immediately give up consumption at the maximum level and accumulate capital as in the capitalist era. This era should continue until we reach the next era, which can be called *postcapitalism* or *communist*.




Fig. 1 Growth Path of Capital: Labor Ratio” after the Industrial Revolution.




Fig. 2 Optimal Growth Path of “Saving Ratio” after the Industrial Revolution

Furthermore, we have to note that our model keeps not only historical materialism, but also the labor theory of value and the surplus-value theory of Marx in the following way.

First, our model expresses the economy as an optimal round-about production system using machines. The word “optimal” means maximizing the amount of production by the same labor, or, in other words, minimizing the necessary labor to produce the same amount of goods. So here the only measurement of the production is labor.

To explain this, we give the following example. Assume four kinds of technologies producing the quantity of products;

The first technology combines zero machines with 1000 hours human labor,

The second technology combines 5 machines with 200 hours human labor,

The third technology combines 10 machines with 50 hours human labor,

The fourth technology combines 20 machines with 20 hours human labor.

Note that these four technologies produce the same amount of products. And then, if we assume again that one machine can be

produced by ten hours human labor, the total labor needed in the above four technologies is:

$$\begin{aligned} 0 \times 10 + 1000 &= 1000 \text{ hours in the first technology,} \\ 5 \times 10 + 200 &= 250 \text{ hours in the second technology,} \\ 10 \times 10 + 50 &= 150 \text{ hours in the third technology,} \\ 20 \times 10 + 20 &= 220 \text{ hours in the fourth technology.} \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the third technology should be chosen by society in order to minimize the labor needed to produce the same amount of goods (in this sense, we can call it the *optimal capital-labor ratio*, and we should recognize that the only measurement here is labor. This is a labor theory of value.

In practice, however, reaching this final goal is not easy, because the needed capital accumulation for the third technology is huge and requires more than one-year total production labor time. Therefore, society should spend enough time to reach this point, going through the path that should be calculated by the time preference ρ . It is the “optimal path” to the ultimate goal, and in this sense, we can identify how long we need to reach it; in other words, how long we should remain in the capitalist era. In my opinion, because this part of national products for this capital accumulation serves capital, and not people directly, this part can be understood as exploitation of workers by capital. As I already mentioned, this exploitation can be justified in the wider sense of historical materialism, because it serves the people in the long run. At least, by this understanding, we can expand the labor theory of value into a historical perspective, and can define *exploitation* quite differently from an older type of Marxism.

Asset disparity and “exploitation” in our dynamic model

This model, however, is not enough to express very important social relations between the rich and poor. Strictly speaking, in our model, “exploitation” is understood as the investment ratio in the GDP or a measure of the labor used for capital accumulation in the sense that this part is not used directly for the people’s living needs. According to this understanding, we could consider an equalitarian society such as the former Soviet Union and Mao’s era in China as exploitative, because capital did exploit people

in these societies. In reality, however, our society usually has a disparity of income or assets among people, and this disparity gives the rich a social status enabling them to exploit the poor and others. We understand this as exploitation not by “capital” but by “capitalists.”

This type of exploitation has been well-defined on the basis of analytical Marxism by the Japanese Marxist Shuhei Mizuchi (1984). He maintained that under the technology of diminishing returns of capital transfer, the transfer of capital from the rich to the poor generates much production, and that this transfer is usually done as a kind of lease by the rich to the poor. Here, this word *lease* means not only lease itself but also employment for wages, because the only difference between lease itself and employment for wages is the place where the poor works, or in other words, where the machines operate.

One example of this lease contract is shown in table 2. Here in table 2 four units of capital are leased to the poor by the rich,

Table 2 Lease Contract between the Rich and the Poor and the Change of Production

	The Rich			The Poor			The Whole Society		
	capital	labor	production	capital	labor	production	capital	labor	production
Initial holding	10	1	3	2	1	1	12	2	4
After lease	6	1	2.5	6	1	2.5	12	2	5

and by this lease contract, the capital-labor ratio of both sides becomes equal. This is the optimal for the whole society under this technology, but the problem is who can take the surplus that is made by this exchange. Analytical Marxists assumed that all of this surplus will be taken by the rich, because they are stronger than the poor, and they defined the acquisition of this surplus as exploitation by the capitalist.

Therefore, we have to research the dynamic path of these two classes in our model, which is expanded to a two-class model. Our basic conclusion (see Ohnishi 2005) is that in the long run this asset disparity will finally disappear as the result of the asset accumulation by the poor; both the lease and the exploitation will be terminated because this disparity is the precondition of the lease contract. Therefore, when we reach the stage of the optimal capital-labor ratio, capitalism will end, and at the same time, all of rich-and-poor disparity, wage labor, and exploitation will be terminated.

Exceptional case of persistent disparity, exploitation, and overaccumulation

Strictly speaking, however, under some conditions, such asset disparity cannot disappear, and so, wage labor and exploitation continue to exist. One condition is somewhat complicated, because it needs many subconditions. First, the entire surplus produced by the lease contract is taken by the rich. Second, there is no depreciation. Third, there is no capital market in which the rich can sell their capital to the poor. Fourth, the rich do not have long-term rational expectations. Under these conditions, even if the rich have already reached their final goal, they can make a lease contract with the poor and appropriate the surplus, maximizing it—the greater the capital accumulation the better. Therefore, their capital asset will be above the optimal capital-labor ratio. On the other hand, the poor continue to accumulate capital until they arrive at the optimal capital-labor ratio. Thus the capital-labor ratio of the entire society will be greater than the optimal ratio. I call it *overaccumulation*. We have to note two points about this condition.

