

ACADEMIC ENCOUNTER

The American University in Japan and Korea

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By Martin Bronfenbrenner

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PREFACE

This study of some 18 American university affiliations with Japanese and Korean institutions is a small part of a larger study of the American university overseas. The larger study is undertaken by the Institute for Research on Overseas Programs at Michigan State University. What is said here about programs in Japan and Korea can be compared with what other staff members of the Institute have said about programs in other countries, particularly other Asian countries such as India and Indonesia.

Many believe with ex-President Eisenhower that the American university should expand its foreign affiliations as a contribution to economic and cultural reconstruction and development overseas, and to better international understanding between America and other countries. In this view, university affiliations are an important type of "people to people" contacts across national boundaries. Others believe that the American university should concentrate its limited manpower and resources on the domestic job it does best, and reduce the scale of its commitments abroad. Part of the decision (or compromise) between these viewpoints should be based on a knowledge of what the existing international programs are in fact attempting or accomplishing. The Institute for Research on Overseas Programs seeks to develop this knowledge and understanding; this report seeks to develop it for one important pair of countries, Japan and Korea.

This report is based mainly on my stay in Japan and Korea from June to December, 1958. In addition to preliminary interviews in America and readings in published sources, the study rests mainly upon approximately 200 interviews with persons connected in some capacity with one or more of the programs studied. (The need to protect the anonymity of particular interviewees accounts for some apparently unsupported statements in the text.) My period in Japan and Korea included the summer vacation, and therefore permitted only partial justice to programs which were not in session. The Japanese programs received more attention than the Korean; within Japan, programs centering in and near Tokyo were studied more fully than programs

elsewhere. Many of the programs are new and are evolving rapidly. Comments valid as of 1958 may have lost validity with the passage of relatively little time, particularly in Korea after the 1960 revolution. At least three new programs have also entered the picture — a University of Oregon program in economic development in Korea, a Stanford-Tokyo study of the Occupation reforms in the Japanese educational system, and a Stanford center for Japanese Studies in Tokyo, with the cooperation of Keio, Tokyo, and Waseda Universities. While the first two are mentioned in the text, nothing substantive could be said about any of the three.

Let me admit some prejudices and preview some conclusions. I came to Asia a cynic, looking for boondoggling, sightseeing and meaningless wheel-spinning by semi-competent hacks. I found with few exceptions sincere efforts by able people, trying hard to compensate for deficiencies in their backgrounds. The programs are not the obvious wastes of time and manpower that their extreme critics aver. On the other hand, it does seem true that the small-scale, unpretentious program built up by university people themselves has a better chance of long-run success in Japan than the grandiose "rush project" sponsored from outside. (This is less true in Korea, where the problems are too large and urgent to wait for the long run.) I also confirmed a belief with which I started: that it is better over the long pull to train Japanese and Koreans relatively slowly in America than to send numbers of American teachers or students for short periods to Japan or Korea.

My main debts are to people connected with the 18 programs and the universities participating in them. They are administrators, teachers, and students. They are government workers and foundation employees. They are friendly and hostile to the university programs. They are American and Japanese and Korean. They took time to see me and answer questions that were sometimes foolish, sometimes leading, and possibly sometimes even hostile. The Institute for Research on Overseas Programs financed my study from a grant by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Its Director, Professor Edward W. Weidner, has been at once responsible for my research orientation, my initial editor, and my severest critic. (He also conducted

interviews with me in Japan during a short visit in September, 1958.) His editorial and critical efforts were continued at the Michigan State University Bureau of Social and Political Research by Dr. Frank Pinner and Mrs. Hilda Jaffe. My wife, Mrs. Teruko Okuaki Bronfenbrenner, has been extraordinarily important to this study because her native tongue is Japanese. My own fragmentary background is due both to her educational efforts and to two public agencies: the United States Naval Training School (Oriental Languages) and the headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Tokyo. At the University of Minnesota, I was fortunate to be assigned the services of an excellent Korean research assistant, Mr. Chul Soon Khang, who has done his best to compensate for the deficiencies of my Korean orientation. None of these people or organizations are responsible for my errors of fact or interpretation. Many have, indeed, disagreed with me actively.

My final debt is to numerous publishers, both commercial and scholarly, who have permitted me to quote from works bearing their imprints.

Minneapolis, Minnesota
March, 1961

Martin Bronfenbrenner

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CHAPTER **1** NINETEENTH-
CENTURY
BACKGROUND

Some of the overseas programs of American universities involve countries with which American cultural contact was virtually non-existent until the end of World War II -- for example, Vietnam and Indonesia. Others involve countries from which America had traditionally imported culture -- for example, France and Germany. Japan is a different case entirely. There is a long history of educational and developmental missions from the United States to Japan during the half-century following the first visit of Commodore Perry in 1853. At least one of the existing programs is founded directly on a half-forgotten one of the last century.

INTRODUCTION

The period 1860-1900, particularly the two middle decades, represents a golden age of American contact with Japan. Japan was acquiring from Europe and America a basic knowledge of Western science and technology. The American missions, however small by twentieth-century standards, had broad interests and made real contributions to the westernization of Japan. Curti and Birr describe most nineteenth-century American overseas missions as "of minor importance" and "designed to gain information for the United States rather than to help others." "Only the missions to Japan," they continue, "approach some of

the twentieth-century ventures in scope and complexity."¹ And Reischauer, surveying the same period as an epoch in Japanese history, concludes that, "In the long run the Japanese probably borrowed more from the United States than from any one European nation."²

Western influence in awakening Japan was a natural by-product of the rush to modernize and industrialize in time to preserve Japanese political and economic independence from European imperialism. The pre-eminence of American influence requires especial explanation. America itself was at this time something of an intellectual backwater, largely dependent for its higher culture upon Great Britain, France, and Germany. A number of reasons can nevertheless be adduced for Japan's reliance on American technical and educational assistance:

1. America had until 1898 no imperial ambitions in Asia, or in the Pacific beyond the Hawaiian Islands. There was nothing to fear from America, as there sometimes was from Britain, France, or Russia.

2. Americans shared with the British the command and use of the English language -- the great international commercial medium of the day.

3. America had faced in the West problems similar to those confronting Japan on her own northern frontier, the island of Hokkaido. There were even climatic similarities between Hokkaido and the American Midwest.

4. British missionary and allied cultural activity in Asia was concentrated in British possessions, particularly India and Burma. French activity was concentrated in Indo-China. Dutch activity was concentrated in Indonesia. The Germans may be said to have

1. Merle Curti and Kendall Birt, Prelude to Point Four (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1954), p. 204.

2. Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 11.

neglected the Far East in favor of eastern Europe and the Turkish Empire. Together with China, and even more than China, Japan became an American field of concentration more or less by default.

5. Nor can the personal element be overlooked. Among the individual foreign teachers of early Meiji Japan,³ four Americans (by birth or adoption) stand out above any similar number from any European country -- Guido Verbeck, William Smith Clark, Ernest Fenollosa, and, of course, Lafcadio Hearn. We shall hear more of them later.

ment by the German is also related to some of these same factors. American-Japanese rivalry in Eastern Asia was rampant by 1910, together with ill-will between the two countries over such problems as Japanese immigration into Hawaii and California. English as a scholarly, scientific, and technical language had taken second place to German in many fields during the generation preceding World War I. Japanese expansionism had shifted from the Hokkaido frontier (which bore some resemblance to the American West) to Korea, Manchuria, and North China, where American experience was less relevant. On the Asian Continent, Japan's great need was an army, and Hohenzollern Germany had the best army in the world. Finally, the last of the great American teachers of early Meiji was either dead or had left Japan by the end of the Russo-Japanese War (1905).

But enough of "why it happened." Our study is concerned primarily with "what happened," with special reference to the relations between Japanese and American universities. Sampling from a wide range of available material, we shall discuss: (1) Tokyo University, (2) Hokkaido University, (3) two private universities, Keio and Doshisha, (4) the Japanese educational system, and finally (5) American-educated Japanese. To a

3. The term "early Meiji" usually refers to the period between the restoration of the Meiji Emperor to power (1868) and the outbreak of the first Sino-Japanese War (1894). We shall sometimes use the term more loosely to include events before 1868 or after 1894.

greater extent even than indicated by our footnote references, we shall make use of information supplied by Schwantes' valuable study of Japanese-American cultural relations.⁴

THE FOUNDING OF TOKYO UNIVERSITY

Tokyo University has been since the late 1870's the undisputed intellectual leader among Japan's institutions of higher education, which now number approximately 500. No American university quite corresponds to "Todai." It has approximately the same relative standing in Japan that Harvard has in the United States, but as it is a public institution with low fees, its exclusiveness is based more on the difficulty of its entrance examinations and less on the cost of attendance than is the case with Harvard. So marked has been its dominance of the national civil service in particular that Occupation authorities referred to a "Tokyo University clique" which they attempted (unsuccessfully) to break up.⁵

This educational giant developed from an institution called the Bansho Torishirabejo, or "Institute for the Study of Barbarian Writings," founded by the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1855. Its main purposes were the translating of foreign documents and the teaching of foreign languages. After the Meiji Restoration of 1867 it was replaced, in 1870, by an institution known as Nanko, described as "essentially a replica of an American grammar school." College level courses in law, chemistry, engineering, and mining were added in 1873, and the name changed to Kaisei Gakko or Overseas School. Tokyo University itself was founded in 1876 by amalgamation of Kaisei Gakko with the Tokyo Medical School. A

4. Robert S. Schwantes, Japanese and Americans: A Century of Cultural Relations (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955; published for the Council on Foreign Relations).

5. One proposal in this direction was reported to have involved the use of the main Tokyo University campus as Occupation headquarters, and the scattering of the Tokyo University faculty among other national universities all over Japan. This proposal (dating from 1945-1946) was never carried out, possibly because the campus is inconveniently far from the shopping and amusement centers of Tokyo.

further amalgamation ten years later with an engineering college founded by the Department of Public Works produced the Tokyo Imperial University, but the name "Imperial" was dropped from the titles of this and other national universities during the Allied Occupation (1945-1952).

For the American influence in this development we must move southwest from Tokyo to the port of Nagasaki on the island of Kyushu. For some 225 years this city had been Japan's window to the West. On an island called Dejima in Nagasaki harbor Dutch merchants were permitted to live and carry on a limited trade. Nagasaki was therefore a center for the study of Dutch, the only Western language known to the Japanese, and through Dutch for the study of Western culture in general. There in 1859, after Nagasaki had been opened to foreigners generally, came an American missionary named Guido Verbeck. He was officially a teacher of English, actually a missionary for the Dutch Reformed Church in America. (Overt Christian missionary activity was forbidden in Japan until 1873.) Verbeck was particularly qualified for this assignment since his native tongue was Dutch and he could take maximum advantage of the little Western training the Japanese already had. Invited by the Governor of Nagasaki, Verbeck became in 1863 head teacher of a foreign language school. As English textbooks he used the United States Constitution and the New Testament, claiming these two volumes were the foundations of American civilization. Various feudal lords or daimyo invited Verbeck to found similar schools for their clans or han, but he remained in Nagasaki until 1871. Then, due to the influence of two of his former students, Shigenobu Okuma⁶ and Taneomi Soejima, he was called to Tokyo to become principal of Nanko and assist in the founding of the Kaisei Gakko.

The call to Verbeck to head a daimyo's private school was not an oddity under the conditions of the time. During this period, a number of clans tried to improve their power and prestige by training their henchmen in Western languages and science, and

6. Later an eminent Liberal politician, "Japan's First Democrat," twice Prime Minister, and founder of Waseda University.

sometimes hired foreigners for the purpose. The best known, William Eliot Griffis, a recent Rutgers graduate recommended by Verbeck, taught physics, chemistry, geography, geology, and physiology at the school founded by the head of the Fukui clan. When the feudal clans or han were abolished by the Meiji Government in 1871, the former diamyo were required to move to Tokyo. Their foreign teachers (including, for example, Griffis of Fukui) often came with them, some staying on to participate in the founding of Tokyo University. Many of their best students came too, because of the opportunities for civil service jobs. The pre-eminence of Tokyo in higher education dates from this period.

In addition to Verbeck as principal, most of the teachers of Nanko were Americans, and American textbooks were generally used. The same American note prevailed initially at Tokyo University itself. The literary and scientific departments were largely American until approximately 1890. Over 30 Americans were among the first professors,⁷ and a large proportion of the Japanese faculty had studied in the United States.

In the Department of English, for example, American influence lasted for a generation. At the Kaisei Gakko the professor was an Englishman who, however, used an American textbook devoting approximately equal space to British and American authors. His successor was a Yale graduate, William Addison Houghton. Houghton's teaching is credited with turning a whole generation of Japanese critics away from Confucian ideas of literature as primarily an ethical force⁸ to the Western view of literature as primarily a representation of human life. After Houghton left in 1882 the chair was held by a number of British and American scholars, the former predominating, until the tenure of Lafcadio Hearn from 1894 to 1903. Hearn's fame rests primarily upon

7. Even the professor of Japanese was a foreigner — the eminent British Japanologist Basil Hall Chamberlain!

8. The "official" Confucian critical dogma was that literature should illustrate "punishment for vice and reward for virtue." The Houghton student who led the critical revolt against this view was Shoyo Tsubouchi, a great name in the history of Japanese criticism.

his writings, but he was also an inspiring teacher. Part of the secret of his effectiveness was his knowledge of and respect for Japanese culture and civilization -- he referred at times to himself and his fellow Westerners as "we barbarians." He adopted Japanese citizenship and took his wife's Japanese name of Koizumi. It is therefore as Koizumi Yagumo⁹ that his reputation lives in his adopted country. On a more practical level Hearn impressed the Japanese by his willingness to teach as his Japanese students wanted to be taught -- in English, but so slowly that every word could be taken down in longhand. His students published several volumes of his lecture notes verbatim after his death.

The Tokyo philosophy department also had an eminent American teacher, best known today as an interpreter of Japan to the West. This was Ernest Fenollosa, the first university teacher of philosophy in Japan.¹⁰ Coming to Tokyo from Harvard in 1878, he taught political philosophy and political economy as well as the history of modern philosophy. He is remembered for his exposition of religion in terms of Herbert Spencer's sociology of the "survival of the fittest" among human ideas and institutions, although the popularity of Spencer and his "social Darwinism" in Japan began only later, with the lectures of Masakazu Toyama, trained at Michigan.¹¹ (Lafcadio Hearn was also a professed Spencerian.) In political philosophy Fenollosa was interested in the connection of politics with sociology, ethics, and metaphysics. Later his interest shifted to the collection and preservation of classical Japanese art. He was active in the founding of the first Japanese journal devoted to the fine arts, and also in the founding of the Tokyo School of Fine Arts. His collection forms

9. The characters for "Yagumo," meaning "Eight Clouds," can also be read "Ha-Un" as an approach to Hearn's Occidental name. Japanese abounds in such plays on characters as well as words.

10. Before Fenollosa's arrival, however, Japanese translations of such philosophical books as Samuel Smiles' Self-Help and Francis Wayland's Elements of Moral Science were read widely. The last-named volume was used as a textbook by Yukichi Fukuzawa at Keio.

11. Chitoshi Yanaga, Japan Since Perry (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949), p. 76.

the basis of the world-famous Japanese collections of the Boston Museum of Art. After he resigned the Tokyo Chair of Philosophy in 1886, it went to another American, the Presbyterian missionary George W. Knox (1886-1903), and thereafter to a succession of German scholars.

In the natural sciences, American influence sprang from zoology, where Edward S. Morse of Harvard was the first professor and founder of the first Japanese laboratory of marine biology at Enoshima. He was a pupil of the great Louis Agassiz. During his 13-year stay at Tokyo (1877-1890), he was called "the Agassiz of Japan." He was something of a storm-center, giving popular lectures on the dangerous subject of evolution and shocking the missionary elements. In his spare time, he excavated Japanese archeological remains, and became an authority on prehistoric Japanese pottery.¹² He interested in Japan not only Thomas C. Mendenhall of Ohio State, who did the first advanced teaching of Western physics, but also the philosopher and estheticist Fenollosa. The first professors of astronomy and geology at Tokyo were also Americans. Morse's successor in zoology, Charles O. Whitman, was later to have an eminent career at Chicago. The first professor of botany was Ryokichi Yatabe, trained at Cornell. Except for Morse, however, none of the American natural scientists remained in Japan very long, their places being taken first by Germans and, after 1885, by European-trained Japanese.

In other branches American influence was weaker. The Kobu Daigakko, which affiliated with Tokyo University in 1886 to form its Faculty of Engineering, was split by a feud between British and American professors of civil engineering. British influence predominated after the merger.

In medicine a number of American medical missionaries had begun teaching Japanese students in English in the 1860's. The best known of these was Dr. J. C. Hepburn of Yokohama, remembered for a widely used system of Romanizing the writing of Japanese. There was considerable enthusiasm for continuing

12. A good account of Morse is found in Curti and Birr, op. cit., pp. 63 f.

medical education in English. Guido Verbeck, however, was anything but a cultural nationalist, and his influence seems to have turned the tide in favor of a decision to follow the German model. Verbeck pointed out that Americans were far behind Germany, and often went to Berlin or Vienna for advanced study. Furthermore, the use of German would fit in better with the medical science the Japanese had previously learned from the Dutch. The Japanese government engaged a long series of German professors in the medical faculty of Tokyo University, and the majority of Japan's leading medical scholars were German-trained for generations.

In law, the predominant influence was that of a French jurist and code maker, Gustave Boissonade, and Japan used the code rather than the Anglo-American case system. Prior to Boissonade's arrival, however, the first Tokyo Chair of Roman and International Law was held by a Presbyterian missionary from the United States, Divie Bethune McCartee (1873-1877). At the time of Boissonade's greatest influence, a chair in Anglo-American law, expanded to include specialized work in agency, partnership, marine, and international law, was occupied by Henry Taylor Terry from 1878 to 1912. Terry is said to have used the case method at Tokyo University as early as 1880 in teaching Contracts and Sales, thus anticipating the Harvard Law School by nearly a decade. In economics, made part of the law curriculum after 1890,¹³ there was a succession of American professors at Tokyo University until 1921. One of this group, O. M. W. Sprague (1905-1908), later made a name for himself at Harvard in the field of money and banking.

13. As in philosophy, Japanese interest in economics anticipated formal instruction in the subject. The earliest American economist in Japan was Erasmus Peshine Smith, who had a brief and stormy career as adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as early as 1871. He popularized the American protectionism of Matthew and Henry Carey. Later American economists were divided on the (then) basic issue of protection versus free trade, but in Japan protectionism dominated after 1888. This was due to the popularity of Friedrich List and of the German Kathedersozialisten, whose representatives taught economics in the philosophy department of Tokyo University. Yanaga, op. cit., pp. 72-74.

It is easy for an American to assume that the influence of all these American teachers, at Tokyo and elsewhere, was for the good, but Schwantes suggests otherwise:

The American practice of course examinations set by the instructor, instead of general examinations by disinterested outsiders, had led in Japan to an absurd parroting of lectures, and a failure to integrate what is learned. The large number of courses taken by each student, which a British editor of the Japan Mail criticized as an American characteristic in 1887, is a legacy from the days when our college curriculum was struggling to encompass the whole of knowledge, before adopting either free electives or fields of concentration. The emphasis on lectures began when lectures were efficient ways of covering broad fields of knowledge not too crowded with either facts or ideas. As knowledge has become subdivided, lectures have become less synthetic and interpretive, and deal with limited subjects that the student might better approach directly. In America these dangers have been relieved by experimentation. . . In Japan these practices of a bygone day have become fossilized.¹⁴

A kind of "last rose of summer," and likewise a link with contemporary programs, has been the Hepburn Chair of American Constitutional History and Diplomacy at Tokyo University. It was endowed in 1910 by A. Barton Hepburn on his retirement as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Chase National Bank in New York, at a time when Japanese scholarship had developed substantially and when relations between Japan and America were relatively cool. A generation earlier such a chair would have been filled by a foreign (presumably American) scholar. There was no thought of such a procedure in 1910, even though no Japanese scholar was qualified for the position. What happened was that Inazo Nitobe, popularizer of Bushido, and Tatsukichi Minobe, eminent Japanese constitutional lawyer, lectured on American

14. Schwantes, op. cit., p. 166.

history and public law under the Hepburn endowment while the first permanent occupant of the chair, Professor Yasaka Takagi, was studying in America prior to assuming his duties. Inflation subsequently reduced the value of the Hepburn endowment, and while the name of the chair is retained, it is actually supported almost completely by regular Japanese government appropriations.

THE FOUNDING OF HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY

Early American influences on Tokyo University are remembered chiefly by a few antiquarians. They are very much alive at Hokkaido University in Sapporo, founded under American auspices as the Sapporo Agricultural College in 1876.¹⁵

Hokkaido is the northernmost of the four main islands of Japan. It is also the most sparsely settled, and has remained for centuries a sort of Japanese domestic frontier. In 1870 it had 50,000 inhabitants and an economy based on fisheries. As one of its initial problems the Meiji Empire of 1867 turned to the settlement of this island, first as a home for part of Japan's surplus population, and second as a bulwark against possible encroachment by the Russians from Siberia.

A Kaitakushi or development office was set up in Tokyo, and a number of officials, including General Kiyotaka Kuroda, Vice-Governor of Hokkaido, went abroad in search of foreign assistance and foreign models that would be useful in Hokkaido. It was natural that they should turn primarily to the United States, then

15. The Hokkaido University Calendar (Sapporo: Hokkaido University, 1956), pp. 1-3, gives a brief history of the names under which this institution has been known:

1872: Hokkaido Development Office Temporary School (Tokyo)

1875: Sapporo School (Sapporo)

1876: Sapporo Agricultural College (Sapporo)

1907: College of Agriculture, Tohoku Imperial University (Sendai -- but the Agricultural College remained in Sapporo)

1918: Hokkaido Imperial University (Sapporo)

1947: Hokkaido University (Sapporo)

This abstract ignores a number of subsidiary branches located outside of Sapporo on other parts of the island of Hokkaido.

in the midst of its "Wild West" era. The climate of Hokkaido is more like that of New England and the upper Midwest than like the remainder of Japan; its cold winters had been the main reason for its delayed settlement by Japanese. The extensive agriculture of the American West also seemed more suitable to Hokkaido than the paddy rice agriculture of Japan, although, as we shall see, this preconception was later modified. Finally, the American frontier combination of farming and Indian-fighting impressed the Japanese visitors as a possible model for pioneer life in Hokkaido in the event of the Russian invasion¹⁶ which never occurred.

Approximately 70 Americans are estimated to have participated in the development of Hokkaido over a 25-year period beginning in 1870. It was primarily the first mission to Hokkaido, headed by no less a personage than General Horace Capron, President Grant's Commissioner of Agriculture, which inspired Curti and Birr's comparisons with the Point Four missions of three generations later.¹⁷ This four-year mission and its successors are held responsible for many features of Hokkaido culture which resemble nineteenth-century America and differ sharply from the rest of Japan. The casual visitor will note immediately the stationary glass windows replacing the sliding oiled-paper shoji, in houses topped by shingle or composition roofs instead of the Japanese tile and thatch. In the countryside he will see separate farmsteads, often with hip-roofed barns and cylindrical silos,¹⁸ whereas Japanese farmhouses elsewhere are grouped together in villages on terraced hillsides. He will see horses used instead of manpower for many tasks. He will see plows, harrows, tillers, and mowers, and hear them called by their English names. In the American-planned prefectural capital of

16. The aboriginal inhabitants (Ainu) were no longer a military problem to the Japanese settlers. They had been subdued long before and were, in fact, dying out.

17. Vide supra, this Chapter, Note 1.

18. The silos were not introduced directly by the Americans, but by German and Danish agriculturists who arrived later.

Sapporo he will find wide, numbered streets laid out on a rectangular grid -- a welcome contrast to the labyrinth of Tokyo or Osaka.¹⁹ Anywhere on the island he is apt to hear of the pioneer spirit of Hokkaido men, and the disproportionately large role they played in Japan's colonial ventures -- not only in cold areas like Korea and Manchuria, but also in tropical areas like Formosa. And even though the entire over-all culture remains unmistakably Japanese, he may wonder what might have happened had Hokkaido farmers not developed new strains of rice capable of maturing in paddies during the cool and short Hokkaido growing season.²⁰

Among the proposals of the Capron Mission was the establishment in Hokkaido of an agricultural college to be modeled after one of the new American land-grant colleges. This suggestion was accepted with avidity by General Kuroda and his subordinates. A number of young men, mainly from knightly or samurai families, were recruited for a Hokkaido development office established in Tokyo, while General Kuroda and his staff visited the United States in search of a president and a model for the new institution of higher education they hoped to establish in the frontier capital of Sapporo, which then had a population of 2,500.

Of the American institutions they saw, Kuroda and other Japanese envoys²¹ were impressed particularly by the Massachusetts Agricultural College at Amherst and by its President,

19. The old capital of Kyoto is also laid out on a rectangular grid, but was planned a thousand years earlier.

20. The inability to foresee the development of these new strains of rice and the consequent advice against investing resources in attempting to develop them represent the major mistakes of the early American missions in the domain of agriculture. (It is also interesting to speculate what might have happened had General Capron been able to put into effect a proposal to bring a hundred American pioneer families to Hokkaido to show the Japanese the American techniques of subduing a new frontier. This proposal came to nothing because of failure to reach agreement as to whether the new settlers should be subject to American or Japanese law.)

21. These included a special commissioner, Tomomi Iwakura, and his assistant Arinori Mori; the latter particularly is an important figure in the history of the Japanese educational system.

Colonel William Smith Clark. It was an agricultural college pure and simple.²² Students engaged in physical labor while attending school, and all received military drill under the President himself. Clark was a front-line veteran of the Civil War, who had refused a promotion to Brigadier General to return to college teaching. He was, nevertheless, an adventurous soul, and was impressed by the opportunity to accomplish something new and different in Japan. He secured a year's leave of absence from his college presidency, recruited two of his own recent graduates as assistants,²³ and was in Sapporo to open the academic year 1876-1877.

Clark served as President of Sapporo Agricultural College over a student body of 14 for only eight months, but he had a greater impact than many another foreign teacher who stayed in Japan for 20 years. This is partly because he was succeeded by a number of other Massachusetts men who kept his name alive and continued his work over the following 16 years,²⁴ but primarily due to his own amazing industry and versatility. Schwantes says:

Besides directing the college, the preparatory school, and the experimental farm, Clark taught botany, agriculture, ethics, psychology, and English. He made the students choke down tomatoes and other unfamiliar foods and record their impressions -- Westernization by shock treatment. He introduced field sports and

22. Clark himself, however, held a Ph. D. from Göttingen University in Germany. His field was chemistry; his thesis, dealing with meteoric iron, was published in full in Annalen der Chemie und Pharmacie (1851-1852). Before assuming the presidency of the Massachusetts Agricultural College, he had been for many years Professor of Chemistry at Amherst College. See Shingo Osaka, Kuraku-Sensei no Shoden (Tokyo: Maruzen, 1956), p. 484.

23. After returning from Japan, both these men had long careers as college teachers and administrators, one primarily at Massachusetts and the other primarily at McGill University in Canada.

24. One of these successors, Professor William Penn Brooks, taught in Sapporo for eight years. His fields were chemistry, agriculture -- and physical education!

organized military drill. A fervent Christian himself, he converted nearly all his students and laid the basis for a non-denominational church in Sapporo out of which came Kanzo Uchimura and other religious leaders. In his parting words he gave the school a characteristic motto: "Boys, be ambitious!"²⁵

Clark returned to disgrace and early death in Massachusetts,²⁶ but the Massachusetts-Hokkaido relationship lived on. It fell on evil days in the early nineties, however, and the Japanese discontinued it in 1893 in the belief that there was nothing more to be learned from American agricultural colleges. The last Massachusetts professor in Sapporo, Arthur Brigham, devoted a large part of each lecture on agriculture to drilling his students on the material presented in the preceding one, which they had to present verbatim in English. The American-style extensive farming methods he advocated were not always practical in Japan. Indeed, Brigham's Japanese colleagues founded a rival chair in "Japanese Agriculture" to stress traditional Japanese intensive methods as a counterpoise to Brigham's teaching.

Many of the innovations introduced by the Massachusetts group still live on in Hokkaido, although it is no easy matter to distinguish their contributions from those of Japanese contemporaries returning from foreign travel and those of Edwin P. Dun, the agricultural specialist of the original Capron Mission who remained in Japan for 50 years and served for a time as

25. Schwantes, *op. cit.*, pp. 55 f. On the subject of Clark's religious faith, Osaka (*op. cit.*, p. 492) points out that he was not only a Christian but a Puritan, who required of his students abstinence from tobacco and liquor.

26. Clark's Hokkaido experience was the high point of his life. After his return, he resigned the presidency of Massachusetts Agricultural College to found a "floating university" which was to go round the world on an ocean liner, but which never left the dock. He then returned to Amherst, but was used by stock swindlers as a reference in selling worthless shares to many of his friends, neighbors, and associates, and died a broken man.

American Minister in Tokyo.²⁷ The present administration of Hokkaido University believes the material Massachusetts contributions to lie largely in agricultural architecture and in horticulture -- in the farm buildings, vehicles, fruits, and vegetables introduced.²⁸ The Massachusetts contact was only one of a number of factors responsible for the more extensive nature of Hokkaido agriculture, for the importance of the dairy industry, and for the widespread substitution of horse for human labor power; it was probably not the most important contact in most of these respects. The principal importance of the 17-year Massachusetts relation, as seen from the perspective of three generations, appears to President Harusada Suginome of Hokkaido to be primarily non-material -- the spirit of Clark's motto, "Boys, be ambitious," the spirit of the frontier, and (in religious philosophy) the spirit of the "Sapporo Band" of early Christian converts.

TWO PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES

Both Tokyo and Hokkaido Universities have always been public institutions, financed almost entirely from the national government budget and subject to the control of the national Ministry of Education. Most Japanese universities are, however, privately endowed and administered, and we now sample nineteenth-century American influence on two of the more eminent of these. Our two-member "sample" is not a random one; it includes a Christian

27. Dun was an Ohioan and a law graduate of Miami University who had managed his father's farm in Ohio and engaged in ranching in the West. His interest was mainly centered in horses, cattle, and farm machinery. His connection with the Sapporo Agricultural College seems to have been limited to occasional guest lectures. He is reported to have co-operated with the Massachusetts group, especially with Professor Brooks, in the introduction of sugarbeet cultivation. In dairying, on the other hand, his views reflected Midwestern practices while the Massachusetts group favored New England methods. The difference was chiefly that New England dairying included cultivation of forage crops for cattle, whereas at that period Midwestern dairying relied almost entirely on natural pasturage.

28. Among these were corn, potatoes, cabbage, onions, tomatoes, timothy, and bluegrass. In exchange, the Massachusetts agriculturists introduced Japanese soybeans to the United States.

institution, Doshisha University in Kyoto, and a secular one, Keio University in Tokyo. In each case, the American contact is one which has been to some extent preserved until the present day.

Doshisha

Doshisha is not a typical Mission School. Perhaps the difference can be brought out most clearly if we outline the early history of some unnamed but representative Mission School or Gakuin, to cite the common Japanese name. The representative Gakuin was founded by American Protestant missionaries and their early Japanese converts. It originally specialized in teaching English and the Bible at the high-school level and below. Later its curriculum expanded and advanced to the college level, but a significant minority of its faculty and administration remained American, and a significant part of its annual budget was contributed by one or more American denominational mission boards. This was the situation prior to 1940, and it has been re-established after 1945. The tie to America is centered on the mission boards rather than any particular American college or university, denominational or otherwise. There are often sentimental ties to one or more American colleges where some of its respected Japanese teachers spent their Wanderjahre or from which some of its respected American teachers graduated, but the ties are not formalized.

At Doshisha, on the other hand, we find the closest Japanese approach to the "Yale Band" which populated the American Midwest in the early nineteenth century with little replicas of the contemporary Yale. We deal however with Amherst rather than Yale, and with a "one-man band," Joseph Hardy Neesima.²⁹ Neesima (1843-1890) was a samurai from what is now Gumma

29. On Neesima, the standard source is Jerome Dean Davis, A Sketch of the Life of Rev. Joseph Hardy Neesima (Kyoto: Doshisha University Press, 1936). A briefer account may be found in Frances Benton Clapp, Mary Florence Denton and the Doshisha (Kyoto: Doshisha University Press, 1955), Chapter 2.

prefecture north of Tokyo. He became interested simultaneously in foreign travel and the Christian religion in 1864, when both were strictly forbidden in Japan. His first stop was the open port of Hakodate on Hokkaido, where he studied Christianity with a Russian Orthodox priest and the English language with the Japanese clerk of an English trading firm. Then he stowed away on a ship which had put in at Hakodate en route to Shanghai, China. At Shanghai Neesima became a formal convert to Christianity and secured passage to America on the whaler Wild Rover, bound for Boston. Here he was fortunate enough to become acquainted with one of the Wild Rover's owners, Alpheus Hardy of Fairhaven, Massachusetts. Hardy and his wife took the young Japanese into their home, and financed his education through Phillips Andover Academy and Amherst College (1870); in gratitude for their kindness Neesima adopted his American middle name of Hardy. After completing his formal education, Neesima was able to join as interpreter the Iwakura Mission which traveled through America and Europe in 1871-1872, observing educational practices and reporting on them to the Japanese government.³⁰ As a reward for his linguistic services, he received not only a formal pardon for having left Japan but also restoration of all political rights and the special privilege of teaching Christianity there upon his return. Returning to Japan in 1874 after theological training at the Andover Theological Seminary, Neesima refused offers of government employment in order to found a private Christian educational institution in Japan. This was the Doshisha English School, founded in 1875 on a former daimyo estate across the street from the old Imperial Palace in Kyoto.³¹

30. Neesima was ordered to take this position of interpreter. He "had received no government aid and resented being so ordered. He told [the Mission] he would refuse if ordered, but would gladly do so if requested. This was a new idea, a strange expression of independence, to these commissioners, but they liked the young man and forthwith requested his services." Clapp, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

31. After the Imperial Court moved to Tokyo in 1867, the palace area of Kyoto fell into disrepair. The common people considered the feudal yashiki which surrounded it to be haunted and feared them at night. What is now some of the choicest land in the city of Kyoto was therefore available for a song in 1875. *Ibid.*, pp. 23 f.

From the beginning the new institution, though not of collegiate grade, was planned along American lines. Neesima was the first president. He was assisted by three pioneer Congregational missionaries, Dr. J. S. Berry, Dr. M. L. Gordon, and Dr. Jerome Davis. There was a continuing tradition of having American teachers in residence, teaching in English. These Americans, accredited as missionaries, came mainly from New England, with some concentration of graduates of Amherst, Neesima's own Alma Mater.³² Their presence made Doshisha, although more of a theological seminary than a university, known as the leading Japanese institution for imparting a knowledge of oral English. One of these American teachers, Dwight W. Larned, a Yale graduate who taught at Doshisha for 50 years, is believed to be the first economist to discuss Socialism in Japan as a serious subject.³³ Another American teacher, Miss Mary Florence Denton, who taught English and home economics for 60 years, is beloved for her resolution, after the passage in 1924 of American legislation excluding Japanese immigrants, never to return to America until this offensive legislation was repealed.³⁴

Neesima himself died relatively young, of pneumonia contracted during a fund-raising drive whose object was Doshisha's elevation to university status. This rise in status occurred in 1912, after a period of friction between the Japanese and Americans during which Doshisha came to rely for current expenses entirely upon Japanese sources. The relation with

32. Frank A. Lombard, "Amherst in Japan," Amherst Graduates' Quarterly (February, 1922) lists six Amherst graduates as having been connected with Doshisha as members of the faculty or the Board of Trustees.

33. Nobutaka Ike, The Beginnings of Political Democracy in Japan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1950), p. 118, citing Etsuji Sumiya, Nihon Keizaigaku Shi no Issetsu. Larned was not a socialist but a laissez-faire economist who expected "true humanism" and "true Christianity" to overcome and evils of capitalism.

34. Miss Denton, "The Doshisha Treasure," was the subject of Miss Clapp's biography cited above in Footnote 29 of this chapter. She refused repatriation at the beginning of World War II, and survived the hardships of the war period in Japan. She died in 1947 at 90, after the war but prior to the restoration of a nominal Japanese immigration quota.

Amherst was, however, not only maintained but formalized in 1922 (see below, Chapter 3). Doshisha also became known as a liberal institution both theologically and politically at a time when Japanese liberalism was on the decline. The school was therefore subject to disapproval and discrimination as being pro-Western and pro-American during the decade which ended in 1945. A number of individual teachers were purged by the Japanese military, but the institution itself stayed open throughout the war, albeit under military supervision.

Keio

While Doshisha is a Christian university, Keio has always been secular. While the founder of Doshisha had the advantage of a formal American education, the founder of Keio was largely self-taught in Western lore. While Doshisha was founded under Western auspices from which it broke partially away during its "time of troubles," Keio was founded as purely Japanese, and turned to America for aid only for a short period at a critical juncture in its career.

The founder of Keio University, Yukichi Fukuzawa (1835-1901) was, like Neesima, a samurai, but came from Kyushu in the relatively backward Southwest. He became Japan's great popularizer of Seiyo-Jijo or "Things Western," to translate the title of one of his most influential works, during the period 1860-1880. His Autobiography, translated into English by his grandson, is a valuable source book for the intellectual history of the times.³⁵ Keio University, which he founded as a high school or Gijuku in 1858, was intended as a democratic and Western counterpoise to the intellectual aristocracy, based on Confucian Chinese traditions, which then dominated the Japanese government. Its stress has been on preparation for business rather than politics or the civil service; it is one of the more expensive of Japanese universities, yet its democratic tradition went at one time so far

35. Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi. Eng. tr. by Eiichi Kiyooka. (Tokyo: Hokuseido, 1934.)

as to discourage its professors from acquiring the degree and title of Ph. D.³⁶

Keio was the first Japanese private school to receive standing and accreditation as a university. It received this dignity in 1890, and it was at this time that Keio called for American assistance. Fukuzawa had traveled widely in America, and had become interested in the "free elective" system of college education then being pioneered by President Charles W. Eliot of Harvard University. When Keio rose to university rank, Fukuzawa called on President Eliot for assistance. Eliot himself selected three young Harvard graduates to help in the establishment of the new university in Japan, and so the first private university to be opened in Japan had three Harvard men on its faculty: Garrett Drovers was professor of economics, William Lipscomb professor of English, and John Henry Wigmore professor of law.

Of the three, the most eminent was Professor Wigmore, later to become Dean at Northwestern University Law School and author of the standard treatise on the law of evidence. While at Keio (1890-1893) he collected a great body of Tokugawa (1615-1867) case law and popularized common law jurisprudence in Japan, even though the legal system adopted by Japan followed the European code system. Following the appointment of Professor Drovers, the tradition of having an American instructor in economics at Keio lasted for over 30 years, until 1925 to be exact. Of the seven American teachers to occupy the post, most came from Harvard. Perhaps the most celebrated economist was Daniel H. Buchanan, who later had a distinguished career at North Carolina; better known to the general public was Harry Emerson Wildes, whose history of the Occupation, Typhoon in Tokyo, became a popular reference work in that period, and who also became a leading American authority on the history and problems of Japanese journalism.

36. The Japanese equivalent of the Ph.D. degree is granted formally by the Ministry of Education. Fukuzawa's disdain was not for the degree itself but for the subservience to the government which he felt was required of candidates from private institutions submitting their credentials to the Ministry.

The recollection of this Keio-Harvard relation has survived longer at Keio than at Harvard. On the basis of this history, as well as of its general academic standing, Keio people proudly refer to their university as "The Harvard of Japan," and have been anticipating renewal of the former ties between the two institutions.

THE JAPANESE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

American influence may be said to have dominated Japanese primary and secondary education for the two decades beginning in 1871. In that year the first Senior Secretary of the new Ministry of Education (established after the Meiji Restoration of 1867) was sent abroad to study Western school systems, in the belief that a Western system of education was essential to the modernization of Japan. This gentleman, Fujimaro Tanaka by name, was impressed by the primary and secondary school systems of Massachusetts and Connecticut, by the universities of Germany, and by the highly centralized educational organization of France.

To help organize the Japanese primary school system, Tanaka desired an American advisor. Professor David Murray of Rutgers College was selected for the purpose by Arinori Mori, Japanese Minister in Washington, and spent the period 1873-1879 in Japan as Superintendent of Educational Affairs. He appears to have been an exceptionally fortunate choice. As professor of mathematics at Rutgers, then affiliated with the Dutch Reformed Church, Murray had taken an interest in the Japanese students sent there largely by Guido Verbeck, and had developed considerable familiarity with Japanese culture and education. In his original report to Minister Mori, Murray stressed the dangers of indiscriminate borrowing, the desirability of universal education (for girls as well as boys), the need for technical schools, including teacher-training institutions, and the advantages of educational museums, forerunners of modern audio-visual education.³⁷

37. On Murray, see the account in Curti and Birr, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-62.

His work as superintendent included the planning of courses of study and educational legislation, recommendations on the construction and equipment of school buildings, and inspection of educational progress in the field. He also found time to play a role in the founding of Tokyo University.

It is probable that Murray, had he so desired, could have made the Japanese schools copies of the American ones. But he was, as we have seen, an exponent of "cultural relativism" -- opposing, for example, Minister Mori's plan for Japan to follow India in adopting English as its scholarly language. Murray did, however, introduce into Japan such American devices as short-term teachers' institutes and normal schools for women; wooden buildings furnished with seats, desks, blackboards, and wall maps; regular recitation hours; and so on. He also founded an educational museum. Other Americans later helped develop their special subjects in Japan -- George A. Leland, the Amherst College system of class calisthenics in physical education, and Luther Whiting Mason the Boston Public School system of elementary class instruction in vocal music.

The educational code which Murray found in operation in Japan had just been enacted in 1872. It was drawn up largely by Yukichi Fukuzawa. Its main features, borrowed chiefly from France, were universal education strongly centralized under the Imperial Ministry of Education in Tokyo. Eight years of compulsory education were involved, with each locality responsible for financing its own schools but with educational content directed from Tokyo. This plan encountered wide spread opposition as being financially unrealistic. In the country districts peasants rioted against the tax burden of the public elementary schools, and in the cities the upper classes sent many of their children to private schools which gave a more traditional (Confucian) type of instruction.

This system was decentralized in 1879, under the aegis of Murray and Fujimaro Tanaka, Vice-Minister of Education. The Tanaka-Murray reorganization reduced compulsory education to 16 months, and delegated responsibility for schools to popularly-elected school committees in each town and village. Unfortunately, the Japanese, with little experience in local government,

interpreted this loosening of central control as meaning decreased emphasis on education in general. They reacted by closing a few schools and combining others to save money. The proportion of children in school declined, the education of girls being especially neglected. As a result, a further revision of the education code was made which raised compulsory education to three years, made the election of school committees indirect, and gave more regulatory powers to prefectural governors appointed from Tokyo. By this time, however, Murray had left Japan to become one of America's leading specialists on Japanese history and institutions. Tanaka, assuming responsibility for the failure of the decentralization program, resigned his post as Vice-Minister.

Educational theory remained largely American for somewhat longer. The Ministry of Education sent three men to leading American normal schools in 1875. There they absorbed the prevailing views of Pestalozzi, a Swiss educator who stressed the use of sense experience with actual objects rather than the memorizing of verbal abstractions.

In the 1880's, however, a combination of economic depression, Japanese nationalism, and German educational theory replaced these American influences. During the depression even the surviving elements of American-style decentralized elementary education worked badly; by 1887 the proportion of children in school was lower than it had been in 1871. Mori, earlier responsible for the Murray mission, became Minister of Education in 1885. He prepared legislation creating the uniform system under close control of the Ministry of Education which survived until 1945.

At the same time, the new German theories of education began to be influential in Japan. The most important of these stemmed from Johann Friedrich Herbart and stressed the "principle of historical culture," that the best material for character training came from the national history and literature. This appealed to a Japan reacting against a period of fervid Westernization and regaining confidence in its own past. A nationalistic trend in education was evidenced in a revived study of Japanese and Chinese classics, and claimed as a victim

Minister Mori, assassinated by a nationalist fanatic as unduly pro-Western. It culminated in an Imperial Rescript on Education, issued in October, 1890, which spoke reverently of "the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors to be observed by their descendants and their subjects, infallible for all ages, and true in all places." Refusal to bow to this Imperial Rescript, and to the pictures of the Emperor and the Empress, was to cost many a teacher, both foreign and Japanese, his position if not his liberty during the ensuing half-century.³⁸

There was a flurry of revived interest in American educational ideas during the relatively liberal 1920's, centering about the "progressive education" of John Dewey and his colleagues at the Columbia University Teachers' College. The leading Japanese progressive school of this period was Seijo Gakuen, started in a Tokyo suburb in 1917 by Masao Sawayanagi and Shigeno Konishi. This flurry, however, subsided almost entirely in the succeeding decade.

JAPANESE STUDENTS IN AMERICA

A few Japanese were coming to America to study before such visits were legalized in Japan. The first of these foreign students even came to America before Commodore Perry's visit to Japan. The captain of a New Bedford whaling ship picked up a drifting fisherman named Manjiro in 1841 and placed him in school in Massachusetts under the name of "John Munn." On his return to Japan in 1851, Manjiro's (or Munn's) illegal exit was forgiven.³⁹ Not only this, but he was given the surname of Nakahama

38. Among the early victims of the Imperial Rescript was Kanzo Uchimura. A member of the "Sapporo Band" founded by William S. Clark, and an Amherst graduate, Uchimura was publicly disgraced in 1891 for refusal to join the other teachers of the Tokyo Higher Middle School in bowing to the Imperial Signature on the Rescript. Five years later an American teacher, Christopher Carrothers, lost his position in the Second Higher School in Sendai for refusal to bow to portraits of the Emperor and Empress. Schwantes, *op. cit.*, pp. 167 f.

39. John W. Bennett, Herbert Passin, and Robert McKnight, In Search of Identity -- The Japanese Overseas Scholar in America and Japan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 29.

and the rank of hatamoto (standard-bearer). He rendered useful service as a teacher of English, and as interpreter at the time of Perry's visit; he later translated Bowditch's Practical Navigator into Japanese. The most famous of the illegal students was probably Joseph Hardy Neesima, whom we have considered in connection with the founding of Doshisha University.

During the 1860's a few students were sent abroad legally or semi-legally, both by the Shogunate itself and by some of the feudal lords. Most went to Europe, but one name stands out among the "American" group; it also illustrates the rapidity with which Western trainees rose in the ranks. This was Arinori Mori. He was sent abroad by the Lord of Satsuma on Kyushu after a naval battle with a British squadron (Kagoshima, 1863). He studied in England in 1865-1866, in America in 1867. We see him next in 1869-1870 -- as Japanese Minister to Washington!⁴⁰

After the Restoration of 1867 policy changed drastically, and the trickle of legal Japanese students became a flow. The leaders of the Restoration felt that the threat of colonization could be met most effectively by developing modern technology and civilization, and they began sending large numbers of young men overseas. In 1871 each feudal lord was directed to choose from one to three men for foreign study. About 250 were sent overseas, perhaps half to the United States. In the following year, the Iwakura Mission found a total of 500 Japanese students in the United States. The Education Law of 1872 included provisions for overseas study. The government was to select 180 men each year, 150 from middle schools for 5-year terms, and 30 of university grade for 3-year terms. Their study abroad was to be supervised by the Education Ministry. On their return, they had the choice of working for the government or refunding the money advanced for their education.⁴¹

Most of the pre-1872 group knew no English. Many entered classes with young children in preparatory schools. They were

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid., p. 31.

at first supervised inadequately, but after a belated official inspection, all below college level were ordered home in 1873.

Thereafter government students were chosen by rigid examinations, and a Superintendent of Students in the United States (himself a Harvard Law School product) was appointed to inspect the progress of those coming to America and order the unsatisfactory ones home. This system lasted until about 1880. By that time Tokyo University was beginning to supply the Japanese demand for specialists in most fields,⁴² and the few Ministry students after the 1880's went mainly to Germany.

The first Japanese women students in the United States date from the early 1870's. They were five samurai daughters sent to America by the Hokkaido Colonization Commission to serve as educated mothers for future leaders of Hokkaido. None of the five had any later connection with Hokkaido, but three had interesting careers. Vassar graduates married a leading general and a leading admiral. The youngest of the five -- who went to America at the age of seven and had forgotten Japanese by the time of her return -- was Miss Umeko Tsuda. A Byrn Mawr graduate, she founded in 1900 the Tsuda English College which has since grown into a complete women's college in the Tokyo suburbs, specializing in the English language and literature.

