

Resettling Buha: A Social History of Resettled Communities in Kigoma Region,
Tanzania, 1933-1975

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Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to two groups of elders whose telling of oral histories shaped this project. The elders of Buha who shared their memories with me are the touchstones for this project. I am certain I felt so comfortable with them and in doing this work because of their graciousness and, in equal measure, because of the initiation into oral histories and memory that I had from my grandfather, great uncles, and great aunts. To them, and especially to the memory of my grandfather, Robert John Mueller, I dedicate this work.

Tusisahau tutokako: kwa marehemu babu yangu, 1921-2003.

Abstract

Residents of lowland Buha, in western Tanzania's Kigoma Region, faced state-sponsored, forced resettlement campaigns in both the colonial and postcolonial periods. In the 1930s, British colonial officials compelled those living in the easternmost areas to resettle closer to the roadway as a public health intervention in response to epidemic sleeping sickness. In the 1970s, Tanzanian officials forced everyone in the region to resettle again, this time in African socialist, or *ujamaa*, villages. This dissertation examines these schemes as part of a long-term history of resettlement in Buha, demonstrating how resettlement was a decades-long, unfolding process for both Ha people and government officials. In particular, I examine the interplay between the moral visions that different government officials and Ha people had for resettled areas and the material constraints in which they operated. Neither group could unilaterally implement their priorities but instead had to work within a series of limitations. For Ha people, this involved managing the forms of interference that government settlement and natural resource policies placed on their choice of domicile and use of resources. For state officials, they not only had to contend with competing Ha priorities, but also with resource limitations, internal divisions within their bureaucracies, and their own ideological commitments to western science and economic development. In the end, resettled communities created in the wake of removal were not the results of the transformative power of state planning, but instead formed at the intersection of Ha and governmental desires to replicate, adjust, or revolutionize Ha lives and livelihoods.

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Introduction: Resettlement as Process

When anthropologist Johan Scherer arrived in western Tanzania's Kigoma Region¹ in 1950 to write the first, and only, ethnography of the Ha people, he began with the region's basic geography. He wrote that Buha, the areas of Kigoma where the Ha cultural and language group live, was roughly triangular: bounded to the west by Lake Tanganyika and Burundi, to the south by a line about fifteen miles south of the central railway and to the east by the Moyowosi river. Like German and British colonial officials before him, he distinguished between the environments and agricultural systems of the Buha highlands to the west and the lower-lying areas to the east. He then noted how the presence of trypanosomiasis, a human and animal disease spread by the tsetse fly as its insect vector, had fundamentally shaped life in Buha. The highlands and a few other pockets were "by nature tsetse-free" and so Ha people were able to live with few governmental restrictions on choice of domicile and areas for economic activities, but the lowlands were different. The lowlands were "covered with so-called *miyombo*, open woodland infested with tsetse flies" and, in consequence, in half of Buha's land where a quarter of the population lived, the "people are compelled to live in sleeping sickness settlements."

Scherer described Buha's geographical layout in part to explain why he chose to conduct his research exclusively in the highlands. Lowlanders' lives had sustained so many changes that the authenticity of their social structure, economic activities, and

¹ Under British rule, colonial Tanzania was known as Tanganyika Territory. Upon independence in 1961, it was known as Tanganyika and changed its name to Tanzania following Tanganyika's unification with Zanzibar in 1964. The names of administrative units underwent frequent change over the course of the twentieth century as well, and Kigoma Region refers to the current administrative entity that includes the districts of Kigoma, Kasulu, and Kibondo.

customs was in question, and so the untampered highlands were a more appropriate area on which to focus his anthropological research. Scherer's vision of an unchanging past in the highlands aside, what is most telling in his account is how he framed the creation of these sleeping sickness settlements in the 1930s. In his two-page summary of Buha's twentieth century history, Scherer described the resettlement campaign with one sentence: "Several sleeping sickness settlements were opened, where the bush-dwellers were concentrated."² In this one sentence exposition of resettlement, Scherer elides the complexity of eastern Buha's forced removal and planned resettlement in a way that is representative of most written descriptions. In his formulation, the creation of new settlement sites is in the past tense and in the passive voice, an accomplished fact whose agent is unnamed. Absent are the immense challenges of such a move: determining who should move, choosing new sites, formulating plans for new settlements, motivating people to take part through persuasion or force, and, of course, the immense human labor and effort required for the move itself: making the journey by foot, hauling goods without the aid of vehicles, building homes, and establishing new agricultural fields. Nowhere in this telling is there space for discussion of how Ha peoples' lives changed in the context of resettlement, nor how they may have shaped the experience. Even though Scherer's account of twentieth-century history is deeply truncated, it is representative of colonial and postcolonial written accounts of resettlement in Buha. These accounts, particularly those written and published by colonial officials, tend to condense in a similar way the