If, however, we focus on this possibility, we can find some method to avoid this overaccumulation. For example, the social-democratic program for a welfare state or progressive taxation is a way to increase consumption and restrain investment. Another way is for the trade unions to demand part of surplus produced by the lease contract, This sharing weakens the incentives of the rich to invest. These ways can be understood as non-Marxist ways,

because they do not terminate exploitation itself. However, Marx wanted to terminate exploitation by confiscating the capitalist's property directly.

In my opinion, confiscation of the capitalist's property is not realistic today and, therefore, we have to find another way. My proposal is to establish a capital market for the rich to obtain capital. This is the way to satisfy the conditions that lead to the simultaneous approach to the optimal capital-labor ratio by both the rich and the poor. We could find this way by careful research.

One more point that we have to note here is that our way also eliminates exploitation itself, and in this sense, it can be regarded as a Marxist path. In Japan, we have many scholars who do not think Marx's path was always confiscation. Actually, Marx anticipated the future growth of stock companies, which is also a neoclassical path, as is our model. Is this accidental or not?

Presented at the First Forum of the World Association for Political Economy, "Economic Globalization and Modern Marxist Economics," Shanghai, 2-3 April 2006.

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NOTES

1. This type of formalization was established by Yamashita and Ohnishi (2005).

2. It is assumed that instantaneous utility is logarithm of Y .

3. Even if some capitals are used to make machines, we can neglect such capitals. It is because $(1-s)$ part of total labor is used in equation (4) totally, that is directly and indirectly.

4. We assumed α had jumped from 0 to a certain value (larger than 0 and smaller than 1).

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MARXIST FORUM

A front-page story in the Kolkata (formerly Calcutta) newspaper *The Telegraph* on 4 January 2007 was headlined “False alarm sparks clash.” The story describes pitched battles between a 3,000-strong crowd and police at the village of Nandigram in the Indian state of West Bengal after word spread that the authorities had convened a meeting of the local village council to inform it that land acquisition for a special economic zone by an Indonesian conglomerate was to begin. The meeting, however, had nothing to do with land acquisition. It was called to declare the area a “clean village,” a designation indicating that all households have toilet facilities.

The police, however, did not succeed in ending the clash. Several people were killed, vehicles burned, roads dug up. Nandigram and several other villages in the area were taken over by the Trinamul Congress, the main opposition party to the Left Front government. The supporters of the Trinamul Congress were joined by Naxilite (Maoists) groups in violence against members of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), evicting them from the villages and denying access to representatives of the state government. Further violence, with many deaths, occurred on 14 March 2007, when police attempted to restore order in the villages. Some of the Left Front coalition partners of the CPI(M) were critical of the level of force used by the police. The tension continued through November. By December, the district was returning to normalcy.

The state of West Bengal has been governed some thirty years by a Left Front coalition. The political groups that make up the coalition and the share of votes they received in the 2006 elections to the West Bengal Legislative Assembly are: Communist Party of India (Marxist) 36.9%; Communist Party of India, 2.1%; All India Forward Block, 5.7%; and the Revolutionary Socialist Party (3.7).

In this Marxist Forum section, we reproduce a memorandum presented on 9 November 2007 to the governor of West Bengal by a delegation of members of parliament and the state legislative assembly from the Communist Party of India (Marxist). Following that is an appeal about the Nandigram situation by Noam Chomsky and other progressive intellectuals. We end this section with an article summarizing the results of three decades of Left Front rule in West Bengal.

Memorandum on the Nandigram Situation

Presented on 9 November 2007 to the governor of West Bengal by a five-person delegation consisting of members of the parliament and state legislative assembly from the Communist Party of India (Marxist).

An asterisk marks terms explained in the glossary on page 498

We would like to draw your attention to the developments that have taken place at Nandigram and its surrounding areas over the past eleven months, and the consequences thereof.

1. From the beginning of 2007, a large number of people have been put to a great deal of distress. The train of events started on January 3 when a meeting in progress at the Kalicharanpur Gram Panchayat,* for declaration of a Nirmal Gram,* was misconstrued deliberately by the Trinamul Congress* leadership as a plan to take over land for a proposed chemical hub. An attacking gang of the Trinamul Congress and the Naxalites,* the broke up the Panchayat meeting and chased away government officials, set on fire police vehicles, and ransacked houses of CPI(M) supporters nearby. This set the pattern of things to develop over the next ten months.

2. From the evening of January 3, houses of CPI(M) supporters were attacked by an organisation called the Bhumi Ucched Pratirodh Samity (BUPS) or the so-called “committee to prevent eviction from land” that was set up and run by the Trinamul Congress and its allies the Naxalites, and the SUCI* with outside support declared by the local units of the Congress and the BJP.*

3. Since the night of the January 3, the entire area of Nandigram and its surrounding localities were forcefully taken over by the

armed gangs of the BUPS and the Trinamul Congress and they allowed only their writ to run, they would not allow either the police or the civil administration any entry. This was the time when they aligned themselves with the armed Maoists from Jharkhand and Orissa to enter the area.

4. Bridges were destroyed, culverts were broken up, all roads leading onto and out of Nandigram were slashed up, and Nandigram was declared a “liberated zone” where the state government would not be allowed entry.

5. A large amount of explosives and a large number of guns by then had been sneaked into Nandigram and they were distributed to a large number of goons and anti-socials who swore allegiance to the Trinamul Congress, the Naxalites, and the SUCI under the garb and guise of the BUPS. Ostensibly, the violent “movement” was to “prevent the LF* government from acquiring land for a chemical hub project,” which was a lie.