Government students in America were replaced after 1880 by others who went on their own or had private support. Many were young men of means who had failed the entrance examinations for Tokyo or other Japanese universities, and preferred a foreign degree to a second-rate Japanese one. Some came from families with traditions of foreign education. A few went for special training after completing the so-called elite channel of Japanese education, or as a reward for good work in this channel, or en route to or from Europe. Quite a number went to small denominational colleges, often on scholarships secured for them by missionaries in Japan. These tended to be deviants

42. Bennett *et al.* (*ibid.*, pp. 33 f.) present statistical evidence on this point. As late as 1885, the proportion of Japanese students abroad to total Japanese university students was estimated at 50 per cent. By 1904, it had fallen to 7 per cent.

from the accepted Japanese pattern -- they were Christians, political liberals, and/or feminists. A final large group arrived with no resources whatever, and worked their way through colleges. These were the "Japanese Schoolboys, Age 35" of popular anti-Japanese fiction. Their flow dried up after 1907 when the Japanese government agreed to issue no more passports for laborers going to America. The Bennett study generalizes as to their intellectual levels:

There was an important change in the calibre of the Japanese students who elected to go to America. While in the early period they had been on the whole the leading and most promising, by about 1910 many were failures; those who could not get through the competitive rigors of the Japanese system.⁴³

A revival of Japanese government grants for study in America occurred during and shortly after World War I when the Japanese were at war with Germany, which had become their conventional source of advanced specialized training. Coming to America at first as an interim measure, Japanese students were impressed with its possibilities. As a result, by 1919 there were 80 government students assigned to the United States. The number declined after the Treaty of Versailles, and further after the recovery of European universities. Thirty Japanese government grantees studied in the United States in 1928, and 17 in 1932. Over the decade 1921-1931, of an average of 273 Japanese government grantees per year, the United States received only 12 per cent, as against 47 per cent for Germany, 19 per cent for Great Britain, and 12 per cent for France.⁴⁴ The majority of Japanese students in America throughout this period continued to be privately financed, including perhaps as many as 200 women through 1934.

43. *Ibid.*, pp. 41 f.

44. Edward C. Cieslak, The Foreign Student in American Colleges (Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1955), p. 8, citing statistics prepared by SCAP in 1948.

Schwantes tabulates a series of estimates of the number of Japanese students in America each year for a number of years, the peak being 1,713 in 1936-1937.⁴⁵ These figures are admittedly inexact. In one year (1904) they show 105 Japanese students in America, which may have included some Japanese-Americans, although the Japanese government issued 1,267 passports for study in America. Some of the recipients of these passports were illegal immigrants, but others were students in preparatory, commercial, or unaccredited institutions. On the other hand, the number of student visas issued by the United States government to Japanese in the 1920's and 1930's is less than the number of Japanese students registered as students in accredited colleges and universities in the United States. The problem of the Japanese-American erroneously reported as Japanese is important here. Furthermore, it is possible that many Japanese who entered the country as tourists or business men also carried on various courses of academic study.

Statistics on the distribution of Japanese students in America by field of study are not available for the early Meiji period. Schwantes gives a distribution for the academic year 1924-1925: 40.0 per cent in liberal arts, 9.3 per cent in engineering, 8.2 per cent in commerce, 7.2 per cent in theology, 3.8 per cent in medicine, 3.7 per cent in dentistry, 1.9 per cent in education, 1.6 per cent in pharmacy, and a substantial remainder in "miscellaneous" and "unclassified" categories.⁴⁶ The study of American law in particular was much more popular in the earlier period, before Japanese jurisprudence was completely Europeanized.

The distribution of students by institutions is also of interest. There are three natural concentrations: the best-known institutions from the academic point of view, institutions in the three or four largest cities and their environs, and the Pacific Coast institutions most cheaply available to the Japanese. There is also another concentration in a number of small denominational

45. *Op. cit.*, p. 199.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 202.

colleges recommended by American missionaries. Guido Verbeck, for example, sent Japanese students to Rutgers College in New Jersey and Hope College in Michigan. A Methodist missionary named John Ing directed two future Japanese ambassadors in Washington to De Pauw University in Indiana. Amherst College in Massachusetts also had steady Japanese connections following the graduation of Neesima. No less than 12 Japanese, many of them future admirals, were trained at Annapolis during the period 1868-1906.⁴⁷ On the other hand, a proposal to open West Point to Japanese students was defeated in 1872.

The success achieved in later life by Japanese educated in America prior to 1900 has not been and is not likely to be duplicated. Many were extremely well connected, including at least a dozen heirs to daimyo titles; an impression indeed gained currency in the eastern U. S. that all these interesting social curiosities from Japan should be treated as princes and princesses! Training within Japan was still inferior, and the competition of home-trained contemporaries little to be feared. The rapid tempo of change also operated to increase opportunities for young men with special training. On the other hand, many of the self-supporting students became victims of anti-Oriental prejudice on the West Coast,⁴⁸ and some sent by missionaries were shocked by the lack of Christian principles in the daily life of the American people.⁴⁹

47. One of these, Admiral Sotokichi Uryu, was a distinct pro-American whose influence was important in securing acceptance of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. (Mrs. Uryu was a Vassar graduate, one of the first group of five women students sent to America by the Hokkaido Colonization Office.)

48. As an example, we may cite Yosuke Matsuoka, later pro-Axis Foreign Minister during World War II. He was put ashore in Seattle at the age of 14, and eventually worked his way through college and law school at the University of Oregon by domestic service and waiting on tables.

49. Kanzo Uchimura (of the "Sapporo Band") writes in his autobiography that his pocket was picked as soon as he landed in San Francisco in 1884, and that the only Biblical expressions he heard were curses. He later founded the mukyokai or "no-church" movement, hostile to both the United States and foreign missionary activities although professing allegiance to Christianity.

Of some 293 Japanese known to have studied in the United States between 1865 and 1885, Schwantes has traced the later careers of 197, or 67 per cent. Of these, 162 (55 per cent of the total) occupied positions of responsibility and influence in government, academic, or business life.⁵⁰ Many of the failures were probably members of the large group of poorly qualified samurai sent over in 1871-1872. Of those not traced, many probably changed their names through adoption or yoshi marriages into their wives' families; certainly some of these achieved success under their new names.

Analysis of the Japanese Who's Who for 1940-1941 and 1950-1951 under a number of common letters of Japanese names also suggests some concentration of success among Japanese students in America. Of 507 biographies under the letter K for 1950-1951, 7.7 per cent indicated some education in the United States; of 260 under the letter O, 9.2 per cent; of 349 under the letter S, 7.4 per cent. For 1940-1941, the percentages were 8.5 under the letter O and 11.7 under the letter S.⁵¹

Among the less eminent of the returnees, and particularly during the twentieth century, there has been a tendency for the returned student from America to concentrate in special niches outside the main stream of Japanese life. These have been, first, Christian institutions of all kinds and, second, foreign-owned trading firms and banks. The influential pure-Japanese institutions, on the other hand, are reserved for those who have gone through the so-called elite channel which must include a high-ranking Japanese university and in which foreign study, if it occurs at all, is only frosting on the cake. The Bennett study indicates the distant relations between the two worlds in the following passage:

50. Schwantes (*ibid.*, pp. 209-214) goes into considerable detail to list individuals, American institutions attended, and positions occupied in later life.

51. *Ibid.* Military and naval leaders were included in the listings for 1940-1941, but excluded for 1950, so that the two samples are imperfectly comparable.

Bennett *et al.* (*op. cit.*, Appendix A, pp. 261-274) give a more detailed analysis of these Who's Who data, including comparisons with returnees from Europe and breakdowns by time period and field of study.

Once a young Japanese has entered the world of foreign companies and banks, it has been extremely unlikely that he could ever work in a Japanese company or bank whatever his training and experience.⁵²

We shall consider only two nineteenth-century student careers in detail, located at opposite extremes of the spectrum. Kentaro Kaneko was a blue-blooded aristocrat, conservative but pro-American, who rose almost to the top in the Japanese political hierarchy. Sen Katayama was a rebel eventually expelled from both Japan and America, who died in the U. S. S. R. as a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

Kaneko was one of three outstanding successes among the group of samurai selected in 1871 for study in America. He came to Boston and had the remarkable good fortune to attract the patronage of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., later Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Holmes steered his protégé to the study of law, and he graduated from the Harvard Law School in 1874. On his return to Japan he became almost immediately "a leader among the oligarchy."⁵³ Under the authority of the Genro-in, or Senate, he undertook a translation of Edmund Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France in 1881, as an antidote to Japanese liberals' interest in the political thought of Rousseau.⁵⁴ He became a member of the Privy Council during the 1880's, and was chosen as one of Prince Hirobumi Ito's three lieutenants in the drafting of the Meiji Constitution of 1889.⁵⁵

52. Bennett et al., *op. cit.*, p. 40.

53. Robert A. Scalapino, Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 1953), p. 74.

54. *Ibid.*; also Ike, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

55. Japanese liberals were suspicious of this whole procedure, preferring drafting by the Genro-in or Ministry of Justice to this ad hoc group set up in the Imperial Household and "thereby becoming sacrosanct and completely removed from any outside influences." Prince Ito's position as leader was a cause of special concern, since his infatuation with Bismarck (which extended even to imitation of personal mannerisms) was well known and feared. E. Herbert Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), p. 187.

One of his major contributions to this Constitution, which was based in part on a draft drawn up by a German professor at Tokyo University, was the suggestion of secrecy in all constitutional discussions. No press releases were permitted when the Constitution was being drawn up (1887) or when it was discussed in the Privy Council (1888), nor were any outsiders admitted to the discussions. This procedure may have been based on the Philadelphia Convention which drew up the American Constitution a century earlier, or on a desire "to guard the work of framing the Constitution from any contact with public opinion."⁵⁶ Kaneko's other contributions to Meiji constitutional policy were the election law and organization procedure for the Lower House. After the adoption of the Constitution, possibly as a reward for his labors, he was one of five ranking bureaucrats sent abroad to observe Western parliaments in action, and he subsequently wrote two major articles on the Japanese constitutional history of the period, one in *Taiyo* (1909) and the other in *Shigaku Zasshi* (1911).

Among the more bizarre notions of early Meiji was the belief that the Japanese racial stock might be improved by wholesale marriages between Japanese men and Occidental women. This idea, which apparently originated with Yoshio Takahashi in 1883, was for a time considered seriously by Prince Ito. After Kaneko's return from abroad, he was selected by Ito to inquire of the eminent philosopher Herbert Spencer the advisability of forbidding such wholesale miscegenation on biological grounds, since Japanese were adapted to Japanese conditions and Europeans to European conditions, while hybrids would be inferior anywhere.⁵⁷

After remaining aloof from and hostile to political parties until the end of the nineteenth century, Prince Ito as representative

56. *Ibid.*, p. 188. See also Yanaga, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

57. Yanaga, *op. cit.*, p. 97. The correspondence is reprinted (from the London Times) in Lafcadio Hearn, *Japan: An Attempt at Interpretation* (New York: Macmillan, 1904), p. 531.

of the ruling oligarchy decided in 1900 to take over one of the existing parties, change its name, and act as its leader. The result was the Seiyukai Party, and we again find Kaneko in the forefront of the Ito lieutenants within this organization.

On the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, Prince Ito persuaded Kaneko, now a baron and member of the House of Peers, to serve as Japan's public relations agent in the United States. Kaneko met Theodore Roosevelt, whom he had known at Harvard and who confided to him a secret hope of Japanese victory. Then he set up headquarters in New York and began a series of speeches and writings which are credited with shifting a majority of the American press to a pro-Japanese position.⁵⁸ Many of these are included in a book, Kokushi Jiken Ronshu, which he wrote as his memoirs.

Prince Ito was assassinated by a Korean nationalist in 1909. Kaneko was passed over for the succession to leadership of the Seiyukai Party in favor of Prince Saionji. As a result, he never became Prime Minister of Japan, and his prominence decreased after 1910. We hear of him as active in the Friends of America and America-Japan societies, but as resigning in disgust at the anti-Japanese immigration legislation passed by Congress in 1924. He was also promoted to the rank of viscount. As the last survivor of the group which drafted the Meiji Constitution, he was dragged out of retirement in his nineties to lecture to some 150 law professors against the pernicious theories that the Meiji Constitution had intended the Emperor to be merely an "organ" of the State or had been copied from Western models. On the contrary, Kaneko assured them in either disregard or forgetfulness of the facts, the Constitution had been drafted "merely in accordance with the national polity and history."⁵⁹

58. Yanaga, op. cit., p. 312. Unfortunately for the Japanese, Kaneko's work was largely dissipated during the subsequent Peace Conference at Portsmouth in 1905. The Japanese representative was secretive and arrogant toward the American press, whereas the Tussian representative hired an American publicity man to secure a favorable hearing.

59. Scalapino, op. cit., p. 373. This pathetic episode occurred in July, 1935.

Quite a different type is our other example, Katayama. He was a poor boy who came to California as a high school student because he felt that he could work his way through school more easily in America than in Japan. After graduating from high school in Oakland, Katayama went to the Midwest to college to avoid Pacific Coast anti-Oriental prejudice. He enrolled in Grinnell College in Iowa, where he completed a four-year course in three with a brilliant scholastic record (1892) and became a Christian. Following his graduation from Grinnell, Katayama decided on a career in the ministry and entered the Union Theological Seminary in New York. Up to this time there is no hint of socialism in his thinking: surviving Grinnell classmates interviewed in 1958 by Professor Shichiro Matsui of Doshisha were surprised to learn of his subsequent career in the radical movement.⁶⁰

Katayama's conversion to socialism came about through a series of articles written by an American economist, Professor Richard T. Ely, in the Christian Union while Katayama was a theological student.⁶¹ (Ely had a long and eminent career at Hopkins, Wisconsin, and Northwestern universities. Long associated with reform movements and occasionally accused of socialism, he was never affiliated with any organized socialist movement.) By 1898, now an active Christian Socialist, with Utopian leanings, Katayama was back in Japan and affiliated with a Workmen's Society formed the previous year in Tokyo. Its membership rose from 70 in 1897 to 5,400 in 1900, and Katayama founded its monthly magazine Rodo Sekai as the sole organ of

60. The writer owes the bulk of his information on Katayama, and especially on his American career, to Professor Matsui, who spent the spring semester of 1958 as visiting professor at Michigan on research into Katayama's American papers.

Yanaga (op. cit., p. 231) claims that Katayama had become interested in left-wing social movements before coming to the United States, having been affiliated with the Society for the Study of Social Problems organized by a number of reformers including a missionary, Charles E. Garst, called Tanzei Taro ("Single-Tax Charlie") by reason of his devotion to the doctrines of Henry George. Professor Matsui, however, denies this.

61. Schwantes, op. cit., p. 96.

the Japanese labor movement. He had also joined the Association for the Study of Socialism which met in Unitarian Hall, Tokyo.

In the following year (1901) Katayama was one of the founders of the Japanese Social Democratic Party, whose eight-point platform called for public ownership of land and capital, equitable distribution of wealth, disarmament, world peace, the abolition of class distinctions, the equality of political rights, the principle of universal brotherhood, etc. The party was banned within three hours by the Ito Cabinet, and Rodo Sekai was banned shortly thereafter for publishing the platform. Three non-socialist newspapers were fined for the same offense. The Ito Cabinet fell shortly thereafter, and the socialists planned to revive their party under another name (Nihon Heimin To). A petition to this effect was, however, rejected by the new Katsura Cabinet.

Traveling in Europe at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, Katayama rose to world prominence by publicly embracing George Plekhanov, the exiled leader of the Russian Social Democratic Party, at the International Congress of Socialists in Amsterdam in August. He was however unmolested when he returned to Japan in February, 1906, after the signing of the peace treaty with Russia. Here he helped organize the Japan Socialist Party, with a membership which never rose above 200. There was no declaration of principles beyond a reformist objective, namely, the bringing about of socialism within the limits of the law. The party propagandized widely in city and country, one campaign being to raise Tokyo streetcar fares for the benefit of workers' wages. The new Socialist Party was wrecked in 1910 by exposure of a plot by some of its members (not including Katayama) to assassinate the Emperor. The fact that some of the plotters, including the leader, had spent time in America did not escape notice.⁶²

Katayama was expelled from Japan for anti-war activities in 1915, and took refuge in the United States. In America at the time of the Russian Revolution of 1917, he shifted sharply to the Left, supporting the Bolsheviks and shortly becoming a Communist.

62. Yanaga, op. cit., pp. 235 f., 238 f.

During the Palmer Raids of 1919-1920 a warrant was issued for his arrest as a dangerous alien revolutionary, but he fled to Mexico in 1920 and to Russia the following year. In 1922 he became the Japanese member of the ECCI (Executive Committee of the Communist International), retaining this post until his death in 1933. He is believed to have been largely responsible for the framing of Soviet policy toward Japan during this period, and the pallbearers at his funeral included Stalin himself.

CHAPTER 2 ICA - FINANCED PROGRAMS

Turning from the nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth, one finds first of all a substantially changed Japanese university system. The changes result mainly from American influence and pressure, exercised during the Occupation of 1945-1952.

CHANGES IN THE JAPANESE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM

For the student of Japanese higher education, the most important changes during the Occupation period - whether good or evil, whether temporary or permanent -- were in the direction of democracy and decentralization of higher education. (Critics also add, in the direction of devaluation and depreciation of the university degree.) Thus:

1. The number of institutions accredited as universities by the Ministry of Education has been increased more than tenfold to approximately 500, nearly 100 in Tokyo alone. This includes junior colleges and other narrowly specialized technical schools of allegedly college level.

2. The entrance level of universities has been lowered by a year or two, and now takes in the last two years of the Japanese kyusei-koto-gakko or "old system higher school." To offset

this to some degree, the ordinary curriculum has been lengthened from three years to four.¹

3. The university curriculum has been changed in consequence of the lower admission level. Under the old system, there were only specialized faculties of literature, law, medicine, engineering, etc. Under the new system, the first two years are normally devoted to "general education," often at separate campuses. At Tokyo University, for example, the first two years are normally taken at the former First Higher School campus in Komaba, while the last two years are normally taken at the main campus in Hongo.

4. There has been a great deal of formal decentralization of the university system. Under the old system, universities were concentrated in a few urban centers. These were Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka, Fukuoka, Sendai, and Sapporo, with the first two overwhelmingly dominant. Under the new system, national universities have been set up in each of the 46 prefectures, and private universities have also sprung up in many of them. These newer universities are often upgraded high schools or technical schools. As in the United States, the Japanese country boy or girl can now go to college near home.² Unfortunately, there is great difficulty in providing staff, buildings, libraries, or laboratory equipment for many of these new provincial universities, some of which are in most branches universities in name only.

5. These and other changes have culminated in substantial downgrading of admission standards, at least for most of the

1. The "new system" of education generally involves six years of elementary school, three years of middle school, three years of high school, and four years of university work. This 6-3-3-4 sequence is familiar to Americans. The "old system" was more complex. The closest equivalent to the 6-3-3-4 pattern would be a 6-4-3-3 sequence: six years of primary school, four of middle school, three of higher school, and three of university work.

2. These home-town institutions the Japanese call satirically *ekiben-daigaku* or "whistle-stop colleges." The idea is that any town where trains stop long enough for passengers to buy lunch on the station platform (*ekiben*) now has a university.

new universities. This has meant greater formal democracy of university education. Fewer high school graduates are denied educational opportunities because they lack money -- or, cynics add, because they lack brains. The reverse side of the picture is that the new universities have little status, that many of their alumni cannot find jobs "appropriate" for university graduates.³ So long as only a few of the older institutions really rank as universities in the Japanese public mind, the increased educational democracy remains largely formal, with the dissatisfied under-employed or unemployed "intellectual" one of its leading products.

ICA OBJECTIVES

We begin the account of present-day affiliations between Japanese and American universities with three programs financed largely by United States government agencies. The responsible agency in Washington is the International Cooperation Administration (ICA); hence these programs are called "ICA programs." The Tokyo field agency of ICA is the United States Operations Mission to Japan (USOM) attached to the United States Embassy; USOM naturally has much closer connection with the day-to-day details of university contracts and their administration than does ICA in Washington.

Three related purposes underlie ICA programs in Japan. These are (1) assisting Japanese efforts to increase both industrial and agricultural productivity, measured in output per man-hour; (2) increasing contact between Japanese university research and

3. Thus the larger firms sampled by Abegglen in The Japanese Factory hired for management positions only from the economics and law departments of five out of Japan's 500 universities. These were Tokyo, Kyoto, and Hitotsubashi among the public universities, Keio and Waseda among the private ones. All are old institutions, although Hitotsubashi was a Handelshochschule (commercial college) until 1946. All but one are in Tokyo. James G. Abegglen, The Japanese Factory: Aspects of Its Social Organization (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958), pp. 30 f. Abegglen's sample has been criticized in Japan as weighted somewhat heavily by firms from the conservative Sumitomo combine. On the other hand, what he says of Japanese big business is about equally true for the national civil service and the more highly esteemed professional careers.

its application in the business and agricultural communities; and (3) popularizing in Japan the use of American teaching methods in applied subjects, particularly business administration.

However ambitious these purposes appear, they are more limited than those of ICA programs in a number of less developed countries, where ICA has become involved in the establishment or rehabilitation of entire educational institutions. An example of such broader programs will be found in Korea (Chapter 5, below). For Japan such a program was appropriate for Hokkaido in the 1870's, and might have been appropriate elsewhere, but it would be entirely out of place now.

The mid-twentieth century finds Japan well supplied with higher education. Despite the surviving effects of wartime bombing and post-war inflation on many campuses, there was no need for a really large-scale ICA operation, and none was considered. ICA programs in Japan have been not only small, but limited to a few technical areas in which the Japanese were believed to be lagging behind America and desirous of American assistance.

ICA in Washington and USOM in Tokyo feel that one key to continued Japanese economic growth in per capita income, in the face of a high rate of population increase, must be found in increasing labor productivity in both industry and agriculture. They agree also that Japan has much to learn from America as regards productivity, both through the universities and by more direct methods. The Japanese government has acceded to this view, and a formal agreement has been reached between the two governments regarding the establishment of a Japan Productivity Center with American aid.⁴ All three ICA contracts involving Japanese and American universities are also within this general field of increasing industrial and agricultural productivity. As we shall see, this concept is interpreted broadly to include marketing, human relations in industry, and general agricultural economics as well as "scientific management" in the narrow sense.

4. The English and Japanese texts of this agreement have been published by USOM under the title, Exchange of Notes between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States Regarding the Productivity Program: April 7, 1955.

Although there is agreement between American and Japanese government agencies on the desirability of increasing productivity in Japanese industry and agriculture, this agreement is not shared by all segments of the Japanese population. The largest Japanese labor federation, Sohyo, opposes the program, as do most of its affiliated unions.⁵ Sohyo's belief is that under capitalistic conditions productivity increases operate to reduce employment (and thereby wages) rather than to increase them. This belief is reinforced by two facts only indirectly related to the productivity program: (1) The Occupation-sponsored "rationalization" movement within the Japanese government and Japanese industry in 1949 took the form largely of firing "excess workers"; (2) When the Japan Productivity Center was set up in 1955, there was no representation from organized labor. Justified or not, Sohyo opposition (and also opposition by left wing political parties) is an important factor precisely within the Japanese universities; left wing opinion is stronger among university students and faculty members than among the general public.

The second purpose of the ICA contracts is to break down the isolation which ICA and USOM observe between Japanese universities and the world outside the campus. This is necessary in order that productivity improvements developed in university research be applied outside, and that university teaching be modernized in line with new developments in industry and agriculture. ICA and USOM criticize what they consider the "ivory tower" tendencies of Japanese universities in devoting too much of their research time and budgets to problems of "pure theory" which do not interest the business or farming communities. When, as often happens, their results are of interest outside the campus, Japanese universities do not take the trouble to communicate them to practical business men and farmers in language they can understand. Industry and agriculture, on their part, look with suspicion on the universities as nests of impractical idealists or radicals, and seldom bother to consult faculty

5. Two smaller labor federations, Sodomei and Zenro Kaigi, are generally more conservative, and cooperate with the productivity program.

members on technical problems that arise in their own work. Suspicion, probably due to the strength of Marxism in Japanese economics departments, sometimes goes so far that it is a positive advantage to the investigator of delicate aspects of the Japanese industrial system to have no Japanese university connections whatever. Thus Abegglen includes the following passage in the preface to his study of personal relations in Japanese factories in partial explanation of the willingness of management to cooperate with his investigation:

The investigator had no formal contact with a Japanese university, a point which was frequently questioned. Although the respect accorded the scholar in Japanese society is high indeed compared with the United States, confidence and trust of businessmen in Japanese academicians is more qualified. It was clearly an advantage. . . to be able to offer my academic credentials. . . and yet not be associated with. . . a particular Japanese university. The investigator's role then was essentially that of. . . a qualified and friendly outsider. [Italics added.]⁶

Here again Japanese university people, although perhaps not the general public, disagree with the American charge of undue isolation. As regards agriculture, Hokkaido University professors deny that the university, the experiment station, and the dirt farmer were ever as isolated as they were pictured by American caricatures of "the German system." In business and economics, there is the suspicion that too much or too close contact with business and industry may be an indirect threat to academic freedom if it results in research funds being cut off from workers in "pure theory" or from academicians with an anti-business point of view. And, as we have suggested already, the disagreement of Japanese academicians with the fundamental preconceptions of American sponsors may hamper the success of the programs

6. Abegglen, op. cit., p. xii.

themselves, unless care is taken to avoid any appearance of pressure on the Japanese universities to change their ways of doing things.

A third subsidiary purpose of the ICA contracts is to demonstrate to the Japanese American ways of teaching applied and practical subjects, particularly business administration. Many Japanese university alumni engaged in business agree with ICA and USOM that Japanese university training for business over-stresses theory which cannot be applied, and that the American system of business education would work better. Most Japanese teachers of these subjects, particularly the older men, naturally feel otherwise. Here, even more than in other aspects of the ICA programs, direct pressure must be avoided, particularly in public institutions, and stress placed on demonstration of American methods to younger Japanese teachers, both in visits to America and at home in Japan.

USOM AND AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES

Relations between American university contract personnel overseas and the staffs of ICA in Washington or USOM in the "host countries" have seldom been so uniformly friendly as in Japan. University people in some countries have felt that ICA treated them like direct employees responsible only to ICA, or that ICA wished to replace them by direct-hire personnel. ICA on its part has felt university teachers to have been irresponsible in various professional and financial respects, to have been remiss in reporting their activities, and sometimes to have taught doctrines conflicting with American policy overseas.

None of these difficulties, however, exist in Japan. There is no desire by USOM or ICA to replace university people by civil service employees. University people have special technical advantages, both as individuals and as groups, which Embassy or other government people would have difficulty in duplicating. Japanese university faculties and student bodies tend to suspect political pressure and political taint in anything undertaken directly by USOM or the United States Embassy in Tokyo. This

feeling is largely a survival of Occupation days. It usually does not extend to activities or suggestions by American university people from institutions which are known and respected in Japan, even when these people come to Japan under government contracts. Another advantage of the university contract over the use of regular civil service people is that the contract term is longer than the usual relation between a Japanese institution and any particular group of USOM or Embassy employees. There is, therefore, greater expectation and hope of continuity on the Japanese side for anything which universities undertake.

No problems of academic freedom have ever arisen in connection with ICA contracts in Japan. This contrasts with the situation in some other countries. ICA has a rule that contract personnel clear with USOM public statements, radio broadcasts, etc., but this rule does not apply to statements made in class or in informal discussions, and it is not enforced stringently.

Two special features of ICA programs in Japan must be remembered in this connection. (1) Under the Japanese ICA programs, American professors rarely teach classes, and therefore do not come into contact with large numbers of Japanese undergraduates. (2) The existing contracts relate to relatively narrow and technical problems of agriculture, industry, and educational curricula; the American visitors have stayed within the letter of these contracts and avoided involvement in controversial subjects. Public administration is one field which USOM has avoided as a subject for contracts, partly because public administration in Japan has already developed to a fairly high degree, but partly to stay away from political controversies.

Another source of ICA-university friction, not entirely absent in Japan, has been the slowness of government procurement, accounting, and disbursement procedures. USOM sympathizes with university impatience at the slowness of ICA in Washington in approving contracts and expenditures made under them, and has assisted in working out alternative procedures by which more expenditures can be made subject only to post audit in Washington. On the other hand, USOM feels that some universities are too hasty in ordering equipment and sending it to Japan before ascertaining the precise needs of Japanese institutions or allowing

procedures to be worked out between USOM and the Japanese government to waive prohibitions or customs duties on the import of items which compete with Japanese-made products.

MICHIGAN-WASEDA PROGRAM IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTIVITY

Of all the American university affiliations in Japan, this one got off to the worst start and aroused the most active opposition. Despite these handicaps, it has gone steadily about its business. It has come to be regarded as an ICA "showpiece" program in the Far East less than two years after student street demonstrations against it.

The idea of establishing, at a Japanese engineering school, with the aid of an American university, a center for study and application of current American techniques in industrial engineering and business administration occurred at about the same time to USOM officials and Japanese business and government workers at the newly-established Japan Productivity Center. It was decided to maximize speed and minimize political repercussions by selecting a private university for this effort. Of Japan's private universities, Waseda (in Northwest Tokyo) was generally believed to have the best engineering school, although some of its other departments were reputedly radical and anti-American.⁷ Waseda alumni affiliated with the Japan Productivity Center broached the subject of teaching and research in productivity engineering to President Nobumoto Ohama and his Canadian- and American-trained assistant, Professor Susumu Kobe. President Ohama and Professor Kobe were interested, and negotiations got

7. This reputation is a sore point with President Ohama and Professor Kobe, who consider it unjustified by the facts. Waseda has always had a liberal tradition, resulting from its founding by "Japan's First Democrat," Count Shigenobu Okuma, when Okuma was in disgrace with the traditionalists in the Japanese government (1882). Waseda has always been a breeding ground for opposition journalists and politicians, as well as for small businessmen unaffiliated with the large *zaibatsu* combines. Ohama and Kobe believe, however, that the student body of over 20,000 includes only 20 or 30 active Communists and as many more "fellow-travelers."

under way both as to the nature of the program and the identity of the American partner.

It was decided to select the participating American university first, and let its representatives assist in formulating the details of the program. USOM prepared a list of nine leading American engineering schools with strong programs in industrial engineering which might be interested in a Waseda affiliation. From this list Waseda selected the Georgia Institute of Technology in early 1955. The choice of Georgia Tech was made with a view to the maximum advantage to Japanese who might study in America under the program. Georgia Tech, being among the smallest institutions on the USOM list, was expected to offer Japanese visitors more individual attention than would a larger school. Georgia Tech's other advantage was climatic; Japanese were expected to have difficulty adjusting to the severe winters of the Northeast and Midwest.

Georgia Tech expressed interest, and negotiations got under way. It was then that active opposition began, in both Japan and America. Exaggerated rumors of what was afoot circulated among younger professors and anti-American students. Americans were to be given control of the Waseda engineering curriculum; Waseda students were to be required to take courses under American professors; Waseda engineering professors were to be assigned to military research projects for the benefit of the American Armed Forces; Waseda was to be used as a base of operations for recommendations to fire Japanese workers and wreck the Japanese labor movement. These and similar extreme rumors spread on the Waseda campus and were difficult to contradict in the absence of explicit information as to what the proposed contract would contain.⁸ There were also objections

8. Copies of ICA contracts made in other countries and circulated at Waseda did in fact contain references to Americans reorganizing curricula and teaching methods, subsidizing research along particular lines, and teaching courses required for graduation. It was not made clear to the people at Waseda that ICA or USOM realized the difference between Japanese and "underdeveloped" conditions, or between a going concern like Waseda and a new or devastated institution being established under American auspices.

to Georgia Tech as an affiliate because of the racial policies of the State of Georgia, and fear was expressed that Japanese professors might be subject to racial discrimination there. Meanwhile, opposition was expressed in Georgia, particularly in the textile industry, to Georgia Tech participation in any program which would increase the efficiency of its Japanese competitors, or in any program sponsored by the State Department, which was considered unfriendly to Georgia's requests for limitation of Japanese textile exports to America. Negotiations were broken off in July from the Georgia Tech side, just as a Georgia Tech team was about to leave for Japan to survey the situation at Waseda.

The opposition at Waseda considered this a victory, but otherwise the break was of no great concern to the Waseda administration, which had lost much of its original enthusiasm for Georgia Tech. It also strengthened Waseda's stand against having Americans teach Japanese students under the program, or having the program include the kind of ICA contract research the opposition feared. At this stage the College of Engineering appears to have wavered in its support of the whole idea of an American affiliation, since the opposition leader was a young assistant professor in this college.⁹ President Ohama, however, who was impressed with the opportunity to work with industry,¹⁰ went ahead anyway and received support from a somewhat unexpected source in the Waseda faculty.

This was the College of Business. The dean of this college and his department heads expressed their desire for an American affiliation, whatever engineering might decide to do. The interest

9. This is Toshiei Takahashi, who still (1958) remains an assistant professor in the College of Engineering.

10. It is alleged by opponents of President Ohama that he was acting under pressure from wealthy Waseda alumni, but Ohama himself denies that any such pressure was ever exerted. His method of operation had been to keep deans and department heads informed as to what was going on, and to secure their approval. The faculty and student body at large were not consulted or informed about the progress of negotiations.

of the College of Business led to its inclusion and therefore to some important changes in the program. The main change of content was expansion to include work in marketing, personnel relations, etc., along with the technical aspects of industrial engineering proper. The exchange of professors was also broadened to include both business and economics as well as engineering. The main change of organization was to set up a separate Institute for Research in Productivity (IRP). President Ohama himself acted as the first director of this Institute on a part-time basis, and was succeeded by his assistant (Professor Kobe) on a full-time basis in December, 1958. President Ohama's high position and personal connections probably forestalled criticism which might otherwise have been expressed.

Many of the above developments did not occur until a new American affiliate had been selected to replace Georgia Tech. President Ohama presented USOM with a "preferred list" of institutions from USOM's original group. Michigan was on the list, although it was not Waseda's first choice. When Waseda's first-choice institutions hesitated to send ranking faculty people to Japan for two-year periods, ICA in Washington proposed Michigan on its own account. One reason for this was that ICA had previous good experience with Michigan on another foreign contract in the Philippines. It had nothing to do with Professor Kobe of Waseda's Michigan doctorate in economics, since he had no connection with either business or engineering while at Michigan. Neither did it have anything to do with the existence of a Center for Japanese Studies at Michigan, or with other Michigan affiliations in Japan. Actually, the communication and liaison between this program and the Center for Japanese Studies on the same campus has been very slight even after the program got under way. ¹¹

11. This led to an unusual situation in the Fall of 1958. The Institute for Research in Productivity (IRP) at Waseda was considering inauguration of econometric research while one of Michigan's leading econometricians, Professor Daniel B. Suits, was spending a semester in Japan under the sponsorship of the Center for Japanese Studies. The Michigan group at Waseda learned of the presence of the Michigan man too late to use his services in any essential way.

When President Ohama and Professor Kobe visited Ann Arbor in the Fall of 1955, they were impressed with the possibility that their own work in productivity might become self-supporting, as are many of the research activities at Michigan. Following their visit, a Michigan survey team came to Waseda in February, 1956. A draft contract was prepared while they were in Japan, and the final version signed in May. It was decided that the affiliation would concentrate entirely on research and involve no teaching. At this stage, too, major emphasis was placed on operations research, linear programming, and electronic computation. The procedure, usual in ICA contracts, is to have separate agreements drawn up between ICA and each of the participating universities, with no direct contract between these universities themselves. Waseda found the ICA representatives extremely easy to deal with. They were hesitant about introducing any ideas of their own, and were willing to accept almost anything Michigan and Waseda worked out between themselves -- within the limits of financial feasibility.

Until its contract with ICA was actually signed, Waseda kept the negotiations secret in order to avoid trouble. Furthermore, Waseda felt it had no right to disclose any details of the Michigan-ICA contract, even though President Ohama received a copy. After the contract was signed, the Japanese text was disclosed to, and approved by, the entire senior faculty of Waseda. These were the circumstances under which charges of "secrecy" were brought against the Waseda administration by dissident faculty members and student leaders.¹² There were several aspects to this charge:

1. Since the negotiations were kept secret until final agreement was reached, the Waseda faculty was presented with a fait accompli.

12. The writer has had access to copies of the student newspaper, Waseda Daigaku Shimibun, which was controlled by the opposition, during the critical period of September, 1956.

2. The Waseda faculty and student body were not informed of the provisions of the Michigan-ICA contract.

3. There were alleged discrepancies between the Japanese and English texts of the Waseda-ICA contract.

Actually, according to the Waseda administration, the contract as published was so favorable to Waseda, and gave Americans so much less control than did ICA contracts in the Philippines and Korea, that Leftists assumed there must be some sort of secret appendices or codicils, especially since ICA was involved. Actually there are no strings of any kind, and the entire contract is spelled out in the published version.

While charges of "strings attached" (himotsuki) were the principal ammunition of the opposition, something was made of provisions that Waseda could not terminate the contract, amend it, or rid itself of undesirable Michigan personnel without the approval of ICA. The main fears seem clearly to have been (1) American control over the Waseda curriculum; (2) use of Waseda research facilities for military purposes; and (3) Waseda participation in a movement involving dismissals and speed-ups of Japanese labor.

With the signing of the two contracts in May, 1956, two members of the Michigan engineering faculty, Professors C. B. Gordy and E. L. Page, were scheduled to arrive in Japan for two-year terms, after the end of both American and Japanese summer holidays. Before the end of the Japanese vacation, however, the opposition both on and off the Waseda campus started its campaign in earnest. A sound truck was brought onto the campus to broadcast speeches against the program. Students from other institutions, probably recruited by the Leftist student organization Zengakuren,¹³ also entered in large numbers, along with non-student members of Sohyo unions. They posted placards

13. See the last section of this chapter, which deals briefly with Zengakuren and its attitude toward American-Japanese university affiliations, although this organization's importance has thus far been confined largely to the Michigan-Waseda program.

on the campus denouncing "cultural imperialism" and the entire movement to raise productivity in the "war industries" of Japan for the benefit of the capitalists.

After the re-opening of the university, two Waseda student councils, one in literature and one in economics (the former but not the latter affiliated with Zengakuren) passed resolutions demanding that the Waseda administration reconsider the entire American affiliation. Neither business nor engineering student councils passed any such resolution. "Hands Off Waseda!" demonstrations were held in front of the United States Embassy; accounts differ as to the proportions of the demonstrators who were actual Waseda students. A few threats of bodily injury to Professors Gordy and Page were made. Students from 24 Japanese universities sent cables to Michigan to keep the two professors at home.¹⁴ On the Waseda campus itself the noise of the sound truck, amplifying constant speeches and Leftist songs, interfered with university classes. Professor Takahashi, who had led the faculty opposition, was himself disturbed by this turn of events and dissociated himself from the extremists. Conservative students organized to throw the intruders off the campus. Some faculty members favored calling the Tokyo police for the same purpose, but President Ohama refused. The question was one of minimizing injuries to students, damage to university property, and reflections on the reputation of Waseda University.

The two Michigan professors were scheduled to arrive separately, first the Gordys and then the Pages. Following the demonstrations and threats outside the Embassy, USOM wired the Gordys to wait for a few days to avoid any possible "welcoming committee" at the Haneda Airport. When they actually came, the Gordys used Mrs. Gordy's maiden name to avoid the anticipated crowd at the airport; actually there was no crowd there.¹⁵

14. Subsequent investigation indicated that all these cables were sent from a single post office located near Communist Party national headquarters in the Yoyogi section of Tokyo.

15. The Gordys' strategy worked so perfectly that the Waseda administrators recognized them only because of a previous meeting in Ann Arbor, after having been assured they were not on the plane.

Once the Gordys arrived, there was minor annoyance from Japanese newspaper men who refused to let them rest before interviewing them, but by the time the Pages came, a week or ten days later, there were no incidents whatever. During the interval the demonstrators removed their sound truck and placards from the Waseda campus, and have never returned.

Opinions differ as to the reasons for the collapse of the opposition. Some alternative surmises were suggested by interviewees:

1. The demonstrators were afraid of being beaten up by Waseda students, with or without police assistance.
2. Zengakuren decided to concentrate its efforts on blocking extension of the runways at the Tachikawa Air Force Base.¹⁶
3. There was dissension within the ranks of Zengakuren itself, in which the Waseda representatives lost out to other factions.
4. Professor Page, after his arrival, made a good impression by an impromptu talk to some Waseda students who had broken into a welcome banquet in a Tokyo hotel. He told them Michigan would never tolerate a contract with strings attached, and that the only strings attached to this one were on a Hawaiian lei which Mrs. Page was wearing.

What was the importance of this whole episode? It may have played some part in shaping the program so as to eliminate teaching by Michigan professors or direct influence by Americans on the Waseda curriculum. It may have played some part in the

16. A mob, in which students were prominent, blocked surveying for extension of the runways at the village of Sunakawa (near Tachikawa) in October, 1956.

set-up of IRP outside the College of Engineering of Waseda, and directly under the president. It may have made the Michigan professors more careful to avoid recommending personnel cuts and speed-ups, although they themselves deny this. What is certain is that this history did not interfere with the friendly reception accorded the Michigan staff in Japan, both at Waseda and in the business community, although they were sometimes thought of as United States government rather than University of Michigan staff members. Neither did it reduce their ability to make personal friendships, nor worsen their own attitudes toward Japan and the Japanese. They came to do a job, as one of them put it, and not to look for trouble. When they did not look for trouble, there was none.

The job the Michigan professors came to do at Waseda was set forth in the two contracts of May, 1956, which were renewed in 1958:

1. The establishment of an Institute for Research on Productivity (IRP) on the Waseda campus, to serve as a center for productivity research in the Japanese academic community and to accept outside contracts from business firms, government agencies, etc. "Productivity" was interpreted broadly, as including specifically problems of marketing and industrial relations. At the expiration of the contract, the Institute was to be taken over and run completely by Japanese members of the Waseda faculty.
2. The popularization of academic research on productivity within the Japanese business community by such devices as summer seminars for managers and technicians, plant visits and audits, and addresses to Japanese business audiences.
3. The training of Waseda staff members to operate IRP by study, research, and plant experience in the United States, both at Michigan and elsewhere.

The principal evidence that the program is a success is that it has "taken the curse off" ICA university contracts in Japan. Other contracts (even at public universities) have gone through without the acrimony and opposition which marked the early stages of this one. It has also been paid the compliment of imitation. Some aspects of this program have been taken over by Keio University, Waseda's traditional rival, in framing its own program with Harvard, as we shall see later in this chapter. Another university has sought ICA assistance to set up a similar program in the Kansai (Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe) area, and Kanazawa University in Kanazawa is trying to interest its American affiliate, the University of Pennsylvania, in a somewhat less technical one. (See Chapter 4.)

This success has not, however, been complete or devoid of problems, as we shall see. It rode the crest, furthermore, of a great wave of interest in American methods of business management and industrial engineering, which the Japanese call a "Kei-Ei Boom" after the Japanese translation of "Business Economics." This boom in turn is ascribed less to the Michigan-Waseda program than to the activities of the Japan Productivity Center, and to the objective need for Japan to export to world markets although strong trade unions block to some extent the traditional methods of keeping costs down.

We may expand the discussion of the three main elements of the job done under this program (as of 1958).

1. The Institute for Research in Productivity has been set up and is a going concern. Two Michigan professors are in charge, but Japanese counterparts lacking primarily experience are ready on the Waseda faculty to replace them when the contracts expire. It is difficult to gauge the extent to which the Institute's outside contracts have made it self-supporting, because there is no accepted way of attributing an appropriate share of general university overhead. The Methods-Time-Measurement (MTM) aspect of the program, however, is paying all its separable costs and contributing to general overhead. It was expected in 1956-1957 that mathematical and statistical work in operations research (OR) and linear programming (LP) would be the main features, but apparently these techniques cost more and require

more data than Japanese firms realized in advance, or could supply in short order. The exceptions to this generalization are mainly the largest firms who can hire their own staffs and need not contract out a great deal of work to an agency like IRP. Plant surveys and audits, of a sort which would have cost American firms \$5,000 and up on a consulting basis, have however been done for Japanese firms free of charge as a means of building up Japanese business interest in academic research, so that an important source of funds for IRP has yet to be developed. Work in marketing and "human engineering" has got businessmen interested in these things, but on the other hand these are fields in which businessmen can fend for themselves once their interest is aroused, and they have not led to sustained interest in IRP or to many consulting contracts.

IRP maintains informal contacts with the Japan Productivity Center so as to minimize duplications of program. It also sponsors conferences and seminars at which the returned Japanese participants from Michigan share their new technical knowledge with professional colleagues who have not yet been abroad -- including faculty members from universities other than Waseda, and interested technicians from business and government offices. There is some feeling within USOM that these contacts should be made more formal and regular, so that the diffusion of knowledge within Japan might be somewhat more rapid.

2. Not only the "permanent staff" from Michigan on two-year appointments, but also special lecturers brought in from Michigan and elsewhere for summer management institutes and other programs, have been welcomed by the Japanese business community. They have written articles for non-academic journals which have apparently been read by businessmen; their lectures and seminars have been well attended and appreciated by businessmen, even when substantial admission fees were charged; their advice has been asked by businessmen on practical business problems. Waseda faculty members always accompany the Americans on these lectures and seminars; Waseda administrators sometimes accompany them on long trips outside Tokyo, and use the occasion to strengthen alumni loyalty and collect contributions. It is the hope and belief of all concerned

that the academic-business good-will generated by the visiting Americans will not be confined to them, but will be transferred to their Japanese counterparts when they themselves leave.¹⁷

The point has been made by several Japanese critics that the Michigan advice and suggestions are relevant mainly for the largest Japanese companies. This is not the intention of the program; indeed, plant surveys and audits have found more room for improvement, generally speaking, in smaller than in larger companies. However, it may result, especially in the case of operations research and linear programming. One of the visiting specialists at a summer conference mentioned the desirability of hiring marketing experts at approximately \$10,000 a year. These men, it was asserted, easily earn their pay. This may be true, but \$10,000 comes in Japan to ¥ 3,600,000, which is much more than the president of a medium-sized company can hope to receive.

3. Through August, 1958, 25 participants had been sent to Michigan by Waseda on one-year programs, and seven had returned. These men are chosen by President Ohama mainly from among younger faculty members in engineering, business, and economics, although industrial engineers not employed at Waseda are encouraged to apply. In addition, two senior members of the Waseda staff had gone for shorter visits. The Michigan representatives and their families assist the participants particularly in oral English, and at Michigan the participants have as a special advisor a retired member of the Michigan engineering faculty with experience in the Philippines. Their programs include both classroom work and industrial plant visits and are worked out for each individual in detail, by the man himself, the advisor, and the program's campus coordinator, Professor Wyeth Allen of the Department of Industrial Engineering.

17. The Waseda representatives interviewed expressed the feeling that these academic-business relations had never been generally so poor as believed by USOM or suggested by Abegglen (Note 6, this Chapter). There has been business suspicion of university people, but this suspicion has been limited largely to economics departments and has not affected work in engineering.

It is largely returned participants who will be in a position to take over all aspects of IRP when the Michigan professors leave. Because of these men, Waseda now feels well ahead of any other Japanese institution in industrial engineering. Among the returnees are specialists in methods-time-measurement, operations research, linear programming, and electronic computers; all returnees can be used in Japan as soon as they return.

These things have not been accomplished without a certain amount of trouble, particularly during the first year (1956-1957). A minority of the trainees in this first group were "problem children," interested in developing their own specialties and disinterested in IRP. They wanted to use Michigan facilities for their own research and reading; they resented being required to attend classes in other fields or to observe industrial applications of the techniques they were studying. There were problems of status. The Japanese wished to be considered "Visiting Professors," which they were not, under American usage. They disdained titles such as "Student," "Scholar," or "Assistant," and registration with other foreign students. Some of the participants expected board and room on approximately the same level of comfort as given the Michigan professors at Waseda. Instead, they were lodged in special boarding houses which had previously been scheduled for demolition to make way for parking lots, and fed "Japanese" dishes poorly prepared. Some wished more spending money, since Japanese businessmen under other programs were supplied more liberally and Waseda staff members had equal status in Japan. At least one participant, who had heard exaggerated accounts of Midwestern winters, wished to spend the winter months in Florida. Another felt he should have been supplied with an automobile for his plant visits.

At one point in 1957 President Ohama asked Michigan to send some of the trouble-makers home instead of merely complaining about them. This Michigan declined to do. Instead President Ohama identified them through other Japanese students at Ann Arbor and communicated with them personally. There was no trouble thereafter, but complaints crop up in the résumés and reports written by participants before returning to Japan.

These complaints tend to stress general features of American life rather than specific problems of the program. One persistent theme is American ignorance of things Japanese, and American underestimation of the extent to which Japan is "civilized" in the Western sense. Another is anti-Oriental and particularly anti-Japanese prejudice, as displayed in motion picture and television programs.

The solution of the more acute difficulties has been due to improved orientation at Waseda. The orientation period for Japanese participants has been increased from one month to six. It has come to include more work in oral English, in which the families of the Michigan staff have participated. Many Japanese engineers feel that language is unimportant in the mathematical and mechanical aspects of their field, but have come to recognize that industrial engineering may be different in this respect. President Ohama makes a point of warning participants that their job at Ann Arbor is to learn the industrial applications of their specialties, rather than to further their personal scholarly researches. The title "Visiting Research Specialist" has alleviated their status problem on the Michigan campus. Participants no longer expect luxurious accommodations there. They are told in advance that there are more of them to be cared for at Michigan than Michigan people at Waseda and, furthermore, that the finances of the program come mainly from America. Perhaps most important, knowledge of conditions in Ann Arbor is now widespread; people who do not wish to endure them need not apply. No one is under pressure to go, and there are always more applicants than positions to be filled.

As in other similar programs, differences of opinion have arisen concerning the sending of Waseda senior staff people to Michigan for short visits. Michigan wants such visits kept to a minimum. Senior Waseda men must be entertained, and take up the time of the Michigan faculty. Some speak little English, and may appear more interested in sightseeing than in the academic purposes of their visits. Waseda would like to see the number of visits by senior men maintained or expanded, provided they are received as befits their seniority. Although they know little oral English and attend no classes, these senior men have training

and experience, and learn more than may be apparent to their hosts. If suggestions for changes at Waseda are made by returned participants who are younger, it is important that the older men who hold the real power consider them on the basis of actual observation of American conditions, without the bias resulting from having been left out of the program. During the summer of 1958, however, Waseda itself discontinued sending senior people to Ann Arbor, because per diem compensation adequate to their seniority was not obtained from ICA.