² Johan Herman Scherer, "The Ha of Tanganyika," *Anthropos* 54 (1960): 841-904. Quotations found on 843 and 849.

challenge of uprooting and resettling tens of thousands of people. Instead, they expound on two basic dimensions: detailing a plan and enumerating its accomplishment.

This dissertation engages with the history of planned colonial and postcolonial resettlement in Buha in a different way, by examining it as process.³ Indeed, for most African colonial subjects, being moved, resettled, or evicted was a common experience and has been at the center of most historical studies of rural Africa. In this study, I approach resettlement primarily as a lived experience, and contend that by doing so what appear to be top-down, coercive projects can instead be seen as deeply contingent interactions between and among Ha people and government officials. In particular, by approaching resettlement as process, my study enables the examination of two critical dimensions of resettlement: how Ha dynamics and priorities served as a main driving force in the formation of new communities, and how the work of government officials was time-bound and contested. Both of these emphases are underappreciated in the most widely available accounts of these resettlement campaigns, as well as general scholarly works on large-scale, centrally-planned projects, which tend to focus on the intentions, priorities, and epistemologies of government actors. Instead, this dissertation shifts attention toward the interior histories of resettlement sites and how they were dynamic arenas in which Ha people and government officials contended to replicate, adjust or revolutionize Ha lives and livelihoods.

Approaching Buha's twentieth-century resettlement schemes as process depends on a decades-long examination of the topic that produces a fundamental reframing of the

³ This framework gained momentum and depth following conversations and email exchanges with Melissa Graboyes.

schemes themselves. The typical understanding is that, like a few other areas in Tanzania, Buha experienced two separate resettlement campaigns, one that created sleeping sickness “concentrations” in the 1930s in response to epidemic sleeping sickness, and a second that resulted in African socialist *ujamaa* villages in the 1970s to transform rural economies and pursue nationalist goals. The work of the two scholars who have noted potential interconnections between sleeping sickness concentrations and *ujamaa* villages exemplifies the framework that definitively separates the two. In their brief examination of these schemes, Dean McHenry and Helge Kjekshus both emphasize how concentrations and *ujamaa* villages illustrate the ideologies, goals, and tactics that Tanzania’s colonial and postcolonial governments held in common. As Kjekshus writes, “the manipulation of the traditional settlement pattern has been part of efforts by central authorities to gain control over the population for various worthy causes ranging from the prevention of diseases to planned development more generally.”⁴ This way of approaching the issue, though, privileges the perspective of state officials who viewed the creation of concentrations and villages as distinct campaigns. Drawing comparisons between the two schemes thus presupposes that they were separated in fact for all those who experienced them. For Ha people living in eastern Buha, though, there was no decisive interlude between the two schemes. The resettlement of the 1930s was an ongoing, changing process up until the 1970s campaign.

⁴ Helge Kjekshus, *Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History: The Case of Tanganyika, 1850-1950* (London: James Currey, 1996): xxvi. See also the brief mention in Jamie Monson, *Africa’s Freedom Railway: How a Chinese Development Project Changed Lives and Livelihoods in Tanzania* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009): 75-7. See also Dean McHenry, “Concentrations and Ujamaa Villages: A Note on Resettlement Efforts in Kigoma Region,” *Taamuli* 5.1 (1975): 54-9 and McHenry, *Tanzania’s Ujamaa Villages: The Implementation of a Rural Development Strategy* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1979), 14-27.

