

**Understanding U.S. Civil-Military Cooperation in the U.S.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan**

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**By
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Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to:

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Abstract

The purpose of this study was to determine how the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) organizational structure promotes cooperation within U.S. PRTs in Regional Command East (RC/E) in Afghanistan between 2009 and 2010. A case study approach, incorporating qualitative methods, was used. Twenty candidates were selected using purposeful sampling. These candidates participated in semi-structured, individual interviews. Interviewees included civilians and military personnel working with the PRTs in Afghanistan. Definitions of cooperation, cooperative behaviors, and non-cooperative behaviors were generated. These findings, in combination with social network analysis, were utilized to further identify and explain specific conditions and relationships required for effective civil-military cooperation in the PRTs. Using social networking sociographs, organizational structures that best promoted or not promoted civilian-military cooperation were mapped and compared. The study's results may serve as a useful guide for U.S. civilian and military leaders when considering the establishment of PRTs in other post-conflict countries.

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Understanding U.S. Civil-Military Cooperation in the U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan

“Effective civil-military relations are indispensable to national defense, and dysfunctional relationships between the topmost civilians and the most senior military officers, particularly lack of candor, consultation, coordination, and collaboration- can be disastrous for policy and decision making, in peacetime and in war” (Kohn, 2009, p. 269).

Chapter 1: Introduction

Background

The attacks on the United States by Al Qaeda terrorists on September 11, 2001, dramatically transformed the U.S.’s national security policy (Ambassador Negroponte, 2008). The organized attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon, and the foiled attempt resulting in a deadly crash in Pennsylvania left nearly 3,000 dead and a nation reeling from the largest attack on its soil since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II (Sharani, 2002). The U.S. was swift to retaliate, engaging in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) or the War in Afghanistan.

Beginning in late fall, 2001, the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces overthrew the Taliban, a repressive political regime that has supported Al Qaeda and offered refuge to Al Qaeda’s principal leader, Osama Bin Laden. OEF is part of the overall Global War on Terror, which also includes Operation Iraqi Freedom, a nine year campaign freeing Iraq from dictatorship while encouraging economic growth and democracy. The Global War on Terror has now been extended to Pakistan. Taliban and Al Qaeda supporters have been transporting supplies through the porous, Afghan –

Pakistan border. Consequently, the U.S. is keenly interested in managing the border and disrupting the Taliban's supply line.

The U.S. intention to focus initially on Afghanistan was not incidental. The attacks against the U.S. in 2001 were planned in Afghanistan. Many of these terrorists received training in sophisticated terrorist centers in Afghanistan (Eronen, 2008; Jones, 2008). Furthermore, the 9/11 Commission Report concluded that "a U.S. failure to stabilize Afghanistan would decrease U.S. security by allowing the country to become a safe haven for terrorists and criminals" (Jones, 2008).

Recognizing that the enemy was not a professional army that fought with conventional strategies, the U.S. and its allies needed to devise a new approach to eliminate an enemy that had embedded itself in the local communities (Lopez, 2007; US Army, 2006). In Afghanistan, the primary enemies remain Al Qaeda operatives and the Taliban, Muslims who are notorious for encouraging extremist Islamic teachings, denying basic rights for women and children and empowering the local drug lords (Bhutta, 2002; Spink, 2005). The latter are influential power brokers who finance the Taliban insurgents through the illegal growth and export of opiate producing poppy seeds.

Al Qaeda and the Taliban are not the only enemies facing the U.S. and its coalition partners. Other insurgent groups include: Hikmatyar Faction, Haqqani Faction, the Pakistani Taliban, and Laskhar-e-Tayyiba or "The Army of the Righteous" (Katzman, 2012). The first two factions are composed partially of former *mujahedin*, who supported the U.S. during the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s.

The latter two operate largely out of Pakistan. All have ties to Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or both (Katzman, 2012). Regardless of affiliation, insurgents are often silent and invisible, infiltrating local governments and terrorizing village members who support the U.S. and its allies. Because of Afghanistan's mountainous and harsh terrain, isolating the enemy has been difficult.

A counterinsurgency or COIN strategy was drafted and adopted to combat the insurgents. U.S. Army General David Petraeus, former commander of the U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, and his staff authored the Counterinsurgency Manual, a 177 page document outlining counterinsurgency goals and implementation plans. COIN enables military action to seek and destroy insurgents as well as support civilian efforts "to promote a more capable, accountable, and effective government that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function with limited international support" (USAID Democracy and Governance, 2010). A combination of "hard power" (military force), combined with "soft power" (social and economic development programs), underlies this strategy (Fore, 2008). The U.S. and its allies could "win the hearts and minds" of the Afghan people by providing support to the local populations in the forms of security, self-governance, and economic development. The goal is to neutralize the insurgents by empowering the local population to turn against them (Jones, 2008; Skinner, 2010).

In concert with the COIN strategy, the role of the U.S. State Department (DOS) has been elevated and is now a "pillar of U.S. national security strategy." These pillars include diplomacy, development, and defense (Negroponte, 2008). Both in Afghanistan and Iraq, the development of the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) is a direct

result of this strategy. As part of a “unity of effort”, the PRTs work in concert with the U.S. military command and the interagency organizations (PRT-BCT Unity of Effort Reference Guide, 2011) to achieve the PRT mission:

To enable the Afghan Government and its people to: counter the insurgency and prevent the use of Afghan territory by international terrorists, build a state that is accountable and responsive to its people, and establish a foundation for longer-term development (ICMCP, 2011, p. i).

There are 26 PRTs within Afghanistan, and their charter is to work in collaboration with international and U.S. military operations (Serafino, 2008). The PRTs are headed by different NATO – affiliated countries; some are led by civilians, while others are led by the country’s military. See Figure 16 in the Appendix for PRTs by region in Afghanistan and Table 24 for PRT country affiliation. A glossary of terms is also referenced. All are technically governed by ISAF (International Security Armed Forces), a 130,000 person foreign army, under NATO. The PRTs are spread across four Regional Commands or military zones within Afghanistan. These Commands include RC North, RC West, RC South, and RC East. There is a fifth command, RC Central or Kabul, but no PRTs are present within the Afghan capital. The U.S. oversees most PRTs, 12 in all. Most of these PRTs are located in Afghanistan’s RC East, the region experiencing the most ‘hot spots’ or active conflict (Eronen, 2008). In these areas, the U.S. PRTs are led by the U.S. military, not civilians. As of spring, 2012, the Laghman PRT was turned over to the local Afghan governor and forces. It receives some support from U.S. forces in the area but, in general, the PRT’s official mission has been accomplished (CENTCOM, April 2012)

The PRTs are designed to be flexible and adapt to a province’s needs (Davis, 2011; PRT-BCT “Unity of Effort” Reference Guide, 2011). The PRTs are to work with the

battle space owners or brigade combat teams (BCTs) in their provinces to identify sources of instability that can fuel the insurgency. Theoretically, if the primary 'source of instability' is hostile insurgent forces, then the PRT will have a heavy security component. If the 'source of instability' is a contentious problem with land rights or illegal timber harvesting, then the PRT may have a stronger governance and development component.

To help facilitate unity of effort within the PRT context, five Senior Civilian Representatives (SCRs) were created, one for each of the four regions and NATO. The role of the SCR is to manage civilian resources and to bridge the differences between the civilians and their military counterparts within and across the regions (Green, 2010). It is their job to build a sense of team within their regions, especially the PRTs (Green, 2010). To support the SCR and the civilians beneath him or her, a civilian chain of command was established. This chain of command was designed to equalize the civilians and their military counterparts at every level within the PRT structure (Green, 2010). The SCR is the voice and principal problem solver for civilians experiencing issues with the military.

The Problem

The price tag for these teams, and the war in general, are substantial. By the end of fiscal year 2011, the U.S. had spent \$443 billion in Afghanistan alone (Katzman, 2012). It cost \$100 billion per year just to keep approximately 100,000 American troops in the country (Chandrasekaran, 2012). Approximately \$90 billion has been allocated to the U.S. military in 2012 to conduct its operations. About \$16 billion in additional aid is

to be provided in 2012, with an estimated \$9.2 billion to be granted in 2013 (Katzman, 2012). Other costs, non-financial in nature, include the loss of 1,834 lives and over 15,000 wounded since the war started 11 years ago (Bingham, 2012).

U.S. public concern over the costs of the war and the overall effectiveness of the COIN strategy has grown. According to an article published by *The Washington Post*, 60% of Americans think the war is not worth its costs versus only 35% who believe the 10 year effort has warranted its expense and loss of life. Over 50% of Americans reported believed the U.S. should withdraw from Afghanistan even if the Afghan National Army was not ready to protect its country (ABC News Poll, March 12, 2012). A more sobering poll from Reuters/Ipsos indicated that 77% of Americans wanted all U.S. combat troops (except for trainers and Special Forces) to return to the U.S. by the end of 2012 (Brooks, 2012).

The recent unrest caused by the Koran burnings, the alleged murders of 17 Afghan civilians by a U.S. soldier, and reports of the defilement of Taliban corpses by U.S. Marines have further solidified a desire for an exit strategy from the U.S. public and the Afghans (King; 2012; Knickerbocker, 2012). With respect to the PRTs, the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, has been calling for their end as part of the U.S.'s transition out of Afghanistan (Felbab-Brown, 2012; Katzman, 2012). Finally, with ongoing allegations of the misuse of development funds, the effectiveness of the PRTs and their future has been questioned (DeYoung & Jaffe, 2009; Nabizada, 2012; Shirzey, 2012; Waldman, 2008).

The U.S. PRT structure challenges civil-military cooperation in terms of mission and role differences. The military has been ordered to participate in development efforts that have traditionally been in the realm of civilian agencies. It does not have the expertise to build democratic structures, write rule of law, and educate the local populations (Shirzey, 2012). Furthermore, the U.S. PRTs have been “plagued with overriding military leadership” (Eronen, 2008, p. 15). As a result, some of the PRTs have been divided along civilian and military lines, and efforts to integrate the two groups have been largely unsuccessful (Eronen, 2008). This division has been acknowledged repeatedly. During a lecture at Kansas State University, U.S. Navy Admiral Michael Mullen (Ret.), former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commented: “U.S. foreign policy is still too dominated by the military, too dependent on the generals and the admiral who lead our major overseas commands, and not enough on the State Department” (Mullen, JCS Speech, 2010). A senior military commander in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed this statement by insisting that military efforts should be “firmly nested” within the diplomatic initiatives of the U.S. Department of State (Eckert, 2011).

Civil-military cooperation was further tested by the Civilian Surge from 2008-2009. This surge was partially a response to operationalize the PRTs in the shortest time possible. The civilian ranks grew from 360 to 1,200 at a rate that strained the staffing capabilities for the primary agencies involved: DOS, USAID, and USDA (Green, 2010). The diplomats in DOS were not used to capacity-building or nation-building in the field. USAID, while used to being in the field, was a small agency and did not have the physical

numbers to deploy to Afghanistan (Nguyen, 2009). USDA employees had the knowledge, but little experience in developing countries, let alone those at war (Kuypers & Anderson, 2010). With the sudden arrivals of inexperienced civilians, the military found it difficult to integrate them into their operations.

The SCR's ability to increase cooperation between the civilian and military functions within the PRTs has not been easy. Many civilians deployed to Afghanistan were not clear about their roles and have suffered from low morale (Green, 2010). This lack of organization and diminished confidence, complicated by the dominant military leadership, has made it difficult to create an integrated civil-military team (Green, 2010). To better adapt to the military's way of thinking and operating, a civilian chain of command was instituted (GAO 12-285, 2012; Green, 2010). Mimicking the military hierarchy, each civilian had a higher civilian to whom he or she could appeal to for information and support. Unfortunately, the apparent rigidity of the SCR decision-making process hindered any sense of team or unity as the SCRs earned the reputation of "little Caesars", being too territorial over their jurisdiction (Green, 2010). With the recognition that war in the 21st century requires closer cooperation between military and civilian agencies than ever before (Kolvisto, 2007), U.S. policy makers, civilians, and

"The process of establishing who the SCR is at each level of the revamped civilian decision-making structure has been difficult and has led to unnecessary conflict in the field" (Green, 2010, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2010/10/477123/>)

military personnel need to find a solution to bridge the gap in civil-military relations (Davis, 2011; Lopez, 2007; McNerney, 2005).

The Importance

This study is important for a number of reasons. First, it may provide insights into new ways to improve civilian-military cooperation and role integration within the PRTs in Afghanistan. Second, the current U.S. Administration is highly interested in the success of the COIN strategy and whether the PRTs would be an effective foreign policy instrument in similar scenarios in other post conflict countries (Abbaszadeh, Crow, El-Khoury, Gandomi, Kuwayama, MacPherson, Nutting, Parker, & Weiss, 2008; Irvine, 2011; McNerney, 2005; Ooi, 2010). Third, with growing public concern regarding the war's mounting costs and an expected troop withdrawal date, this study may clarify the optimal ratio of "hard" to "soft power" – the formula or argument enabling a country in conflict to peacefully transition into a self-governing nation-state without the long-term presence of U.S. and ally troops (Fore 2008; Katzman, 2012; Kaufmann, 2010).

Currently, there are 90,000 troops in Afghanistan. Combat troops are expected to withdraw by 2013 even though there are questions about the Afghan National Security Forces' (ANSF) ability to protect its people and their government (Cordesman, 2012; Katzman, 2012). President Obama and other senior U.S. officials have continually assured the Afghan public that U.S. forces will likely remain after 2013 to continue to train the Afghan National Security Forces (Katzman, 2012). Finally, in a broader context, this study may provide insights into the organizational structures and behaviors

required to merge or integrate different roles, functions, and cultures across organizations.

The Purpose

The purpose of this study is to determine how the PRT's organizational structure promoted or not promoted cooperation between U.S. civilian and military personnel within U.S. PRTs in RC East in Afghanistan between 2009 and 2010. The study will provide guidance as to what leadership structures best foster acts of cooperation across organizations with different missions, roles, and cultures. Social network analysis will be used to map and identify cooperative behaviors among PRT leaders and team members to better understand how the teams can achieve success in Afghanistan.

Research Questions

This study will answer the following questions:

1. How does PRT organizational structure facilitate cooperation between the U.S. military personnel and U.S. civilians to aid in the success of U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan?
2. What theory can be generated to better design an organizational structure to promote successful civil-military cooperation in U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan?

Chapter 2: Literature Review

An integrative literature review was selected because there is limited amount of knowledge available about the study's primary topics. By definition, an integrative literature review is a "form of research that reviews, critiques, and synthesizes representative literature on a topic in an integrated way such that new frameworks and perspectives on the topic are generated" (Torraco, 2005, p 356). Since the SCR role was created in 2009, and the PRTs have only been in existence in Afghanistan since 2002, information regarding these subjects is recent and, in some cases, untouched (Eronen, 2008; Kuypers & Anderson, 2010). Further, social network analysis, to the best of the author's knowledge, has yet to be applied to the Afghan PRTs.

Sources were identified through a number of different search strategies. Key word searches were conducted in Google Scholar and the University of Minnesota library system. Databases searched included: Academic Premier, Business Source Premier, ERIC, CIAO, PAIS International, LexisNexis Government Periodicals, Social Sciences Citation Index, and PsychINFO. Key words included various combinations of provincial reconstruction teams, Afghanistan, civil-military cooperation, leadership, team effectiveness, crises, social networks, U.S. foreign policy, U.S. national security, civilian and military cultures. Referred journals, credible news reports, government documents, and relevant dissertations were reviewed.

This literature review will focus on three subject areas. First, the PRTs are discussed in terms of the different models, the pros and cons associated with each one, and their perceived effectiveness. Next, the relationship between the U.S. civilian

agencies and the U.S. military will be highlighted to better comprehend its historical roots and how current perspectives have shaped the civil-military relationship within the PRTs. Finally, literature regarding social network analysis and its impact on cooperation will be explored to ascertain how social networks can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the PRT organizational structure.

The PRTs

A provincial reconstruction team is an “interim civil-military organization designed to operate in areas with unstable or limited security usually following open hostilities” (Eckert, 2011, p. 1). As previously mentioned, there are 26 PRTs currently operating in Afghanistan in the four regional commands. NATO affiliated countries oversee the PRT operations. These countries include: Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Lithuania, Netherlands, Romania, Spain, South Korea, Turkey, Finland, and the U.S. All are technically governed by the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), an organization created by NATO, to better coordinate the multi-country military and civilian efforts within the PRTs. It should be noted that PRTs have also been established in Iraq. However, their mission and composition differ from those in Afghanistan (Perito, 2007) and will not be considered in this study.

There are four, generic PRT structural models, which include: American, German, British-Nordic, and Turkish (Eronen, 2008). Similarities are abundant. The mission of providing developmental assistance in concert with military security is basically the same for each model (Eronen, 2008; Foust, 2011; Perito, 2005; McNerney, 2005). NATO

Ambassador, Mark Sedwell, introduced the three 'Rs' or functions needed for PRT success:

“The first, *Regain...*, we need to regain the initiative against the insurgents; secondly, we need to *Rebuild* and reinforce Afghan government institutions, military and civil, so they may take responsibility for governing their country; and lastly, *Resolve* the political grievances that fuel the insurgency” (NATO, 2010, emphasis added by author).

Most recently, the strategy has been rephrased as “clear, hold, build”

(Buonocore, 2010). Troops are needed to *clear* or eradicate insurgents from villages and institutions. Troops are then expected to *hold* or secure the area so that development work can occur peacefully. Civilians are then tasked to *build* the appropriate state and civil institutions necessary to ensure sustainable economic growth in a safe, democratic nation-state.

Most models, except the U.S. and Turkish model, are co-operated with other partner organizations. The German model includes the most partners, ranging from four to five for each PRT (Eronen, 2008). The partners' respective militaries engage in similar projects as the other PRT models. These projects include building roads, providing access to clean water, setting up the infrastructure for schools, health clinics and hospitals, establishing democratic institutions, training a National Afghan Army and local police forces, and assisting with agricultural needs (Franke, 2006; Irvine, 2011).

The differences in the PRT models are significant (Eronen, 2008). Much depends upon size and location. The German PRT in Kunduz in RC/North is the largest of all PRTs. The size of its multi-national military ranges from 400 to 500 soldiers with approximately 10-20 civilians. What is most unusual about the Kunduz PRT is that the Germans have established a leadership structure that enables an equal partnership

between the military and civilian roles (Eronen, 2008). Both the military commander and the civilian counterpart are responsible for the oversight of their own, *independent* halves.

The British and the Nordic PRTs in RC- North and RC- South partner with northern European countries. The size of their respective military components is roughly the same – approximately 150-200 members. On the civilian side, the British have approximately 20-30 personnel, slightly higher than the 8-15 civilians found in the Nordic model. The British have a joint military, political and development representative that assists in managing the relationship between the military and civilian structures. The Nordic model proposes a military commander to work in consultation with a joint civil-military command group.

Distinct from all models, the Turkish model is led by a civilian coordinator only. This team is located near Kabul, and its primary mission is to train Afghan police forces. It does have a military component of approximately 70 personnel. The civilians number around 15. The Turkish team works independently, but it must coordinate its intentions and movements with the U.S. combat troops in the area.

The U.S. model is notably different. Similar to the German model, the U.S. PRT leadership is dual in nature. However, unlike the German PRT, the U.S. has tried to integrate the two entities (Eronen, 2008; Kolvisto, 2007). However, because these teams are located in RC/East – the region experiencing the most intense conflict – the civilians in the PRT are technically embedded under military leadership (Eronen, 2008). As a result, military culture and needs tend to dominate over civilian (Eronen, 2008).

Along with NATO and other coalition partners, the U.S. has embraced a “whole of government” approach. See Figure 1: NATO’s Whole of Government Approach.



Figure 1. NATO's Comprehensive Whole Government Approach (Eckert, 2011)

This approach recognizes that security is accomplished through the linkage of government and military objectives (Eckert, 2011). This diagram shows how the “the whole of government approach” is nested within NATO’s comprehensive approach to stability operations. The diagram further illustrates how the military’s command and control style is complicated as it needs to cooperate and collaborate with countless government agencies (USG and GoIRA), international organizations, coalition forces, and private entities that may or may not have the same decision-making structure (Eckert, 2011).

Complementary to the whole government approach is the U.S. unity of effort concept. See Figure 2: U.S. Unity of Effort Diagram. Unity of effort should not be confused with unity of command. The former calls for the combined cooperation of the

BCT, Federal agencies, and the PRTs to achieve the PRT mission of extending the Afghan central government to its people. The latter integrates the efforts of the civilian agencies and military units under one command. Given that the organizations were structured differently, had different organizational cultures, and different decision-making processes, it is not a surprise that civil-military relations within the PRTs had struggled.

A former senior U.S. military commander noted in early 2000, "The most serious problem in Afghanistan today: It's not security. It's the utter failure in the unity of effort department (Lamb & Cinnamond, 2009, p. 2).




Figure 2. U.S. Unity of Effort Diagram (BCT-PRT Reference Guide, 2011)

As of June, 2012, there were 11 U.S. PRTs as the Laghman PRT in the Mehter Lam province had just closed. There were 12 during the course of this study.

Each U.S. PRT is led by a military PRT Commander (PRT-C) who partners with U.S. civilian leaders of roughly the same rank. These civilian leaders are from DOS, USAID,

and USDA. The ratio of military personnel to civilians is decidedly different from the other PRT models. There are approximately 60 - 80 military personnel to one civilian. The military component consists of roughly 80 members from the Army Civil Affairs team, military police, intelligence officers, explosive experts, medics, psychological officers, and infantry platoon soldiers. There are also 8-12 civilian subject matter experts, representing primarily DOS, USAID, and USDA. However, depending upon the PRT's needs, there could be representatives from the National Security Council (NSC), and the U.S. Departments of Homeland Security, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, and Treasury if needed (GAO-12-285, 2012). These individuals may be U.S. government employees or contractors (Perito, 2007).

PRT Positions

Because the PRTs' organizational structure reflects a military design, the civilian roles were created to match their military counterparts. The PRT dual leadership structure is illustrated in Figure 3. Theoretically, the structure allows a level of coordination among equals, yet still allows leaders to work with their "home" organizations. However, evidence exhibited previously demonstrates that the equality of roles has been questioned regularly (Hernandorena, 2008).

On the PRT level, the civilian leads from DOS, USDA, and USAID hold the equivalent rank of the PRT-C, who is typically a lieutenant colonel in the armed forces. The civilian leads are to report to both the SCR-B as well as their respective home offices. The PRT-C is a peer to the maneuver unit commander (MU-C), who owns the battle space. The MU-C commands a battalion of approximately 800 soldiers who are

battle ready. Both the PRT-C and the MU-C report directly to the brigade commander. There is no cross-over authority. The civilian leads do not report to the brigade commander – nor does the PRT-C report to the senior civilian representative at the brigade level (SCR-B).

One level below the PRT is the district support team (DST). Approximately three to four district support teams report to the PRT. Whereas the PRT works primarily with the governors of the provincial governments, the DSTs work more with the sub-governors of the smaller, village governments. Similar to the PRT, there are three civilian leads from DOS, USAID, and USDA. Their military counterpart is typically a captain or major, lower ranks than the PRT and brigade commanders. The civilian leads are to report to their respective leads in the PRT, just as the captain will report to the PRT-C. As there was initially a shortage in civilian staffing, particularly with USAID (Nguyen, 2009), the civilian leads at the PRT level often had to assume some of the DST duties.

The U.S. SCR-B is a GS-15 (General Schedule) in the Federal government classification system. This position is senior, but it is one step below the Senior Executive Service – the highest ranking classification in the U.S. Foreign Service. The SCR is paired with the BCT-C who commands a brigade (3,000 to 5,000 soldiers) in three to four provinces. The SCR-B is responsible for approximately 3 - 4 PRTs. The BCT-C is responsible for all military activity in his area of responsibility (AOR), to include the PRTs.

The SCR-B reports to the senior civilian representative at the regional level (SCR-RCE). This person is a part of the Senior Executive Service. Similarly, the BCT-C reports

to his divisional commanders (101st Airborne Division) who partner directly with ISAF and NATO. This officer holds the rank of a brigadier or major general. The SCR-RCE answers to the U.S. Ambassador responsible for the economic development in Afghanistan.




Figure 3. Dual Chains of Command (Created by author)

PRT effectiveness

There are mixed opinions regarding the effectiveness of the U.S. PRTs and their ability to fulfill their mission (Serafino, 2008; Cordesman, 2012; Dzedzic & Seidl, 2005; Gauster, 2008; Green, 2010; Hernandorena, 2008; McNerney, 2005; Shirzey, 2012). Many point to the PRTs success in terms of developing basic infrastructures, such as schools, clinics, and roads (Abbaszadeh et al., 2008; Serafino, 2008; Csurilla, 2012; Kaufmann, 2011; McNerney, 2005; Rogers, Hope, & Kemp, 2008; Fore, 2008). Some are appalled at the amount of aid that has been allocated to the Afghans, with a few reflecting that the aid has been ill-received (Buonocore, 2010; Kaufmann, 2011; IRIN,

Nov. 29, 2010). The Afghan government, the recipient of aid designed to create a durable, democratic government, remains fractious and ineffective (Cramer & Goodhand, 2002; Jalali, 2006; Kaufmann, 2011; IRIN, 2010; Skinner, 2010). Because Afghanistan's government under Hamid Karzai is ranked as one of the three most corrupt states in the world (Transparency International, 2012), Afghans, as well as some foreign civilians, believe that the aid delivered only increases the government's waste and corruption (Buonocore, 2010; Foust, 2011; Giustozzi, 2004; Jalali, 2006; IRIN, November 29, 2010). Additionally, Afghans have grown weary of war and foreign occupation (Foust, 2011). Finally, there is a recent warning from the World Bank regarding the instability of the Afghan economy once the bulk of foreign aid ends. The Bank has predicted that Afghanistan will slide into a recession of which it will be difficult to recover (Cordesman, 2012). What is even more discouraging is the revelation that some of the projects started in the "Build" phase of the U.S. policy are not mature and will fail during a U.S. draw down (Cordesman, 2012).

"The challenges for American policy in Afghanistan, where the Provincial Reconstruction Team concept was born, remain formidable" (Rogers, Hope, & Kemp, 2008, p. 31).

Being able to properly measure the PRTs' impact with tangible metrics has also challenged the debate surrounding the effectiveness of the PRTs (Abbaszadeh et al., 2008; Davis, 2011; Eckert, 2011; Irvine, 2011). Some metrics seem to be obvious, such as the number of roads built, wells dug and schools constructed. However, there are

questions of whether these metrics actually assess a secure, economically sustainable Afghanistan in the long-term (Irvine, 2011). Referencing a Canadian PRT's accountability structure, one scholar believes that the PRTs should establish "multiple indicators of institutional capability that can be measured over time" (Eckert, 2011, p. 51). An example of a possible indicator may be the date when the Afghan people can organize national elections that are democratic and free of corruption (Eckert, 2011).

To help resolve this dilemma, there has been a number of assessment tools created. Perhaps, the most popular assessment is USAID's District Stability Framework (DSF). See Figure 4: USAID's District Stability Framework. The DSF is used by the U.S. government, most of the military units, and some international partners to assess the impact of security and aid initiatives (PRT Handbook, February 2011). Complete with a tool kit of planning guides and matrices, the framework helps PRT leads to build **situational awareness** i.e. gather data to fully understand the environment, the sources of instability, and Afghan needs in a specific district or province. Next the leads **analyze** and identify objectives and impact indicators that will meet the Afghan needs. Specific activities are developed in the **design** phase, and finally, the team **monitors and evaluates** their impact in eliminating the sources of instability. Particular attention is also paid to determine how the activities affect the overall stability of the region. While this assessment and others like it are a step in the right direction, rating the overall effectiveness of the PRTs is still somewhat elusive and is not consistent across the PRTs (Irvine, 2011).



Figure 4. District Stability Framework (PRT Handbook, February 2011)

Some U.S. civilians and military personnel believe that aid provided to the Afghans will be far more effective if the PRT functions are uncoupled (Buonocore, 2010; Eckert, 2011; Rogers et al., 2008; Shirzey, 2012). The military and civilians would be separated, not integrated. Civilians would be responsible for long-term humanitarian and developmental projects, while the military would be tasked to train the Afghan army and local police forces so that they could provide for their own country's security (Buonocore, 2010; Waldman, 2008). The rationale is twofold: 1) Once the military departs, civilian aid groups will be well-positioned to continue their work; 2) Civilians can feel more comfortable engaging in developmental projects without the Afghan perception that aid is just another military tool (IRIN, November 29, 2010; Nordland, 2010). This uncoupling also reassures some civilians that they would no longer be targets for the Taliban as they would be independent from the military (Franke, 2006;

Hoshmand, 2005; Nordland, 2010). Despite this push for separation, there are others who believe almost the opposite: the military and civilians within the PRT should be fully integrated, but governed by a civilian, not the military (Eckert, 2011; Hoshmand, 2005).

Given the active conflict in Afghanistan, some have suggested a hybrid model. The military has discretionary funds (e.g. CERP funds) to conduct immediate, high impact projects, such as quickly digging a well so that a village has access to a clean water supply (McNerney, 2005). These funds were initially granted in the early days of the PRTs when civilian expertise was not available (CRS, 2008). Some argued that civilians should also be allowed such funds, especially since they have more expertise in determining which development projects would provide the most positive impact in a short period of time (Rogers et al., 2008). By the end of this study, such funds were made available through the U.S. State Department, but they were not effectively leveraged by the PRTs.

As a variation to the hybrid model, some have suggested that the Afghan government be given aid during a budgeting process (Paradiso, Tellis, & George, 2010). Each provincial governor should work with its people to determine what the province and districts genuinely needed for economic development. The U.S. PRT would then approve or deny the request. If approved, then the government needed to demonstrate afterwards that the funds were used for the agreed upon purpose. These practitioners believe this practice improves upon earlier aid models as the government was listening and responding to its people's needs, a central tenant of the PRT mission (Paradiso & George, 2010).

NATO suggested another solution. It recommended that the value and status of the SCR be increased (Jakobsen, 2008). Although the SCR and the regional command level holds a civilian rank equal to a U.S. general, NATO has suggested elevating the SCR to serve as the deputy to the Commander of ISAF (COMISAF). Further, it was proposed that the SCR function fall under the NATO umbrella, thus strengthening the civilian voice and authority (Jakobsen, 2008).

Given the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces by the end of 2013, the future role of the PRTs has been questioned. The PRTs were designed to provide assistance in the most dangerous environments (Bernard, 2005). Many believe that the teams should now focus on larger development projects, and move away from the quick, \$5,000, stabilization projects (Vasquez, 2010). However, there are others who wonder if the changes instigated by the PRTs are sustainable without military support (Katzman, 2012; Paradiso et al., 2010). Whether the PRTs have accomplished their missions or not, the U.S. supports President Karzai's decision to eliminate the PRTs in Afghanistan (Nabizada, 2012). It is not clear when the PRTs will be disbanded, but the hope is that the Afghans will soon be able to own their country's development without the long-term assistance of these teams (Nabizada, 2012).

Civil – Military Relations

Because the U.S. military and civilian agencies must work closely within the PRT structure, it is helpful to review the nature of their relationship. A better understanding of civil-military roles, their interdependencies, historical tensions, and their impact on the PRTs can be gained.

Historical roots

The intricacies surrounding U.S. civil-military relations were present even before the United States was recognized as its own country in 1783 (Johnson & Metz, 1995). The U.S. founding fathers were clear and intentional with respect to the establishment of distinct civilian institutions that governed the separation of civilian and military roles and functions. The fundamental belief underpinning the relationship is that civilian political structures should control the military's purpose, size, and budget (Burk, 2002; Johnson & Metz, 1995; Nielsen & Snider, 2009). This structure is not purely American and is reminiscent of von Clausewitz's treatise, *On War*. In this seminal work, von Clausewitz asserted that war in the 19th century was a socio-political phenomenon, and the military is a tool used by civilian leaders to win it (von Clausewitz, 1971; Collins, 2010).

Historically, two classical theories have explained U.S. civil-military relations. Samuel Huntington proposed an "objective civilian control." Civilians would dictate military policy, but leave the means of execution up to military leadership (Burk, 2002; Collins, 2010; Huntington, 1995). Morris Janowitz's views were grounded in republic theory, which dictates that civilians need to pursue a common good for the state. The "citizen-soldier" approach positioned military service as a positive obligation, one that will enhance one's citizenship so that he will protect his democratic rights and the rights of others (Janowitz, 1960).

Civil-military relations in the U.S. have changed over time. Different political goals, public opinion, threats to national security, and the growing sophistication of

weapons have led to varying policies and relationships (Johnson & Metz, 1995).