The returned participants have generally reported themselves enthusiastic about several phases of the American system of engineering education, including the stress on laboratory and field work. (There is some hostility to the discussion system. American students display too little respect for their professors, according to Waseda critics.) Curricular changes at Waseda have not as yet resulted from the Michigan affiliation, however. The Michigan visitors at Waseda have carefully refrained from exerting any pressure in this direction, and have enough to do along other lines. The main objection to change appears to be financial: the lecture system, which sometimes degenerates to dictation of professors' notes to students without textbooks or outside readings of any kind, costs least per head to the university and therefore to the student.

The salaries paid the Michigan professors at Waseda are fantastically luxurious by Japanese standards, and also exceed those paid Fulbright professors from America in other departments of Waseda. Not only are the salaries generous, but the Michigan visitors have free housing, diplomatic privileges (PX, etc.), and income tax exemption if they stay 18 months. The Michigan professors know of no resentment of their treatment, but would not themselves be surprised if it existed. At the same time, the salaries paid at Waseda attract first-class Michigan men in their most productive years only at a substantial financial sacrifice. This is because the American industrial engineer who goes abroad for two years sacrifices consulting contacts which require a much longer period to rebuild after he returns. The loss of consulting opportunities is much less of a problem when it comes to recruiting staff for summer institutes and seminars;

these posts are accordingly easier to fill than the two-year positions on the Waseda campus. Needless to say, the problem of attracting good men overseas at moderate salaries is not peculiar to the Michigan-Waseda relationship. It is common to all programs which involve the stationing abroad of American professors who earn substantial consulting fees in addition to their faculty salaries at their home universities.

MASSACHUSETTS-HOKKAIDO PROGRAM IN AGRICULTURE

The University of Massachusetts tried to revive its historical connection with Hokkaido University as early as 1953, with the aid of ICA funds. ICA, however, rejected the Massachusetts overtures, since ICA university affiliations were then limited to underdeveloped countries. Impressed by the interest of the Massachusetts administration, ICA offered Massachusetts a share in a proposed Central African affiliation instead, which would have involved other New England land-grant colleges as well. Massachusetts turned this proposal down, being interested in Hokkaido and not in foreign contacts generally.

Largely at the urging of USOM personnel in Tokyo, ICA changed its policy in 1955. In the same year, Professor Shannon McCune came to Massachusetts as Provost. McCune is a geographer, born in Korea and specializing in the Japan-Korea region. He has also had experience elsewhere in the Far East, notably in Indonesia, and has many Washington contacts. When ICA changed its policy, Massachusetts and two other American universities made overtures to Hokkaido to request affiliations with them,¹⁸ since ICA requires formal requests for affiliation to come from the non-American side. USOM was taking an active interest in the economic development of Hokkaido, where the Japanese government had spent a good deal of money without corresponding results beyond a great Sapporo building boom. There was at the same time interest in an American affiliation

18. One of the other institutions, the University of Washington in Seattle, has a strong program in fisheries, which is of special interest to Hokkaido. Fisheries people at Hokkaido show some regret at the selection of Massachusetts.

at Hokkaido. Professor Takeo Matsuda, who had studied land economics at Northwestern under Richard T. Ely in the 1920's and later headed the Hokkaido Department of Agricultural Economics, was among the faculty members pressing for such an affiliation; he had worked mainly through Fulbright grants and the Council of Economic and Cultural Affairs in New York. Despite this interest, the official Hokkaido replies to the early Massachusetts overtures are described as "formal." President Harusada Suginome of Hokkaido was afraid of undertaking any activities which might annoy anti-American members of his faculty and student body, many of whom were already violently opposed to a private arrangement by which a Hokkaido faculty member was using university facilities in connection with a contract with the United States Air Force.¹⁹ After President Suginome became convinced that a Massachusetts relationship would be least likely to arouse opposition because of its historical background, Massachusetts had the "inside track" in the competition for the contract.

A series of fortunate incidents resulted in the resumption of Massachusetts-Hokkaido relations in 1956. Professor Takeshi Yajima of the agricultural economics staff at Hokkaido was spending the year 1955-1956 at Cornell on a fellowship financed by the Council of Economic and Cultural Affairs. At the suggestion of his colleagues and seniors in Sapporo,²⁰ he came to Massachusetts

19. This is the physicist Ukichiro Nakaya, a world-famous authority on snow and ice, known in Japan as "Professor Snow." The research in question relates to icing of airplane wings. Although obviously of military interest, the research is not classified, and the results are available to commercial air lines and foreign powers, including the Soviet Union, as well as to the United States. Professor Nakaya's Air Force research had in 1958 been in progress for three years, and the opposition on the Hokkaido campus had died down.

20. The choice of Yajima as negotiator was apparently in part a tactical move by the Hokkaido administration. Yajima is a pacifist who was accused of communism by the Japanese military during World War II. He is a Hokkaido campus leader of the often Leftist and sometimes anti-American Federation of Democratic Scientists (Minka), which has units at most leading Japanese universities. He is said to have had difficulty obtaining a visa to go to Cornell in 1955. It was feared in advance that he might lead the opposition against the Massachusetts affiliation. He has in fact become one of its strong supporters.

in February, 1956, ostensibly to pay his respects at the grave of William S. Clark. He was impressed by what he saw at Massachusetts, and reported to Hokkaido in favor of the affiliation. The year 1956 was also the fiftieth anniversary of Hokkaido's elevation to university status, and ceremonies were held at Sapporo to commemorate the event. Three Massachusetts faculty members, including President Jean Paul Mather, attended the ceremonies on an ICA grant. At these ceremonies President Sugimoto was awarded an honorary D. Sc. degree from Massachusetts in recognition of his work in organic chemistry. An actual Massachusetts-Hokkaido agreement was worked out shortly after the ceremonies in October, 1956. It was signed as a formal contract the following year, after some delays in Washington, and effectuated by the first exchanges of representatives between the two schools in March, 1958. The four-year contract is to expire in 1961; Massachusetts hopes not only for extension but for expansion.

The purpose of the contract is understood somewhat differently at the two participating universities. Hokkaido's interest is mainly in having its staff and students learn the latest American techniques in various fields of agricultural science, and in obtaining American equipment for its laboratories. Massachusetts' interest, which is shared by USOM, is in showing the Japanese how an American land grant college works²¹ and suggesting contributions that such a college can make to the development of the island of Hokkaido. Massachusetts and USOM believe the

21. Actually Massachusetts considers its system significantly different from that of most land grant colleges. It is more integrated. Nearly all faculty members spend part of their time in campus teaching, part in research, and part in extension work, instead of concentrating only on one or two of these. This does not preclude a man's spending all of a particular term or year on one activity, but it does reduce almost to zero the number of professors who never teach, never do research, or never talk to farmers. Hokkaido reactions to this system are somewhat skeptical. If a man is a good researcher but a poor extension worker, would not a concentration on research be the best use of his abilities? Is it always possible to predict when a research project will reach a convenient stopping point, or will a man's work be left dangling for awhile to let him teach or do extension work? These are some of the questions raised in Sapporo.

research activities of the university, the program of the agricultural experiment station, and the activities of the Agricultural Extension Service should be interrelated more closely than they are. Hokkaido believes that these three institutions are already related more closely (although informally) than the Americans realize, and doubts the feasibility of any more formal relationship under Japanese budgetary law and procedure.²² As one Hokkaido spokesman put it, Hokkaido is glad to listen to advice from Massachusetts or USOM, but will make up its own mind about following it.

Under the present contract, two senior Massachusetts professors were to serve at Hokkaido for two-year terms starting in 1958, and two others for two-year terms starting in 1959. Professors Mack Drake (agricultural chemistry) and George Westcott (agricultural economics) came to Sapporo in the spring of 1958. Each had already met his Japanese counterpart in the United States; Professor Drake had also had Hokkaido experience as an army officer in military government in 1946. Professor Drake, a specialist in soil chemistry, is doing graduate teaching in soil chemistry and working with the Hokkaido staff on appropriate treatment of Hokkaido's volcanic and acid soils to increase the yield of forage crops for dairying. Professor Westcott is planning a program in agricultural marketing with Professor Yajima of Hokkaido. (No Japanese university has such a program currently.) He is also teaching a course in intermediate economic theory which is compulsory for senior agricultural economics majors. It is also attended by some juniors, graduate students, and staff members. Later Massachusetts representatives

22. Hokkaido is a national university. It is financed from the budget of the Ministry of Education, and its professors are on the payroll of this Ministry. The experiment station has been divided into two parts. One is under the national Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the other under the Hokkaido Prefectural Government. The Extension Service is also under the Prefectural Government. Japanese law specifies that no individual can receive a salary from more than one government budget. This rules out joint appointments between the university and either of the other agencies, although some university faculty people work without pay at the experiment station.

at Hokkaido will be chosen from the fields of food technology, home economics, and poultry husbandry.

A few problems have come up in connection with this aspect of the program:

1. The Massachusetts professors had anticipated a greater gap between the state of knowledge in America and Japan than they actually found. Some of the Japanese varieties of forage plants, for example, grow better on Hokkaido soil than the imports from Massachusetts. Professor Westcott finds his class at Hokkaido better trained and harder working than similar classes at Massachusetts. He is also impressed by Japanese accomplishments both in the technique of agricultural marketing (e.g., packing fruit in rice hulls to prevent bruising) and in economic theory (some of which he hopes to have translated and published in English).

2. There was a great deal of delay and difficulty before permission could be obtained to land some of the equipment shipped to Hokkaido by Professor Drake under the contract. This was because the equipment was shipped too soon, without a prior request for waiver of duties from Hokkaido University. It is felt that this difficulty has been solved, and that future shipments of equipment will follow the roundabout procedure wanted in Japan.

3. Professor Takeo Matsuda, Chairman of the Department of Agricultural Economics, would like the American visitor in his field to do some work in agricultural policy as well as marketing. On a visit to the United States in 1952, Professor Matsuda was impressed by the activities of the Farmers Home Administration, which provides funds for improving living conditions to families who will accept a good deal of supervision of their expenditures. He believes something similar would work in Hokkaido. The Japanese Ministry of Agriculture has embarked on such a program, but it has not yet been applied in the farm villages to any great extent. Professor Matsuda would like an American agricultural economist to help him get this program moving. Professor Westcott of Massachusetts has been inclined to concentrate his activities on the Hokkaido University campus.

4. Massachusetts would like to send a home economist to Hokkaido for two years, to set up a program in this field. It would be the first such program in Japan at the university level. Massachusetts and USOM representatives both feel such a program would contribute to farm welfare in Hokkaido, by teaching farm wives family budgeting and, particularly, nutrition. In Japan a rise in the incidence of malnutrition has accompanied the recent rise in living standards, because women have used the extra incomes to feed their families more polished rice and fewer vegetables. Some Hokkaido faculty members would also like to see this aspect stressed. The Hokkaido administration and the Japanese Ministry of Education both disagree. Their view is that, granting the importance and scientific character of home economics, expansion of Japanese work in this field would best be done at private women's colleges rather than national universities like Hokkaido. Many private women's colleges now teach the subject, more or less vocationally and on a sub-university level. The thing Hokkaido wants to expand next, in the view of its administrators, is probably atomic physics rather than home economics. Expansion of Hokkaido's work in atomic physics would probably not come under the existing contract with Massachusetts.

The other major aspect of the Massachusetts-Hokkaido relationship is the visits of Hokkaido faculty members to the corresponding departments at Massachusetts. Eight such participants from Hokkaido were sent to Massachusetts in 1958. Three had returned at the time of the writer's visit to Sapporo, two from three-month visits and one because of illness. The other five were expected to return after the end of another academic year. Nine other Hokkaido faculty members had been selected for three-month, six-month, and one-year terms. The total of 17 included two entomologists, a horticulturist, a food technologist, a poultry specialist, an agricultural engineer, a forestry specialist, a fisheries specialist, and the director of the university farm. Three men were also to be sent by other Hokkaido organizations: a specialist in veterinary medicine from the Snow Brand Dairy Company, a specialist in field crops from the Nippon Beet Sugar Company, and an agricultural marketing

specialist from the Federation of Agricultural Co-Operative Societies. These men were selected by an all-Japanese board of 14, eight from the university and six from outside, representing, other interests.²³ The principal criterion for selection is academic accomplishment and academic promise, but knowledge of English and personal adaptability are also essential, particularly for the shorter visits.

The two returned participants, an agricultural engineer and a zoologist, came full of ideas regarding application of Massachusetts practice to Hokkaido on subjects like the creation of cranberry bogs from swampland, the reclamation of abandoned farms, and the control of rodent pests. They praise their treatment at Massachusetts, and regretted that their duties at Hokkaido required them to return early. The participant who was taken ill, a biochemist, caught incipient tuberculosis and then suffered a nervous collapse from worry about his health. There was a difference of opinion among the Hokkaido faculty as to whether an error had been made in his selection, but no blame for his trouble was assigned to Massachusetts.

Certain difficulties remain to be worked out in connection with the participant part of the program:

1. Hokkaido wishes to send over its best men practically regardless of field and regardless of the time they can spend away from Sapporo. Massachusetts would prefer a concentration in the five contract fields: agricultural chemistry, agricultural economics, food technology, poultry husbandry, and home economics, so as to train counterparts for the Massachusetts professors. Massachusetts would like men to stay for a year or two at Massachusetts, but Hokkaido does not feel it can spare its best people for so long. Funds are also lacking for longer stays, if participants are not limited to the five contract fields.

23. Of the eight university members, each represents one of the eight departments of the College of Agriculture. Of the other six, one represents the experiment station, one the Extension Service, one the Prefectural Government, one the dairy industry, and so on.

2. Hokkaido would like to send some of its people to institutions other than Massachusetts under the contract; Massachusetts is willing to admit this only for fields not developed there. As for other fields, the Massachusetts view is that Massachusetts cannot exercise its contractual responsibilities to ICA if it permits participants to wander about on "Cook's Tours" of college campuses without some form of supervision.

Opposition to the affiliation on the Hokkaido campus has been limited to a student protest to Professor Matsuda. The protesting students felt that because the affiliation was approved by ICA it must aid the United States, and therefore must injure Japan. The Hokkaido faculty unit of Minka (Federation of Democratic Scientists) denies having opposed the affiliation or having stirred up student opposition. Its position is that American affiliations are desirable -- but so are affiliations with Soviet or Chinese Mainland institutions.

It may not be too early to suggest that this program is regarded as a success in Japan. When President Suginome of Hokkaido was a candidate for re-election (1958), one point made in his favor was his negotiation of this affiliation, and his opponents did not use the affiliation against him. President Suginome himself feels the program is so successful that he would like ICA to work out other Hokkaido affiliations with American universities in fisheries, dairy husbandry, forestry, or atomic physics.

HARVARD-KEIO PROGRAM IN BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

Although business administration is involved actively in the Michigan-Waseda program, this is only at the research level. The primary emphasis is on industrial engineering, and teaching is carefully left alone. The USOM ambition, seconded by the Japanese businessmen in the Japan Productivity Center, to influence Japanese methods of teaching business subjects, is left unsatisfied. There is room for another contract in precisely this field.

This "other contract" is the Harvard-Keio program in business administration. It may be remembered that Keio enjoyed a brief Harvard affiliation around 1890, has called itself "The

Harvard of Japan," and has hoped for a resumption of the affiliation. Keio is also Waseda's traditional rival; Keio faculty members say that Waseda's success in industrial engineering and in its Michigan relationship irked many influential Keio alumni in business circles, including the Japan Productivity Center.

As early as 1953, a number of Keio economics graduates employed in business requested from the University the opportunity to take non-credit seminar work at the graduate level in business management subjects. With the cooperation of the Japan Productivity Center a series of seminars was actually held. The speakers were Japanese businessmen, many of whom had visited the United States under the auspices of the Center. American businessmen in Tokyo also heard of the Keio program, and suggested that Keio get in touch with professors of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration (Harvard Business School) who were giving advanced management seminars each summer at Baguio in the Philippine Islands by the American "case method" of business teaching. This was done in 1955, and special arrangements were made to enable one Keio faculty member to attend the Baguio seminar in that year. He was not only impressed by the Harvard program in Baguio, but arranged for two of the Harvard participants to stop for a few days in Japan on their return from Baguio in the following year (1956). They gave a three-day seminar at a resort hotel in September, 1956, under Keio auspices. About 60 Japanese businessmen, mainly top management people in large companies, attended and were likewise impressed. The experiment was repeated with equal success the following year. In fact, many of the same companies participated the second time, although usually sending different staff members than in 1956. These programs also broke a little better than even financially -- an important consideration. The third summer program, in 1958, was somewhat enlarged in scope. It involved three Harvard professors and lasted for five days. Professor Harry Hansen of Harvard, whose specialty is marketing, has participated in all of these Keio summer seminars.

After the Michigan-Waseda affiliation began in 1956, the business group among Keio alumni began casting about for something

similar for their own school. USOM, on its part, suggested willingness to underwrite a similar mutual interchange between Keio and some well known American school of business. Partially in preparation for such a move, the President of Keio, Fukutaro Okui, split up the University's Department of Economics and set up a separate Department of Business Administration which was to form the nucleus of a business school.

With the success of the September seminars led by Harvard men, Keio's desire to set up its own school of business, and the historical record of Harvard-Keio relationship, it was natural for the business element among the Keio alumni to press for a Harvard affiliation. These alumni arranged for preliminary meetings between President Okui and USOM which resulted in the dispatch of President Okui and three Keio faculty members to Harvard in the spring of 1958.

To the surprise of some members of the Keio delegation, their mission was limited to the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration. There had been hope on the Japanese side that the Harvard Graduate School might itself be involved. Harvard, moreover, was not enthusiastic about lending professors to Keio for long periods. The scheme worked out was for Keio to send five professors to Harvard in 1958-1959 to participate in the collection and use of business case materials. During the next two years Keio was to send three men each to Harvard for a year. Harvard was to send a professor to Keio in 1959-1960 to assist in setting up the Keio business curriculum, and to send others thereafter for shorter periods.

Upon returning to Keio in May, 1958, President Okui chose five professors to spend the following academic year at the Harvard Business School. Though the choices conflicted with commitments some of these men had made in Japan for 1958-1959, they all felt it best to go. A number of other considerations, both for and against going, weighed in the minds of some of the five:

1. They expected to be treated more like graduate students than faculty members.

2. They did not think Harvard Business School studies would be close enough to their own specialties -- but some hoped somehow to take at least part of their Harvard work outside the Business School.

3. They did not all have sufficient fluency in oral English to profit greatly from a one-year stay in the United States.

Two features of this procedure conflicted with certain Keio traditions. The first was that the basic decisions were made by President Okui and influential alumni as Keio spokesmen rather than by the Keio faculty as a whole. The second disturbing feature was the acceptance of ICA financial support. Keio has always prided itself on independence of government -- whether Japanese or foreign.²⁴ There was also fear that an ICA contract may smack of political involvement, and fear of the consequences of giving foreigners too much authority in the setting up of curricula in Japanese universities.

This is not to imply the existence of widespread Keio faculty discord about the program. There were great hopes that it could be expanded to involve the Harvard Graduate School generally, although it was never likely that any such expansion could be financed from ICA funds. A great deal also depended upon the Harvard representatives who were to help set up the Keio business curriculum. If their suggestions could be carried out without offending Keio faculty members, there might be no serious problems.

ZENGAKUREN

Japanese student organizations have been active in relation to programs of university cooperation, particularly in the Michigan-Waseda case. Zengakuren (an abbreviation for a Japanese title

24. Keio did however set up its Library School during the American Occupation, using American funds supplied by the Occupation, and hiring professors from America, without political difficulties.

which means "The All - Japan Union of Student Self-Governing Associations") is only one of the number of left-wing student organizations dominating the gakusei undo or "student [political] movement" in Japan. But as it is much the largest and most influential, it is used synonymously with the group as a whole.

After suppression by Japanese militarists during the 1930's, student political organizations were revived by the early Occupation in 1945-1946. It was a time of disruption, inflation, and, for many students, near-starvation. Students organized councils which set up employment exchanges, established cooperatives -- boarding-houses, restaurants, bookstores -- and campaigned politically as well to purge militarist professors, prevent the increase of tuition and transportation rates, etc. As economic recovery got under way the economic activities of the student councils became less and less important as compared to the political ones. As the conservative and well - to - do students became generally uninterested in student-council elections, the councils thus came more and more under left-wing control. The best source in English on this student movement, its history and activities, is Lawrence H. Battistini's Postwar Student Struggle in Japan.²⁵

On Japanese university campuses the most important left-wing attitudes are those of the organized student movement. (The Japanese Federation of Teachers, Nikkyoso, is leftist but very weak at the university level. The Federation of Democratic Scientists, Minka, takes few positive or forceful stands.) And when we speak of a student movement in a Japanese university we mean, for all practical purposes, the student councils of its various colleges. Most Japanese universities have no student council for the entire institution but, rather, separate ones for individual faculties or colleges (law, literature, economics, medicine, etc.). Most of these take stands, not only on matters affecting students directly, but on general political questions as well, on which they purport to speak for their entire constituent student bodies. Most of these student councils are affiliated

25. Tokyo and Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle, 1956.

into several rival national organizations. The strongest of these, Zengakuren, is Communist-controlled; this is shown by its affiliation with the World Union of Students, with headquarters in Czechoslovakia. After the period of this study, Zengakuren achieved international prominence by its leadership in the bloody riots of May and June, 1960, protesting (unsuccessfully) against the revised version of the Japanese-American Mutual Security Treaty and also protesting (successfully) against the proposed Japanese visit of President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

While Zengakuren is Communist-controlled, it deviates from the present majority line in the Japanese Communist Party. It is dominated by an "International faction," tending toward Stalinism, Maoism, and direct action, whereas the "Main Current" faction which controls the Party favors building up popular strength before attempting revolutionary activity. Because of the dispute 72 members of the Zengakuren leadership were expelled from, suspended from, or reprimanded by the Party following a brawl on June 1, 1958, at which Zengakuren seized temporary control of the Party's Yoyogi headquarters.²⁶ Zengakuren on its side has eliminated "Main Current" sympathizers from its executive committee. Within Zengakuren there is an action squad (known as Hansen until 1957). It is even more direct-actionist than the main body, and issues instructions on methods of seizing police boxes, radio stations, etc. when the Revolution comes, and takes the lead in battling the police at all student demonstrations.²⁷

Within any university with several colleges or faculties, then, each college or faculty usually has its own student council. Some student councils may affiliate with Zengakuren, others be in sympathy, and still others hostile to it. At Tokyo University the Economics Student Council is a Zengakuren stronghold and furnishes Zengakuren with much of its national leadership, but

26. "Red Party Disciplines 47 Student Leaders," Japan Times, Dec. 13, 1958.

27. Compare I. I. Morris. "Policeman and Student in Japanese Politics," Pacific Affairs (March, 1959).

the Law Student Council is hostile. At Waseda University, the Zengakuren base is the Literature Student Council; the Politics-Economics Student Council, while friendly, is not a member.

Many Zengakuren leaders, both on individual campuses and in the national organization, have been "students" for more than four years, usually without attending classes or taking examinations. At the present time a student forfeits his status unless he graduates within eight years of his original entrance into a university. This is a Ministry of Education rule, but it is not usually applied retroactively. Some Zengakuren leaders have reportedly been "students" for ten years and more, understating their ages and concealing their family affiliations in order to appear to be ordinary students.

Although Hansen opposed "foreign professors" at its first convention in 1931,²⁸ Zengakuren does not boycott or attack the individual Fulbright professor or other American teacher on a Japanese campus. It uses this neutrality as evidence that it is a reasonable organization which respects academic freedom. This does not prevent Zengakuren members from heckling visiting American teachers at public meetings, but it does prevent any kind of systematic persecution. It is interesting but fruitless to speculate on what might happen if American teachers acquired a following among Japanese students and took active stands against Zengakuren. In practice, these American teachers have stayed only short periods, have worked in Christian universities where Zengakuren is weak, or concentrated their attention on graduate students who are indifferent to the student movement. Similarly, Zengakuren practice is to let the occasional American student alone so long as he leaves them alone. Where he does not, as in the case of an American National Student Association representative enrolled as a special student at Tokyo University, he may receive anonymous midnight phone calls and threatening letters, be assaulted at open meetings, and be denounced as a United States spy attempting to split the Japanese student movement.

28. Battistini, op. cit., p. 77.

Zengakuren is hostile to scholarships for Japanese students to study in the United States. It regards them as United States propaganda, designed to corrupt Japanese students into tools of American colonialistic capitalism. It also believes the various public and private scholarship programs to be more centralized under government control than is actually the case. Its "line" is that anyone with money can study in America, and that even those without money can get scholarships to the United States so easily that there is no honor involved in getting one. Zengakuren does oppose in writing one type of scholarship, however: the National Student Association scholarships for Japanese Student Council members. These are a direct threat to the organization, being aimed at the same student political leaders Zengakuren tries to recruit. The scholarships have been denounced as part of a plot to split the Japanese student movement, and the Zengakuren denunciation has been echoed by the World Union of Students in Prague.

Zengakuren would not oppose university contracts between Japanese and American universities if contracts were available on the same basis between Japanese and Russian or Japanese and Chinese universities. Since they are not so available, Zengakuren does not appear to have adopted any definite policy on contracts as such. It does, however, oppose contracts which involve any loss of autonomy for the Japanese university by the introduction for any extended period of faculty members and programs not under the university's control. It also opposes any contract receiving financial support from ICA, since ICA also finances military aid programs, and secret "strings" of a military character are allegedly attached even to non-military ICA assistance.

It was the combination of the Michigan-Waseda program's supposed threat to the latter university's autonomy and the presumption that there were secret strings attached, plus the standard socialist objections to an increase of labor productivity in capitalist industry that accounted for the Zengakuren objection to the Michigan-Waseda relationship in 1956. Of the two student councils which played the most active roles in opposing the Michigan contract, one was affiliated with Zengakuren, and the other sympathetic.

A Japanese news magazine published in 1957 an estimate of the number of Communist Party members among Japanese university student bodies.²⁹ The largest group was at Tokyo University (216, plus another 27 in the Science and Technology Research Institute in Chiba). Next was the Osaka Municipal University (134), and in third place Waseda (101), by far the largest number in any private university. Then came Nagoya (74), Osaka (72), Shizuoka (68), Kyoto (61), Yokohama (56), and Hokkaido (51), all public institutions. According to this Japanese source, one can usually assume the presence of three "fellow-travelers" to each Party member.

CHAPTER 3 FOUNDATION-
FINANCED
PROGRAMS

INTRODUCTION

We deal next with three important programs financed by American educational foundations (the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations). Each of these programs has supported the affiliation of one or more American universities with one or more Japanese ones. In contrast to the technical subject matter of the ICA-financed programs considered in Chapter 2, these programs tend to be concentrated in humanistic, social, and legal studies.

Contemporary Tokyo abounds in educational foundations, as well as in visitors from foundations in Europe and America. Some of these foundations are primarily governmental; most are not. Some specialize in teaching, some in research, some in propaganda. The main function of some is the provision of financial aid for Japanese who wish to study abroad; others specialize in financing research.

We shall study in detail three programs which have worked through American-Japanese university affiliations. The great bulk of foundation activities, however, do not: actually, they reduce the need for university affiliations by providing international contacts on a personal or other alternative basis. It would be almost as misleading to consider foundations primarily as aids to the programs studied here as to disregard the three "foundation-financed programs" themselves.

Of the foundations supplying alternatives to American university programs in Japan, the largest and most important is the United States Education Commission in Japan, popularly known as the Fulbright Commission. This quasi-governmental body administers the Fulbright program (Public Law 584) and the Smith-Mundt program (Public Law 402) as they relate to Japan¹ -- the fifth largest "Fulbright program" in the world. Its 1958 allocation was \$1,320,000. Its grants to students and professors were distributed as follows:

Japanese professors in the U. S. (75)	\$130,740
American professors in Japan (28)	264,624
Japanese students in the U. S. (150)	163,750
American students in Japan (12)	<u>51,000</u>
 Total: 265 grants	 \$610,114 ²

This is much larger than any university program in Japan, whether size be measured by budget or by number of participants. It is by no means intentionally competitive with the American university programs, although some members of the Fulbright Commission staff favor personal grants over institutional affiliations as means of carrying out their objectives. There are a number of cases of direct support of university programs by Fulbright grants to individual American or Japanese participants. Unavoidably, however, the net effect of Fulbright Commission activities is to reduce the need for and importance of the university affiliations. The Commission also has many of the same problems as the university programs, some in more acute form. These include the selection of participants and the placement of

1. P. L. 584 programs are currently financed by the foreign-currency proceeds of the sale of United States surplus agricultural commodities abroad. P. L. 402 programs are financed by direct congressional dollar appropriations.

2. The difference between the total allocation of \$1,320,000 and the tabular total of \$610,114 is made up of funds allocated for exchanges of "leaders," "specialists," and high school teachers.

returnees in their home countries;³ the problems of the Fulbright Commission will, however, not be discussed in this report.

What will be discussed in this chapter are the three large foundation programs operating in Japan as of 1958 which involved American universities as such. Two of these are Rockefeller Foundation programs in American Studies, one at Tokyo University and the other at Kyoto and Doshisha Universities. The American affiliate is in the first case Stanford, and in the second, Michigan. The third foundation program is in comparative legal studies. It is a Ford Foundation program, financed through the Institute of International Education. It involves three American and six Japanese universities, and also the Judicial Research and Training Institute of the Japanese Supreme Court Secretariat.

STANFORD-TOKYO PROGRAM IN AMERICAN STUDIES

This is the oldest foundation program currently operating in Japan which involves an American university affiliation.⁴ It is also the prototype of the Kyoto American Studies program. It dates from the American Occupation, having been set up in 1950; it was in 1958 scheduled to become a purely Japanese program, supported entirely from Japanese sources and divested of its American affiliation.

With the Occupation in 1945-1946 came a desire for the development of American studies in Japan. This desire was felt on both the American and the Japanese sides. Within the Occupation it centered in the Civil Information and Education Division of SCAP (General MacArthur's headquarters), a division known as C. I. and E. The desire was not without its propagandistic

3. The Fulbright Commission takes no formal responsibility for the placement of returnees, but it is concerned with the problems of returnees who cannot find suitable employment, or who prefer to remain in America rather than face their home country employment markets. Its current policy in Japan is to make no grants to Japanese nationals who have not secured permanent employment.

4. The Center for Japanese Studies of the University of Michigan was conducting a large-scale research project in Okayama under a Carnegie Foundation grant well before the founding of the Stanford-Tokyo program. This project is no longer in operation, but is discussed briefly at the end of this chapter.

overtones. On the part of the Japanese it was a reaction against the anti-Americanism of the previous generation which had left the country's academic institutions with only three Americanists of any stature, the most eminent already close to retirement age.

Under these circumstances the inauguration of an American Studies program in Japan was to be expected. Its involving an American university, and specifically Stanford, was due to a succession of coincidences. Professor Claude Buss of Stanford's History Department had two tours of duty in the Occupation between 1945 and 1948, the second one in C. I. and E. He knew the Japanese language, and was a personal acquaintance of General MacArthur. Professor George Kerr, now of the University of Hawaii, was in 1947-1948 at the Hoover Library on the Stanford campus. He was a veteran of both high school teaching in Japan and of a long career in the United States diplomatic service. These two men, both at Stanford, sparked the affiliation on the American side, but Stanford's long record of interest in Japan should also be mentioned. Stanford has a chair in Japanese Civilization, held for many years before World War II by Professor Yamato Ichihashi. Stanford's first president, the zoologist David Starr Jordan, has also been well known in Japanese scientific circles for studies of Japanese marine life.

On the Japanese side, Tokyo University was the obvious choice as a center of an American Studies program. Not only was it the outstanding single academic institution in Japan, but it housed the Hepburn Chair whose occupant, Professor Yasaka Takagi, was the best-known American specialist in the country. President Shigeru Nambara, moreover, became an eager proponent of an expanded American Studies program, to be run by academicians rather than SCAP employees and kept free of propaganda.

President Nambara and Professor Buss had met in Japan, and had kept up correspondence after Buss returned to Stanford in 1948. During a trip to American educational conferences in 1949 Nambara visited Stanford. A program of summer seminars by Stanford faculty members was drawn up, and also a proposal for Stanford aid in building up the Tokyo library in American Studies. Details were thrashed out by Professors Buss and Kerr and President Wallace Sterling of Stanford, President Nambara

and Professor Hideo Kishimoto representing Tokyo.⁵ Much had to be left to correspondence, since the Japanese had limited time in America. Official announcements of the summer seminars were not forthcoming until April, 1950. A number of difficulties had to be overcome in this initial program:

1. Permission to enter Japan and to use Occupation facilities while there had to be secured from SCAP. SCAP's policy was at the time hostile to visits by unaffiliated American scholars, but Professor Buss's SCAP contacts were useful in overcoming this prejudice.

2. Financial support for the salaries, transportation, etc. of the American participants was required. It was decided not to seek these from SCAP, in order to minimize the suspicion of propaganda. Here the Rockefeller Foundation entered the scene. Dr. Burton Fahs of the Foundation was both a Japanese specialist and an enthusiast for area studies. He knew Buss's plans, and his interest made the financial problem less difficult than might have been anticipated.

3. Cooperation was needed from the Stanford faculty and administration. The administration would have preferred faculty members to concentrate on research and on-campus teaching even during the summer months. Many faculty members had other plans which prevented their participation. During the first summer, therefore, faculty members were selected somewhat less carefully than they were later. The social science departments, as it turned out, were over-represented, with four of the five American participants coming from these fields. (The four social science departments represented were Economics, History, Political Science, and International Relations.)

4. In Japan there arose the more delicate problem of relations with intellectuals both in and out of the universities. The heyday of American popularity had passed by 1950, and the intellectuals

5. Professor Kishimoto occupies the chair of Religion at Tokyo. He has studied in both the Divinity School and the Department of Philosophy at Harvard, and was teaching Japanese Language and Culture there before being called to his present chair in 1936. He happened to be in America for a theological conference in 1949, and was instructed by President Nambara to represent him in negotiations with Stanford.

were suspicious of anything that looked like either American propaganda or a revival of prewar Japanese-American friendship organizations.

The prewar "semi-professional pro-Americans," men like Count Kentaro Kaneko, Viscount Eiichi Shibusawa, and Baron Noboru Kanda, were not universally popular among the intellectuals. These men had been generally anti-militarist in foreign policy questions. Some suspected that, like many other Japanese "liberals," they had preferred peaceful means to realize much the same imperialistic aims as the militarists themselves. This group had also been paternalistic in domestic policy, and had affiliations with the financial oligarchy or *zaibatsu*. Professor Takagi himself was connected with this circle, being a son of Baron Kanda and having been adopted by the Takagi family in his youth. Despite Professor Takagi's eminence as an American scholar, therefore, his connection with the program has been reduced to an honorific one. This decision has been resented by many of Takagi's friends and former students, especially since Takagi had been urging expanded American Studies programs in Japan well before 1949.

The Tokyo-Stanford affiliation as originally set up involved six-week summer seminars held by five-man teams of visiting American scholars in Tokyo. In the first two years these were followed by shorter reprises elsewhere in Japan. After the first year, approximately half the participants came from institutions other than Stanford; Tokyo and Stanford collaborated in the selection, basing choices on the eminence of rival candidates and the particular fields in which the Japanese showed most interest. In general, the five fields covered were American History, American Literature, Philosophy, Economics, and Political Science (or International Relations). In the first two of these, stress was on American subject matter. In the last three, it was on aspects or techniques which had been developed further in America than in Japan (econometrics, survey research, logical positivism, etc.). The Japanese participants, 15 in each of the five seminars, were selected and paid by Tokyo University from applicants all over Japan. All were university graduates but were not required to have had any connection with Tokyo University.

Most have in practice been graduate students and faculty members at various Japanese universities. In addition, informal auditors were permitted who might be undergraduate students. It was anticipated that discussion would follow the remarks of the American visitors, and that discussion would require the use of interpreters. These were selected, supplied, and paid for by Tokyo University from Rockefeller funds.

Formal announcement of the first (1950) program was delayed by the details of getting the seminar set up, and as a result there was at first a scarcity of suitable Japanese applicants. For a time Professor Kishimoto, who was in charge, feared it might be necessary to reduce the level or the size of the seminar, but in the nick of time applications came in with a rush, and Tokyo was able to pick and choose. In subsequent years the program was crowded from the beginning, with more applicants for nearly all the seminars than there were places to be filled. One of the inducements after 1952 was the availability of two scholarships a year for American graduate study, limited to participants.⁶

The success of the summer seminars, both in supplying the Japanese university demand for American specialists and in recruiting outstanding Japanese graduate students for American universities, was generally acknowledged. Kyoto University paid the seminars the compliment of partial imitation. Mentioned as causes of the program's success were the sedulous avoidance of propaganda by the Americans and Tokyo's provision of skilled interpreters. Anti-American elements in Japanese intellectual circles ignored the seminars and made no attempt to interfere with their use of Tokyo University facilities. The Americans neither tried to enlist their support nor challenged their positions. The Tokyo committee avoided favoring Tokyo students and graduates when selecting seminar participants, and took care to minimize controversy in selecting people whose interests would correspond to those of individual visitors. Among the American group, those who made the most lasting impression were often

6. These scholarships were financed from a number of sources, some of them anonymous. Recipients were not required to study at Stanford.

those who had either European training or prewar experience in Japan; at the very least, they had a genuine interest in Japanese problems, and a desire to visit the country for more than the standard touristic reasons.

Discontinuation of the summer seminars after 1955, however, was due to the feeling on both sides that diminishing returns had set in on the kind of material such seminars could present "in breadth" (e.g., in lecture or survey form). Some of the seminars had come to feature small groups of Japanese "repeaters," and from the viewpoint of these repeaters the frequent changes in American participants involved a good deal of discontinuity.⁷ Other complaints of overwork and overstrain came from the Tokyo University committee that selected Japanese seminar members and carried on other administrative tasks in connection with the summer programs. In many cases, a man's entire summer vacation was taken up by such uncongenial work.

After a year's lapse, a second phase of the Stanford-Tokyo program began in 1957. Single American professors of distinction were to spend six months at Tokyo University, each teaching a graduate seminar and guiding a few individual younger Japanese scholars in research in his field. This teaching and research was to stress "depth" (detailed study of particular problems) rather than the "breadth" of the discontinued summer programs. Whereas in the first or seminar phase Kyoto University was following a Tokyo University pattern, this second phase was originated at Kyoto, and Tokyo was now modifying the Kyoto model. This phase, scheduled to expire in 1960, will not be renewed. It was a disappointment to the Japanese that so few outstanding American scholars were willing to come to Tokyo for six-month periods. There are a number of explanations given why this was more true for Tokyo than Kyoto. The fact seems to be that by the time Tokyo decided on its candidate he was found to be signed up for years in advance, and Tokyo would not invite people it considered second rate. Stanford committee

7. There were of course some "repeaters" among the American seminar leaders, particularly Professor John Goheen (Stanford, Philosophy) who conducted five of them.

members complained that the Japanese preferred older men, of whom many had passed their prime and were often too old to travel. (The Tokyo committee did not consider the criticism justified.) The visiting chair was vacant for one semester of both 1957-1958 and 1958-1959. The visitor in 1957-1958 was Professor Walter Gellhorn (Columbia, Public Law), and the one in 1958-1959 was Professor Carl Christ (Chicago, Economics). It is interesting to note that neither is from Stanford. Indeed, one of the features praised by the Japanese has been Stanford's cooperation in helping them find the best men available, whether at Stanford or elsewhere.

The program's third phase is to be handled completely by Tokyo University. Stanford connections will be maintained only informally, and financing will come entirely from Japanese government sources. It is Tokyo's position that after ten years its strength in American Studies has been built up to a point comparable to the strength of Harvard in Soviet Studies. It needs a formal American affiliation, the argument runs, no more than Harvard needs a Soviet one. The Rockefeller Foundation also approves of this change. The purpose of its grants is to get a worthwhile project started and in operation to the point where it can stand on its own feet, not to support particular projects indefinitely.

On the other hand, there is widespread disagreement at Tokyo University regarding the form this third phase is to take.⁸ We can do no more here than mention a few of the issues which were under faculty committee consideration as of December, 1958.

1. Will the program continue to concentrate on American Studies, or broaden out to comprise an Institute of International Relations? We have seen that President Nambara of Tokyo was in favor of the former plan; his successor, President Tadao

8. It was also uncertain as of December, 1958 how much support for the third phase would be included in the Education Ministry's budget.

Yanaihara, was more consciously neutralist in politics and favored the latter. Neutralist and anti-American elements on the Tokyo campus and in Japanese intellectual circles generally favor the second approach, with stress divided approximately equally between the United States and continental Asia.

2. Where will the program be located physically? There are two rival campuses at Tokyo University. General Studies and the first two years of the undergraduate program are located mainly at the former First Higher School campus at Komaba. The old-line graduate departments are located mainly at the original Hongo campus downtown. The present program has its offices at Hongo, its library at Komaba. Relations between the two campuses are sometimes strained, although many professors teach at both. To Komaba enthusiasts, Hongo tends to overemphasize dry - as - dust pedantry and fuddy - duddyism, while to Hongo enthusiasts, Komaba is too hospitable to journalists and dilettantes. Both sides see the physical location as important in determining the character of the whole program.

3. How will the program be divided between teaching and research? Assuming the main if not the exclusive concentration to be on research, will this be limited to individual projects or will inter-disciplinary cooperative projects be stressed?

4. Will the new program have its own koza (chairs)?⁹ If so, are holders to occupy them permanently, or to alternate them with regular posts in regular departments?

5. What will be the role of the American scholar in the new program? Unless more financial support is forthcoming than has been anticipated, few American visitors can be called to Tokyo. A given travel budget "goes further" if spent for Japanese

9. A Japanese koza, modelled after German prototypes, includes not only a full professor at the top, but the assistant professor and instructor who are to succeed him in turn, and usually at least two assistants at the bottom.

visitors to America, and the main emphasis will be on studies by Japanese scholars in Japan.

6. What will be the role of Stanford University in the new program? Stanford will, it is hoped, continue to provide opportunities for Japanese Americanists to study and occasionally teach in America. Individual Stanford staff members, with whom contacts have been built up over the years, will continue to be asked for advice both on the placement of Japanese in America and the selection of the few Americans who may be called to Tokyo. The formal affiliation, however, will probably be dissolved.

The effects of the Tokyo affiliation on the Stanford campus are several. In fact, they appear to be more substantial than is the case of most of the other Japanese and Korean programs of American universities.

The Rockefeller Foundation supports Stanford's chair in Japanese Civilization, which was vacant in 1958 following the retirement of Professor Ichihashi. The Foundation has also supported a series of visiting professorships for Japanese scholars in various subjects in its stead. Three of these visitors have been from Tokyo University; their invitations have resulted indirectly from contacts made during the programs on the Tokyo campus. The three were selected in part for their ability not only to lecture but to carry on discussions in English. They describe their classes as small but interested, making up in willingness to study whatever they lack (as compared to Tokyo students) in preparation and, possibly, in native ability.

The Foundation is also supporting a series of five visiting lectureships for Japanese scholars, associated with research projects under way at Stanford. The first of these scholars visited Stanford in 1957-1958. He was interested in problems of translation of Japanese literature, and also in the formulation of critical standards common to Eastern and Western literatures. His oral English was not fluent, and his influence was limited to specialists in translation and criticism, some of whom came from other California campuses to consult with him for extended periods.

There are several projects at Stanford which have sought visiting lecturers from Japan on the same basis. Some of the departments involved are Art, Law, Philosophy, and Political Science.

In 1958 another Stanford-Tokyo affiliation was arranged, this one under the auspices of the Ford Foundation. It is for joint study by Americans and Japanese of the effects of the Occupation reforms on the Japanese educational system. It is centered in the Departments of Education of the two universities, and developed too late for consideration here. There is, however, no direct connection between this Ford program in Education and the American Studies affiliation. It is largely coincidental that the same pair of institutions is involved.

MICHIGAN-KYOTO-DOSHISHA PROGRAM IN AMERICAN STUDIES

This second Rockefeller Foundation American Studies program arose directly from the first. After the second Tokyo summer seminar of 1951, the predominantly Stanford University group of visitors moved to Kyoto for an abbreviated version of the seminar on the Kyoto University campus in the latter half of August.¹⁰ Doshisha and Kyoto Universities cooperated in the recruiting of Japanese participants. The Japanese regarded this experiment with such favor that they set about establishing a longer summer program for Kyoto as the cultural center of the Kansai region of Japan. This move reflected in some degree a long-standing rivalry between the Kansai and Kanto areas;¹¹ anything one gets, the other wants. It also resulted from the belief that Kansai, more conservative and traditional, had a greater need for American Studies than did Kanto, which had more foreign contacts.

One of the visitors of August, 1951, was Professor Royden Dangerfield (Illinois, International Relations). Dangerfield was

10. The 1950 group had gone to Sapporo, Hokkaido, for its short session.

11. The center of the Kansai area is the tri-city region of Kobe, Kyoto, and Osaka. The center of the Kanto area is the Keihin, formed by the two cities of Tokyo and Yokohama.

eager to cooperate with plans to set up summer seminars in Kyoto. He saw in them an opportunity to build up Oriental Studies and International Relations work at the University of Illinois, which had not previously had extensive Asian connections. He also had the support of the Illinois administration. The Rockefeller Foundation agreed with some misgivings to finance this program in much the same fashion as the Tokyo one. This was contrary to usual Foundation policy against simultaneous support of similar programs, and Foundation pressure was exerted in the direction of differentiating them. The Foundation also had misgivings about the ability of Kyoto and Doshisha Universities to work together, but did not want to discriminate against either institution.

Summer seminars were held at Kyoto under an Illinois-Kyoto-Doshisha arrangement in 1952 and again in 1954. The fields they covered included a wider range than the Tokyo five -- Anthropology, Education, Psychology, and Sociology were added in one or more years. According to professors in Kyoto, efforts were made from the outset to make the Kyoto seminars more advanced and technical than the Tokyo ones, but Tokyo professors do not believe any actual difference resulted.

Important changes took place in 1954-1955. It was first decided to supplement the summer seminars by arrangements whereby American visiting professors stayed in Kyoto for six months during the academic year, taught courses, and acted as temporary resident directors of the program. There were thus two American directors in each year, chosen from different academic disciplines. The program was so arranged that the two directors overlapped for the month of July and neither was in residence in January. This arrangement gave the program more administrative continuity on balance, though most of this continuity was provided by a small permanent Japanese staff. It had the offsetting disadvantage of making it considerably more difficult to provide housing for the American directors. The presence of American directors for long periods provided a shift from breadth (lectures and surveys) to depth (graduate seminars), and served to distinguish the Kyoto from the Tokyo program. (Tokyo, as we have seen, later adopted the arrangement.) The shift

had the support of all participants, although the initiative in making it seems to have come from the Foundation. The summer seminars were continued, one of the main administrative duties of the February-August director each year being the selection of American professors for the seminars, mainly from among Fulbright professors already in Japan.

Shortly afterwards the University of Michigan replaced Illinois as the American participant, although Michigan had had no previous connection with the program. A major academic upheaval at Illinois brought in a new administration less interested in Dangerfield's program for expansion of Far Eastern Studies. Michigan, on the other hand, had a record of Far Eastern interest dating back to President James B. Angell's service as United States Ambassador to China in the 1880's, concentrated in a Center for Japanese Studies, founded in 1947, which had carried on extensive field research in Okayama Prefecture during the Occupation. (See the last section of this chapter.) Another factor prompting the interest of Michigan in this project (and vice versa) was the personality of the Director of the Center for Japanese Studies. This was Professor John W. Hall (History). Hall had spent his boyhood in Kyoto as the son of an American faculty member at Doshisha University. After he finished college in America, he had later returned to Doshisha as a teacher of English under the Amherst-Doshisha exchange program.

The triangular Michigan-Kyoto-Doshisha affiliation expired in 1959, except for book purchases and grants for American study by Japanese professors. It was replaced by separate programs run by the two Japanese universities without direct Michigan connections. As with Tokyo, the Rockefeller Foundation does not propose to continue its support indefinitely. Unlike Tokyo, there was in each of the Japanese universities (in Doshisha more than Kyoto) some sentiment for maintaining the Michigan affiliation if the other Japanese partner could be eliminated without loss of face.

The program in Kyoto did not encounter Tokyo's primary difficulty in finding American directors. It was, for one thing, first in the field. Kyoto represents "old Japan," and many Americans are more interested in spending six months there than in the

Westernized bustle of Tokyo. Also, according to Tokyo, Kyoto's standards of necessary "eminence" for American directors are lower than their own.¹² There have, however, arisen a number of other difficulties which the Tokyo program has avoided; most of these arise from the triangular nature of the Kyoto program:

1. As has been hinted above, relations between Kyoto and Doshisha as institutions are not of the best, although faculty members know each other well and meet socially. Kyoto is a national university, second only to Tokyo in eminence. Doshisha is a Christian university with somewhat less rigorous admission standards.¹³ Kyoto looks down on Doshisha as academically inferior -- as a kind of combination "country club" and Sunday school, while Doshisha fights for equality of treatment and status, taking pride in its liberal history, its stress on character

12. On the other hand, the Kyoto program lays down one restriction not found in Tokyo. Kyoto will not invite Americans with prior interests in Japan, its purpose being to spread this interest widely among American scholars generally. Tokyo has no such concern.