For Ha people living in eastern Buha, settlement policies related to sleeping sickness underwent a series of shifts but remained a major factor in their lives until forced *ujamaa* villagization. Between 1933 and 1941, over 65,000 people in lowland Buha forcibly moved from their homes to settle in eleven sites designated as sleeping sickness concentrations. This was the largest trypanosomiasis-related resettlement anywhere in the colony and affected a quarter of Buha's total population. These resettlements were a key component in colonial officials' public health intervention against epidemic sleeping sickness. While scientific interest and massive funding supported research efforts in the colony to control the tsetse fly population, medical officials' main tactic to combat outbreaks of the disease was to forcibly regroup people into sleeping sickness concentrations.⁵ These new settlements theoretically offered a means to disrupt the epidemic outbreak by making it easier for medical officers to identify and treat current cases, and more importantly, to prevent future infections. Siting sleeping sickness concentrations near the colony's roadways, they argued, would facilitate treatment of the disease, as cases could be more easily identified and treated. But concentrating population also theoretically disrupted the possibility of infection by separating people and the tsetse fly more completely. Concentrating population was key to this goal because the higher population's yearly agricultural clearings would destroy tsetse habitat near settlements. Over time, settlement policies in sleeping sickness areas

⁵ While *ujamaa* villagization was nation-wide, sleeping sickness resettlement was limited to only 10 districts, mainly in the west. These included Ufipa, Tabora, Kahama, Biharamulo, Mwanza, Mahenge, Mbulu, and Liwale. See Tanzania National Archive [TNA] 11771 vol 2, 14 November 1945 listing the concentrations that existed in 1945. Also cited in Dean McHenry, *Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages*, 25. Kirk Arden Hoppe notes that there were always between 50 and 100 concentration sites until independence. See Hoppe, *Lords of the Fly: Sleeping Sickness Control in British East Africa, 1900-1960* (London: Praeger, 2003), 114.

changed, but residents of lowland Buha continued to live with settlement restrictions related to the presence of sleeping sickness through the coming of independence. This dynamic changed somewhat when, in 1967's Arusha Declaration, President Julius Nyerere introduced his vision for a rural Tanzania dominated by *ujamaa* villages. Over the years, he made a case for the villages' many purposes, including simplifying and thus magnifying the government's efforts to provide technical advice and social services to the nation's largely rural population; preventing the creation of separate economic classes in Tanzania by emphasizing collective rather than individual efforts; developing the nation's largely agricultural economy through centrally planning exportable crops and using improved inputs like fertilizers, pesticides, and mechanization; and enhancing Tanzania's national security and cultural unity in times of regional instability and international pressure. Nyerere called upon all levels of government to support villagization efforts by persuading people to join them, and officials managing sleeping sickness in Buha responded in 1969 by making *ujamaa* villages their official prevention policy. Few Ha people formed *ujamaa* villages as disease control mechanisms, but some Ha people living under sleeping sickness regulations responded to Nyerere's call and created *ujamaa* groups. Nyerere's policy of persuasion, though, changed in the early 1970s when he declared that all Tanzanians must live in villages by 1976. As part of Kigoma Region, eastern Buha was involved in one of the earliest forced resettlement campaigns, Operation Kigoma, in which over 100,000 people were resettled into 129 villages between 1972 and 1974. Resettlement campaigns have thus shaped and reshaped Buha across the colonial-postcolonial divide.

A history of resettlement rooted in Ha oral histories reveals the changefulness of state policy, and offers interpretations that differ from those of state actors about the meaning of resettlement. Far from state narratives that emphasize progress, economic development, or nation building, Ha memories of resettlement focus on the coercive power of state governments and how this was used in an attempt to wrest control of Ha labor and wealth. While state narratives highlight two coercive moves, one in the 1930s and the other in the 1970s, Ha memories include dozens of instances of forced resettlement in the intervening years, all employing similar coercive techniques of burning possessions, beating people, or the threat to do so. When Ha elders recall the changes they experienced in concentrations and villages, they inevitably highlight how resettlement imperiled food security and economic prosperity. Moving into new areas without the kinds of agricultural preparations Ha people normally followed consistently caused food shortages immediately following resettlements. When compounded over the course of a lifetime in which government officials could force four or five moves in reaction to changing settlement policies, the impact was profound. Even more meaningful, though, was the way in which resettlement removed people from the major sources of wealth in their home areas – the salt and honey industries – ending salt making completely and complicating honey work. While Ha men managed to keep the honey industry alive, their efforts were imperiled over the year – by the tax burden of the colonial state and the desire on the part of the independent government to create a game reserve in their former homes. In Ha narratives of resettlement, changes in policies over the years caused severe short-term losses and impeded long-term investments.