Through World War II, the civilian and military roles and structures were distinct, despite the fact that Ulysses S. Grant and Dwight D. Eisenhower, former U.S. Army generals, became U.S. presidents (Johnson & Metz, 1995). Perhaps, the most compelling argument for the ongoing separation was President Eisenhower's warning against the encouragement of a "military industrial complex." Eisenhower firmly believed that this mindset could be a threat to U.S. democracy (Feaver & Kohn, 2001).

The Cold War (1945 – 1989) between the U.S. and the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.) ushered in a new era where it was difficult to maintain separation between military and political leaders (Johnson & Metz, 1995). Nuclear deterrence theory – ensuring peace by avoiding nuclear mass destruction – necessitated that U.S. national security policy and strategy become more holistic (Johnson & Metz, 1995). Political, social, and military knowledge and interests had to be integrated and aligned. Military leaders must not only be technical experts in the art of war, they must also have the knowledge and skills in the social sciences to be able to interact with civilian leaders in the areas of defense and foreign policy (Murray, 2009). Senior military leaders are now expected to have advanced degrees (Johnson & Metz, 1995). The former Secretary of State, General Colin Powell, USA (Ret.) received an MBA from George Washington University. The current Director of the CIA, General David Petraeus, USA (Ret.) earned a PhD from Princeton University. The military has evolved into a professional organization with officers becoming statesmen and, upon retirement from service, private contractors for the Department of Defense (DOD) (Collins, 2010; Johnson & Metz, 1995; Gough, 1992). As a

result, roles have been blurred between the institutions, which have created confusion regarding the establishment and enforcement of U.S. national security policy (Dziedzic & Seidel, 2005; Gough, 1992; Waldman, 2009). Some scholars firmly believe that the separation of the military and civilian authority is no longer possible, especially at the highest level of decision-making (Nielsen & Snider, 2009). The relatively recent creation of AFRICOM – the U.S. military’s regional command in Africa – has a mandate of humanitarian assistance requiring civilians and military working collaboratively to manage unrest in the region (Ooi, 2010).

The latest thinking in civil-military relations argues that the Global War on Terror has created a “qualitative shift in civil-military relations in the U.S” (Morgan, 2008, p. 6). Terrorism had taken on a new form. Terrorist attacks are fewer, but the resulting casualties have increased (Morgan, 2008). With the bombings in New York, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania, the U.S. has been aggressive in its response. In an unprecedented fashion, the military has taken center stage in terms of the melding of politics and national security (Morgan, 2008).

For years, different administrations have recognized the need to define the civil-military relationship in complex situations abroad. The initial Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 detailed President Clinton’s policies and procedures as they relate to complex contingency situations involving civilian agencies and the military (Eckert, 2011). In 2005, President George W. Bush expanded PDD 56 with the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44. NSPD 44 outlined objectives for the actions required for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign governments hoping to

transition from conflict to peace. Specifically, NSPD 44 called for the improvement of coordination, planning, and implementation among military and civilian entities, especially DOS (NSPD 44, 2005). NSPD 44 was crafted partially as a response to PDD 56's inability to govern the civil-military relationships in Iraq and Afghanistan. These relationships included the PRTs in both countries.

Crisis in civil-military relationship

Given the assertion that some senior military leaders are “playing politics,” there is a question of whether the U.S. civil-military relationship is in crisis or not (Collins, 2010). Specifically, do senior military officers yield too much influence over U.S. executive and congressional leadership? Combining politics with security can create tension within civil-military relations, especially during times of war (Collins, 2010; Huntington, 1997; Stevenson, 2006). The military is asked to advise civilian leaders when time is short and political, military, and public opinion stakes are high. Both camps run the risk of misspeaking, leaking information regarding national security before it is ready to become public, engaging in excessive micromanagement, and making quick assessments that may not be entirely accurate (Collins, 2010). This sense of distrust is fueled and further exacerbated by a general feeling by some politicians that the military is not to be completely trusted to act lawfully when setting and implementing foreign policy (Johnson & Metz, 1995; Rosen, 1995; Stevenson, 2006). However, civilians have retained authority over military leaders and their commands. Also, military doctrine, outlining the military's subordinate role to civilian leadership, is

still being followed. Consequently, it may be premature to suggest that the civil-military relationship is in peril (Collins, 2010).

Whether the relationship between the civilian and military institutions is in crisis or not, Betts (2009) articulates three reasons why civil-military relations should always be a concern. First, hypothetically, the military could impose its political will on civilian leadership through force. Second, mistakes in communication can easily escalate a crisis that can end with disastrous consequences. Third, a lack of integration of policy and operations can produce “strategic incoherence that wastes blood and treasure in uses of force even when they prove successful” (Betts, 2009, p. 27). The points listed above and in the preceding paragraphs demonstrate ample opportunities for friction between the two. Military leaders are now expected to comment on national security and foreign policy. Civilian leaders, while always retaining authority over the military, are now asked to become more involved with military affairs. As such, it is not a surprise that cooperation between the two has been difficult to achieve in Afghanistan.

Civil-military cooperation and integration issues within the PRTs

Franke defines cooperation between the civilian and military as “integrating traditional military capabilities into a collective response to human need... civilian and military actors share the long-term goal of promoting human security and developing the conditions for societies marked by conflict to transition back to peaceful and stable structures” (Franke, 2006, p. 7). The implementation of the PRTs has tested U.S. civil-military relations in Afghanistan, especially within the PRTs. Some of this resentment

evolves from the belief that peacekeeping initiatives are not part of the military's responsibilities (Franke, 2006; Miller, 1997).

While the U.S. government has tried to keep the military and civilian roles separate, the military has frequently been involved in foreign assistance at varying levels (CRS, 2009; Eckert, 2011; Franke, 2006; McFate, 2004). Prior to its role in Afghanistan, the military has engaged in the following: 1) responding to humanitarian and basic needs, such as earthquakes, floods, and famine; 2) building foreign military capacity and capabilities, such as providing weapons and training to friendly foreign countries; and 3) strengthening foreign governments, such as training police forces and bolstering the legitimacy of foreign governments by participating in small economic and health driven development projects (Franke, 2006). The U.S. military's presence and work in Vietnam, Somalia, Bosnia – Herzegovina, and Kosovo exemplifies these points (CRS, 2008; Eckert, 2011; Franke, 2006). DOD has been able to justify these efforts in the past by distinguishing its role from that of the U.S. military. The former may use military troops and civilian contractors for assistance programs, while the latter is reserved for activities that can only be completed through the exclusive use of the armed forces (CRS, 2009). Despite this distinction, there remains confusion with respect to the elevation of the military's limited role from humanitarian assistance to wider-scale development efforts (Jakobsen, 2008).

To increase cooperation and integration, the Embassy and U.S. military leadership in Afghanistan developed and signed the *Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan (ICMCP)* in August 2009 (Green, 2010). The

plan created decision-making structures and working groups to better improve reconstruction efforts as well as lay the groundwork for the “civilian surge,” a term used to reflect the dramatic increase in civilian personnel. From January 2009 to October 2010, the U.S. civilian populations grew from 360 to 1,200 to improve PRT implementation and effectiveness (Green, 2010).

As outlined by the ICMCP, there are approximately 14 entities that facilitate the integration of civilian efforts with military goals. Only a few are mentioned in this paper. At the national level, there is the Principal’s Group. The U.S. Chief of Mission (in-country Ambassador) and the Commander of the U.S. Forces work with the commander of ISAF, NATO and representatives from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) to coordinate civil-military affairs at the highest level. The Executive Working Group, at the deputies-level body, meets weekly to discuss issues requiring civil-military coordination decisions. The National-Level Working Groups are working groups that focus on the development and monitoring of the U.S. Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan. The Afghanistan Civil-military Planning Group manages civil-military relations between the U.S. and NATO.

At the sub-national level (Regional Commands), the Integrated Regional Command Team integrates the efforts of the Regional Command and the Regional Platform (structure outlining regional civilian roles and activities). Finally, the Task Force Integrated Team, a collective body of sub-regional leaders, helps to synchronize the efforts of the sub-regional combat brigades, SOF, and the PRTs.

In July 2009, the U.S. expanded its civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) doctrine to include the Office of Interagency Provincial Affairs (IPA). This agency was created to improve the ability of the field staff to “reach back to the Embassy and onto the central U.S. government” (Green, 2010). Accompanying this structure was the creation of the previously stated civilian chain of command. This hierarchy was designed to better manage the military’s wants and needs by providing a feedback mechanism to the civilian PRT leads and the SCRs. In this command structure, the SCR-RCE was equal rank to the U.S. Army Division’s commanding officer (General); the SCR-B (senior civilian representative at the brigade level) was the equivalent to the brigade combat team commander (BCT-C); the civilian lead at the PRT level held the corresponding rank of Army Lt. Colonel or Naval/Air Force Captain of the PRT Commander (PRT-C); and the District Support Team Lead (DST-L) had the same rank as its military counterpart, an Army captain.

“For some, a formal mandate demanding a ‘dual civil and military chain of command at the country level’ may be the best solution for improving civil-military relations within the PRTs” (Lamb & Cinnamond, 2009, p. 10).

Similar changes occurred within the PRTs as well. To better understand and coordinate civilian development, the military created the Civil Affairs (CA) role within each PRT. This function focuses on military needs and provides suggestions regarding the improvement of support from the civilian and other military actors (Franke, 2006).

CA officers work closely with the PRT Commanders as well as the civilian leads from DOS, USAID, and USAID within the PRTs. It is important to remember that the military units within the PRTs are not combat units. They are not authorized to take action against the drug lords or the Taliban (Jakobsen, 2008). This distinction has been created to protect local Afghans and aid workers and to convince the Taliban that these troops are meant to support, not fight.

In terms of cooperation and integration, the PRTs have struggled in numerous areas (Hernandorena, 2008; Perito, 2005; 2007). From the beginning, it was difficult to marry the concepts of a 'humanitarian space' with military security (Dziedzic & Seidl, 2005). The PRT goals reflected this dissonance. PRT members on both sides lacked clear guidance (Hernandorena, 2008). In fact, there were many times when civilian PRT members arrived at their posts, only to discover they had been reassigned to another. Or, they were expected to perform a different function, one that did not match their areas of expertise (Green, 2010).

Second, along with unsynchronized goals, the civilians' relative lack of preparation and training also complicated cooperation. Some civilians received limited instruction from their agencies, which was later pieced together with knowledge gleaned from their PRT's Commander and other PRT members (Hernandorena, 2008). Additional training was offered through DOS and the National Guard, but it was generally viewed as insufficient (Hernandorena, 2008). Similarly, because the PRT humanitarian mission did not reflect traditional military aims, the military did not have a consistent approach to prepare its personnel to assume PRT duties. Both sides

complained that they needed more language and Afghan cultural training in addition to PRT training (Hernandorena, 2008; McFate, 2004). As of 2009, PRT training had become more sophisticated with a six-day, integrated pre-deployment training at the Camp Atterbury Joint Maneuver Training Center in Indiana, USA. The State Department and USAID had also enhanced their courses to include Afghan history and culture as well as policies and guidance specific to their agencies. Finally, the COIN Training Center in Kabul, Afghanistan was established to help orientate new civilians and soldiers to their varied roles and responsibilities, to include PRT duties.

While additional preparation has been embraced, there are some who think training needs to be better managed between the military and the civilians (GAO 12-285, 2012). Specifically, the civilian agencies offer training that is duplicated by DOD's training of their civilians. Further, the training offered by DOD may be inadequate to prepare civilians for the inevitably tough situations – physically and mentally – encountered in a nation-state at war (GAO 12-285, 2012).

A third problem arose from the civilian agencies' inability to adequately staff their roles. Unlike the U.S. military, U.S. civilian agencies cannot force their employees to accept postings in hazardous countries, such as Afghanistan. Tour lengths range from three months to 18 months, with different requirements expected from different agencies (Kuypers & Anderson, 2010; McNerney, 2005). The State Department had the Civilian Response Corps (S/CRC), a core group of experienced civilians who specialize in stability and reconstruction and can deploy at any time. Unfortunately, like USAID and USDA, its ranks were small. Consequently, all of the agencies needed to employ

contractors (Kuypers & Anderson, 2010). Known as 3161s in DOS, and direct hires and personal service contractors (PSCs) in USAID, many were unfamiliar with their agency's systems and processes. Their inexperience and non-coordinated rotations made it difficult to coordinate efforts within the PRTs (McNerney, 2005; Hernandorena, 2008).

A fourth obstacle is the presence of a predominant, rigid military culture in the PRTs (Dziedzic & Seidl, 2005; Hernandorena, 2008). The U.S. military and civilian cultures are distinctly different. Both the civilians and military personnel appreciate middle class values – the belief that everyone could get ahead economically and socially in a democracy (Gough, 1992). However, military values are influenced by the military's ability to rely on coercive methods to establish order over “reason and persuasion” to minimize conflicts (Burk, 2002). Military policy emphasizes national security, public order, and protection through force (Dunivin, 1994; Dziedzic & Seidel, 2005), and unlike civilian agencies, which make decisions on a consensus basis (Mackenzie, 2010), the military prides itself on its hierarchical “command and control” approach (Rubinstein, 2003). This approach permits a clear and uncompromising decision-making style reflective of “mechanical obedience” – the notion that soldiers are part of a fraternity that does not question authority (Hedges, 1922). The military's intense focus on community and internal cohesion make it look ‘clannish’ and alienate those, its civilian counterparts, who are not part of its realm (Gough, 1992). Lastly, the military breeds a distinct culture celebrating heroes and the honor of dying for one's country.

The military is unique in our respect for heroes. Leadership and heroism are not the same, but we have much to learn about the latter in understanding the process of leadership. The situation and human response that lead military officers and enlisted personnel to sacrifice their personal safety to save others is

a psychological response for which we have little understanding. Yet these acts of leadership are celebrated as examples of leadership and camaraderie in the military and set those who serve apart from leaders in other arenas (Taylor & Rosenbach, 2005, p. 7).

A fifth challenge is the emergence of leaders with powerful personalities, particularly on the military side. Since the U.S. PRTs are under military rule, it is not surprising that the military counterparts would assume decision-making authority (Dziedzic & Seidl, 2005). Further, in the absence of civilian action, the military has been known to sacrifice a development focus for faster results in the security arena (Dziedzic & Seidl, 2005). Given that some civilian counterparts were either absent or ill-prepared, their military counterparts typically took over the initiative and made decisions with little collaboration with the civilian side (Hernandorena, 2008). In certain cases, the civilians felt bullied or intimidated by their military commanders and found that their resources were limited, reassigned, and decisions were stonewalled (Hernandorena, 2008). The role of the SCR was designed to help mitigate such behavior. Unfortunately, these occurrences continue, and tensions between the civilian agencies and the military remain.

Opportunities for improvement

Many practitioners and scholars have already offered recommendations to improve the cooperation between the U.S. military and civilian agencies as part of a larger strategy to improve overall PRT effectiveness (CRS, 2008; Dziedzic & Seidl, 2005; Eronen, 2008; Franke, 2006; Hill, 2010; Hernandorena, 2008; Lamb & Cinnamond, 2009; McNerney, 2005; Perito, 2005; 2007; Waldman, 2009). In general, their recommendations focus on the clarification of goals, roles, and expectations, increased

number of civilian leaders, improvement of training and preparation programs, extended tour lengths, and a methodological approach to measuring a PRT's effectiveness (Hernandorena, 2008; Irvine, 2011; McNerney, 2005; Perito, 2005; 2007). Some scholars also mention that lessons can be learned from studying the German and British PRT models (Hernandorena, 2008). The German model demonstrates a true dual civilian-military leadership, which seems to have resulted in better cooperation. Similarly, the British model, highlighting civilian control of reconstruction efforts, appears to have increased cooperation between the military and civilian groups (Hernandorena, 2008). From the military perspective, some contend that the military should have even larger discretionary funds so that they can continue to promote the PRT mission absent their civilian counterparts (Eronen, 2008). Likewise, there is a belief that if security is an issue, then the military should have the final say in collaborative efforts (Lamb & Cinnamond, 2009).

McNerney advocates strongly for an increase in PRTs with extended operational capacities as a mechanism to improve cooperation (McNerney, 2005). Additionally, he recommends that the PRTs be granted the "best communication and transportation assets" so that they can reach the most rural populations and communicate more effectively up their respective civilian and military commands both in Washington and the field (McNerney, 2005). Finally, he proposes that more robust metrics be instituted to fully determine the effectiveness of the PRTs (McNerney, 2005). This push for more adequate measurements remains an ongoing theme (Abbaszadeh et al., 2008; Irvine, 2011).

In terms of coordination issues inherent in a command and control culture, Davis (2011) posits that a procedural control may be a better fit for the PRTs than the traditional positive control. The latter grants the commander direct control. Decisions requiring senior approval are slowly worked up and down the hierarchical channel. The process can be bureaucratic and slow (Davis, 2011). In contrast, procedural control focuses on guidelines and gives the commander the flexibility to adapt them as he or she deems appropriate for the situation. As a result, decision-makers can act quickly. Given the fast pace of the PRT environment and the central need to coordinate with the civilian agencies, procedural control may be a more effective approach (Davis, 2011).

There are ample opportunities to improve civil-military cooperation to benefit the PRTs. Many have already been highlighted. As the transition to Afghan leadership draws closer, the PRTs capability to transition from short stabilization projects to longer developmental projects is of prime importance (Katzman, 2012).

The last section of the literature review explores social network analysis, its primary definitions and applications. As a theoretical construct, social network analysis is useful because it can map and explain different organizational structures and the relationships within them.

Social Network Analysis

The use of social network analysis to better understand social relationships within specified units of analysis has been on the rise for the past 30 years (Knoke & Yang, 2008). It emphasizes a multi-disciplinary approach, and can be found in broad topic disciplines, including sociology, anthropology, psychology, science, business, and

political science (Knoke & Yang, 2008; Knox, Savage & Harvey, 2006). It has been used to better understand the social interactions, functional roles, and motivations in various subjects, such as leadership (Gerster & Day, 1997), teamwork (Moon, Schneider & Carley, 2006; Sparrowe et al., 2001), knowledge-sharing and innovation (Burt, 2004; Daniel, McCalla & Schwier, in press; Tortoriello, Reatans & McEvily, 2009), individual and organizational learning (Eguiluz, Zimmermann, & Cela-Conde, 2005); individual job performance and commitment (Sparrowe, Liden, & Kraimer, 2001); new employee socialization and development (Morrison, 2002), labor unions (Pulignano, 2009); strategic alliances among corporations (Lui & Ngo, 2005; Doz, 1996), social capital (Brass & Krackhardt, 1999; Burt, 2000; Coleman, 1988; Ibarra, Kilduff, & Tsai, 2005), power structures within organizations (Geller & Moss, 2008), global trafficking (Jenson & Sandstrom, 2008); organizational cultures (Elkins & Keller, 2003; Granovetter, 1983), and international and transnational relations (Duffield, 2002; Hoff & Ward, 2004; Pulignano, 2009). It has also been used in the creation of network items in the General Social Survey – one of sociology’s most prominent databases (Burt, 1984). Perhaps, the work that is most closely related to this study, at least in context, is the integration of social networks in the U.S. COIN Strategy. Social networking analysis was used to identify Al Qaeda networks within Afghanistan and their reach across the world (U.S. Army COIN Doctrine, 2006).

Basic terms

The central objective of social network analysis is to “measure and represent these structural relations accurately, and to explain both why they occur and what are

their consequences” (Knoke & Yang, 2008, p. 4). Wasserman & Faust (2009) define the basic network as composed of two components: 1) a set of **actors** (nodes), which could be individuals, groups, organizations, and nation states; and 2) its **relations** (ties) among these actors. The discipline’s basic assumptions include: interdependence of actors and their actions; perception that networks constrain an individual’s actions; and conceptualizations of lasting, relational patterns among actors within a network (Hatala & Lutta, 2009).

Researchers can organize actors into various forms and networks. These can be described as follows (Knoke & Yang, 2008):

Egocentric Network: a micro level of analysis. It outlines the simplest network with an ego and its directed relations with its alters or other actors. The relationship of the SCR and her role with her peers and other PRT members could be studied within this network.

Dyadic Networks: a micro level of analysis that is marked by a pair of actors and their relations. The relationship pairing of a DST leader and his corresponding battalion commander could be examined.

Triadic Relations: a micro level of analysis that depicts a group of three actors. Studying the triad composed of the DOS, USAID, and USDA might be valuable when comparing the relationship of this subgroup against other members or subgroups in the network.

Complete Network: a macro level of analysis that illustrates structural relations among actors and the tie patterns between them. The complete network in this case is the U.S. PRTs in RC-East.

Networks are frequently termed as “friendship” or “advice.” Ho & Ting-Ting (2008) reviewed a number of scholars and made the following distinctions: Friendship ties typically occur between individuals with shared perceptions, experiences, and depend upon each other for social or political support. Advice ties are depicted as individuals approaching others for work-related advice. The former communicates affect and emotion across boundaries, while the other leads to organizational learning, information sharing, and performance. Both friendship and advice ties may be important when analyzing the civilian and military networks. Friendship ties are often characterized by high levels of trust (Brass & Krackhardt, 1999), a characteristic already noted as being important to individuals in dangerous environments. Advice ties are helpful when analyzing collaboration and interdependence within groups (Gibson, 2005). The relevance of these directed relations is high when considering not only the relationships between the military and Federal agencies, but interagency cooperation in general.

Social networks and teams

Kozlowski and Ilgen (2006) identify coordination, cooperation, and communication as key team behavioral processes. Social network analysis is appropriate for this study because of its ability to explain cooperation within teams across organizations (Siebod, 2007; Sparrowe et al., 2001). Cooperation has multiple definitions and facets in social network analysis, but one that seems most fitting is the “exchanging of useful information and sharing commensurate goals” (Hines & Jia, 2005). This definition is appealing because the dual leadership structure and competing

cultures may compromise information sharing and goal agreement between civilian and military actors at multiple levels of the network.

Team behaviors can be explained by studying a subgroup’s cohesion within the network. Cohesive subgroups are “subsets of actors among whom there are relatively strong, direct, intense, frequent, or positive ties” (Wasserman & Faust, 2009, p. 249).

There are four general properties of ties used to indicate the presence of subgroup cohesion (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). These properties and their corresponding network measures are listed in Table 1: Subgroup Cohesion Properties and Measures.

Table 1. Subgroup Cohesion Properties and Measures (Created by author)

| Subgroup Cohesive Property | Social Network Measure |
|---|---|
| <p>Mutuality (subgroup members must be able to choose or are adjacent to one another)</p> | <p>Cliques (maximum complete subgraph of three or more nodes; absence of a line means no choice exists)</p> |
| <p>Closeness or Reachability (subgroup members must be able to interact with each other)</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Path distances (distance between nodes) • Geodesics (shortest path distance between nodes) • n-cliques (maximum geodesic distance connecting pairs of actors) • k-plex – sets of actors among whom there are relatively numerous adjacencies |
| <p>Frequency (subgroup members have ties to many others in the subgroup)</p> | <p>Density – average number of ties within the subgroup</p> |
| <p>Relative Frequency (relative frequency of ties among subgroup members compared to non-subgroup members)</p> | <p>Density of the subgroup must be higher when compared to the density of the non-subgroup members</p> |

Social network analysis is also suitable for studying leadership structures and behaviors (Gerster & Day, 1997; Lord, Brown, Harvey & Hall, 2001). Even though the study's focus is structural, the literature review has suggested that powerful personalities may have an impact on the PRTs' effectiveness. As such, the potential for graphing leader/follower relations with respect to power and authority should not be dismissed.

There are many other network measures that may be effective when describing cooperation within the complete U.S. PRT network, its subgroups, and individual members. Based upon Knoke & Yang's definitions (2008), these measures include:

- **Centrality** – the actor has high number of relations regardless of sending (initiates ties) or receiving (is the recipient of a directed tie). It can indicate how important leaders or team members are in terms of facilitating cooperative behavior within or across the civilian and military subgroups.
- **Prestige** – the actor receives many directed ties, but initiates few ties. Prestige may indicate how much influence a leader or team member may have within and across subgroups.
- **Betweenness** – the actors in between other actors. They control or mediate relations in dyads that are not directly connected. This measure may indicate if certain individuals are pivotal in sharing information with others within or between subgroups.

- **Indegrees** – number of ties directed to an actor. This measure assesses centrality at a deeper level, and may outline a leader or team member’s importance in exchanging information or making key decisions.
- **Outdegrees** – the number of ties directed from an actor to other actors. This measure may explain a leader or team member’s ability to quickly disseminate critical information needed for cooperative efforts.
- **Reciprocity** – a social norm indicating that actors will return the relation or choice when receiving it from another actor. This measure may suggest how willing actors are to engage in cooperative behaviors with others.
- **Structural Equivalence** – a specific relation that has identical tie patterns sent to and received from the other actors in the network. This measure may illustrate how equal a group of actors or subgroups are to one another in terms of decision-making authority.
- **Cliques** – A subgroup of at least 3 actors that have direct ties to one another.
- **Adjacency** – Path distance of only 1 step between actors. Members of a clique have adjacency.
- **Clustering** – a method that creates clusters or separates actors into subgroups. To further understand cooperative behaviors, groups of actors may be divided by clusters, such as all PRT Commanders or all DOS personnel.

Social network theories relating to cooperation are listed by scholar in Table 2: Social Network Concepts and Cooperation. Principles of cohesion and centrality

measures are stressed. Upon further data collection and analysis, some of these concepts may be able to explain cooperation within the U.S. PRTs under the SCR model.

Table 2. Social Network Concepts and Cooperation

| Scholar | Relevance to cooperation between individuals, teams, and organizations |
|----------------------------|--|
| Burt (1998) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Teams are more likely to be considered successful when members are able to span “structural holes” (relationships requiring team member(s) to serve as intermediaries or brokers). Tie strength is irrelevant; positions and roles primarily affect interactions between actors. |
| Burt & Ronchi (2007) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High frequency of interaction with the same group members can institutionalize a “rigid communication pattern.” Group members lose the richness of new ideas that can surface from members outside of their network. As a result cooperation within subgroups may be stifled. |
| Coleman (1988) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social capital, and the need to retain it, increases reciprocity and trust in closed networks. Obligations formed ensure social control over deviant behavior. |
| Cornwell & Cornwell (2008) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong tie networks generate more trust because these networks tend to be closed and inclusive. A dense network produces a sense of “social solidarity” that is necessary for members to willingly share expertise. |
| Doz (1996) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Through learning and adapting over time, organizations learn to cooperate. Evolution is key as initial response is conflict. Role of middle managers is critical as they interact with others at varying levels in own organization and across organizational boundaries. |
| Fukuyama (2002) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • People cooperate for the common good on the basis of shared informal norms and values. |
| Gargiulo & Benassi (2000) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Repeated interactions among members of the same group breeds friendliness and confidence. Members are more apt to consult and cooperate with those familiar to them and the network rather than with new members or those outside the network. |

| | |
|----------------------------------|--|
| Gerstner & Day (1997) | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Leadership Exchange Theory – leader and subordinate relations consistently correlate to team member job performance, overall team satisfaction, team commitment, role perceptions, and turnover intentions. Transformational leadership may encourage higher levels of satisfaction and commitment. |
| Gnyawali & Madhavan (2001) | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Structurally equivalent, inter-organizational competition will yield to cooperation or “co-opetition” as organizations must learn to share information and access to resources. They bond together to monitor each other and to prevent conflict. |
| Granovetter (1983) | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Strong ties create homophilic groups with high levels of trust, reciprocity, and culture formation; friendship networks overlap considerably and cooperation among members occurs easily.• Weak ties allow for “bridges” so that one group can connect to another for collaborative purpose.• Weak ties also increase cohesion through gossip communications. Gossip causes groups to adopt stronger norms to protect group identity. |
| Ho & Ting-Ting | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Simmelian-tied friendship dyads promote greater trust, shared cognition and congruent perceptions that encourage work performance, knowledge access and social support spanning organizational boundaries. Cooperation may be increased if these dyads are present between actors within different subgroups. |
| Ibarra, Kilduff, and Tsai (2005) | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Centrally connected actors in friendship networks foster more knowledge-sharing to avoid redundancy. Networks bestow social identity and social capital on group members. In turn, members will forge stronger ties to maintain their status in the group. |
| Jenson & Sandstrom (2008) | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Flexible, adaptive, and de-centralized networks can lead to illegal practices among global organizations. The demand and speed for information and resources create new bureaucracies with altered rules.• The network range affects knowledge-sharing more within groups than cohesion (mutuality, closeness, frequency, and relative frequency). However, range is not a huge factor when studying knowledge-sharing across organizational groups. If knowledge-sharing is identified |

| | |
|--|---|
| | as a cooperative behavior, this theory may increase understanding if cooperation occurs more among actors who are less connected. |
| Krackhardt (1995; 1999) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Simmelian dyads - strong ties in a bridging position between cliques can constrain social interactions, and by extension, limit cooperation among its members. |
| Lui & Ngo (2005) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cooperation is a cyclical behavior among partners and will ensue as long as trust exists and transactional costs are manageable. |
| Puglinano (2009) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International and transnational actors can cooperate and coordinate when a strong information-sharing network exists. |
| Santos, Pacheco, & Lenaerts (2006) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cooperation is sustained in heterogeneous networks where individuals have high levels of connectivity and can simultaneously alter their behavior and social ties. |
| Santos, Santos & Pacheco (2008) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cooperation occurs when socially diverse individuals are expected to promote the public good. Defectors are eliminated as more individuals choose norms and behaviors required for the public good. |
| Shermerhorn, (1975) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organizations are autonomous, but interdependent, and will cooperate for a specific reason. The reason is based upon resource scarcity, positive view of cooperation, and powerful extra-organizational forces. |
| Simmel (1971; 1971) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Simmelian triads are strong, trusting, and durable as they increase collective behavior within the group, reduce individual bargaining power, and decrease conflicts. Adding additional members does not necessarily change the group's dynamics. Cooperation may be a natural outcome within these triads. • "The Stranger" is a third-party intermediary that is in the group, but not close to the core members. If present, this actor may or may not facilitate cooperation across subgroups. |
| Sparrowe, Liden, Wayne, & Kraimer (2001) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The density of advice networks (ties formed between individuals asking for work-related advice) does not increase team performance. This concept may help to explain how team effectiveness is impacted through cooperative behaviors. |

Weimann (1983)

- Strong ties increase the speed of information-sharing between actors, add credibility, and increase an actor's influence.

Young & Urlacher (2007)

- Actors are more likely to cooperate in democratic societies rather than authoritarian regimes. Computational Prisoner's Dilemma games demonstrated that authoritarian rule experienced more conflict among its actors; thus, less cooperation.

Social network applications to the PRTs

Based upon this literature review, Figure 5 illustrates an example of a possible network for the U.S. PRTs in RC/E. The individual PRT is in the center. Using a spoke network structure, one can visualize the relative position of the subgroups within the network. Members of the PRT interact primarily with individuals among these primary groups. Clearly the U.S. military dominates in relation to its civilian counterparts. Furthermore, civilian groups appear less unified, showing strong connections to their home agencies.




Figure 5. U.S. PRT Network Example (Created by author)

Network stability

It is important to understand what can destabilize a network, especially since the networks in question exist in a country at war. According to Carley, Lee & Krackhardt (2002), there are three indicators that suggest a de-stabilized network: 1) rate of information exchange has been seriously reduced; 2) network members can no longer reach consensus; and 3) the network as a whole is less effective i.e. its accuracy at doing tasks or interpreting information has been impaired. In network terms, a structure must be constructed that does not allow for any cut points (e.g. removal of a leader) in any of the key positions. A break in these positions would result in a severe reduction of information, crippled decision-making, and compromised organizational products and services.

Limitations to Social Network Analysis

While social network analysis is helpful in describing current relationships among actors, it does have its limitations. Carley (2003) outlines several reasons to be cautious when using social network analysis as a theoretical construct. First, most of the traditional analyses have focused on small, bounded networks, measuring friendship or advice ties. Second, while it is generally understood that networks are changing and dynamic, traditional analysis can only capture relations at one particular time. Third, networking tools and software are still geared towards the simplest type of network, e.g. single mode at one level. The study of multiple modes and levels is increasing in popularity, but the networking tools have not yet reached this level of sophistication. Finally, many of these tools do not scale well when network sizes are dramatically

increased. As a result, the researcher runs the risk of making inaccurate assumptions and conclusions.

Chapter 3: Research design, Methodology, and Data Collection

The study was based on a case study approach, incorporating both qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis methods. The study was conducted in two phases: 1) individual interviews with a sample of PRT civilian and military members during the Civilian Surge in Afghanistan from 2009-2010; and 2) theory building with respect to an organizational structure required for effective cooperation between civilians and military personnel within Afghanistan and other post conflict countries. Hopefully, the theory will also yield insights for the effective design and implementation of other cross-cultural teams in other organizations, especially if they are facing physical and psychological danger.