13. Pearl Buck compares public and Christian institutions in Nanking during the 1920's in My Several Worlds (New York: Pocket Books, 1954), p. 201. We reproduce her comparison, although it is too extreme for Kyoto in the 1950's and both Japanese universities are coeducational:

I taught classes not only in the Christian university but also in the provincial one, and had therefore two entirely different groups of students. The young men in the Christian university were the sons of Christians and had scholarships, or they were the sons of the rich who could afford to pay substantial tuition fees. All of them understood English at least fairly well and . . . were somewhat cosmopolitan and certainly conservative in their family background. The students in the National University, on the other hand, were nearly all poor and they knew little English and they paid no tuition. Most of them had not much to eat . . . In winter they were bitterly cold, and so was I, for we had no heat in the buildings and when window panes were broken they were not replaced, whereas in the Christian university everything was in good order and we had central heat and much comfort. Yet I enjoyed my work in the provincial university far more, because there my students were desperate for learning . . . Their English was almost unintelligible and had I not spoken Chinese I could not have taught them . . . They were young men and women, thinking and questioning and alive, and I learned far more from them than from the suave and acquiescent men students in the Christian university.

development, and its superiority in the English language. The Kyoto view of Doshisha's inferiority is accepted in Japanese academic circles, but Michigan took pains to treat the two schools as equals. Relations were such that during the academic year separate classes were held by the American director in the same subject at the two neighboring campuses.¹⁴ Sentiment for disassociation from Michigan was, as might be expected, stronger at Kyoto than at Doshisha.

2. In some academic areas the two schools disagree as to what "American Studies" should be. In Philosophy, interest at Kyoto tends to be concentrated in logic and particularly logical positivism, while Doshisha stresses ethics and pragmatism. In modern economics, to use another example, Kyoto is interested in econometrics and Doshisha in institutional economics.

3. Partially because of disagreements between Kyoto and Doshisha Universities, Michigan played a more dominant role in Kyoto than has Stanford in Tokyo. Michigan had final positive authority in the selection of American directors to come to Kyoto, although the Japanese prepared the initial list of nominees and rejected individual Michigan suggestions. There was some feeling in Japan of "too much Michigan" in the program; Michigan on the other hand criticized the Japanese lists as overweighted with men past their prime and uninterested in Japan. There was a somewhat different conflict over the selection of Japanese to come to the Center for Japanese Studies with Rockefeller Foundation support. Here again Michigan had the final authority. Kyoto University professors feel that Michigan tried to keep institutional representation even between Kyoto and Doshisha with the result that outstanding Kyoto people were passed over in favor of inferior ones from Doshisha.

4. The decision to continue summer seminars with a heavy weighting of Fulbright visiting professors was criticized by the Japanese. Japanese scholars do not necessarily regard Fulbright visitors as competent teachers above the undergraduate level.

14. Kyoto University rules prohibit admission to the campus and use of facilities by students at other institutions. This was a postwar rule, adopted primarily to reduce the danger of student riots.

Some have been eminently satisfactory. Some have been "either too young or too old." Others, coming from elementary teaching in smaller schools in America, have not kept up with their own fields. Still others, regarding their sojourn in Japan as a vacation, have not prepared useful advanced seminar material.

5. Both Kyoto and Doshisha staff members appreciated the opportunity to study at the Center for Japanese Studies with American professors under the program, but there were certain complaints. There was not always complete liaison between the Center and the academic departments at Michigan. Visiting Japanese were not always included in departmental teaching programs, seminars, consultations, etc., and felt slighted. As in the Waseda program also, full professors from Kyoto or Doshisha felt that they were treated at Michigan as graduate students or research assistants rather than as visiting colleagues and equals. When, as sometimes happened, a Japanese visitor at Ann Arbor was accompanied by his wife, he would have liked better housing than the graduate-student efficiency apartment he was assigned in Ann Arbor, especially in view of the relative luxury of the accommodations of American directors in Kyoto.

6. The Kyoto program, like its Tokyo counterpart, avoided government propaganda, and was therefore ignored rather than attacked by anti-American students and other intellectuals.¹⁵ It was, however, not quite so free of international controversy and friction. One storm center (who made a great impact and is well remembered) was Professor Fritz Machlup (Princeton, Economics), who was Director in February-August, 1955. Machlup is strongly and aggressively anti-Marxist, while the Economics department at Kyoto is at least half Marxist. Machlup expressed the view that Japanese wage rates in the export industries, though low by Western standards, were too high to permit Japan to balance her international accounts without foreign aid; this

15. During the summer seminar of 1952, Leftist students congregated at the entrance to the lecture room and handed out anti-American leaflets to Americans and Japanese entering and leaving sessions. They took particular delight in handing them to the visiting lecturers, who had no idea of their contents. The students were, however, quiet, peaceful, and orderly.

position was anathema to Japanese liberal intellectuals. Machlup also made no secret of his belief that Doshisha training in theoretical economics was inadequate.¹⁶ Kyoto and Doshisha Universities, moreover, gave no academic credit to students attending lectures given by the visiting Americans. One reason for this was that the visitors' six-month periods of residence did not coincide with Japanese school terms, and another was that their topics sometimes duplicated those of the Japanese staff. Some of the visitors, including Machlup, have eyed this lack of credit askance as a sign of some hostility to the program.

The American Studies programs to be set up by Kyoto and Doshisha Universities will be different from each other, as well as from the program under discussion here, and from anything done in Tokyo. Kyoto University plans to set up five chairs for Americanists within the existing faculties of Law and Economics, Education, and Literature.¹⁷ There will be only a tenuous and informal committee organization between their holders, and no cooperation in research. There is indeed no guarantee that the holders of these chairs will teach specifically American aspects of their disciplines, since Japanese professors, once appointed, lecture on anything they choose.¹⁸ The chair professors will not be veterans of the seminars under the Michigan program, for the men who attended the seminars are too young for consideration. They will, rather, be older professors, some of whom will require study in America (under Foundation grants) before they assume their new duties.

16. Doshisha's senior theoretical economist, Professor Tetsuhito Nakajima, had been on leave of absence because of illness during the academic year preceding Machlup's visit, and Doshisha had not obtained a suitable replacement.

17. The two chairs in the Law-Economics Faculty will be in Law and Economics respectively. Only the Economics chair will be new; the Law chair presently exists but is unoccupied. The two chairs in the Literature Faculty will be in English Literature and in Cultural Anthropology.

18. This is a common European practice. One of the few American equivalents is the "University Professorships" at Harvard.

Doshisha will concentrate at first on building up its library of American materials, since the entire library of the tripartite program will go to Kyoto University. Subsequently it plans to select two or three departments within which to build up a strongly inter-disciplinary and cooperatively-organized program of teaching and research in American Studies, and from which to send a number of faculty members to America for study.

Both schools will continue to consult with Michigan on planning for Japanese scholars in America and occasional Americans invited to Japan, making use of contacts built up during the tripartite program. The influence of the Michigan Center for Japanese Studies may also be found in Doshisha's American Studies Center once it is organized. In neither institution, however, will Michigan continue to have any authority, and in neither will visits by American scholars to Kyoto continue to be stressed. Whereas Kyoto intends to emphasize study by Japanese in America, the emphasis of Doshisha in the first instance will be on the building up and maintenance of library facilities.

It is too early to anticipate concrete results in Japan or in America from the Michigan-Kyoto-Doshisha relationship. The Rockefeller Foundation itself feels that the impact at Kyoto University has been greater than at Doshisha or at Tokyo, both of which had been more internationally-minded before World War II. In Japan the principal accomplishment has been to familiarize a number of younger Japanese teachers at Kansai area universities with American methods, materials, and historical information in several disciplines. A secondary accomplishment has been to find a few particularly promising people for advanced training in America, some of whom may become American specialists themselves. There have also been a few changes in curricula and research methods. The whole field of Cultural Anthropology is an example of a new subject introduced into Japan. Another is interest in the statistical testing of economic theory. Teaching methods have thus far been affected less. We have noted occasionally the lack of interest of most

older Japanese professors in the Michigan program.¹⁹ In view of the importance of seniority in Japanese universities, effects must therefore wait until the younger generation of the 1950's attains positions of some authority. One forecast is that quantitative methods will in fact "catch on" in Japan, due to programs like this one, more rapidly than they otherwise would in areas such as econometrics and survey research. On the other hand, the large-scale cooperative inter-disciplinary research project probably will not prove transplantable to Japan, especially when the cooperation must be international.

Michigan is a larger institution than Stanford, and the Center for Japanese Studies at Michigan is to a certain extent isolated within the University. For these reasons the American Studies program at Kyoto has not had the campus-wide impact at Michigan that the Tokyo program has had at Stanford. Its influence is limited to the small group of Japanophiles and Japanologists clustered about the Center. Like the Stanford program, however, it has interested a number of individual American professors in Japanese and Far Eastern problems who did not previously have such interests. Some of these are Michigan men without previous connection with the Center for Japanese Studies, while others are from other institutions. It remains to be seen how deep or how long-lasting these interests will prove to be.

COOPERATIVE PROGRAM IN LEGAL STUDIES

During the seven-year Occupation of Japan (1945 to 1952) drastic revisions were made in Japanese law at the urging of SCAP. A number of Anglo-American concepts were introduced as safeguards, primarily against the authoritarianism of prewar Japan, and secondarily against revolutionary violence from the Left. Among the branches most affected were criminal procedure,

19. There are certain obvious exceptions to this generalization. In Economics two active senior participants have been Professors Shichiro Matsui (Doshisha) and Kiso Tasugi (Kyoto), both of whom have visited Ann Arbor under the program. The minority would have been larger, both in Economics and in other fields, were it not for the language problem.

administrative law, labor law, trade regulation, and tax law. The changes tended generally to enhance the legal position of the defendant vis-a-vis the prosecution in criminal cases, to draw clear distinctions between the judicial and prosecuting functions, to base results of litigation on legal provisions rather than on bargaining and negotiation, to safeguard the rights of labor to organization and collective bargaining, and to regulate capitalism in the interest of competition. There was no attempt to substitute the Anglo-American case system for the code system of jurisprudence which the Japanese had adapted from French and German sources during the early Meiji period.²⁰

While they accepted passively most of these Occupation suggestions, the Japanese had no clear idea of what they implied in detail, or how they worked in America. There was some fear, for example, that American criminal procedure might open Japan to Capone-style gangster domination. SCAP lawyers were for the most part equally unfamiliar with the Japanese law they were proposing to supersede. It is true that the Law Faculty of Tokyo University (principal training ground of the Higher Civil Service) had in its first years (1872-1876) based its curriculum on the common law, and that separate curricula in common law, French law, and German law had competed for influence on practically equal terms until 1887.²¹ It is also true that the Law Faculty of Chuo University (principal training ground of Japanese practicing attorneys) had itself developed from an

20. On Occupation legal reforms and their aftermath, see two articles by A. C. Oppler, "The Reform of Japan's Legal and Judicial System under the Occupation," Washington Law Review (1949) and "Japan's Courts and Law in Transition," Contemporary Japan (1952). An introductory summary may be found in Harold S. Quigley and John E. Turner, The New Japan: Government and Politics (Minneapolis: University Press, 1956), Chapter 13.

21. Chitoshi Yanaga, Japan Since Perry (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949), p. 78. In 1876, however, the Japanese Department of Justice established its own law school for in-service training, which specialized in French law (Napoleonic Code). For a brief account of the subsequent rivalry between common, French, and German law, see Arthur von Mehren, "Some Reflections on Japanese Law," Harvard Law Review (1958), pp. 1487 f.

Institute of English Law. Nevertheless, these traditions had long since receded into the antiquarian background, and the ordinary Japanese lawyer, law teacher, procurator, or judge knew next to nothing about Anglo-American law or its practical working.

In an attempt to bridge the gap and remedy the confusion, SCAP sent numbers of leading Japanese lawyers and judges, who included Chief Justice Kotaro Tanaka of the Japanese Supreme Court, on inspection tours of American courts and law schools during 1950-1951. One of the institutions visited by the Japanese was naturally Harvard Law School in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Here the predicament of the Japanese visitors particularly impressed Associate Dean David F. Cavers of the Harvard faculty, who became the father of the program that was under consideration.

Cavers conceived the idea that American legal scholarship in general, and the Harvard Law School in particular, could and should do something about the Japanese situation. A few selected present and future teachers, lawyers, and judges from Japan should receive the advantages of American training. At the same time, a few American legal scholars with comparative law interests should specialize in Japanese law, and a few American law graduates might do likewise, with a view to practicing on both sides of the Pacific. At the outset Cavers had some missionary or propagandistic purpose also in mind: the Japanese should be shown how the American system worked, with the aim of persuading them to retain the Occupation-introduced American elements in their own legal system. As time passed missionary zeal gave way to the simple desire for greater mutual understanding in the legal field.

Cavers presented his proposal to the Ford Foundation, which arranged for him to visit Japan in 1953 in the company of Richard W. Rabinowitz, later to become executive secretary of the cooperative program. Rabinowitz, a Yale Law School graduate with wartime and postwar training in the Japanese language and culture, was then a Ford Foundation Fellow in Japan. He was working on a doctoral dissertation for Harvard on the social status of the Japanese lawyer, and had been admitted to the

Tokyo Bar as a gaikokujin-bengoshi.²² The result of this trip was a second proposal, presented to the Ford Foundation in December, 1953, which forms the basis of the present cooperative program. Japanese lawyers, judges, and legal scholars were consulted, but the actual proposal came exclusively from the American side. Several Japanese critics believe the project might have been improved by greater Japanese participation at the planning stage.

The program is a cooperative one on both the American and the Japanese sides. The American participants, in addition to Harvard, are the Law Schools of Michigan and Stanford Universities. They were chosen not only as first-class law schools in the Midwest and Pacific Coast, but because they are located on campuses where Japanese studies are stressed. As the program has developed, the roles of Michigan and Stanford have been secondary to that of Harvard. This is because no Michigan or Stanford law school administrator has taken the same continuing interest as Dean Cavers of Harvard; the situation does not reflect any desire for monopoly on Harvard's part. On the Japanese side, six leading university law schools were chosen to participate. Considerations of both eminence and "politics" entered into the choice. Among the "political" factors were weighting between public and private institutions and between Tokyo and the provinces. The select group includes Tokyo University (public, Tokyo), Chuo, Keio, and Waseda Universities (private, Tokyo), Kyoto and Tohoku Universities (public, provincial). These six schools were glad to participate, while others were offended at being omitted. Resentment is felt by several "outside" public universities such as Hokkaido, Kobe, and particularly Kyushu. It is also felt by the "outside" private universities who think that at least one of their number should have been included. (Doshisha would have been a strong candidate.)

The seventh Japanese participant is the Shiho-Kenshujo, or Judicial Research and Training Institute attached to the Supreme

22. Gaikokujin - bengoshi or "foreign lawyers" are not full members of the Bar. They may practice only in cases involving foreigners, foreign law, or both.

Court Secretariat in Tokyo. This Institute has no American equivalent, and its nature requires explanation. It was founded in 1947, and has been since its founding the only professional law school in Japan.²³ The aspiring attorney, procurator, or judge (but not law teacher) must take two years of combined academic study and internship at the Institute after graduation from a university.²⁴ Students at the Institute receive stipends from the government.

The Law faculties of the universities teach Political Science, International Relations, and Public Administration as well as Law. The Law graduate of a Japanese university may never study a law course and have no intention of practicing law in any form. If he does take law courses (which stress legal theory) with some professional intention, his university training is equivalent only to an American pre-legal program. No matter how many courses he takes, the aspiring practitioner has no assurance of admission to the Institute. Admission is by competitive examination, with less than 15 per cent of all applicants accepted. Another examination is required for graduation from the Institute and professional certification two years later, but the mortality rate here is low.

23. Until the early 1920's all Imperial University Law graduates were automatically eligible to practice law or to take examinations for appointment as judges and procurators, even without law courses. Other candidates were examined in legal theory and jurisprudence, but no practical experience was required. Subsequently examinations were required of all prospective lawyers, while prospective judges and procurators were also required to pass examinations separate from those for the Higher Civil Service. Certification of moral character and 18 months of practical experience were also required. The experience requirement could be satisfied by "putting in time" meaninglessly in a law office.

The establishment of the Institute in 1947 had Occupation approval but was at the initiative of the Japanese. Its purpose was to raise the standards and repute of the legal profession. Restriction of numbers to raise lawyers' incomes was not its purpose. The Institute would admit more students if the government provided more funds for their support.

24. Law teachers receive special treatment. Graduation from the Institute is not a condition for eligibility for academic appointment. Five years of teaching is regarded as equivalent to graduation from the Institute as far as certification for private law practice is concerned. Ten years of teaching is an alternative to graduation from the Institute as regards eligibility for appointment as judge or procurator.

Because of the number of institutions involved both in America and in Japan, unusual financial arrangements have been worked out under this program. The recipient of the Ford grant is the Institute of International Education in New York. The Institute of International Education acts as a distributing agent to the participating institutions, which in turn distribute funds to the individual participants. The Fulbright Committee in Japan has also aided the program, particularly with travel grants for Japanese participants.

The program was divided into three phases. The first phase covered the period 1954-1956, and is regarded as successful. The others will continue through 1961, and their success is less certain.

In the first phase, eight promising Japanese jurists were sent to the United States for advanced study of American law and procedure relevant to their specialties. They were young men in their thirties with some knowledge of English. Selection was made by a committee in Japan which included Japanese professors, judges, and lawyers -- and also American lawyers resident in Japan. The choices were reviewed by an American committee of three Law School deans representing Harvard, Stanford, and Michigan. Six of the eight successful candidates were university teachers, two each in comparative and criminal law, one each in administrative and labor law. The others were judges, one from the bench and one from the Judicial Research and Training Institute. Both of these joined the Institute faculty on returning to Japan. A ninth Japanese, a procurator already in America, also joined this group of eight. Their first year (1954-1955) was spent at Harvard. In the second year the men were divided among the three American participating institutions, and were permitted to send home to Japan for their wives.

The program got off to a flying start at Harvard in 1954-1955. Not only were the participants well selected, but they were together at Harvard with a special advisor, and their morale is described as having been unusually high. This special advisor was Rabinowitz, executive secretary of the program, whom most of the participants had met in Japan. He was sent to Harvard for

one year to act as advisor and to defend his Harvard doctoral thesis on the status of the lawyer in Japanese society.²⁵ In the second year, when the Japanese were scattered and Rabinowitz had returned to Japan, there were complaints that participants were treated as students rather than equals, and that there were too few opportunities for them to present comparative (i.e., Japanese) materials on legal points which came up for discussion in classes and seminars.

In the second phase of the program, six American Law professors with comparative law interests were to be sent to Japan to familiarize themselves generally with the Japanese legal system, and with some specific aspects in detail. The number was later reduced to five when suitable candidates did not present themselves. The first two selectees under this phase spent the academic year 1956-1957 in Japan -- Professor Arthur Von Mehren (Harvard) at Tokyo University and Professor B. James George (Michigan) at Kyoto University. Von Mehren led a seminar in "The Judicial Process" at Tokyo University which was also attended by jurists from other Tokyo area institutions. He organized another seminar in "Reactions of Legal Systems to Social and Economic Change," in which he played the role of a student learning how Japanese law had responded to Meiji Era industrialization. He also lectured to students at Tokyo, Chuo, Kyoto, and Tohoku Universities. The year after his return (1958) he published a short introduction to the Japanese legal system in the Harvard Law Review.²⁶ George's interest in both comparative law and Japanese Studies has been aroused by his year in Kyoto. He plans study at the Center for Japanese Studies in Ann Arbor, and return to Japan for another extended period of legal research and teaching.

25. Part of Rabinowitz's dissertation has been published. "The Historical Development of the Japanese Bar," Harvard Law Review (1956).

26. Von Mehren, "Some Reflections on Japanese Law," *op. cit.*, pp. 1486-1496. See also Von Mehren, "An Academic Year in Japan," Harvard Law School Bulletin (December, 1957), pp. 8-11.

This phase is expected to provide several leading American law schools (including of course the three participants) with a few faculty members who know Japanese law and institutions and who have personal contacts with Japanese lawyers and jurists. It is, however, difficult to find American law professors willing to go, since interest in Japanese law is not widespread in America. The sending of Japanese-speaking American lawyers as well as law teachers has therefore been considered but rejected. The reason for the rejection is the belief that the law teachers will be more influential in the long run. Another difficulty is that most Japanese-speaking American lawyers are Nisei (Americans of Japanese extraction). Nisei are looked down upon by some Japanese because their ancestors were poor farmers in backward regions and because their Japanese, while fluent, sometimes smacks of the rice paddy.

The third phase of the program consists of two- and three-year fellowships for younger men trained in law. Americans are to go to Japan for further study, and Japanese are to go to America. Through mid-1958 at least, results under this phase of the program have disappointed its sponsors.

Four Americans were originally to be selected for three years each in Japan after graduation from law school. Only three have gone, one from each of the participating law schools. (The "Michigan" man actually comes from Minnesota, but took extra work at Michigan.) The three years' stay in Japan, which includes intensive language study, has appealed to few American law school graduates, since it delays their professional careers and may be only a blind alley. Study in Japan was expected to lead to law practice there as gaikokujin-bengoshi, to practice in America on problems involving Japan, to service with American government agencies in Japan, or to teaching. It has lost much of its appeal for two reasons. The volume of American legal work on Japanese problems has not developed sufficiently to justify even large law firms in employing specialists on such cases. More important, the privilege of admission to practice as gaikokujin - bengoshi has been withdrawn from

Americans by the Japanese government.²⁷ One of the three Americans in Japan under this phase, Mr. Timothy S. Williams (Harvard), has as an extra-curricular activity prepared a trenchant criticism of the various academic exchange programs operating in the Kyoto area where he was studying.²⁸

The Japanese part of this third phase will send eight men to earn Japanese L.L.M. degrees with three years of study in the United States. Six came in 1957, and two in 1958. They are to spend two years at one of the three American law schools, then one year at a second one. The group includes one judge, one procurator, one assistant professor, and five teaching assistants. It is not expected that the majority will take American degrees. They are for the most part potential teachers. Their ages have not been much below the ages of the 1954-1956 group, a fact which has given rise to the fear that they may have been selected for political considerations to satisfy universities other than Tokyo which would otherwise have been under-represented. Their English is less good, and their approach to law more exclusively that of library research. They are also scattered among three American universities, without the unifying activities of Rabinowitz. In any event, morale is reported as somewhat lower in this group than in the first one.

With increasing knowledge of the nature and importance of Anglo-American law in Japan, the subject has become a recognized specialty in Japanese law schools, and specialists in many fields of legal study have at least a cursory acquaintance with it. As a result, visits of American legal scholars to Japan on Fulbright and other programs have taken on significance. Examples are the tenure of Walter Gellhorn (Columbia) at Tokyo University under the Rockefeller Foundation program and of

27. The Japanese government cut off this privilege from Americans because the United States government is unable to guarantee reciprocity to Japanese. Licenses to practice law are issued by the States, and all States presently limit the practice of law to Americans.

28. Williams's study of "Academic Exchange Programs between Japan and the United States" was submitted to the Ford Foundation and has not been published.

Charles Maggs (Duke) at Kyoto and Doshisha Universities under the same auspices. The popularity of undergraduate courses in Anglo-American Law has also increased, whether they are taught by Japanese or by Americans.²⁹

The limited facilities of the Cooperative Law Program are also available to assist the legal studies of other Americans in Japan. An example is Mr. George Sieker, Assistant Attorney General of the State of Wisconsin, who spent the year 1956-1957 in Tokyo on a combined Ford Foundation-Institute of International Education-University of Wisconsin grant studying the aftermath of Occupation anti-monopoly legislation as a kind of associate participant in the cooperative program without teaching duties.³⁰

As a result of the American experience of two of its teachers, there appears to be a greater use of case materials and decisions at the Judicial Research and Training Institute than had previously been true at any Japanese law school. The Institute and Harvard Law School have also worked out an arrangement whereby the Institute selects two or three candidates from each graduating class for a year at Harvard, of whom Harvard invites one. The funds for this venture are supplied by the Asia Foundation, as are also funds to permit these men to study oral English in Japan before they leave. Here the hope is to work with men who will be practicing lawyers, along with judges and law teachers, without jeopardizing their careers.

29. The principal American teacher of Anglo-American Law (and also American Constitutional Law) in Japan is Mr. Ben Bruce Blakeney. Blakeney is a Harvard Law School graduate who remained in Japan after duty as defense counsel in the War Crimes Trials. He teaches these subjects at both Tokyo and Chuo Universities in addition to practicing as a gaikokujin-bengoshi. (He has also taught at Keio.) Blakeney sees no conflict between his activities and the Cooperative Law Program since the levels are different, and has participated in Japanese committees to select men for study in America under the program.

30. Sieker had been an attorney with the Anti-Trust and Cartels Division of the Economic and Scientific Section of SCAP in 1945-1948. In 1946 he served with the special mission headed by Professor Corwin Edwards (Chicago, Business Administration) on whose advice much of the Occupation anti-trust legislation was based.

There is no evidence that the program has had any effect one way or the other upon the proportion of the Occupation changes in Japanese law which the Japanese will eventually decide to retain. Nor does the program appear to be changing the status of the attorney in Japanese society. The raising of standards symbolized by the establishment of the Judicial Research and Training Institute is gradually operating to raise this status. A real increase, whether or not it is desirable, will require a major change in the Japanese way of doing business. In America attorneys are customarily consulted in the framing of most major business decisions, particularly contracts and agreements, since these latter are ordinarily enforced literally. The attorney is as a result a person of consequence. In Japan, on the other hand, attorneys are customarily consulted only after trouble has arisen under a contract or agreement, and after the parties have found it impossible to negotiate an agreement without recourse to the law. The attorney is a kind of intellectual repairman not consulted about major decisions, and his status is consequently low.

THE MICHIGAN PROGRAM IN OKAYAMA

The Center for Japanese Studies was organized at the University of Michigan under a Carnegie Foundation grant in 1947. One of its major undertakings was to be the establishment of a field station in a relatively un-Westernized and undamaged, but nevertheless accessible, region of Japan. At this field station studies were to stress the cultural anthropology, cultural geography, and social psychology of the area and the people, but such other disciplines as Economics and History were by no means to be excluded. The first director and guiding spirit of the Center, Professor Robert B. Hall, is himself a cultural geographer.

In the chaotic conditions of postwar Japan, it was decided to center activities in a place sufficiently out of the Occupation's way to avoid competition for housing and remove Occupation objections to granting entry permits for the visiting scholars. The village or buraku of Niike on the outskirts of the city of Okayama (near the seacoast and on the main railway line between Kobe and Hiroshima) was selected as a site. Here the Japanese

branch of the Center for Japanese Studies was established, and here the Center's field activities were carried on. The Niike branch was closed after its original group of projects was largely finished and while funds still remained from its Foundation grant. With the closing of the Niike branch much of the interest of the Center shifted to the triangular exchange relation with Kyoto and Doshisha Universities discussed previously in this chapter.

There is disagreement both in America and Japan as to the accomplishments of the Center at Okayama, and as to the value of the experiment which it represents. Professor Hall has no doubts of its success.³¹ In the first place, establishment of the field station at Okayama represented the first small breach in SCAP's opposition to independent research in Japan under the Occupation.³² After its establishment in 1950 this field station was for a time the only place in Japan where a foreign scholar was permitted to live without affiliating himself with some SCAP agency. Subsequently the Japanese food situation improved and more convenient locations opened up (particularly Kyoto and Tokyo) leaving Okayama rather in the position of an intellectual backwater. In the second place, the Center trained a number of social scientists from the Okayama area in survey research techniques at this field station. With the assistance of these Japanese, the Michigan social scientists studied the Niike buraku in its relatively unmechanized state. This research has already resulted in a number of doctoral dissertations. A major volume has been published under the co-authorship of Professors E. K. Beardsley (Anthropology), John W. Hall (History), and

31. Hall, while on extended leave of absence from Michigan, acted as head of the Tokyo office of the Asia Foundation. Several of his assistants in Tokyo were Michigan Ph.D.s whose dissertations were based on field work in Okayama.

32. One reason for SCAP's hostility was the shortage of food and housing all over Japan. Another may have been the desire to reduce "controversial" research and avoid publication of conclusions hostile to General MacArthur. (SCAP employees were themselves subject to censorship in writing for "outside" publications. Compare Harry Emerson Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo (New York: Macmillan, 1954), Chapter 28 and index references to "Censorship, American.")

Robert F. Ward (Political Science).³³ Several of the Niike-inspired dissertations are also to be published as monographs of the Center for Japanese Studies.

Modern machinery was subsequently introduced into the agriculture of the Niike region. The history and consequences of the change are being studied, not by the Center for Japanese Studies at Michigan, but by the Okayama group trained at its field station. Their results too should be published in the course of the next few years, but primarily in Japanese. Without striving to train particular counterparts for particular men, then, the Michigan group in Okayama trained its own successors in a collective sense.

In assessing the results of the Niike venture, the creation of good will should not be forgotten. Anyone connected with the University of Michigan (not necessarily with the Center for Japanese Studies), can anticipate a royal welcome not only in Niike but all over Okayama. At the same time the Niike buraku has been "researched to death," like Muncie or Newburyport in America. The Niike farmers might not welcome resumption of the Center for Japanese Studies activities in their midst.

There is a National University in Okayama, built after the war around the former Sixth Higher School. The Center had no official affiliation with it during its stay in Okayama, because it was just getting started as a Shinsei-Daigaku ("New System University") when the field station was established. Many of the Center's trainees, however, were or later became Okayama University students and teachers. As has been mentioned, they have been continuing the Center's research on their own. Had Okayama University been an established institution of university grade in 1947, affiliation would have been considered seriously by the Michigan group.

33. Village Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959).

CHAPTER 4 PROGRAMS OF INDIVIDUAL INSTITUTIONS

We pass to seven American university programs in Japan supported neither by ICA nor by any major educational foundation.¹ These programs are smaller and less ambitious than those considered in the two preceding chapters. Many are also older, having been interrupted by World War II. These older programs owe their origin directly or indirectly to missionary activity. Most of the programs considered here are centered on students and recent graduates rather than faculty members. Their purpose is primarily improved international relations or elementary teaching, rather than advanced teaching or research. Many of them are inadequately financed, and struggle on in the hope of gaining greater significance in the future than they have as yet attained either in Japan or in America.

In this study we attempt to include all programs in being as of the second half of 1958. Some may have been omitted inadvertently, if located outside the Kanto and Kansai areas. A conscious omission has been the type of program limited to the

1. Some of the programs have support from other United States government agencies; an example is the University of Maryland's program in the armed services. Others are supported by small specialized foundations, such as the International Christian University's program, which is supported by a special Japan International Christian University Foundation. The last section of this chapter considers also the international programs of Japanese universities involving other Asian countries.

selection by alumni of some American college, often Americans living in Japan, of Japanese students for one or more years at the old alma mater. These programs are difficult to locate and to distinguish from private individual philanthropies. The American college itself plays so passive a role (remission of tuition, provision of dormitory space, etc.) that no positive overseas program seems to be involved.

AMHERST IN JAPAN

In a class by itself is the long-standing affiliation between Amherst College and Doshisha University. As we mentioned in Chapter 1, the founder of Doshisha was himself an Amherst graduate who took the name Joseph Hardy Neesima.² Contact between the two schools was maintained throughout Neesima's lifetime,³ and even after his death in 1890. Its main forms were teaching at Doshisha by occasional American graduates of Amherst, occasional study at Amherst by Japanese graduates of Doshisha and by sons of American teachers at the Japanese institution.

Proposals for more regular affiliation, and the inaccurate notion of Doshisha as "Amherst in Japan," seem first to have been pressed by the Rev. Alden Clark, an Amherst graduate of the Class of 1900. Clark had spent many years as a missionary in India, but was in 1919 associated with the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions⁴ of the Congregational Church. Clark proposed in 1919 that in connection with its centennial in 1922, Amherst College should set aside \$40,000 for a Neesima Memorial Building on the Doshisha campus and an additional \$10,000 for its endowment; that Amherst should maintain a

2. Two other foreign missionary institutions founded by Amherst graduates in the later nineteenth century were the Syrian Protestant College (now the American University of Beirut) and Robert College of Istanbul, Turkey. Claude M. Feuss, Amherst: The Story of a New England College (Boston: Little Brown, 1935), p. 355.

3. Neesima himself was awarded an Amherst LL. D. in 1889. Frank A. Lombard, "Amherst in Japan," Amherst Graduates' Quarterly (February, 1922), p. 98.

4. We shall have occasion to refer to this organization subsequently by its abbreviated title, "The American Board."

young graduate in residence at Doshisha, paying his salary and traveling expenses,⁵ and that it should provide a two-year scholarship to permit a Japanese student at Doshisha to spend the latter half of his college career at Amherst. This project died in the Amherst Alumni Council.

Clark was, however, not discouraged. In the Amherst centennial year itself he went to the undergraduates, faculty, and townspeople directly. He persuaded them to raise through their annual Christian Association drive a fund to send to Doshisha a graduate of the Amherst centennial class. Mr. Stewart B. Nichols was selected for a two-year assignment as an English teacher at one of Doshisha's affiliated high schools. He was highly popular on the Doshisha campus, and became himself a Doshisha enthusiast. Toward the end of his term Nichols sent a proposal to the Amherst College Board of Trustees entitled "Amherst in Japan," suggesting the erection of an Amherst-Neesima Memorial Building at Doshisha as a center for the work and influence of later Amherst representatives there. Nichols died shortly after his return to America, and his proposal was shelved. He died of tuberculosis, which he may have contracted from exposure to Kyoto winters without central heating.

The exchange itself, however, continued. Every other year an Amherst graduate was selected by Amherst authorities and sent to teach high school English at Doshisha from funds raised in the Amherst community. Many of the successful candidates were planning careers in the ministry. Competition was less keen for this appointment than for opportunities to study in Europe. The Doshisha appointment seems to have been partially an honor, partially a consolation prize for the runners-up in competitions for Europe. Amherst graduates at Doshisha were young, unsupervised, and sometimes spent most of their time with other foreigners in the Kansai area. Of the ten men selected

5. It had been proposed in 1915 that Amherst provide \$1,000 a year to send regularly to Doshisha a young graduate as a teacher of English.

This account of the history of the Amherst - Doshisha relationship prior to World War II leans heavily on Stanley King, The Consecrated Eminence (Amherst, Massachusetts: Amherst College, 1951), pp. 187-189.

during the 20-year period 1922-1941, however, three had subsequent Far Eastern connections and experience.⁶

The dream of an Amherst House on the Doshisha campus was realized in 1932. Mr. Nichols' parents made the original gift of \$25,000 in 1928; it was more than matched by other sources. The building was modeled on an Amherst College fraternity house, but since most Japanese academic architecture is in Western style, it does not appear incongruous in the middle of Kyoto. It was used not only for ceremonial occasions and as the headquarters of the Amherst representative, but as living quarters for a few selected Japanese students from Doshisha who might profit from practice in oral English, from association with Westerners, and from closer contact with Western culture, including specifically Christianity.

A number of the Japanese alumni of Amherst House during the 1930's have "crossed the cultural barrier" between East and West. One is active in international work with the Japan Broadcasting Company (Nippon Hoso Kyoku, N. H. K.), another in similar work with the Japan Air Lines, a third with Nissan, a leading automobile manufacturer. There are also a number of college and high school English teachers among these alumni, and one has been adopted by Daisetz Suzuki, the internationally renowned leader of Zen Buddhism.

During World War II Doshisha was under constant military surveillance and suspicion as a possible hotbed of liberal and pro-American ideas, but was never closed. The Amherst-Doshisha

6. These were Donald Zoll, Richard A. Merritt, and John W. Hall, who served at Doshisha in 1931-1933, 1937-1939, and 1939-1941 respectively. Zoll had subsequent Far Eastern study at Columbia, United States government work in Japan, and was for a time a Far Eastern representative of the Soviet trading agency Amtorg. Merritt taught at the Higher Commercial School at Hikone (the present Shiga University) after expiration of his Doshisha term, was a wartime conscientious objector, and returned to Japan in 1947 as chaplain and teacher of religious education at Rikkyo (St. Paul's) University in Tokyo. Hall, born in Kyoto and raised on the Doshisha campus, is at present Professor of Far Eastern History and Director of the Center for Japanese Studies at the University of Michigan.

relationship was cut off,⁷ and Amherst House was used as a combination office building and living quarters by the Doshisha administration to prevent its being taken over by the Japanese army as a military hospital.⁸

After the war there came an early revival of Amherst-Doshisha relations, but a decision against renewal of the affiliation in its prewar form. The decision to change the character of the program was prompted by some of the deficiencies we have noted and also by the availability of an unusual Amherst faculty member, Professor Otis Cary. Cary was born in Hokkaido, and is the son and grandson of American missionaries in Japan. An Amherst graduate (1941), he would have been the 1941 - 1943 Amherst representative at Doshisha but for the war. After service as language officer in United States Naval Intelligence Cary joined the Amherst faculty on his return to civilian life and was himself for approximately ten years the Amherst-Doshisha affiliation.

Cary holds two academic appointments simultaneously. He is a professor at Doshisha and an assistant professor at Amherst. At Doshisha he teaches American History, and at Amherst he teaches Far Eastern History and Japanese Civilization. He is stationed regularly at Doshisha, but spends one year of each three or four at Amherst. This irregularity is intentional. The timing of Cary's years in America depends upon conditions at Amherst and Doshisha, and upon the general international situation.

In addition to teaching at Doshisha, Cary acts as counselor to a number of Japanese students (usually 16) who are selected

7. The financing of the program by annual drives in the Amherst community had in fact become highly precarious during the late thirties because of deterioration in Japanese-American relations.

8. Otis Cary, "Three Years in Amherst House," Amherst Alumni News (December, 1950), pp. 103-105.

by the Doshisha faculty to live in Amherst House.⁹ In this function he replaces the prewar Amherst representatives at the House. His counseling has covered a wide variety of fields, including religion, vocation, and even marriage. The House's weekly program for its members is somewhat like that of an American college fraternity, but with greater stress on religious activity and scholarship. One special Amherst House project in which Cary takes particular interest involves the translation of the theological works of Reinhold Niebuhr into Japanese.¹⁰ Although he has served temporarily as associate dean and as registrar of Doshisha, Cary no longer has administrative responsibilities there beyond ordinary committee work in the History Department and the Faculty of Literature.

As his major activity outside Doshisha, Cary engages in semi-popular writing and broadcasting.¹¹ In his writing, interviews, and radio work, Cary tries to present a Christian American point of view, although the views expressed are his own. Cary's position regarding his speaking and writing is best stated in his own words:

Perhaps the area where I have the best chance to give the widest representation of the reason why I am sent here is through the press and radio. Japan is a country in which every method of mass communication is wide open. The westerner who can or will take the trouble to write or speak in an imaginative way in Japanese is non-existent. A

9. Admission to Amherst House is an honor; there are always more applicants than can be admitted. The choice is not confined to Christians or pro-Americans. One early selection was in fact an active Communist, admitted with full knowledge of his views. He left after a few months for "direct action among the proletariat." *Ibid.*

10. In this translation project Cary works with Japanese colleagues on the Doshisha faculty as well as with students of Amherst House.

11. An interview with Professor Cary in connection with the present study was interrupted by a request from a Kyoto newspaperman for Cary's reaction to the accidental killing of a Japanese civilian by an American airman at Johnson Air Base outside Tokyo (September, 1958).

conscientious and often Christian interpretation of local or even international events in Japanese is unusual and desirable. I have more opportunities than I can use for articles in newspapers and magazines -- often journals of hundreds of thousands of nation-wide circulation.

The advent of commercial broadcasting has meant programs to fill, and there are many requests in this line too. As often as not the request is on a moral issue which it would be cowardly to ignore as an American who may not be an expert, but who has the equipment of expression, e.g., the atomic bombings, the hydrogen bomb, the moral degradation around American military installations, McCarthyism, American racial prejudice, "Let Asians fight Asians."

Any approach to problems such as these necessitates getting down to basic presuppositions underlying western civilization, such as the problem of the individual and his make-up, or a compassionate view of history, or other issues which are basically Christian. So these requests in the broadest sense are the very reason for which I am sent out here by the trustees, faculty, and students of Amherst College.¹²

He is not considered a representative of the American government, since the Japanese are used to having American teachers and missionaries speak out on policy issues and sometimes take positions differing from those of the State Department or the Embassy in Tokyo. But without being taken for a stooge or spy, Cary occasionally gets into difficulties with the Japanese because of his views. An example of his difficulties was the Kuboyama case in 1955. The Japanese fishing vessel Fukuryu Maru was dusted with radioactive fall-out from American H-bomb tests at Bikini. Kuboyama, its radio operator, subsequently died from the effects. Cary made the point that Americans and Pacific Islanders dusted with the same fall-out had informed

12. "Report from Doshisha," Amherst Alumni News (January, 1954), p. 5.

American authorities of their symptoms and been saved, whereas the Fukuryu Maru had kept radio silence until the ship returned to Japan. Cary felt and said that this difference in conduct reflected a lower estimate of the value of human life by Japanese than by Americans. This statement, published on the day after Kuboyama's death (and several weeks after Cary had issued it) created a sensation.

Since his Japanese education extends only through primary school, Cary's literary style, however fluent, is somewhat crude. He feels the crudeness makes it more effective, and insists on editors not correcting his manuscript without his permission. Amherst House students or Doshisha faculty colleagues review his material to be sure that his point gets across, but the literary niceties take care of themselves.

In 1958 the prewar Amherst-Doshisha affiliation was revived but on a substantially modified basis. Mr. Douglas Williams, an Amherst graduate of 1956 who had completed two years of study at the Virginia Theological Seminary, came to Doshisha in September to teach English to freshmen and sophomores and assist Cary with his counseling duties. He went for only one year, and with the status of an associate missionary of the American Board.

Amherst now deliberately selects a man with two or three years of graduate work, rather than a new graduate as it did in the twenties and thirties. The man selected is now expected to teach lower division college classes; his additional years of maturity are expected to make him steadier and more worthy of respect by college students. Furthermore, while each previous Amherst representative was almost completely on his own, each new man will be under Cary's supervision. This feature is expected to add to the continuity of the program. Most of the future representatives are expected to be seminarians (like Williams) or graduate students. Few doctors or lawyers can afford to take a year off from professional school to come to Japan. It will, of course, be required that the Amherst representative be an Amherst graduate, and in view of Doshisha's religious affiliations, that he be a Protestant Christian. Amherst would not be averse to selecting a Roman Catholic, a Jew, or an agnostic if Doshisha would approve. On the other hand, such a

representative would probably not be acceptable to Doshisha, and Amherst would not exert pressure for his acceptance. In one prewar case, Amherst decided against a Jewish representative when the American Board reported that his presence might embarrass Doshisha.

Finances for this aspect of the program are raised from Amherst College students and alumni, and from the Amherst community. In October, 1958, the Ford Foundation gave Amherst House a \$7,500 grant which will be used largely in its support.

Another element in the original Clark proposal of 1919 for an Amherst-Doshisha relationship has come to pass belatedly. This is the two-year Doshisha scholarship to Amherst inaugurated in 1955. It is used by Doshisha as a subvention to train potential staff members, and goes to a graduate assistant in one of the Doshisha departments. It is considered a good idea for a Japanese university graduate with an inadequate background in English to attend a small school like Amherst and take an M.A. degree there.¹³ If he can then finance a third year at another American institution he may do so, but Doshisha cannot afford to keep his staff position open for a fourth year, and he must return before taking an American Ph. D.¹⁴

CARLETON IN JAPAN

We have mentioned several Doshisha affiliations past and present, involving both Michigan and Amherst. Doshisha has other international programs as well, being in fact one of the most active Japanese universities in this respect. In addition

13. Amherst does not give graduate degrees to American students except under unusual circumstances.

14. One scholarship holder under this phase of the affiliation, Professor Yasuo Sakakibara (Doshisha, Economics), has written in English an account of his experiences, "The Oriental at Amherst," Amherst Alumni News (July, 1957). After two years at Amherst as holder of the Doshisha scholarship, Sakakibara spent an additional year as a graduate student at Harvard.

to the two affiliations already discussed and the Carleton connection to be considered next, two other Doshisha programs might be mentioned, for a total of five in all. There is a program with the American Board to send associate missionaries to Doshisha for two-year terms as English teachers at the high school level. There is also a "Christian Social" project financed out of funds originally earmarked (by Harvard University) for the Harvard-Yenching Institute in China. It involves the study of the social influences of Christianity in the early Meiji period (1867-1894). Documents and other materials are currently being gathered. The work is done by the Japanese faculty, with Professor Cary also a participant.

Playing a role secondary to the Michigan and Amherst relationships is one with Carleton College of Northfield, Minnesota. A small scale "Carleton in China" program had struggled along as a largely meaningless tradition on the Carleton campus for over 50 years. Revitalization was expected when it was moved to Japan and to Doshisha.

Carleton's program of sending English teachers to the Orient began about 1900. It can be traced chiefly to the activities of Dr. Percy Watson, a Carleton graduate who became a medical missionary in North China. At his suggestion Carleton began supplying, sometimes annually and sometimes biennially, an English teacher for a middle school in Fenchow, China, unaffiliated with any college or university. The student selected (by a joint student-faculty committee at Carleton) went to China at the end of his junior year, taught English for a year or two, and then returned to Carleton for his senior year. This involved lengthening his college career to five or six years. The direct costs were raised by solicitation from Carleton students and faculty. The overhead costs were borne and the administrative duties performed by the American Board.¹⁵ Relatively few students became candidates for this position in China. They

15. The American Board is, as we have seen, affiliated with the Congregational Church, with which Carleton (like Amherst) has a nominal relationship. The relationship was more than a nominal one prior to the First World War.

seem usually to have been pious and earnest young men and women interested in missionary or ministerial careers. If they ever reported to Carleton on their activities in China their reports have been lost. Carleton has at any rate no record of their accomplishments and no knowledge of their subsequent activities.

The Second World War forced suspension of Carleton's program in China. The relationship was resumed in 1946, but its locale was transferred to Peking. When the Communists captured Peking in 1949, the last Carleton representative, Miss Fern Larson, left China voluntarily.

Nothing was done in the two years 1949-1951 beyond the raising of funds by a Carleton campus committee headed by the college chaplain, Rev. Phillip Phenix. Phenix was exploring actively with the American Board prospects for affiliations outside of China, but the transfer to Japan came about almost accidentally. The American Board sends associate missionaries to Japan for three-year terms to test their fitness for missionary careers, quite unconnected with any American university. One such associate missionary, a young lady, returned ahead of schedule in May, 1951 from a middle school affiliated with Kobe College in Japan. She had been teaching English there, and Phenix was able to fill the vacancy with another young lady who was graduating from Carleton in the following month. A similar situation arose at Doshisha in 1953, and the vacancy was filled by a Carleton graduate for a two-year period -- a young man in this case. Since both Carleton and Doshisha are coeducational while Kobe is a woman's college, Carleton preferred Doshisha as the place to send graduates.

In each odd-numbered year since 1953 a Carleton graduate has been sent to teach English as an associate missionary of the American Board for a two-year term at one of the middle schools affiliated with Doshisha. This means that Carleton has to some degree replaced Amherst in the provision of middle school English conversation teachers for the Doshisha system. As in Carleton's previous Chinese relationship, the program's overhead is borne by the American Board, while the direct costs

are raised in Northfield. "Carleton in Japan" receives approximately one-third of the proceeds of the Carleton Campus Chest.

The two young men selected in 1953 and 1955 were assigned to the Iwakura Middle School north of Kyoto. Both later became theological students, one at the Divinity School of Yale University and the other at Union Theological Seminary. Both hoped for reassignment to the Orient as missionaries. While in Kyoto they were under the supervision of resident missionaries, and the Carleton committee required them to keep Carleton informed of their activities. Their letters were published in the Carleton student newspaper, and they spoke at Carleton campus convocations after returning from Japan. The net effect has been to rouse more interest in the "Carleton in Japan" program than in the "Carleton in China" program which preceded it.

Doshisha provided for the Carleton representative at Iwakura a Japanese-style house known as "Carleton House." Here lived, in addition to the representative himself, four or five selected students of the Iwakura middle school and a Japanese house-keeper. Before the arrival of the first Carleton representative the house had been occupied by a Japanese teacher, a former faculty member of the middle school who had been transferred to Kyoto. The university, which owns the property, moved this Japanese teacher to a house in Kyoto to make room for the Carleton representative. The Carleton representative was in no way responsible and did not know about it, but the incident gave rise to ill feeling between him and his Japanese colleagues. The resentment came not from the man who was moved nearer to his new job in Kyoto, but from other Iwakura faculty members who hoped for the assignment of this house to one of their number. Salaries are low in Japanese schools and universities, and the occupation of institutional housing (virtually rent free) is a valuable perquisite. There is no report that the resentment arising from this situation interfered in any way with the efficiency of the program.

One of the Japanese students from Carleton House, Mr. Sadao Asada, subsequently received a scholarship to Carleton and graduated with Phi Beta Kappa honors in the class of 1958. He won a scholarship for graduate study at Yale in 1958-1959.