6. Bengal chief minister declared in a huge CPI(M) rally at Khejuri in February that the LF government had not issued any notice at all for any such acquisition of land for any such project that would include Nandigram and its surrounds. However, the violence was continued by the Trinamul Congress and its allies.

7. On the morning of March 14, a police firing had to be resorted to when violence was let loose by the Trinamul Congress and its allies. Bengal Left Front chairman and Bengal chief minister both expressed regret at the incident and called for peace.

8. Specific targets have been made of the CPI(M) workers, and supporters and their houses were looted and then set on fire, forcing them to leave hearth-and-home and take refuge in the miserable conditions of relief camps that were set up on an emergency basis. Even the relief camps have since then been routinely attacked, and the refugees prevented from going back to their villages.

9. The Trinamul Congress now joined by cadres of the Maoists ejected at gunpoint hundreds of people every day from Nandigram villages and from surrounding areas. At present more than 3,500 people are rendered refugees in their own homeland. 1,500 live in the inadequacies of relief camps and the rest have found shelter in houses of relatives away from Nandigram. Men,

women, and children are not able to lead a normal life and are terror-struck.

10. What is criminal in intent are the acts of commission by the Trinamul Congress and its allies even after the Bengal chief minister again clearly declared subsequently in September that there was no plan to set up a chemical hub at Nandigram and that the desolate sandhead at the mouth of the River Ganges called Nayachar has been selected for the chemical hub extending from Haldia.

11. In the meanwhile, more and more attacks have been organised on the CPI(M) workers and CPI(M) supporters. Until date, 13 more CPI (M) supporters have been done to death. Women have been raped and killed. Cattle, poultry, and fishes poisoned. Stocks of cereals, vegetables, food stuff looted. A business is run by the Trinamul Congress and the Maoists (under the cover of the BUPS) where funds are extracted from the villagers before allowing them to till the land and harvest crops, or to run shops.

12. Every kind of developmental work was brought to a standstill. 15,000 children could not take doses of pulse polio. Rs 2 crore* worth of health infrastructural work had to be abandoned. The health centres and the subsidiary health centres virtually could not function. Rs 2 crore worth of electrification could not be done. With no developmental work allowed by the Trinamul Congress-Maoists, the future of development even next year looks bleak with the inability of the district administration to produce utilisation certificates for funds allocated and not used.

13. The CPI (Maoist) has added a violent dimension to the imbroglio at Nandigram. They have brought in groups of armed and trained action forces from outside of Nandigram, even outside of the two Midnapores, east, and west from Jharkhand and Orissa. They have coordinated efforts with the Trinamul Congress setting up joint commands at Nandigram and surrounding areas. The action is coordinated by Ranjit Pal of the Maoists (the self-declared killer of JMM MP Sunil Mahato), and Subhendu Adhikari of the Trinamul Congress. Three landmine bursts have occurred recently killing two CPI(M) supporters and it is apprehended that many more landmines have been planted in and around Nandigram.

The Maoists control a large tract of land from Garchakraberia to Sonachura. The *DNA* of Mumbai and the national daily *Economic Times* (copies enclosed) have carried the details of the Maoist plans of action very recently.

14. To fund the armed activities the Trinamul Congress and the Maoists have stolen a huge quantity of products from the Burn Standard factory at Jellingham and sold them in localities of south 24 Parganas. They also cut down and illegally sold a large number of prime and valuable trees. In both instances, the criminal were caught and they confessed to the crimes.

15. The need of the hour is peace and development. The Bengal chief minister has already briefed the media about the outcome of a meeting between the district administration and the BUPS led by the Trinamul Congress where it was agreed that the remaining concerned police officers would be transferred, cases lodged withdrawn, and payment compensation to victims fixed. In return, refugees living in the unhealthy conditions of the relief camps would be allowed a safe return. To this, the Trinamul Congress, and the BUPS agreed but later did not allow the refugees to go back to their villages.

16. The Trinamul Congress leadership has recently declared publicly at a rally at Riyapara that anyone willing to live at Nandigram shall have to become a member of the Trinamul Congress or else will be either killed or ousted. In attacking the CPI(M) office there, the miscreants also tore down and burnt two Red Flags.

17. A violent turn of events occurred soon after. Following the attack on the Riyapara office of the CPI(M), the combined forces of the Trinamul Congress, the BUPS, and the Maoists crossed a canal on November 5, entered into newer areas, a process they have started during the festival season, and threatened to do away with relief camps. People in the relief camps have had a very miserable time for the past eleven months.

18. You may kindly recall that the destitute people of Nandigram who were driven out from home-and-hearth had met you earlier in deputation (copy enclosed) communicating to you the misery they faced at the relief camps.

19. They could take it no longer. In utter desperation and braving bullets and bombs, they with the help of the people in the nearby areas came out of the camps and marched peacefully towards their home villages.

20. Bengal Left Front has issued a specific appeal for peace and for the safe and secure return to villages of all people living outside of them, irrespective of political affiliation. The men, women, and children are to be ensured a safe rehabilitation. The Left Front has also called upon the people of Nandigram to cooperate with the police and the civil administration to help establish peace and ensure a new beginning for the stalled works of development. There should not be allowed any instance of retaliation.

21. The state administration has recently reiterated what the chief minister told the media earlier. The package announced include compensation for the victims, shifting of the remaining police officers, punishment for the guilty, withdrawal of cases, and providing relief to the distressed people. The police will with permission of the concerned political parties enter the Nandigram zone and set up police camps to begin the peace process.

22. Out of fear, some villagers have very recently left their places, and have taken shelter in the Nandigram police station and a nearby school. A section of them has already gone back to their villages after assurance of safety and security by the erstwhile and returned refugees.