A qualitative approach

A qualitative approach over a quantitative approach served as the methodological foundation for this study. A driving component of this study was the interpretation of meaning of cooperation by individual PRT members. Meanings were derived from the study of language and action, and data were frequently found in the form of words (Ruona, 2005). Furthermore, a qualitative approach was well-suited to the study of PRTs because little research has been conducted in these topics. Qualitative studies can provide an-depth description of a subject because they are typically case-specific, rich in context, interpretive and naturalistic (Stake, 1995).

Theory building is a complicated process at best. Some scholars maintain that quantitative approaches are best. A quantitative approach “infers evidence for a theory through measurement of variables that produce numeric outcomes” (Field, 2009, p.2).

By contrast, a qualitative approach “extrapolates evidence for a theory from what people say or write,” (Field, 2009, p.2). For the quantitative researcher, theory building is a deductive process, objectively derived through the use of the scientific method. Research designs are controlled, ‘value-free’ and replicable (Stake, 2005). For the qualitative researcher, subjectivity is core. New theories emerge from an inductive process, embracing the researcher’s and subjects’ values (Lincoln, 2005; Torraco, 2005b). Qualitative case studies have been identified as a research method that can produce or confirm theories (Ellinger, Watkins & Marsick, 2005).

Case study method

A case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2009, p. 18). A case study method is appropriate when three conditions are met: 1) the researcher seeks to answer “how”, “what”, and “why” questions; 2) the degree of focus is on contemporary events; and 3) the researcher has little control over contemporary events (Ellinger et al., 2005). Case studies are “bounded” or restricted by the unit of analysis, time period, and whether the data will be historical, ongoing, or a combination (Ellinger et al., Yin, 2009). Case studies are frequently used to further a deeper understanding about a particular phenomenon, evaluate various programs, and to generate new theories (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fitzpatrick, Sanders & Worthen, 2004; Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2007; Torraco, 2005).

There are multiple types of case studies. Yin (2009) identifies six types: exploratory, explanatory, and descriptive, with single-case and multiple-case models

available for each. His approach uses the case to create knowledge and theory, and he advocates a mixing of qualitative and quantitative when building the case (Fitzpatrick et al., 2004; Yin, 2003). Yin's approach is flexible as he believes there is no standard format when designing case studies (Yin, 2009).

Exploratory case studies are often prequels to a more robust study. Their outcome may be definitive research questions and hypotheses for a follow-on study (Yin, 2003). Explanatory cases seek to explain how and why some event(s) have occurred (Yin, 2003). Descriptive case studies provide a thorough depiction of the scope and the depth of the phenomenon (Yin, 2003).

Stake (1995) promotes a more interpretivist approach to case study research, relying heavily on qualitative methods (Fitzpatrick et al., 2004). He also offers three types of case studies: intrinsic, collective, and instrumental. An intrinsic case study is one that is pre-selected before the study begins because the researcher has an interest in that particular case (Stake, 1995). An instrumental case study is used when the researcher wants to gain insight about a particular issue (Stake, 1995). Finally, a collective case study is similar to the instrumental case study, except that multiple cases are selected to provide a deeper understanding about an issue (Stake, 1995).

Fitzpatrick, et al. (2004) identifies three types of cases: description, explanatory, and evaluation. A description case study is useful when examining factors that lead to certain outcomes. Explanatory case studies seek either relational or causal patterns. Evaluation case studies are conducted so that the researcher has sufficient knowledge to render a judgment (Fitzpatrick et al., 2004).

There are drawbacks to using case studies. Some researchers warn against the use of multiple cases because insufficient attention can be paid to each one. Therefore, the number of case studies can actually weaken the study (Fitzpatrick et al., 2004). Many warn that novice researchers are vulnerable to making simple, yet costly, mistakes in the design that result in compromised data (Gall et al., 2007; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2009). Others criticize how long the case study process takes and the difficulty of ensuring the study's validity and reliability (Ellinger et al., 2005; Yin, 2009). Finally, while many admit that case studies can yield interesting theories, they may not be ideal because cause and effect generalizations are difficult to make (Torraco, 2005; Yin, 2009).

The PRT case study design

Most qualitative researchers insist that the type of case selected and its resulting design is driven by the overall study's purpose and research questions (Gall et al., 2007; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2009). This study's purpose is to determine how the PRT's organizational structure promoted or not promoted cooperation between U.S. civilian and military personnel within the U.S. PRTs in RC/East in Afghanistan between 2009 and 2010. The research questions seek to answer how and why cooperation does or does not occur under the current organizational structure.

The questions are as follows:

1. How does the organizational structure facilitate cooperation between U.S. military personnel and U.S. civilians to aid in the success of U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan?

2. What theory can be generated to better design an organizational structure to promote successful civil-military cooperation in the U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan?

Referencing Yin’s classification system, an explanatory, single case study method with will be employed.

Gall et al., (2007) offers a useful method to organize the PRT case into four core elements (See Table 3).

Table 3. Case Study Elements

| Elements | |
|--|---|
| Phenomenon <i>Process, event, person, programs, roles or other item of interest</i> | 10 U.S. PRTs in RC/East, Afghanistan during the Civilian Surge from 2009 – 2010. |
| Case <i>Particular instance(s) of the phenomenon</i> | U.S. civilian agencies and U.S. military in U.S. PRTs in RC/E |
| Unit of Analysis <i>Aspect of the phenomenon that will be studied across one or more cases</i> | U.S. civilians and military associated with PRTs in RC/E |
| Focus <i>Aspect(s) on which data collection and analysis will concentrate</i> | Cooperative and non-cooperative behaviors between U.S. civilians and their military counterparts in U.S. PRTs in RC/E |

Eisenhardt (1989) specifically proposed a case study design that supports emerging theories. Since one of the study’s outcomes is a theory of civil-military cooperation, her approach was used. Her model follows an eight step progression: 1) Getting Started; 2) Selecting Cases; 3) Crafting Instruments and Protocols; 4) Entering the Field; 5) Analyzing Data; 6) Shaping Hypotheses; 7) Enfolding Literature; and 8) Reaching Closure. These steps are matched with the corresponding data collection (Eisenhardt, 1989).

Step 1: Getting Started

Definition of research question and possible a priori constructs

This study focused on cooperation between civilian agencies and military in the PRTs. The study was based upon existing theoretical concepts and constructs from social network analysis, specifically as they relate to group cohesion. Cooperation within social network analysis has been typically described by the strength of the ties or relations between actors and their ability and intention to share knowledge and reciprocate with one another (Krackhardt, 1998). Specific concepts explored included strong ties and weak ties (Granovetter, 1983), social capital (Coleman, 1988), structural equivalence (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001), structural holes (Burt, 2000), and Simmelian ties and triads (Simmel, 1971). These theoretical constructs can be used to explain how different individuals, teams, and entities interact with one another to promote or inhibit cooperation. In this study's case, these constructs were used to map cooperative behaviors among PRT members in RC /E.

Step 2: Selecting Cases

Theoretical, not random sampling of U.S. PRT members

Purposeful sampling for the interview was used when identifying the study's participants or units of analysis because specific experiences, agency or military unit affiliation, and years of tenure in Afghanistan are key to unearthing typical vs. atypical cooperative behaviors. This type of sampling was also selected because it is especially conducive for case studies (Fitzpatrick et al., 2004). Nominated or volunteer

participants may be concerned more about pushing their own political agendas than with providing the researcher with meaningful experiences.

The researcher, in collaboration with her State Department contact, identified those civilian and military positions integral to the PRT strategic direction and operations in Afghanistan. All candidates had to have served in Afghanistan during the Civilian Surge from 2009-2010. The researcher used purposeful sampling to select 20 individuals serving in these roles. There were 11 civilian and 9 military interviews.

The specific civilian actors interviewed included principal leaders from the U.S. Department of State (DOS), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the National Security Council (NSC), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Most were Federal employees. Two were contractors and one was a direct hire (a 5 year temporary employee).

The PRT military counterparts included brigade combat commanders (BCT-C), PRT Commanders (PRT-C), and a commander responsible for PRT training in Kabul, Afghanistan. These commanders represented the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and the U.S. National Guard. These interviews were conducted with the military and civilian leadership of non-U.S. PRT members to further understand the larger context of the PRT and whether the proposed organizational structure might work for PRTs commanded by other countries. Additional interviews were requested with commanders from the maneuver units (MU) and the Special Forces (SOF) to double-check findings and verify hypotheses.

Interviewees served with the PRTs in RC/E (See Table 4: PRTs in RC/E). In the table, the PRTs are listed by name, country affiliation, and level of kinetic activity. The latter criterion was self-identified by the U.S. combat brigade commanders who were responsible for these provinces. A highly kinetic province experienced approximately 300 missions/week. Those provinces that experienced little kinetic activity were located closer to Kabul, the capital city of Afghanistan.

Table 4. PRTs in RC/E

| PRT | Country Affiliation | Level of Kinetic Activity |
|-----------|---------------------|---------------------------|
| Kunar | U.S. | High |
| Bamyan | New Zealand | Little |
| Ghazni | Poland | High |
| Nangarhar | U.S. | High |
| Kapisa | U.S./France | Moderate |
| Khost | U.S. | High |
| Logar | Czech Republic | High |
| Nuristan | U.S. | High |
| Laghman | U.S. | High |
| Panjshir | U.S. | Little |
| Parwan | South Korea | Moderate |
| Paktia | U.S. | High |
| Patika | U.S. | High |
| Wardak | Turkey | High |

Step 3: Crafting Instruments and Protocols

Multiple data collection methods, using a combination of qualitative data

Qualitative data were gathered in three formats: 1) literature review and background information (E.g. Congressional reports, statements, reputable news sources, and refereed journals); 2) interviews with selected PRT members; and 3) follow-up conversations and emails to clarify confusing or contradictory information found in the interviews as well as to confirm findings and hypotheses.

Twenty (20) semi-structured interviews were conducted to understand how key leaders interpret cooperative behaviors within the PRTs and SCR leaders. Semi-structured interviews are those that are defined by a particular area of interest, but still allow the researcher the flexibility to probe or pursue other areas of interest (Morse, 1989). Since the interviews were exploratory in nature, a phenomenological perspective to crafting the interview questions was critical because it helped to explain “what an experience means to the individuals who have had it and be able to provide a comprehensive description of the experience” (Swanson & Holton, 2005, p. 358). To ensure rigor and an eidetic perspective, interview question guidelines by Rubin & Rubin (1995) were used. These guidelines as well as examples of the interview protocol and questions can be found in the Appendix.

Interviewees were asked to participate via an e-mail correspondence or phone call from the State Department contact. The researcher followed up directly via e-mail or phone to schedule the interview and to discuss the process. Interviewees received a one page sheet describing the project, interview instructions, individual consent form, and a list of potential questions. Approximately ¼ of the interviews were conducted face-to-face in Washington, DC. Telephone or Skype interviews were arranged for those leaders who were located in Afghanistan or other parts of the world. Interviews were audio-taped, transcribed, and emailed to participants to verify their accuracy.

The interview questions were:

1. How would you describe your involvement with the PRTs in Afghanistan?

2. How would you describe the relationship between the U.S. civilian agencies and the U.S. military within the PRTs?
3. What does civil-military cooperation mean in the Afghan PRT context? How does it differ from integration?
4. Please describe an example of successful cooperation and an example of a failure to cooperate.
5. Which roles or positions helped or hindered civil-military cooperation within the PRTs? How did these roles interact with one another?

The open-ended questions were designed to better understand the nature of civil-military cooperation in terms of its definitions and the behaviors that promoted and inhibited it. To better understand the social network aspects of the PRT's structure, interviewees were asked to identify and describe those relationships most critical in ensuring that cooperation occurred.

In addition to an in-depth literature review, the researcher kept current by examining various reports, such as U.S. Congressional reports and testimonies, unclassified publications issued by the armed forces Department of Defense, Department of State, USAID, United Nations, NATO, and ISAF. News from credible news agencies was also reviewed, such as *CNN*, *The Washington Post*, and *The New York Times*. Information learned can serve as ongoing background knowledge and be used to compare against other findings.

Step 4: Entering the Field

Overlap of data collection and analysis, including field notes to enable opportunities for emerging data.

Eisenhardt (1989) notes that field notes or memoing are a “running commentary to oneself” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 538). Field notes demonstrate a flexible data collection and analysis approach – researcher has the ability to adjustments in the process to pursue or probe new ideas. It is important to analyze the data in an integrated fashion because “even a simple comparison of the results of the two components could lend confirmation to and thus strengthen the argument” (Dreher, 1994, p. 289).

To begin establishing the overlap of data gathered from the interviews, literature review, additional background reading, and follow-up phone conversations and emails, the researcher kept an informal “field folder” with insights and current news articles that could be referenced or pursued later. She also recorded a running list of tasks and dates in an Excel spreadsheet.

Once the interviews were transcribed, but before they were coded, the researcher identified five categories in which to list the coded data. These categories roughly corresponded to the interview questions. They included:

- Organizational Structure
- People
- Cooperative Behaviors
- Non-Cooperative Behaviors
- Other

Step 5: Analyzing Data

Within case analysis and cross-case pattern search using divergent techniques

The primary goal for this step was to ensure that the researcher was intimately familiar with the case so that cross-case patterns can be derived. There are multiple organizational techniques used to achieve this clarity. The first step is often the coding or representation of data into distinct families of categories (Ellinger et al., 2005). Sandelowski (1998) notes that using typology as a coding family is helpful when building theory. This technique was used as it allowed the researcher to juxtapose two or more mutually exclusive categorizations. The two groupings – civilian agencies and military – were compared and contrasted against different definitions of cooperation, cooperative and non-cooperative practices, PRT structural improvement ideas, and opinions regarding the most pivotal positions needed for cooperation to occur. Patterns between the two groupings were then detected.

Transcriptions were categorized as follows:

- Civilian or Military
- Job Position
- Interviewee's first and last initials

During the coding process, each job position was assigned a corresponding colored post-it note. To establish order and rigor while protecting confidentiality, full names and their associations to specific PRTs were removed (See Table 5 for the post-it note assignments).

Table 5. Interview Coding

| Interviewee | Color | Job Position |
|------------------------------|--------|--|
| Military (M1, M2, M3, M4) | Teal | Brigade Commanders |
| (M5, M6) | Purple | PRT Commanders |
| (M7) | Gold | PRT Trainer |
| (M8, M9) | Pink | Maneuver Unit Commander Special Operations Forces Commander |
| Civilian (C1, C2, C3) | Blue | SCRs at the brigade level |
| (C4, C5, C6) | Red | DOS Leads |
| (C7) | Yellow | USAID Lead |
| (C8) | Green | USDA representative |
| (C9, C10, C11) | Orange | DOS Leads/Non-PRT |

On the lower right corner, the initials of the interviewee and the page number corresponding to the transcription were recorded. The researcher was then able to quickly reference the comment in question. The researcher also noted the frequency of how often a specific word or comment occurred through the use of hash marks in the upper right corner of the post-it note. Figure 6 (Military Coding) and Figure 7 (Civilian Coding) partially depict the military and civilian coding.

Green and some orange post-it notes were also used to post additional questions. These questions emerged from the coding process. The researcher either answered these questions by reviewing the transcripts again or by posing them as follow-up questions.



Figure 6. Military Coding



Figure 7. Civilian Coding

Once the coding was complete, the researcher looked for patterns between the two groupings. These patterns were noted as topics and recorded in two files: civilian and military. Examples are listed in Table 6: Civilian and Military Topics.

Table 6. Civilian and Military Topics

| Category | Topic | Evidence | |
|-------------------------------|--------------------|---|--|
| | | Civilian | Military |
| Organization Structure | | | |
| | Leadership | <i>It was critical to have a SCR at the brigade level. (C10)</i> | <i>“If I had the same PRT in a more kinetic environment? Quite frankly I would have done everything I could to ensure the civilian lead in the PRT was at least a co-equal, if not the lead, for governance and development.” (M4)</i> |
| | Roles/Expectations | <i>It was assumed we were all heading in the right direction, but that didn’t always happen (C5).</i> | <i>I knew what I wanted. I’m not sure they (civilians) knew what they wanted (M1).</i> |
| | Chain of Command | <i>There has to be a chain of command in order to make things work. (C8)</i> | <i>We automatically think in a hierarchy. It works. I don’t think civilians think like this way, yet that’s how we set up the structure. (M5)</i> |
| | Improvements | <i>The PRT should be civilian run and sourced that way with a private security contingent. (C2)</i> | <i>Need a plug and play structure with buy-in and people who have been trained and educated. (M7)</i> |
| | Team Composition | <i>We needed more civilians. We had different rotations and some were just not well-suited to the environment. (C6)</i> | <i>The most effective structure had the DOS-L, USAID-L, and PRT-C working together. (M5)</i> |
| | Military Dominance | <i>Military outrank us 100 to 1. (C2)</i> | <i>I had the most money. I had the most resources. If I really wanted something done, I could do it. (M2)</i> |

| Category | Topic | Evidence | |
|------------------------------|---|--|--|
| | | Civilian | Military |
| People | | | |
| | Personalities | <i>Structural problems allowed personalities to become so influential. (C4)</i> | <i>Cooperation is personality dependent. (M3)</i> |
| | Ideal Personality | <i>The person has to be flexible, work hard, and be comfortable operating in a military environment (C1)</i> | <i>Ideal person has to be willing to ask for and offer help (M9)</i> |
| | Key Relationships | <i>Key relationships are with your other civilian lead, the PRT-C, the SCR-B, the BCT-C, the MU-C and the SOF-C (C5)</i> | <i>The key relationships are the PRT civilian leads (USAID and DOS), the PRT-C, the SCR-B, the BCT-C, and the MU-C (M5)</i> |
| | Recruitment/Staffing | <i>I don't know how they recruited, but some of the PRT Commanders were not qualified to lead (C4)</i> | <i>I'm not sure where they found some of these guys. They were very new and required some handholding. (M2)</i> |
| | Expertise (Skills & Knowledge) | <i>Civilians have to know how the different agencies and know how to source them (C2)</i> | <i>The spark to the team is shared knowledge and shared skills (M7)</i> |
| Cooperative Behaviors | | | |
| | Communication | <i>Let them (civilians and military) in on everything (C6)</i> | <i>I insisted on a Board of Directors (BOD) meeting every Friday for 1 ½ hours (M2)</i> |
| | Respect | <i>Military saw the need for civilian expertise and they wanted it. They recognized we had value to bring to the table. (C8)</i> | <i>We need to be pointing the fingers at ourselves because we're just as bad. We don't have an understanding, an appreciation, an awareness of what the civilians bring to the table. (M7)</i> |
| | Sharing Resources (expertise, info & funds) | <i>They (SOF) shared everything with us... intelligence, civil affairs... everything. (C7)</i> | <i>I invited my civilians to every briefing, targeting meeting, any meeting that could be helpful to them (M5)</i> |

| Category | Topic | Evidence | |
|--------------------------------|------------------------------------|--|---|
| | | Civilian | Military |
| | Friendship | <i>We genuinely liked each other. (C5)</i> | <i>We did everything together... worked, ate, traveled, worked out... (M2)</i> |
| | Planning and Implementing Together | <i>Planning builds cooperation just in the sense that anything does when you thrash things out, put something together, and then do it (C10)</i> | <i>The MU-C said: "Why don't we take my conference room and turn it into joint offices?" It immensely improved cooperation amongst us." (C5)</i> |
| Uncooperative Behaviors | | | |
| | Interagency/Inter-service Tensions | <i>There was a certain disconnect between the agencies. If they liked me, I'd get the information. If they didn't like me, I didn't it." (C2)</i> | <i>I think the Big Army felt like the National Guard guys had to prove themselves a little. "You guys do this part time. We do this all the time." There was a need to win and earn respect. (M6)</i> |
| | Credibility Concerns | <i>You had to prove yourself to the military – show them that you brought value to their operations (C1)</i> | <i>I think a civilian could lead the PRT in a highly kinetic environment, but that lead would have to be very capable. (M4)</i> |
| | Personal Motivations | <i>This commander promised a village a well, and kind of tied his personal prestige to it. But it needed to be thought through and run through the government channels. (C4)</i> | <i>I don't want to sound pejorative, but we didn't always put the best people out there. Some people focused more on the paycheck and just kind of sucked it up. (M4)</i> |
| | Accountability Issues | <i>Even though the Ambassador informed this agency that we were going to have this structure, they refused to do it. (C1)</i> | <i>The guy from that agency was a smart guy. I didn't write his evaluation, though. I would complain, and he'd pick it up for a while. But, it was kind of superficial (M1)</i> |

| Category | Topic | Evidence | |
|--------------|------------------------|---|---|
| | | Civilian | Military |
| | End-runs | <i>Civilians tried to work around the military. I saw how they questioned everything the military did. (C9)</i> | <i>If there's a senior development person who is in charge of a region, then everyone there should work for him or her. There shouldn't be those messy lines that if someone didn't like what he had been told, he couldn't call back to someone else. (M2)</i> |
| Other | | | |
| | Organizational Culture | <i>This sort of contract with the military definitely involves civilians being sucked into the military cultures. (C4)</i> | <i>Working across offices and units was a little challenging. If I were to do it again, I would have tried to break down their cultural stereotypes very, very early (M5)</i> |
| | Training | <i>The next most important thing would be to have a unified or at least coordinated recruitment and training program. (C11)</i> | <i>The Reservists and the National Guard just didn't receive enough training in CA to be truly effective. (M9)</i> |
| | Pace/Prioritizations | <i>Civilians have to understand the military pecking order. That PRT-C needs that dam now because he reports to a BCT-C, who reports to the DIV-C, and that's what he wants. (C8)</i> | <i>The short term space, the military owns. The long term space, development and governance own... You had people coming in over one another and expecting the other to conform to their way of doing business. (M7)</i> |

The topics were reinforced through the use of triangulation. This method was used to assist with both the within case and cross-case pattern comparison by reviewing the literature review, running notes, and new research conducted after the interviews ended. This method requires the use of multiple data-collection methods, data sources, analysts, or theories as supporting evidence (Gall et al., 2007; Patton, 1994).

Triangulation was also used in the upcoming steps as a useful method to test the validity of qualitative research.

Step 6: Shaping Hypotheses

Iterative tabulation of evidence; replication logic across cases; search for evidence of the “how” and “why” research questions

According to Eisenhardt (1989), hypotheses are formed through a two-part process by: 1) sharpening the constructs; and 2) building evidence which measures the construct in each case. This process is iterative and involves the constant comparison between data and constructs until there is a convergence into a single, well-defined construct. The use of replication logic – comparison of construct to each case - is especially important because it also enhances confidence and validity of the emerging hypotheses (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009).

Through constant iterations and comparisons to the research questions and the topics identified in the preceding section, the following hypotheses were formed:

1. Civil-military cooperation in the PRT was severely compromised when the military did not respect civilian expertise or rank.

2. Civil-military cooperation in the PRT suffered when both civilians and military ignored the civilian chain of command.
3. Physical co-location of the PRTs with the maneuver units is key for successful civil-military cooperation.
4. Constant and frequent communication between the senior civilian at the brigade level (SCR-B) and the PRT civilian lead was critical for civil-military cooperation in the PRTs.
5. The most pivotal roles to ensure civil-military cooperation in the PRTs were the SCR-B, brigade combat team leader (BCT-C), provincial reconstruction team commander (PRT-C), Department of State lead (DOS-L) and the U.S. Agency for International Development lead (USAID-L).
6. If the PRT-C was ineffective, then civilian leads cooperated directly with the maneuver unit commander (MU-C) and Special Operations Forces commander (SOF-C).
7. The PRTs could not succeed and achieve their missions if they did not have the support of the BCT-C
8. Personalities, while important, became a stronger determiner in cooperation when the structure (Simmelian triad) falters.
9. Cooperation within the PRT struggled when the structure did not facilitate behaviors required for high performing teams.
10. Different development philosophies hindered cooperation in the PRTs.

Step 7: Enfolding Literature

Comparison with similar and conflicting literature

This step required comparing the emergent findings and hypotheses against the existing literature. An intentional comparison will either confirm or disconfirm the findings. In some cases, the comparison yielded conflicting results. The researcher then discussed the discrepancies with the interviewees. For example, the researcher noticed that tensions outside the PRT created issues within the PRT that hampered cooperation. Specifically, both the civilians and military personnel noted conflict between the PRT-C and the MU-C and SOF-C, primarily with respect to role redundancies (C5, C6, M8, M9). Each commander had intelligence and civil affairs soldiers assigned to him. As a result, there were “turf” battles and questions of who was responsible for certain roles.

In addition to the literature, searches for new articles, books, and paper have been conducted throughout the past year. The researcher used search engines and databases, such as Google Scholar, Google Books, EBESCO, CIAO, Academic Premier. Internal documents from DOS, US Army, and USAID were also requested. This literature further cemented the study’s findings and conclusions.

Step 8: Reaching Closure

Theoretical saturation when possible

The study was complete when theoretical saturation of the data and the theory was achieved. In other words, new research did not produce any additional insights, and the theory could only be incrementally improved.

Theoretical saturation was reached through the triangulation process. The researcher confirmed that saturation had occurred when she verified the key findings, hypotheses, and theory with several of the interviewees from DOS, USAID, conventional U.S. Army, and Special Operations Forces. The researcher also compared the results of the study against peer reviewed papers, relevant government documents, and updated articles published by a respected news agency.

Threats and Resolutions

To improve the accuracy and the validity of the data, the following threats have been identified. The researcher took these threats under consideration and countered with the resolutions listed in Table 7: Threats to Validity.

Table 7. Threats to Validity

| Threat | Resolution |
|--------------------------------|--|
| Faulty Construct | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Theoretical saturation of data and theory (Eisenhardt, 1998; Yin, 2009) - Replication logic/pattern search (Eisenhardt, 1998) - Triangulation of data (Patton, 1999; Yin, 2009) |
| Hypothesis Testing | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Replication logic - Comparison against existing literature (Enfolding Literature step in the model) - Triangulation of data and potential theory (Eisenhardt, 1998; Stake, 1995) |
| Non-response Bias (interviews) | Requested senior DOS contact and brigade commanders to endorse study and encourage participation |
| Researcher Bias | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bracketing to withhold researcher presuppositions (Ray, 1994). • Reflexivity or ability to critically examine own reactions (Paterson, 1994). |

Ethics and Human Relations

This study was approved by the University of Minnesota Institutional Review Board (IRB) on May 7, 2010. The ethics office in the U.S. Department of State also approved the study to ensure that the participants are protected by the U.S. Privacy Act.

The next section articulates the results of the study. Adhering to the methodology articulated in this chapter, results are identified and explained. They are then discussed in the context of the research questions to determine what organizational structure is best for the fostering of cooperation between the civilians and the military within the PRTs.

Chapter 4: Findings and Results

Findings and results are explored in this chapter. The chapter begins with a review of the research questions, topics, and hypotheses that were formulated from the data collection phase. Findings were generated and compared with effective team behaviors and social network structures that promote or do not promote cooperation within the PRTs. Finally, these findings were used to evaluate hypotheses to determine whether a new organizational structure and underpinning theory can be crafted to improve cooperation between the U.S. civilians and military in the U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan.

Review

The two research questions this study seeks to answer are:

1. How does the current PRT organizational structure facilitate cooperation between the U.S. military personnel and the U.S. civilians to aid in the success of the U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan?
2. What theory can be generated to better design a structure to promote cooperation in U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan?

The findings have been generated principally from the 20 interviews conducted. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the raw data had been categorized into five categories and 24 topics. See Table 8: Summary of Categories and Topics.

Table 8. Summary of Categories and Topics

| | | Categories | | | | |
|---------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|---|------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------|
| | | Structure | People | Cooperative Behaviors | Uncooperative Behaviors | Other |
| Topics | • Leadership | • Personalities | • Communication | • Interagency/ | • Org Culture | |
| | • Roles/ Expectations | • Key Relationships | • Respect | • Inter-service Tensions | • Training | |
| | • Chain of Command | • Recruitment/ Selection | • Sharing Resources (expertise, info & funds) | • Personal Motivations | • Pace/ Prioritization | |
| | • Improvement | • Expertise (Skills & Knowledge) | • Friendship | • Credibility Issues | | |
| | • Team Composition | | • Planning and Implementing Together | • Accountability Issues | | |
| | • Military Dominance | | | • End-runs | | |
| | | | | | | |

Ten hypotheses evolved and were categorized based upon their relevance to the research questions. Additional support to confirm or disconfirm these hypotheses was garnered through the literature review, follow-up questions with new and original interviewees, and additional documentation review. The hypotheses are:

1. Civil-military cooperation in the PRT was severely compromised when the military did not respect civilian expertise or rank.
2. Civil-military cooperation in the PRT suffered when both civilians and military ignored the civilian chain of command.
3. Physical co-location of the PRTs with the maneuver units was key for successful civil-military cooperation.
4. Constant and frequent communication between the senior civilian at the brigade level (SCR-B) and the PRT civilian lead was critical for civil-military cooperation in the PRTs.

5. The most pivotal roles to ensure civil-military cooperation in the PRTs were the SCR-B, brigade combat team leader (BCT-C), provincial reconstruction team commander (PRT-C), Department of State lead (DOS-L) and the U.S. Agency for International Development lead (USAID-L).
6. If the PRT-C was ineffective, then civilian leads cooperated directly with the maneuver unit commander (MU-C) and Special Operations Forces commander (SOF-C).
7. The PRTs could not succeed and achieve their missions if they did not have the support of the BCT-C.
8. Personalities, while important, became a stronger determiner in cooperation when the structure (Simmelian triad) falters.
9. Cooperation within the PRT struggled when the structure did not facilitate behaviors required for high performing teams.
10. Different development philosophies hindered cooperation in the PRTs.

Findings

The research findings are organized as follows:

- Definitions
- Contradictions and Commonalities
- PRT Environment
- Main Findings

The study's results were then derived from the application of the findings to the research questions.

Definitions

During the interviews, participants were asked how they would define cooperation and to provide examples of successful and unsuccessful cooperation between the military and the civilians within the PRT context. The participants were also asked to define integration as the researcher noticed that cooperation and integration were used interchangeably at times. Civilian responses regarding cooperation generally included fostering a collaborative approach by regularly communicating, working towards a common goal, sharing resources, and managing personalities. They tended to blur any distinctions between cooperation and cooperative behaviors. "Cooperation is sort of representatives of multiple organizations working together." (C4) "Cooperation is an inter-team approach. You're in the same area, but you're just not really the same team" (C2). "Cooperation is willing to spend time explaining the situation with your counterparts and being open to how you can work together (C3). "Cooperation is creating an enabling environment for mutual respect and a collaborative decision-making approach." (C7).

In a few cases, the civilians described cooperation as a response to their relationships with their military counterparts: "Cooperation is when civilians add input to military matter"(C1). "Cooperation is civilians adapting to the military thinking of operations" (C2). "Cooperation is allowing /presenting opportunities to disagree" (C5). "Cooperation occurs with the military willingness to learn civilian culture" (C8).

To continue to refine cooperation, the researcher identified cooperative and uncooperative behaviors within the interviewee's stories and examples. Common

cooperative behavior among the civilians included: “communication... lots and lots of communication” (C1). “Living together... meeting, dining, working out, traveling together... we became friends” (C3). “Planning, executing, and making decisions together” (C6).

Uncooperative behaviors centered on exclusionary practices, such as not inviting their counterparts to meetings, disrespecting the civilian’s rank, and reinforcing inequality of roles and authority. “It was hard not being included in important meetings, like kill or capture targeting meetings” (C9). “Having to always prove ourselves was draining, and sometimes it didn’t even matter at the end of the day. They (military) were still going to do what they wanted to do” (C6). “An uncooperative behavior was using Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) money on a development project without consulting us first” (C8).

Integration was not as well-defined as cooperation. “Integration = 1 team” (C8). “Integration means you share more responsibilities and trust others to do their part” (C5). “Integration is dependent upon the successful management of personalities” (C1). “Integration is bringing representatives of all organizations into becoming one organization” (C4).

Civilians definitions of integration were equally diverse. Some acknowledged that integration was a desired goal. “Integration is essential for COIN to work.” (C5). Most resisted integration and advocated that it was not in the best interests of the civilians or the PRT. These individuals reflected a general concern that they could become a voice or tool for the military (Dzeidzic & Seidl, 2005). “I don’t see integration

as something we should necessarily be striving for.” (C4). “Personally, I don’t think integration is desired” (C9). “If there are separate missions (civilian and military), then don’t integrate. There is no platform; it’s a combat unit.” (C2). Another reported that “civ-mil integration was actually civilians being assumed under a military structure and following military orders” (C4). One distinguished integration as “bringing disparate groups under one structure. Cooperation is allowing disparate groups to work together, but keeping groups distinct. Integration is not necessary” (C7). Finally, one civilian believed that “integration will mean going to whichever are more numerous or more powerful. They (the military) are going to do things the way the military knows how to do things, and you’re going to lose a lot of accumulated experiential knowledge that people with assistance and diplomacy have” (C10).