Subsequently his younger sister, Miss Michiyo Asada, who had not lived in Carleton House, also accepted a Carleton scholarship. This scholarship, and also that of her brother, was awarded by a Kellogg Foundation grant. The function of the grant is to finance study at Carleton by foreign students. The Asadas were awarded scholarships in competition with applicants from many foreign countries. There is no scholarship feature in the "Carleton in Japan" program itself.

Difficulties have arisen between the Carleton committee and the American Board, set off largely as a result of circumstances connected with the selection and orientation of the 1957-1959 Carleton representative at Doshisha, Miss Nancy Winsch. Eventual friction was probably inevitable, as the clerical atmosphere at Carleton has become steadily less important. The Carleton committee has come to feel that "Carleton in Japan" should become independent of the American Board even before the college itself can take over the administrative functions the Board performs for it. These administrative functions include provision of the assurances and guarantees necessary to secure two-year Japanese passports, counseling and supervision in Japan, medical care and insurance in Japan, and special facilities for lightening the Japanese income tax on the representative's teaching salary. Orientation facilities in America are also provided for college and university representatives on the same basis as for missionary trainees.

The Chairman of the Carleton committee, Professor Henry Van Dyke (Biology) would like Carleton to be free to select its representative without restrictions of sex or religious affiliation, to provide its own orientation for its representative, and to have its representative exempt from answering a searching American Board inquiry as to his religious and philosophical beliefs. It is however probable that Doshisha, which has remained more evangelical than Carleton, would not wish a complete elimination of the affiliation's religious overtones. The Carleton committee selected Miss Winsch as its Doshisha representative for 1957-1959. Although a Protestant, Miss Winsch had no

evangelical leanings and no intention of taking up a clerical or missionary career. She was selected over another Carleton honor student of the same class (1957), Mr. Richard Devol, who had these precise ambitions and whom the American Board would have preferred.

Not only did the Carleton committee select Miss Winsch over Mr. Devol, but it changed the method of her orientation. In previous years the Carleton graduates participated in the American Board orientation program for beginning missionaries, but Miss Winsch and the committee preferred that she should spend the summer of 1957 at Yale instead, studying the Japanese language and culture without clerical overtones. This departure was also opposed by the American Board.

Difficulties next arose in Japan in connection with Carleton House. Since it is isolated from Kyoto and it was difficult to obtain suitable chaperonage for Miss Winsch, it was decided that she should not live there. Instead she lived near the main Kyoto campus of Doshisha, and her teaching of English was transferred to the Girls' High School or Semmon-Gakko on that campus. When Carleton House became vacant in Iwakura, it was turned over for three years to the American Board's nominee for middle-school English teaching at Doshisha. The American Board appointed as its representative the same Mr. Devol whom Carleton had passed over in making its own selection. Discussion has naturally ensued among Carleton, Doshisha, and the American Board as to the long-term disposition of Carleton House.

There is some disagreement concerning the extra-curricular activities of the Carleton representative at Doshisha. The American Board and the Doshisha administration would like him to teach Sunday school and engage in missionary work. Although she too was officially an associate missionary of the American Board, Miss Winsch's activities were entirely secular. She prepared monthly articles for the Carleton paper on events in Japan, which elicited a number of comments and replies mainly in the form of suggestions for future articles. More of these

requests came in than Miss Wunsch felt capable of handling. Secondly, she framed suggestions to the Carleton authorities for possible modification of the school's Japanese program. Miss Wunsch's main suggestion of 1957-1958 was that the representative might better be assigned to a secular than to a Christian school. She felt that the services of English conversation teachers were needed much more in public schools than at Doshisha with its large contingent of English-speaking faculty. During the summer of 1958 she participated as a teacher in a summer seminar for Japanese high school English teachers, and found most of them no better in English conversation than her high school students at Doshisha.

On the Carleton campus the committee, and particularly Professor Van Dyke, have sought to broaden the scope of the program and deepen its impact on Carleton. Van Dyke would like to bring Japanese professors regularly to Carleton on a visiting basis. Subsequently he would like to establish a regular exchange relationship between Carleton and Doshisha (or some other Japanese university) and set up a full-scale Oriental Studies program at Carleton with a Japanese emphasis. This expansion is, however, held back by lack of funds from either Carleton or educational foundations. As for the maintenance of the Doshisha connection, both advantages and disadvantages are seen. The main advantages are Doshisha's location in the cultural center of Kyoto and its long record of American contacts. Offsetting these are two disadvantages. Doshisha is more interested in Amherst than in Carleton, so that the Carleton program seems doomed to a secondary or tertiary role in the eyes of the Doshisha administration. And, as has been pointed out, Doshisha's interest in foreign affiliations has remained less secular than Carleton's has become over the years.

ROCKFORD-KOBE AFFILIATION

Like the two preceding programs, this one had its origin in the nineteenth-century missionary activity of the Congregational Church, and religious considerations continue to play an important role in it.

Kobe College (Kobe Jogakuin)¹⁶ was founded as a Christian elementary school for girls in Kobe in 1875. The founders were two Congregationalist missionaries from the United States, sent by the American Board to Japan shortly after missionary activity was legalized there in 1873. One of these founders, Miss Julia Dudley, had been a Rockford College student. The other, Miss Eliza Talcott, belonged to a collateral branch of the Talcott family which contributed prominently to Rockford College. The Kobe institution rose to collegiate grade in 1894, and moved to its present campus at Nishinomiya (between Osaka and Kobe) in 1934. This campus is a spacious one on a hillside, and its buildings are in modified Spanish mission style. It has an expanse of green lawn, and the buildings are carefully maintained. It resembles a small college transplanted bodily from Southern California rather more than any Japanese campus, Westernized though most Japanese campuses are. Kobe College has remained strongly Christian; its present denominational affiliation is with the United Church of Japan, called Kyodan.

There were many Americans on the Kobe College faculty until 1940, including the majority of the higher administrative officials. The most important for our study was Miss Susan Searl who, starting in 1883, was there for over 30 years, most of them as President. The financing of the college has also remained largely American. Along with a Kobe College Foundation in Japan (almost entirely Japanese) there has grown up a Kobe College Corporation in Chicago. This is a large group, whose governing board of 10 to 15 people is largely affiliated with the Congregational Church and includes three members with Rockford College connections. These are Miss Mary Ashby Cheek, President Emeritus of Rockford and Dean at Western College for Women; Miss Jeremy Ingalls, Professor of English; and Miss Dearing Lewis, Professor of English and Foreign Student Advisor. Both Miss Cheek and Miss Ingalls have taught at Kobe College for one

16. Kobe College should not be confused with other institutions which also bear the name of the city of Kobe, the most important of which is Kobe University (Kobe Daigaku), a national institution.

year, under foundation grants, Miss Cheek in 1956 - 1957 and Miss Ingalls in 1957-1958. The Corporation has little connection with the academic policies of Kobe College. The funds which it raises are earmarked largely for three purposes: (1) international exchanges, (2) new buildings, and (3) scholarship aid for needy Japanese students. Both Japanese and Americans hope to make Kobe College independent of American aid, but there seems no immediate prospect of success. Kobe College has deliberately kept its standards high and enrollment low (currently 900 in the college department). This has necessitated tuition charges of \$250 per year, very high by Japanese standards, and has given the college a reputation for economic rather than scholastic aristocracy which it hopes to remedy by its scholarship program.

Rockford College of Rockford, Illinois, was founded in 1847 as a women's college under the joint auspices of the Presbyterian and Congregational Churches. It was designed as a sister institution of a men's college founded under the same auspices in the previous year in the neighboring city of Beloit, Wisconsin. The connection was broken off during the 1890's, and Beloit College has become a coeducational institution. Over the years Rockford College's religious affiliations have loosened, and to a much greater extent than Kobe's. Until the end of World War II, it remained an aristocratic women's college, "Vassar of the Prairies," with an enrollment of perhaps 400, of whom there were usually only about 50 from the city of Rockford. There arose during the thirties and forties a trend toward reduced enrollment in midwestern women's colleges, which Rockford met by admitting men. The first male students were admitted in 1946, and there are now more men than women in Rockford's student body of 1200. The men are officially in a separate institution, Rockford Men's College; they are largely day students from Rockford and its environs. It is probable that Rockford will become primarily a community college and likewise completely coeducational within a relatively few years, although some members of both the faculty and the Board of Trustees hope to preserve the genteel women's college tradition. Here again development is in a different direction from that at Kobe.

The Rockford-Kobe affiliation dates from 1921, when the two were following similar lines. It arose as a consequence of a personal friendship. Miss Searl, then President Emeritus of Kobe College, was a friend of President William A. Maddox of Rockford College, and was strongly in favor of increasing Kobe College's ties with American women's colleges generally. The idea of a formal relationship was presented to Rockford students by Miss Lillian Picken, an American Board missionary doing "deputation work" among American youth groups while on furlough from India. As a result of her talk, some 300 Rockford students made gifts totalling approximately \$600, from which small fund the Rockford-Kobe relationship began. The students also founded a special club to further internationalism by "brother and sister college" relationships which became the World Friendship Committee of the Rockford College YWCA. In addition to raising funds for the Rockford-Kobe affiliation, it financed a special "Rockford College Room" in one of the Kobe College buildings. This idea of furthering international friendship by brother and sister college relationships was a special enthusiasm of Dr. John R. Mott, then president of the International YWCA.

Over the years from 1921 to 1941 the relationship followed a fairly standard pattern. A Rockford graduate taught English for two years in Kobe's high school department following graduation.¹⁷ The choice of students was somewhat irregular, largely because of financial difficulties. Kobe College paid the graduate's expenses in Japan plus a purely nominal salary in yen. The funds for transportation both ways were raised on the Rockford College campus and by the Friends of Kobe, predecessors of the Kobe College Corporation. Rockford College has no record of the number of its graduates who went to Kobe under this program, and does not know whether any of them found this experience useful in their later lives.

In 1937, when Japanese-American relations were already deteriorating, the Friends of Kobe made the relationship more

17. During this period Radcliffe and Lake Erie Colleges had similar relationships with Kobe College which have not been revived since World War II.

reciprocal, setting up a system of exchange fellowships between Kobe College and the three sister institutions¹⁸ to give foreign training to graduates of all the participating colleges in their special fields. Eight American women went to Japan as Kobe College Fellows under this program, and six Japanese women came to a total of seven American colleges. Rockford College's role in this relationship was, however, minor. No Kobe alumna came to Rockford, and the only Rockford alumna to go to Kobe left before finishing her first academic year early in 1941 because of international tension. This was Miss Anne Belknap (Mrs. Alan Norton Benner). She later took an M. A. degree in philosophy and religion at Mills College with a dissertation on "Sovereignty in Japan."

In 1948, after the close of World War II, the Kobe College Corporation took over from the "sister colleges" the function of sending recent American women's college graduates to teach English at the Kobe College high school department. Rockford College graduates are given some preference because of heavy Rockford representation on the Corporation, but women from other colleges are often selected. There is sometimes a shortage of qualified applicants. The selectee should be a Protestant, in view of Kobe College's denominational tradition. Kobe also prefers white over Negro applicants. The contract is for three years as an associate missionary of the American Board, and the selectee is expected to be active in church work on campus or in the community in addition to teaching conversational English. Three Rockford alumnae have gone to Kobe under this program. The most recent one (1955), Miss Anne B. Cobb, stayed for an extra year to teach English in the college proper. She is the granddaughter of a Doshisha teacher of theology and classical languages. Her father was born in Japan and is a member of the Kobe College Corporation.

There has been no friction with the American Board as in the Carleton - Doshisha affiliation. Rockford in fact speaks highly

18. Later additions to the program were Mount Holyoke and Olivet Colleges, the latter a coeducational institution.

of the Board's briefing program and its annual summer conferences for neophyte missionaries. These conferences are six-week sessions held each summer on the campus of Allegheny College in Meadville, Pennsylvania. They are conducted through the cooperation of mission groups all over the world, but with special sections on individual countries including Japan.

Because of the unhappy experience of the first postwar Rockford graduate at Kobe, Miss Marguerite Rasmussen, direct Rockford-Kobe relationships have been revived in addition to the Kobe College Corporation program. Miss Rasmussen contracted pneumonia and rheumatic fever while at Kobe on the Corporation program in 1948-1949, and died in an Occupation hospital in Osaka in the spring of 1949. In her memory two scholarship funds have been set up, one in Japan for use at Kobe College and one raised by Rockford alumnae and students for Kobe College students at Rockford. Miss Rasmussen's part in the Rockford-Kobe affiliation thus resembles that of Mr. Nichols in the Amherst-Doshisha one.

These last-named scholarships are administered by Rockford College without the participation of the Corporation. The Kobe College faculty chooses a candidate each year from among students who have completed two years of college work. Until 1957 the faculty reached its decision and then asked its first-choice candidate whether she was interested in going to America. Subsequently the faculty has sought applications and chosen from among them. The first procedure is typically Japanese, the second typically American. Selection is based on scholastic record (with special emphasis on oral English) and personality. Religion is not a factor; Miss Natsuko Yoshimura, selected in 1957, was not a Christian. The scholarship covers tuition and board and room. Because of a misunderstanding between Rockford and Kobe, there were three Kobe College scholars at Rockford in 1958-1959 instead of two. For that year, therefore, the Japanese girls were expected to work for board and room. The scholarship does not cover the substantial expense of transportation between Japan and America, but the selectees have been successful in having this paid by other organizations, notably

the American Association of University Women. The Japanese girls come to Rockford for two years, and return to Japan with Rockford (not Kobe) degrees. The Rockford faculty feels that Kobe has made good choices, and that the students selected are above the general Rockford average despite their language handicap.

The impact of this program is expected to make itself felt almost entirely in the United States, as the Kobe scholars at Rockford will probably marry and not engage in public life. Along with other foreign students at Rockford, the Japanese are intended as a leaven to provincialism. They do a great deal of speaking in and around Rockford for fees, and earn a good part of their incidental expenses in this way. They are limited by college rules to three speeches a week, and are advised to avoid controversial topics.

A few problems have arisen. Some Japanese students expect to see Christianity emphasized to the same extent at Rockford as it is at Kobe, and are disappointed that this is not the case. They are required to live in Rockford dormitories, so as to increase their contact with other students, and thus have got in the habit of conversing only in English even with each other. Living in the dormitories adds to their financial problems, since it prevents their taking "meal jobs" off campus. (Work in the Rockford dormitories does not provide enough income to pay for meals.)

This is the only American college program leading to American undergraduate degrees for Japanese students.¹⁹ As we have seen, there are definite disadvantages for the young Japanese man who enters the job market with an American rather than a Japanese degree. For a young woman, however, these are more than balanced by the advantages. An American degree is proof of proficiency in oral English; this proficiency is an immediate advantage in "international" firms and in teaching. A Japanese university education is only important for higher posts, to which

19. Knox College has considered such a program in cooperation with the Bancroft Foundation, but it was not in operation in 1958-1959.

young women are not expected to aspire. As regards marriage, an American degree is sometimes taken by conservative Japanese to indicate that the young lady who holds one will not be satisfied with Japanese living standards and marriage customs, but if her stay in America is limited to one or two years, this handicap too is counter-balanced by the additional urbanity and sophistication foreign residence is supposed to give her. The young women themselves are not worried about the possibility that an American degree will disqualify them for marriage; "there are plenty of modern-minded Japanese" summarizes their attitude.

Kobe College is quite willing to have a Rockford College student come to Kobe for six months or a year in reciprocation; it will provide free tuition, board, and room. The Rockford student, however, must provide her own transportation, and will, moreover, lose academic credit, since the language problem will, in most cases, prevent her following Kobe College's lectures and classwork. There have as yet been no Rockford applicants for this scholarship.

Prospects for expansion of this program are not favorable. The present Rockford administration wishes to concentrate on the community college aspect of the institution, and is reducing rather than expanding the international undertakings of its predecessor. At Kobe, President Monkichi Namba hopes the relation can be broadened to include an exchange of faculty members, but has not raised the question with Rockford because of the financial difficulties. As he sees it, Rockford professors coming to Kobe under this program could lecture in English to advanced classes, and use interpreters in elementary ones. Kobe College professors at Rockford would limit their activities to observation and research, except perhaps in English literature. Here two difficulties arise. Rockford College is not a graduate institution, and the nearest large-scale graduate research facilities are over 50 miles away (Madison, Wisconsin; Chicago, Evanston, and Champaign, Illinois). Furthermore, the exchange would have to be concentrated in the English departments of the two colleges in order to avoid a constant net drain on the Rockford facilities.

JUNIOR YEAR AT INTERNATIONAL CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY

Doshisha and Kobe are not representative examples of the 16 struggling Christian colleges founded all over Japan during the Meiji Era (1867-1912). Most are undergraduate institutions, weak and shaky, dependent on annual grants from foreign (usually American) sources to keep open. A considerable number, like Doshisha, give graduate degrees, but their prestige and standing are low compared to the first-class national universities (Tokyo, Kyoto, Hokkaido) or the first-class secular private ones (Keio, Waseda).

To build in Japan a first-class Christian university was a long-time ambition of both Japanese and American Christian workers. After 50 years of preliminary work the Japan International Christian University Foundation was organized in New York in November, 1948, following the establishment of a juridical body in Japan in May. It was representative of some 15 cooperating bodies, including the American Board. Its original purpose was to establish a purely graduate institution as a capstone to the existing Christian colleges, but Education Ministry rules effectively forbade this. The Ministry receives petitions for accreditation of a given Faculty at the undergraduate level only. If accreditation is granted and results are satisfactory, the Ministry will then consider petitions to extend the existing accreditation to higher levels. The plan was therefore changed to envisage a kind of Japanese Johns Hopkins, with undergraduate work available but subordinate in all respects to graduate training. When the International Christian University (ICU) opened its doors in 1952 at Mitaka, a Tokyo suburb, however, it was an entirely undergraduate institution competing with the Christian colleges and to some extent resented by them. It is still primarily undergraduate, although graduate work is expanding, particularly in Education.

Competition and resentment center not on student enrollment but on American financial support. There are students enough to go round, but not dollar exchange. The older Christian colleges feel that the funds raised for the International Christian University could have been better spent on improving their own physical

plants, faculty salaries, etc. An ICU rebuttal is that funds would have been spent more productively in shutting them down and pensioning off their faculties than in attempting to revive them.

ICU has also encountered resentment in the Mitaka and Osawa communities. Its 368-acre campus is the largest in Japan, and much of it is kept vacant in anticipation of future expansion. This campus was a former military airplane factory and airfield, built for World War II on land taken over from neighboring farmers. These farmers and their heirs had expected it to be returned for agricultural use after the war, and regard ICU as something other than "an innocent purchaser for value without notice." Agitation has been periodically stirred up among them over the land issue.

The International Christian University proposes to internationalize Christian higher education in Japan, quite as its name implies. Internationalization is being carried out in a number of ways. The large isolated campus, steam-heated dormitory accommodations, small classes, and education by discussion are all more Western and particularly more American than Japanese. ICU has men's and women's dormitories on one campus -- a revolutionary innovation in Japan. The students spend their first year in an intensive program of oral English, and one-third of their subsequent classes are in that language. This "crash program" in English requires ICU students to cover in their last three years the material in other subjects covered in four by other Japanese universities. This means that an ICU trimester is equivalent to a semester elsewhere.

Foreign students have come to ICU from Burma, Canada, Denmark, England, Hawaii, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Taiwan, and Thailand as well as from the continental United States. Half have, however, been Americans. They spend 18 months in intensive Japanese-language training, which necessarily lengthens their undergraduate course beyond four years. This may be one reason why no Americans have yet graduated from ICU. Twenty-two of the 53 full-time teachers and 90 of the 730 students are non-Japanese. The administration hopes to increase both these proportions, as well as to decrease the proportion of Americans among the foreigners. ICU is

criticized even by some of its own students as being an American enclave in Japan's educational system, and its program has been called "brainwashing." As often happens in Japanese universities, controversy centers on the Economics Department. ICU refuses to hire Marxist economists because Marxism is regarded as hostile to Christianity. The administration is under some pressure to hire at least one Marxist economist; one of the pressure groups is a student political society called "Liberté." President Hachiro Yuasa, however, insists that his aim is a completely international institution, and calls a Japanese-American institution a danger to be avoided.

President Yuasa is that rare phenomenon, a Japanese professor with no Japanese university training. After becoming a Christian in his youth, Yuasa left Japan to live close to nature in a Christian country -- the United States. He took up farming in California after graduating from an Oakland high school. Finding himself physically unfit for farm life, Yuasa obtained admission to Kansas State College and worked his way through. One of his summer jobs was in the College's Experiment Station. This job concentrated his interest in entomology, and he published several scientific papers while still an undergraduate. He enrolled at Illinois for graduate work in entomology, and almost immediately upon receipt of his Illinois Ph.D. obtained a professorship at the Kyoto Imperial University. Such a career would be impossible today, but Kyoto was then a new and brash institution. After more than 20 years at Kyoto, Yuasa accepted the presidency of Doshisha in 1935 when the grip of military bureaucracy closed in on Kyoto Imperial University following the "Takikawa Affair." He stayed at Doshisha until 1952, when he became the first president of ICU.

ICU's non-Japanese faculty members (who must be Christians) come largely on leave from foreign institutions. Two-thirds of them are Americans from colleges and universities in the United States. They stay for three-year terms, both to save transportation expenses and to make them available to a complete college generation. ICU is, however, anxious to obtain Fulbright visiting professors for shorter periods. George Kleiner (Economics, Illinois) served there in 1957-1958, and Helen

Walker (Statistics, Columbia) in 1958-1959. Some 30 American institutions have released faculty members to ICU, although leaves of absence as long as three years are highly unusual in American academic practice. Syracuse University and Goshen College have been particularly cooperative; Dr. Maurice Troyer (Education), on leave from Syracuse, is vice-president of ICU. Syracuse sends a recent graduate to Taiwan each year as an English teacher in connection with a "Syracuse in Asia" program. ICU would like to see this practice expanded to include its own campus in Japan.

The American staff tends to be either quite young and not yet established professionally, or quite old and close to retirement. People in their most productive years have children in American high schools or colleges, are busy with research projects they cannot pursue in Japan, or are making too much money to be interested in moving. A few American faculty members in their middle years have been displaced or have lost prestige as a result of "palace revolutions" in their home departments. Such men are usually "teachers" and "generalists," unappreciated in departments which stress research and specialization.

In order to attract American teachers, it is necessary to pay them approximately four times as much as comparable Japanese professors, although the ICU salary scale is among the highest in Japan. Representative figures are \$6,400 for the American, \$1,600 for the Japanese, both paid on a 12-month basis and augmented in many cases by low-rental university-owned housing. The differential means that the American visitors can have automobiles, domestic servants, etc., which the Japanese cannot afford. Difficulties are exacerbated because many of the Japanese staff members and their wives tend to develop foreign tastes by association with their Western colleagues.

The ICU administration is critical of some of the American faculty, and is trying to work out exchange arrangements with American colleges and universities whereby it might be improved. There are, however, difficulties because of differences in salary scales and the reluctance of American institutions to exchange key men for Japanese visitors whose academic competence and oral English are unknown quantities in America.

"Junior Year Abroad" programs are a prominent feature of the relations of American universities with the European Continent, particularly England, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland.²⁰ They are practically unknown in Asia. Distances are greater, but more important has been the lack of American interest in the cultures, history, and languages of Asia. ICU, however, is taking the lead as an international university in getting such programs established in Japan, taking advantage of the postwar upsurge of American interest in the country.

With its own first junior-year class (1954-1955) ICU arranged with the Presbyterian Church in the United States to send over a few American juniors, not necessarily from Presbyterian colleges, and this program has continued ever since. A similar program was in 1958 under negotiation with the Methodist Church.²¹ Of the 12 American junior-year students at ICU in 1958-1959, seven became interested in the institution through the Presbyterian Church, and many of the others are from church-related colleges of other denominations. Still other students came as a result of miscellaneous arrangements; it is not uncommon for American government workers, teachers, and such in Japan to send college-age children to ICU for a year or two. The group coming under Presbyterian auspices includes students from such colleges as Antioch (Ohio), Boston University, Claremont (California), Goshen (Indiana), Manchester (Indiana), Macalester (Minnesota), and Wooster (Ohio). (Many of these colleges have no Presbyterian ties.)

Beginning in 1957, ICU also established a student exchange arrangement with Occidental College (California). It provides for an exchange of one student per year. The institution visited pays room, board, and pin money, while the student provides

20. For a discussion of these programs see John Garraty and Walter Adams, From Main Street to the Left Bank (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1959).

21. The Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A. and the Methodist Church are two of the 15 organizations participating in the Japan International Christian University Foundation.

his own transportation. Thus Occidental provides the visitor from ICU with room, board, and incidental expenses, while ICU does the same for the visitor from Occidental. This is the only reciprocal arrangement concluded as of 1958 with a particular American college, although negotiations were under way with Denison University (Ohio) to have the exchange student himself provide for a year's education and maintenance at his home campus for his counterpart from abroad.

The "junior year abroad" and "exchange" students in Japan have a good many characteristics in common. They need not be Christians or have backgrounds in Japanese studies. Many students who come feel there is glamor about foreign study; they tend to become unhappy, want to go home, and waste their year abroad because the anticipated glamor does not materialize. Others come to Japan with a zeal for acquaintance with Japanese and Japanese students, but without realizing the need to study Japanese culture before one can understand the Japanese. They tend to remain rather dilettanteish and superficial, and to see differences in terms of right and wrong. Only a minority are real students who seek understanding of Japan and the Japanese.

Emotional problems also arise. An occasional man or woman wants to sow wild oats far away from parental influence and home-town public opinion. Others (mainly women) have been rejected at home and seek abroad the "love" that has been denied them. Still others do not understand the courtship and dating practices of the upper-class Japanese. The "problem child" here is the innocent young man who does not realize until too late that two or three dates with an upper-class Japanese girl are regarded as an engagement which cannot be broken without damaging the girl's chances for a good marriage in her own society.

Many one-year students like to spend their last term in a Japanese home rather than in the ICU dormitories. ICU helps make these arrangements whenever possible since its dormitories are rather un-Japanese, but the arrangements do not always work out well. Some Japanese families spend more than they can afford to fix up their homes, alter their diets, and make the American visitor feel at home. Others try to make money

out of the arrangement, and the visitor complains of inadequate food and heat.

Because so many ICU classes are given in English, American students can earn a year's academic credit from a year's residence there without prior knowledge of Japanese. This is not true of other Japanese universities. However, the course offerings in English are so few in most fields that the exchange student is advised to concentrate on elective courses rather than on his academic major, unless that major happens to be the Japanese language or Far Eastern studies. The program is in this respect quite different from the ordinary French or German "junior year abroad," where most of the students are concentrating in French or German language, literature, or history and can work on their majors at least as effectively as if they were at home.

From the financial point of view, ICU officials stress that a year or two of college in Japan is a better bargain for the American student living away from home at a private college than he usually realizes. He can save more than enough in tuition charges and living costs in Japan to pay for his round trip passage by sea. Conversely, a year or two in America is extremely difficult for the Japanese student to manage without assistance from someone in America. Not only is it impossible for any but the most wealthy to accumulate the yen equivalent of American tuition, board, and room charges, but Japanese exchange controls forbid his legal purchase of dollars for educational travel without permission of the Education Ministry, and Ministry policy is to deny all dollar exchange applications from undergraduate students who wish to study abroad.

Rumor in Japanese educational circles has it that ICU students are mainly of upper class origin, because ICU tuition is high. This is denied by the ICU administration. Nearly half the ICU student body has scholarships; the value of these scholarships, plus payments to students for campus jobs, comes to nearly three-fourths of total tuition collections. But whether students are wealthy or not, exchange controls limit their participation in junior year abroad programs.

STANFORD-KEIO STUDENT EXCHANGE

The four programs considered thus far in this chapter have involved Christian colleges and universities in Japan, and have had religious emphases at least in their early periods. The remaining three programs, while differing widely among themselves, are all secular. The distinctive features of the small Stanford-Keio student exchange, in particular, are the fact of its being run largely by the students of the two institutions and its relationship to Stanford University programs in other countries.

Since the close of World War II, Stanford and its student body have been heavily involved in international education. The university has opened a branch in Germany, essentially a "junior year abroad" program exclusively for Stanford students. (A similar branch is planned for Tokyo in 1961.) Stanford also has a number of Associated Students of Stanford University (ASSU) scholarships for foreign students, paid for by student dues. Recipients are selected by the ASSU governing board, and live with American students in Stanford "living groups," which may be either fraternities or dormitories. Stanford has also had for many years an active student Institute for International Relations (IIR), likewise supported from student dues. This organization also sponsors a variety of programs, some involving relationships between Stanford and foreign institutions.

Over and above the ASSU scholarships, for which Japanese students are eligible to compete, the IIR has developed three international student-exchange programs. The oldest and best established is with the Free University of Berlin, and the second with the University of the Philippines at Manila. The one under discussion here, with Keio University, is the newest of the three. A fourth was attempted with the University of Delhi, but failed because of opposition from anti-American elements within the Indian student body.

In all three cases, the initiative in establishing the relationship came from Stanford. The choice of a Japanese institution was due to the tradition of Japanese studies at Stanford, on which we have commented in Chapter 3, and also to the large

number of ex-G. I. 's in the Stanford student body in the decade after World War II. The choice of Keio as the Japanese university was made by the faculty advisor of IIR, Professor James Watkins (Political Science).²² Watkins considers Keio the Japanese university most similar to Stanford, since it is private, secular, liberal, business-minded, and unsympathetic to left-wing radicalism. Other members of the Stanford faculty with experience in Japan would have preferred Waseda to Keio as somewhat more democratic and therefore more interesting.

The original Stanford proposal was for communication only, meaning an interchange of newspapers, news-letters, tape recordings, and so on. An eventual student exchange was, however, mentioned. At Keio the Stanford letters were referred to the International Liaison Department or Gaijibu, headed by Professor Eiichi Kiyooka. The Gaijibu, a unique administrative office for a Japanese university, was originally established to negotiate with the Occupation for the return to Keio of its Hiyoshi campus, taken over in 1945. After the return of this campus, the Gaijibu was allotted most functions concerned with Keio's international affiliations, with the problems of individual Keio professors abroad, and with foreign scholars at Keio.

Professor Kiyooka, a Cornell Ph. D. in English, is a grandson of Yukichi Fukuzawa, the founder of Keio, and translator of Fukuzawa's autobiography into English. In addition to heading the Gaijibu, he is Professor of English in the School of Law.

Since Stanford students appeared to be handling the American side, Kiyooka felt that Keio students were their appropriate opposite numbers, and communicated the Stanford suggestion to the Student Self-Government Association or Jichikai. The Jichikai set up a Stanford Affiliation Committee, including representatives of such member organizations as the English Speaking

22. Watkins taught English in a Japanese middle school for two years (1929-1931) following his graduation from Stanford. Many of his friends at that time were Keio graduates. He renewed his acquaintance with Keio on two later occasions: the first was in 1945-1946 when he went to Japan on a military government mission, and the second in 1950 when he participated in the first Stanford - Tokyo American Studies seminar.

Society, Camera Club, and so on. There was no active opposition from any Keio student group, although some might have been anticipated from the left wing.

The relationship between Stanford and Keio was friendly from the start, and reached the student-exchange stage quite early. The first Keio student, Mr. Masao Oda (Economics) spent the year 1956-1957 at Stanford, and there has been at least one Keio man at Stanford in each subsequent academic year. The first Stanford representative at Keio was Mr. Byron Marshall, (Philosophy) in 1957-1958.

Selection as a Keio exchange student at Stanford is a great honor on the Keio campus. It is open to second- and third-year men. Freshmen have not done enough in one year to permit assessment of their qualifications, and seniors are ruled out since the exchange student is expected to spend at least one subsequent year at Keio. The selection from numerous candidates is made by a faculty committee selected for the purpose by the Gaijibu. Candidates are interviewed in both English and Japanese, the English interview being conducted by Americans visiting on the Keio campus. There is also a written examination in English, and applicants' general grade records are considered. A good student is desired, with considerable English facility; on the other hand, he should not be "too academic." Religious affiliations do not enter into the selection; the same cannot be said of political beliefs. The Keio authorities do not believe a left-winger should be sent to Stanford as a Keio representative. Such a student would not only be unhappy at Stanford but, in their opinion, would make others unhappy also.

At Stanford a student committee with a faculty advisor recommends to Keio one or more Stanford students interested in spending a year there. It was originally stipulated that applicants have behind them at least one year of formal instruction in Japanese, but this requirement was waived in 1958. The selection is mainly by oral interview; students are asked questions to test their knowledge of Japan and their possible reactions to difficult problems there.

The exchange students each lose an academic year by the exchange, and thus lengthen their undergraduate programs to

five years. Keio is less strict than Stanford about transferring credits from the other institution; the loss of a year discourages applications on the American side. Students are expected to attend classes (somewhat less than a full program), and also to participate in campus activities and speak when requested in the foreign college community. The non-academic values are expected to be more important than the academic ones, although added English language facility helps the Keio students get good jobs, and the first Stanford exchange student specialized in Far Eastern Philosophy.

A major problem in any student affiliation of this type is financial. Each university gives the exchange student from the other school a full scholarship as well as funds to cover his board, lodging, and minimum incidentals. The contribution is greater from the American side, since costs are higher. Each exchange student must make his own arrangements for transportation expenses although, for the year 1958-1959, Stanford students paid half the transportation cost for the Keio representative. Funds are raised at Stanford from among students by solicitation. At Keio a special assessment has been added to the student activities fee to finance the program. The program remains voluntary in the sense that the Jichikai has voted on behalf of the student body to undertake it, but the actual collection of funds is on a compulsory basis.

The Keio representative is "boarded round" at fraternities and dormitories -- at least one term in a fraternity house and one term in a dormitory. The Stanford representative is aided by Keio to find housing in Tokyo. The first Stanford representative, Mr. Byron Marshall, lived for a time in the home of Mr. Oda, the Keio representative whom he had met at Stanford. Subsequently he moved to a regular boarding house which was inadequately heated, so that he had to move again in mid-winter, this time to a Japanese government hostel for foreign students. In making its selection, Stanford tries to avoid students who may have difficulty standing Japanese winters. This is one reason why Stanford does not select women. Another is that Keio, while officially coeducational, has very few women students.

The financial allowance set aside for the Stanford student at Keio is 30,000 yen, approximately \$85 a month, for ten months. Out of this he is expected to pay for board and lodging. In Marshall's opinion it is possible to live on this, although he himself spent a good deal more, borrowing from his family and relatives. The amount is well in excess of that spent by the average Keio student, so it is hardly fair to Japanese students to expect any more. American students should probably expect to go into debt while in Japan, and to repay their debts upon their return to the United States.

Keio considers the Stanford program sufficiently successful to have attempted a similar one on its own initiative. Many other universities (outside the United States) were circularized, but most were uninterested. The reasons for their lack of interest were primarily the non-academic emphasis of the Keio proposal and the loss of an academic year by the foreign exchange student at Keio. An arrangement was finally worked out with the University of British Columbia in Canada, with which Keio had had sporadic earlier relations under the auspices of the World University Service. The first British Columbia-Keio interchange occurred in September, 1958.

Keio is among the most "international" of Japan's 500 universities. We have noted its solicitation of assistance from Harvard on becoming a university in 1890, its current Harvard affiliation in Business Administration, its participation in the Cooperative Program in Legal Studies, and now its student exchanges with Stanford and British Columbia. There have been other relationships in the recent past either under way or under consideration. An example in each category: Keio has a Library School, established with the assistance of the University of Washington during the Occupation. It has an exchange arrangement in engineering with the Technische Hochschule of Aachen, arranged through the auspices of the (West) German Embassy in Tokyo. An affiliation with Princeton University in Industrial Relations was under consideration in 1958.

Keio is likewise among Japan's most hospitable institutions to Fulbrighters and other visiting scholars.²³ It is natural for Keio teachers to hope that the Stanford and British Columbia relationships may in the future expand to include faculty exchanges as well. Nothing has yet been proposed concretely for financial reasons, and Tokyo University appears meanwhile to have pre-empted the greater share of opportunity for Japanese exchange visitors, at least on the Stanford campus.

PENNSYLVANIA-KANAZAWA STUDENT AFFILIATION

Less flourishing than the Stanford-Keio exchange is another student relationship involving the University of Pennsylvania and Kanazawa University. Penn is an old and well-established institution, a member of the high-prestige "Ivy League" on the Eastern seaboard. Kanazawa, while one of the better Shinsei-Daigaku or "New-System Universities" founded under the Occupation and supported by the national government, remains a Shinsei-Daigaku and a provincial one at that. Its principal constituents had been the prewar Fourth Higher School and Kanazawa Medical College. Its seat, the city of Kanazawa, is the cultural and intellectual center of the Hokuriku region, but the region itself is sometimes known as Ura Nippon or "Japan's Back Door." Fronting on the Sea of Japan rather than the Pacific Ocean and facing Asia rather than the West, Hokuriku has lagged in industrialization and "modernization." Kanazawa University therefore ranks considerably lower in Japan than does Penn in the United States.

The first suggestion that Kanazawa might affiliate with an American university came from Robert G. Flershem, Director of the American Cultural Center in the city, which is also regional headquarters of the United States Information Service (USIS). He was originally a professional historian, and was trained in Japanese by the Canadian army during World War II. After coming to Kanazawa in 1953 he developed a specialized interest in the tomura system of social organization used by the Kaga

23. The writer enjoyed Keio hospitality during the summer of 1955, when investigating post-Occupation developments of the Japanese tax system under a grant from the University of Wisconsin.

Clan in administering the Kanazawa area during the Tokugawa period, and has cooperated with Kanazawa University historians in collecting and preserving source materials on it. Flershem received in 1954 a suggestion from Tokyo headquarters that cultural centers should encourage university affiliations. At the same time USIS encouraged "sister city" programs between American and Japanese municipalities. Several of the latter remain in operation, but the Penn-Kanazawa affiliation is one of the few tangible results of USIS interest in university programs. Flershem was on good terms with Kanazawa's president, Shozo Toda, and brought the suggestion directly to him. After some delay and the inauguration of Professor Tokuzo Namba (Agricultural Education) as Dean of Students,²⁴ President Toda returned to the subject with an inquiry as to possible affiliates. A number of possibilities were mentioned, and nine American universities received inquiries. Pennsylvania's response showed the most interest, probably because President Gaylord P. Harnwell is an enthusiast on international education. Penn also has a strong Department of Oriental Studies, although its interests have in recent years been concentrated on India and Pakistan. While Flershem himself holds a Penn M.A. in history, this connection did not affect the selection. There has been a substantial faculty turnover at Penn since Flershem's student days, and Flershem had not known as a student any of the Penn professors who have been active in the Kanazawa Affiliation Committee. Flershem did, however, visit the Penn campus while on home leave, and encouraged faculty members interested in Japan to cooperate in the affiliation. While correspondence was under way, President Harnwell of Penn visited Kanazawa en route home from Karachi, Pakistan, where Penn had an ICA contract in Public and Business Administration.

A decisive factor in establishing the relationship was an official visit by Mr. Hamilton Mather of the United States Information Agency in Washington to the Penn campus in November, 1955.

24. Dean Namba's predecessor was approaching retirement, and wished to avoid raising possibly controversial issues during his last months in office.

He was referred to Professor F. Hilary Conroy, whose specialty is Japanese history. On behalf of USIA, Mather offered an annual contribution of \$1,000 to the exchange of books, student papers, etc. Conroy accepted on behalf of Penn, after making it clear that no censorship would be permitted. He then wrote President Toda before the end of the month, and the program got under way the following spring.

The program is intentionally decentralized and uncoordinated on the Penn campus. Conroy has been merely the titular head of a faculty group that includes a number of people from political science, medicine, history, Oriental studies, the foreign student advising staff, etc. During the academic year 1958-1959 Professor Dale Saunders (Oriental Studies) replaced Conroy while the latter was in Japan on leave of absence. Both Conroy and Saunders came to Japan for theological conferences during the summer of 1958 and made visits to Kanazawa.

Conroy receives no time off from teaching for activities on this Kanazawa Affiliation Committee. The student organization which does most of the clerical work centers around Japanese and Nisei students and the Women's Self Government Association (WSGA). The president of WSGA in 1957-1958 was Miss Jean Wong, who is half Chinese and lived under Japanese rule in Hong Kong during World War II.

The program is also unambitious, and depends to an unusual extent on student participation. There is a widespread exchange of books and materials. Used books (mainly textbooks) are sent to Kanazawa. Fraternity and sorority members contribute ten cents each for new books to be sent there. The University of Pennsylvania Press supplies Kanazawa with copies of all its publications, and special efforts are also made to assist Kanazawa's medical library collection. The books from Penn are kept in a dean's office at Kanazawa under lock and key, but will be added to the general library after cataloguing.

There is an exchange of student newspapers between the two universities. Pennsylvania has prepared Japanese-language editions of collected papers on Penn student opinion. Kanazawa has prepared an English-language paper about the city and the university at Kanazawa which involved more work than anything

done at Penn. On the Penn side, 20 to 25 students are interested and active in preparing material to be sent to Kanazawa. Most of these are of Japanese ancestry or are active in WSGA. When the English-language Kanazawa News arrived on the Penn campus, however, all copies were snapped up quickly and read eagerly in classrooms and outside. Japanese exhibits and festivities such as a special "Japanese night" are well attended. The exhibits have featured materials supplied by Kanazawa students on Japanese art, the Japanese theatre, etc. Home Economics students at Kanazawa also prepared two dolls in local costume for one exhibit in Philadelphia.

In summary, Penn looks on the Kanazawa affiliation as mainly involving students and as aimed primarily at international understanding. This viewpoint seems to be shared by Kanazawa students. Kanazawa's Affiliation Committee, however, is dominated by its 11 faculty members, selected by the various departments, and would prefer a different orientation. The remainder of the Kanazawa committee consists of 19 students selected by the Student Self-Government Association and by various clubs. The English-Speaking Society, the Camera Club, and the student newspaper are among the most active.

Kanazawa reports itself satisfied with the student side of the affiliation. Rather less than 10 per cent of the student body of approximately 3,000 shows any interest, but nothing more was ever expected. There was some opposition in 1955-1956, mainly in the Law Faculty and the English department. The ground was the standard neutralist one -- affiliations with American universities are "un-neutral" until such time as similar affiliations with Russian and Chinese universities are permitted. The opposition has died down, partly because Penn has kept propaganda out of its communications to Kanazawa and partly because the chief opposition leader accepted a position at another university.

The Kanazawa faculty would like to see faculty exchanges on a scholarly basis, rather than merely casual student communication. Professors of medicine, natural sciences, and economics would like opportunities to use Penn's research facilities, which are superior to anything available at Kanazawa. Professors of English would like the chance to use Penn's libraries and improve

their command of oral English. Enthusiasm for inviting Penn faculty members to Kanazawa is centered in medicine and economics. Within the economics faculty, interest comes from a business administration group led by Professor Atsuo Maruoka which would like to see the practical and empirical approach of Penn's famous Wharton School developed in Japan as a counterweight to the stress on pure theory and Marxism in Japanese economics.

Financial considerations prevent either Penn or Kanazawa from expanding the affiliation rapidly along the lines desired by the Japanese. There is also some question whether such extension is worthwhile from Penn's point of view. Small beginnings have, however, been made. Assistant Professor Tokumoto Makita (Education) combined a Penn tuition scholarship with a Fulbright travel grant to spend a year in Philadelphia studying American literature. In addition to his scholarship, Makita received a monthly stipend for work in the preparation of Japanese-language materials sent by Penn to Kanazawa under the affiliation program. Makita teaches American literature in Kanazawa's American Studies program, which is in the Faculty of Education. His training is, however, primarily in English rather than Education.

Penn contributed funds but not personnel in support of the tomura research on which Kanazawa historians have worked together with Flershem of USIS. The first Penn contribution of faculty personnel came in 1959-1960. Mr. James Q. Harty, Instructor in the Wharton School, received a Fulbright grant to lecture and conduct research in Industrial Management at Kanazawa. "Pure theory" and "Marxist" sentiments combined to block accreditation of his courses by Kanazawa's Economics Department after a factional dispute, but they were accredited by the Faculty of Engineering instead. A reciprocal appointment was arranged for 1960-1961 in Medicine, the other major field in which Kanazawa had hoped for faculty interchange with Penn. A young Japanese radiologist was to have come to Penn in that year, but the Penn medical faculty made its acceptance of the visitor conditional on his passing the "standard medical examination" set for all foreign physicians practicing in the United

States. The Kanazawa candidate postponed this examination until too late for him to take up his visiting appointment on schedule.

It is also improbable that the student program will expand along the lines of the other programs discussed in this chapter. Finances are lacking, particularly at Kanazawa which considers itself among Japan's more impecunious universities. There is also a special reason for Kanazawa's lack of interest in having Penn students or recent graduates visit. Each summer ten or a dozen American students from a number of Eastern colleges and universities spend approximately six weeks in the Kanazawa area²⁵ under the auspices of the Experiment in International Living, which has no direct connection with individual educational institutions. These students live in Japanese families, discuss current issues with Kanazawa students, and attempt partial assimilation into the Japanese environment. This vacation program reduces the interest in broadening the Pennsylvania affiliation along similar lines.

As a possible result of the Pennsylvania affiliation Kanazawa University applied for three American visiting professors under the Fulbright program for 1959-1960. This is a distinct innovation, since the university had previously been among the most stand-offish in Japan. There has also sprung up on both the Penn and the Kanazawa campuses an interest in the eminent Japanese biochemist Jokichi Takamine (1854 - 1922). Brought up in Kanazawa, Takamine spent most of his working life in America after helping establish the chemical fertilizer industry of Japan. In America he achieved fame as the discoverer of adrenalin and Takadiastase. A Takamine Society now perpetuates his name in his home city. He also married an American lady from a Philadelphia family, but had no direct connection with either the University of Pennsylvania or Kanazawa University.

25. Kanazawa was selected because, more than most other cities, it represents the old Japan which was so largely destroyed during World War II. It is a quiet old joka-machi or "castle town," with narrow streets, no bomb damage, and a population which has been nearly stationary for a generation.

FAR EAST DIVISION, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

Unlike any of the other programs reviewed in this study, this is an American program for Americans overseas, and is not designed to exercise any particular impact either in America or abroad. It operates in American military establishments throughout the Far East, but is treated as Japanese because its headquarters are in Tokyo.

Courses at the college level under the supervision of the University of Maryland's College of Special and Continuation Studies are given to American military and civilian personnel at one establishment at Guam, 20 in Japan, 24 in Korea, six in Okinawa, and one in Taiwan under the general supervision of the Far East Division of the College, located in Tokyo. The program gives degrees in both liberal arts and military studies. Originated in 1956, it granted its first 20 degrees in June, 1958. Eighteen of these first degrees were in military studies, only two in liberal arts.

The degree-conferring feature explains why Maryland took over the program, which had been started mainly for servicemen by the University of California in 1950. California refused to waive a requirement that all graduates' last 30 hours be taken in residence on the California campus, but Maryland was willing to consider its foreign extension centers part of its College Park campus for degree-conferring purposes. When California found that a strict interpretation of its rules precluded its meeting military requests for a degree program in the Far East, California people suggested Maryland as the most qualified successor institution. One reason for considering Maryland particularly qualified was its record of cooperation with the military since 1947 in educational projects all over the world -- in the North Atlantic, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and also in the Pentagon.

Relations between California and Maryland have continued to be friendly. California turned over its relevant files and also a part of its teaching and administrative personnel to Maryland when the program was transferred. Maryland administrators in Tokyo nevertheless pride themselves on having doubled California's

enrollment record in two years, which suggests that the friendship is not untouched by rivalry.

Classes are held not in the Tokyo headquarters but for the most part in American military establishments ("bases") under widely varying conditions. Class arrangements are made by consultation between base educational directors, usually civilians, and Maryland representatives in Tokyo. Only a few classes are given at any one base at any one time. Each class meets two nights a week for eight weeks, each night's session lasting for three hours. A full-time instructor handles two classes at a time for five eight-week terms a year. A part-time instructor may handle half this load (a single class), but usually handles less (one class in some terms, none in other terms). Very few students are able to take more than one class at a time.

Classes are mainly at the freshman - sophomore level, but advanced courses are also offered. Students are more ambitious and highly motivated than at most American campuses. At most bases laboratory facilities do not exist, so instruction is limited to humanities, social sciences, and mathematics. Libraries are poor. Attempts are made to combine the facilities of the numerous base libraries by inter-library loans, and likewise to use Maryland's own library in Tokyo to provide some course readings beyond the assigned textbooks. The machinery was still imperfect in the fall of 1958, and books often failed to reach outlying bases in time.

In principle the minimum size of a class is 30 if taught by a full-time instructor and 15 if taught by a part-time instructor, but these rules are not enforced strictly. Since the program is expected to be self-supporting, there is a bias in favor of the large elementary classes rather than the smaller advanced ones. California, which was willing to run its Far Eastern operations at a financial loss, offered a larger proportion of advanced courses.

Effort is expended to make the degrees granted in Tokyo the equivalent of regular Maryland degrees. This means that recipients have had American college work before coming to the Far East, particularly in natural sciences, since these are weak in the Far East. It also means that in many major subjects

no degrees can be given. Students can compete for service scholarships which will give them their final year in any American institution they choose, or they may transfer their Far East Division credits to other American schools after they return to the United States; this lessens the importance of the limitations of the Maryland program.