State officials rarely recognized how the competing priorities, the different moral visions, that Ha people had for their own families and communities fundamentally shaped the trajectory of resettled communities. Focused on their own failure to bring to fruition their visions of change in Ha lives, officials ignored the dynamism in concentrations and villages where residents confronting the rupture of “routine relations of social time and social space,” rebuilt and changed their lives.⁶ Ha categories of analysis for the rupture they were experiencing and how it could be repaired were critical in directing the resettlement process. Elders’ recollections often emphasize the chaos, the *ugwimo*, that removal and resettlement brought to Ha communities in terms of their productive systems, their social relationships, and their connection to the spirit world. The way to repair these relationships was “to cool” them, *ukuhoza*, which Ha people did by reorienting new homesteads to enhance relations with ancestor spirits and by forming new social ties in resettlements to ease the increased labor burdens that resettlement brought. Over the course of the decades of resettlement, Ha people used these analytical tools and new ties again and again as they confronted shifting settlement policies.

A study focused on resettlement as process opens up new dimensions in examinations that typically focus on resettlement as a prototypical tool of twentieth-century state governments; however, examining resettlement as process also reinforces some of these findings. Part of Buha’s resettlement history supports the notion that resettlement schemes are an example of “the ultimate expression of a state.”

⁶ Theodore E. Downing, “Mitigating Social Impoverishment when People are Involuntarily Displaced,” in *Understanding Impoverishment: The Consequences of Development-Induced Displacement*, ed. Christopher McDowell (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1996): 33-48, 33.

Anthropologist Anthony Oliver-Smith uses this phrase because resettlement schemes rely on the state's

... monopoly on the management of violence and its ambitious social engineering projects freed from all other non-political power or institutions of social self-management...[Employing resettlement allows states to] exert ultimate control over the location of people and things within a territory.⁷

As chapters one and four argue, Buha's resettlement schemes included the elements of violent compulsion in order to implement social engineering projects. In particular, it was the strict placement and boundedness of concentrations and villages, and the spatial control over people this enabled, that offered officials a means to intervene in Ha lives. From the perspective of early colonial officials, resettlement was a way to implement officials' previous, largely unsuccessful attempts to delineate administrative territories and collect taxes. Then, in the 1940s and 1950s, re-establishing concentrations was a means in the broader late colonial attempt to emphasize their roles as enhancing economic development. Post-independence political leaders, on the other hand, used control over settlement as a means to claim sole political legitimacy, direct local economies, and insure national security. For officials, though, just as important as the pursuit of change in Ha social, political, and economic lives was how it allowed government officers to enact their own perceived professional responsibilities. For both colonial and postcolonial officials, attempting to impose their specific moral visions for Ha futures was a fundamental expression of their perceived professional responsibility, a way of thinking that always placed them in the active role of directing transformations.

⁷ Anthony Oliver-Smith, "Fighting for a Place: The Policy Implications of Resistance to Development Induced Settlement," in *Understanding Impoverishment: The Consequences of Development-Induced Displacement*, ed. Christopher McDowell (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1996): 77-97, 78.

Considering resettlement as process, though, also allows for new insights into the very real limitations that detracted from officials concentrating their full power and influence to implement resettlement schemes. These included officials' structural positions in state bureaucracies and their ideological commitment to certain forms of knowledge. Examining the slow evolution of colonial and postcolonial resettlement policies reveals state bureaucracies riven by internal disagreements between different hierarchical levels and specialist departments. In the colonial period, local officials intent on bringing radical change to Ha sleeping sickness concentrations clashed with their cash-strapped superiors in Dar es Salaam who focused on the more modest goal of preventing epidemic outbreaks. After independence, the dynamic was somewhat reversed, with the central government and the ruling party pushing for such rapid *ujamaa* villagization that they pressured local officials into creating large numbers of villages quickly rather than insuring that they were well-grounded in *ujamaa* principles, much less located in viable areas. From the 1930s through the 1970s, though, government interventions at resettlement sites lacked unified direction because the separate expertise of the government officials involved did not always lead to cooperation. Managing resettlement sites fell under the authority of medical, agricultural, and administrative officials, and their different priorities frequently stymied overall efforts. In these ways, colonial and postcolonial bureaucratic structures were riddled with tensions and competition that lessened their effectiveness.