Interestingly, the military did not make a distinction between cooperation and integration. “I don’t ever recall defining those terms (cooperation and integration) and asking people to use them that way in discussions or anything like that.” (M3). It was assumed that integration was the goal, and that cooperation would naturally occur. “Without integration, cooperation is lukewarm at best” (M8).

Military examples of cooperative behavior gleaned included constant communication (M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, M6), an understanding of military priorities (M1, M3), sharing resources, and the ability to plan and implement together (M3, M5, M6, M9). In particular, the military stressed a “Board of Directors” (BOD) approach in which the BCT-C, SCR-B, PRT-C, PRT civilian leads, MU-C, the ADT-C, ACOE-C, and the SOF-C

met on a weekly basis. In person meetings were preferred, but not always possible if the key leads were located on different bases.

In summary, while cooperation was desired by both the military and the civilians, integration was not always the answer. Civilians, in particular, were not in favor of being fully subsumed into the military hierarchy. Regardless, both seemed to agree on cooperative and uncooperative behaviors. Both sets of behaviors seem to hinge on the ability to physically meet, communicate, share information, and positively relate to each other in a fast-paced, war environment.

Contradictions and Commonalities

The interviews, follow-up questions, and literature review generally supported each other. However, there was a polarity in the raw data that revealed how far apart the two groups perceived certain issues and behaviors. Contradictory findings are listed in Table 9: Civil-Military Contradictions.

Table 9. Civil-Military Contradictions

| Finding | Contradictory Finding |
|--|---|
| <i>PRTs can operate in any environment. (M1, M2, M3)</i> | <i>PRTs struggled to operate in areas experiencing more than moderate conflict. (C3, M4)</i> |
| <i>Any civilian lead from DOS, USAID, or USDA can lead the PRT. (C8, M3, M5)</i> | <i>The DOS lead should lead the PRT. (C11)</i> |
| <i>Civilians are not receiving enough information. We should be involved in targeting meetings. (C1, C2)</i> | <i>Civilians are receiving too much information that is often unrelated to their missions. (C5, C6)</i> |
| <i>Military and civilian personnel are clear about the PRT's mission. (C5)</i> | <i>Military and civilians have different conceptions of the PRT mission. (M1, C4, C8)</i> |
| <i>Cooperation can exist without integration. (C7)</i> | <i>Cooperation = integration. (M3)</i> |

| Finding | Contradictory Finding |
|---|--|
| <i>Civilian hierarchy is needed to work with the military. (C8)</i> | <i>Civilian hierarchy adds yet another bureaucracy that slows down the flow of information. (C4)</i> |
| <i>The pre-deployment PRT training was good and adequate. (M5)</i> | <i>The answer is training. More training before and during deployment is required. (M7, C3, C10)</i> |
| <i>The Special Forces, Reservists and National Guardsmen were great to work with because they understood civil affairs. (C5, C6, C11)</i> | <i>Reservists and National Guardsmen are not qualified to work substantively in civil affairs. (M9)</i> |
| <i>I worked with some terrific civilians from DOS, USAID, and USDA. (C11)</i> | <i>Some civilians were old, whiny, and had no international experience (C1)</i> |
| <i>Physical co-location of the PRT with the maneuver unit is imperative (C4, C5)</i> | <i>It doesn't matter if the PRT and the maneuver unit are co-located. (M8)</i> |
| <i>Reach back to the Embassy is good as you can get answers to your questions much faster. (C6)</i> | <i>Reach back to the Embassy complicates cooperation as it confuses messages and surprises other civilians and military personnel outside the chain of command. (C4)</i> |
| <i>Some of the worst PRT-Cs were Navy or Air Force.”(M4, M9)</i> | <i>It doesn't matter. A Navy guy, Air Force guy, or National Guard guy... anyone can do the role as long as you are a good Lieutenant Colonel. (M8)</i> |
| <i>Age doesn't matter as long as the individual is competent and can earn others' respect. (M8)</i> | <i>Age matters is a culture that respects maturity. (C2, M9)</i> |

Interviewees did agree on some findings. These agreements dealt with regular communication among all the leads and the SCR-B and the BCT-C, the much-needed support from the BCT-C, interagency and inter-service branch tensions, the impact of positive and negative personalities, the role of organizational culture, and the importance of skilled labor. These commonalities are listed in Table 10: Civil-Military Commonalities

Table 10. Civil-Military Commonalities

| Civilians | Military |
|---|---|
| <i>Constant communication between BCT-C, SCR-B, DOS-L, USAID-L, MU-C, and USDA representative if present is key. (C1, C2, C3, C5, C6, C8, C9)</i> | <i>Weekly, “Board of Director” meetings with the BCT-C, SCR-B, DOS-L, USAID-L, MU-C, and USDA representative if present is a must. (M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, M6)</i> |
| <i>Without BCT-C, the PRTs cannot achieve success. (C1, C5, C6, C11)</i> | <i>BCT-C must set the expectations up front and demand that commanders comply. (M1, M2, M3, M5, M6, M8).</i> |
| <i>Interagency tensions, carried over from DC, could make cooperation more difficult. (C7)</i> | <i>Tensions between agencies, especially USAID and DOS strained cooperation. (M1, M7)</i> |
| <i>Military CA tension with other CA units fanned questions of who was in charge. (C9)</i> | <i>Frictions among the CA roles complicated cooperation. (M7, M8, M9)</i> |
| <i>Everything depended upon personality. (C1, C3, C6)</i> | <i>Personality helped or hindered cooperation. (M2, M3, M7)</i> |
| <i>Organizational culture underpins everything. (C8, C10)</i> | <i>Cooperation cannot be understood without taking into account organizational culture. (M3)</i> |
| <i>Skilled and experienced talent is critical. (C1, C2, C10)</i> | <i>Having the right people in the right jobs was critical. (M2)</i> |

The commonalities seem to reflect a mutual agreement on cooperative behaviors and issues promoting civil-military cooperation within the PRTs as well as those derailing it. These issues will be explored in depth throughout this chapter.

Little Change

Unfortunately not much has changed in terms of structure and behaviors since 2003 and the timeframe for this study (2009-2010). PRT members still complain of unclear goals and ties to a larger strategy (Kuypers & Anderson, 2010; Lopez, 2007; Perito, 2005; Vasquez, 2012; C10), lack of preparation and training (Hernandorena,

2008; Lopez, 2007; PRT-BCT Handbook, 2011; C9; M7), inability of civilian agencies to staff positions with qualified civilians (McFate, 2004; C6; C9; M2), civilians' difficulty of fitting into the military's strict, 'command and control' culture (Dziedzic & Seidl, 2005; Eckert, 2011; C5; C6), having to adversely deal with powerful personalities that could either promote or hinder cooperation (Dziedzic & Seidl, 2005; PRT-BCT Handbook, 2011; C6; M1; M4). While these problems persist, the interviewees and more recent literature for this study noted that there have been improvement in some areas e.g. preparation and training and the streamlining of some project funding and implementation processes (GAO 12-285, 2012; C7, M7, M9).

The PRT Environment: Six Operating Conditions

The U.S. PRTs cannot be understood fully without understanding the contextual environment that impacts them. Six central operating conditions emerged that shape the PRT's general working environment. These conditions impacted all of the PRTs and their members in varying degrees. They include:

1. **War.** Afghanistan is a nation-state at war. The U.S. has had combat troops in Afghanistan for over 10 years. Some interviewees reported that working in an active combat zone was a new experience for many civilians (C3, M1). Even though U.S. development and democracy efforts do occur in conflict and post conflict countries, most civilians were not accustomed to living and working alongside the U.S. military. These civilians were also not as familiar with the intense security focus, whereby leaving the forward operating base (FOB) became a "mission" that the PRT-C or the Maneuver Unit Commander (MU-C) had to plan in advance. For a civilian to leave

one of the FOB's, a cadre of soldiers would have to accompany him or her in heavily armed personnel carriers. Surprising to this researcher, both military and civilian interviewees reported that the civilians did not let the threat of physical injury, capture, or death impede their willingness to work in such a hostile environment (C3, M4).

Because of the war status, the pace of projects and missions was faster than many civilians were prepared to adopt. This finding is clearly evidenced by the different development philosophies shared by many civilians and military personnel (C7, M1, M7). Civilians that specialized in development tended to prefer a slow development cycle (e.g. building an education system instead of just building a school) (M3). The military opted for quick, stabilization projects, such as digging a well. The military viewed these short-term projects as a way to ensure Afghan cooperation to hand over insurgents, report improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and provide any information leading to the killing or capture of Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives.

2. **Military-domination.** The U.S. PRTs are distinct from the other PRT models in that they are led by the U.S. military. The U.S. PRTs are primarily located in Regional Command East (RC-E), where the bulk of the fighting is still occurring. The physical security of the team is of primary importance. As a result, the military has more money, physical assets, and people. It heavily influences key decisions and actions. "The military are running the show." (C4). "Usually the military guys had something they wanted to do at the PRT, and they'd ask us (civilians) to contribute to it" (C10).

Because of these extreme differences, some maintain that structural disparity between the civilians and the military is the biggest problem. “One could say that the military IS the problem” (C8).

There was one U.S. civilian-led PRT in RC-E. The Panjshir PRT, located in the province of Panjshir, was run by a civilian from DOS. This PRT had a different environment. First, insurgents had been routed in the area, and the province was relatively peaceful. There was less focus on security, and more on governance and development (Smith, 2010). Second, the Panjshiris were adamant about downplaying military presence in their province. “They basically signed an agreement that they would ensure the safety and the security of the PRT” (M4). The presence of combat troops was not needed or welcomed.

3. **Interagency and Inter-service branch tensions.** Every interviewee mentioned the tension between some of the civilian agencies that could impact cooperation. In particular, the historically uneasy relationship between DOS and USAID was listed as the most common interagency tension that hampered cooperation. DOS and USAID have had a difficult relationship since the latter’s inception in the 1960s. For the past 50 years, USAID and DOS have differed on the primary issue of who should be responsible for international development and assistance. “The State PRT office leader was trying to integrate them (DOS, USAID, and USDA offices) and trying to push them back into order. And the AID folks kept trying to push her back” (M7). USAID, a small agency of only 5,000 people, has a dotted line connection to State. They share the same Secretary, but USAID is funded and operates separately.

This fractious relationship impacts the PRTs in two ways. First, in some cases, DOS and USAID were at institutional odds and resisted collaboration.

There's got to be a management structure where you can point to one level down and say "take care of this at your level." USAID fought it... like you can't rate them. You can't really have any control over any of these people. I could say: 'AID, I need information on this.' And the AID guy could just ignore it. And I don't even have any institutional mechanism because they would just go back to the Embassy and say: "State is causing me headaches." It was a huge, huge, problem because then we were not unified. (C2).

Second, USAID's internal processes caused some civilians and military to view USAID as incompetent. Procurement, project implementation, and monitoring and evaluation are traditionally, driven centrally out of the USAID Mission (in-country program office) and the agency headquarters in Washington, DC. In this case, key decisions were made out of Kabul and Washington, DC. Unfortunately, many times these decisions were not communicated to the USAID people in the field (M7). As a result, many USAID professionals were embarrassed or frustrated that not only were they lacking accurate information, but they could not quickly implement projects (C7). Unfortunately, these communication issues, compiled with hiring inexperienced contractors and direct hires, compounded negative stereotypes of incompetence. It is not a surprise that mutual understanding and cooperation among the parties was lacking (M7).

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) had such a small footprint or presence in Afghanistan that it did not factor heavily in the analysis of civil-military cooperation. In fact, there were only five USDA staff members in Afghanistan in 2009 (Kuypers & Anderson, 2010). Because of its developmental focus,

one interviewee even stated that USDA should be under USAID (M5). For the most part, the USDA personnel were assets and were able to work cooperatively with other civilian agencies and their military counterparts. “USDA’s culture is collaborative. They’re used to working with teams as the agency is so small” (C8).

Likewise, there were tensions occurring within the military that hampered cooperation among themselves. A common tension mentioned is the relationship between the PRT-C and the maneuver unit commander (MU-C). “There was friction between the PRT-C and the MU-C. The MU-C always wanted to get involved and get in the business of the PRT. Likewise, the MU-C didn’t like it when the PRT-C seemed to be infringing on the turf of the Maneuver Unit. (M6). Causes fueling this tension included disparate personalities and perceptions by the maneuver unit that the PRT security forces were not “real” soldiers i.e. the PRT troops were not combat troops, but were chartered to protect civilians and Afghans (M4).

Another sticking point was the disparity in power and resources. Since the PRT forces are not designed for combat, they needed to request support from the maneuver units to complete their missions. Typical support included additional security or air assets (e.g. helicopters to transport civilians to cities and villages that were deemed too dangerous to travel in the traditional MRAPs (mine resistant armored personnel carrier). In some cases, the personality clashes between the PRT-C and MU-C were so poisonous that the MU-C reportedly denied access to these assets and other support required by the PRT.

Sometimes our requests didn't happen for various reasons: special missions, bad weather, whatever. But, in general, if we requested it, we generally got it... What I observed with this team is that they didn't get it very often. The military counterparts withdrew resources because they didn't take him (PRT-C) seriously. (C5)

Other tense relationships included the relationship between the PRT CA group and the maneuver unit's CA group.

Within the military, you have the PRT Commander and the CA team leader (from the maneuver unit) conflict. You add the CA guy and his team to the PRT CA team and you have an organizational structural nightmare (M7).

The CA team within the PRT was further stressed by the need to coordinate with the Special Operations Forces commander (SOF-C) and his civil affairs teams (M9). The strain between the PRT CA and the MU-CA teams and SOF seemed to stem from role redundancies and a perceived lack of preparation and expertise. All three were responsible for civil affairs, but it was not clear who was in charge.

Lack of expertise within the PRT and the MU was another issue among the CA teams. The CA soldiers in the PRTs and the maneuver units were primarily Reservists and National Guardsmen. These units received approximately two weeks of training in civil affairs, while the SOF received a minimum of one year (Lamb & Cinnamond, 2009). Some military firmly believed that these 'weekend warriors' should not interact with the Afghan provincial and district governors because they could do more harm than good (M6, M9).

Interestingly, some civilians stated they preferred working with the Reservists and Guardsmen over conventional Army personnel because the former "got" civilian sector jobs. These non-career troops held jobs such as attorneys, public administrators,

and teachers and had first-hand knowledge of expertise the PRT was trying to instill within the Afghan population (C4, C5, M4). Likewise, it should be noted that civilians enjoying working with Special Forces for exactly the same reason. “We had wonderful cooperation with the Special Forces. It is actually the model we need for the future of Afghanistan” (C6).

A final tension within military-military relations concerned the recruiting and staffing the PRT-C position. Within the 2009-2010 timeframe, there were 12 U.S. PRT commanders who were from either the U.S. Air Force or the U.S. Navy. Their ranks of captain were roughly the equivalent of a colonel in the U.S. Army or National Guard. Typical comments included: “The Navy and the Air Force need to staff these positions because their guys can’t be promoted unless they have command experience in a combat zone. They are still learning how to lead” (M4). Or, “What does a Naval nuclear submarine captain know about leading ground troops? Afghanistan is a land-locked country with no Navy” (M9). These perceptions created a sense of disrespect and distrust towards the PRT-C, whether it was warranted or not.

4. **Washington Politics.** Comments were made repeatedly that the problems with civil-military cooperation was a problem of Washington politics playing out into the field. “What happens in Washington happens in the Embassies. There are cases where somebody wants to do something that doesn’t fit with the way the military would like to do things... or perhaps how the civilians would like to do things” (C10). Again, the age old tension and turf wars between DOS and USAID were mentioned. This constant tug of war over who is charge of what project and how the project will be implemented was

clearly evident in the field. “The tension between AID and State gets in the way. But it gets in the way because the biggest tension between AID and State is in the beltway.” (M2). This condition complicated cooperation because some of the direction coming from the Washington-headquartered home agencies was contradictory to the people in the field. Washington politicians, to appease their constituents or critics, pushed for projects that may have been unsustainable at that moment in time. “We maybe had a short-term mindset in that we tried to implement solutions which may have had merit, but we tried to do it on a political timeline that really... made it ineffective” (C6). This recognition of the presence of Washington politics at work helped create the argument that pre-deployment training must take into account the goals and organizational cultures of DOS, USAID, and the Pentagon (C10, M7).

5. **Organizational Cultures.** It would be remiss to discuss civil-military relations without taking organizational cultures into account. As mentioned by both military and civilian interviewees, organizational cultures heavily impacted cooperation (C2, M4).

Cooperation between two organizational entities was often compromised when the two respective cultures clash.

The differences between the civilian and the military cultures make it harder... the military is very results-driven, tends to have less tolerance for ambiguity, for being patient with something over a timeframe. So the fact that we had to keep saying: We’ve got to be patient. We can’t rush it. This guy (Afghan provincial governor), you know, may not be perfect. They aren’t all bad guys. You can’t just lump everyone into the bad guy category. It’s a hard message you have to keep hitting over and over. (C4).

Cultures are generally formed through a system of interrelated assumptions that are often shaped by a shared history, values and expectations (Veiga, Lubatkin, Calori &

Very, 2000). Members form a strong psychological bond that underpins their individual as well as their group identities. As a result, members prefer to be among their own and tend to avoid those with dissimilar cultures (Veiga et al., 2000). Not surprisingly, the military and civilians tend to gravitate towards their respective units and agencies rather than to their PRT. “We all recognize that we’re in a sense serving two masters. We all have our own bosses elsewhere outside the PRT” (C10). Given that different organizations have different missions and priorities, this allegiance to core beliefs caused significant barriers to cooperation within the PRTs.

The military unit as a whole had difficulty dealing with the COIN strategy. I think they had been prepared in their state as: “You’re going to Afghanistan and you’re going to kill bad guys.” They didn’t value the mission of the PRT. We came in with a bad misunderstanding of this group’s mission. It hurt us in terms of cooperation. (C5)

The U.S. military and the civilian cultures are distinctly different. Military values are influenced by the military’s ability to rely on coercive methods to establish order over “reason and persuasion” to minimize conflicts (Burk, 2002). The military prides itself on its “command and control” approach that encourages a hierarchical decision-making process that is clear and uncompromising. From the outside, the military’s intense focus on community and internal cohesion makes it look ‘clannish’ (Gough, 1992). This tight knit family can often alienate those who are not part of it (Rosen, 1995). A natural outcome of this clannish behavior is the notion of “mechanical obedience” – that soldiers are part of a fraternity that does not question authority (Hedges, 1992). For civilians, this sentiment reflects a more authoritarian organization,

not their own democratic organizations, where people are free to communicate without a formal chain of command.

Now there were some units with us that were completely closed off. And, it was just really hard to break into that culture because there were some people that were really there to fight. Now you're relying on the military chain of command to say: "Hey, we're doing something different here. It was very difficult (C2).

The SCR role, with its accompanying civilian chain of command, was created to help bridge this cultural gap and resolve disputes between the civilians and the military.

It was determined that there needs to be a support structure and an authoritative structure for civilians so that there was a place to go and resolve issues where you might have an issue with your military counterpart in leadership and development. (C8)

Unfortunately, many civilians reported the military did not respect the civilian chain of command, referring to the chain as "shoulders without rank." Consequently, civilians felt they could be easily dismissed and were not encouraged to cooperate (C1, C2, C5, C6, C11).

They (military) have a certain view of what a colonel is, and if you tried to tell them that the civilian so and so (rank) is the equivalent, they don't believe that. They just don't see; don't hold that person in the same regard or envision as having the same authority. (C9)

Dissimilar cultures also hindered cooperation because the civilians and military viewed mandates, roles, processes and basic philosophies differently.

The Army's organizational culture is built around fighting people until they are defeated. Counterinsurgency means you're eliminating the need to fight. That's not what armies do. On the interagency culture, USAID officers have been operating for years alone and unafraid in the worst places in the world with nothing, but a bag of money. And they do just fine in that setting. They don't fix sources of instability. They don't fix schools. They build education systems. They build democracies in whole countries. That culture worked against us a little. (M3)

A simple example of how different cultures created confusion centered on security and what it meant to both entities (Nordland, 2010). Military orders dictated that security was to be achieved through attacks against the insurgents (Dziedzic & Seidl, 2005). Civilians, on the other hand, view security as an indication that the insurgents did not perceive them as a threat (Dziedzic & Seidl, 2005). This difference of perception supported dissonant cultural beliefs. The military's traditional goal is to forcefully eliminate terrorist threats through violence (M3). Many civilians, on the other hand, maintain that the presence of armed forces deters some Afghans from receiving aid as well as promotes civilian interests as military interests (Dziedzic & Seidl, 2005).

Another example in which different cultures supported different operational beliefs centered on the Joint Prioritize Execution List (JPEL). The military approached the list as eliminating those insurgents who are the most influential and dangerous to the ISAF mission. The insurgents' roles within the communities were secondary. Civilians approached the list differently, pointing out that certain insurgents had important ties to the local Afghan governments. If these insurgents were eliminated, the process of administering aid to the community through the Afghan government would be compromised (C1, C3, C7).

In terms of PRT operations, civilians often describe the military's culture as having a "Get it done" attitude.

The military is trained to lead. And they will. They will take on leadership, assign tasks, and get things done if they see it is not being done. And that may mean they are stepping on your toes because they don't like how it's getting done (C5).

In some cases, the military justified its “stepping in” because they had resolved similar situations with their own expertise and problem-solving skills. (M1, C1, C2, C4, C5). As one senior military officer pointed out:

In most cases, they (civilian lead and Army captain) got along pretty well. The smart guy realizes that the younger captain really understands what’s going on from previous experience. And the captain now realizes he’s got the textbook he didn’t have before. A lot of times it wasn’t too different than what he had already been doing. (M1)

These behaviors, at times, created conflict between the civilians and their military counterparts because the former may have had different development ideas regarding a specific village or province. One example included the digging of wells in a certain province.

The military were digging a lot of wells in one province. They saw that the Afghan women had to walk a mile to the river to get fresh water for the day. The military thought it could improve the villagers’ lives by digging a well in the center of the village so that the women would not have to walk as far. They dug a number of wells in the centers of many villages. Where they thought they helped the Afghan population, they actually hurt it. They disrupted their social practices. The women go to the river every day not just to get water, but to catch up with family and friends from neighboring villages. Furthermore, by indiscriminately digging all of these wells, the military actually lowered the water table level in that province. The military and civilians alike need to be more thoughtful and systemic in its assistance (M9).

It is not that the military did not welcome the expertise brought by the civilians. “I was ready for civilian leaders to take charge. I wanted them to apply their expertise and run with it.” (M1). However, if it is a project that is not in line with military interests, the military had a habit of promoting and implementing their goals first.

You got to build roads because everything hinges on it. I think schools and libraries and women shelters... all those things are extremely important. I got that. And I would get rid of every single one of them for one more mile of road. (M1)

It should be noted that civilian and military cultures can be dissected to reveal the presence of other organizational cultures. Each civilian agency has its own culture, shaped by the agency's structure, assumptions, and beliefs. "DOS had a culture of diplomacy in advanced countries. AID had a culture of development in peaceful, third world countries. USDA had a domestic focus and had to learn for the first time how to live and work internationally" (M3).

The various military units also have their own cultures. Special Forces, with its stringent acceptance criteria, prides itself on having some of the most elite soldiers (M5, M9). National Guardsmen and reservists, viewed historically as part-time soldiers, have cultures driven by their purposes and vast experience in the civilian world. Finally, the service branches – US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines – have cultures that produce a distinct understanding of key processes (M5). These cultures also have an impact on the PRTs as these service members perceived their responsibilities through the lens of their respective traditions and ways of conducting business (M9). For these service men and women, it took a little time to adjust to the U.S. Army's systems and processes (M5).

Finally, it should not be forgotten that Afghanistan's many ethnic cultures may have had an impact on the PRT. Local Afghans served in the PRTs as interpreters, representatives of the provincial governments, members of the police, and soldiers from the ANSF. "So on top of all, perhaps was the most important culture, the Afghan culture. Even in the Afghan culture, they are subdivided in so many ways: tribally, educated vs. non-education, communist military officers vs. mujahedeen... They are all

cultural divides.” (M3). However, since this study focuses on the relationships among U.S. civilians and military within the context of the PRTs, the Afghan personnel and their respective subcultures are not discussed.

6. **Funding.** Many of the interviewees discussed the need to coordinate funding sources (C1, C2, C7, C8, M1, M2, M6). According to one civilian, one of the biggest challenges to the PRT was to coordinate the funding efforts across approximately 15 different organizations that were offering aid and assistance (C7). Complicating this issue was the latent, unwritten belief that if the agency does not spend all of its money, the U.S. Congress will freeze or reduce its funding for the next year’s budget (C7).

USAID had considerable funds tied into various developmental programs across the country. DOS had stabilization funds to spend, and all of the military units had discretionary funds they could spend on stabilization and development efforts. In particular, the PRT-C had substantial funds available to him or her via the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP). In one area of responsibility (four provinces), the CERP fund had more than \$34 million for quick stabilization projects and to supplement civilian development and governance funds (M2).

There was never a question of not having enough funding to complete a project (M1, M2). Instead, it became a question of which agency or military unit could fund and implement a project the fastest. In many cases, the PRT-C used CERP money since it was easy to access and the military was willing to share these funds as needed. “I just want to make you (civilians) successful. You need security to get to point A so that you

can check on a project? Do you not have enough money to complete a project? Maybe I can augment it with my CERP dollars” (M1).

Because nearly all of the organizations in the field had separate funding mechanisms, it was difficult to coordinate a general aid strategy (C7). “We were wasting a lot of money over there. We were spending money on stuff we really didn’t need”

(M2). One described the funding conflict between the civilians and military as:

What doesn’t work is our giving stuff away. People don’t take ownership when you give stuff away. So if there’s a place where civilians or military personnel will come into conflict, it’s going to be the one wanting to give stuff away, while the other one says no. We set up a farm enterprise, something that was sustainable. Then the military came and offered to give out 154,000 tons of wheat seed. You just killed any private institution you developed (C8).

Some civilians and military noted that the CERP budget could be misused because of a PRT-C’s personal motivation. Until recently, the PRT-C was rewarded partially by how much money he or she spent on reconstruction activities (C4, C7, C8, M2).

USAID’s funding proved to be especially troublesome as it was centrally directed from the USAID Mission in Kabul, not the provinces. This condition could be challenging as USAID personnel in the field had limited abilities to make program decisions (C7, C11). Communication was reported to be inconsistent between the Mission and the employees and contractors in the field (M7). USAID is a small agency and had to ramp up quickly to meet the hiring needs required by the civilian surge. Consequently, it deployed a mix of employees, personal service contractors (PSCs) and direct hires who had little knowledge of USAID processes. This lack of knowledge frustrated not only the USAID people, but other military and civilians as well (C11, M2, M3).

USAID's funding mechanisms also put strains on the other agencies and military units. "The differing philosophies of USAID sometimes were a hindrance and not as fruitful as it could have been" (C10). Of all the reconstruction projects in the country, USAID had the most. However, most of these were not connected to the PRTs. Until 2010, a central database listing all of these projects was lacking. Unfortunately, this accounting was only for two provinces (C7), Military commanders and civilians alike were irritated. Not only did they not know which USAID projects were in their battle space, but they did not know which ones were attached to the PRT (C1, C3 , C7, M1).

In summary, there are six primary conditions that impact all of the U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan in terms of structure, roles, people, culture, and funding. Depending upon the PRT's location, leadership, staffing, and kinetic levels, these conditions affected civil-military cooperation within the PRTs to varying degrees.

The next section describes how these findings – definitions, contradictions, commonalities, and PRT environment – serve as the foundation for the two primary findings uncovered in this study.

Main Findings

There are two overarching findings that were generated from the triangulated data. They are:

1. **Confusing Leadership Structure.** The confusing PRT leadership structure, stressing co-equal roles, is not reflected in the field. Removing the USDA from the model, the existing structure emphasizes a triad of leaders: Department of State (DOS), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the PRT Commander (PRT-C).

When the civilian presence was lacking, the military took charge and the model became a single-person leadership structure with the PRT-C primarily directing the others' operations. Because the existing U.S. PRT model incorporates two to three civilian leads, the question remains what leadership structure can be devised that will equalize the authority among the three roles.

- 2. Underdeveloped Team.** The current organizational structure of the PRT is not conducive to cooperation as it does not facilitate the principles and behaviors required for successful teams. Successful teams need team members to share a common purpose, work within clearly defined roles, contribute through complementary specialized skills and expertise, accept responsibilities, be held accountable, and extend compassion to one another (Katzenbach & Smith, 1993). Findings from the interviews, supported by team development literature, suggest that team members lacked clarity with respect to the PRT's mission, roles, and responsibilities (C2, C11, M8). The findings also indicate an absence of qualified personnel and skillsets across the civilian agencies and military units (C2, C3, C4, M1, M2, M4, M7). Yet, everyone admitted they had worked with some "talented, open, and hardworking people" from the civilian agencies as well as most military units (C1-C11, M1-M9). Finally, accountability to individual and team performances was rare as the team members suffered from numerous commitments and expectations outside of the PRT (C8).

Confusing Leadership Structure

The U.S. PRTs have a leadership structure that generates confusion vis-à-vis roles and responsibilities. As noted many times, team members often asked the question of “Who’s in charge” (C2, C4, C5, C8, C10). Technically, the military leadership is in charge of the U.S. PRTs (except for Panjshir) (Perito, 2005). The mission of clear, hold, and build supports this decision. It is the military’s job to clear the area of insurgents. It is the military’s responsibility to hold or secure the area so that both civilians and the military can engage in reconstruction activities.

The underpinning philosophy of COIN, with its combination of “hard power” (military force) and “soft power” (civilian governance and development), supports a transitioned leadership. As physical safety increases, the presence of military forces decreases. Therefore, civilians will take on a larger leadership role as security becomes less important. See Figure 8: Spectrum of Conflict Transformation.

We all clearly recognized that our goal for the military was to leave eventually. And at that point, it will be the civilian agencies that will be most active there. The civilians understood that their goal is also to put us in the forefront so that we can do our jobs well to make their jobs easier. (C5)

However, at what point does the transition from military to civilian leadership begin? When does security become less important than governance or development? These questions are further muddled as many of the non-U.S. PRTs, such as the Turkish

*“You have to institutionalize the role of the civilian agencies together with the military. We need to have clear lines of authority that point out how this should be structured. It has been very organic to date”
(C1)*

PRT in the deadly Wardak province, were already civilian-led in highly kinetic areas.




Figure 8. Spectrum of Conflict Transformation (ISAF PRT Handbook, Edition 4, 2005)

The PRTs are a tool to help actualize the U.S. 3 D’s foreign policy: defense, diplomacy, and governance. The equal emphasis on each “D” leads one to think that one is no more important than the other. The organizational charts and corresponding activities suggest a triadic leadership model that supports this policy. The triad is composed of the PRT-C (defense), DOS-L (diplomacy), and USAID-L (development). Since USDA’s presence was too small during the period of analysis, it is treated as a civilian, but not a lead unless the DOS or USAID person is missing.

The many PRT organizational structural models reflect the equality of the DOS, USAID, and USDA leads. A civilian model found in the USAID’s interagency briefing assessment is depicted in Figure 9: PRT Core Task Organization. Similarly, Figure 10: PRT Integrated Command Structure illustrates a similar PRT model found in the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) – PRT Reference Guide (September, 2011).

PRT Core Task Organization




Figure 9. PRT Core Task Organization (Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. An Interagency Assessment, 2006).




Figure 10. PRT Integrated Command Structure (BCT-PRT Reference Guide, 2011)

As with the other models, the civilian leads are represented as co-equals. What is even more confusing in these models is that the PRT-C is shown as being the equivalent to the civilian leads despite the acknowledgement that the PRT-C was in charge of the team (Perito, 2005).

The text accompanying this graphic describes the leadership structure as follows:

DOD was assigned responsibility for improving security in the PRT's area of operation as well as providing all logistical support and providing force protection for all PRT members, including civilians. USAID was given the lead on reconstruction, and DOS was responsible for political oversight, coordination, and reporting. All members of the PRT leadership structure — military and civilian — are required to approve reconstruction projects and coordinate with local government offices and national ministries. The concept anticipated that as PRTs matured and conditions changed, additional capacity would be available through reach-back to additional military and civilian assets.