Maryland's degree in military studies has been under attack, since Maryland accepts as much as 35 hours of "service credit" for work which is in considerable degree non-academic.²⁶ On the other hand, it requires 136 semester hours of work instead of the usual 120. It is represented by Maryland as the equivalent of a West Point or Annapolis degree with one important and defensible difference. Whereas West Point or Annapolis supplement strictly military subjects mainly from natural sciences and engineering, Maryland does so from humanities and social sciences. At any rate, Maryland's military studies degree has been recognized in the United States. Ten to 12 alumni a year (from all over the world) enter the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, to cite a prominent example.

The Maryland staff is headed by three full-time administrators, only one of whom is on leave from Maryland. The full-time teaching staff included between 11 and 13 people as of August, 1958, only one of whom was on leave from Maryland. Those not on a leave status have no permanent academic standing at Maryland. Over 100 people have been made eligible to teach courses on a part-time basis, but only half are teaching at any one time. All full-time people and nearly all part-time people are Westerners: officers, enlisted men, civilian employees of the armed services, commercial residents, missionaries, teachers, etc. None of the part-time people has any permanent standing on the Maryland campus.

All contracts are for one year only, which means some insecurity for instructors not on leave from Maryland. There is a

26. The courses in question are "Basic ROTC (two years); Advanced ROTC (two years); Physical Activities (two years); Military Speech and Command (two semesters); Military Leadership (one semester)." University of Maryland, Far East Division Bulletin No. 1 (January, 1958), pp. 22 f.

high turnover rate -- 20 to 30 per cent per year -- but recruiting of full-time people is not usually difficult. Many have an interest in the Far East, others enjoy the adventure, others have sabbatical leave from various institutions. A considerable number can earn more money in this program than in any other, and have obligations (such as alimony payments) which require them to maximize this earning power.

Salaries of the instructors do not appear high by American standards. Full-time instructors, however, have full diplomatic privileges -- use of P.X. and commissary facilities, use of military transportation, hotel rooms at \$9 per month (\$15 in 1959), steak dinners at \$1 per plate, and so on. In addition, they are for all practical purposes exempt from both American and Japanese income taxes if they stay for more than 18 months. Considering these features, one unmarried instructor has computed his salary (\$5,600) to be the approximate equivalent of \$11,000 at an American university. The differential is smaller for the married instructors, or instructors with other dependents.

On the other hand, instructors are subject to reassignment every 16 weeks, and are expected ordinarily to spend some time at relatively undesirable posts, both in and out of Japan. The least desirable posts are those located north of Seoul in Korea. Here instructors are expected to live in tents in the front lines in midwinter, quite like enlisted men. This movement and reassignment makes it difficult to satisfy married men with families. As a result, almost all the full-time people are single, separated, or divorced. Part-time instructors are subject to reassignment, if at all, only within a limited area such as metropolitan Tokyo. On the other hand, they have none of the "fringe benefits" of the full-time staff.

Full-time instructors who are not members of the Maryland faculty are hired for the Far East Program by the chairmen of the respective departments at Maryland. When a Maryland faculty member comes, he does not stay more than three years, and some Maryland chairmen oppose renewal of other full-time contracts more than twice. Part-time instructors are recruited locally, but each Maryland chairman has a veto power over any appointment in his field. This system, designed as insurance

against incompetent instruction, does not always work well in practice. The standards applied are sometimes lower than for candidates to teach at Maryland itself. Men "eligible" in one department are sometimes automatically eligible in other departments as well, which rarely happens at College Park. Thus an economist may be certified to teach classes in Mathematics or Business Administration or Political Science as well as Economics. Moreover, eligibility is interpreted broadly, to cover all courses in a department: if a man is eligible in History, he is eligible in American, European, and Far Eastern History, and may teach whichever branch there is most demand for. On the Maryland campus, sub-areas within departments are separated more scrupulously. Some instructors in the Far Eastern division have volunteered to teach in fields which they have never studied; others have been assigned to this form of "on-the-job-training" despite some protests. It is difficult for instructors to keep up with their specialties or do research while with the Maryland program. This is because of frequent reassignments, lack of laboratory facilities, and inadequate library facilities. Nevertheless, the small course-load permits some research output by the full-time staff.

Briefing is done mainly in Tokyo by the administrative staff. It has failed in some cases to prepare people to stand the rigors of tent life in the Korean winter, or to observe the requirements of military courtesy. The proportion of instructors who have serious difficulties with these or other features of quasi-military life as civilians is cited by Maryland administrators in arguing in favor of limiting contracts to one year. In most cases, however, there has been room to doubt whether a longer or more formal briefing program would have done enough better to be worth its cost.

Maryland's Far Eastern Program is much less international in aspect than its European one, according to instructors who have taught in both. Whereas in Europe many instructors of French, German, or other nationalities are hired, the Far Eastern Program includes a smaller number of Orientals. The reason is that so few Oriental teachers are able to conduct classes in English, although many Europeans can. There were

in 1958 no full-time Far Eastern nationals on the staff, but the part-time instructors included four Japanese (three teaching Japanese, one American History), two Ryukyans (one teaching Japanese, one Accounting), and one Korean (teaching the Korean language). Three other Japanese nationals had been certified as eligible to teach Japanese language, literature, or history, but were not actually teaching because of lack of demand for these classes. All these Far Eastern teachers have had American training, and are known to at least one American university. They had full-time jobs, usually with universities, in addition to their Maryland teaching assignments; their Maryland appointments were only secondary. Because American and Far Eastern pay scales are so different, problems arise in the payment of Far Eastern instructors. Japanese teachers, for example, are paid at approximately double the Japanese scale for similar work, but this is on the average only 60 per cent of what their American colleagues are receiving. The Japanese instructors know that the Americans receive more pay for the same work, but the Maryland administrators are confident that they do not resent the differential because they are receiving so much more than they would in a purely Japanese institution. In fact, Maryland receives on the average two or three applications a month from Japanese teachers who want part-time work in the program.

Japanese students also apply for permission to attend Maryland classes, mainly to improve their knowledge of English and of American educational methods. They are, however, not eligible to attend even as auditors, and even if they have already obtained admission to American universities. Maryland has three reasons for this inflexible policy. One is to avoid any possible competition with Japanese universities or any disagreements with the Japanese Ministry of Education. Another is that classes are held on American military installations, so that security problems would be involved if Japanese attended classes there. A third is that tuition must be paid in dollars, which Japanese and Koreans are forbidden to possess. A few Oriental nationals (possibly five or six a year) do attend classes, as exceptions to the rule just mentioned. They are workers on the American bases who already have security clearance and are vouched for by American

officers. These officers also usually pay the dollar tuition charges for their proteges.

Two perennial problems relate to instructors' desire for tenure and to relations with education specialists on the military bases. A good many full-time instructors would like some assurance of employment either at College Park or in Maryland's other overseas programs in case the Far Eastern Program should be cut down. Maryland tries to make such transfers in practice, but cannot guarantee them. Maryland is particularly loath to make such assurances in the Far East, since Far Eastern assignments are considered less desirable than European, and the Far Eastern Program is staffed partially from European programs which have been scaled down. Tenure problems are of course reduced in magnitude when part-time teachers are used. These teachers have other connections in the Far East and usually desire no connection with the University of Maryland outside the country where they are employed.

The Maryland instructors work with the education directors and education specialists at the various military bases to which they are assigned, and conflicts sometimes arise between them. These education directors and specialists are usually civilian employees of the military, but any "anti-intellectual" criticisms of the program are expressed by them rather than by the uniformed personnel.²⁷ The education directors and specialists have often left positions in secondary school teaching or administration in America. Their educational backgrounds are apt to be in teachers colleges or in university departments of Education. They tend to be weak in "subject matter areas." Their efficiency ratings and advancement depend largely on the enrollment in courses on their bases, and on the good will of the officers who rate them. They therefore put considerable pressure on Maryland to give elementary rather than advanced courses. More rarely, they exert pressure on Maryland to

27. The "anti-intellectual" military man seldom causes any difficulty. The Maryland classes are purely voluntary, and the anti-intellectual stays away.

hire high-ranking officers as part-time teachers, and urge high grades for everyone, to insure high enrollment in classes.

Underlying the education directors' hostility toward the Maryland teachers, when it exists, may be jealousy of the higher academic qualifications of the Maryland staff, and a fear of having their own academic inadequacies exposed. Education directors are typically older and more experienced than Maryland instructors, and wish more recognition of their seniority and status than they are accorded.

Academic freedom, on the other hand, is not an issue. In classes of uniformed personnel on American military bases controversial economic and social questions can generally be discussed with the same freedom as in ordinary American university classrooms. It may be that any outright "indoctrination" in "un-American" ideas would be suppressed especially quickly and firmly on military bases, but the problem has not arisen. One instructor of several social science subjects has suggested that military men themselves -- at least, military men interested in off-duty classes -- are less given to emotional fanaticism than are some of their self-appointed spokesmen in civilian life. It is these latter who are "More Royalist than the King, more Catholic than the Pope," and "More Militarist than the General."

OVERSEAS PROGRAMS OF JAPANESE UNIVERSITIES

This report has pictured the overseas relations of Japanese universities as passively one-sided, with Japanese learning from Americans and Europeans. In fact, Japanese universities have long been havens for foreign students and have begun to institutionalize their foreign relations in somewhat the same way as American universities have done.

As soon as it became obvious that Japan was Westernizing more successfully than the other countries of East Asia, Asian students began attending Japan's new educational institutions. They were for the most part Chinese and Koreans, for whom the Japanese language was not a serious problem. For many of them Japan was a second choice -- if they had had more money, they would have preferred Europe or America. On returning home, some of them

became important influences in modernizing and pro-Japanese directions. The attempted reformers of the Manchu Empire in China, and the Republicans who overthrew it, included many leaders trained in Japan as well as in the West.

A biography of the Chinese Communist General Chu Teh provides an interesting outlook on Chinese students in Japan during the 15 years following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, together with unfriendly asides on American educational relationships with China during the same period.

After [the Sino-Japanese War, General Chu] said, Japanese influence spread swiftly throughout China, and Japanese advisers were attached to every branch of the government, to industries, and to schools and colleges. "A Japanese teacher even began teaching in a new school not far from my home. Frightened by the rapid rise of Japanese imperialism, Peking sent thousands of students to Japan -- most of them to study military science, administration, and international law.

"Many Chinese students went to Japan to study because the cost of living there was about the same as in China. Some went to America on Boxer indemnity scholarships, but America was not popular in China in 1905 because the final step in the Chinese Exclusion Act had just been taken and because news circulated in China of maltreatment, and even murder, of Chinese in the United States . . ."

The United States, General Chu said, returned a small part of its share in the Boxer indemnity for the purpose of building Tsinghua University near Peking, but this was no philanthropy. Tsinghua was set up for the purpose of training students to be sent to the United States for advanced studies, after which they were expected to serve American interests. 28

28. Agnes Smedley, The Great Road: The Life and Times of Chu Teh (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1956), pp. 64, 56.

The Japanese welcomed these foreign students, even -- perhaps especially -- those coming as refugees from backward countries or from Western colonies. Japanese educational institutions sometimes admitted them as special students when they could not pass regular entrance examinations. As in America, low-ranking schools were more liberal than the more elite institutions. For Koreans in particular, after the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910, it was usually easier to obtain higher education in Japan than at home.

Japanese imperialism brought with it Japanese universities abroad. Full-scale Imperial universities were established in Taihoku (the present Taipei, Taiwan) and in Keijo (the present Seoul, Korea). Other small private institutions in China, mainly in and around Dairen and Shanghai, specialized in training Japanese and Chinese students in each others' language and culture in the eventual interest of Sino-Japanese "co-prosperity." These institutions differed drastically in character. The Korean one was almost entirely for Japanese. Korean students were admitted only under restrictive quotas, and Korean teachers were not employed. The Chinese schools were more liberal on all counts, and more successful in developing international understanding and goodwill.

All this collapsed in 1945. Japanese educational institutions abroad were turned over to Chinese and Koreans, and their Japanese faculties repatriated to Japan. Foreigners were not given passports to study in Japan under the Occupation. The foreign-student population of the Japanese universities was limited largely to occasional individuals who had been in Japan at the time of the Surrender and had chosen to remain.

After the recovery of independence in 1952, however, Japanese universities began once more to attract foreign students, primarily from the Asian Continent, somewhat as they had done in the later nineteenth century. We have attempted no detailed examination of their programs, but present scattered notes on current developments.

1. There were in the academic year 1958-1959 over 600 Asian students in Japan's 500 universities, according to estimates of the

Society for Economic Cooperation in Asia (Asia Keizai Kyokai).²⁹ This compares with 138 in 1954-1955. Many have come under scholarship programs sponsored by the American ICA, the Colombo Plan, and the United Nations. The largest number are Chinese from Taiwan and Hong Kong. Many grew up under Japanese rule, or are refugees from Communist China. These estimates do not include Korean residents in Japan, many of whom are illegal immigrants and plan to return to Korea.³⁰ The Japanese Ministry of Education has provided hostels for Asian students (not resident Koreans) in Tokyo. In 1958 an impressive structure called the Asia Center of Japan (Asia Kaikan), to house 150 of their number, was built by a non-profit corporation with Japanese government funds.

2. Individual Japanese universities will make special concessions to foreign students desiring admission. We have noticed this at ICU, but it is also true of more conventional Japanese institutions. An example is drawn from the English-language bulletin of the Hitotsubashi University, which is supported by the Japanese government.

Students from non-Japanese speaking countries who seek admission to the graduate or undergraduate courses must demonstrate proficiency in Japanese, since all lectures are given in that language.

Overseas students are not given the regular entrance examination, but must pass a special test.

Applicants whose admission is particularly requested by the Japanese government, foreign governments or institutions which our university recognizes, are sometimes admitted as special students. After studying in the university for more than four years and after completing

29. Japan Times, December 15, 1958.

30. They consider themselves refugees from the government of the Republic of Korea, and will not return voluntarily to the jurisdiction of that government. Several thousand were repatriated to North Korea in 1959-1960, over the protests of the Republic of Korea.

the requirements in accordance with the fixed regulations, they may be given the Degree of Gakushi (Bachelor).

With regard to graduates of overseas universities who wish to enter the graduate school of our university, if such overseas universities are of good standing and if the applicants are proficient in Japanese, they may be eligible. Although, they must pass a special examination.³¹

3. Sophia University (Jochi Daigaku), Japan's leading Catholic university, is located in Tokyo. It has an ambitious International Department founded in 1947. Courses are given in English to foreigners and Japanese alike. Japanese students must, however, be graduates of Japanese universities. Courses are designed to correspond with those offered in accredited American colleges, and to lead to admission to Western graduate and professional schools. Sophia University finances between two and four scholarships a year for graduates who wish to pursue advanced study in Europe or the United States. These are primarily for Japanese graduates of the "regular" university, but one International Department graduate has won one. There are 600 students in the International Department, approximately 90 per cent of them Americans. The faculty is international, with American, German, French, Belgian, Spanish, and Japanese members. Among the non-Japanese faculty of Sophia as a whole, German Jesuits predominated until 1945, and the university was regarded erroneously as German. Since 1945 there has been a predominance of Americans among the foreign staff, and the university is regarded erroneously as American. In fact, however, Sophia's staff and administration have been predominantly Japanese since its founding in 1906.

Outside its International Division, Sophia University has sponsored student exchanges with Vietnam during the summer recess. A number of Sophia students specializing in French went to Saigon in 1957 and stayed in the homes of Catholic Vietnamese students known to French Jesuits there. The following

31. Hitotsubashi University Bulletin of Information (1955-1956), p. 71.

year (1958) the Vietnamese group visited Japan and lived in a Sophia dormitory. It is hoped that this arrangement can be made permanent and expanded into a student exchange with Jesuit institutions throughout the Far East.³² Another program, with Latin America, is also under consideration. In the summer of 1957 ten of Sophia's students of Spanish, accompanied by a professor of Spanish, went to various Latin American ports on a Japanese freighter. Their purpose was not only to improve language facility, but also to make trade contacts.

4. Asia University, located at Musashino in the suburbs of Tokyo, grew out of the Toa Semmon Gakko or East Asia Technical College founded in 1938 by the Gotoh Educational Foundation to train Japanese for overseas jobs in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It has a student body of 1,000 Japanese interested largely in trade with China and Southeast Asia. In addition the university has enrolled 150 overseas Chinese from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaya, Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos. Some of these are also aiming at trade careers in Japan, but most hope for diplomatic careers or graduate study at Japanese universities, particularly in medicine.

There are two main features of the Asia University program which invite comparison with what American universities are doing. One is its foreign student program for overseas Chinese and the other its exchange affiliation with New Asia College in Hong Kong.

Each entering class at Asia University includes about 25 overseas Chinese, of whom two or three are women. They usually know no Japanese, and although they have been selected from a large number of applicants their high school training does not come up to Japanese standards in such subjects as English and natural sciences. They therefore spend a year or a year and a half in the university's preparatory department. In the first six months they study nothing but Japanese, and subsequently make up the deficiencies of their high school training. These special classes are conducted in Chinese. After they have made

32. There is a Jesuit university in Manila, and another is planned for Seoul.

up their deficiencies, they enter the regular university, and graduate in five years instead of four.

The Chinese students are housed together in a special dormitory, but are encouraged to meet Japanese socially. They are taken on frequent sightseeing tours not only in Tokyo but all over Japan. The adjustment problem is eased because many of the students have relatives in Japan. During the summer vacation, students live with middle- or upper-class Japanese families for a month. The program has worked well to the extent that there have been no problems of home-sickness or mental illness among the overseas Chinese students. In fact, none has had to be dropped from school for any reason, although some have needed a good deal of special tutoring.

The student exchange with New Asia College in Hong Kong is different from American "Junior Years Abroad." Each year two third-year Japanese students of Asia University who have done well in three years of Chinese, and whose general scholastic records are good, are sent to Hong Kong at the expense of Asia University. There they take their fourth year at New Asia College after six months of further intensive study of the Chinese language. At the end of a total of five years these students graduate in Hong Kong with degrees from Asia University in Japan as well as New Asia College. A similar program in reverse is available to New Asia College students with three years of work in Japanese. Asia University hopes to extend this exchange program to cover other overseas Chinese universities, such as the Nanyang University in Singapore and one of the private colleges in Taiwan. Its philosophy being strongly anti-Communist, it does not propose to enter into relations with any Communist institution either on the Chinese Mainland or among the overseas Chinese.

5. As part of the Japanese Indonesian Reparations Agreement, the Japanese Government is training 100 Indonesian university students per year in various Japanese universities, public and private. The main problems faced by this program in its early years were linguistic and financial. Few of the Indonesians knew Japanese before then, and many found the Japanese Government stipend (¥ 150,000, or approximately \$45, per month) quite inadequate.

CHAPTER 5 PROGRAMS IN KOREA

An hour's flight across the Sea of Japan by commercial airline will carry the traveler from Southwest Japan to Southeast Korea. But despite the geographical proximity of the two countries, and despite their many cultural affinities, American university programs face quite different problems on the opposite sides of the narrow sea.

Korea is less developed than Japan with regard to Western civilization, thanks to nearly two additional generations of isolation in the later nineteenth century. Its contacts with America in particular were much more limited than those of Japan until the Liberation of 1945. The obvious material gap between "modern" Japan and "backward" Korea was reduced by World War II, in which Japan was bombed and Korea escaped undamaged. The gap was then increased again by the devastating and inconclusive ground warfare in Korea during 1950-1951, from which recovery has been slowed by the political division of Korea and the concentration of labor power in military service.

American university programs in Korea have perforce been concentrated in the modernized capital of Seoul (Keijo) to a greater extent than such programs in Japan have been concentrated in Tokyo. This is in part because historically Korea has had only one major center outside Seoul. This is Pyongyang (Heijo). The rivalry between Seoul and Pyongyang corresponds vaguely to that between Tokyo and Kyoto in Japan. Pyongyang is,

however, the capital of North Korea, and American programs have not been welcome there. Even with this concentration of programs in Seoul, the logistic problems of housing and transportation have been more severe than in Japan. Several of the programs in Korea we shall find larger in scale than any we have seen in Japan, building up Korean universities over broader areas and from more primitive beginnings. The roles of both the American and the Korean governments have been active, more so than the roles of the American and Japanese governments in connection with the Japanese programs.

There is as yet no Fulbright program in Korea, so that the ICA-sponsored university affiliations are more important than they would otherwise be. The United States gave the Republic of Korea a good deal of surplus military property after World War II, for which the Korean currency equivalent was to be used to finance a Fulbright program, but this property was used or destroyed in the Korean War. Negotiations were under way in 1959 for a standard Fulbright program to be financed by the sale of surplus American agricultural commodities in Korea.

Although there is currently no Fulbright program in Korea, there is a Smith-Mundt program financed by a direct United States government dollar grant. Under this grant there were in 1958-1959 45 Korean students in the United States and two visiting Smith-Mundt professors in Korean universities. (One taught American literature at Seoul National University, and the other political science at Korea University, both in Seoul.)

On the American side in particular, ICA has been the initiating force in setting up programs, almost to the exclusion of educational foundations or individual universities. There are, however, portents of future non-governmental international activity by American educational institutions in Korea. Marquette University (Wisconsin) is the chosen instrument of the Jesuit Order in a plan to establish a Jesuit university in Seoul. Chungang University outside Seoul is seeking foundation support and American university affiliation for programs in both American studies (for Koreans) and Korean studies (for Americans and Europeans).

ICA's operating group in Korea is not a United States Operations Mission (USOM) as in Japan and most other countries. It is called OEC, the Office of the Economic Co-Ordinator for Korea. The Co-Ordinator himself, although an American (Mr. William L. Warne), is technically a United Nations official since his post arises as a consequence of United Nations intervention in the Korean War, and since he represents the other allied participants in that war along with the United States.

BACKGROUND BEFORE 1945

For decades after both China and Japan were open to trade with the West, Korea remained the "Hermit Kingdom," hermetically sealed. This isolation was maintained by violence -- French, American, and Japanese overtures were all forcibly repelled during the decade 1866-1875.¹ Korean success in defeating the West where China and Japan had yielded was a source of great pride to the ruling Lee dynasty,² giving the Korean nobility a completely exaggerated and unfounded notion of their country's military ability to withstand more determined foreign pressures.

The period of adamant Korean anti-foreignism ended in the 1880's, to be succeeded by two decades of rivalry for influence in the country. During the decade ending in 1895 the rivals were China and Japan, China being the country's traditional suzerain until Japan won a short war in 1894-1895. During the decade ending in 1905 the rivals were Japan and Russia. Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was followed by a de facto Japanese protectorate over the country and five years later (1910) by outright annexation. A third period of Korean history is therefore the 50 years of Japanese domination that ended in 1945.

None of these three periods could be considered favorable for American influence in Korea, whether political, economic, or cultural. During the first period Americans were under the

1. For an account of these overtures, see H. M. Vinacke, A History of the Far East in Modern Times (New York: Crofts, 1941), p. 124 f.

2. The name of the Korean royal family is also frequently written Li and Yi.

general anti-foreign ban. During the second period they were overshadowed by the more energetic efforts of the three powers bordering on Korea, namely China, Japan, and Russia. During the third period they were objects of continued suspicion and frequent discrimination by the dominant Japanese, as Japanese-American relations deteriorated steadily from 1906 to 1941.³

The principal educators to enter the unfriendly and unprofitable Korean field were Protestant Missionaries, mainly Presbyterian. Roman Catholic missionary activity in Korea was largely French, and fell under Japanese suspicion as pro-Russian during the Franco - Russian entente cordiale preceding World War I. The first "educational institution" founded was entirely secular, however, being a language school for interpreters opened by the Korean Crown in 1883 under Mr. T. E. Halifax, described as "a telegrapher without scholarly pretensions."⁴ This school was short-lived, but three years later, at the request of the Korean government, the United States Commissioner of Education nominated three young graduates of the Union Theological Seminary to teach English to 30 sons of Korean noblemen. This school, too, failed to prosper, as its funds were diverted to the private purses of Korean officials, but its teachers stayed on as missionaries in Korea and attempted vainly to influence President Theodore Roosevelt to uphold Korean independence against Japanese pressure.⁵

In the same year (1886) there was founded under Methodist auspices the oldest missionary college in Korea surviving today. This is Ewha Haktong ("Pear-Blossom Institute"), so named by the Queen of Korea. Originally a girls' school, it has been of

3. The first date marks the passage of a San Francisco municipal ordinance segregating Japanese and other Oriental school children, which was resented bitterly throughout Japan. See Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 17. The second date is, of course, that of the Pearl Harbor attack.

4. K. C. Chung, Korea Tomorrow (New York: Macmillan, 1956), p. 11.

5. L. George Paik, History of Protestant Missions in Korea, 1832-1910 (Pyongyang: Union Christian College Press, 1929), p. 118.

collegiate grade since 1910. According to tradition its first student was a concubine whose patron sent her to learn English in hopes that his own prestige might rise if she became interpreter for the Queen.⁶ It speaks well of the tolerance of the missionaries that they admitted young ladies of this background--but they were hardly in a position to choose. Widespread Korean rumors accused the American missionaries of planning to send graduates of mission schools to America as slaves and even of "fattening them up for the table."⁷

Three other surviving American missionary colleges should also be mentioned, although none of them has the institutional connections of, say, Hokkaido with Massachusetts or Doshisha with Amherst.

The Union Christian College (Soong Sil) was founded in Pyongyang by the extension of a boys' school in 1905 to cover two years of college. A joint Presbyterian-Methodist enterprise, it was a stronghold of religious fundamentalism. At first only Christians were admitted, and the English language was omitted deliberately from the curriculum to avoid attracting students with worldly interests.⁸ It was primarily a "feeder" institution for the Presbyterian Theological Seminary founded in 1902, also in Pyongyang, and for many years the largest Presbyterian seminary in the world.⁹ It could not achieve recognition from the Japanese because the program included compulsory Bible study.¹⁰ After the partition of Korea the buildings and grounds were taken over by the Communists and Soong Sil moved to

6. Ibid., p. 119.

7. Ibid., p. 125.

8. Horace H. Underwood, Modern Education in Korea (New York: International Press, 1926), p. 127.

9. The Pyongyang Seminary required no college-level work for admission, however, and was under constant criticism for low scholastic standards. Ibid., p. 145.

10. Ibid., p. 128.

Seoul, where many of its faculty became affiliated with other institutions, but where Soong Sil itself survives on a small scale.

An early tangible sign of reaction against Pyongyang fundamentalism was the establishment of the Severance Medical College in 1905. After a false start as early as 1884, Severance was established in Seoul as a missionary medical college. Its founder was a medical missionary, Dr. O. R. Avison, stationed at Severance Hospital (Presbyterian). Avison had been translating standard medical texts into Korean since 1893. Although efforts at medical education were opposed at first by many of Avison's fellow-missionaries as too secular, the Presbyterians were joined by a number of other Protestant mission groups in financing Severance. These accessions occurred mainly during the five years from 1912 to 1917. Severance also included after 1906 a Nurses' Training School as well as medical training proper, but the nurses' training was at a high-school educational level.

Chosen Christian College, later to join with Severance to form Yonsei University, was a more direct revolt against Pyongyang and Union Christian College. Its leading spirit was Dr. Horace G. Underwood, whose initial teaching fields in Korea had been, significantly enough, elementary physics and chemistry (at the Kwang Hei Won Hospital from which Severance later grew). Dissatisfied with the narrow religiosity and elementary nature of the Union curriculum, Underwood and the liberal-modernist group among the missionaries finally started a college of their own at Seoul in 1915, after years of debate -- one college versus two, Pyongyang versus Seoul. The new college, Chosen Christian, had commercial and science departments from its inception, and was accused constantly of insufficient stress on Christianity.

Dr. Underwood died in 1916, whereupon President Avison of Severance served as head of Chosen Christian College until 1933, the common presidency forecasting the subsequent union of the two schools. Avison was succeeded by Dr. Horace H. Underwood, son of the founder. Although subsequent presidents have been Asians, members of the Underwood family resumed their connection with the administration of Chosen Christian College and its successor institutions in 1945.

Although it received a Japanese charter in 1917 (as a Technical School or Semmon Gakko, definitely below collegiate status), Chosen Christian College operated from the outset as a potential center of American and therefore anti-Japanese influence in Korea. Eventually the Japanese expelled the last American missionary president, Dr. Horace H. Underwood, in 1940. Two years later they changed the institution's name to Chosen Kogyo Keiei Semmon Gakko [Chosen College of Technology and Business] and ran it themselves during World War II as a purely secular establishment.

Korean students in America, fewer than Japanese, have been less extensively studied. They appear to have been concentrated in two categories with only slight overlapping. Those in the first category were Christians, whose American education was financed partially or wholly by missionaries and by the Korean Christian colleges. Many of these became professors, pastors, and secondary-school teachers in Korea. Those in the second group were refugees from Japanese rule in Korea.

The disfavor with which the Japanese regarded American-supported Korean colleges applied equally to Koreans desiring to study in the United States. Not only did the Japanese-controlled government and Japanese firms refuse to hire such Koreans after their return to Korea, but the Japanese authorities did all they could to discourage their leaving the country in the first place. The technique used was the delay of their passports. It took several months and often several years for a Korean student to receive his Japanese passport for study in the United States. The time was taken up mainly by careful investigation of the applicant, his background, and his political views by the Japanese "Thought Police." Fear of being brought to the special attention of the dreaded "Thought Police" discouraged many Koreans from attempting to study abroad at all.

As for the second category, political refugees, these fled Korea mainly during the oppressive governor-generalships of Terauchi and Hasegawa (1910-1920). The largest exodus came after the bloody suppression of anti-Japanese demonstrations in the spring of 1919. The exiles fled in the first instance to Manchuria, and were assisted to the United States by Korean colonies both in China and in Hawaii.

Many of these refugees remained in exile until 1945, but then returned to play major roles under both the American military government and the Republic of Korea. Both President Syngman Rhee and Vice-President John Chang held American doctorates. As of the end of 1958, the Minister of Finance, the Speaker of the Assembly, and two major leaders of the Democratic Party had all studied in America during the Japanese regime. Despite their small number, therefore, returned students from America are playing more significant roles in the special circumstances of Korea than their Japanese contemporaries have ever done in the relatively more stable conditions of their native land.

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA-SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY AFFILIATION

By far the largest and most comprehensive American university program in either Japan or Korea has been the University of Minnesota participation in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Seoul National University (SNU). In monetary terms alone, its budget for the four fiscal years 1955-1958 inclusive (to July 31, 1958) was \$5,451,000 in dollars plus another \$2,650,000 in Korean hwan at the official conversion rate.¹¹ Like the other programs reviewed in this chapter, the Minnesota-SNU affiliation is financed by ICA funds, but whereas the other programs concentrate in single fields this one covers four separate major disciplines, agriculture, engineering, medicine, and public administration.

Seoul National University was founded as the Keijo Imperial University [Keijo Teikoku Daigaku] by the Japanese government in 1924. Its campuses are scattered about Seoul and its environs. The engineering campus is approximately 15 miles to the northeast, and the agriculture campus approximately 25 miles to the south; inter-campus communication is difficult. The university was originally intended not for Koreans but for

11. University of Minnesota, Progress Report to ICA, SNU, and Office of General Affairs, Republic of Korea (Minneapolis, October 19, 1958, mimeographed), p. 66.

Japanese residents of Korea and mainland Japanese unable to gain admission to older and more distinguished Imperial universities in Japan proper. Korean students were admitted, but only on a restricted quota basis. The faculty was entirely Japanese. The language of instruction was also Japanese, as was the case throughout the Korean educational system. Keijo Imperial University was therefore in no sense a Korean university, but a Japanese university located in Korea and admitting a few selected Korean students.

After the Liberation in 1945, the Koreanization of the university was a task of high priority. It was easy to change its name. It was easy to evacuate the Japanese teachers and students -- even those who might have been sympathetic to an independent Korea. A competent Korean faculty was, however, hard to come by. Few Koreans had been permitted adequate training in Korean, Japanese, or Western universities. Many of these were needed for tasks more urgent than teaching; others had been dulled by long service in routine clerical or secondary-school teaching posts under the Japanese. In some fields the ideological division of Korea imposed additional difficulties; a number of Japanese-trained economists and social scientists of Marxian leanings fled to North Korea in 1947-1948. Nevertheless, Seoul National University was a functioning and reasonably high-grade institution when the Korean War broke out on June 26, 1950.

During the fighting Seoul changed hands four times. SNU, along with the other educational institutions of the city, was evacuated to Pusan at the southern end of the Korean peninsula. In the Pusan area it survived in temporary quarters while the fighting was going on. When it returned to Seoul in 1952-1953, its campuses were in disrepair and ruin. Those in best shape had been reconstructed by United Nations forces for use as barracks, headquarters, etc. Libraries and equipment were burned, smashed, or gone. Part of the teaching staff had fled or been kidnapped to North Korea; others had not survived the rigors of the war. The situation of the university was even more critical than it had been seven years earlier.

In this crisis it was natural for the Korean leaders to turn to American universities. Many had received their education

in America, and they had dealt with Americans in Korea since 1945. Individual American universities, moreover, had already begun various programs of assistance to less developed countries.

One of the earliest proposals for large-scale American university aid to Korea was made by President L. George Paik of Yonsei University, the successor institution to Chosen Christian College. (Paik holds a Ph.D. in history from Yale.) His plans centered on rebuilding Korea's four major private universities, including his own. He proposed the use of American funds to secure American affiliations for Ewha Women's University (Home Economics), Korea University (Business Administration), Severance Medical College (Nursing) and Yonhi University (Public Administration). The Korean government transformed this proposal drastically. It gave priority among educational institutions to SNU, the outstanding national university under its own control. Because of SNU's primacy, it was hoped that improvements there would be transmitted rapidly throughout Korea's system of national universities. This hope has been to some extent disappointed, as some of the other national universities (notably that at Taegu) have set up "academic empires" of their own which care relatively little about the changes in Seoul.

The Korean government also gave priority among academic disciplines to agriculture, engineering, and medicine as most urgently needed for Korean reconstruction. Public administration was added later. Only the business administration segment of the original Paik plan is being carried out -- in modified form, and in affiliation with Washington University of St. Louis.

OEChrought the Korean government proposals to the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) in Washington. The year was 1953. FOA, predecessor of ICA, was headed by Harold Stassen, a Minnesota alumnus who had risen to national prominence as Governor of Minnesota. FOA accepted the Korean plan as the basis for its subsequent operations in arranging an American affiliation for SNU.

To secure administrative simplicity it was decided to frame a single comprehensive contract with a single American university covering the three fields of agriculture, engineering, and medicine. This limited the choice of American universities to

those strong in all three of these fields. Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Columbia, and Chicago, for example, were ruled out as having no colleges of agriculture. Choice was further restricted to schools whose colleges of agriculture, engineering, and medicine were all free of large-scale overseas commitments. (FOA and its predecessor organizations had begun promoting large-scale university contracts in 1951. By 1953 a large number were already under way in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.) Only two American universities passed both tests in 1953, Minnesota and Ohio State. Minnesota was selected partly because its engineering school included work in marine engineering (which Ohio State's did not) and partly because of Stassen's contacts with the Minnesota administration.

On the Minnesota campus, President James L. Morrill was sympathetic to the FOA proposal as presented initially by Stassen over the telephone in December, 1953. Morrill knew Stassen personally, and was interested in international education. He chose Professor Tracy F. Tyler (Education) as chief Minnesota negotiator. Tyler has had both graduate training and long experience in university administration, which have given him firm views on government-university relations. However, he had had no prior Far Eastern interests.

Preparations and negotiations, including a visit to Korea by several Minnesota administrators (including Tyler) consumed nearly a year, but a contract was signed in 1954 and the program got under way in 1955. Tyler continued to serve as campus coordinator in Minneapolis, and Professor Arthur Schneider (Forestry) was chosen as Minnesota's chief of party in Seoul. He had served as a forestry specialist with the American military government in Korea in 1947-1948, so that this was his second tour of Korean duty.

Relations with ICA

The relations of Minnesota with both ICA and the Korean government have at times been stormy, although amicable compromises had been arranged by late 1958. Some time after the Minnesota contract was signed, ICA worked out a "standard

form" for its university contracts, and has tried at each renegotiation of the Minnesota contract to push Minnesota closer to this standard form. Minnesota has resisted this effort. We shall summarize some of the points in dispute before surveying accomplishments under the program itself.

Minnesota did not seek the Korean affiliation, but was sought out by ICA. Its Korean contract does not contribute financially to general university overhead, and Minnesota accepts it only on condition that it run it as it likes. It sees its own staff as being more competent than ICA, and the SNU staff as more competent than Korean government people. It sees the affiliation as one between two universities and not between two governments. If either the American or the Korean government disapprove of what Minnesota is doing in Korea, it can refuse to have Minnesota's contract renewed,¹² but while the contract is in force Minnesota is under no obligation to consult with American or Korean government people or even to keep them informed of what is going on except as a matter of courtesy and beyond specified quarterly reports. When advice is offered by American or Korean government officials, Minnesota is to judge the pertinence and value of the advice.

ICA feels that waste is involved when a university contract is cancelled in mid-passage or transferred to another institution, so that it is extremely reluctant to refuse contract renewals. The Minnesota interpretation therefore leaves ICA helpless in fact, whatever may be the Minnesota theory. ICA therefore wishes the contract to contain detailed limitations on what Minnesota may do. It wishes to be kept informed of all significant Minnesota decisions involving the contract, and to exercise rights of consultation or delay if not of veto over decisions it feels unwise. Although no specialists in the disciplines covered by the contract, OEC people in Korea feel that since they know more about Korean conditions than do the Minnesota people in

12. Most Minnesota-ICA contract periods have run for two-year terms. The original contract of 1954 ran for three years, since it did not actually go into effect until 1955.

Minneapolis, their views are worth seeking out and listening to. During the Stassen regime, OEC and ICA working-level personnel were incensed by the way Minnesota was sometimes able to by-pass them by going directly to ICA "top brass" in Washington.

Seven substantive disagreements are listed below. As often happens, they are not independent of each other.

1. What the contract is about: Minnesota sees its main educational function as the training of selected Koreans in the United States. ICA ascribes equal importance to the training of larger numbers of Koreans in Korea.

2. Terms of service of the Minnesota staff: Minnesota wants freedom to send its people to Korea for whatever periods it thinks best. Many top staff members will not serve in Korea for more than a few months, and they are felt capable of accomplishing their technical missions there in short order. In one case (that of a librarian) Minnesota feels that a week or two in Korea would be sufficient. ICA feels that familiarity with the Korean environment is essential, and that a two-year term of service is practically a minimum for adequate familiarity. OEC tours of duty in Korea are two years long.

3. Ages of the Minnesota staff: Minnesota tends to concentrate on older men at or near the retirement age (68 at Minnesota) but still active. They have more experience than younger people, and their age commands respect in Korea. Their families are grown, and they are often freer to spend long periods overseas. ICA would, however, like to see a larger proportion of men in their thirties and forties. The younger men can usually be hired for less money. ICA also feels that some of the older men have not kept up with their disciplines, and are incapable physically of operating under the rugged and primitive conditions of Korean living.

4. Duties of the Minnesota staff: Minnesota sees its short-term representatives in Korea as planners and consultants, and its long-term representatives as administrators. It is a waste of time, in Minnesota's opinion, to use them for teaching Korean students through inept interpreters, although they are

encouraged to lecture occasionally in graduate and faculty seminars. They are accordingly forbidden to teach. ICA and the Korean government feel that if the Minnesota visitors do not teach in addition to their other duties, they are not earning their high salaries. Moreover, they delay the immediate recovery of SNU; the program depletes the SNU teaching staff by sending promising people to America for study, and Minnesota professors do not try to replace them.

5. Training of Korean teachers in America: Here Minnesota is called "research-minded" rather than "action-minded" by ICA. Minnesota feels that for bare professional competence SNU teachers should have the equivalent of American higher degrees, which they will in most instances never get unless they do so at Minnesota under the present program. Minnesota therefore tries to retain its Korean trainees until they can earn Minnesota degrees. Minnesota furthermore scorns such compromises as "quickie" or "Oriental" degrees, "certificates of residence," etc. ICA and the Korean government, more conscious of the immediate jobs to be done in Korea, set time limits on trainees' study in the United States and object to extensions. The Korean government also fears that some Korean trainees may try to remain in America permanently and be lost to SNU. To minimize this possibility, trainees are not allowed to bring their wives and families to Minnesota.

6. Transfer of budgetary funds: Minnesota wishes authorization, without specific government approval but subject to post-audit, to transfer funds within its total appropriation between various sub-programs to meet unanticipated situations. ICA fiscal people wish tighter control over these funds, to reduce the chance of any bad publicity resulting from possible Minnesota mistakes.

7. Location of Minnesota authority: The Korean program is part of the operations of the University of Minnesota as a whole, and the university as a whole takes responsibility for its success or failure. Moreover, the program cuts across a number of

administrative jurisdictions within the university. The Minnesota position is therefore that major decisions regarding the Korean program should be subject to approval in Minneapolis by the committee headed by Professor Tyler and representing the entire university. OEC and the Korean government prefer to see more binding decisions made on the spot by Professor Schneider, Minnesota's chief of party in Seoul. They can then be made more quickly and with more knowledge of the situation in Korea. Schneider, moreover, has personal friends in OEC and the Korean government, while Tyler and his committee in Minneapolis are quite removed from their influence.

The role of SNU in these controversies is difficult for the outsider to assess. Both Minnesota and OEC feel themselves to be speaking for SNU, and SNU seems loath to speak for itself. Individual SNU teachers may be found on both sides; the writer believes a majority favors the ICA view. It is easy to conjecture that SNU is trying hard to take a polite middle course to avoid alienating either its own government, OEC, or its American affiliate.

Despite all disagreements with ICA, Minnesota was awarded the ICA Korean contract in public administration and was given first refusal on two other ICA Korean contracts subsequently awarded to other schools. Minnesota considers this evidence of more than merely satisfactory performance; ICA calls this interpretation unjustified. The public administration contract was in some respects closer to the ICA "standard contract" than to the usual Minnesota version. Some of the Minnesota "options" on other contracts have been described as pro forma or courtesy gestures, and ICA was quite happy to leave them unexercised.

In some countries where university-ICA relations have been unfriendly, ICA is accused of attempted restrictions on the academic freedom of university staff members. No such charges are made in Korea. ICA is also accused in some countries of desiring to replace university staff members by its own employees, a charge not made in Korea; ICA has had difficulty filling the existing vacancies in the OEC table of organization in that country.

The Original Program

Minnesota's original contract in agriculture, engineering, and medicine is administered differently from the later contract in public administration. In agriculture, engineering, and medicine, the program in Seoul is headed by a Minnesota over-all advisor who serves for at least a year and reports to Professor Schneider. This over-all advisor supplies continuity to the services of a number of short-term representatives who work for brief periods within individual specialized departments. While a total of over 30 Minnesota representatives have served terms in Korea, the number in residence at any one time is often as low as five or six. At Minneapolis each separate program is headed by a member of the Minnesota faculty who has had at least a visit in Korea and who reports to Professor Tyler.

In principle, all Minnesota representatives are regular full-time active members of the Minnesota faculty, except in departments where Minnesota is not active (such as textile engineering). In practice, several of the over-all advisors have been emeritus, and some of the short-term consultants have come from other institutions. Minnesota has had difficult staffing problems in engineering, where the Minnesota professors dislike interrupting research programs and consulting relationships. Minnesota has refused to hire staff members as "second-class citizens" exclusively for service abroad, except, as we shall see, in its public administration program. It prides itself on "remembering" its men in Korea when it comes to promotions and salary increases.

Much of the time of the Minnesota staff in Korea is spent in approval and supervision of plans for the reconstruction of SNU buildings, acquisition of equipment and supplies, replenishing of libraries, etc. Most of the original planning is done by Koreans; there is some Korean feeling that the reviewing services of Minnesota cost more than they are worth. On the other hand, the prestige of Minnesota is important in getting plans approved and money appropriated for SNU, where in Minnesota's absence the same plans might have gathered dust on shelves and the same money have been used for other purposes. Minnesota

prestige is also important in inducing the Korean government to undertake construction heretofore unknown at SNU -- an example being a dormitory for students on the relatively isolated agriculture campus at Suwon. The Korean government has agreed to maintain all buildings and equipment purchased for SNU under the Minnesota contract, but there is doubt whether this agreement will be honored fully in view of the financial situation of the Republic of Korea. Cases are cited of Minnesota advising more modern and expensive buildings and equipment than Korea can afford. In other cases, it has been Minnesota which has restrained over-ambitious Korean plans for expansion of facilities.

Consultation on individual departmental curricula also takes up much of the time of the Minnesota group in Seoul. Their advice runs generally along a few main lines: fewer courses, with more time devoted to each; more laboratory work, with special reference to the application and empirical verification of theory; more use of textbooks and library readings (in addition to laboratory work) to supplement the conventional Korean lecture method of instruction; and higher scholastic standards in individual courses, so that the passing of entrance examinations to SNU should not guarantee graduation four years later. In at least two cases, Minnesota has advised drastic reorganizations which have not yet been carried out. The transfer of the program in veterinary medicine from the College of Medicine to the College of Agriculture has been suggested. The difficulty here, apart from academic politics, is that the two campuses are 25 miles apart and that the present staff lives more conveniently close to the medical campus. The unification of the Institute of Agriculture (an agricultural experiment station) with the neighboring College of Agriculture has also been suggested. The Institute is, however, under the Ministry of Agriculture, and the College is under the Ministry of Education, so that unification will be difficult to bring about despite its theoretical advantages.¹³

13. A similar recommendation has been made by University of Massachusetts representatives at Hokkaido University in Japan, and the same difficulties stand in the way of its realization. See above, Chapter 2.

Another major function of the Minnesota representatives has been participation in the selection of SNU teachers for study in America. Here again, the Korean faculties make most of the initial choices, with the Minnesota representatives acting in a review capacity. This capacity is, however, far from perfunctory. In some cases Minnesota insists that selectees agree to become degree candidates, and not mere tourists or junketers. In others Minnesota tries to secure representation of senior as well as junior men, so as to prevent jealousy of returnees by their seniors. Such jealousy stands in the way of acceptance of ideas developed in America by the junior people.

At times these two criteria, avoidance of junketers and representation of senior men, interfere with each other. In one particular case (Medicine) a full professor refused to take courses after being consistently out-performed by his own teaching assistant, and insisted on doing nothing but "independent research" from which nothing ever developed.

From the inception of the program until October, 1958, 91 SNU faculty members had begun their studies at Minnesota.¹⁴ Of these, 30 had been awarded Masters' degrees. One had gone on to Paris and taken a doctorate there. Thirty-five had returned to Korea without Minnesota degrees. Twenty-six were currently at Minnesota. While many of these Koreans were found at first "not academically oriented," it has become possible to weed such men out in advance, and Minnesota reports itself more than satisfied with SNU teachers as graduate students. In many cases they rank above the average American graduate student. Language remains a handicap, but the SNU group is given English-language orientation in Seoul before departure, and special English classes are offered for them by instructors in the English department at Minnesota. These classes are paid for under the program. Funds are also made available for SNU faculty members to secure special tutoring where necessary in

14. University of Minnesota, Progress Report, op. cit., pp. 11-13, 27. These figures include trainees under the public administration program as well as the original three.

particular courses, somewhat as is done for varsity athletes here, but on a much higher level.

Public Administration Program

In public administration, Minnesota is cooperating in the foundation of a new institution, not merely in the rehabilitation of an institution already in existence. The new institution is a School of Public Administration at SNU, which is administratively distinct from the College of Law, although the two have for the present a common dean, the economist Tai Whan Shin. The Department of Political Science (in the College of Liberal Arts) wanted the public administration program to be affiliated with itself in accordance with American practice. The decision in favor of the law affiliation was made by the Koreans without American intervention. The political scientists have not cooperated actively with the new school, nor have they attempted to sabotage it in any way.

The other half of Minnesota's public administration program does not involve SNU, but brings Minnesota representatives into direct contact with a Korean government agency. This is the National Officials Training Institute (NOTI) which was founded under American military government for the in-service training of Korean civil servants. The project at NOTI is to set up more advanced three-month training courses useful to higher-echelon officials, and to train (from among working Korean civil servants) teachers capable of conducting these short courses.

As in many other Far Eastern countries, the career civil service in Korea is staffed primarily by graduates of colleges of law. Two sets of difficulties are involved. Even for civil service jobs involving technical fields such as agriculture or economics, it is difficult for the agriculture or economics graduate to pass the qualifying examinations unless he has legal training as well. Conversely, there are inadequate facilities whereby the law graduate can acquaint himself with the special field of his civil service post, or with such non-legal subjects as accounting, statistics, personnel administration, etc. Since the problem in Korea is considered similar to the problems of

other Far Eastern countries, the Korean program was able to profit by experience gained under five other ICA public administration contracts in South and East Asia.¹⁵ The Korean government, however, doubting that much could be learned in other Far Eastern countries, has thus far refused to permit Dean Shin a passport for a proposed tour of inspection.

The more ambitious part of the program is the establishment of the new School of Public Administration. Preparations were begun during the academic year 1957-1958, although the school did not open until April, 1959. The department heads of the College of Law at SNU selected a total of 11 graduate students, assistants, and instructors in such fields as economics and public law for a year of study of public administration at Minnesota, followed by a summer of internship in an American government office. Choice was made on the basis of general academic records and ability in the English language. Seven of these 11 returned to Korea in August, 1958 with M. A. degrees completed except for theses.¹⁶ The other four, whose Minnesota records were outstanding, were selected by Minnesota to stay on and work toward Ph. D. degrees in public administration. Eight more men were sent to Minnesota for the academic year 1958-1959.