23. Currently, peace talks have been initiated at the lower level and the concerned political parties have agreed that they want to restore normalcy and allow to the setting up of police camps. If there is no interference from above, everything will be normal very soon.

24. Peace negotiations have commenced at the level of the district administration with participation of political parties. Negotiations can be continued with the BUPS and the Trinamul Congress but cannot be organised with the CPI (Maoist) for the latter has been the propagators of an intense violence taking the shelter of the Trinamul Congress and the BUPS.

Chomsky and Other Intellectuals on Nandigram

To Our Friends in Bengal:

News travels to us that events in West Bengal have overtaken the optimism that some of us have experienced during trips to the state. We are concerned about the rancor that has divided the public space, created what appear to be unbridgeable gaps between people who share similar values. It is this that distresses us. We hear from people on both sides of this chasm, and we are trying to make some sense of the events and the dynamics. Obviously, our distance prevents us from saying anything definitive. We continue to trust that the people of Bengal will not allow their differences on some issues to tear apart the important experiments undertaken in the state (land reforms, local self-government).

We send our fullest solidarity to the peasants who have been forcibly dispossessed. We understand that the government has promised not to build a chemical hub in the area around Nandigram. We understand that those who had been dispossessed by the violence are now being allowed back to their homes, without recrimination. We understand that there is now talk of reconciliation. This is what we favor.

The balance of forces in the world is such that it would be impetuous to split the Left. We are faced with a world power that has demolished one state (Iraq) and is now threatening another (Iran). This is not the time for division when the basis of division no longer appears to exist.

Signed: Noam Chomsky, Tariq Ali, Howard Zinn, Susan George, Victoria Brittain, Walden Bello, Mahmood Mamdani, Akeel Bilgrami, Richard Falk, Jean Bricmont, Michael Albert, Stephen Shalom, Charles Derber and Vijay Prashad.

Reprinted from People's Democracy, 18 November 2007.

Nature, Society, and Thought, vol. 19, no. 4 (2006)

Three Decades of Left Front Rule in Bengal

Prabhat Patnaik

An asterisk marks terms explained in the glossary on page 498.

The Left Front's completion of three decades in office in West Bengal by winning every single popular election since 1977 naturally raises the question: how has this been possible? A phenomenon such as this does not belong to the realm of the "small change of politics" (to use BTR's* phrase). It can occur only under certain specific historical circumstances, namely when the political formation in question comes to power in the midst of an acute social crisis and is successful in leading society out of that crisis. And this is exactly what the Left Front in West Bengal has done.

The acute social crisis that had come to a head in West Bengal in the mid-seventies can be traced back to its colonial past. Bengal was the first region in India to be colonised by the British and faced the massive impact of the drain of wealth that began immediately after Plassey.* This impact, whose manifestations were de-industrialisation, impoverishment of the people, and a string of famines, which lasted almost till the end of British rule, also altered the structure of the economy in crucial ways. The Permanent Settlement of 1793, a mechanism erected for effecting the drain, did not just create a class of parasitic intermediaries. It also entailed an almost total absence of investment by the colonial rulers in irrigation or the agricultural sector (since such investment yielded no additional revenues to them). This,

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in the context of the acute pressure of population on land that de-industrialisation generated, meant agricultural stagnation, and an intense exploitation of the peasantry through rack-renting. The abysmal state of the peasantry worsened further in the period of the Great Depression when the decline in the terms of trade greatly increased peasant indebtedness and loss of land. Even though sporadic efforts had been made to provide some succour to the peasantry before independence (for instance by the Fazlul Haq ministry), the situation continued to remain grim. The last straw was the huge burden of financing Britain's war against Japan, which was unjustly put on India as a whole but affected Bengal to the greatest extent, trebling the price of rice in less than two years and resulting in three million famine deaths with another half a million rural households being reduced to beggary.

Roots of social crisis

The post-independence land reforms of the Congress government, even though they broke the power of the erstwhile zamindars,* succeeded only in strengthening the class of jotedars* which had come up just below this layer and had become the real centre of local power even before the end of the colonial era. No doubt some rich peasants moved up into the category of owners from that of tenants, but the bulk of the toiling peasantry remained steeped in misery. And once the easy prospects of increasing cropping intensity had got exhausted by the end of the fifties, the agrarian crisis resurfaced in all its old ferocity, to a point where it was almost taken for granted by scholars, both in India and abroad, that Bengal had reached an agrarian impasse.

The industrial front too presented a cheerless picture. Old industries like jute which had come up in the colonial era faced bleak prospects. The engineering industry, which had surfaced towards the end of the colonial era and prospered for a while on the basis of catering to government orders, especially of the railways, went into terminal illness with the mid-sixties recession which marked the end of the era of active public investing. The Freight Equalisation Scheme ensured that the edge that Bengal would normally have enjoyed in a whole range of new industries

because of proximity to coal and iron ore reserves, got blunted. For all these reasons, in the case of industry too, as in agriculture, it appeared to be the end of the road for Bengal.

The social crisis was born out of this impasse. The peasantry was mired in poverty and stagnation, with little prospects for improving its position; the working class, employed largely in industries which were declining, faced unemployment and ruin; and the urban middle class faced bleak job prospects. The situation was explosive, and yet attempts by revolutionary extremists to change the situation by force came a cropper. The bourgeois-landlord State sought to control the situation through semi-fascist terror, for which Left extremism provided it with an excuse. It unleashed this terror against the CPI(M) which lost nearly 1200 cadres over a short span of time.