(PRT Handbook, February, 2011, p. 41)

In the above description, all leads are required to approve reconstruction projects and all are authorized to coordinate with local government officials and national ministries. Yet, this equality was not reflected in practice.

In reality, somebody has to be in charge. Sometimes we talk about the integrated command teams. And somehow the idea is that you have a PRT-C, DOS representative, and a USAID representative, and they're all equals, and somehow they come to a decision by consensus. It wasn't like that (M6).

In terms of official responsibilities, the role divisions seem clear. DOD was responsible for improving security in the PRTs area of (AOR); USAID was tasked to be the lead on reconstruction and development, and DOS was expected to provide political oversight, coordination, and reporting (The Afghanistan PRT Handbook, 2011). See Table 11. PRT Official Responsibilities.

Table 11. PRT Official Responsibilities (Afghanistan PRT Handbook, 2011)

| PRT Commander | DOS Lead | USAID/USDA Leads |
|--|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commanding the military component of the PRT. • Developing PRT strategies in conjunction with the integrated command group • Conducting key leader engagements (KLE's) with high-level GIRoA officials • Coordinating project funding with PRT elements • Ensuring all lines of authority have the same situational awareness on PRT activities/issues • Harmonizing all activities within the lines of operations and understanding the network of PRT tasks | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Developing the PRT strategies in conjunction with the integrated command group • Being the lead on policy, governance, and political issues • Political reporting through various lines of authority • Conducting KLE's with local actors (e.g. governor, elders, and tribal leaders) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Developing PRT strategies in conjunction with the integrated command group • Providing development advice to the PRT and local governance and agricultural structures • Performing PRT development interventions (projects programs and policy) • Conducting KLEs with development actors (e.g. governor, donors, UN, and nongovernmental organizations [NGOs]) |

The organizational charts and the table outlining specific responsibilities add some clarity, but the authorization to work with the same officials across the three lines of effort is confusing. Therefore, who determines the direction of the political relationships when security, governance, and development are so interrelated? A quote

from one DOS-Lead describes how contentious the civil-military relationship can be when key decisions are at stake:

So this issue (with the project) went back and forth... but for a month it was pretty ugly. "Civilians, you don't get it. You just want to split the governor blindly when you know we've got soldiers out here dying." The civilians were saying: "You don't get it. You're not thinking of anything beyond 10 miles down the field. We have to think about what we're trying to achieve long-term (C9).

The triadic structure struggled in other ways.

First, some of the civilian leads were late to deploy or did not deploy at all (C2, C4). This absence left a vacuum of leadership and expertise that the other leads were expected to fill. Second, some civilian and military leads were ineffective because they lacked expertise, a certain skill set, or they had a difficult personality that no one wanted to cross (C1, C5, C7, M4). As a result, these leads were circumnavigated, and others within the organizations were tapped to supply the appropriate information, make a decision, or provide military support. Third, the newly created SCR role and the accompanying chain of command added some confusion even though it was designed to equalize the civilians with their military civilian counterparts. "The role of those senior civilians was not exactly clarified, so there was not a hierarchical organizational coherence" (C11).

Finally, civilians were subject to the military's dominance and their commanders' willingness to provide expertise, intelligence, and transportation. One civilian noted

"The issue was that the Embassy perceived PRTs as civilian entities. They are not civilian entities. They are military entities. If they are civilian entities, then the NSC and the Embassy need to say: "OK. You, the civilian, is in charge" (C2)

casually that the brigade commander, not the PRT-C ruled the PRT as the latter could not be effective without the active support of the brigade commander (C1). Another observed that little could be accomplished until you could persuade the PRT-C of its usefulness (C4). Others commented that “there was less friction if civilians just accepted the military way of doing business” (C2). This ongoing battle was exhausting, especially when the official organizational charts suggested a three or four lead leadership structure.

A useful reference to better understand the complicated leadership dynamics is Zander and Butler’s leadership typology (Zander & Butler, 2010). This typology outlines single, paired, rotated and shared leadership modes. See Figure 11: Leadership Mode Typology. Each mode is identified by the leader’s authority (vertical or horizontal) and the nature of the leader’s activities (specific and focused versus varied or distributed). In many cases, a single-leader structure ensued. The single leader or the PRT-C had the authority to make decisions on key activities within the team. Even though the PRT-C could not force the civilian leads to any action, he had the power to heavily influence or stonewall the leads so that he could accomplish his objectives (Hernandorena, 2008).




Figure 11: Leadership Mode Typology

What evolved most of the time was a dyadic or Zander & Butler’s (2010) paired leadership structure. This structure mirrored the SCR concept of a civilian chain of command that balanced the military chain of command. In many cases, the DOS person assumed the lead role across from the PRT Commander. The paired leadership approach represented a horizontal, not vertical, line of authority as the PRT-C and the civilian lead shared leadership responsibilities. If the relationship between the PRT-C and civilian lead was healthy, the two served as co-leads and made decisions together (C5). If the relationship was unhealthy or fractious, the single-leadership model evolved again. In these cases, the model almost always favored the PRT-C.

Why was DOS and not USAID the co-lead? None of the interviews could fully answer. Some speculated that DOS took the lead because of sheer numbers. There were more DOS personnel in the PRTs than from any other agency (C7). USAID had a large presence, but they were slow to deploy and many of their staffs were contractors, not employees. Another maintained that the DOS person assumed leadership because

the Afghan model was built loosely on the U.S. Iraqi PRT model (C7). In this model, a DOS representative was tasked to co-lead with the PRT-C. Finally, there were some that just believed the DOS should take the lead as governance underpinned all of the PRTs activities (C11). Some speculated that DOS took charge as the military started to favor the PRT's governance goal to strengthen the Afghan government's ability to peacefully serve its population over other development goals (C10). Based on this thinking, it made sense that the governance person from DOS should have more authority than his or her developmental counterpart (C8).

The military seemed to have no preference with respect to which agency led the civilians within the PRT. "The senior civilians could be AID or State. It's about getting the right person" (M2). When pressed, one PRT-C was asked if he could only have one civilian agency in the field – DOS or USAID – which one would he choose? He chose USAID. "USAID has the most resources, and their projects fit the stabilization or clear and hold phases the best" (M5). As the area becomes more stable, this PRT-C believed that a governance person should be the primary lead as the Afghan government would then be in a stronger position to sustainably lead the Afghan people (M5). However, once again, the military was quick to point out that it will assume the development and governance roles if DOS or USAID is not present or if their representatives are ineffective (M1,M8). The dyad then became a single-leader model of leadership.

It is not surprising that the PRT structure waffled between single, dyad, or triad leadership structure. As one civilian pointed out, each PRT was decidedly different based upon terrain, staffing, and level of insurgent activity (C3). Regardless of the actual

leadership structure, there remained an expectation that the triad structure should be sought and maintained. Confusion and resentment occurred when those who believed they were equal, were not treated as equals. “The first part of success for the PRT is to not have any whiny people” (C2).

Underdeveloped Team Structure

In addition to a problematic leadership structure, issues with cooperation between the military and civilians within the PRTs occurred because the structure did not promote cooperative behaviors necessary for a high performing work team. Earlier in this chapter, cooperative behaviors are listed as understanding the mission, communicating regularly, and having the right skills and personalities. Examples illustrated that different understandings of roles, sporadic communication, unqualified staffs, and difficult personalities strained civil-military cooperation.

“Having the right people with the right attitude and the right guidance was huge. Where it fell apart was when you couldn’t get together as a team.” (M5)

Because one of the underpinning conditions for the PRTs is the state of war, teams also needed to be prepared for crisis situations or “when team members are faced with a daily threat of violence in a physically dangerous environment” (Yammarino, Mumford, Connelly & Dionne, 2010). In many cases, team members were new and had difficulty adjusting the environment (C2, C3, C6). This lack of experience could negatively impact relationships with the more seasoned team members.

In addition to the six, underpinning conditions, the PRTs were also affected by rotation schedules (C4, M4). The key roles changed at various times as different agencies and units had different tour lengths. Therefore, successful PRT teams needed

to adapt quickly to new members in an uncertain and often chaotic environment (Edmondson, 2012).

For the purposes of this study, desired team behaviors are categorized by the five success factors in Table 12: Team Success Factors. The success factors are: transparency, harmony, truth-telling, commitment, and accountability. These success factors capture Katzenbach & Smith's seminal work on teams with extra emphasis on those elements necessary for teams in crisis. Katzenbach & Smith (1993) and others asserted that teams were successful if the team members shared a common purpose and goals (Eppler & Sukowski, 2000), had accepted work approach or processes (Eppler & Sukowski, 2000), possessed highly specialized and complementary skills (Sangvai, Lyn & Michener, 2008), were committed and held each other accountable (Sangvai et al., 2008), and genuinely cared for one another (Dubrin, 2010).

In terms of teams in crisis, some scholars maintain that successful teams must have team members who have a strong familiarity with one another (King, 2002). As a result, a freer communication style among the members evolves (Wittenbaum & Stasser, 1996). These same teams are also more likely to openly disagree with each other in a respectful manner (Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams & Neale, 1996). Truth-telling is also easier with an open and respectful environment (Edmondson, 2012).

Trust in each other has been noted as a key element for teams who survive unexpected, often tumultuous events (Campbell, Hannah & Mathews, 2010; Fisher, Hutchings & Sarros, 2010; Sangvai et al., 2008; Sweeney, 2010). Being able to see the contextual interdependencies as well as have a readiness to reflect and consider all

points of view is critical for a team that must be flexible to adapt to new circumstances (Edmondson, 2012).

Findings derived from the interviews and follow-up conversations are compared against each success factor in Table 13: Team Success Factors Comparison. These comparisons describe instances of how and why success factors were not present within the PRTs.

Table 12. Team Success Factors

| Team Success Factors | | | | | |
|----------------------|--|---|---|--|--|
| | Transparency | Harmony | Truth-telling | Commitment | Accountability |
| Key Behaviors | <i>Clarifying mission, goals, processes, roles, and personal beliefs</i> | <i>Creating strong relationships through trust, compassion and acceptance</i> | <i>Distilling truth from myth and having the courage to stand up for it</i> | <i>Creating unity of effort through shared agreements and promises</i> | <i>Holding self and the team responsible for extraordinary results</i> |
| | Acts authentically – according to one’s values | Builds personal, trusting relationships with others | Is willing to state the truth and not tell white lies | Offers solutions | Accepts job responsibilities from start to finish |
| | Can immediately articulate team goals, roles, and responsibilities | Extends compassion towards other team members | Reflects on the impact of individual actions | Willingly shares information and resources | Meets deadlines on time |
| | Communicates regularly to avoid misunderstandings | Unreservedly accepts other team members | Expresses differences openly and respectfully | Is passionate about the team’s mission | Does not want to let their team members down |
| | Aligns team member talents to the right task | Recognizes other team members’ contributions | Stands up for one’s beliefs | Strives for consensus decisions when appropriate | Achieves both team and individual goals |
| | Understands key team processes and their interdependencies | Includes others in team processes | Does not make assumptions based upon imperfect data | Honors promises made to others | Goes the extra distance – will pick up the slack to make the team work |

Table 13. Team Success Factor Comparison

| Team Success Factor | Not present | Evidence |
|--|---|--|
| <p>Transparency <i>Clarifying mission, goals, processes, roles, and personal beliefs</i></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of clarity regarding roles and responsibilities • Redundant roles • Different priorities • Poor communication • Lack of coordination regarding funding • Territorial or turf issues • Inadequate staffing and training | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “The big guidance – overall commanders – sent and understood the correct messages. The middle and upper middle struck me as... not so much mission focused.” (C6). • “A lot of PRT people were struggling because they wondered: What’s my role here? I mean, the military had people who could provide governance and economic development assistance. Oftentimes the State Department person felt like, well... What am I doing here?” (C9) • “The real problem was the military, frankly. It was basically over the issue of who is in charge.” (C9) • “Some information never got out of the AID agency in the Embassy to the field reps. And then, within the reps, the ability of State and Aid folks sharing information was sporadic.” (M7) • “Lack of physical proximity was another factor in poor communication.” (C5) • “The PRT-C may not be needed as his role is redundant. The MU-C can do everything the PRT-C can do.” (M8) • “There were people out there, who really shouldn’t have been there. They had worked in development for 20 years, maybe retired for a few years and couldn’t pay their mortgage.” (C2) • “There were tensions. You feel someone is infringing on your turf, on your territory. Why are you meeting with the governor? That’s my job.” (M6) |

| Team Success Factor | Not present | Evidence |
|--|---|--|
| <p>Harmony <i>Creating strong relationships through trust, compassion and acceptance</i></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disrespect • Distrust (no credibility) • Lack of Emotional Maturity • Stereotyping | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “Tension between various civil affairs teams were caused by a lack of trust and confidence in one another. Concern over who was in charge and who wasn’t. Concern over knowledge. Did they have the right knowledge or not?” (M7) • “There was a lot of struggle on the civilian side – a great deal of insecurity, a huge sense of we have to prove our worth.” (C2) • “Leave one (agency) of them out, immediately cooperation begins to disintegrate. Suspicions arise, and people begin to pull back. (C8) • “Those preconceived stereotypes can be an impediment to working effectively within the organizational structure, rather than an accelerator of coordination.” (M7) • “All it takes is one civilian who’s got this idea that Marines are jarheads and treats them that way. You’re back down to broken relations and mistrust.” (C9) |
| <p>Truth-telling <i>Distilling truth from myth and having the courage to stand up for it</i></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conflict avoidance or too conflictive • End-runs • Inability to openly disagree without repercussions | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “I saw civilians contact the Embassy, and the Embassy contacted some higher command, and they pushed it down to my military counterpart. My counterpart then said: Why’d you have to do that? Come talk to me first.” (C9) • “There was a civilian from the DST who did an end-run around my PRT-C. We had to find out his concern from the SCR-B. It shouldn’t have happened this way.” (C6) • “Our PRT-C was just difficult and narcissistic. We tried to avoid him if we could.” (C4) |

| Team Success Factor | Not present | Evidence |
|--|--|---|
| <p>Commitment <i>Creating unity of effort through shared agreements and promises</i></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unwillingness to share resources • Conflicting personal motivations • Lack of belief in the PRT mission • Competing organizational loyalties • Lack of consensus decisions • Stalwart in defending home agency or unit beliefs and philosophies | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “Some were there because the military ordered them to be there. They could care less. They were there to pursue their own career advantage.” (C6) • “Some just didn’t believe in the PRT mission. That it wasn’t their job.” (C4) • “For the most part, we were able to work around historic DOS and USAID tensions.” (C7) • “We talk about an integrated command team. The idea is that you have a PRT-C, DOS representative, and a USAID representative. They’re all equals, and they somehow come to a decision by a consensus. It wasn’t like that. (M6) |
| <p>Accountability <i>Holding self and the team responsible for extraordinary results</i></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not able to add input or supervise performance reviews • No real mechanism to monitor performance • Inability to dictate how funds are spent | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “Because the structure is set up to give the military 95% of the resources, when they decide they don’t want to play, there’s not much anybody can do about that.” (C4) • “We did have some issues that we couldn’t deal with... some personnel problems because we didn’t have the authority to do so.” (C4) • “They answer to me as a battle space owner, but I don’t prioritize their money (DOS). They get their marching orders from them.” (M1) |

It is important to observe that there was not a “perfect” PRT or a completely unhealthy PRT. All interviewees noted successful examples of civil-military cooperation, failed examples, and opportunities where civil-military cooperation could have been improved.

The next section discusses how social network analysis (SNA) was used to explain how a confusing organizational structure and an underdeveloped team impacted civil-military cooperation within the PRTs. Different PRT structures are diagrammed. The diagrams illustrate those structural elements that help or hinder civil-military cooperation. The diagrams further show how the team success factors are or are not met.

Social Networks and the PRTs

The organizational structure and ensuing civil-military cooperation for the PRTs in Afghanistan can be explained through the use of social network analysis (SNA). SNA can explain how and why certain interactions occur within a structure (Knoke & Yang, 2008). For this study, the interactions within various PRT structures promoting or hindering cooperation will be analyzed.

A social network “consists of a finite set or sets of actors and the relation or relations defined on them” (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). The actors in the PRT network include individual positions, civilian agencies, and military units. These include the PRT itself, the DSTs, the maneuver unit, SOF, the ACOE, the ADT, the Embassy, the IPA, 101st Airborne Division (and later the 82nd Airborne Division), ISAF, and the respective civilian

agency headquarters. The SCR-B and the BCT-C are represented separately to better illustrate how these positions have a decided impact on civil-military relations.

This network illustrates how the PRT and its members are connected to other entities that also play a role in implementing the “Clear, Hold, and Build” philosophy of COIN. Because the PRT as a team is emphasized, social network concepts assessing group cohesion are used to describe cooperative or uncooperative team behaviors. This use is appropriate as subgroup cohesion principles are frequently used to study teams (Wasserman & Faust, 2009).

Basic network concepts: A primer

This section briefly outlines a legend that can be used to understand how network terms are applied in the sociographs.

Sociograph Legend:

- **DOS Representative**
- **USAID Representative**
- **USDA Representative**
- **US Military Representative**

Blue Line – relation between two DOS offices/people or tie initiated by a DOS person/office

Red Line – relation between two USAID offices/people or tie initiated by a USAID person/office

Orange Line - relation between two USDA offices/people or tie initiated by a USDA person/office

Green Line - relation between two military people or tie initiated by a military person

Black Line – relation between two people/offices of different agencies

Line Thickness – width of the line varies; depends upon the number of interactions

— = three or more interactions reported.

— = less than three interactions reported.

----- = speculated interaction

Networks are generally described as being open or closed. An **open network** contains weak ties and structural holes or gaps among the network members (Ooi, 2010). A **closed network** contains cohesive ties that can promote trust and cooperation (Coleman, 1990). Within this type of network, the structure is a “density knit clump” of individuals who are closely connected to each other (Granovetter, 1983). The PRT network is open as not every ego is closely connected to one another

The ego or actor in this network is the individual person or position within different organizations. An ego-centric network illustrates the relationship of the ego and his relation with his alters (other people). Interviewees identified the following positions as key to ensuring good civil-military cooperation. These positions are: the PRT-C, the DOS-L, the USAID-L, the SCR-B, and the BCT-C. These positions are graphed with respect to each other and the other organizations within the network.

Assumptions

It is beyond the scope of this paper to graph every relationship within the PRT network. The focus of the study is the civil-military cooperation within the PRT itself. Consequently, some relationships are assumed, and their exact characteristics are not

known. These relationships generally respect the chains of command. On the military side, these relationships include: the Army Agribusiness Development Teams (ADT), the Army Corp of Engineers (ACOE), and ISAF. On the civilian side, relationships with the Embassy staff, the IPA, and ISAF are depicted. Depending upon their focus, civilians did interact directly with the ADTs and the ACOEs in the field. However, for the sake of simplicity, these relationships are assumed.

Because many civilians and military identified information sharing as an important cooperative behavior, social network graphs described in this paper show interactions based on this behavior. Graphing networks focusing on information sharing or knowledge sharing is popular in social network analysis (Ooi, 2010, Weiman, 1980).

Relations or Ties

A relation at its simplest terms is a connection or tie between actors (Knoke & Yang, 2008). There are two basic relations in social network analysis: directed and non-directed (Molm, 2003). Directed ties generally consist of one actor seeking advice from another. These **advice ties** are typically found in the work setting and are frequently used when describing collaboration among members within groups (Gibson, 2005). These ties are symmetrical (two directional) or asymmetrical (unidirectional). They are represented by arrows, pointed in the direction of an individual seeking or receiving advice from another. Because information-sharing is the thrust of this paper, ties are portrayed as sending and receiving information, not advice.

Non-directed ties represent mutuality. Both actors are at liberty to interact with one another. Depending upon the environment, these ties are also known as **friendship**

ties. Friendship ties occur between individuals with shared perceptions and experiences who also depend upon each other for social and political support (Ho & Ting-Ting, 2008).

Knowing the strength of a tie is helpful as it can help determine how and why information is exchanged. Tie strength is assessed by the frequency of interactions. Granovetter's (1983) pioneering work in social networks defined strong and weak ties and their associated attributes. Strong ties have a high level of **frequency** or a high number of interactions with each other. With a high level of frequency, interactions can convey emotions. Consequently, individuals find it easy to confide in one another (Granovetter, 1983). In terms of information exchange, some maintain that strong ties make it easier to quickly exchange information because individuals are closely connected (Krackhardt, 1998). In this study, strong frequency is indicated if three or more interviewees reported information sharing between the same positions in the network.

Weak ties have a lower level of connectivity. Some argue that information exchange is actually higher with weak ties (Burt & Ronchi, 2007). In this argument, strong ties can create rigid structures that limit the exchange of new information. Individuals are then forced to seek interactions beyond their close-knit group (Burt & Ronchi, 2007; Granovetter, 1983). Weak ties are represented by thin lines as interviewees reported a frequency of less than three instances among the same positions.

Strong ties also encourage **reciprocity**. Reciprocity is defined as a social norm that indicates the tendency for actors to freely choose to contact one another (Knoke &

Yang, 2008; Nagpaul, 2002). With reciprocity, trusting relationships can occur (Krackhardt, 1998). Trust can be perceived as a willingness for one party to be vulnerable to another party, believing that the other will perform an action that is important to the first party (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). As a result, strong ties can generate high levels of trust among individual team members.

A network characterized by reciprocity and friendship tends to experience less conflict (Coleman, 1988). Individuals choose to adapt to group norms that will maintain a stable network (Krackhardt & Handcock, 2007). Consequently, a network built on friendship ties also breeds more cooperation than other networks (Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1983).

Cliques

Cliques are subgroups of three or more individuals who have ties with everyone within the subgroup (Knoke & Yang, 2008). Cliques are made up of strong ties that have **adjacency** or a short path distance of only 1 step away (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). Cliques are solid and stable as they inherently resist change (Krackhardt & Handcock, 2007). The PRT leadership triad is a clique if all three leads are present. Interactions are frequent. Such a high density (frequency average) can create a norm of “social solidarity,” an expectation that members will cooperate by sharing expertise (Cornwell & Cornwell, 2008).

There are dangers associated with a clique. Some claim that information sharing can be restricted as the strong ties in a clique can be rigid and not open to outsiders (Burt & Ronchi, 2007). Also, the strong ties breed a certain homophily (or sameness) in

team beliefs and processes. Diverse teams, those with weaker ties, may actually transmit more varied types of information as individuals will serve as “bridges” to connect to other groups in the network (Burt & Ronchi, 2007; Granovetter, 1983).

Social Capital

Social capital can be defined as “the contextual complement to human capital. The social capital metaphor is that the people who do better are somehow better connected” (Burt, 2000, p. 2). Social capital in the PRT context can be seen as possessing valuable information and having access to important people. An important person is “whoever can provide the most accurate information the fastest” (C1). These people included powerful contacts in the Embassy, home agencies, and the Afghan government. Given that personalities internal and external to the PRT play such a large role in cooperation or lack thereof (C1, C3, C8, M3, M6, M8), the amount of social capital key individuals possess is a critical feature within the network. The SCR-B, BCT-C, the PRT-C, and the PRT civilian leads may have a lot of social capital if they have access to, and are able to control, the information that is disseminated to others.

Centrality

Centrality is a social network concept that can convey how critical an individual is to a network. A person with many **in-degrees** (ties directed to a person) is considered central or popular. Many people are seeking to connect with this person, usually because he or she has positional power i.e. the relationship between a supervisor and his or her subordinate (Knoke, 2012). Centrality is assessed by the number of **in-degrees** or ties directed to a person. This person may also have prestige. A person with

prestige has many in-degrees and few **out-degrees** (directed ties sent from the person). In the PRT network, BCT-C and his commanders were central, but they did not have prestige as there are not as many out-degrees as in-degrees. On the civilian side, the SCR-B, the DOS-L, USAID-L, and USDA (if present) were also central as there were in-degrees from the DSTs and their home agencies. However, similar to the BCT-C, they did not have prestige. Their out-degrees are roughly the same as their in-degrees. The PRT leads, the SCR-B, and the BCT-C were not only receiving information from multiple positions, they were also sharing it.

Knoke (2012) divides centrality into **closeness and betweenness centrality**. The former “indicates how quickly an actor can contact others” (Knoke, 2012, p. 87). The latter “considers the extent to which a third actor controls or mediates the connection between pairs of actors that have no direct tie” (Knoke, 2012, p. 87). Within this network, the SCR-RC, SCR-B, and BCT-C have betweenness centrality because they serve as important bridges or information brokers to the Embassy, Washington headquarters, ISAF, and all of the military units under the brigade command (PRT, MU, SOF, ADT, and MU). As brokers, these individuals can increase cooperation by sharing information across “structural holes” or gaps in the network (Burt, 1998).

These individuals are also **cutpoints**. If they are removed, the network will split into distinct networks with no ties or bridges connecting them (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). These individuals can be very powerful if they control information and access to highly influential contacts. Based upon the SCR-B’s frequent information sharing with multiple groups and central people further up the hierarchical chain of command, the

researcher termed him as “The Man in the Know.” This person had a lot of social capital as others were constantly seeking his favor. This person also knew that his level of social capital was dependent upon the speed and quality of the information he was able to provide (C1).

Triads versus Simmelian triads

A triad is a subset of three individuals and the relations among them (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). In general, triads tend to be stable because of the effects of balance theory. Individuals are motivated to establish and maintain network stability (Krackhardt & Handcock, 2007). The theory decrees that if two individuals are transitive or like each other, then they their opinions with balance the opinion of the third individual within the triad. Conversely, if two individuals within the triad dislike each other, then their opinions of the third individual will differ so that balance is maintained (Wasserman & Faust, 2009).

Simmelian triads are triads that have people who are tied to other groups. Known as Simmelian ties, these people experience mixed allegiances, which can cause role stress or confusion (Dekker, et al., 2004). In contrast, Simmelian ties have also been shown to survive longer than other ties (Dekker, et al., 2004). The PRT-C, DOS-L, and USAID-L create a Simmelian Triad. These individuals are directly tied to each other, but they also have Simmelian ties to their home agencies or military unit. Consequently, headquarters can make a demand on its civilian lead or the PRT-C in the triad that will create role stress or confusion for that individual (Krackhardt, 1998). He or she was put

in the position where compliance with headquarters may have been in conflict with the triad's goals.

On the positive side, Simmelian triads have "super strong and sticky bonds" (Krackhardt, 1998). These triads tend to be more durable than other triads because they create collective behaviors and norms within the group, reduce individual bargaining power, and decrease conflict (Dekker et al., 2004; Simmel, 1971). Perhaps most importantly, these triads reduce the impact a personality can have on the group as the group naturally strives to balance power and create group norms.

The "super strong and sticky bonds" disappear if a person is missing from the triad. The relationship then becomes a dyad. Dyads, if not supported by a strong network, are fragile and are easier to destroy or circumnavigate (Krackhardt & Hancock, 2007). In the PRT context, paired leadership can be risky because if one person is removed (e.g. different rotation schedule), the dyad ceases to exist. Also, conflict within a dyad "often escalates out of control" because there is no third party to balance or mitigate it (Krackhardt & Hancock, 2007, p. 4).

There is another benefit to a Simmelian triad. Once norms are set, the triad can develop a self-identity that can outlast the group's membership (Dekker et al., 2004). This factor may be an important consideration as different members can rotate in and out during the lifecycle of the PRT. Having an established group identity based upon agreed accepted practices can help the group retain stability as new leads assume leadership in the triad.

Unlike Granovetter (1983), who maintained that tie strength impacts individual interactions, Simmel (1971) argued that the structure shapes individual interactions. Within a clique or another subgroup, there can be a “stranger,” a tertiary person that can impact others based upon his or her position in the group. Examples of “the stranger” would be the USDA representative, SOF-C, MU-C, ACOE-C, ADT-C. They can all positively or negatively impact the effectiveness of the triad.

The next section describes cooperation in the PRT network. Sociographs highlighting the key positions, relation types, and tie strengths are illustrated. Simmelian triads, if in existence, are marked on the graphs by the peach triangles. In most cases, the triad includes DOS-L, USAID-L, and the PRT-C. Their competing ties are to their home agencies or units.

Cooperation within the PRT network

Three basic levels of cooperation were identified: good, poor, and mixed. Each type is defined, graphed, and assessed against the team success factors.

Good Cooperation

Good civil-military cooperation is defined when most of the team success factors and their associated behaviors were present within the PRTs.

Transparency – clear mission, goals, processes, roles, and personal beliefs – occurred because of the Simmelian triad leadership structure. The PRT-C, DOS-L, and USAID-L were connected with **friendship ties** (ties with no directional arrows) because of the mutuality of their bonds. These relationships were built on strong ties as the leads chose to interact frequently with one another. As a result, they created shared

beliefs and perceptions that shaped their relationships (Ho & Ting-Ting, 2008). See Figure 11: Good Cooperation. Two-way communication regarding missions, goals, daily operations, sudden changes, etc. were transmitted on a daily basis (C5). Individuals could easily meet as they were **adjacent** (1 step away) and were nearly always co-located on the same base with the maneuver unit. Because of this proximity, these individuals had **closeness**, which allowed them to transmit information easily and in a short period of time. This closeness was a benefit as interviewees often described the PRT environment as “fast-paced.” Many times the leads had to make a decision quickly and did not have time to wait for guidance from further up the chain (C4, C6). Interviewees mentioned repeatedly that input on issues from both the civilians and the military clarified relationships, which ultimately improved cooperation (C1, C2, M5, M6).

In terms of **frequency** of interactions, the triad met together, ate together, traveled together, experienced nightly attacks together, and even spent downtime together (C5, C6, M5, M6). This frequency among strong, adjacent ties created reciprocal relationships. **Reciprocity** bred a high level of trust and caring among these team members (C5, M5). They viewed themselves as co-equals and moved past the negative stereotypes cast upon them by their agency or unit affiliations (C8, M7). Because of the **friendship ties**, the leads openly shared information about themselves and admitted to the need for the others’ expertise (C5, C7, M5). Their relationships became actual friendships, and their actions allowed respect and confidence in the others’ capabilities to grow (C2, C3, C8, M2, M4). Thus, the success factor of **Harmony** – creating strong relationships through trust, compassion and acceptance – is met.

Likewise, the ability to disagree openly, stand up for one's viewpoint, and co-construct and implement data-based plans (C2, C5, M3, M8), permitted the team to satisfy the success factor of **Truth-telling** – the ability to distill truth from myth and having the courage to stand up for it. The **Commitment** success factor – creating unity of effort through shared agreements and promises – was present as team members in the triad willingly offered solutions, shared resources, made joint decisions, and honored agreements (C4, C5, M4, M5, M6).

The **Accountability** factor – holding self and the team responsible for team results – was not as evident. As discussed many times, the civilians did not report to one another, nor did they report to any of the military commanders. At best, team members alluded to accountability as “working hard”, “helping another to succeed,” “recognizing that together we are better” (C1, C5, M1, M3). The situations referenced included providing critical information about a maneuver unit mission or persuading a provincial governor to act in a way that supports another team lead's objectives.




Figure 12. Good Cooperation

Beyond the leadership triad, good civil-military cooperation also occurred. What is especially important to notice is that chains of command were respected. The network measures are also slightly different. Advice ties were apparent outside the leadership triad. These individuals included leads in the District Support Teams (DSTs), MU-C, SOF-C, ADT-C, and ACOE-C. Advice ties are work related and typically unidirectional; individuals are either seeking or receiving advice or information. Many of the advice ties in this study are represented by two-directional arrows because

individuals were sharing information both ways. Information could have been cables, reports, briefs, guidance, requests, contact names, directives, and military orders.

Outside of the triad, the PRT-C, DOS-L, and USAID-L can be seen sending and receiving information from their DST representatives, USDA representative, military peers, the BCT-C, the SCR-B, the SCR-RCE, the USAID mission in Kabul, and personnel in their home agencies. The difference between these relations and those stemming from friendship ties was that most of these individuals communicated for a work-related purpose and expected reciprocity i.e. when information was requested from someone, it was expected that he or she would provide it because of professional rules and etiquette. The individuals in these relationships were also not physically co-located, and the condition of **closeness** may have been difficult to achieve. To meet face to face, these individuals had to work through others to arrange for transportation and security. As one PRT lead mentioned, it was much faster and easier to communicate when they were all on the same base (C5). These more distant relationships most likely did not create shared perceptions, beliefs, and a group identity that is inherently found in friendship ties and a Simmelian leadership structure.

The tie between the DOS-L in the PRT and the SCR-B was particularly strong. In many of the good cooperation examples, the SCR-B was a State Department person. This person tended to communicate frequently with the DOS-L in the PRT. The exact reason is not known.

There are advice ties between the PRT civilian leads and the corresponding offices in the IPA. These ties are asymmetrical or unidirectional. Based upon the

interviews, there were more instances of the leads seeking information from these offices than receiving.