The School of Public Administration is to have 100 Korean students in each year's class, and a faculty of 19 Korean teachers, including returnees from Minnesota. The program is to take 18 months or two years, and to give an M. A. degree. The first year will be devoted to course work in personnel administration, fiscal administration, research methods, accounting, statistics, etc.

15. These contracts have been with Indiana University in Thailand, the University of Michigan in the Philippine Islands, Michigan State University in Vietnam, the University of Pennsylvania in Pakistan, and the University of Southern California in Iran.

16. Of a total of nine August, 1958 returnees (including two from NOTI), three had completed and submitted acceptable theses by March, 1959, having been assisted in thesis preparation by the Minnesota staff in Korea. It is considered probable that most returnees who do not have Korean M. A. degrees will earn American ones.

The second year will be spent on internships in appropriate Korean government agencies.

Admission to the school will be open on a competitive basis to holders of bachelor's degrees from any Korean university in any field. The entrance examination will be comprehensive, covering oral and written English and a year of work in three of the following fields, selection being made by each candidate: political science, law, economics, sociology, psychology, history, or mathematics. From 500 to 600 applicants per year are expected, since government positions are in great demand in Korea.

Graduation from the School of Public Administration is no guarantee of a Korean government job. It is, however, to be an alternative method to the passing of a national examination whose stress is largely upon law.¹⁷ Dean Shin hopes that eventually a public administration degree will be required for securing any professional-grade civil service employment in Korea.

For the first year at least, staffing of the School of Public Administration was a major problem. Too many part-time people, mainly from other colleges of SNU, were used on a temporary basis. Many of the first group of returnees from Minnesota were not regarded as competent to teach. They should have remained in America for one more year, not because of poor selection but because language trouble prevented their learning a great deal at the outset. Their youth stands in the way of their being accorded by their students the respect they deserve, and the American M. A. degree has lost considerable prestige as a result of the misguided leniency of some American institutions toward their Korean graduate students. SNU is required by contract to use all returnees as teachers in the School of Public Administration for a two-year period, and will live up to its contract. After that period, some may be released.

Participants to be sent to Minnesota are selected by NOTI from among Korean civil servants on the same basis as that used by SNU in choosing from among its graduate students and young

17. We refer only to the higher-grade civil service positions. Routine clerkships require only a high school education.

instructors. In practice, NOTI selectees have had weaker academic backgrounds or have been away from their studies for longer periods. It is also possible that "influence" enters to a greater extent into their selection. At any rate, they do less well at Minnesota. On returning to Korea, they may either return to their former ministries, teach full time at NOTI, or alternate between these occupations. The contract is deliberately vague on this point, since so much depends on the vicissitudes of Korean politics and administration.

New NOTI courses are being planned, many of which Minnesota returnees are expected to teach. These aim at "executive development" on the bureau chief level. They will be more advanced than the existing NOTI three-month "orientation" and "upgrading" courses. Some of them may also last longer than three months. There may at some future date be a problem of division of responsibility, perhaps even of conflict, between SNU and NOTI, if SNU courses, offered for graduate credit, should be scheduled in the evenings when civil servants can attend them.

While at Minnesota the Koreans take a regular Minnesota public administration program, with two special features. One of these is a separate class for the Koreans to correct their inadequate grounding in Western public administration practices. This course lasts for three terms (one academic year). Each quarter is taught by a different man; all teachers are regular Minnesota staff members. Each spring there is a special project for each Korean student, in consultation with one of the three American teachers, to develop for Korea a course outline on some aspect of public administration. This course, plus the administrative responsibilities of Professor George Warp under the program, has made it necessary to enlarge the Minnesota staff in public administration. The new people are paid from ICA contract funds, but are regular Minnesota employees who will be retained after the contract expires.

The second special feature is a "counterpart" system designed to acquaint the visiting Koreans with American graduate students in public administration. Each Korean has assigned to him an American graduate student counterpart, who is expected to have the same general interests and take some of the same

courses. This works out well in most cases. The Americans undertake the added burden voluntarily and without pay; in some few cases it causes them to neglect their own work. The Koreans seem to like this system, although a certain loss of status is involved since the American counterparts are persons whose status in America is lower than that of the Korean in his own native land.

The "Minnesota" staff in public administration in Korea is predominantly not from Minnesota. Professor Stuart McCorkle (Texas) has had two one-year contracts to head the group at SNU while on leave from his regular position. Mr. E. R. Draheim of the United States Department of Agriculture, a Minnesota graduate, is at NOTI under similar conditions. These men were both known to and respected by the Minnesota department. They also keep in touch with each other and consult frequently. Under them, on six-month contracts, are younger men, also mainly on leave from institutions other than Minnesota. Minnesota is somewhat defensive about this arrangement, which was caused by the illness of one Minnesota professor who had planned to go, and the involvement of another in court proceedings for the adoption of a child.

Terms of service in Korea under this public administration contract are longer than under the other Minnesota contracts, and renewals have been more frequent. This is because of the different nature of the job to be done, particularly at SNU. Another factor is the availability, since late 1957, of American-style dependent housing and education, which has made Seoul a more attractive place to work than it had been previously.¹⁸ Transportation is now the most serious "personal" problem, since Seoul streetcars and buses are still overcrowded, dirty, and infested with pickpockets.

18. In providing dependent housing for U.N. forces, OEC staff, and contract personnel, OEC has erected on the outskirts of Seoul "golden ghettos" of higher quality than most of the dwellers had enjoyed before. These compounds are segregated from Korean life behind high walls and barbed wire. Koreans may not enter without special passes; some individual houses are patrolled 24 hours a day by armed Korean guards. These arrangements, while adding to the security of the Americans, obviously discourage Korean-American social contacts.

Despite the number of Korean students who have attended Minnesota since 1955, despite considerable publicity in the student paper, and despite special displays and exhibits of Korean art and culture, Minnesota's large Korean program has had disappointingly little impact on the home campus. This is at least partially because the university is so large -- 22,000 students on the St. Paul and Minneapolis campuses -- and also because Minnesota is largely a "streetcar college" located in two large cities. Another difficulty is the absence from Minnesota's staff of any ranking Korean expert. The Far Eastern interests of the Minnesota faculty are concentrated in Japan, China, India, and Indonesia; the only Far Eastern languages taught at Minnesota are Chinese and Japanese. The same large program at a smaller school in a smaller town might have had greater impact, particularly had the permanent faculty included at least one leading Korean specialist.

PEABODY COLLEGE PROJECTS IN EDUCATION

The Minnesota affiliation with SNU is the largest American university program in Korea, and likewise covers the widest range of academic disciplines. It is, however, not the ICA or OEC showpiece program. This honor is reserved for the many-sided relationship between the George Peabody College for Teachers and the Korean Ministry of Education. While the Ministry is a government agency, a number of Korean colleges and universities both public and private also participate in individual parts of the Peabody program.

Two major faults have been found in the Korean educational system which can be remedied without waiting for substantial advances in the Korean economy. In the first place, a feudalistic relation still prevails in most Korean schools. The teacher is expected to do what he or she is told by the principal, and to issue orders to the students which are to be followed without question. In the second place, Korea stresses higher education too much, and pays too little attention to a broader base of elementary education.

The autocratic atmosphere of the typical Korean school results in great part from traditions surviving from the Japanese Occupation and before, and is reinforced by the inadequacy of Korean training in education. Neither principals nor teachers have received training adequate to handle more permissive procedures.¹⁹ The major part of the process of "democratizing" the Korean school is therefore believed to be the improvement of professional training in education and allied subjects.

Korea has long been and still remains a poor country, most of whose limited educational resources have gone into the advanced training of the leadership group. A system of six-year compulsory education was inaugurated under the Japanese in 1938, but facilities were never completed because of World War II. Many school buildings were destroyed with all their equipment during the Korean War of 1950-1953, and compulsory education exists only on paper in some rural districts. Within the schools, the program is tailored to the intellectual and economic elites who go on to college or university training, while the average student is neglected. This intellectual snobbery was part of both the Confucianist Chinese and the Germanized Japanese educational systems which have vied for leadership in Korea. It was continued by the Koreans after 1945, partly as a reaction to the Japanese prejudice against Koreans as unfit for advanced intellectual work.

The criticisms just listed were made originally less by Koreans themselves than by visiting educational missions from America. They have, however, been accepted by the Korean Ministry of Education and by Korean educators who have studied and observed American educational practice. The Ministry also accepted with alacrity an OEC suggestion that an American college of education might help Korea correct these defects in elementary education in the same way that Minnesota was helping rebuild Korea's outstanding institution of higher education.

19. Actually most teachers in Korea before 1945 were Japanese. After their expulsion, they were replaced by Koreans who had had training in subject matter but none in education.

American colleges of education, on the other hand, were unenthusiastic about ICA contracts in Korea -- particularly outside of Seoul. Considerable canvassing was therefore required before an acceptable contract was offered to and accepted by the George Peabody College for Teachers in Nashville, Tennessee. A three-year contract was signed in 1956; a two-year renewal was signed in 1959.

Although Peabody was not the first choice of either OEC or the Korean government, its selection is now regarded as singularly fortunate. Peabody has specialized in the educational problems of the American South which, like Korea, is economically poor and culturally traditionalistic. Together with two other college-level educational institutions in Nashville²⁰ (with whom it shares library facilities), Peabody has had a long international tradition and interest in international education. There is, however, no background of interest specifically in Korea. Peabody is a small school, privately supported, which regards selection for a major overseas contract as an honor and a sign of national recognition. It is glad to lend its most respected and best-known staff members for overseas work for as long periods as they can be spared from Nashville. Much is made of the program on the Peabody campus, including a special issue of the college monthly devoted to Korean problems.²¹ It is also fortunate that Peabody has not become identified with any one approach to educational philosophy, and is regarded as moderate in controversies which have centered around the "progressive education" views of John Dewey, W. H. Kilpatrick, and their disciples at the Teachers' College of Columbia University. Peabody staff members deny specifically any intention to "foist progressive education on Korea," particularly since application of Dewey's ideas requires

20. These are Vanderbilt University and Scarritt College for Christian Workers. As a missionary-training institution teaching English as a foreign language, Scarritt in particular has attracted many Far Eastern students to the Nashville area.

21. Peabody Reflector, Special Korean - International Issue (February, 1958). This includes reports and articles by several members of the staff then in Korea.

smaller class sizes than Korea will be able to afford for years to come.

Numerous discussions between Peabody, OEC, and the Ministry have led to a subdivision of the total program into eight parts in Korea plus the sending of Korean trainees to the United States. Two of the eight Korean divisions are located at private rather than public colleges, and several range far outside Seoul into the primitive rural areas.

1. One member of the Peabody team is assigned to the College of Education of SNU as a specialist in secondary education. His work is concerned with the teaching of natural science subjects in Korean high schools. In conjunction with his Korean colleagues at SNU, he is attempting to have the curriculum modified to stress laboratory methods in the teaching of high school science courses. There is no opposition to this, but Koreans must learn how it is done. There is considerable useful equipment for science laboratories in many Korean high schools, much of it donated and distributed by the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA).

Another aspect of the secondary education program is the planning and conduct of pilot courses and workshops for science teachers presently employed in Korea. Science teachers are brought to Seoul for these programs from all over Korea. This part of the program is now being handled entirely by Koreans -- the Peabody representative has "worked himself out of a job."

2. Two specialists in elementary education are stationed at the Kwangju Normal College and its attached school in the southwestern corner of Korea. It is important that these two specialists be a married couple, because there is only one house available for the project and because the wife is assigned work in kindergarten and pre-primary education. Furthermore, it is desirable to station a woman with professional standing in rural Korea to show the Koreans that women are capable of professional jobs. Kwangju was used as a model school despite its isolation because of two offsetting advantages. Previous American educational missions had visited Kwangju and knew the local situation

fairly well, and there is a small American military encampment nearby to assist in logistic support.

The facilities at Kwangju include a model normal school (on the high school level) and a normal college (on the junior-college level). The two specialists give courses in teaching methods. They conduct in-service training in the form of workshops and refresher courses. They distribute technical literature in Korean, much of which is translated from materials that have been made available in Seoul by other members of the Peabody project. Many of the workshops are concerned with the relationship between pupils and teachers, with the purpose of making this relationship less authoritarian.

3. Another Peabody man has jurisdiction over the program in teacher education at five separate normal schools and colleges. The purpose of his work is to expand the job being done at Kwangju in elementary education. Kwangju is somewhat isolated, and results achieved there are often not transmitted elsewhere. Also cooperating in this program is an arts and crafts specialist (an OEC employee) stationed in Pusan. Pusan, rather than Kwangju, is therefore used as the model for all Korea in the field of arts and crafts.

4. A fifth Peabody representative acts as advisor to the Central Education Research Institute (CERI) in Seoul. The Institute was founded in 1954; it is controlled jointly by the Ministry and by the Korean Teachers' Association. Its function is to carry on research, translation, and in-service training. Most of the translations thus far have been of American materials, many of them supplied by Peabody. The research is mainly in the application of American psychological tests and measurements to Korean conditions, in surveying specific situations in individual Korean localities, in sampling methods for educational statistics, and in experimental teaching methods. The Peabody representative believes that CERI has done a good deal in four years to develop Korean teachers' confidence in educational research as a useful method whereby to solve some of their practical teaching problems.

5. A sixth Peabody representative is assigned to the textbook bureau of the Ministry of Education. The textbook bureau is more

than its name implies. Essentially it determines the Korean primary-school curriculum, as it prepares standard textbooks which must be used in all Korean primary schools. It also approves high school textbooks, ordinarily written by Korean educators not employed in its own office.

The improvements suggested by the Peabody representative involve mainly the simplification of the vocabulary and the sentence structure of primary school textbooks. He has also pressed for conferences with classroom teachers to get their suggestions on revision of the textbooks. (Previously textbook editors from the Bureau lost face if they asked advice from mere classroom teachers.) Since the supply of Korean-language textbooks is short, the Peabody representative has had a number of American textbooks and reference works translated into Korean. The official textbooks determine the curricula of courses based on them, and thus the Peabody representative is also, of necessity, an advisor on curriculum.

6. A specialist in kindergarten and primary education is stationed at the Ewha Women's University. This institution, which is privately supported, was selected because it is on a higher level than any of the government normal colleges and provides the only university-level training available in Korea for elementary teachers. The Peabody representative, who must be a woman, is to teach methods of early-childhood education, and to act as advisor to the model kindergarten attached to Ewha. She is also on call for in-service training workshops in primary and pre-primary education. These are held all over Korea, chiefly during the summer. They use the Ewha elementary school and kindergarten when the programs are held in or near Seoul, and Ewha teachers also participate. Workshops are held mainly on weekends so as not to interfere with the regular Ewha program.

Miss Emma Kim, dean of Ewha's College of Education, has a Chicago M.A. in education and subsequently did research in early-childhood education at the Teachers' College of Columbia University. The Peabody contract was drawn up during Miss Kim's absence in the United States. Because of her special training and familiarity with American educational practices,

Ewha staff members feel that the off-campus workshops, which Ewha could not conduct, are more useful than the activities of the Peabody representative at Ewha itself.

7. A specialist in library science is co-director of a new Department of Library Science in the College of Liberal Arts of Yonsei University, also a private institution. This is the only library school in Korea, and will eventually offer both the B.A. and M.A. degrees. The Peabody representative teaches at Yonsei, helps plan the curriculum of the library science program, and conducts in-service training for Korean librarians who have not had professional librarianship training. Other work is with libraries themselves, especially those of SNU and, of course, Yonsei itself. Important functions have been bringing books out into the open where they can be used, cataloguing the books available, and purchasing such items as shelves, cabinets, etc. At the National Library in downtown Seoul, which is illustrative of the older and more conservatively run Korean libraries, books can only be used in the reading room, which is itself so small that students and others line up at 6:00 a.m. to be sure of getting seats when the building opens two hours later.

8. Added to the Peabody group in 1958 was a building specialist from the United States Office of Education, who deals with building and equipment problems in schools all over Korea. His colleagues feel that he paid his way during his first month in Korea by designing science rooms in five normal schools. At one in particular, Changchun, near the truce line north of Seoul, he worked out plans for laboratory desks which could be used both with and without running water systems. This was important at Changchun, where the normal school now operates without running water, but hopes to use the same equipment later on when war damage has been repaired and the water system restored.

Twelve Korean participants came to the United States under this program in 1957 - 1958, and 18 in 1958 - 1959. Each of the first seven phases of the program includes the nomination of one or more participants, but the final selection is made by the Peabody group as a whole. Fluency in English plays an important role in the selection -- too much so, according to some Korean critics. Motivation is also examined. The project

wishes to avoid people who will stay in America, or leave the teaching profession after returning to Korea. A final basis is influence within Korea. This has led to the rejection of some promising younger people in favor of older men less teachable and less fluent in English, but in positions to apply directly in Korea the results of their American training. It has also led to the selection of ministry officials, normal-school teachers, and school administrators rather than classroom teachers. The final selections are made by the Ministry of Education, but the major basis has been the Peabody recommendations unless political considerations were involved. The Korean government is reluctant to approve for foreign travel anyone who has been active in any opposition party. Approval is also difficult to secure when the applicant is a refugee from North Korea, since most such refugees joined the People's (Communist) Party before leaving North Korea.

Selectees are required to spend two to three months at the Foreign Language Institute in Seoul to improve their English before going to America. In addition, they spend a month working at the Peabody project office in Seoul. Their stay in America includes one academic year at Peabody plus a summer vacation period which they may spend wherever they like. One textbook bureau official went to Princeton; a professor of biology at the SNU College of Education went to the Marine Biological Laboratory at Woods Hole, Massachusetts; some travel and do no formal educational work at all. In general each man's program at Peabody is tailored to his needs and desires, but degree requirements are not modified for the benefit of the Koreans. Some of the participants actually take M. A. degrees, but most do not. Some work in subject matter fields, others in education. Those who wish to work in subjects where Peabody is weak at the graduate level may take their work at Vanderbilt instead. Those weak in English can take additional work in this subject at Scarritt.

These Korean participants are not supposed to return as specific counterparts of individual Peabody representatives. The expectation is that the Peabody functions will be taken over by Korean institutions as a whole after the expiration of the Peabody

contract, and not by specified Koreans. This differs from the practice under many other technical-assistance contracts, but all parties seem confident that it will work out successfully.

Staffing has been the major problem under the Peabody contract. At any given time at least one post listed above as filled by a Peabody representative is apt to be vacant, and only a minority of the "Peabody representatives" are members of the Peabody faculty. Peabody is described as tightly staffed. Many of its teachers are willing to go to Korea for long periods despite the inconveniences of life there, and are capable of making contributions to the program there. Peabody, however, cannot spare them and must hire outsiders. These outsiders are usually Peabody graduates, or professors at other colleges of education. They are known personally to Peabody faculty members, and come on leave from their permanent positions. None are given "second-class" Peabody appointments. Some are at or near retirement age. Only one has great skill in the Korean language or long prior experience in Korea. During the contract period 1956-1958 Peabody was usually able to secure continuity in the work of Peabody representatives by delaying each man's departure until he could brief his successor. The opening of the academic year 1958-1959, however, saw several leaves of absence expire simultaneously, and this could not be done.

Chief of the Peabody party from 1956 to 1958 was Professor Willard C. Goslin. He had served as Superintendent of Schools at Webster Groves (Missouri), Minneapolis (Minnesota), and Pasadena (California), before coming to Peabody. He achieved national publicity in the controversies which led to his dismissal from Pasadena. In Korea, however, he has not been a controversial figure. His work is praised as "dedicated," not only by Peabody colleagues but by ICA and OEC staff members.

Other staff members have also been dedicated. A particular example of devotion to duty was given by two Peabody representatives, Mr. and Mrs. Robert Zimmerman from the Springfield, Illinois, public schools. Assigned as specialists in elementary

education to the Kwangju Normal School, they had been promised military housing in a nearby army camp until facilities could be built for them. At the camp, however, they encountered a commanding officer who reserved all military housing for military employees, contract or no contract. The Zimmermans could have gone home to Springfield or retreated to Seoul. They chose, however, to stick to their jobs in Kwangju and "board around" with missionaries until admitted to military housing by a new commanding officer.

Relations with ICA and OEC have been friendly. Peabody has had only three complaints about the program under its first contract, which are expected to be remedied in the new one.

1. There has been poor liaison between the Korean Ministry of Education, ICA in Washington, and OEC in Seoul. This poor liaison, plus detailed fiscal supervision of Peabody accounts, means that it often takes two years to get and distribute textbooks and other material. This in turn means that the representative who orders the material has gone home before it arrives. One cause of this delay is that personnel changes too rapidly in ICA and OEC, and that few new people are willing to accept without review what their predecessors have done. Another cause for delay is the Korean government policy against buying materials from Japan if they are obtainable elsewhere.

2. Both OEC and the Ministry of Education are too satisfied with Peabody and try to overload the staff. For example, they have approached Peabody in connection with programs in vocational education (for which Peabody has no facilities whatever) and nursing education (for which Peabody can neither spare nor recruit staff). OEC eventually decided to use direct-hire people in vocational education and to include nursing education in the Minnesota-SNU contract.

3. The program in its first two years has been concentrated too highly in Seoul, and not enough has been done in the countryside.

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY PROGRAM
IN BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

President L. George Paik's original plan for American aid to Korea's private universities included a program in public administration at Yonsei University and a business administration program at Korea University.²² When the public administration program was given to SNU, Yonsei wanted business administration instead, but Korea University declined to give up its own hopes for a business administration program. It was therefore decided to attempt the difficult job of having one American university try two programs simultaneously in the same field at two rival Korean institutions.

This, plus the somewhat over-advertised inconveniences of life in Korea, caused a number of American schools of business to reject this ICA contract. Washington University of St. Louis expressed interest, however, and was awarded the contract in 1958 despite ICA misgivings. These misgivings were due to experience under an earlier public health contract in Thailand which the Washington University Medical School staffed largely with outsiders whom ICA considered inferior.

Washington University's own eagerness for the Korean business administration contract cannot be explained by any prior interest in Korea. Academic opponents of Dean Ross W. Trump of the School of Business and Public Administration suggest that the school was overstaffed, particularly in retailing, with people who could be sent to Korea under the contract. The ICA contract also provides Dean Trump with a substantial contribution to the overhead expenses of the school.

We have referred to Yonsei and Korea Universities as rivals, which indeed they are. They are probably the two outstanding private universities of Korea and are both located in Seoul, but their traditions are quite different. With Yonsei's early history we have dealt briefly.²³ An American-founded institution with

22. See above, p. 172.

23. See above, pp. 168 f.

liberal Protestant leanings, it began in 1915 as Chosen Christian College. After numerous vicissitudes it changed its name to the Chosen Christian University (Yonhi) in 1946. During the Korean War, Yonhi fled southward, as did the Severance Medical College, which had a similar American missionary background. On returning to Seoul in 1953, both Yonhi and Severance were in serious financial difficulties. Severance in particular found replacement of its destroyed and damaged facilities impossible with its own resources. After four years of intermittent negotiations, the two Christian institutions decided to join forces under the new title of Yonsei University.

Korea University (Kodae) was founded as Posung College in 1905. It was non-Christian and nationalistic from the outset, and has prided itself on independence from Western as well as Japanese connections. For a number of years it was affiliated with a Korean religious sect called Chondo-kyo, but later resumed its secular character. Posung College hoped to become a full-scale, purely Korean university, and it was partly to forestall this threat to Japanese leadership that the Japanese founded Keijo Imperial University (predecessor of SNU) in 1924. Meanwhile Posung's nationalism kept it in difficulties with the Japanese, who forced its reorganization during World War II as the Keijo Colonization and Economics College. Its founders had never given up their ambitions, and the school took the title of Korea University in 1946.

In Korea as well as in most of the rest of the world ICA believes that competitive private business would be more flourishing and enjoy greater social repute if education for business as a profession were organized on the American pattern. In Korea OEC and other American observers have found a number of flaws in collegiate business education which they hoped an American type of program might help to remedy by its example. These faults, which are by no means confined to Korea, include:

1. Great stress on theoretical economics. Whatever its validity as social science or its value in public policy, much economic theory is not related to the day-to-day operations of individual private firms -- for which business education should provide high-level technicians.

2. Practical courses taught on too low a level, and in large lectures. There is no scope for original contributions by the students themselves. There are not even outside readings or textbooks to compete with the drone of the professor reading his notes.

3. Too much stress on "general principles" and Sunday School "maxims" in business courses. There is practically no use of specific case material, and what there is comes from Germany or Japan rather than from Korea.

4. Isolation. Korean teachers of business subjects are isolated from the business community. They do not know what is currently going on in the Korean business world. Korean businessmen do not utilize their services and special talents. Even in recruiting young men for business, Korean firms rely on family connections rather than business training.

Once on the Korean scene, however, Washington University found that all these points were overdrawn, at least at the private universities to which it was affiliated.²⁴ Thus, there is great stress on theoretical economics at Yonsei, where there is a combined College of Commerce and Economics, but not at Korea University, where the two departments are separate. The proliferation and duplication of low-level courses exist in college catalogues, but many of these courses are seldom given. The use of the lecture system is an economic necessity; discussions, to be effective, require smaller classes than Korean universities can afford. Korean case material is hard to come by; Korean businessmen are secretive, especially since they are so few in number as to make the "models" of cases identifiable quite easily. There is in practice a great deal of social contact between Korean businessmen and Korean professors of economics and business; there is also considerable consulting by the faculty and considerable guest lecturing by the businessmen. The Korean student without family connections does well to concentrate in business subjects if he expects a good business job, since Korean

24. Washington University representatives, however, criticize the College of Commerce at SNU as "just another department of economics."

firms have no training programs to speak of. In short, the differences between Korea and America are by no means so great as the Washington University group had anticipated. The main difference which they actually see is that work in a number of business fields is under-developed in Korea. These fields include accounting, business finance, marketing, and personnel administration.

There were four Washington University representatives in Korea. All had prior experience in the Far East and/or in building up business curricula. Professors Richard Reidenbach and George Robinson were from the Department of Marketing. The chief of party, Dean Charles E. Gilliland, is a Washington University D. B. A. and former faculty member who resigned his deanship (at the University of Kansas City) to come to Korea. A full-time professorship at Washington University awaits him at the expiration of the Korean contract, if he wants it. The assistant chief, Professor Robert Manhard, is on leave from the University of Missouri. Both Dean Gilliland and Professor Manhard are specialists in industrial management.

Both Reidenbach and Robinson taught demonstration courses, each at the Korean university to which he was assigned. Professor Reidenbach taught marketing at Korea University, and also a supplementary class in English conversation. Professor Robinson taught industrial management at Yonsei. No attempt was made to introduce a pure case system, but the Americans branched out from lecture methods by using audio-visual materials, American cases, and some discussion. Courses were given in English without interpreters. They were not compulsory and carried no academic credit, but were attended by both Korean students and teachers. If there is demand, teaching may be expanded to include a credit course in business policies, given by the entire Washington University staff at both Korean universities separately. There is some question whether Korean students know enough English to profit by such a course; this problem is acute at Korea University. Yonsei students, because of the missionary background of their institution, have higher standards in oral English. Gilliland and Manhard divided their time between the two campuses and acted as liaison officers with OEC. All four

men worked on curricular problems at both Yonsei and Korea Universities. Assisting the Washington University group was Professor Chong Ha Lee (Finance, Yonsei), a particularly fortunate choice with connections at both rival schools. Although a Yonsei graduate and teacher, he is the personal protege of one of the Korea University senior professors.

It was originally planned to invite six Korean faculty members to St. Louis for one year each, or 18 over the three-year period covered by the contract. They were to be divided equally between the two Korean institutions, and to observe American business practices as well as methods of teaching business courses. Four went to America before the contract was signed, having been selected by O E C and sent to Teachers' College of Columbia University for one semester and then to Washington University after the signing of the contract. They were enrolled in special non-credit courses. Selection was to be by consultation between the Washington University representatives and the Korean faculties, with preference probably given to men under 40, and with English proficiency a prerequisite. Subsequently Gilliland developed more ambitious views on this portion of the program. He would like to see all business faculty members of both Korea and Yonsei who desire to visit the United States go to Washington for periods of from six months to a year and a half or even more. He would like to see them take courses for credit, so that each university could have several Washington University M.B.A.'s and D.B.A.'s on its faculty. He feels that nearly all the Korean faculty members know enough English to profit by six months in America, but that only a minority have broad enough backgrounds for the Washington University D.B.A. degree.²⁵ Any such wholesale or long-term migration would deplete Korean teaching facilities, but the Washington University representatives feel it would be possible to increase teaching loads and hire part-time people.

25. The Washington University D.B.A. requires proficiency in the four major aspects of business: finance, marketing, personnel, and production. In addition, it requires a somewhat lesser degree of proficiency in four tool subjects: accounting, business law, economics, and statistics.

Gilliland's first job as chief of party was to operate a management development program, involving a two-week summer seminar in July, 1958. While such programs are common in the United States, this was the first attempt in Korea.

The summer seminars were led by five regular members of the Washington University business faculty, all of whom came to Korea only for the project and all of whom have since returned to St. Louis. The sessions were held at a hot spring resort called Onyang, 75 miles south of Seoul. The original plan was to have 20 Korean participants, mainly from private industry, plus a few from the government and the army. Actually the recruiting program was so successful that 30 Koreans were selected to participate. They came from the government, the army, the banks, and government-owned corporations, with only a few from private business. Their ages ranged from 30 to 70. They were presidents or top operating officials, not more than two to an enterprise. They represented mainly big business on the Korean scene. Faculty members of Yonsei and Korea Universities also attended as discussion leaders, observers, and interpreters.

The reason for the successful recruitment was the broad base of cooperation in sponsoring the program. The management development program was advertised as being conducted by Yonsei and Korea Universities in cooperation with Washington University. It was under the joint sponsorship of four Ministries (Finance, Reconstruction, Industry, and Transportation) and of OEC. It was given wide newspaper and radio publicity, mainly in the Seoul area. There was little representation from such major Korean economic centers as Pusan and Taegu, and also little representation from small business.

Separate seminars were held in finance, marketing, personnel, and production, as well as in accounting. In addition there was one session in statistics, given by consultants from the Survey Research Corporation, who are helping the government set up reliable statistical series. The method used was a combination of lecture and case systems. Only American cases were used, but they were selected by Koreans with a view to meaningfulness in Korea. Discussion was held in both English and Korean. All discussions in English were translated into Korean, but much

of the discussion in Korean was not translated into English. Simultaneous -translation equipment was ordered but did not arrive.

During the two -week sessions Gilliland's impression was that Koreans do as well on case material as do similar American groups, and that Koreans are more advanced in business thinking than is realized by most Americans. The best in Korea is often comparable to the best in America, although Korean performance is spottier and the Korean over-all average appears to be lower.

Subsequent follow -up conferences covered about half the participants. There was some objection to "modern" methods by old-line Korean businessmen, but a number of devices that were suggested at the Onyang seminars are actually being adopted in Korean firms. Most of these involve the use of formal job classifications. One of the Washington University visitors is cooperating with a special Korean committee that includes both businessmen and faculty members from Yonsei and Korea Universities to prepare Korean case materials for classroom use in Korea. There have also been inquiries about future conferences, not only from Korean companies which were not represented, but from countries as far away as Thailand.

These management development conferences also appeal to the Korean universities, primarily as improving their contacts with the business community. Korea University has suggested that Washington University help it sponsor one such conference during the Christmas holidays; however, they exclude Yonsei. This has been the first overt manifestation of positive ill will between the two institutions.

Although living like other American university representatives in special American compounds, the Washington University people engage freely in social contacts with their Korean colleagues. Individual members speak of having found "second homes" in Korea and seem positively happy to be there. They praise the people and the scenery, and joke about the inconveniences. Another

example of enthusiasm about Korea and the Koreans is the story of their indoctrination. Even before the contract was signed, the group selected began studying the Korean language and history together. They were disappointed with the briefing given them by ICA in Washington which was, they felt, elementary or out of date, and said nothing about Korean higher education. They therefore contacted the Korean Embassy in Washington on their own initiative, and claim to have learned more in one afternoon there than they had learned in the whole previous week.

This pro-Korean attitude and high morale has also had its effects in St. Louis itself. The city has been described as more Korea-conscious by reason of this program than it ever became during the Korean War. This is partly through the speeches and other public appearances of the Korean participants in the St. Louis area, but primarily through those of Dean Trump of Washington University, who has made himself a kind of unofficial Korean ambassador-of-good-will in the community. Even in a large university in a large city, this experience suggests, a university program can make some impression.

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY AUDIO-VISUAL CONTRACTS

The department of audio-visual instruction in the School of Education of Syracuse University is a veritable wholesaler of overseas contracts. It has had 16 contracts in seven countries with various United States government agencies since 1950, and has sub-contracted several which it could not staff itself. Among the sub-contracting universities in various countries have been Minnesota, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Southern California. One reason for its adaptability for overseas contracts is that it performs largely a service function on the Syracuse campus. Its main job at Syracuse is the preparation of audio-visual materials for the entire university, including materials not only for the teaching departments but also for public relations. Only a minority of the staff actually teaches in the School of Education.

The department is a large one, including 34 people at Syracuse and 17 overseas as of November, 1958. The number overseas has been at times as high as 28. It should be noted that at Syracuse technicians without college degrees have the tenure and pay of professors, although they do not have professional titles and do not participate in formulating university policies. Many of them teach, particularly in laboratory courses; they are often very good teachers. This system of employing technicians on the faculty, while not unique to Syracuse, is most unusual.

As for the academic tenure status of the Syracuse people overseas, this is not a problem, since they have no employment difficulties on their return to the United States. Often they join the Syracuse staff, but sometimes go to other universities or to private industry. It is not unusual for them to remain with government agencies. They are definitely not the "second class citizens" of the Syracuse department.

The two contracts dealt with here were signed in July and October, 1958. They were the most recent contracts the author encountered in either Japan or Korea,²⁶ and work was just starting at the time of the author's visit in November. Both contracts are with OEC, and each involves a relation with a different branch of the Korean government. No Korean universities are involved directly.

The earlier two-year contract, signed in July, has six Syracuse staff members working in the Korean Office of Public Information (OPI). They are to train Koreans in the making of educational motion pictures. Together with the Koreans, the Syracuse representatives make education and training films. Some are of the "nuts and bolts" variety in which concrete processes are shown step by step; others have more conventional educational content. They do not make propaganda and information films

26. A later contract was signed in 1959 between the Korean Government and the University of Oregon. This involved advice to the Korean Ministry of Reconstruction on problems of economic development.

because the Koreans already do this job satisfactorily. The films are shown in schools and villages, some for children and some for adults; some of the audiences are ordinarily illiterate. They may be shown by either USIS or Korean technicians.

The first project director in Korea was Professor James McCarron of Syracuse. He had served for many years with a similar Syracuse project in Iran, and his functions in Korea were largely administrative. Under him were five specialists from Syracuse, some from the regular staff and some hired for work in Korea. One was a writer-director, one a cameraman, one a sound man, one a laboratory technician, and one an equipment maintenance man who could also design equipment and parts. Their function was on-the-job training of Koreans working in the same fields. For example, Korea has a good many professional movie cameramen, but they are said to place too much stress on speed and not enough on clarity for educational motion picture work.

The second and smaller Syracuse contract was signed in October, 1958, also for a two-year term. It involves Syracuse with the Korean Ministry of Education. It is an entirely separate enterprise, involving only two American staff members. The project director was Professor Gilbert Tauffner of Syracuse; his associate was Professor Kenneth Iverson of Wisconsin, on leave for the project, who had had no prior connection with Syracuse University.

The task in the Ministry is to set up a model audio-visual demonstration center, which the Ministry is trying to induce normal schools and public schools to use and emulate. The center shows cheap teacher-made and village-craftsman-made Korean materials, such as can be duplicated in small villages. These include charts, posters, and science models made out of such things as tin cans and rubber hose. Audio-visual materials of this kind have been constructed by many American rural schools; Professor Iverson has had a great deal of extension experience with such work in Wisconsin.

Where projectors are available, the use of films is also encouraged. A catalogue of films is made available for use in community development and village school projects. Some of the films used show how to make other audio-visual materials, such as the silk screens on which charts can be drawn or posters attached.

Since both Peabody and Syracuse are working in the Ministry of Education, difficulties may conceivably arise between the two groups of representatives. It is, however, the intention of the Syracuse group to take a subordinate role, assisting Peabody when requested to do so but not taking the initiative. Similar principles govern possible Syracuse relationships with other American university representatives in Korea, as well as with OEC itself. This attitude is expected to demonstrate to the Koreans how well two American institutions can cooperate with each other.

No Koreans are sent to America under the Syracuse contract. Indiana University, which also has a large audio-visual center, does most of the participant training for ICA, while Syracuse handles most of the overseas contracts. Two of the Korean Office of Public Information technicians have already been to Indiana. This division of labor -- participant training at Indiana, overseas staff from Syracuse -- applies not only in Korea but all over the world, particularly the Middle East and Latin America.

Since Syracuse has had so much experience with ICA overseas contracts, the comments of Syracuse representatives on relations with ICA have particular value. They feel that ICA in Washington is difficult to deal with. The Washington staff is relatively uninterested in problems overseas or in the problems of American universities. It is concerned rather with legal and budgetary considerations. The result is delay, continued even after all disagreements in principle have been ironed out. For example, ICA/Washington is reluctant to issue "letters of intent" which would permit contractors to hire people for overseas work before

contracts have actually been signed. Because of this, Syracuse has sometimes operated overseas without contracts, despite the risks involved. In one case Syracuse operated for two and a half months without a contract. Other universities are usually unwilling to do this; therefore Syracuse has stopped sub-contracting overseas assignments even when it has difficulty staffing them.

The Syracuse representatives found it difficult to generalize about relations with USOM and OEC people in the several host countries where they have worked. Where the host country director is good, Syracuse has had no difficulty, but the service function of audio-visual work has been such as to avoid difficulties which might otherwise have come up. There are, however, two types of host-country directors whom Syracuse considers difficult to work with. One has been the petty dictator, who seeks to control all the details of the Syracuse operation. Another has been the over-liberal type, who gives contractors too much freedom for too long periods of time, only to cause trouble later if disagreements with over-all ICA policy arise. In both these cases, which appear to be at opposite extremes, the basic difficulty is that ICA does not consider contract people as members of its staff in the same sense as people hired directly.

The Syracuse representatives want to be controlled as to policy and objectives. At the very least, they expect to be told at all times what the policy and objectives are to which they should conform. Since theirs is a service function, problems of academic freedom mean less to them than to some other departments elsewhere. On the other hand, Syracuse does not want ICA control on such details as budgets and time schedules. If Syracuse men wish to work a different schedule from ICA staff members, Syracuse feels that they should be permitted to do so, provided only that the result is not less work than contracted for. With special reference to Korea, Syracuse expects no difficulty. Mr. William L. Warne, director of OEC, has also supervised the Syracuse audio-visual project in Iran, where relations were good. Mr. William Gelabert, Chief of OEC's

audio-visual division, is himself a Syracuse M. S. who had overseas experience as a Syracuse staff member on the same Iranian project before joining ICA.

No Syracuse representatives were able to survey the Korean situation in any detail before signing the two contracts, and therefore arrived in Seoul with a certain degree of misinformation regarding the problems they would have to face. They found their Korean counterparts better trained and more advanced technically than they had expected. They also found the problem of housing for themselves and their families much easier than they had anticipated. If they had known the actual situation, staff recruiting would probably have been easier. On the other hand, the transportation problem within Seoul has turned out to be very difficult, because of an increase in the number of Americans in the city and the shortage of automobiles.

CHAPTER 6 PURPOSES
OF
PROGRAMS

Even limiting our study to a single pair of host countries, we have found a wide variety of American university programs in operation as of the latter half of 1958. There is not one but a variety of "models." Before attempting any suggestions or recommendations, it is well to begin with a resume of the purposes of the programs. These are not always the same as seen from the viewpoints of the various participants. We shall consider first the "good" reasons for the programs, and then pass on to other reasons sometimes ascribed to some of the programs by their critics.

STATED PURPOSES

Examining the individual programs in the order of their consideration, their principal stated purposes appear to be the following:

ICA-Financed Programs (Chapter 2)

Michigan-Waseda Program in Industrial Productivity: To develop and apply in Japan current American techniques of research in industrial productivity, with a view to increasing the productivity of Japanese industry.

Massachusetts-Hokkaido Program in Agriculture: To develop and apply in Japan current American techniques of research in applied science, with special reference to agriculture and perhaps home economics; to demonstrate to Japanese the advantages of the American land-grant college system in bringing research to bear on the actual problems of rural life; to contribute to the economic development of Japan's Hokkaido frontier.

Harvard-Keio Program in Business Administration: To develop and apply in Japan current American teaching methods in business administration, particularly the case method as against the lecture system; to increase contact between Japanese teachers of business subjects and Japanese business circles; to improve the technical and administrative competence of younger Japanese businessmen.

Foundation-Financed Programs (Chapter 3)

Stanford - Tokyo Program in American Studies: To develop American area studies in Japan, including both American subject matter (as in history and literature) and characteristically American forms of study and research (econometrics, survey research, pragmatism, social anthropology, logical positivism).

Michigan - Kyoto - Doshisha Program in American Studies: The same essentially as the Stanford - Tokyo Program in American Studies.

Co-operative Program in Legal Studies: To develop Japanese understanding of general Anglo-American law and its case system, with special reference to the Occupation-inspired changes in Japanese law; to increase American understanding of the Japanese legal system.

Michigan Program in Okayama: To carry on social science field studies in rural Japan; to train American specialists in Japanese area studies.

Programs of Individual Institutions (Chapter 4)

Amherst-Doshisha Affiliation: To further international understanding and goodwill by exchange of students and teachers; to improve the teaching of elementary English in Japan.

Carleton-Doshisha Affiliation: To further international understanding and goodwill by exchange of students and recent graduates; to improve the teaching of elementary English in Japan.

Rockford-Kobe Affiliation: To further international understanding and goodwill by exchange of students and teachers; to improve the teaching of elementary English in Japan; to assist Christian missionary efforts in Japan.

International Christian University Program: To further international understanding and goodwill by exchange of students and teachers; to establish a first-class Protestant Christian University in Japan, with special emphasis on graduate training.

Stanford-Keio Student Exchange: To further international understanding and goodwill by exchange of undergraduate students.

Pennsylvania-Kanazawa Student Affiliation: To further international understanding and goodwill by exchange of student materials (newspapers, records, art exhibits, etc.).

University of Maryland Far East Program: To provide accredited college training for American servicemen stationed in the Far East.

Programs in Korea (Chapter 5)

Minnesota-Seoul National University Affiliation: To reconstruct and expand the facilities of SNU in the fields of agriculture, engineering, medicine, and public administration; to develop and apply in Korea current American techniques of teaching and research in these fields; to demonstrate to Koreans the advantages of the American system of teaching and of applying research to the actual problems of the people.

Peabody Projects in Education: To assist in democratizing the Korean educational system along two main lines: (1) stressing elementary education for the many as against advanced training for the few; (2) reducing authoritarianism in the relations of school principals to classroom teachers, and of teachers to their students.

Washington-Korea-Yonsei Program in Business Administration: To develop in Korea current American teaching methods in business administration, particularly the case method as against the lecture system; to increase contact between Korean teachers of business subjects and Korean business circles; to improve the technical and administrative competence of younger Korean businessmen.

Syracuse Audio-Visual Program: To assist Korea in the preparation and use of audio-visual materials, particularly motion pictures, and in the on-the-job training of Korean audio-visual technicians.

It is conventional to divide the activities of American colleges and universities into three main categories: instruction (teaching), scholarship (research), and service (adult education, extension work, continuing education, etc.). Most of the programs under consideration here are concentrated in the third or service field. Some might almost be described as the opening of temporary extension centers by one or more departments in Japanese or Korean universities or government offices. This generalization has numerous exceptions, particularly among the smaller programs conducted by individual institutions without governmental or foundation support discussed in Chapter 4. The Michigan program in Okayama was clearly scholarly; the Maryland program is clearly instructional; both are large, and have outside financial support. The generalization is however safe for the more controversial programs, particularly those supported on the American side, by ICA or by its Korean equivalent of OEC. It may be significant that the Michigan-Okayama project has had no successor of equivalent scholarly ambitions.

OTHER PURPOSES OF AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS

Since the close of World War II, American colleges and universities have faced chronic shortages of staff for teaching, for research, and for domestic extension work. Despite the natural sympathy of educational administrators for the stated purposes of the overseas programs, one wonders why they should agree to dissipate their own strained manpower resources further and co-operate actively.

One almost universal reason for their willingness appears to have been the attitude of the faculty itself. Faculty members were interested for a variety of reasons in periods of overseas service in the Far East. (Japanese service was a greater attraction than Korean.) Some of these reasons we shall discuss in later paragraphs of this section, and shall refrain from giving in complete detail here. From the institutional viewpoint, however, the appeal of the overseas program in attracting (or retaining) desirable faculty members was something to be considered.

Another frequent inducement, particularly when the Federal government was involved, was clearly financial. ICA contracts include compensation for "overhead expenses" that constitute a welcome addition to the general funds of educational institutions which have been chronically pressed for money as well as for staff. Tuition and allied fees paid by public or private agencies on behalf of foreign visitors under these programs also aided college and university exchequers in some small way.

A third inducement, for all but the aristocracy of American institutions, was prestige. It gives prestige when dealing with prospective donors or with state legislators to show that one's institution is good enough to have been singled out over all comers by a public agency to carry on an international program on the other side of the globe; no need to mention that one's institution was that agency's fourth or fifth choice. Prestige is also acquired when the program involves the presence of numerous foreign students and other visitors on an American campus. The university appears less provincial than it is, and more world-renowned than it is. Nor is this always a matter of

deceiving oneself or others. It is quite possible for contacts established under overseas programs to extend beyond contract expiration dates, and thereby actually decrease the provincialism and increase the international renown of the American participant.

A fourth inducement relates to staffing, at the graduate level particularly. We have mentioned the role of the overseas program in attracting and retaining staff members in the competitive market. It is also true that despite the over-all shortage (and in anticipation of greater shortages in the future) some departments of most institutions are systematically over-staffed at the graduate level in particular. The opportunity to live within one's budget by sending extra men abroad is a tempting one for administrators. So is the increase of enrollment in advanced courses by the influx of foreign visitors; but for them, Professor Smith might have to discontinue his seminar every other year and teach the hordes of freshmen instead. Sometimes, too, foreign students coming under international programs act as research assistants without drain on departmental budgets.

Finally, it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that some schools accepted overseas commitments without knowing what they involved, and have continued them largely out of inertia. They may not have realized the need to send staff members abroad for a year or more at a time. They may not have realized the number of people who would have to go at once. They may not have realized the difficulty of piecing out their own ranks with equally competent people from elsewhere. Perhaps most frequently, they may not have realized the unacceptability of the very young, the very old, or the obviously second-rate staff member to his Japanese or Korean counterparts.

Save for the occasional cynic, individual American participants are sympathetic to the stated purposes of the programs in which they take part. Their other motives and purposes, over and beyond this sympathy, vary widely from case to case. Many participants come with Far Eastern teaching or research interests which they hope to develop further. These often arise from previous wartime or civilian service in the area. Others, without such interests themselves, come in order to acquire them, often under the influence of Japanophiles among their friends and

colleagues. Some are attracted by the higher pay, the perquisites, and the tax privileges of overseas service. These add up, in many cases, to an opportunity for saving money unequalled in American academic life. Some participants want a paid vacation with travel at someone else's expense. The amenities, scenery, and souvenirs for which Japan is famous attract the "sabbatical tourist." Korea also profits by these, since Tokyo is accessible from Seoul. Some participants hope to meet lower, or simply more congenial, professional standards abroad, and gain there the repute which they have somehow never achieved at home. They hope, in a few cases, for little puddles in which to be big frogs. A final group, repelled by some aspect of American culture or by their personal or professional situations, want mainly to "get away from it all." These are the misfits or expatriates, whom most programs seek to avoid.

OTHER PURPOSES OF ASIAN PARTICIPANTS

The writer was never able to discover the extent of genuine Japanese and Korean sympathy with and support for the stated purposes of the various overseas programs. It seems a safe generalization that they were never actively hostile, but their actions suggest that their real purposes were quite different. While the worst American participants were accused of neglecting their duties for sightseeing and entertainment, the worst Japanese and Koreans were accused of deliberately substituting more congenial work for their duties under the program.

An Asian institution, particularly a public one, has much to gain from an overseas program. It can obtain buildings, laboratory equipment, and library books from abroad, along with assistance in planning construction and purchases which is more frequently a help than a hindrance. Sometimes more important, these material resources from bricks to books come with a commitment by the home government or the home trustees to maintain or replace them. Even though unenforceable at law, such a maintenance or replacement commitment is valuable in countries like Japan and Korea where valuable academic properties have

traditionally been left to the tender mercies of time, wind, and weather after money has been raised for their procurement.

When the prospective American partner is a prestige institution like Harvard, status-seeking may explain why a Japanese or Korean institution wants affiliation. It may be doubted, for example, that Kyoto and Doshisha universities would have been quite so eager to participate in an American Studies program but for Tokyo University's having secured a Stanford affiliation in the same field, which excluded both the Kansai area and the private universities. Similarly, the great names of Harvard, Michigan, and Stanford attached to the Co-operative Program in Legal Studies caused many Japanese universities to strive for inclusion before the program got under way, with hard feelings when they were turned down. In Korea there were fewer programs, but the pre-emption by Seoul National University of agriculture, engineering, medicine, and public administration left the private universities struggling eagerly for the major plum which remained, namely, the business administration contract.