Historical contribution

The terror in West Bengal provided the backdrop to Indira Gandhi's infamous Emergency rule, which it preceded and merged into. But the net result of this terror was only to keep the social crisis simmering below the surface. Or to put it differently, on top of the basic social crisis which remained unresolved, West Bengal experienced additionally the impact of Left extremist and semi-fascist violence. It could neither move forward to a revolution, nor carry on in the old way. It was caught in a logjam. The Left Front government which came to power in 1977 broke this logjam; and therein lay its real historical contribution, because of which it has remained dear to the hearts of the people of the state for so long.

In the countryside, it broke the social power of the jotedars. Operation Barga recorded unregistered tenants and thereby gave a legal status to the sharecroppers who until then had been at the complete mercy of the landlords. In fact the term "sharecropper" is a misnomer, since it suggests as if he received a fixed share of the crop; instead, it was typically the landlords' men who harvested the crop and handed over a pittance to the bargadar who had done the actual cultivating. The Left Front government promulgated a simple rule: whoever cultivated the land was alone entitled to harvest the crop. The harvest therefore went into the

bargadar's possession in the first place, and it was he who then handed over the landlord's share, against a receipt. This increased the tenant's income. In addition, by assuring him of a fixed share of the produce, it increased the tenant's incentive to introduce better agricultural practices and increase output. Moreover, the receipt obtained from the landlord, since it indicated that the tenant had some right over the land, also acted as a collateral for obtaining credit. This improvement in the tenants' position, together with the distribution of ceiling-surplus land,* brought about a change in the correlation of class forces in the countryside which formed the basis for an agricultural revival.

At the same time public investment in agriculture, especially in irrigation, was stepped up greatly. Given the skewed distribution of fiscal resources between the centre and the states, and the centre's propensity to treat the magnitude of total devolution of resources to the states and their inter se [among themselves] distribution across states, as matters over which it had absolute discretion, the West Bengal government faced severe fiscal punishment for the political sin of being Left. But it fought back vigorously. It championed the rights of the states against the centralisation of fiscal resources and powers, and united state governments to carry forward the fight for a genuinely federal structure. At the same time, notwithstanding the acute fiscal difficulties into which it had been pushed, it ensured substantial increases in plan outlays.

The combination of land reforms and increased public investment in the countryside, made West Bengal, for the decade of the 1980s, the state with the highest rate of growth in agricultural output. During the neo-liberal nineties, agricultural growth declined everywhere in the country, but even so West Bengal's performance was relatively better. This agricultural revival, and the general re-fashioning of the West Bengal countryside, occurred within a whole new set of institutions, the panchayats, where again West Bengal was a pioneer in the country. Panchayati raj,* which until then had been a virtually defunct concept, retained by the Congress government in its official documents largely in deference to the Mahatma's memory, was given a whole new life

and became, under a Marxist dispensation, a powerful instrument of democratic decentralisation.

The agricultural revival put purchasing power in the hands of the peasants and labourers and enlarged the domestic rural market, which in turn stimulated significant rural industrialisation. To this was added a whole new set of initiatives on the part of the state government to enlarge the modern industrial base of the state. With the big bourgeoisie chary of investing in West Bengal, these initiatives entrusted the public sector with a leading role, of which the Haldia petrochemical complex, the most ambitious industrial project completed in the state to date, was a direct off-shoot.

Challenge posed by neoliberalism

The adoption of neo-liberal policies at the centre since 1991 has become a major constraint on the Left Front's pursuit of its old development trajectory. A central feature of that trajectory was active government intervention and investment; but neo-liberalism wants a "withdrawal of the State" (a euphemism for State intervention confining itself to providing "incentives" to domestic and foreign monopolists and financiers). The Left Front government had energised agriculture by freeing the peasantry from jotedar hegemony, by using the government to succour the peasantry against landlords, something which the Nehruvians had only planned on paper but never succeeded in doing; but neo-liberalism wants the peasants to be left to the mercy of the "market forces" which means being hegemonised by corporate capital making encroachments into the agricultural sector. The Left Front government had given the public sector a prominent role (and has had remarkable success even of late in reviving public sector units); but neo-liberalism wants the State only to promote private corporate capital, both domestic and foreign, through the so-called "public-private partnerships". The Left Front government had stepped up plan outlays significantly; but neo-liberalism forces expenditure deflation on the State, including on state governments, through inter alia the so-called fiscal responsibility legislation (which West Bengal has held out against till now). In short, neo-liberalism poses a major challenge for the

pursuit of a Left development strategy at the state level, such as underlay the remarkable success of the Left Front government. This challenge however has to be met and overcome. There are still enough possibilities within the system which can be used. For instance, the Central Sector Schemes (which the centre itself formulates on the implicit assumption that they would remain unutilised) can be fully utilised to the benefit of the poor. A bold and imaginative fiscal effort can be made, which can frustrate the neo-liberal policy of imposing expenditure deflation on state governments. The public sector can be brought back as a counter-weight to private corporate capital, by converting even small budgetary resources into large investible funds through imaginative methods of financial leveraging. This counter-weight can be used to place a clear limit on the extent to which the state government can accommodate the demands of would-be private investors, and to specify clear criteria, protective of the interests of the basic classes against corporate encroachment, on the basis of which alone approval can be given to such investors. In short, the scope still exists to ensure that neo-liberalism's attempt to derail the Left from its established development trajectory, to coerce it into accepting a neo-liberal trajectory instead, and to force it to adopt measures that would drive a wedge between itself and the basic classes on whose support the Left subsists, does not succeed. The Left Front government which has successfully waged many a battle will no doubt emerge triumphant from this one too.