The lack of proximity impacted trust, but the latter could still occur when individuals were in different locations provided that interactions were frequent (Coleman, 1988). In the good cooperation scenario, the PRT-C worked well with his fellow military counterparts even if they were not co-located (M5, M8). There was a high level of interactions between the PRT-C and the MU-C to coordinate military support; the PRT-C and the SOF-C, ADT-C, ACOE-C to share resources; and the PRT-C and the BCT-C to obtain direction or approval. If these individuals respected and trusted each other, then cooperation usually followed (C4, C5). Hence, the team success factor of Harmony could be met.

The USDA person, while not a part of the triad, may play the role of Simmel's "stranger" because increasing the subgroup's size will not impact the triad (Simmel, 1971). The benefit of the stranger is that this person can bring additional knowledge to the team. However, the role can also be divisive, disrupting the natural balance of the triad (Krackhardt & Handcock, 2007).

Frequency, as assessed by tie strength to home agencies and other military units, varied. Some of these relationships are speculated because these individuals were not interviewed. In all cases, the interviewees described a good civil-military cooperation scenario when both the civilian and military chains of command were respected (C2, M5).

The tie between the SCR-B and BCT-C is strong and friendship-oriented since they spent the bulk of their time together either planning, problem-solving, traveling, eating, or relaxing. Since the focus of the study is the PRT, not the relationship between SCR-B and BCT-C, it is not known exactly how this interactions impact the leadership triad. It has already been noted that support from both positions was pivotal to the triad’s success. However, as will be discussed in the next section, poor civil-military cooperation could occur despite the strength of the SCR- and BCT-C bond.

In closing, a summary of good civil-military cooperation and how well it meets the team success factors for a high performing team is listed in Table 14: Good Cooperation and Success Factors.

Table 14. Good Cooperation and Success Factors

| Team Success Factor | Impact |
|---------------------|--|
| Transparency | Clear goals; frequent communication about team actions and responsibilities |
| Harmony | Trust and genuine caring for each other; respected lines of effort and chains of command |
| Truth-telling | Ability to disagree without fear of consequences; willingness to stand up for his or her viewpoint |
| Commitment | Agreement on the mission; willingness to share information and resources |
| Accountability | Willingness to work hard and help other team members succeed. |

Poor Cooperation

Poor civil-military cooperation occurred when most of the success factors were not met. This lack of cooperation usually occurred because of an absent or ineffective PRT-C. The DOS-L and the USAID-L often “banded together” (increased their frequency

of interactions) to counteract the ineffectiveness of the commander (C4). This PRT-C may have been ineffective because he or she had a difficult personality (C4, C5, M4), personal motivations that conflicted with the PRT mission (C4, C5, M4), an inability to lead (M4), or was physically absent because of a non-overlapping rotation i.e. his or her tour did not intersect with the DOS-L, USAID-L, or both (C4).

Because of role redundancy in civil affairs and intelligence fields among the PRT forces, the MU, and the SOF, the PRT had enough information to still function.

Accordingly, the DOS-L and USAID-L instituted and strengthened their ties with the MU-C to coordinate their security and transportation needs (C4). The civilian leads created stronger ties with the SOF-C to access his resources as well. Both military entities were willing to share their funds, assets and expertise with the civilian leads (M4, M8, M9).

See Figure 12: Poor Cooperation.




Figure 13. Poor Cooperation

Civil-military cooperation within the leadership triad in this scenario floundered because roles shifted and blurred as more civil affairs and intelligence troops were added to the group without effective coordination from the PRT-C. **Transparency** was negatively impacted because of the confusion brought on by role replication and the inevitable question of who is in charge (C8).

Individual personalities and motivations also became more predominant as the leadership structure weakened and ties became less pronounced (C2, C4). This triad lacked **mutuality** and **reciprocity**. The tendency to turn to each other disappeared, and adherence to shared perceptions and norms was jeopardized. This trend is indicated by

the civilian leads' decreased interactions with the PRT-C as well as the unwillingness of the PRT-C to reach out to his civilian leads. **Harmony**, with its focus on trust and acceptance, is not present.

Harmony was further compromised with the PRT-C's inappropriate use of the CERP fund. As the PRT-C was rewarded for the amount of CERP money he or she spent, the reward structure made it easy to sacrifice team goals for individual goals. For example, if promotion was an individual goal, it often conflicted with the other leads' goals and the overall PRT mission (C5, C6, C11, M4). This action created additional mistrust and feelings of disrespect between the civilian leads and the PRT-C (C4, M4, M9).

Personalities also prevailed as the remaining leads had to adjust to new, more permeable roles and responsibilities outside the normal triadic structure. Those who were independent, confident, hardworking, flexible, willing to work with the military, and not hung up on titles, tended to do well in this ambiguous environment (C2, C3, C8, C9, M1, M2, M8). If the civilian leads needed a lot of direction, demanded entitlements, and were unwilling to work with their military counterparts, their personalities soured the civil-military relationship (C2, C8, M1, M2). Further, the resulting acrimonious relationships permitted stereotypes to become more prevalent (C9). For example, referring to soldiers as "jarheads" infuriated some of the troops. These soldiers then tended to align themselves, or strengthen their ties to their home units (M7).

In these scenarios, the **Truth-telling** success factor was not met. Many civilians and military personnel chose to do an end-run or work around these difficult

personalities to avoid conflict. As already noted, new ties or existing ones were strengthened as the civilian leads tried to accomplish their goals without interacting with the PRT-C. Not surprisingly, the PRT-C became less central and lost his **betweenness closeness** or ability to broker information. This condition is evidenced by the loss of in-degrees and out-degrees from the PRT-C position.

The **Commitment** success factor was also at risk. Since the triad was dysfunctional, there were fewer attempts to share resources, make joint decisions and honor agreements. What may have been strong ties with the PRT-C had weakened. Stronger ties are established with others who can share resources and participate in joint decisions (e.g. MU-C and the SOF-C).

Finally, the **Accountability** team success factor was lacking. In addition to the absence of any formal reporting structure, the PRT-C was not willing to cooperate and help his civilian leads overcome barriers to achieve success (C4, C5, M4). There is also no evidence to suggest that the civilian leads held each other accountable to team or individual goals.

While civil-military cooperation failed within the leadership triad, civil-military cooperation outside the PRT could exist. A new Simmelian Triad formed among the DOS-L, USAID-L, and MU-C. All were adjacent (1 step away) and had Simmelian ties to other organizations (e.g. their respective civilian headquarters and the brigade). There remained a **friendship dyad** between the DOS and USAID. However, based upon the interviews, ties between them and the MU-C were **advice-oriented** as the roles interacted primarily around sending and receiving work-related information. This

finding supports the belief that the PRT-C is not needed as the MU-C and the SOF-C can assume their roles without disrupting their own missions (M8, M9). An important consideration to note is that this Simmelian Triad only worked when the MU-C supported the PRT's mission (C4, M8). The interviews yielded multiple examples where the MU-C resented the PRTs and their mission. These commanders were "old school", believing that their duty was to fight, not engage in reconstruction or nation-building (C2, C5, M3, M8)

Poor cooperation could also occur if one of the civilian leads had a difficult personality (C1, C3, C8, C10, M1, M2). "There were some challenges with cooperation among the development people. This is really not a civil-military divide as it is a divide amongst the civilians" (C10). There were plenty of examples of unqualified and difficult civilians, but they were not always part of the leadership triad (C1, C2, C3, M1, M2, M8). However, when this individual was part of the triad, the remaining civilian and PRT-C worked around the him or her. Similar to the situation with the ineffective PRT-C, new ties were created and existing ones strengthened so that the remaining civilian lead and the PRT-C could accomplish their goals. Given that the other leads and the SCR-B could not discipline this person, he or she was often ignored or transferred (C3, C5). In rare cases, the person was terminated and asked to leave Afghanistan (C1, C2). Regardless of the outcome, the ineffective leads lost their **centrality** and **betweenness closeness**, and therefore, lost a certain amount of social capital.

One relationship that bears mentioning is the relationship between the USAID Mission in Kabul and the USAID leads in the provinces. Advice, unidirectional ties to the

Mission from the leads and the SCR-B are shown. There were ample reports of the leads in the provinces requesting, but not receiving the necessary information from the Mission (C2, C3, C7, M2, M3).

A summary of how the success factors fared in poor cooperation is articulated in

Table 15: Poor Cooperation and Success Factors.

Table 15. Poor Cooperation and Success Factors

| Team Success Factor | Impact |
|---------------------|--|
| Transparency | Roles blur as more responsibility transferred to the MU-C and the SOF-C; limited communication because of a difficult personality or an absent PRT-C |
| Harmony | Distrust towards the PRT-C; civilians “gang up” with MU-C to manage the PRT-C and to achieve PRT goals |
| Truth-telling | Interactions with the PRT-C is minimized to avoid conflict |
| Commitment | The PRT-C is motivated through personal gain; team animosity compromises ability and desire to reach consensus |
| Accountability | Group norm within the triad is weakened as new triad appeared; triad depended upon the BCT-C to remove or discipline the ineffective PRT-C |

Mixed Civil-Military Cooperation – Missing DOS or USAID Lead

Civil-military cooperation could still occur within the PRT even if the DOS-L or USAID-L was missing. However, the triad disappeared, and civil-military cooperation suffered. The leadership structure once again

became a dyad relationship. This time the dyad was between the remaining civilian lead and the PRT-C. In many cases, there was a missing actor because the individual had yet to arrive in the field (McNerney, 2005; C11). Similar to managing an

ineffective PRT-C or civilian lead, the SCR-B became more involved, or strengthened his or her ties with the remaining civilian and the DST leads. Also, interactions with respective home agencies apparently increased because of role confusion and ensuing turf battles.

Good civil-military cooperation seemed to occur because of the positive relationship between the PRT-C and the remaining civilian lead. Also, a key component was the drive and the talent of the SCR-B, the remaining civilian lead, and the DST leads. “I would trade a 100 civilians, if I could just have one more <name withheld> in the field” (M2). “If they were all like <name withheld>, we wouldn’t have had any issues with civ-mil cooperation” (C1). The successful SCR-Bs and civilian leads interviewed in this study shared common traits: tireless work ethic, independence, flexibility, willingness to work in the military culture, presence to stand up to the military, and ability to not only live in a dangerous and spartan environment, but to actually enjoy it

“If one of the agencies was absent, civ-mil cooperation disintegrated.” (C8)

(C1, C2, C3, M1, M2). With a missing or ineffective PRT civilian lead, the combination that seemed to work best was the pairing of the SCR's strategic ability to find answers quickly with the DST lead's proven expertise (C9). U.S. military support was also evident as the examples described an **adjacent, friendship tie** between the SCR-B and the BCT-C as well as a friendship tie between the PRT-C and the remaining civilian lead (C1, C2, C3, M1, M2, M3).

A network graph of mixed civil-military cooperation illustrates the missing civilian lead and the increased **frequency** and creation of **strong ties** between the SCR-B and the remaining civilian PRT lead. The relationship between the SCR-B and DST-L now has **closeness** because the ties are **adjacent** – 1 step away. See Figure 13: Mixed Cooperation – Missing DOS Lead. The SCR-B's **centrality** and **social capital** increased as more people at the DST level sought direct guidance and assistance from him or her. The successful DST leads benefitted from the SCR-B's adjacency and social capital to obtain quick guidance and feedback (C1, C3). In these cases, agency affiliation did not seem to matter as long as the SCR-B and the DST leads were highly competent and had a good attitude (C2, C3).

Transparency and **Harmony** in these relationships could be assumed as the increased interactions yielded more clarity, confidence, and trust regarding individual needs and competence (C1, C2, C3, M1, M2). However, because of the involvement of new entities (e.g. the Embassy or home agencies), opportunities for miscommunication increased (C4, M2). Some **Truth-telling** seemed to exist as discussions with between the DSTs and the SCR-Bs were described as direct, open, and frank (C1, C2). **Commitment**

was also present as there were reports of the SCR-B, civilian PRT lead, and DST leads jointly scrambling to find solutions in the PRT's fast-paced environment (C6, C8, M2). Unfortunately, there were also examples of the lack of resource sharing and support if the PRT-C or remaining civilian lead were ineffective (C4, M1). As with all of the relationships, **Accountability** was the weakest success factor. Formal boundaries with respect to chain of command and home agency supervision were blurred as new relationships formed outside the normal chain of command. When cooperation was evident, individuals described scenarios where they wanted to help others succeed (C1, C8).

Advice ties are indicated in that the majority of the interactions involving the SCR-B, PRT-C, remaining PRT civilian lead, and the DST leads were work related and were not necessarily reciprocal. A DST lead could include the SCR-B in a communication, but the latter may respond by working the issue through the remaining civilian lead (C6). The **frequency** of interactions with home agencies were also expected to increase, but this assertion cannot be confirmed since the headquarters staffs were not included in the study. There were differing reports regarding the leads' interactions with their respective desks in the IPA.

Special circumstances existed when the missing civilian was a USAID person. Because of USAID's central organizational structure, more interactions occurred between the SCR-B and the USAID Mission Director in Kabul (C2, C3). See Figure 14: Mixed Cooperation – Missing USAID Lead.

The missing lead enabled a fragile, dyadic structure between the PRT-C and the remaining PRT civilian lead. Unfortunately, if the former was not supportive of his civilian counterpart or the PRT mission, cooperation within the team suffered (C4). Cooperation could still occur, but as Krackhardt and Handcock (2007) point out, this type of structure is difficult to sustain. The heavy involvement of the SCR-B could make a difference in the PRT-C’s performance, but not always (C4, C5). Personalities again prevailed and could positively or negatively affect the civil-military cooperation (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5). “The new PRT-C did all the right things in terms of the PRT goals and having BOD-like meetings, but we didn’t get the feeling that he really believed in it” (C5).




Figure 14. Mixed Cooperation - Missing DOS Lead




Figure 15. Mixed Cooperation - Missing USAID Lead

A summary of the team success factors and their impact on civil-military cooperation within the PRT is compiled in Table 16: Mixed Cooperation and Success Factors – Missing Leads.

Table 16. Mixed Cooperation and Success Factors - Missing Leads

| Team Success Factor | Impact |
|---------------------|---|
| Transparency | Role blurring between the SCR-B, the civilian lead, and the DST leads because of the SCR-B working outside chain of command; confusing communications with the involvement of home agencies |
| Harmony | Increased trust and confidence between SCR-B and DST leads. Distrust from PRT-C if not committed to the PRT |
| Truth-telling | Open and frank conversations between SCR-B and DST leads; PRT-C or remaining PRT civilian lead avoided if deemed ineffective |
| Commitment | Active problem-solving between SCR-B and DST leads; poor resource sharing with PRT-C or the remaining civilian lead if not onboard |
| Accountability | Little input on individual and team performance between civilians and military at all levels |

Mixed Cooperation – Reach back or End-runs

The literature described ‘reach back’ as the ability for civilian representatives in the field to be able to access or reach back to their home offices for additional expertise if needed (Green, 2010). End-run are described as lower level civilians who bypassed the civilian chain of command to obtain quick answers or support (C2, C8). Reach backs and end-runs are associated more with civilians as the military personnel tended to follow their chains of command. Reach back complicated cooperation within the PRT because it added another level of bureaucracy as additional individuals and their offices were included in the team’s information sharing and decision-making processes (C4).

Advice ties are directed and symmetrical (two-directional) or asymmetrical (unidirectional) in these graphs. The colors of the asymmetrical ties reflect the agency or unit affiliation of the individual directing the tie. For example, if DOS is initiating the reach back or end run, then the tie is blue with a single arrowhead directed at another individual. With both reach backs and end-runs, individuals are exchanging information outside of their normal chain of command. This exchange is particularly evident in the following relationships: 1) the PRT civilian leads and the Ambassadors in the U.S. Embassy; 2) the DST civilian leads and the Ambassadors in the U.S. Embassy; 3) the DST leads and the SCR-RCE; 4) the PRT and DST leads with their home agencies (C2, C6, C8). See Figure 15: Mixed Cooperation – Reach backs and End-runs – for a description of these relationships.




Figure 16. Mixed Cooperation - Reach backs and End-runs

Information-sharing in Washington among the agencies also complicated cooperative efforts (M2, C6). However, it is not known if information-sharing increased or decreased because of the reach backs and end-runs.

Civil-military cooperation is mixed in this scenario because the military valued the civilian's ability to reach back and obtain information faster (C4, C6, C9). By bypassing people one or two levels above them, individuals added **closeness** to key decision-makers or people of influence. As previously mentioned, the military's pace in determining and executing on their priorities was much quicker than the civilians (M1, C4). Fast, accurate information regarding Afghan contacts and government relations

was highly valued by the military (C1, C6, C9). These ties grew stronger in some cases as the frequency of interactions increased. These **strong ties** enabled faster information sharing, added credibility, and expanded one's social capital (Weimann, 1980).

For the military, reach back also had its downsides. The act was then referred to as "end-runs." (C8). Commanders were occasionally caught by surprise since the civilian chain of command was not followed. The division commander (DIV-C), BCT-C, and PRT-C would receive information from the Ambassadors and the senior civilian representative of RC/E (SCR-RCE). Aside from the DIV-C, these individuals are superior in rank and status to the BCT-C and the PRT-C. The lower levels of command believed this information should have been shared earlier and through the proper channels. As a result, some military commanders were a little disgruntled as summarized by the quote: "Why did you have to tell my boss? Couldn't you have come to me directly?" (C2).

Reach backs and end-runs were not always beneficial to the civilian leads, either. These leads' **centrality** was reduced as they were no longer the primary sources for information. If the USAID-L or DOS-L was circumvented during an end-run, these individuals lost their **betweenness closeness** and were unable to control access to information and contacts. There were reports of DST Leads bypassing the PRT civilian lead and communicating directly with the SCR-B, the SCR-RCE, and even the Ambassadors in the Embassy (C4, C8). The negative consequence for this change is the loss of **social capital** for the PRT civilian leads and the SCR-B. They were no longer "in the know." Without this asset, the military's respect for these individuals dwindled (C3, C8, M7), although none of the SCR-Bs in this study suffered from this fate.

In terms of the team success factors, reach backs and end-runs impacted the **Transparency** success factor as role boundaries tended to become hazy with the additional input from higher-ups (C4). Turf wars and attempts to control information increased as more agency people from outside the PRTs were included in the PRT’s decision-making process (C8).

The success factors of **Harmony** and **Truthtelling** were also negatively impacted in this scenario. Respect was lost as individuals bypassed their normal points of contact (C2). Truths were also distorted with the addition of people who were removed from the situation on the ground. Some interviewees provided examples that illustrated how the inclusion of people in Washington or the Embassy altered communications or decisions so that the PRTs’ activities were more palatable to a wider, policy-oriented crowd (C4, C6). **Accountability** was also challenged as people felt obligated to respond to SCR-RCE, DIV-C, and BCT-C because of their superior ranks (C2, C4). The ongoing challenge of being able to hold others accountable through their performance reviews continued.

A summary of these success factors can be found in Table 17: Mixed Cooperation and Success Factors – Reach backs and End-runs.

Table 17. Mixed Cooperation and Success Factors - Reach back and End-runs

| Team Success Factor | Impact |
|---------------------|---|
| Transparency | Roles blurred, turf issues or territorialism increased; some clarity occurred in PRT when military received needed information |
| Harmony | Lack of respect in terms of role recognition and chains of command; distrust among some of the PRT Leads, DST-Leads and home agencies and units |

| Team Success Factor | Impact |
|---------------------|---|
| Truth-telling | Distorted truths with the inclusion of new people from home agencies |
| Commitment | Fewer shared decisions within the PRT as some were dictated from above (e.g. Embassy) |
| Accountability | Split loyalties, especially to those higher in the reporting structure; inability to impact performance evaluations |

This section has highlighted and explained the two, main findings from the data collection phase. Using sociographs to illustrate the findings, it was discovered that the effectiveness of the PRTs suffered because of a dysfunctional organizational structure and the absence of team behaviors required for successful teams. While the structure seems theoretically sound and fair, the reality is that it struggled when faced with the unique environment and constraints offered by a country at war.

The next section, Results, incorporates the main findings and applies them to the research questions. New organizational structures as well as a theory regarding civil-military cooperation in Afghan PRTs are proposed.

Results

The findings revealed significant differences between the civilians and the military in their definitions of cooperation, key beliefs and actions to achieve it, and barriers that prohibit it. This section posits answers to the research questions and poses some potential organizational structures that may promote better civil-military cooperation within the PRTs in the future.

Cooperation and the current organizational structure

The first research question asks: How does the PRT organizational structure facilitate cooperation between the U.S. military personnel and the U.S. civilians to aid in the success of the U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan?

Cooperation in this study has been summarized as the constant communication of accurate information, the sharing of financial and human resources, the extension of respect and inclusion, and the willingness to go the distance to assist another team member.

It has been shown that the current structure does not promote cooperation 100% of the time. The official structure is confusing to those in the lead roles as it equalizes them in a manner that is not reflected in the field. Within the U.S. PRTs, the military assumes the primary lead as security is of paramount importance in RC/E (Perito, 2005). The equivalent roles of USAID and DOS do not exist as evidenced by DOS taking the lead civilian role in most of the PRTs. Hence, the current structure is more dyadic than triadic.

Additionally, the structure does not promote cooperative behaviors required for a high performing team. Measured against the five team success factors, the role blurring caused by a disconnect in role equality caused confusion, territorialism, and a question of who's in charge (Transparency). Communication was a challenge as the right people in the right roles were not always included. (Transparency). Distrust was found at varying levels in the team because of the damaging impact of difficult personalities and the tendency to buy into negative stereotypes (Harmony). Frequent

citings of disrespect towards civilian expertise and civilian rank also widened the gap between the civil-military counterparts and the network overall (Harmony). Next, the propensity towards conflict avoidance and the need for faster information hurt cooperation as it allowed non-cooperative behaviors, such as end-runs, to continue (Truth-telling). Equally harmful, the unwillingness to share resources and make joint decisions impaired the team as it was unable to synchronize its efforts to accomplish its goals in some areas (Commitment). Further, clashing individual motivations weakened bonds to the team as individuals concerned themselves more with their careers than the success of the team (Commitment). Finally, a central inability to hold the leads accountable for their performance permitted contradictory goal prioritization and allowed personalities to become a more determinant factor in the PRT's staff and operations (Accountability). Since all leads had ties to home agencies and units, they frequently felt more allegiance to them as these organizations managed their respective performance evaluations, compensation levels, and future work assignments (Accountability).

Good cooperation resulted when the five team success factors were present and sustained. Poor cooperation primarily occurred when the PRT-C was ineffective in his role. As a result, the civilian leads worked around the PRT-C and partnered directly with the MU-C and SOF-C. Mixed cooperation was possible when a civilian was missing in the triad, and the remaining one had enough competence and social capital to be able to source the missing agency. A highly competent SCR-B and a supportive PRT-C and BCT-C were critical components to this model. Mixed cooperation also occurred when one

side – the military in this case – found value in information that was gained via reach backs i.e. working outside the accepted chain of command.

Cooperation and a potential PRT structure for the future

Identifying a structure that can promote better civil-military cooperation within the PRTs in Afghanistan is not simple. The structure has to be able to thrive in the six, operating conditions identified earlier in the findings: war, military domination, interagency/inter-service tensions, Washington politics, organizational culture, and funding. Second, it has to be able to meet the team success factors that will help ensure its sustainability.

An organizational structure with a Simmelian triad embedded within the PRT leadership structure is suggested. However, unlike the current structure, the inclusion of the social network concept of structural equivalence may help to ease the relations caused by role confusion within the triad. Structural equivalence, at its most basic form, is when actors “have identical ties to and from all other actors in the network” (Wasserman & Faust, 2009, p.356). This argument may be especially salient with DOS and USAID because of their strained relationship. The leads would hold equal roles with equal access to other organizations within the network. Hopefully, this parity would help to ease the sense of territorialism and resistance to cooperation between the two agencies.

It should be noted that pure structural equivalence is very difficult to achieve (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). In most cases, certain criteria have to be relaxed i.e. not all ties have to be completely equal (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). Another caveat is that it is

assumed that the two leads are highly qualified and able to work well within the six operating conditions.

While current PRT organizational structures reflect this equivalence, it was reported that DOS naturally assumed the leadership on the civilian side of the triangle (C7, C10). Formalizing a structurally equivalent organization structure would mean that the DOS-L and the USAID-L report directly and equally to the SCR-B. Structural equivalence affords an opportunity for these individuals to operate effectively despite the long-standing competition between the two agencies. “Co-opetition,” a combination of cooperation and competition, has a benefit in that the two competing agencies will work together to monitor each other and to prevent conflict (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001).

Another positive outcome of structural equivalence is when the point of cooperation is reached, one agency does not dominate the other (Nagpaul, 2002). Also, the civilian leads will start to adopt and mimic behaviors of the other (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). Finally, structurally equivalent people will form an identity that is confirmed by the perceptions of others in the network. People will consistently see the two actors behaving in the same fashion and will expect these behaviors to continue in the future (Milton & Westphal, 2005). In short, the DOS-L and the USAID-L will begin to act as equals and be perceived as equals.

Since structural equivalence demands equality, logic would dictate that the SCR-B would be held accountable for the leads’ performances through a formal reporting structure that would be recognized and accepted by USAID, DOS, and any other civilian

agency. A social network diagram depicting the structural equivalent organization with good cooperation is found in Figure 16: Good Cooperation – Structural Equivalence. Again, solid lines denote reported relations while dotted lines represent speculated relations (not confirmed).

Perhaps, most importantly, the benefits of the Simmelian triad with the PRT-C are still present. These benefits include triadic stability, decreased conflict, and increased operating norms (Carley et al., 2002). The inherent stability of the Simmelian triad combined with the equality offered by structural equivalence can forge an even stronger PRT leadership structure with fewer opportunities for confusion and disrespect.

The structurally equivalent ties to the SCR-B are **advice** in nature with frequent interactions. It is not assumed that friendship ties will form in their place as it is unlikely that the SCR-B will be physically located with the civilian PRT leads. The high **frequency** bonds created by eating, traveling, and spending downtime together on a daily basis cannot occur. Further, friendship ties are difficult to form because of the supervisor/subordinate relationship. This ordered structure can impact the nature of the ties because of perceived differences in power and authority (Knoke & Yang, 2008).

This triad should also be co-located with the maneuver unit to increase **closeness** and to facilitate the ease of interactions that will help speed communication and coordination.

As mentioned previously, the PRT-C, DOS-L and the USAID-L have **betweenness closeness**, which coincidentally also makes them **cutpoints** in this network. A

structurally equivalent structure reduces the dangers associated with cutpoints. A cutpoint indicates a break in the network if this individual is removed (Knoke & Yang, 2008). As the two leads become essentially equal deputies, they would have similar decision-making authorities. Consequently, a complete void in decision-making is prevented if one lead is not present.

Structural equivalence also affords **centrality** and **social capital** to the leads. Both leads are assumed to have the same knowledge, resources, and access to the SCR-B that is valued by others in the network. Theoretically, one lead should not be considered to be more important to the PRT than the other.




Figure 17. Good Cooperation - Structural Equivalence

The Need for Pre-deployment Training

Aligned with this new structure should be an intense pre-deployment training program. Through ongoing learning and adaptation over time, individuals from different organizations can learn to cooperate (Doz, 1995). Many of the military and civilian interviewees discussed the need for training prior to deployment as well as throughout their tours (C3, C7, M9). This need was also expressed by a number of scholars specializing in the Afghan PRTs (Green, 2010; Kuypers & Anderson, 2010; Perito, 2005).

At the time of this study, training was sporadic. The PRT-C received scenario-based training in security, Afghanistan government, culture, COIN, and civilian roles and agencies (M5). This training was typically a month to 45 days long and took place in various Army training centers in Atterbury, IN, Fort Irwin, CA, and Fort Bragg, NC. During the civilian surge, civilians participated in limited or no training at the outset because of the rapid deployment (M2). Civilian training was largely uncoordinated with USAID and DOS. Both offered their own training. Occasionally, the military and civilians trained together for approximately one week before deploying. This training was considered helpful, but not sufficient (M7).

Training in the field seemed to be governed by the BCT-C and differed by command. If he believed additional information was needed to be successful, he would arrange for guest speakers or assign books and articles to read (M2, M3).

SOF has a rich heritage of offering its own training and education. SOF specializes in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, and they usually spend at least a year preparing for these operations (Lamb & Cinnamond, 2009; M9).

In terms of exploring the knowledge and individual behaviors and skills needed to create a high performing team, the military glossed over or neglected this information (M5). The civilians may have known about successful team behaviors, but they were not systematically followed in the field (C8).

Because Simmelian triads require strong ties, an intense, pre-deployment training is recommended. As Krackhardt noted, “there is no such thing as an instant strong tie” (Krackhardt, 1998, p. 22). Triads require constant interactions to create an environment of reciprocity where trust and adherence to group norms can occur (Coleman, 1988).

Further, pre-deployment training would allow an opportunity for the triad to thoroughly understand each other’s organizational cultures, reporting structures, and funding mechanisms. Some even suggested that the PRT leads spend time at the Pentagon, USAID, and DOS in Washington DC to better understand how these organizations impact priorities and operations in the field (M2, M7, C11).

Leadership training was also a topic that should be considered. As one civilian pointed out:

The military is trained to lead. In many cases, they have very different leadership styles from the civilian leaders. I would say the State Department is quite poor at training leaders. And when you’re not well-trained, cooperation can be even more of a challenge (C5).

Other civilians posited that the PRT leads need to be good leaders first, subject matter experts second (C2, C8). Their contention is that the leads need to understand how to align and manage human and financial resources before expertise can be effectively utilized in the field. In some examples, the lack of civil-military cooperation stemmed from an inability of the civilian leads and the PRT-C to manage their teams (C2, C3). Subject matter expertise, by contrast, was reported to be more important at the DST level. These leads were interacting daily with the Afghans on different projects and relied heavily upon their previous training and education (C8).

The focus on training the triad and not the entire team is intentional. First, given that units rotate at varying times from different locations, it can be hard to coordinate training (M7). Hand-selecting and training trios are much easier to accomplish (C3). Third, because formal accountability is difficult to achieve, spending time engaging in intense activities can promote strong bonds of friendship and loyalty. Team members will be less inclined to let each other fail in high risk, crisis scenarios (Fisher, et al., 2010).

Structural Equivalence and the Team Success Factors

Structurally equivalent roles offer benefits to the team. **Transparency** is achieved as the leads' abilities to access the same contacts and information help to clarify roles and expectations. **Harmony** is accomplished as structural equivalence can promote trust through the increase of the pair's social capital. The need to retain social capital creates reciprocity and trust, particularly when ties are strong (Coleman, 1988). Trust and compassion can also grow through joint training programs offered before and

during deployment. This preparation is especially important with teams in crisis situations (McConnell & Drennan, 2006).

Structural equivalence encourages **Truth-telling**. The equality of roles and the mimicking of each other's behaviors create a group identity of honest and open discourse that can survive differences of opinions (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). Further, structural equivalence creates a "social pressure" within the team that encourages the adoption of norms associated with resource sharing, joint planning, and consensus decision-making (Burt, 1987). These **Commitment** behaviors and practices can thus be instituted and sustained. Finally, **Accountability** can be established absent formal institutionalization of performance management and compensation processes. Structural equivalent roles allow the SCR-B and the civilian PRT leads to better create and reinforce the expectations and standards required to hold others accountable to individual and team performances (Burt, 1987).

The presence of the Simmelian triad of the PRT-C, USAID-L, and DOS-L cements the above benefits. These triads reduce conflict within the teams and promote common behaviors that encourage network stability (Krackhardt, 1998; Simmel, 1971). As the triads are strong and durable, group norms and a group identity can be formed and sustained.

Structural Equivalence and the Six Conditions

The PRT organizational structure also has to be able to thrive under the six operating conditions. Combined with intense, pre-deployment training, the structurally equivalent Simmelian triad leadership model can be anticipated to function as follows:

1. **War:** In physically dangerous situation, such as war, leaders have to have the ability to motivate others to respond quickly (Schoenberg & Flynn, 2004). The structurally equivalent Simmelian triad reflects a shared leadership model. Shared leadership is appropriate for teams that have a variety of tasks and responsibilities (Zander & Butler, 2010). Structural equivalence makes it easier for leaders to transfer roles and responsibilities based upon the situation and the expertise required (DeChurch, Hiller, Murase, Doty & Salas, 2010). If security is the primary focus, the USAID and DOS person can step aside and allow the PRT-C to take the lead. Likewise, if governance or development is the focus, then the appropriate civilian lead assumes leadership, and the remaining civilian lead and PRT-C support him or her. Given that the structural equivalence promotes the monitoring and conformance of individuals and organizations, it is assumed that the DOS-L and USAID-L will work in concert despite the fact that each will assume project ownership at varying times (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001).
2. **Military-domination:** “They (military) are the big dog on the block. They have influence just because they have CERP money and can do their own development and governance projects” (C3). Time spent training with the PRT-C will help to increase understanding of how the military operates in terms of structure and operations in kinetic areas (C3, M7). In particular, time spent planning and executing missions outlined by the civil-military campaign plan will increase understanding of how civilian interests must be interwoven to achieve PRT success for the long-term (C6).