What individual Japanese and Korean participants expect for themselves from overseas programs is easier to summarize. Sympathy with the stated objectives of the programs is frequently absent; there is even occasional hostility. The participants want foreign study and prior access to foreign learning. Prestige has attached for a century to foreign study among Japanese academic circles, and for a shorter period in Korean ones as well. Prestige attaches particularly to those fortunate enough to be invited abroad by European or American institutions or colleagues. Foreign travel also provides the opportunity to learn the latest wrinkles in one's specialty somewhat in advance of one's professional rivals. In Japan and Korea, which have traditionally lagged behind the West and in which academic repute has been obtainable by translation and paraphrase of Western works, this can be vital to a man's success.

As for the presence of American visitors, attitudes are mixed. If the visitor is indeed known favorably in advance to his Japanese colleagues, he is unequivocally welcome. Otherwise his perquisites and amenities are apt to be resented, and he

himself accepted only as part of the price of the program. It is, however, usually an exaggeration to suggest that any program would be more eagerly sought after if American visitors were omitted entirely. Their recommendations are valuable for people hoping for subsidized foreign study and travel. Their knowledge of the latest details of their professional fields is more than welcome. Their presence provides an excuse for rounds of pleasant entertainment. They can usually fill in gaps in the Japanese or Korean faculties of the institutions to which they are sent. Anything more depends on the man himself. It is the writer's impression that this "something more" has come most frequently from the foundation-financed programs, which are academically oriented and where the Japanese play a greater role in the selection of the visitors who are to come to their country.

FOREIGN POLICY PURPOSES

American government interest in overseas programs has transcended the technical purposes of the ICA programs. There is hope for increased mutual understanding and respect between the United States and Asia, and for the sympathetic presentation of American points of view in Asia. This explains, for example, the special concessions made by SCAP during the Occupation of Japan to the first American Studies program in Tokyo.

The problem of securing mutual understanding and respect, not to mention sympathetic presentation of American views, are acute in academic and other intellectual circles in Japan. Japanese intellectuals are more influential than their American counterparts. Their political positions also tend towards the Socialist Party; this makes them neutralist if not positively anti-American in contrast to the pro-American attitudes of the Japanese government.

The hope of the American government for sympathetic presentation of American viewpoints does not extend to any pressure for attacks upon the U.S.S.R. or upon the Chinese Communists. Neither does it lead to censorship of Americans visiting Japan under university programs. Many American economists in Japan, for example, have sympathized publicly

with Japanese complaints against American import policy toward Japanese goods. They have not been disciplined for this, although their views have not been welcome at meetings sponsored directly by the U. S. Information Service.

A more delicate question has been the use of overseas programs to secure "intelligence - type" information. By this is not meant military information but, rather, economic or political information. How much of what is made where, by what methods, and with what prospects? What are the political views of Mr. X, and what influence does he have in what circles?

Anti-Americans in Japan smell this rat in American university programs, even those without American government support. Their fear is not that this information may be used against the present Japanese government, but rather that it may be used in co-operation with this government in some future "red purge." This fear has been intensified by the publication in Japanese of Prisoners of Liberation,¹ a "confession" of "espionage" activities by two American students in Peking during the first years of Communist rule.

As far as this writer could discern, none of the programs has ever had as even an incidental purpose the collection of intelligence information. Individuals connected with various programs have been interviewed by United States intelligence agents either abroad or after their return, as has this writer himself. Their responses vary from case to case; the writer knows of individuals who have refused to answer the questions of intelligence agents without penalty for their non-co-operation.

It is true that some individuals connected with the university programs have had World War II or Korean War experience in military or naval intelligence, as have had a considerable percentage of American Far Eastern specialists between the ages of 30 and 50. This intelligence experience rarely extended beyond translation of documents, monitoring of press and radio, interviewing of war prisoners, and serving as interpreters.

1. Allyn and Adele Rickett, Prisoners of Liberation (New York: Cameron Associates, 1958)

Nearly all the men involved are on inactive status even when they retain formal connections with one or another intelligence reserve. Statistical study of this point is obviously difficult, but the writer (who has himself had such intelligence background) can speak from the personal experiences of wartime associates as well as his own.

Other delicate questions relate to individual programs. In the case of the Michigan-Waseda productivity program, the Japanese Left diagnoses as an ultimate purpose the furthering of the economic interests of big business, particularly of firms making war goods for American forces in the Far East. The program (in their view) is planned to oppress small business, peace industries, and the labor movement. In the case of the American Studies programs, the charge is one of infecting Japanese intellectuals with pro-American propaganda. In the case of the Co-operative Program in Legal Studies, the charge is one of propaganda for maintenance of the Occupation changes in the Japanese legal structure.

The ultimate consequences of the productivity program may conceivably be what the Left suggests, as may be true also of the other programs considered. But whatever these ultimate consequences may be, the interested parties -- including government agencies and educational foundations as well as universities -- have no such purpose in view and are doing all they can to avoid suspicion of bias and propaganda. In the law program particularly, some thought of influencing policy may have entered during Occupation days, but has been eliminated following the recovery of Japanese independence.

CONFLICTS OF PURPOSES

We have examined a multiplicity of purposes and motives underlying the overseas programs of American universities. Some have been laudable, some less so. But multiplicity of this kind is inevitable. Stated purposes never tell the whole story. What difference, if any, does this multiplicity of purposes make here?

It makes a difference in two ways, both requiring considerable firmness of control. Obviously, purposes actively hostile to the programs must be suppressed or repressed. Thus, at Ann Arbor some Waseda participants had to be pressed into visiting industrial plants and studying the applied mathematics of industrial productivity. They would have preferred to advance their professional interests as pure mathematicians, and considered factory visits beneath their dignity. Further, it requires firmness by chiefs of party or other group leaders to keep extraneous purposes (the sideshows) from swallowing up the stated purposes of the program (the circus). There is always competition in time and energy, even when the extraneous purposes involve no conflict of substance with the stated ones. It is complained of some programs, particularly in Korea, that the American participants do too little work to justify their salaries and other privileges. Controls of some sort, however, are in operation, since such complaints are made less frequently of university program personnel in Japan than of Fulbright visitors who operate more nearly as free agents.

CHAPTER 7 SUGGESTIONS
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

"LITTLE BROWN BROTHERS"

More than a century ago, Ralph Waldo Emerson published a celebrated essay, "On a Certain Condescension in Foreigners," whose subject matter is not yet out of date. A Japanese or Korean Emerson could publish today with equal justification an essay "On a Certain Condescension in Americans," and document it from the overseas programs of American universities.

This condescension may be called the "Little Brown Brother" approach to the Orient, dating the phrase from William Howard Taft's pro-consulship in the Philippines. Its most obvious manifestation is the willingness (complained of particularly by Korean interviewees) to fill out missions with a minority of second-class, untried, or superannuated people with little to offer, or with touristic types who conduct their duties on levels more slipshod and elementary than they would at home. Some instances of universities staffing overseas programs from outside represent a willingness to send abroad men not acceptable as members of their own faculties. Occasionally a university will go further and attempt abroad a program in a field like economic development for which its prior record in America provides no particular credentials.

Condescension is sometimes reinforced from government sources, as when Secretary of State Acheson testified before Congress in 1949 that American specialists in Asia:

. . . don't all need to be top authorities in their fields. This work should appeal to young people with some competence and experience. I suspect we shall find hundreds of good people in state and municipal governments, on farms, in schools and universities, factories and private research organizations. The problem is to seek out these people, give them a little extra training and persuade them to go abroad.¹

Acheson may have been factually correct, yet his stress was quite wrong. The point to be emphasized is not that all men sent abroad do not need to be top authorities, but that many of them do. Many an American university administrator may have made the same mistake in accepting and implementing an overseas contract that Secretary Acheson made in his testimony.

A common sign of condescension toward Japan and Korea is the American universities' failure to use Japanese and Korean program participants to the fullest advantage. This is particularly true for the older man visiting America. When a full professor at a Japanese or Korean university comes to an American campus under an overseas exchange program, he is apt to receive the stipend, accommodations, and treatment of a graduate student. He may not be invited to lecture on his specialty, or even to participate in seminars dealing with it. He may be asked to listen to lectures and write course examinations in English, in unfair competition with his own students whose English is better than his. He may be shuttled about the country on a series of visits which preclude his use of American facilities for his own research. The contrast between his treatment in America and his American counterpart's treatment at home may strain his

1. Hearings, Foreign Aid Appropriation Bill for 1950, Subcommittee, House Committee on Appropriations, 81st Congress, I, 27. Cited by Victor Perlo, American Imperialism (New York: International Publishers, 1951), p. 117.

equanimity and decrease his friendly feelings toward America.

More fundamentally, condescension toward the Japanese and Koreans, and toward their institutions, has exaggerated the need to send Americans abroad. It has made programs large, with concentration on administration and curriculum planning. The actual need for Americans abroad may be limited to a few special fields in which America is temporarily well ahead of Japan and Korea, and to a few others in which Americans have natural advantages. Operations research and educational testing belong to the first category; American history and American literature belong to the second. Much of the administrative work and curriculum planning may be left to Japanese and Koreans who can compare American systems with other possible models, including the status quo. This was Japan's method in the Meiji era; why not try it again?²

To condescension may also be ascribed a somewhat lackadaisical attitude toward the orientation of Americans sent abroad under university programs. What difference do the history and culture of Japan and Korea make if the slate can be wiped clean by transplanting an American land-grant college across the Pacific? Orientation is particularly haphazard and often erroneous as regards the academic environment in which the Americans must work overseas. It is common for the arriving American faculty member to think of his temporary Japanese or Korean base as a carbon copy of a caricature of the nineteenth-century German university -- an ivory tower divorced completely from real problems and life off-campus, and awaiting only "The Word" for transformation into its up-to-date American successor. But

2. Compare Henry Hart's discussion of overseas programs in India (manuscript; Chapter 9, p. 7): "Imagine a Danish specialist in rural adult education brought to the U. S. in 1916 to advise an American college of agriculture in setting up its curriculum to train county agents. Or imagine a professor of history from one of the fine German universities assigned in 1880-1882 . . . to help 'modernize' and 'strengthen' the whole system and discipline of history teaching in an American state, from high school through graduate education."

misinformation about the Japanese and Korean academic scene has other aspects too, and is a topic in itself.

THE ACADEMIC SCENE

Except for the minority of programs antedating World War II, affiliations have been undertaken rapidly and on a large scale between institutions unacquainted with each other. Initial planning visits on ICA programs in particular have been little more than guided tours and hand-shaking expeditions. Programs have been underplanned rather than (as in some Indian cases) overplanned. The viewpoints secured by American administrators have been largely those of American officials and a few English-speaking civil servants and university administrators from the host country. American officials abroad, with some exceptions, are biased against the host country universities as now constituted because they are centers of non-American influences -- German scholarship, Socialist ideology, and so on. These same officials' respect for American universities seems concentrated at times in such "applied science" branches as agriculture, engineering, and business administration. American university administrators and representatives come to Japan or Korea with comparable biases against Japanese and Korean institutions. Some recover quickly and inform their successors accordingly, but some apparently do not.

The state of contact between university and outside world in Japan or Korea varies from campus to campus and department to department, quite as in America. Contact is generally quite active, though admittedly less so than in an American land-grant college. It is, however, easily missed, since it is not organized in the paraphernalia of "contact institutions" such as Extension Divisions, Farm and Home Weeks, Institutes, affiliated Experiment Stations, and so on. Rather, it is individual teachers or groups of teachers who consult for outside agencies, teach extension classes, or work on practical problems in research stations unaffiliated with their universities. Another departure from the American plan is that it is unusual for such teachers to introduce into academic lectures material from their outside jobs.

It is therefore easy but misleading to conclude from the paucity of contact institutions and the abstractness of academic lectures that host country universities have less contact with host country society than is actually the case. In economics, for example, many Japanese businessmen who complain that there is too little contact between academic theorists and business realities complain minutes later of too much contact between these same teachers, the trade union movement, and the Left-wing political parties.

Visiting Americans are not ordinarily informed of the reasons for the Japanese and Korean preference for the large lecture system in undergraduate teaching and the relative neglect of textbooks, cases, libraries, laboratories, and discussion groups. It is not that "they don't know any better" or "they like to hear themselves talk." There are sound economic reasons for the differences. Japanese and Korean universities are too poor for small classes, large libraries, case research, and extensive laboratory equipment, especially for undergraduates. Textbook prices are also too high for students, particularly if the text is an authorized translation or reproduction of a standard foreign work.

Student poverty and reliance on part-time work (called arbeit) also explain why Japanese and Korean students resent being expected to study hard in individual courses. (Their unwillingness to study is a frequent complaint of the American visitor.) A more important reason, however, is that freedom from class assignments and drill represents to the Japanese or Korean student one of the great advantages of passing his "Examination Hell" [shiken-jigoku] and gaining admittance to a university. When the Japanese or Korean collegian studies less than his American contemporary, the visiting teacher should not forget that in his high-school days he worked much harder. Pressure to re-emphasize individual courses is seen by Japanese and Koreans as down-grading university work to the high school level. It is resented particularly by Leftist students, since its ulterior motive is alleged to be to keep the student so busy with

useless tasks that he will be diverted from the outside world and particularly from the student political movement.

The president and the deans of the typical Japanese or Korean university are elected by their faculties. Faculty control being less powerful in America, Americans tend to underestimate the need to secure faculty (and in some cases even student) support for university programs along with that of public officials and academic administrators. Even in America overseas programs have been criticized when undertaken over faculty opposition.³ This is more of a problem, particularly in Japan, as the Michigan-Waseda history indicates.

Great as is the desirability of reconciling the senior faculty to any program that involves them in an affiliation with an American university of which few may have even heard, this group is often neglected. Overseas programs are sometimes presented as demonstrations to the younger faculty members (in the instructor and assistant professor categories) of the superiority of American methods to the German or Japanese models their seniors use. The senior men themselves, despite their influence at home, are shunted aside: "Their English is bad. They are set in their ways. They are too old to learn." These are frequent rationalizations; they are often correct. The fact remains, however, that the senior men resent being shunted aside, and sometimes exaggerate it into a plot to undermine their standing and prestige. Because of their power and influence, it is usually desirable in the long run for programs to go out of their way to give reconciliatory recognition to these older men, even at the cost of some "waste of time" for the American universities to which they may be invited.

3. Representatives of the economics and business faculty of Michigan State University, which has an unusually large number of overseas programs, have resolved that "no service activity should be undertaken without full consultation with the faculty who will be expected to participate as well as with the departments directly involved." Michigan State University, Report of the Seminar on International Economics and Business (East Lansing, Michigan; mimeographed, November, 1958).

CULTURAL INVESTMENT

It is a common observation that most American university representatives reach Japan or Korea with insufficient short-term "orientation" to their host country and its problems. To this we can make two or three positive suggestions. One is that greater use be made of any on-campus specialists in these countries, who will not be going abroad themselves if they are historians and the affiliation is in engineering. The second suggestion is that systematic use be made of Japanese and Korean diplomatic facilities -- the staffs and libraries of embassies and consulates -- to assist in orientation. The third suggestion is that ICA provide somewhat higher level orientation programs for professional people like the university representatives, in answer to the frequent complaint that the existing programs are adapted to the stenographer with only a high school education.

With the best conceivable short-term orientation, however, we should not overlook the desirability of longer or more frequent foreign service for most university representatives. Institutions which cannot or will not send enough good long-term people for large-scale, long-term projects must anticipate interference from government agencies or from foundations to compensate for the shortcomings of their representatives in ability or experience. When long terms cannot be arranged, men should overlap with their successors to secure greater continuity in their efforts.

Short-run orientation is only one phase of the cultural investment in Japan or Korea which is desirable for men serving in these countries and, to a lesser extent, for men training Japanese and Koreans in America. By "cultural investment" we mean general knowledge of the language, history, geography, government, and economy of the country, over and beyond its special problems in one's own specialty -- not all of these items in every case, but certainly the majority of them.

This investment may be expensive. Willingness and ability to make it are major components in the mysterious "X factor" or

factors determining one's success or failure in the "Art of Overseasmanship."⁴ It would be made more frequently by university representatives if the expected returns were greater. (It is not usually possible to reduce the high cost.)

Cultural investment often does not pay. There are several reasons for this. Its motivation is usually service abroad. Terms of service abroad are too seldom repeated, or scattered among too many countries for it to be worthwhile. When the investment is made, it is often combined with a specialization within one's own discipline, as when a political scientist concentrates on Japanese governmental institutions. University representatives abroad, however, often have duties unrelated to their teaching, research, or other interests.⁵

The likelihood of adequate cultural investment is particularly small if the man who works abroad, or with foreign students, comes to be regarded as a second-class academic citizen -- if he is overlooked, that is to say, in "merit" salary increases, or forgotten for promotions in academic rank. When time permits he should also be consulted on problems of policy in his home department during his stay abroad, and his interests should be considered by his colleagues. Finally, he should not be regarded automatically as an "expatriate," a "misfit," or otherwise "peculiar" as a simple result of having made a cultural investment and of desiring foreign service.

GOLDEN GHETTOS AND UGLY AMERICANS

Important difficulties arise, particularly in Korea, from difficult housing situations and from the bait of luxurious living

4. John W. Masland, "Factor X: What is Different About Being Abroad?" in Harlan Cleveland and Gerard J. Mangone (eds.), The Art of Overseasmanship (Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1957), pp. 95-102.

5. The Michigan State University Seminar on International Economics and Business commented unfavorably on this point in its Report (op. cit., p. 84), recommending that "no service activity be undertaken which will not contribute to the professional growth of the participants . . . either directly on the job or indirectly by virtue of the availability of research data . . ."

used in attracting personnel to that war-torn and poverty-stricken country.

Many university representatives participate voluntarily or otherwise in the "golden ghetto" variety of compound living in and around Seoul. Standards of living there are higher than many of these people could expect at home, since they combine the advantages of Western mechanical gadgetry and free American public education with ample supplies of cheap Eastern servant labor. Harlan Cleveland criticizes "past generations of businessmen" for having "built compounds, surrounded by high steel fences, to exclude the 'natives' and give their own employees that warm sense of never having left home."⁶ Cleveland's words apply equally to some American installations where university representatives on ICA programs associate so exclusively with the American community as to be confused with actual American government employees. Although it is common to invite occasional high-ranking Japanese or Koreans to such homes as guests, the gap between the American compound and their own humble abodes embarrasses the Asians because of the difficulty of reciprocal entertainment. Another consequence of life in the golden ghetto, over and above alienation from the host country, is the time spent preparing for, giving, and recovering from parties within the American community, plus the time spent shopping for possessions both "stateside" and "native" with which to impress one's American neighbors.

Ambassador Gilbert MacWhite of The Ugly American submits to his superiors in Washington six requests which apply to this and other parts of our discussion. We reprint these requests in full:

1. I request that every American (and his dependents) sent to Sarkhan be required to be able to both read and speak Sarkhanese. I am satisfied that if the motivation is high

6. Harlan Cleveland, "The Essence of Overseasanship," in Cleveland and Mangone, op.cit., p. 4.

enough, any person can learn enough of the language in twelve weeks so that he can get along. This should be required of both military and civilian personnel.

2. I request that no American employee be allowed to bring his dependents to Sarkhan unless he is willing to serve here for at least two years. If he does bring his family, it should be with the understanding that they will not be given luxurious quarters, but will live in housing which is normal to the area; their housing should certainly not be more luxurious than they are able to afford in America. They should also subsist on foods available in local stores -- which are wholesome and simple.

3. I request that the American commissary and PX be withdrawn from Sarkhan, and that no American supplies be sold except for toilet articles, baby goods, canned milk, coffee, and tobacco.

4. I request that Americans not be allowed to bring their private automobiles to this country. All of our official transportation should be done in official automobiles. Private transportation should be taxi, pedi-cab, or bicycle.

5. I request that all Americans serving in Sarkhan, regardless of their classification, be required to read books by Mao Tse-tung, Lenin, Chou En-lai, Marx, Engels, and leading Asian Communists. This reading should be done before arrival.

6. I request that in our recruiting program we make all of these conditions clear to any prospective government employee, so that he comes here with no illusions. It has been my experience that superior people are attracted only by challenge. By setting our standards low and making our life soft, we have, quite automatically and unconsciously, assured ourselves of mediocre people.⁷

7. William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, The Ugly American (New York: Norton, 1958), p. 268.

Our estimates of the practicability of these suggestions for Japan and Korea are as follows:

Require- ment No.	Practicable In		Notes
	Japan	Korea	
1.	No	No	<p>a. The Japanese and Korean ideographic systems are major obstacles to acquiring reading or writing skills in these languages.</p> <p>b. It should be permissible to substitute other than linguistic evidence of cultural investment in Japan or Korea.</p> <p>c. Language requirements are not applicable to short-term personnel.</p>
2.	Yes	Partially	Korea still suffers from war shortages.
3.	Yes	Partially	Korea still suffers from war shortages.
4.	Yes	Yes	<p>a. This requirement is already in effect in Korea.</p> <p>b. This requirement might be extended to certain other American consumer durable goods as well.</p>
5.	Yes	Yes	Exceptions should be made for short-term personnel.
6.	Yes	Yes	

An additional requirement might also be added, at least for university personnel: "All private social functions at private homes involving more than eight people should include Japanese (or Korean) guests." Such a requirement is intended not only to

increase social contacts between Americans and Asians, but to reduce the number of parties whose major topic of conversation develops into the disadvantages of Asian life and the peculiarities of the "natives."

On a more political side, it is a mistake for university representatives to ask, however innocently, "intelligence-type" questions about the political beliefs or affiliations of their host country associates. They should also refrain from taking propaganda initiatives to glorify American institutions or the "American way of life." They should, however, have available "answers to dispel the inaccurate and stereotyped beliefs so frequently expressed in the questions of their . . . audiences about race relations, materialism, economic imperialism, and American political objectives."⁸

It is also a political error to deny passports or visas to prospective participants in university programs who have been critical of the government of either the United States or the host country. (We assume that such people are not suspected of active subversion or espionage.) The Republic of Korea has been subject to more criticism in this regard than either the American or Japanese governments. The problem is, however, one beyond the control of universities or their representatives.

CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS

Passing from the completely general to the somewhat more particular, we consider a few factors which might govern the choice of institutions to participate in university programs, both in America and in Asia. Our suggestions add up to a counsel of perfection, with which compromise will almost always be necessary.

8. Cited (from a report on India to the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils) by Gerard J. Mangone, "Dungaree and Grey-Flannel Diplomacy," in Cleveland and Mangone, *op.cit.*, p. 23.

An American participant college or university should be eminent enough for its name to have meaning in Asia. Failing this, the programs should start slowly enough for the American university's reputation to grow on the Asian campus before inaugurating the main body of the program. This method has advantages in the reverse direction as well. As the reputation of the unfamiliar Asian university grows on the American campus, better men will be willing to spend time there and regard their Asian colleagues without the condescension we have criticized.

The American institution should have Asian specialists on its staff who can assist with orientation and cultural investment. Its Center for Japanese Studies gives the University of Michigan special advantages for programs in Japan. The American institution should at the same time be humble enough, and located in a receptive enough community, so that the overseas program will be a welcome sign of recognition, and so that Asian participants will have some impact on and off campus. This sort of situation has developed at Peabody College for Teachers in Nashville, and at Washington University in St. Louis. The American institution should also be democratic enough to avoid having a program accepted by its president and deans without the approval of most of the faculty members who are expected to cooperate. The Minnesota program in Korea is one which has suffered in some branches from faculty indifference.

The last paragraph suggests that despite the obvious advantages of centralizing under one administration a large project like the rebuilding of the Seoul National University, it would have been more effective in the long run to use a number of small contracts, divided among a number of institutions, rather than to put so many eggs into one basket as ICA did in the case of Minnesota. Division of the contract would have enlisted the aid in agriculture, engineering, medicine, or public administration of more institutions like Peabody in education or Washington University in business administration, which are smaller and more grateful for the recognition and financial aid such contracts bring. More division of labor would also have lightened the

administrative duties of the party chiefs, giving them time for substantive as well as administrative work.

Nor is it easy to choose a participating institution overseas. In both Japan and Korea there are three sets of rivalries among universities -- public versus private institutions, "the capital" versus "the provinces," and established versus ambitious institutions. Counsel of neutrality is counsel of perfection, but programs should be divided in general among host country institutions in such a way as to minimize American "interference" with their relative standings, even though it is easier to persuade individual American participants to go to the well-known national university in the capital city than anywhere else in the country. In Korea particularly there may have been too heavy a concentration of programs around Seoul and too little in the area of Taegu and Pusan.

Unless the program has a strong religious orientation, it is desirable to affiliate with a "purely Japanese" or "purely Korean" university rather than to build up "foreign" competition on Japanese or Korean soil. Asian resentment of "foreign" educational institutions seems quite general, although this Chinese Communist example is extreme:

When I asked him if he had ever thought of going to a missionary school to study Western science, General Chu stared at me in amazement.

"How could I?" he exclaimed. "I was a patriot! The missionaries turned Chinese into political and cultural eunuchs who despised their own history and culture. Chinese Christian converts could speak Chinese but hardly write a letter in their own language. They thought America, Britain, or France was the paradise to which the souls of all good Chinese went when they died!"⁹

Institutional jealousies in both America and Asia make it desirable to affiliate only one American and one Asian university in each program. Failing this, segmentation may be practicable.

9. Smedley, *op.cit.*, p. 57.

In the Michigan American Studies program in the Kyoto area, work in the humanities might have been assigned to one of the two participating Japanese universities, and work in the social sciences to the other. Similarly, work in marketing might have been assigned to one of the two Korean universities participating with Washington University in the business administration program, and work in management to the other.

Extending this principle further, it is well that no American university has attempted both a Japanese and a Korean program simultaneously. Relations between these two governments have been unfriendly since the achievement of Korean independence from Japan in 1945. It is difficult to imagine an American university avoiding some sort of indirect involvement if it had affiliations in both countries.

CHOOSING PEOPLE

The ideal American participant in an overseas program is a scholar and teacher of international repute, efficient in diplomacy and administration, who has somehow acquired a complete background in the special problems of the country to which he is being assigned. Despite these sterling qualities, he is not needed urgently at home, and is free to remain abroad for two or more years at a time.

Such people are rarely if ever available even for project directorships, but such is the ideal with which each program must make its peace as well as may be. In most cases the compromises have been reasonable enough, but a minority of the callow and the superannuated, the incompetent and the junketers, have given overseas programs a worse name than they deserve, both at home and abroad.¹⁰ As Hart has put it for certain of the programs in India:

The conclusion is not that Americans on ICA university contract assignments are substandard, but only that the

10. At least in Japan, the critics tend to confuse the organized university programs with the relatively unsupervised Fulbright and other programs.

lower limit of quality should be raised, and insisted upon by the contracting universities much more firmly than it is now.¹¹

We have suggested that the number of Americans sent abroad for such purposes as curriculum planning may well be reduced. Reduction would itself make it easier to raise standards of selection. Standards might also be raised if Asians were given some voice in the selection process, as is done in the two American Studies programs in Japan.

Few American universities have been able to staff large-scale programs overseas completely from their own faculties. They have recruited as best they could from graduate students, recent graduates, and professional acquaintances, usually but not always from institutions less favorably known than those holding the contracts for the programs in question. This type of subcontracting has aroused the ire of ICA, but the Asians view it with equanimity. As one Korean administrator (who had studied in America) put it to the writer: "University A holds the contract in this field, but from what I saw in America it is not particularly good in it. The people from B and C are at least as good as A could have given us." There is some presumption that if B and C are less favorably known than A, those staff members whom B and C are willing to lend to A for the sake of A's foreign contract are less able than those whom A itself is unable or unwilling to supply. But this presumption is rebuttable. It may be that the man from B has a better Far Eastern background than his counterpart at A, while university A has its eye on the man from C to fill its next vacancy. ICA's main objection to subcontracting seems to be that it decreases team-work between the members of a project. This too may be wrong in individual cases, as when the department at university A, which holds the contract, is rent with internal friction, or when the people recruited from B and C are former students of the project director from A and are known to work together well. We could not repeat in Japan

11. Hart manuscript, op.cit., Chapter 10, p. 15.

or Korea Hart's study, in which he concluded from a small sample that in India technicians recruited from outside contracting universities were rated by Indians as slightly more competent than those recruited from within them.¹² Our guess is that the results would not have differed widely.

In view of the difficulties of staffing overseas programs, it would be well to reconsider the conventional warnings against the use of "expatriates" or "misfits" for such work. The standard doctrine has been stated: "If a person seeks an overseas position because he has been unsuccessful in a job or in a personal situation at home, he can be expected to be a failure abroad as well."¹³ Or again: "A person who is well-adjusted in his American environment will not necessarily succeed in an overseas assignment; but a person who is not, almost assuredly will not succeed."¹⁴ Cases aplenty may be cited to support this conventional wisdom, but we should forget neither the Lafcadio Hearn nor the Hideyo Noguchis of this world, who made their major literary and bacteriological contributions as voluntary exiles from countries in which they were less than well adjusted.¹⁵

The most important personnel problems, however, relate to the Japanese or Korean participants sent to America, since it is probably through them that the overseas programs exercise their greatest long-run effects.

American teachers in Japan and Korea are struck almost always by the number of students and young teachers they meet who seem better trained and more alert than the average Japanese

12. Ibid., p. 19 f.

13. Masland, "Factor X," op. cit., p. 98.

14. Michigan State University Group in Vietnam, Proposals for International Programs in Technical Assistance (East Lansing, Michigan; mimeographed, December, 1958), p. 5.

15. Both these men have Japanese connections. Hearn (1850-1904), whom we have encountered in Chapter 1, spent his last 14 years in Japan after a checkered career in America. Noguchi (1876-1928), insufficiently appreciated in Japan, left for America in 1901 and returned only for brief visits.

or Korean exchange student in the United States -- including the participants on university programs. A major reason for this is probably that the university programs, being "action-minded," allow so little time for study in the United States. This results in a temptation to select trainees less for their professional ability and more for their capacity in the English language than would otherwise have been the case. It is therefore suggested that an extra year be given most Japanese and Korean trainees who come to America for graduate study, over and beyond the time required by an American student to complete the same amount of work.

The Japanese or Korean needs the extra time because his first year must be devoted so largely to the English language that he can learn little in his specialty, and also because his elementary or undergraduate background, being different from the American, leaves him imperfectly prepared from the American viewpoint for American graduate study. The extension of time would be desirable in itself, with no American degree involved. A degree usually is involved, however, since its equivalent seems necessary if the participant is to learn enough to do himself or his country any good in the long run. Nor should American degree requirements be watered down for Asian students merely to send them home on schedule with sheepskins to show for their American sojourns. In the "Chinese degree" lies kindness in individual cases, but depreciation of the American degree in the long run. Such depreciation has already progressed apace in Japan and Korea, particularly at the Master's level.

In addition to time pressure and its accompanying stress on "elevator-boy English," there are other reasons for mistakes in trainee selection. There is not enough check on nepotism and "influence" -- not that these can ever be eliminated entirely. Insufficient attention is paid to older men who, while slower to learn and nearer retirement, are also most influential after their return. Sometimes men are chosen because of "American" traits -- aggressiveness, boldness, brashness -- which do not appeal to their potential or actual seniors. It is a mistake made more frequently by missionaries than by university programs

to bring trainees to America before they have completed their Japanese or Korean undergraduate degrees and established their Japanese or Korean connections -- in other words, below the graduate level. Such men often cannot reassimilate to life in their native countries. Exceptions must of course be made for junior years abroad, or for students who do not intend to enter the main channels of Japanese or Korean life.

The selection process has also been criticized at times as too political. Study in the United States should be open to Asians neutral or even unfriendly to America. There is a natural suspicion if only pro-Americans are admitted, and returnees sometimes become blatantly anti-American in order to dispel any such suspicion. Nor, for that matter, should passports be withheld by Asian governments from political opponents who might criticize them in the United States. (This has been a problem in the Korean situation.)

Many participants sent to the United States are married and have families. Domestic and psychological troubles can result when families are separated, and trainees should be permitted to bring their families with them if they stay in America for more than a two-year period.

It is, however, feared in some countries that participants will not return home once their families leave the country. Acting on this theory, the Republic of Korea has refused passports to the wives of such participants. It is true that some Japanese and Korean students have in fact tried to remain indefinitely in America. These cases bring up the difficult question of the uses to which students are put upon their return. The best insurance against their staying on in America is the assurance of suitable work at home. A few, perhaps the majority under the ICA programs, are needed as counterparts to replace Americans or carry out suggested expansions of domestic curricula. (We have said that programs often fail unless such counterparts for American participants are trained in America.) More of the trainees come on leave from Asian universities, public agencies, or private companies. They have jobs to return to, although these jobs do not always require the niceties of their most advanced American training, and do not pay as well as similar jobs in

America. The provision of suitable jobs for returnees should be a problem only in a small minority of cases (mainly in natural sciences, engineering, and medicine).

It should nevertheless be made clear by actions as well as words that no university overseas programs are intended to staff American institutions at home or abroad with cheap Japanese or Korean professional labor. The American Immigration Service should consider a harsher policy toward participants who stay on after taking American degrees when work is available for them at home, despite the complaints of some American employers and of some participants as well. On the other hand, host countries have no real basis of complaint if America "steals" trainees who prefer not to face unemployment, down-grading, or "involuntary private practice" on their return.

RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON

The largest of the overseas contracts in Japan and Korea, albeit a minority of the total number, are carried on with American government financial subvention. Even when this is lacking, government agencies are interested in programs relating to foreign policy objectives. (Examples are the two American Studies programs in Japan.) Relations with foreign governments have been important in the past, as witness the historical sections of Chapters 1 and 5. At the present time, however, these relations are carried on indirectly, with American agencies serving as intermediaries. We shall limit ourselves therefore to relations with United States government agencies.

The principal American agency dealing with the university programs has been the ICA (International Cooperation Administration) and its predecessors, including ICA affiliates like USOM in Tokyo and OEC in Seoul. USIS and the armed services have also had relations with particular programs such as the Pennsylvania and Maryland ones; other agencies like the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have had relations with individual program participants. This section relates, however, primarily to relations with ICA, both in Washington and in the field.

These relations have not always been friendly. There has at times been a feeling in ICA that particular university teams might be replaced advantageously by civil servants hired directly by ICA. In Tokyo and Seoul, however, USOM and OEC deny any desire to replace university contract teams with "direct hire personnel." They see a number of advantages to themselves in operating indirectly through the universities:

1. Members of American university staffs are regarded more highly in foreign intellectual and academic circles than members of the American armed forces or civil service.

2. University staff members are relatively independent of the minutiae of changing American foreign policy. What they have to say or do can be more largely accepted at face value, with less suspicion of espionage, propaganda, or ulterior motives.

3. There is a scarcity of trained technical people in the United States. It is difficult to recruit them for new or short-term government programs unless they have such long-term security as is provided by an academic connection. Universities on their part are more willing to release people on leaves of absence in connection with contracts involving themselves than for ordinary public employment.

4. When people are hired as a contract team from one institution, there is more probability of teamwork between them than if they were hired separately from all over the country by a public agency. This advantage is especially important if the contract is awarded to schools where people know each other, if only a few academic departments are involved, and if the contracting university staffs its foreign operation from its permanent staff and people well known to staff members.

These advantages hold equally well for contracts with non-academic institutions, and there is a certain amount of competition between universities and private firms for contracts. Construction and other large-scale engineering jobs go almost always to private contractors, seldom being attempted by direct-hire civilians and never by university teams. In economic development and planning, the first Korean contract

was let to a Washington firm, Robert R. Nathan Associates, but the second went to the University of Oregon (too late for inclusion in this study). Also in Korea, a contract to advise the Korean government on improvement of statistical series has gone to a private firm, the Survey and Research Corporation, rather than to an academic department of statistics.

This is not to deny the presence of offsetting disadvantages of university contracts, from the ICA point of view:

1. They are expensive. In general, higher-priced people must be hired for the jobs. The overhead contributions made to the contracting universities are usually greater than the extra costs of having similar work done within the civil service.

2. Problems of liaison and coordination often arise between universities and government agencies. In the larger ICA contracts -- Minnesota-SNU being our only example for this report -- government offices which felt they should have been consulted and kept informed were not consulted or kept informed. Another frequent cause of friction is the necessity for university field representatives to clear details with campus coordinators on the home campus, or for USOM and OEC representatives in Asia to clear details with ICA in Washington, D. C.

3. Contracts are for short terms (two to three years) and require lengthy negotiations. It is difficult to terminate them even when performance is unsatisfactory. There is a great temptation to renew them under circumstances where corresponding direct-hire personnel would be dismissed or transferred.

4. Host governments sometimes impose more rigorous restrictions on visas for contract participants than for United States government employees, or require more time to examine visa applications. The party chief of the Washington University contract in Korea felt that if any American participant should become ill or return to the United States for personal reasons, his part of the contract would have to be dropped, since his successor could hardly be cleared in time to get work done before expiration of the contract.

5. Personal relations between university representatives and public employees, both civil and military, are sometimes marred by jealousy and bickering. University representatives and other contract participants are ordinarily higher paid than civil servants doing similar work. They receive not only the same PX and commissary privileges as civil servants and the armed forces, but also receive special tax concessions denied to government employees if they stay abroad for 18 months or more. They are less subject to the "chain of command" and its civil service equivalent, and sometimes flaunt this freedom as a status symbol. This in turn inspires government administrators to subject university representatives to the same rules and regulations as other employees, and so it goes. University representatives feel entitled to consultation about USOM or OEC policy in their areas of specialization, and resent any appearance of discrimination in the allocation of such scarce or rationed items as housing or transportation. These difficulties are more important in Korea than in Japan, since contract and direct-hire personnel in Korea live together in special compounds.

6. Even in Japan the university representative demands privileges which place him in an ambiguous position vis-a-vis the Asians and reduce his social effectiveness. Sharing as he does the privileges of the federal civil servant, and making most of his social contacts in the American colony, he tends to be regarded as a government rather than a university employee and to be treated somewhat more cautiously in consequence. This tends to limit his Japanese or Korean friends to the English-speaking, Christian, or demonstratively pro-American groups.

A few general principles may also be offered cautiously to minimize conflicts between universities and ICA:

1. ICA should accept what might be called the "Minnesota" interpretation of the ICA contract. Under this interpretation, the American university is responsible for performance under its contract. It should be free to administer it as it sees fit, subject only to the agreement of the host country institution with which ICA has associated it. This applies to the choice of

participants, the fixing of their terms of service, the assignment of their duties, and the circulation of their reports. (These have been matters of disagreement between Minnesota and ICA.) It applies still more to issues of academic freedom, which have come up in some ICA contracts in Asian countries, although not in Japan or Korea. As a corollary, the American university should delegate the maximum possible authority to its chief of party or other representatives abroad, so as to speed decisions and action.

2. On the other hand, renewal of university contracts should be made less automatic, even when non-renewal requires ICA to change horses in mid-stream. ICA should consider more seriously shifting contracts from one university to another, or to a private firm, or to direct-hire staff, if performance is unsatisfactory. The model to follow here is perhaps the armed services, which shifted the entire Far Eastern college-level education program from California to Maryland after disagreement as to the granting of Bachelors' degrees.

3. The policy recommended above is more practical for a large number of small-segmented contracts than for large and manifold contracts like Minnesota's. This is another reason to recommend segmentation of contracts, in addition to the enlistment of smaller schools and lightening the administrative burdens of group leaders.

4. During the winter and spring of 1959, ICA proposed to a number of universities a new type of contract by which the universities would keep ICA supplied with staff members from their own faculties for two-year terms on a rotating basis. This proposal amounts to an agreement by universities to keep certain ICA posts filled. It aroused faculty suspicion that ICA might be planning to concentrate university contract participants in "hell holes" where no one else could be induced to go, or into meaningless jobs no one else could be induced to take. It would be in ICA's interest to eliminate suspicion by assuring continuity in a faculty member's work over his term with ICA, and providing

for some consonance between each man's assignments and his interests, both as to area and to subject matter.

JUNIOR YEARS AND ENGLISH TEACHING

We have commented less than favorably on programs which send Japanese (or Korean) students to America for their undergraduate degrees. Such students are generally thereafter unfitted for Asian society. Alternatively, their undergraduate education is prolonged by the necessity of completing undergraduate curricula in two different countries. This involves extra time which few but the rich can afford. Our argument, which is stronger for men heading for careers than for women heading for marriage, also applies in reverse to Americans taking Japanese or Korean undergraduate degrees. Such cases have been rare.

"Junior year abroad" programs are an exception to this generalization, although less important for Asia than for Europe. They are exceptions because the undergraduate is not thereby alienated from his own society, and usually returns home to take his degree. Such programs may develop, at least with Japan, somewhat beyond their present infinitesimal trickle, but it is hard to foresee a flow of students comparable with the programs in Western Europe. Asian universities are in even worse positions than European when it comes to sending students to America. American students will probably remain unable to carry on sufficient academic work in Japanese or Korean to avoid loss of their year abroad from the scholastic point of view; they will also remain too vocationally-minded to lose a year with equanimity. This conclusion applies only in a limited degree, of course, to programs involving institutions like the International Christian University (ICU) near Tokyo, which gives approximately one-third of its courses in English.

To obtain much benefit from a single year in Asia, American undergraduates should have under their belts approximately the same prior cultural investment in these countries as any graduate student or faculty member acting as university representative in the same country. He needs more preparation than the usual junior-year student in Europe, since the cultural differences are

greater. His cultural investment should include some familiarity with the language to provide communication outside the English-speaking minority. Maladjustment to or dissatisfaction with the American environment is no substitute for cultural investment. Neither is the romantic appeal of adventure, travel, and dogoodery in Asian lands.

Many of these observations apply with equal force to the new graduate spending a year or two teaching English to high school students or college freshmen under a university program. A higher proportion of these men and women will, however, be considering careers in Asia, and nearly all will spend more than one year there as teachers. They need less warning about cultural investment. Many will have made it in the natural course of events, and others will have time to make it on the scene. Being older, they also require on the average less supervision.

On the other hand, they face two problems which junior-year students do not. They must teach English as a foreign language; few have any experience in doing so, or even think of English in that light. They must also carry on social relations with Asian colleagues older and more distinguished than themselves, but often less well treated by their employers both in salary and in such perquisites as housing. Japanese and Korean English teachers present particularly touchy problems, since their oral English is often defective and their literary style more ambitious than idiomatic. The young graduate needs special help in dealing with such colleagues.

DISAPPOINTING DOMESTIC IMPACT OF PROGRAMS

University programs in Japan and Korea have thus far had disappointingly little American impact. To a considerable extent this is unavoidable. Not only the majority but, on most campuses, over 95 per cent of all students and teachers have had neither the experience of nor the desire for contact with any non-Western culture. Possibly events may change this parochialism.

Even while waiting for events, however, the impact of these programs could be increased somewhat by various elementary contrivances. One is greater effort at securing faculty support before a program is undertaken; too often the entire impetus

comes from the "top brass" of the university administration and two or three scattered and unrepresentative Japanophiles on the faculty. A second contrivance is greater use of Asian visitors and trainees as guest speakers in classes and as leaders of discussion groups.¹⁶ Many a foreign student or teacher talks to off-campus church groups and "knife and fork" service clubs more often and more earnestly than to American students or teachers. American universities could also give greater attention to faculty members' and students' experiences abroad, while they are overseas and, especially, after they return.

Impact is probably also greater, other things being equal, in small universities than in large ones, and in small towns than in large cities. There are fewer competing attractions either "on campus" or "in town," which fact usually over-balances any differential insularity or provincialism left in rural America after two world wars and the Korean "police action."

SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE

We shall not attempt to balance, on the slight evidence yet available, the costs and benefits of the American university overseas programs in Japan and Korea. Evading this assessment as too difficult, we assume instead that American universities will continue overseas programs in these countries on approximately the present scale and with approximately the present level of outside financing.

The record has not, however, been impressive enough to preclude consideration of a number of qualitative changes in the programs over and above alleviation of the difficulties we have already noted.

A number of observers have made suggestions for drastic modification of the programs. Those from Japanese and Korean sources are in the direction of greater independence from United

16. Concerts, dances, art exhibits, and motion pictures are presented more frequently and on the whole more effectively by Asian visitors.

States government agencies and greater mutuality as between American and Asian universities. Americans and Asians alike prefer to narrow the programs to stress scholarly research rather than training for immediate action or the broader by-products we have called "impact."

Perhaps the most frequent suggestion has been that even government "action" programs of the technical assistance type should be administered not directly but through foundations, or made otherwise less dependent on personnel and policy changes within agencies like ICA. Foundations and universities also change personnel and policies, but it is felt that continuity would be increased and scholarship respected by such a change. There is also a problem of the quality of personnel. Just as some ICA officials stereotype Japanese and Korean universities as collections of other-worldly fuddy-duddies or parlor pinks, some Asian intellectuals stereotype ICA officials as pushy, materialistic, and academically incompetent for the supervision of university relations.

A Tokyo University specialist in Area Studies made a more specific suggestion to the American government during his tenure of an Eisenhower Fellowship. He proposed that university programs be reduced in size and keyed to the deficiencies of American as well as Japanese universities. American universities, he noted, are chronically short of pure scientists. Of these, Japan has an export surplus. Japanese universities, on the other hand, are short of specialists in American history, literature, government, and some applied fields within agriculture, education, and engineering. He therefore suggested direct exchange agreements between individual American and Japanese universities, with the government's powers not to exceed match-making. By such an agreement, ABC University in America and Iroha University in Japan might exchange historians for physicists. Iroha would send one or more physicists to ABC for two- or three-year terms, thus keeping one or more ABC chairs filled permanently without permitting any promising

young Japanese physicists to be "stolen."¹⁷ ABC would do the same for Iroha in, say, American history. Both Japan and America would gain by such exchanges. The gains might be greater on the Japanese side, since the Japanese scientist has more to gain from access to American equipment than the American historian from access to Japanese materials. The cost of the program -- both transportation and salary differentials -- would presumably be met largely from the American side as well.

A staff member of the Osaka University Institute of Economic and Social Research, with an American doctorate, makes a similar suggestion but confines it to single fields. We might have ABC and Iroha Universities exchange economics professors for two- or three-year terms, one post at each institution being filled regularly on this basis. The chair so filled would usually be a research professorship, in view of the language difficulties on both sides.

A social economist at Kyoto University, impressed with the support of Chinese Studies in Japan by the Harvard-Yenching Institute, would like to see the Harvard-Yenching method applied to American Studies. Grants from the Harvard-Yenching Institute are made to an all-Japan board of specialists in Chinese Studies, chosen by the appropriate Japanese learned society. This board then divides the Harvard-Yenching grant between research on China in Japan by Japanese, calling foreigners to Japan for teaching and research on Chinese problems, and sending Japanese scholars abroad to study Chinese culture and civilization. The role of Harvard University is limited to the custody of funds. The same would be true for any university or foundation undertaking Harvard's role in connection with American Studies in Japan. A foundation could indeed serve at least as well as a university, and

17. The "stealing" from Japan of bright young Japanese mathematicians and physicists by American institutions with higher salaries is regarded by the Japanese Left as a planned by-product of postwar American-Japanese cultural relations. This complaint is reflected in the anti-American periodical press of Japan (Chuo Koron, Sekai, etc.), but does not concern directly university programs which we are considering.

if it did, this suggestion would effectively eliminate American university participation in American Studies programs in Japan.

The administration of Chungang University near Seoul, Korea, would like to establish a joint program in Korean and American Studies with an American university. It would be somewhat more mutual than any of the Japanese American Studies programs, since Korean Studies are little more developed in America than are American Studies in Korea. Chungang envisages an arrangement whereby American scholars, including graduate students, would pursue on the Chungang campus under the guidance of the Chungang faculty studies in Korean linguistics, history, archeology, etc. Manchurian and Mongolian Studies might also be included, since Korea is regarded as a good locale for such studies for however long the Chinese Mainland remains closed to American scholars. The American visitors to Chungang would at the same time lecture to Korean students in English on some aspects of American Studies; they would not be expected to teach the English language itself. Unless the level of instruction in American Studies at Chungang were set quite low, this sort of program would seem to require an unusually high degree of versatility of its American participants.

A Michigan State University faculty proposal¹⁸ would have American universities set up their own Fulbright-type grants for their own faculties and graduate students, to be awarded each year on a competitive basis. These grants would supplement rather than replace programs of other sorts. Successful candidates under these Fulbright-type programs could spend a year where they wished, each pursuing his teaching or research project on leave of absence from his own university. This proposal provides a university-sponsored (and presumably university-supervised) alternative to Fulbright grants, much as the Fulbright program provides a government-sponsored alternative to university programs. (See the introduction to Chapter 3, above.)

18. Norman Rich, Proposals for International Cultural Exchange (East Lansing, Michigan; mimeographed, December, 1958), pp. 8-12.

An advantage stressed for this proposal is that it would permit people to return frequently to their own geographical area of specialization, or to broaden it by a year in a contiguous area, as when a Japanese specialist spends a year in Korea. Another advantage is the provision of a basis for recruiting competent foreign scholars to come to America on an exchange basis.¹⁹ It is hoped that university supervision might reduce the occasional touristic abuses of the liberal Fulbright program. Presumably most of the successful candidates would normally go to Europe and Latin America, but Japan might well attract a considerable number.

19. It should be noted that no foreign universities are involved as such. The institutionalization is all on the American side. It is, however, possible that in any one year several successful candidates might propose to go to the same foreign institution, and engage in a joint project there for which the explicit support of the foreign institution could be secured.

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