Reprinted from *People's Democracy*, 24 July 2007.

GLOSSARY

Bargadar: a sharecropper

BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party—right-wing Hindu nationalist party

BTR: Bhalchandra Trimbak Ranadive (1904–1990)—a leading figure in the Communist movement in India

BUPS: Bhumi Ucched Pratirodh Samity (Committee to Prevent Eviction from Land)

Ceiling-surplus land: land in excess of a ceiling on the amount that an individual, family, or body can own

CPI(M): Communist Party of India (Marxist)

Crore: ten million—Rs 3 crore equals 30 million rupees (about \$762,000)

DNA: *Daily News and Analysis*—a Mumbai newspaper

Gram: village

Gram Nirmal: clean village—denotes village in which all households have access to toilet facilities

Jotedar: big landowner

LF: Left Front—governing coalition in West Bengal consisting of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), Communist Party of India, Forward Block, and Revolutionary Socialist Party; the *CPI(M)* is by far the largest party in West Bengal

Panchayat see Panchayat: raj

Panchayat raj: A three-tier system of decentralized democratic rural self-government on the district, block, and village level.

Plassey: British rule is considered to have begun 1757 when armed units of the East India Company defeated Indian forces at the village of Plassey

Rs: rupees

SUCI: Socialist Unity Centre of India—A party that considers itself continuers of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Zedong and opposes the Left Front government of West Bengal

Trinamul Congress: main opposition party to the Left Front government of West Bengal

Naxalites: members of a number of several Maoist oriented groups generally committed to armed struggle.

Zanindar: a high caste associated with tax collecting on land

Book Reviews

Working through the Contradictions: From Cultural Theory to Critical Practice. By E. San Juan Jr. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2004.

In *Working through the Contradictions: From Cultural Theory to Critical Practice*, E. San Juan Jr. returns to champion the re-examination of the emancipatory and anti-imperialist goals behind cultural and social theories that initially helped to form the discipline of cultural studies upon a foundation of social justice. *Working through the Contradictions* makes the case for the ongoing necessity for critical interventions of mind and body. In this case, we may learn from the study of social and cultural theories and their various adaptive qualities. Such skills are demonstrated as viable if not essential to deciphering the inconsistencies in the social and political morass of U.S. hegemony and locating its worldwide resisters, both past and present.

San Juan again engages the works of Antonio Gramsci, Frantz Fanon, Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx, Sun-Yat Sen, Aimé Césaire, Walter Benjamin, Mikhail Bakhtin, and Mumia Abu Jamal, among others. Social theories are posited alongside social outcomes like the “war” on terrorism, the historical reality of racism in social and political institutions, and the recent rise of domestic and sexual slavery under banners of freedom, democracy and free markets.

Via the academic fields of cultural and American studies, San Juan offers social and academic critiques that disentangle, reveal, and clarify even the subtlest of compromises toward authentic justice. Picking up from his last book, *Racism and Cultural*

Studies, San Juan stresses the central agreement needed for any serious critique of social/political injustices and discrepancies. San Juan argues that social and academic attempts at multicultural reform or antiracist or anti-imperialist struggles inevitably falter without connecting their relation to capitalism's ability to appease such demands (via free markets, material goods, etc.), while maintaining the same debilitating system of power and exploitation. At the academic level, such reforms often become the stuff of incomprehensible linguistic "play" and the seduction of cynicism or the appeasement that comes by declaring all things "problematic," indefinable, or joyfully hybrid. San Juan asserts that these attempts, "through postal therapy (postnation, postcolonial, postmodern) fail to comprehend the dynamics of pluralist capitalism in its 'flexible' phase as a mode of U.S. hegemonic rule presiding over the redivision of the world market and the control of international labor power"(19).

Understanding the centrality of capitalism's detrimental role upon the "subject matter" (i.e., the human beings and nations) of postcolonial theory and ethnic studies allows for a greater critique and refinement of antiracist, sexist, and imperialist motivations, as well as actions. To begin our critical interventions, *Working through the Contradictions* leads us through this contentious academic and social terrain known as cultural studies. As is evident throughout San Juan's work, he argues that one of the casualties of a free market and consumerist driven society is the supposed "end" of class and race issues as real determining social factors today. Indeed, San Juan reiterates the "disappearance" of race and racism alongside class issues as perhaps the most damaging trend of multiculturalist projects inside and out of academe. He reminds us that "questions of institutional racism, gender inequality, social justice, and hierarchical power relations in a pluralist or multicultural society should be addressed conscientiously in the study of literary texts and popular cultural expression" (19).

What is hoped to be gained is San Juan's "searching critique" that allows a continuous re-examination of reformist and revolutionary agendas as much as the exploitative forms of power trying to be subverted. Affirming the reality of uneven development

under current capitalist policies as well as the need to *reaffirm* “the centrality of racial and ethnic problems” (19), San Juan offers textual and social evidence that one may very well work through conservative as well as liberal contradictions at this stage of the capitalist project.

By beginning with a contemporary analysis of the Philippines, San Juan asks the reader to reassess how far progressive intellectualism and reformist agendas have moved us towards a “post”-ism world. Throughout the book, San Juan refers back to the Philippines and Filipinos as telltale “signifiers” that inequality and social struggles persist. Later, San Juan describes the epidemic of millions of emigrating Filipino women and men converting into Overseas Contract Workers (OCW). The economic desperation of OCW’s to flee is eclipsed only by their physical and sexual abuse and even death by racist and brutally violent and unjust working conditions overseas. San Juan counterargues against the immigrant story of undying gratitude and adopted patriotism or even rags-to-riches stories by saying, “Since the seventies Filipino bodies have been the number one export, and their corpses (about five or six return in coffins daily) are becoming a serious item in the import ledger” (260).