3. **Interagency/Inter-branch tension:** This study has shown how tensions among agencies and service branches can hurt civil-military cooperation. The long-standing tension between USAID and DOS relationship created a barrier in the field, especially in Kabul (C11). Structural equivalence demands a parity of roles and reporting structures as roles have equal ties to everyone within the group (Wasserman & Faust, 2009). Thus, the structural equivalent requirement legitimizes the USAID and the DOS representatives as co-leads with equal access to the SCR-B. Structural equivalence, with its norm setting properties, sends a clear message to others that the two co-leads are equal in authority and one does not dominate the other (Nagpaul, 2002). This message is currently lacking not only in the PRTs, but in the agencies themselves. As one USAID person outside the study remarked: “Do you know the age-old joke between AID and the State Department? Cooperation is AID doing what the State Department wants.” (USAID Foreign Service Officer, personal communication, May 4, 2012) This perception also created friction within the PRTs. Many of the military commanders in this study thought that USAID reported to the State Department and should do what it advises (M1, M2, M4). Needless to say, this attitude irritated some USAID personnel (C7, C8).

Lastly, the lack of respect generated by an inequality of roles with respect to the military was expressed strongly by civilians (C4, C5, C8). However, there is little evidence to suggest that a structurally equivalent approach would cause the military to view their civilian counterparts as holding an equal rank to them.

4. **Washington Politics:** Attempting to create positive results based on fluid

Washington politics created its own tension over what was possible to accomplish in the PRTs. Based upon strong tie theory (Granovetter, 1983) and structural equivalence (Burt, 1987; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001), the institution of strong, equal ties can create a consistency in thought and action that may be better able to respond and manage how policy shifts impact PRT operations. Also, spending pre-deployment training time at the Pentagon and USAID and DOS can help the triad better understand the political pressures each one receives from their respective headquarters.

5. **Organizational Cultures.** The military culture can be overwhelming, and DOS and USAID cultures can often be misunderstood.

The key tenants of cooperation... Both sides have to put themselves in the others' shoes. The military has to understand the core mission of the civilians out there. It's not to kill the Taliban, and it's not to engage in any sort of head-on conflict with the insurgents (C9).

The increased frequency of equal interactions between the SCR-B and the DOS-L, and the USAID-L improves understanding, builds trust, and helps to form new cultural norms (Granovetter, 1983). Structural equivalence, combined with the stable Simmelian triad (Krackhardt & Handcock, 2007), help to balance the perspectives of the civilian leads with that of the PRT-C. For example, such a balance may have made it easier for the civilians and the military to agree if the military culture dictated a faster development pace than was advisable.

6. **Funding.** How funding is operationalized is beyond the control of the PRT leadership. However, many interviewees stated that knowing the various

organization's funding policies and practices would have been helpful to avoid misunderstandings, redundancies and to shorten the time spent in acquisition (M1, C6, C11). The properties of structural equivalence can help the leads create standard norms and expectations regarding the funding processes in the field (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). Structural equivalence between the leads also allows for consistent and unified behaviors that can be copied by their followers (Milton & Westphal, 2005). While completely synchronizing the funding policies and mechanisms may not be possible, a common understanding and better oversight will help guard against the gross misallocation of aid that has remained problematic (Cordesman, 2012).

Improvement Ideas from the Field

It should be remarked that many of the interviewees suggested alternative organizational structures as an improvement to the existing one. These structures positioned DOS as more of a policy advisor to the SCR-B and the BCT-C (C11). Others promoted a structure that was completely separate from all of the agencies and the military (C2, C4). The PRTs under this structure would have its own funding and not be dependent upon CERP dollars or other agency funding. The PRT would also have a separate security contingent. This difference would help to eliminate disagreements with the maneuver unit as well as position the PRT as an organization specializing in stability and reconstruction, not fighting. One civilian added to this concept by advocating for the creation of an interagency office in Washington that would be attached to DOS and the Pentagon (C11). Another civilian mentioned that the British

PRT model should be adopted (C6). The two year deployment of two months in country and two months at home would allow PRT members to build long term, increasingly more fruitful relationships with the Afghans (C6). In line with this suggestion, many recommended the synchronization of the PRT leads' tours i.e. they would begin and end deployment at the same time (C3, C4, M7). Almost all of the interviewees mentioned the need for comprehensive pre-deployment training to build an understanding of each other's skill sets as well as to learn how to leverage them in difficult and dangerous environments (C1,3, C5 – 10, C11, M1, M2, M6, M7, M9). Finally, a few civilians and military personnel mentioned that key PRT personnel should be part of a "cadre of highly trained people" who can deploy at any time in any location throughout the world (C11, M7).

Some of the interviewees' ideas are in line with the benefits created from a Simmelian, structurally equivalent structure. Instituting a formal PRT administrative and operational organization helps to increase strong ties among the PRT-C, DOS-L, and USAID-L because they are accountable directly to the organization and at least one step removed from their home agencies and units. Increased clarity, loyalty, and accountability can help promote friendship ties within the leadership triad and stronger ties throughout the PRT. Further, stronger ties also increase reciprocity and trust, which will help to manage conflict among diverse personalities and eliminate potential end-runs. These qualities match the benefits obtained from having a separate organization focused on building and managing specific skillsets required to effectively operate a high performing PRT.

In summary, the current PRT organizational structure is flawed in that it cannot promote civil-military cooperation all of the time. Designed for flexibility and the ability to focus on a specific province's security, development, and governance needs, the loose leadership allows for personalities and relationships outside of the PRT to become more dominant. Hence, the structure compromised the triad's ability to act as a single authority and to leverage its team members first. Accordingly, the Simmelian, structurally equivalent leadership triad legitimizes the equality of the DOS-L and the USAID-L. It also cements the management authority of the SCR-B over the civilian leads, which may help to eliminate the stresses caused by a loosely organized structure.

The next section addresses the second research question of: What theory can be generated to better design a structure to promote cooperation in U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan? A theory enhancing civil-military cooperation in the Afghan PRTs is proposed.

A theory of civil-military cooperation in U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan

Generating a respected theory based upon qualitative evidence is difficult to achieve. Qualitative researchers face a strong bias from researcher and practitioner communities of the positivist paradigm. They maintain credible theories should be formed from quantitative analysis (Field, 2009). To build a theory based upon sound qualitative data collection and analysis, the researcher used Eisenhardt's theory building methodology outlined in Chapter 3: Research Design, Methodology, and Data Collection. The heart of this process is to ensure that the findings from the interviews

are cross-checked with the study's constructs and relevant literature before they can be applied against the study's hypotheses.

Hypotheses were either supported or supported with limits. Supported meant that the hypotheses were confirmed through a combination of the study's results and the literature. Supported with limits meant that the study confirmed the results, but the literature did not. The lack of literature support may be caused because the PRTs are a current topic and research has been limited. At the time of this study, there was no research indicating that the PRT's organizational structure and its impact on leadership and team behavior had been posed.

The following hypotheses were either supported or supported with limits:

1. Civil-military cooperation in the PRT is severely compromised when the military did not respect civilian expertise or rank.

Supported. The findings clearly demonstrate that civilians felt disrespected when their military counterparts and peers did not honor their expertise or the equality of their civilian ranks. Civilians felt they had to continually “prove themselves” to the military (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C9). As a result, cooperation was hampered because of the additional time spent by civilians trying to persuade the PRT-C and other military commanders to their line of thinking (C4, C5). Civilians were often exasperated by the military attitude and sought outside ties to the SCR-B, the Embassy and home agencies to help manage the military (C10). The ties in the Simmelian triad structure became advice ties, which were directed to the PRT-C. The ties were asymmetrical (unidirectional) as civilians communicated requests and information to the military that were not always reciprocated.

The literature also supports this confirmation. Civilians often felt bullied by their military counterparts, and their requests were stonewalled (Hernandorena, 2008). Others pointed out that some military did not respect the PRTs mission and would avoid coordinating efforts with the team whenever possible (Cinnamon & Lamb, 2009).

2. Civil-military cooperation in the PRT suffered when both civilians and military ignored the civilian chain of command.

Supported with limits. There were equal examples of how civilian “end-runs”

surprised and frustrated the civilian leads and their military counterparts, including the SCR-B and the BCT-C (C8). Specific cases cited involved civilians at the PRT and DST levels who bypassed the civilian chain of command to seek and obtain answers from Ambassadors, the SCR-RCE, and their home agencies (C10). As a result, stronger ties to those outside the triad increased, which created role confusion within the leadership triad (C2, C9).

Despite frustration, the military and some civilians appreciated the civilians' abilities to obtain answers quickly (C4, M8). Bypassing the civilian chain of command was valued by these individuals. Hence, while circumventing the chain of command hampered cooperation with some, it was prized because it improved the speed of information by others.

The literature supported the bifurcation of the findings. A loosely structured model was intentional as the PRTs were meant to be flexible entities i.e. can adapt according to the kinetic activity in their provinces (Eronen, 2008). As such, there was role blurring and duplication of effort that challenged normal reporting structures (Dzeidzic & Seidl, 2005). However, within this vacuum, the civilians were still able to reach back to the Embassy to obtain information quickly (Abbaszadeh et al., 2008). Civil-military cooperation did occur in these cases because the military found this information useful and timely.

3. Physical co-location of the PRTs with the maneuver units is key for successful civil-military cooperation.

Supported with limits. Civilians and military personnel alike commented that

cooperation was much easier when the leads – DOS, USAID, PRT-C – were in the same location (C4, C5, M1). The proximity allowed a faster exchange of intelligence and civil affairs expertise. It also facilitated the ease of coordinating missions with the MU-C.

The existing literature did not fully support this finding. However, the literature did confirm the need for the PRT leads to work closely and quickly with their military counterparts in the MU or SOF (Cinnamond & Lamb, 2009). Also, it was noted that the PRTs in the more dangerous provinces were vulnerable to attacks and should be co-located with the MU (Perito, 2005).

4. Constant communication among the senior civilian at the brigade level (SCR-B) and the PRT civilian lead is critical for civil-military cooperation in the PRTs.

Supported. In nearly all cases, the interviewees reported that a strong SCR-B was critical for cooperation as the “broker” role helped to manage the military’s dominance and willingness to conduct reconstruction activities without civilian input (C1-C6, C8, C10, M1-M3, M5, M6). The SCR-B’s hard work to obtain information and solve problems increased his social capital as both civilians and military wanted what he controlled. Constant communication was identified by nearly all of the interviewees as a key cooperative behavior at every level in the dual chains of command (C1 – C11, M1-M3, M7, M8, M9).

Interestingly, the role of the SCR at the brigade levels is not well-defined. This finding is surprising given how often the military and the civilians referenced the position. The specific role of the senior civilian representative is not mentioned in

- the U.S. PRT Handbook (September 2011) or BCT-PRT Unity of Effort Reference Guide (February 2011). The role is mentioned in the ISAF PRT Handbook (2009), but only at the NATO level. However, there is some literature, primarily U.S. government documents, that discusses the regional and brigade level SCR and his or her responsibilities (ISP-C-11-53A, 2011). In particular, the importance of communication with the PRT leads and the BCT-C is stressed.
5. The most pivotal roles to ensure civil-military cooperation in the PRTs are the SCR-B, BCT-C, PRT-C, DOS-L, and the USAID-L.

Supported. When asked which positions were most pivotal to cooperation within the PRTs, all of the interviewees reported that the DOS-L, USAID-L, PRT-C, SCR-B, and BCT-C must be constantly communicating and sharing information (C1-C11, M1 – M9). Examples of the best cooperation occurred when the military included the civilians in military-only activities, such as preparing campaign plans and commenting on kill or lists (C1, C2, C3, C5, M5, M6).

In the best cooperation scenario, ties within the Simmelian triad were strong, demonstrating a high frequency of information sharing within the PRT. Both the civilians and the military commented that cooperation improved with the increased interactions and corresponding understanding of the others' needs and prioritizations (C4, C5, M3, M5, M6, M7).

The literature also confirmed these findings, but again, the literature regarding the role of the SCR at the brigade level is limited. With respect to the remaining roles, scholars and practitioners also concurred that these roles and their

interactions were pivotal to a PRT's success (Hernandorena, 2008; Perito 2005; 2007; Rogers et al., 2008; The BCT-PRT 'Unity of Effort' Reference Guide, 2011; The PRT Handbook, 2011).

6. If the PRT-C is ineffective, then civilian leads will cooperate directly with the maneuver unit commander (MU-C) and Special Operations Forces commander (SOF-C).

Supported with limits. The interviews clearly indicated that a difficult, non-conforming PRT-C hampered civil-military cooperation within the PRTs (C4, C5, C7, M4, M8, M9). The interviewees most often cited cases in which the civilians worked around the PRT-C and coordinated directly with the MU-C and the SOF-C (C4, C6, C8, M4, M7).

The literature was not as convincing. There is mention of how the PRT-C's personality, personal motivations and use of CERP dollars ran counter to the PRT mission (Dziedzic & Seidl, 2005). Additionally, the PRT Handbook lists the need to "Establish good relations with the PRT Commander" as a best practice (PRT Handbook, September 2011, p. 167). However, no reference was found that describes the civilian leads' desire to interact more directly with the MU-C and SOF-C when the PRT-C was absent or ineffective.

7. The PRTs cannot succeed and achieve their missions if they do not have the support of the BCT-C.

Supported. Nearly all interviewees admitted that the BCT-C support was essential (C1-C11, M1-M8). Given that COIN strategy worked against traditional military

culture of coercion, the BCT-C was critical in enforcing lower level commands to comply with the PRT's role and needs.

The literature also discussed the need for top-down military support to ensure that more junior commanders were committed to the COIN strategy (Lamb & Cinnamond, 2009; Rogers, et al., 2008).

8. Personalities, while important, became a stronger determiner in cooperation when the structure (Simmelian triad) falters.

Supported with limits. When cooperation was at its best, interviewees described scenarios where the ties among the PRT-C, DOS-L, and USAID-L were strong within the Simmelian triad. The presence of friendship ties illustrated trust, a respect for the different chains of command, and a general feeling of caring towards each other (C5, C7, M5, M6). In these cases, different personalities did not disrupt the PRT's ability to operate effectively.

The literature was resounding in that personalities – positive and negative – had a direct effect on the PRT's operations and achievements (Eronen, 2008; Green, 2010; Perito, 2005; 2007). However, the literature rarely mentioned why personalities became strong determinants within the PRTs. Lamb & Cinnamond (2009) is an exception. They acknowledge that the “right interagency structures and processes” need to be in place so that the PRT's success is not dependent upon personalities.

9. Cooperation within the PRT struggled when the structure did not facilitate behaviors required for high performing teams.

Supported. The best cooperation occurred when the team experienced most of the behaviors found in the five team success factors of Transparency, Harmony, Truth-telling, Commitment, and Accountability. Countless examples of clear roles and responsibilities, frequent communication, a general respect for roles, trust, resource sharing, joint decision-making, and general good will were listed in the good cooperation scenarios (C1 – C6, C8, C10, M1-M7).

The weakest factor, Accountability, was the most difficult to attain as the leads did not report to a single person or agency for performance and compensation purposes. Instead these decisions were made by the leads' respective agencies and military units.

The literature repeatedly mentioned that role clarity (e.g. who's in charge), respect, trust, communication, and information sharing were critical to the PRT's success (PRTs in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment, 2006). As expected, accountability was a major issue for the PRTs. It was not only difficult to manage and supervise individual performance, but it was also difficult to gauge overall team effectiveness (Eronen, 2008; Eckert, 2011; Irvine, 2011; Lamb & Cinnamon, 2009; Perito 2007).

10. Different development philosophies hindered cooperation in the PRTs.

Supported. In many cases, civil-military cooperation with respect to funding developmental projects was compromised (C1, C2, C7, M1, M7). Questions regarding funding priorities and distribution were often raised. Clearly USAID's central, bureaucratic structure slowed the agency's ability to resource projects

quickly (C1, C2, C7). Also, civilians and military personnel alike expressed frustration over not knowing how to identify USAID projects in the field (C2, C3, M1, M2). To USAID's credit, it recognized the issue and made funds available for quick impact projects (QIP's) or short-term stabilization projects (Eronen, 2008; C6, C7).

Another complicating factor was the USAID representative's background and how well he or she knew how to leverage the agency. As one civilian noted, "It would have been helpful to have an AID employee, not a contractor, in the field as at least he would know the agency" (C8). As a small agency, USAID struggled during the Civilian Surge and had to hire many contractors and direct hires to meet the Surge's requirements (C7).

USAID was not the only agency that experienced issues with funding. As one civilian lead remarked, "the biggest challenge I faced was coordinating the development efforts of over 14 different organizations. Each organization had its own funds and its own financial reporting structures" (C7).

Similarly, the military's focus and ability to execute quick stabilization projects with CERP funds created tensions with the governance and development experts because they may have not been in the interest of Afghanistan's long-term development (C4, C5, M1, M2, M8). However, when needed, the military did cooperate and willingly supplemented governance and developmental projects (M1, M2, M5, M6, M8, M9). Consequently, civil-military cooperation regarding funding access and priorities did occur at times.

The literature reinforced the above. Many have highlighted how a dedicated ‘stabilization fund’ should have been made available to the PRT so that the members would be encouraged to work together more closely (Abbaszadeh et al., 2008; Eronen, 2008). Others have noted that fund restrictions did not allow the various agencies to diversify or combine their activities. As a result project duplications did occur (Hoshmand, 2005). Not only did civil-military cooperation on projects suffer, but the quality of the project suffered as well (Eronen, 2008).

Complicating the funding further was the lack of staff familiar with the procurement process within their own agencies. The small agencies, such as USAID and USDA, struggled especially (Green, 2010; Kuypers & Anderson, 2010; Nguyen, 2009). As a result, “many did not know how to represent the agency and were quickly marginalized by the military” (Green, 2010, p. 3). Without sufficient information regarding projects and funding, the military was quick to use CERP money for the betterment or detriment of the PRT (Dziedzic & Seidl, 2005; Hernandorena, 2008; Lamb & Cinnamond, 2009). Civil-military cooperation in these instances could be trying if there was a difference in opinion in priorities and timing.

All of the hypotheses were supported. Only four were supported with limits. The hypotheses are summarized in Table 18: Hypotheses and Results.

Table 18: Hypotheses and Results

| Number | Hypotheses | Results |
|--------|--|-----------------------|
| 1 | Civil-military cooperation in the PRT was severely compromised when the military did not respect civilian expertise or rank. | Supported |
| 2 | Civil-military cooperation in the PRT suffered when both civilians and military ignored the civilian chain of command. | Supported with limits |
| 3 | Physical co-location of the PRTs with the maneuver units was key for successful civil-military cooperation. | Supported with limits |
| 4 | Constant communication among the senior civilian at the brigade level (SCR-B) and the PRT civilian lead was critical for civil-military cooperation in the PRTs. | Supported |
| 5 | The most pivotal roles to ensure civil-military cooperation in the PRTs was the SCR-B, BCT-C, PRT-C, DOS-L, and the USAID-L. | Supported |
| 6 | If the PRT-C is ineffective, then civilian leads cooperated directly with the maneuver unit commander (MU-C) and Special Operations Forces commander (SOF-C). | Supported with limits |
| 7 | The PRTs cannot succeed and achieve their missions if they did not have the support of the BCT-C. | Supported |
| 8 | Personalities, while important, became a stronger determiner in cooperation when the structure (Simmelian triad) faltered. | Supported with limits |
| 9 | Cooperation within the PRT struggled when the structure did not facilitate behaviors required for high performing teams. | Supported |
| 10 | Different development philosophies hindered cooperation in the PRTs. | Supported |

There was general agreement that regular communication among the key roles – PRT-C, DOS-L, USAID-L, SCR-B, and BCT-C – was critical to effective civil-military cooperation within the PRT. Also, military respect for the civilians – their expertise and

complementary ranks were also deemed important for civil-military cooperation. On the contrary, the lack of clarity and procedural bottlenecks regarding the timing and prioritization of development funds exacerbated civil-military cooperation.

Perhaps the most important confirmation is the hypothesis relating to the team's ability to embrace the five team success factors. Even though the PRT was called a team, it was not set up to operate as a highly effective team. Many of the benefits of Transparency (role and procedural clarity), Harmony (trust and respect), Truth-telling (constructive dialogues), Commitment (joint problem solving and decision-making), and Accountability (responsible for individual and team goals) were lacking. Civil-military cooperation suffered when these factors were not present.

The hypotheses that were supported with limits were surprising. Nearly all of the interviewees were in agreement with these hypotheses. However, their statements were not supported concretely by the literature. This lack of congruency may be because the Afghan PRTs are a relatively new and constantly evolving phenomenon. Few, if any research studies, have captured these dynamics yet.

The PRT co-location with the maneuver unit was supported with limits despite the interviewees' unquestioned desire for close proximity. Civilian leads stated that they turned to the MU-C and SOF-C if the PRT-C could not meet their security needs. Next, the hypothesis concerning the adherence to the civilian chain of command by both civilians and military was not fully supported. Despite the military's proclivity towards a command and control culture, there were benefits to both civilians and military if the former's chain of command was bypassed. While the literature supported

the belief that respect was key for civil-military cooperation, there is little evidence to suggest that members of the PRT network must respect the civilian chain of command.

Finally, the hypothesis regarding the Simmelian leadership triad was supported with limits as an organizational structure that influenced how personalities impacted the PRT's mission. Both the interviewees and the literature were clear that personalities mattered for effective civil-military cooperation. Yet, the answering literature alluded to, but could not confirm that structural factors enabled the dominance of positive and negative personalities.

After reviewing the hypotheses and the overall findings, a theory of civil-military cooperation within the Afghan PRTs can be derived. This theory is discussed in the next section.

A theory of civil-military cooperation

A theory of civil-military cooperation within the PRTs in Afghanistan must take into account the six operating conditions, the existing Simmelian triad leadership model, and the hypotheses presented in the previous section. The theory is as follows:

A Simmelian triad leadership model based upon structural equivalence and friendship ties could best promote cooperation within the U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan from 2009-2010.

The Simmelian triad composed of the PRT-C, DOS-L, and USAID-L encourages stability, minimal conflict, and adherence to a lasting group identity. The friendship ties help to guarantee frequent communication, regular information-sharing, reciprocity, and trust. The structural equivalence limits the organizational tension between USAID

and DOS as it promotes equality, agreement on norms and behaviors, and the joint monitoring of each other's actions. Structural equivalence also helps the SCR-B and the civilian leads to better manage and hold others accountable to individual and team performance – a need acknowledged by many of the interviewees and the literature.

Given the six operating conditions of war, military domination, Washington politics, interagency/inter-service tensions, organizational cultures, and funding priorities, the Simmelian leadership triad with structural equivalence can increase role, process, and cultural understanding of the environment impacting the PRTs on a daily basis. The Simmelian triad and structural equivalence also enable the practice of the five team success factors, which help to transform the PRT into a high performing team.

To increase the success of this proposed leadership structure, the triad should be hand-selected based upon leadership skills, subject matter expertise, and familiarity with home agency/unit resourcing and reporting processes. The triad should undergo intense teambuilding and scenario-based training in civilian and military processes, systems, and cultures to better understand the others' home environments. This intense training will also build durable, trusting bonds. Finally, the members of the triad should deploy at the same time with the same tour lengths. It is important to note that many of these recommendations are very similar to the improvement ideas offered by the interviewees.

This chapter reviewed the findings from the interviews and literature and concluded that civil-military cooperation can flounder in the PRTs because of two reasons: 1) a confusing organizational structure; and 2) the absence of behaviors

associated with high performing teams. Using social network analysis, sociographs were created to illustrate how cooperation does and does not occur among the key positions in the PRTs. Finally, an alternative organizational structure is posed that may better foster civil-military cooperation. This structure is founded on the cohesive properties associated with Simmelian triads and structural equivalence. Finally, a potential theory of civil-military cooperation was derived after rigorously comparing the interviewee findings and literature against the study's hypotheses.

The final chapter outlines the study's limitations. It also articulates how the results can be applied to other fields faced with similar team dilemmas. Finally opportunities for future research are presented.

Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusions

This final chapter summarizes the study's findings, discusses its limitations, and proposes potential research opportunities and applications. It begins with a review of the study's purpose, importance, and research questions. A brief recap of the study's methodology and data collection methods will then follow. Next, a summary of the findings will ensue. Afterwards, a short discussion of the study's limitations will occur. Finally, potential research opportunities and practitioner applications will be posed.

Review of purpose and importance

The U.S. has been at war in Afghanistan for over 10 years. Operation Enduring Freedom began with the primary goal of finding and eliminating Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban terrorist networks. COIN or counterinsurgency was conceived to battle an insurgency that hid and buried itself in networks of families, villages, and local institutions. It focuses on combining 'hard' power (military force) and 'soft' (governance and development assistance) power to win the 'hearts and minds' of the Afghan people. The goal was to promote the sustainability of Afghanistan as a sovereign nation-state so that it can develop safely and remain free of corrosive insurgents. Complementary to this strategy is the adoption of the "Clear, Build, Hold" philosophy. Hard power or combat forces are to "clear" or destroy threats of insurgency while soft power or civilian agencies assisted the Afghan government to "build" infrastructures that could be sustained and "held" over time.

The PRTs are part of the "build" stage. Designed to be flexible and to co-exist with combat troops in a particular battle space, the PRTs are able to provide governance

and development aid in areas too dangerous for the traditional, humanitarian assistance groups. As the Afghan government and security forces increase and are able to safeguard their own population, the PRTs are expected to be phased out. Of the U.S. PRTs, Laghman has already closed. Both the U.S. and President Karzai have stated that the PRTs would close in accordance with the drawdown of combat troops by 2013.

The PRTs have received mixed reviews in terms of their effectiveness, especially with respect to civil-military cooperation. To their credit, the PRTs' accomplishments range from building schools and clinics to developing sustainable crops to empowering governors with democratic institutions (USAID Afghanistan: Frequently Asked Questions, 2010). Their critics, however, claim that vast sums of money have been wasted on projects that were ill-conceived and served to over-inflate the Afghan economy (Nasuti, 2009). With the war's mounting price tag accompanied by declining U.S. public support, there is renewed scrutiny regarding how U.S. money is spent in Afghanistan. The PRTs are part of this focus.

Military experts agree that war in the 21st century is distinct from any other period (Morgan, 2008; Stevenson, 2006; Giangreco, 2011). Marrying counterterrorism with COIN dictates the ongoing use of civilian development efforts in conjunction with combat operations. This study sought to understand the nature of cooperation between the U.S. civilians and U.S. military in the PRTs in Afghanistan from 2009 to 2010. In particular, it focused on the organizational structure of the PRTs to determine how it promotes or not promotes cooperation between the civilians and the military. This study is important because it may provide a better organizational model if the U.S.

decides to engage in COIN operations in the future. As the U.S. has been consistently involved in reconstruction efforts after armed conflicts (Haight, 2007), it is likely that the general concept of the PRT will continue to be used.

Review of methodology and methods

A case study method was selected for this study. It is appropriate because it answered “how”, “what”, and “why” questions (Ellinger et al., 2005). The research questions in this study sought to better understand **how** cooperation exists within the PRT organizational structure; **what** causes cooperation to occur or not occur; and **why** it does or does not occur.

Yin’s case study approach was employed. Yin (2009) identified six case study types: exploratory, explanatory, and descriptive, with single-case and multiple-case models available for each. Because the purpose of this study was to explain how and why cooperation occurred within the PRTs, an explanatory case study design was employed. Explanatory case studies attempt to understand relational or causal patterns (Fitzpatrick et al., 2004).

There was only one case examined in this study. The case had a number of elements and boundaries. With respect to time and location, it focused on the 10 U.S. PRTs located in RC/E in Afghanistan in 2009 and 2010. Within the PRTs, the emphasis was on the U.S. civilian agencies and U.S. military units. The unit of analysis was the PRT members, and the factors under study were the cooperative and non-cooperative behaviors between the members.

There were some modifications to this approach as the tentative findings suggested that the original data analysis was incomplete. Specifically, interviewees alluded to tension between the PRT-C, the MU-C, the SOF-C, as well as their respective CA teams. Accordingly additional interviews with the MU and SOF were requested and conducted to confirm that discord did exist because of role redundancies and personalities.

Studying non-U.S. PRTs was also helpful. Analyzing civil-military relations in the PRTs in Parwan (Republic of Korea), Logar (Czech Republic), Wardak, (Turkey), Kapisa (France), Ghazni (Poland), and Bamyan (New Zealand) yielded information about how cooperation occurred when the U.S. was the battle space owner, but not the PRT owner. These PRTs seemed to enjoy success regardless if they were military or civilian-led. The comparison of U.S. PRTs versus non- U.S. PRTs would be an interesting topic to determine how different countries define successful civil-military cooperation, how these definitions differed, and what factors contributed to enhance a PRT's effectiveness.

Data were collected via multiple sources: an in-depth literature review, interviews of civilians and military personnel, and an ongoing monitoring of credible, relevant news articles. To improve the data's accuracy, triangulation was used. This method compared the data gathered across the different sources to ensure the data's veracity.

Through an inductive approach, the researcher identified categories and topics through the coding of key words and concepts from the transcripts. The categories

included: organizational structure, people, cooperative behaviors, non-cooperative behaviors, and other. There were 24, accompanying topics. These topics are listed in Table: 19 Summary of Categories and Topics.

Table 19. Summary of Categories and Topics.

| | | Categories | | | | |
|--------|----------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------|
| | | Structure | People | Cooperative Behaviors | Uncooperative Behaviors | Other |
| Topics | • Leadership | • Personalities | • Communication | • Interagency/ | • Org | |
| | • Roles/ | • Key | • Respect | Inter-service | Culture | |
| | • Expectations | • Relationships | • Sharing | Tensions | • Training | |
| | • Chain of Command | • Recruitment/ Selection | • Resources (expertise, info & funds) | • Personal Motivations | • Pace/ Priorities | |
| | • Improvement | • Expertise (Skills & Knowledge) | • Friendship | • Credibility Issues | | |
| | • Team Composition | | • Planning and Implementing Together | • Accountability Issues | | |
| | • Military Dominance | | | • End-runs | | |

Because one of the goals of this study was to create a theory of civil-military cooperation, Eisenhardt’s (1989) eight step process for building a theory was engaged. Her approach was specifically used as she developed a comprehensive way to generate theory from a case study method. The eight steps and the resulting actions followed are listed in Table 20: Eisenhardt’s Theory Building Model.

Table 20: Eisenhardt’s Theory Building Model

| Steps | Actions |
|--|--|
| 1. Getting Started – research questions and constructs identified | Research questions were carefully crafted to highlight how organizational structure impacts civil-military cooperation within the PRTs. |
| 2. Selecting the Case – choosing theoretical, not random sampling | Case selection was based upon research questions and the types of data and participants needed. |
| 3. Crafting Instruments and Protocols – using multiple data collection methods | Using Rubin & Rubin’s interview guide, the researcher developed interview questions to increase data quality and minimize researcher bias. |

| Steps | Actions |
|---|--|
| 4. Entering the Field – overlap of data collection and analysis, including field notes to capture emerging data | The researcher utilized memo-ing to keep a running list of ideas and tentative hypotheses while gathering the data from interviews, literature, and new clippings. |
| 5. Analyzing Data – cross pattern search using divergent techniques | Employing coding and bracketing, the researcher searched for data commonalities and contradictions |
| 6. Shaping Hypotheses – replication logic across cases; search for evidence of the “how” and “why” research questions | The researcher analyzed findings within and across civilian and military groupings; generated 10 hypotheses. |
| 7. Enfolding Literature – Comparison with similar and conflicting literature | The researcher compared literature and ongoing research of current events with the hypotheses |
| 8. Reaching Closure – Theoretical saturation when possible | Using triangulation (comparison against multiple types of data and data collection methods), the researcher determined that hypotheses were either supported or supported with limits. |

Ten hypotheses were generated. They are as follows:

1. Civil-military cooperation in the PRT is severely compromised when the military did not respect civilian expertise or rank. *Supported.*
2. Civil-military cooperation in the PRT suffered when both the civilians and the military ignored the civilian chain of command. *Supported with limits.*
3. Physical co-location of the PRTs with the maneuver units was key for successful civil-military cooperation. *Supported with limits.*
4. Constant and frequent communication among the senior civilian at the brigade level (SCR-B) and the PRT civilian lead was critical for civil-military cooperation in the PRTs. *Supported.*

5. The most pivotal roles to ensure civil-military cooperation in the PRTs are the SCR-B, brigade combat team commander (BCT-C), provincial reconstruction team commander (PRT-C), Department of State lead (DOS-L) and the U.S. Agency for International Development lead (USAID-L). *Supported.*
6. If the PRT-C is ineffective, then civilian leads cooperated directly with the maneuver unit commander (MU-C) and Special Operations Forces commander (SOF-C). *Supported with limits.*
7. The PRTs could not succeed and achieve their missions if they did not have the support of the BCT-C. *Supported.*
8. Personalities, while important, became a stronger determiner in cooperation when the structure (Simmelian triad) falters. *Supported with limits.*
9. Cooperation within the PRT struggled when the structure did not facilitate behaviors required for high performing teams. *Supported.*
10. Different development philosophies hindered cooperation in the PRTs. *Supported.*

Discussion of findings

After a thorough analysis of the findings through bracketing and triangulation, the findings were applied to the research questions listed below:

1. How does organizational structure facilitate cooperation between the U.S. military personnel and U.S. civilians to aid in the success of U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan?
2. What theory can be generated to better design an organizational structure to promote civil-military cooperation in U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan?

The purpose of this study was to understand how the current PRT organizational structure promotes or not promotes civil-military cooperation in the U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan from 2009 to 2010. The first part of the analysis focused on the definitions of cooperation and integration as many interviewees used the terms interchangeably. Interestingly, the majority of the civilians saw cooperation and integration as separate conditions. They also believed that integration could not be achieved without cooperation. Cooperation from their point of view encapsulated notions of working together towards a common goal, collaborating as separate identities, fitting into the military hierarchy, freely sharing resources to help the other achieve their missions. Civilians, in general, did not believe that integration – or becoming part of the military hierarchical military – was necessary or even desired.

The military did not overly distinguish cooperation from integration. It was assumed that because security was of paramount importance, the civilians would fold into the military's structure. Specific definitions from the military coalesced around understanding the military system and priorities, contributing to joint planning and implementation, and sharing available resources.

Cooperative or non-cooperative behaviors were identified through the interviewees' stories about civil-military cooperation within the PRTs. The most common cooperative behaviors were communicating regularly, sharing resources, willing to be flexible about job requirements, and getting along with others. These behaviors were later used as a determination of how well the team practiced the five team success factors.

Taking into account the definitions and examples of good and poor cooperative behaviors, the findings indicated that the current PRT structure suffers significant barriers that can impede cooperation. The primary barriers were grouped into two findings: confusing leadership structure and underdeveloped team structure.

Confusing Leadership Structure

The official PRT leadership structure includes the PRT-C, USAID-L, DOS-L, and USDA-L. Their areas of expertise are divided by the three lines of effort: defense, diplomacy, and development. DOS is responsible for governance; USAID is responsible for development; and the PRT-C is responsible for security. As mentioned in the beginning of this study, USDA does not play a predominant role in the analysis as its presence was too small to draw any concrete conclusions.

All roles are to collaborate together, make consensus-based decisions, and share resources. Unfortunately, in an attempt to allow the PRT the flexibility to adapt to its environment, the structure presented is confusing at best. Many interviewees, internal and external to the PRT, complained frequently about who was in charge. The military, in particular, voiced a strong opinion of wanting the civilian leads to step up and take charge of their lines of effort. This question was further complicated as not all of the roles were present in the PRT all of the time. Rotation schedules did not always coincide, or no one was available because of staffing shortages. Further, even if the civilian roles were present, their representatives may not have been fully qualified, or they resisted working with their military counterparts. A lack of consensus in decision-making and a gap in leadership then ensued.

When there was a lack of civilian leadership, the military did not hesitate to take charge. Emboldened by a long-standing history in reconstruction, some military personnel believed they could accomplish the job at least as well as the civilians. Given the dangerous conditions brought on by war, the military felt a certain urgency for cities and villages to support the PRT's efforts. Through the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), the PRT-C had substantial funds to conduct development projects without requiring approval from the civilian leads. These projects suited the military's need and may or may not have been in the long-term interest of a developed Afghanistan. The current PRT structure, allowing unilateral decisions and a lack of accountability, enabled this type of behavior to continue.

The PRT-C position was especially pivotal to the structure because he was the cutpoint or primary link to other military units in their battle space. The relationship between the PRT-C and the MU-C was particularly sensitive as the PRT could not travel in the more dangerous areas without the support of the MU troops and their assets and expertise. When this relationship was in jeopardy because of a difficult, unqualified, or missing PRT-C, the civilian leads bypassed the PRT-C and worked directly with the MU-C. Thus, the leadership structure within the PRT was compromised. Civil-military cooperation could still occur, but the civilian leads compensated for the loss of the PRT-C by reaching directly to the MU-C and the SOF-C for information (CA and intelligence) and logistical support.

Finally, the structure hampered cooperation because of the lack of formal accountability. The performance of all of the leads was formally assessed by their

individual agencies or units. If one failed to perform his or her PRT responsibilities, there were few, if any, repercussions. As a result, there was not a formal structure that could force everyone to collaborate for the sake of the PRT.

Underdeveloped Team

The second result that emerged with respect to effective civil-military cooperation was the degree of how well the PRT leadership structure functioned as a high-performing team. An underdeveloped team among the key leads also contributed to the lack of cooperation. Assessing the PRT against five team success factors, the PRT struggled when these success factors were missing, compromised, or only practiced to a limited degree. The success factors include:

1. Transparency – Clarifying mission, goals, processes, roles, and personal beliefs
2. Harmony – Creating strong relationships through trust, compassion and acceptance
3. Truth-telling – Distilling truth from myth and having the courage to stand up for it
4. Commitment – Creating unity of effort through shared agreements and promises
5. Accountability – Holding self and the team responsible for results

When the team members questioned their roles, experienced role redundancy or had difficulty communicating, the success factor of **Transparency** was missing.

When there was mistrust among the team members, disrespect, and a lack of caring towards each other, the success factor of **Harmony** was not present.

When team members only partially told the truth and conducted end-runs that hurt rather than helped relationships, the team was missing the **Truth-telling** success factor.

When the team members were lax about the PRT mission, failed to share information, or were unwilling to offer or ask for help, the team lacked the **Commitment** success factor.

When team members were not held responsible for their performance or that of the team, then the **Accountability** success factor had been compromised. This success factor was also shown to be missing or weak when team members placed their needs above those of the team.

Successful Cooperation

To better understand how an organizational structure could improve civil-military cooperation, social network analysis (SNA) was applied. SNA is appropriate as it could map the relationships of individual positions in terms of information sharing. The sociographs derived from the analysis illustrated the types and strengths of ties or relations needed for the team success factors to occur.

For this study, the network contained the PRT leads, home agencies, the U.S Embassy, ISAF, the senior civilian representatives at the brigade and regional levels (SCR-B and SCR-RCE), the division, brigade, MU, and SOF commanders, the DST leads, and the separate entities of the Army Core of Engineers and the Agribusiness Development Teams. The network is an open network, meaning that there are gaps

between a number of the positions and that they do not connect directly to one another.

Interviewees were asked to identify those positions that are most critical for civil-military cooperation within the PRT. With little exception, the following positions were identified:

- PRT-C
- DOS-L
- USAID-L
- SCR-B
- MU-C
- BCT-C

Through interviewee stories and follow-up questions, the types, direction, and strength of information-sharing ties could be mapped to the key positions. Friendship ties existed between the civilian leads and the PRT-C as they had short path distances, communicated regularly on a number of issues, had high levels of trust, and retained an interest in maintaining the structure through accepted group norms.

Two directional arrows indicated information sharing between two positions. The BCT-C shared information with his subordinates in terms of orders or requests. In turn, the subordinates shared information in terms of seeking advice or responding to the BCT-C's request. A similar relationship existed between the SCRs, the home agencies, the Embassy, the 101st Airborne Division (later the 82nd Airborne), and ISAF.

There was a reciprocal information exchange, but the information may take the form of requests, advice, civilian directives, or military orders.

Mapping the direction, path distance and frequency of ties, networks were constructed to demonstrate examples of good cooperation, poor cooperation, and mixed cooperation. The center of the network is the triadic leadership subgroup composed of the DOS-L, USAID-L, and the PRT-C. The majority of interviewees told stories of how cooperation was more seamless when the three PRT leads were present and working together as a single unit.

The next section describes how organizational structures impact civil-military cooperation from a social networking perspective. Three forms of civil-military cooperation are discussed: good, poor and mixed.

Good Cooperation Network

The three leads form what is known as a Simmelian triangle in SNA. Forwarded by Simmel (1971), the Simmelian triad is a clique (adjacency to one another), and each member has a direct tie to another group. These separate ties are distinct and are not shared among the members in the triad. The PRT-C has a direct tie to the BCT-C, who in turn, has direct ties to the division commander of the 101 Airborne Division as well as to the rest of the commanders in the PRT Network. The DOS-L and the USAID-L share a tie with the SCR-B. However, they also have non-overlapping ties to their respective agencies in Washington DC. The USAID-L also has a direct tie to the Mission in Kabul.

As discussed in Chapter 4, the difficulty with Simmelian ties is that the PRT members can be pulled in other directions that may not be in the best interest of the

PRT or its other members. In short, the ties create a situation of dual allegiance. This tension can create role stress, or a questioning of the members' exact responsibilities and expectations.

The benefits of a Simmelian triad are many. First, because of adjacency and friendship ties, the triad is a tight group. The frequency of information-sharing is high. Reciprocity is also high as the leads in the triad have mutuality; they can freely choose to give and receive information. With reciprocity and repeated interactions come trust.

Simmelian triads tend to last longer and have the capability to create a group identity. A group identity could be helpful to the PRTs for two reasons. First, personalities are downplayed, and negative personalities may be better managed. Second, because of the constant rotation of team membership, the group identity establishes norms that enable new members to adapt to accepted team behaviors and expectations.

The Simmelian ties, as long as they are not stronger than the friendship ties within the triad, are helpful because they offer opportunities for reach back. Thus, additional information required for the job can be accessed quickly. When reach back is not healthy (e.g. end-runs), those in the home agencies seek to change the PRT's status and operations by appealing to others in the network, i.e. Ambassadors, SCR-RCE, and the Division Commander. These end-runs can also occur if DSTs, SOF, ACOE, or ADT bypass the PRT leadership to gain influence over the PRT. These actions have negative consequences as the PRT leadership wonders why it had to learn about an issue second or third-hand.

In summary, good civil-military cooperation occurred under the following conditions:

- The civilian leads and the PRT-C formed a Simmelian triangle. They had strong, durable bonds with each other, but also had ties to other, separate entities outside the PRT. These relations could be leveraged to assist individual team members and the team's performance overall.
- There were strong friendship ties among the DOS and USAID leads and the PRT-C within the PRTs. The leaders communicated regularly, participated in joint planning meetings, travelled together, shared meals, spent downtime together, and suffered through various hardships side by side. The leaders viewed each other as co-equals and treated each other with respect.
- The PRT is co-located with the maneuver unit to better coordinate travel, participate in targeting meetings, and engage with their CA teams.
- The PRT-C was an effective leader who could leverage relationships with BCT-C, the MU-C, the SOF-C, and the commanders of other units, such as the Army Core of Engineers (ACOE) and the Agribusiness Development Team (ADT);
- The BCT-C actively embraced COIN and the philosophy of "Clear, Build, and Hold." The BCT-C approached the management of the PRTs via a Board of Director's approach. The PRT leads, the PRT-C, MU-C, and other

relevant personnel participated in a weekly briefing to share information and offer assistance.

- A SCR-B was a broker in terms of sharing information, providing guidance, and obtaining approval. This person had strong ties with the BCT-C and civilian leads. This person also had a lot of social capital in terms of having fast access to accurate information and influential contacts.
- The civilian and military chains of command were utilized and respected, except when reach backs were employed.

With respect to team behaviors, a PRT structure promoting good civil-military met many of the criteria laid out by the five team success factors (See Table 20: Team Behaviors in Good Cooperation).

Table 21: Team Behaviors in Good Cooperation

| Team Success Factors | Behaviors |
|----------------------|---|
| Transparency | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clear Roles and Responsibilities • Frequent Communication • Mutual Understanding of the PRT Mission |
| Harmony | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mutual Respect and Acceptance • Trust |
| Truth-telling | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Open Disagreement • Honesty Dialogues |
| Commitment | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collective Passion about the Mission • Sharing Resources • Joint Problem Solving/Decision-making |
| Accountability | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meeting Team Goals • Honoring Commitments |

Poor Cooperation Network

A PRT structure that had poor civil-military cooperation reflected a position within the leadership triad that was ineffective. This position most often compromised was the PRT-C. The PRT-C was missing, had a difficult personality, or was ill-prepared. As a result, the civilian leads tended to circumnavigate the PRT-C and form direct ties with the MU-C. Hence, a new Simmelian Triangle was formed with the MU-C replacing the PRT-C. This new triangle was not ideal as some civilians preferred some distance from the maneuver unit as they did not want their reconstruction efforts to be tainted by apparent association with combat troops

Poor civ-civ cooperation could also occur if either the DOS-L or USAID-L was perceived as ineffective. Again, the role was bypassed, and others were expected to be flexible and assume more responsibilities, which may not have been in their lines of effort. Civil-military cooperation could still occur, but the remaining roles were stressed and lacked the necessary information to be able to fully integrate the missing expertise. A great example is a DOS-L who had a difficult relationship with his USAID-L. Information regarding USAID's resources was either lost or purposively withheld. Consequently, many of the team success factors were violated (Table 21: Team Behaviors in Poor Civil-Military Cooperation).

Table 22: Team Behaviors in Poor-Civil-Military Cooperation

| Team Success Factor | Behaviors |
|---------------------|---|
| Transparency | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shifting roles and responsibilities as PRT-C is bypassed. • Communication decreased with PRT-C as the leads coordinate directly with the MU-C and SOF-C. |
| Harmony | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of respect to/from the PRT-C. • Weakened trust as interactions with PRT-C are limited. |
| Truth-telling | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disagreements are avoided. • Civilians tell white lies or lies of omission to manage the PRT-C. |
| Commitment | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resources shared within the new triangle of DOS-L, USAID-L, and MU-C. • Civilian leads seek and problem-solve more with the MU-C and the SOF-C. • End-runs conducted to the SCR-RCE and the BCT-C to avoid the PRT-C. |
| Accountability | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fractured loyalty; PRT-C is most likely motivated by personal goals of promotion. |

Mixed Civil-Military Cooperation

Mixed civil-military cooperation occurred in the case of reach backs. Healthy reach back allowed the PRT access to information or guidance that would help the lead’s and the team’s effectiveness. If the civilian leads engaged heavily in reach back, ties within the triad could be weakened as more interactions (information sharing and decisions) are occurring external to the triad. Regardless, civil-military cooperation occurred as the existence of the triad was not threatened.

End-runs also occurred in mixed civil-military cooperation scenarios. In these cases, someone within the PRTs or the DSTs circumnavigated the normal chain of command, approached directly the home agencies, USAID Mission, the Ambassadors, the SCR-RCE, and avoided the normal chain of command. This behavior created confusion, frustration, and mistrust among members in the PRT.

Mixed civil-military cooperation could also occur when there was a missing DOS-L or USAID-L. The triad migrated to a dyadic leadership structure. This structure is theoretically weaker in terms of endurance over time (Krackhardt & Handcock, 2007). Civil-military cooperation was still present as the PRT-C and the remaining civilian lead worked together to promote the success of the PRT. Similar to poor civ-civ cooperation, it may have been more difficult to access the resources and expertise of the missing lead’s agency.

Team success factors for mixed civil-military cooperation and associated behaviors are shown in Table 22: Team Behaviors in Mixed Cooperation.

Table 23: Team Behaviors in Mixed Cooperation

| Team Success Factor | Behaviors |
|---------------------|---|
| Transparency | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Roles and responsibilities may be muddled • Communication may be increased among the remaining leads, but stunted with missing lead’s home agency |
| Harmony | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mutual respect may be strong among remaining leads if able to work together to manage gap caused by missing lead • Trust may be strong among remaining leads with increased interactions to manage missing lead’s responsibilities |

| Team Success Factor | Behaviors |
|---------------------|---|
| Truth-telling | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Open Discussions • Honesty |
| Commitment | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information and resource sharing limited because of missing lead |
| Accountability | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • May not be able to meet team goals despite commitment • Commitments may be sacrificed because of allegiance to home agencies and units |

Despite the difficult conditions and fast-paced environment, another leadership structure is posited to magnify the benefits of strong, Simmelian triads. This proposed structure is explained in the next section.

Proposed PRT Structure

A Simmelian leadership triad among the DOS-L, USAID-L, and the PRT-L may improve civil-military cooperation when there is structural equivalence between the DOS-L and the USAID-L. The model should reflect Zander & Butler’s (2010) shared leadership model, which proposes that the other civilian lead may make a decision should the primary lead be missing. This triad should undergo intense pre-deployment training to increase understanding of each other’s home agencies and units, build the strong bonds characteristic of a Simmelian triad, and if possible, deploy at the same time for the same duration. Regardless, the stress caused by different rotation cycles may be limited because of the group identity formed as a result of the Simmelian triad.

The benefits of this triad are many:

- Role clarity and decision-making authority parity between the DOS-L and the USAID-L;

- Increased understanding of DOS and USAID infrastructures, policies, and resourcing processes;
- Ability to offer advice, assistance and make decisions if one leader in the triad is missing.
- Equal access to information and guidance from the SCR-B;
- Potentially less tension between DOS and USAID in the field and headquarters because of role parity;
- United civilian front to better manage the military if needed;

The key difference between this PRT leadership structure and the existing one is the inclusion of structural equivalence. This property outlines a distinct boundary between the civilian leads that encourages other PRT members to view their roles as equals in information-sharing, access to contacts, and decision-making.

Limitations

There are a number of limitations that need to be taken into account that could impact the study's validity. As much as possible, the researcher tried to guard against these limitations by adopting various qualitative analysis techniques to improve the accuracy of the data. These techniques included: triangulation, replication logic, bracketing, reflexivity, and theoretical saturation.

The limitations to this study are:

- **Small sample.** The sample of eleven civilian and nine military leaders was small and may not have completely captured the PRT experience. Within the PRT, no one below the rank of the PRT-C was interviewed. Likewise, no civilian leads in

the DSTs were interviewed with respect to their relationship to the civilian leads in the PRT. These subordinate perspectives may have yielded different answers. Also, the civilian sample was dominated by DOS personnel. Due to circumstances outside the researcher's control, only one USAID person was interviewed. Additional interviews with USAID employees may have surfaced other perspectives that may not have been covered by the rest of the sample.

- **Policy vs actual events.** Many of the participants were senior in rank, yielded influence, and were visible leaders in their fields. The researcher needed to distinguish between what actually happened in the PRTs versus how the Administration wanted the public to view the PRTs in terms of the Clear, Build, and Hold strategy.
- **Time delay.** The study was approved by the U.S. Ambassador in Afghanistan under the stipulation that the researcher would not interview the interviewees until they had finished their tours in Afghanistan. Consequently, there was a time delay. The study focused on 2009 to 2010, and many of these interviews occurred in 2011 and two as late as 2012. Understandably, there may be some inaccuracies as the passage of time makes it more difficult for the participants to recall key events and behaviors.
- **Secondary information.** Some Inferences had to be made with respect to PRT relationships outside of Afghanistan. No one from the home agencies or units was interviewed. Thus, social network ties were mapped based upon anecdotal

information from the participants' point of view. These relationships were speculative and could not be confirmed.

Future research opportunities

Based upon this study, there are ample opportunities for further research with the PRT and civil-military cooperation in general. Some examples include:

- To examine the effectiveness of the civilian-led vs. the military-led PRTs in terms of meeting the PRT's mission.
- To compare civil-military cooperation within the U.S. PRTs and the non-US PRTs.
- To study the impact of role redundancy between the different CA teams, Intelligence teams (PRT, MU SOF), and the roles of the PRT-C, MU-C, and SOF-C within the PRT Network.
- To discern whether the PRT-C is needed, or if the MU-C or SOF-C could assume this role with the same or greater results.

All of the above research threads can yield information that would be useful for U.S. policy makers and leaders from DOS, USAID, USDA and DOD if the PRT concept in post conflict countries is to be pursued.

Potential applications

This research could be applicable for researchers and practitioners who are interested in U.S. civil-military cooperation under COIN in other post-conflict countries. The focus on PRT leadership and how it integrates within the larger PRT context may be helpful in creating sound policies, organizational structures, and team preparation. The

need for role equality, mutual respect, accountability, and joint planning and execution strategies are clearly lessons learned from this study.

Key findings as they relate to leadership structures and team behaviors can also be applied to organizations faced with the need to integrate distinct organizational cultures. The principles of SNA are amenable to such a study. Understanding information-sharing patterns and how they are facilitated within and between organizations can help to improve organizational effectiveness in an increasingly complex and global world.

This study sought to explain civil-military cooperation in the U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan during the civilian surge between 2009 and 2010. Employing relevant SNA theories and concepts, good cooperation occurred when the PRT leadership structure was a Simmelian triad consisting of the PRT-C, the DOS-L, and the USAID-L. As a result, the triad encouraged the practice of the five team success factors. To overcome the six PRT operating conditions, it is recommended that future leadership structures be established as Simmelian triads with structural equivalence between the DOS-L and USAID-L and the SCR-B. As long as U.S. foreign policy embraces the 3 D's (diplomacy, development, and defense), there will be a need for strong civil-military relationships in this world. Encouraging the development of equal and trusting bonds among key leaders can help speed the way for greater cooperation.

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Appendix

Table 24. Glossary of Terms

| | |
|---------------|--|
| ADT | Agribusiness Development Teams |
| ACOE | Army Corp of Engineers |
| ANSF | Afghan National Security Forces |
| Battalion | A military unit of 300–1,300 soldiers; consists of two to seven companies; typically commanded by a lieutenant colonel. |
| BCT | Brigade combat team. A military unit of 3,000-5,000 soldiers, consists of two to seven battalions, typically commanded by a colonel |
| BCT-C | Brigade Combat Team Commander |
| CA | Civil affairs officer |
| CIMIC | Civil-military cooperation |
| Civ-Mil | Civil-military relations |
| Colonel | a U.S. military rank; ranging from lieutenant to full colonel; one to two levels beneath a Brigadier General; partners with DST leader and oversees 3-4 PRTs |
| USDA | U.S. Department of Agriculture |
| DEA | U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency; specializing in narcotics, these civilians may be present in the PRTs |
| DOS | U.S. Department of State or State Department |
| DOS-L | U.S. State Department civilian lead within the PRT |
| DSTs | District Support Teams |
| General | A U.S. military rank ranging from one to four stars; brigadier or major general (one or two star) oversees brigade and partners with SCRs |
| GIRoA | Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan |
| HQ | headquarters for DOS, USAID, or USDA |
| ICMCP | Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan |
| IPA | Interagency Provincial Affairs |
| ISAF | International Security Assistance Forces; body constructed by NATO to coordinate military action throughout Afghanistan. |
| Major | a U.S. military rank, one to two levels beneath a colonel; oversees one PRT |
| Maneuver Unit | a U.S. military combat unit (battalion) operating in the vicinity of a PRT |
| MU-C | Maneuver unit commander |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NSPD 44 | National Security Presidential Directive 44: Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization |
| PDD 56 | Presidential Decisions Directive 56: Managing Complex Contingency Operations |
| PRT-C | PRT Commander; senior ranking military officer on the PRT |
| PRTs | Provincial Reconstruction Teams |
| PSCs | Personal Services Contractor; a contracting employment classification used by USAID |

| | |
|------------|---|
| RC/East | Regional Command East; military classification by NATO. This region experienced the most active conflict. The majority of the U.S. PRTs are located in this region. |
| RC/West | Regional Command West; military classification by NATO. This region was the most calm and stable in terms of conflict. |
| RC/North | Regional Command North; military classification by NATO. This region was relatively peaceful and stable. |
| RC/South | Regional Command South; military classification by NATO. This region experienced the most conflict earlier in the war. Conflict has decreased, but is still active. |
| RC/Central | Regional Command Central or Kabul; military classification by NATO. There are no PRTs in this region. |
| SCRs | Senior Civilian Representatives |
| SCR-B | Senior Civilian Representative at the brigade level |
| SCR-RCE | Senior Civilian Representative of Regional Command East |
| SNA | Social network analysis |
| SOF | Special Operations Forces or Special Forces |
| SOF-C | Special Operations Forces commander |
| USAID | U.S. Agency for International Development |
| USAID | U.S. Agency for International Development civilian lead within the PRT |
| 3161s | Independent contractors hired by the State Department |

U.S. PRTs in RC/E



Figure 18: PRTs in Afghanistan (PRT Handbook, 2011).

STUDY CONSENT FORM

Understanding U.S. Civil-Military Cooperation within the U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan

You are invited to participate in a research study to help assess the effectiveness of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. You were selected as a participant because you worked with a PRT or DST (District Support Team) in Afghanistan. We ask that you read this form and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to be in the study.

This study is being conducted by: Ms. Josie Fritsch, a PhD candidate at the University of Minnesota. You may contact her at frit0186@umn.edu at any time throughout the study.

Background Information

The purpose of this study is to determine the effectiveness of the PRT leadership team in terms of its ability to promote cooperation between its U.S. military and U.S. civilian leaders. Specifically, the researcher will study organizational structures and processes and how they impact knowledge-sharing and joint decision-making within specific developmental initiatives. The study is expected to last one year.

Procedures:

If you agree to be in this study, we would ask you to participate in one or two of the following:

- **Participate in a confidential, 1 hour interview.** Senior leaders of the PRTs are asked to participate in an interview. These leaders include senior members from the U.S. civilian agencies and U.S. military units. You may be asked to participate in an additional ½ hour interview to ensure that the information from the initial interview is accurate. Interviews may be face to face or by phone. They will be audio-taped and transcribed into written text. All information exchanged will be unclassified.
- **Complete an electronic survey on your unclassified system.** PRT members representing U.S. civilian agencies and the U.S. military are asked to participate in a short, 20 minute survey. The survey will gather information from current PRT members in the field with respect to their understanding of structures and processes promoting and inhibiting joint decision-making and knowledge-sharing.

Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study

The study has minimal risks. Your confidentiality is protected via the U.S. Privacy Act and the University of Minnesota's Institutional Review Board. Interview participants are encouraged to review their own transcripts to ensure accuracy in their responses.

There are no direct benefits to the participant.

Compensation:

You will receive no payment for your participation.

Confidentiality:

The records of this study will be kept private. If you are interviewed, your names, contact information, and other information that could identify you will be removed from the interview transcripts.

If you are surveyed, your names and contact information will be removed from the responses. The researcher will create separate identities using a code known only by the researcher.

In any sort of report or paper the researcher might publish, the researcher will not use names or descriptions that will make it possible to identify a participant.

Research records, audio tapes, and surveys will be kept private. Only the researcher will have access to these records. Audio tapes will be destroyed upon the completion of the study. Paper and electronic data gathered, including transcripts and survey responses, will be stored and secured in a locked file in the researcher's office. Electronic data will be stored in an encrypted CD. All data will be destroyed after 10 years.

Voluntary Nature of the Study:

Participation in this study is voluntary. Your decision whether or not to participate will not be used in any formal or informal performance evaluation. If you decide to participate, you are free to not answer any question or withdraw at any time.

Contacts and Questions:

The researcher conducting this study is: Ms. Josie Fritsch. You may ask any questions or express any concerns at any time. You may also contact Mr. Alexandre Ardichvili at 612-626-4529 or ardic001@umn.edu. He is Ms. Fritsch's academic advisor. Finally, you may contact Ms. Dawn Liberi, Senior Civilian Representative for RC/E at dawn.liberi@afghan.swa.army.mil. Ms. Liberi serves as the study's sponsor.

If you would like to speak with someone outside of the study, **you are encouraged** to contact the Research Subjects' Advocate Line, D528 Mayo, 420 Delaware St. Southeast, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455; (612) 625-1650.

You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records.

Statement of Consent:

I have read the above information. I have asked questions and have received answers. I consent to participate in the study.

Signature: _____ Date: _____

Please Print
Name: _____

Signature of Researcher: *J. Fritsch*
_____ Date: _____

Please Print Name: Ms. Josie Fritsch

To: Electronic Study Participants, PRT Cooperation Study

From: Ms. Dawn Liberi
Senior Representative Civilian for RC/E

Subject: Electronic Survey Participation in the *Understanding Internal PRT Cooperation under the Senior Civilian Representative Leadership* Research Study

Date: TBD

.....

We are engaging in a yearlong research project that will provide the Senior Civilian Representatives **insights about how cooperation between our civilian and military counterparts can be improved within the PRT structures**. Specifically, the study will focus on communication, knowledge sharing, and joint decision-making behaviors between the U.S. civilians and U.S. military personnel.

The project's researcher is Ms. Josie Fritsch from the University of Minnesota. She will contact you shortly to discuss the study and any questions or concerns you may have.

Your participation in this study is easy and will not require a lot of time. Ms. Fritsch will issue **an electronic survey on our unclassified systems**. You can download it, complete, and submit it via the same system. The process should take approximately **20 minutes**. The survey will ask you questions about communication and decision-making practices and how we share knowledge across our organizations. She will target specific projects of which we have identified as important to future PRT efforts. Ms. Fritsch seeks to understand cooperative patterns – what promotes and inhibits them.

This study is not mandatory, but we would greatly appreciate your participation. Pursuant to the U.S. Privacy Act and the University of Minnesota's Institute of Review Board, **your names and contact information will remain anonymous, confidential,** and known only by Ms. Fritsch. She will assign codes to participants, and the resulting data and results will remain in a secured location until the study is complete. At that time, the data will be destroyed. The publishing of any reports or papers will not disclose any information that can identify you or your responses.

It is important to note that this study is not about individual performance. The results of this study will not be used in your performance reviews or evaluations of any kind. You are free to withdraw from the study at any point in time.

The attached 1 page document discusses the study and its outcomes more in-depth. If you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me at dawn.liberi@afghan.swa.army.mil or Ms. Fritsch at frit0186@umn.edu.

Thank you in advance for your assistance. The benefits of the study can help us improve and accelerate our important and meaningful work in Afghanistan.

Project Purpose: The purpose of this study is to determine the effectiveness of the PRT leadership teams under the SCR in terms of their ability to promote cooperation between its U.S. military and U.S. civilian leaders. **Cooperation will be assessed via the level and quality of knowledge-sharing and joint decisions within the PRT structure.**

Need:

- **U.S. needs to better balance its military and non-military efforts.** Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced during a March 3, 2010 lecture at Kansas State University that “U.S. foreign policy is still too dominated by the military, too dependent on the generals and admiral who lead our major overseas commands, and not enough on the State Department”
- **The U.S. PRT structure and membership in Afghanistan has recently changed and grown.** Whereas there were only 100 civilians outside of Kabul last year, there are now 400. Increasing knowledge-sharing, joint decision-making, and organizational cultural understanding is key to establishing cooperative behaviors and structures.

Importance: This study is important because of its potential implications for future vice development efforts in post conflict countries. The current U.S. Administration is highly interested in observing whether the PRTs in Afghanistan are an effective foreign policy instrument. Furthermore, the U.S. public expresses an ongoing concern regarding the U.S. position in Afghanistan; in particular, how taxpayer dollars are spent and when U.S. troops can safely return home.

Benefits:

- **Identify potentially new leadership structures** that can improve knowledge sharing and joint decision-making;
- **Uncover patterns that promote or inhibit knowledge-sharing or decision-making** for specific initiatives. Initiatives to be determined by Ms. Liberi in consultation with other key leaders.
- **Understand what social mechanisms and technology are required** to improve cooperation within the PRTs.

Project Details: The project is a research study conducted by Ms. Jocelyn Fritsch from the University of Minnesota. Ms. Dawn Liberi, U.S. Senior Civilian Representative for Regional Command East will be the sponsor. The project will include:

- **In-depth interviews with senior civilian and military staffs in Afghanistan and Washington, DC** to understand current leadership structures and how they support or not support cooperative efforts.
- **Unclassified, electronic survey to be submitted to DST and PRT members** to identify communication, information-sharing, and decision-making patterns

within specific initiatives. Results will be reviewed by the U.S. State Department. Data will be protected and secured location.

Project Timeline: April 2010 – March, 2011.

Ethics: Guidelines articulated by the U.S. Privacy Act and the University of Minnesota's Institutional Review Board will be strictly followed. Participants can withdraw from the study at any time. All will have access to the researcher for questions and concerns.