Citing the colonial history of the Philippines, along with the continual struggle today of local insurgents against U.S. military/economic influence, San Juan points out to us that the islands are one instance in which postcolonial enthusiasm has over-stepped current historical reality. Aided by the legacy of corrupt comprador governments, the Philippines has yet to rid itself of the shadow of the Philippine-American War (1899–1903) and its fate as a U.S. colony from 1898-1946. A clear contradiction, the Philippines remains a disenfranchised member of the global market along with the rest of the developing world. In light of this example, the argument against certain liberal social and textual efforts at reform is that they tend to replace collective effort with individualistic triumphalism (usually meaning material gain or *cosmetic* victories). Larger narratives of national struggles against a singular economic and cultural aggression are too dangerous to handle or approach. The popularity of a reductionist individualism

omits class and racial elements into “hybrid” characters (both in the literary and nonliterary sense), promotes singular scenarios of “success” as the collective norm and follows the impotent stance of distrusting any or all ideology.

With the aftermath of 9-11 weighing heavily upon all national resistance groups in the Philippines (and elsewhere), San Juan sees the Abu Sayyaf as yet another contradiction of modern capitalism. The former secretary of state Colin Powell labeled the Abu Sayyaf a terrorist group because it was suspected that they had received donations (along with other militant Islamic groups) via Afghanistan from al Qaeda. San Juan, however, equates the status of the Abu Sayyaf to that of a “criminal gang” that was “born out of the U.S. war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and subsequently used by the Philippine government to sow discord among the more militant Islamic organizations” (43). The Abu Sayyaf becomes living evidence of the dangers and the result of a new *Pax Americana*, a “terrorist” group nurtured by the leading democratic state.

Meanwhile the Philippines and its local and diasporic citizens challenge theories that too often work in favor of a debilitating economic neocolonialism. The now-common tentativeness to reengage in polemical social critique and ideological struggles has left us bewildered as the oppressive past, heralded as a thing of a by-gone era, returns in the form of the Patriot Act, preemptive strikes, racial profiling, and right-wing Christian fundamentalism.

In his comparative theoretical analysis, San Juan stays true to a historical-materialist approach toward aesthetic, cultural, and political issues and debates. He attempts throughout to develop a politics committed to the cultural and social struggles of class, race, and gender. But it is through his presenting of the works and ideas of social and cultural critics that we see the connection between such works and the continuous efforts needed for protecting and enhancing social change. San Juan cites examples such as Engels’s attitude toward aesthetics, Césaire’s reappropriation of surrealism’s subversive goals, and Fanon’s revolutionary influence as being against contemporary postcolonial theory via his writings on the national-liberation agenda of colonial resistance.

What makes San Juan's analysis beneficial and insightful is his tact in negotiating effectively between dense academic expectations and urgent social conflicts. The relevance of his critical interludes into theory is demonstrated by his contextualizing of each writer within his or her own larger social role and involvement. For instance, recognizing and enhancing Gramsci's notion of the "organic intellectual" we read and appreciate how Engels's aesthetics are invested in an accountability of the discrepancies between intellectual and material production and advancing a communist end goal of human emancipation through a utopian vision defying class-limited ideology. Césaire's poetics reappropriates European surrealist aesthetics to present the "unreal" history of colonialism and racism through a powerfully new language based on the *Négritude* movement, while Fanon, perhaps most explicitly, echoes the tradition of "third world" physical and intellectual struggles as unceasing in its critiques and warnings toward imperial and capitalist exploitation through a constant dialogue with culture.

The final chapter, "Spinoza and the War of Racial Terrorism," is an attempt to recover the beneficial aspects of Benedict de Spinoza's *philosophy of freedom* during an era of pivotal global consequences. He writes, "Spinoza's principle of the inalienability of human rights can renew the impulse for reaffirming the ideal of radical, popular democracy and the self-determination of communities and nations" (345). San Juan offers up the seventeenth-century dissenter's life and work as an example of hope to those now demonized as racial/ethnic "aliens" and suspicious foreigners by practitioners of free-market-based morality and stale jingoisms.

Working through the Contradictions offers powerful anticapitalist critiques that utilize contemporary struggles for equality the world over as evidence of socialism's necessary role for many trying to survive against economic, cultural, and military repression today. The collection of radical thinkers San Juan gathers offers a possible theoretical groundwork to maintain a socialist vision of future liberation. *Working through the Contradictions* is yet another of San Juan's unabashed academic contributions to the

greater socialist program. It is evidence of the exciting possibilities still being produced in Marxist critical theory.

At the academic level, his critiques are especially biting toward those who align themselves with the historical battles for democracy and equal rights. He argues that without recognition of the larger forces affecting various marginalized communities and groups, their so-called progressive academic exercises become complicit in the systematic scheme that favors individual identities to collective possibilities for hope. For those of us who *are* in academe, San Juan reminds us that “it is one thing to demystify the language of domination, another to eliminate the entrenched structures and *habitus* whereby such language produces effects in the lived experience of humans” (377). If one only takes a moment to consider how U.S. institutions of higher education have complied with and aided some of the most corrupt and worst abusers of power, one understands the urgency of academic reformists who forward a socialist end goal. Revolution was once described as “a struggle to the death between the future and the past”; it is fitting to understand such efforts and their urgency.

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ABSTRACTS

Erwin Marquit, “Political and Economic Consequences of the Attempted Socialization of Agriculture in the Soviet Union”—

After assuming leadership of the Communist Party, Stalin attempted to continue Lenin’s New Economic Policy, but his failure to deal properly with the relationship between the prices of industrial goods and the prices paid to the peasants for their crops led to bread shortages in the cities. His solution to this problem was abandonment of the worker-peasant alliance, reduction of the peasantry to a semifeudal condition, and a policy of physical extermination of hundreds of thousands of Communists suspected of not supporting the subjugation of the peasantry.

Lauren Raheja, “Anxieties of Empire in Doyle’s Tales of Sherlock Holmes”—

English characters in Sherlock Holmes stories are physically or psychologically damaged, contaminated, or destroyed by their contact with the colonies. Arthur Conan Doyle justifies British colonialism by presenting colonized people as inferior or evil, and while acknowledging the threat from resistance, reassures Victorian readers that disruption can be controlled. Holmes defends the empire, brings justice, and restores order.

Stratos Georgoulas, “The Boy Scouts Association of Greece and Ecological Action as a Conservative Practice”—

The Boy Scouts Association initially socialized youth with the social goals of the leisure class. When the Boy Scouts were made redundant by new economic developments, environmental NGOs took the lead as the main links connecting the aspirations and strategies of the economic leaders of the market.

Henri Houben, “A Marxist Analysis of Present-Day Globalization”—

Demonstrating the continuing validity of Lenin’s analysis of imperialism, the author shows that in the twenty-first century the world economy is dominated by monopolies. Two essential

changes have taken place in imperialism today. Neoliberal policies have been introduced by contemporary imperialists to reduce the power gained by Third World countries and the working people and to redistribute wealth in favor of the capitalists. A second change in current imperialism has been the establishment of the United States as the single global hegemonic power after the collapse of the USSR and the European socialist countries. Imperialist rivalries nevertheless continue, and U. S. hegemony will face challenges from the other imperialist powers, resistance from the Third World, and, in particular, the emergence of China as a world power.

Hiroshi Ohnishi, “A New Marxist Neoclassical Modeling of Capitalism”—Using the examples of Japan, Germany, Indonesia, Egypt, China, Russia, and India, the author argues that capitalist countries go through two stages of economic development—state capitalism followed by private capitalism. The author presents the results of his neoclassical modeling of capitalism, according to which technological development will ultimately lead to an asset transfer from the rich to the poor, thus bringing an end to capitalist relations of production.

ABREGES

Erwin Marquit, «Les conséquences économiques et politiques de la socialisation tentée de l’agriculture en Union Soviétique»—Après avoir pris la direction du Parti communiste, Staline tenta de continuer la Nouvelle Politique Économique de Lénine basée sur une alliance ouvriers-paysans, mais son échec sur la maîtrise des rapports entre les prix des produits industriels et ceux payés aux paysans pour leurs récoltes mena au manque de pain dans les villes. Sa solution à ce problème fut l’abandon de l’alliance ouvriers-paysans, la réduction de la paysannerie à une condition semi-féodale, et une politique d’extermination physique de centaines des milliers de communistes soupçonnés de ne pas soutenir la subjugation de la paysannerie.

Lauren Raheja, «Inquiétudes face à l’Empire dans les contes de Doyle par Sherlock Holmes»—Les personnages anglais des histoires de Sherlock Holmes sont endommagés physiquement ou psychologiquement, contaminés ou détruits par leur contact avec les colonies. Arthur Conan Doyle justifie le colonialisme britannique en

décrivant les peuples colonisés comme inférieurs ou diaboliques, et tout en reconnaissant la menace de la résistance, rassure les lecteurs victoriens que la rupture peut être contrôlée. Holmes défend l'empire, apporte la justice, et rétablit l'ordre.

Stratos Georgoulas, «L'association des scouts de la Grèce et l'action écologique comme principe conservateur»—L'association des scouts commença par socialiser la jeunesse sur la base des objectifs sociaux de la classe oisive. Quand les contributions des scouts devinrent superflues en raison de nouveaux développements économiques, les ONG environnementales devinrent les liens principaux associant les aspirations et les stratégies des chefs économiques du marché.

Henri Houben, «Une analyse marxiste de la mondialisation de nos jours»—En démontrant la validité toujours actuelle de l'analyse léniniste de l'impérialisme, l'auteur fait voir que l'économie mondiale du vingt-et-unième siècle est dominée par les monopoles. Deux changements essentiels de l'impérialisme ont lieu de nos jours. Les impérialistes contemporains ont introduit des politiques néolibérales afin de réduire la puissance gagnée par les pays du Tiers Monde ainsi que les ouvriers et de redistribuer les richesses en faveur des capitalistes. Un second changement de l'impérialisme actuel a été la consécration des États-Unis comme unique pouvoir hégémonique mondial après l'effondrement de l'Union Soviétique et les pays socialistes d'Europe de l'Est. Néanmoins des rivalités impérialistes persistent, et l'hégémonie états-unienne devra faire face aux défis d'autres puissances impérialistes, à la résistance du Tiers Monde, et surtout à l'apparition de la Chine comme grande puissance.

Hiroshi Ohnishi, «Un nouveau modelage néoclassique et marxiste du capitalisme»—En se servant des exemples du Japon, de l'Allemagne, de l'Indonésie, de l'Égypte, de la Chine, de la Russie, et de l'Inde, l'auteur argumente que les pays capitalistes passent à travers deux étapes du développement économique—le capitalisme d'état suivi du capitalisme privé. L'auteur présente les résultats de son modelage néoclassique du capitalisme selon lequel le développement technologique mènera finalement au transfert des biens des riches aux pauvres, ce qui mettra fin aux rapports capitalistes de production.