Despite the usefulness of resettlement campaigns, though, state officials could not simply use them as tools to pursue their favored policies. Instead, the formation and

revision of resettlement policy unfolded according to principles that did not allow the schemes to be mere tools of the administration. This was in part because both the colonial and postcolonial government were committed to certain bases for their legitimacy, particularly on the technical expertise they claimed as a monopoly on knowledge. Colonial authorities in particular insisted that their environmental and medical management techniques alone averted a medical disaster in Buha, relying on monitoring the presence of tsetse flies in the area and trypanosomes in Ha peoples' bloodstreams. But this meant that when new chemotherapies for sleeping sickness or new vegetation clearing methods for tsetse flies debuted, these technical advancements forced officials to change their policies and lessen control over where and how Ha people settled. Moreover, colonial and postcolonial authorities' commitment to developmentalist thinking made them especially responsive to Ha peoples' demands when they accorded with government policies or goals. And so postcolonial officials worked with groups of beekeepers when they formed cooperative societies even though they wished to promote other economic activities, just as colonial officials had allowed some settlements to linger in now-isolated portions of the eastern lowlands long after the bulk of the population had been moved. These governments' claims to scientific expertise and enhanced development were not just ideologies that strengthened the resolve of government officials, they were also systems of thought whose internal logic opened up the policy making process in such a way that Ha people could participate and pursue their own concerns.

Viewing resettlements as process thus reveals how resettled communities formed at the intersection of Ha and governmental moral visions of settlement areas, as well as the material realities of limited governmental capacities and Ha peoples' changed relationships to productive resources. Ultimately, this dissertation shows that while both sleeping sickness concentrations and *ujamaa* villages were planned at the center of governmental bureaucracies, they were fundamentally local constructions, the result of Ha people folding government intrusions into their own needs in the present and desires for the future.

Historiographical Context

This dissertation is located at the intersection of three broad strands of literature, including the history of sleeping sickness in Africa; historical and theoretical studies of resettlement schemes in colonial and postcolonial Africa, including Tanzania's *ujamaa* villagization; and scholarship seeking to delineate the relationship between colonial and postcolonial governance.

Histories of Sleeping Sickness

African sleeping sickness has one of the most extensive bibliographies of any topic in the history of medicine in Africa, due in part to the focus that colonial governments of every nationality placed on the disease. Each colonial power invested significant resources to its eradication and cooperated internationally in unprecedented ways,⁸ explaining why Marynez Lyons calls trypanosomiasis *the* colonial disease.

⁸ Helen Tilley, "Ecologies of Complexity: Tropical Environments, African Trypanosomiasis, and the Science of Disease Control in British Colonial Africa, 1900-1940," *Osiris* 19 (2004): 21-38, 25-26 and Michael Worboys, "The Comparative History of Sleeping Sickness in East and Central Africa, 1900-1914," *History of Science* 32 (1994): 89-102.

Scholars have focused their studies on how the disease acts as a lens through which to view the profound disruptions brought by colonial conquest and early colonial economics,⁹ as intellectual and technical history,¹⁰ for the constellation of ideas that Africans and Europeans associated with the disease,¹¹ and the ways in which the disease and its control influenced surrounding African people.

In order to explicate how colonial officials created and changed sleeping sickness policies over the years, I build on the work of John MacKenzie and Helen Tilley. John MacKenzie's investigation into the relationship between emerging experts and knowledgeable amateurs indicates some of the internal complexities of British tsetse policy, that it was both the result and cause of debate "within a cultural, social, scientific and political complex."¹² MacKenzie shows how crafting a coherent tsetse policy was bedeviled by disputes between field researchers and metropolitan experts, white settler

⁹ Marynez Lyons' wide-ranging and pathbreaking research on colonial Congo was the first work to explore at length how the specifics of the disease interacted with profound political and demographic disruptions of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. See Marynez Lyons, *The Colonial Disease: A Social History of Sleeping Sickness in Northern Zaire, 1900-1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). James Giblin also focuses on the disruptions that early colonialism brought to African disease control measures. See James Giblin, "Trypanosomiasis Control in African History: An Evaded Issue" *The Journal of African History* 31.1 (1990): 59-80 and the opening chapters of his *The Politics of Ecology Control in Northeastern Tanzania, 1840-1940* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992).

¹⁰ Michael Worboys examines "the patterns of knowledge and practice" observable in the different British, Belgian, and German approaches to combating sleeping sickness. Michael Worboys, "The Comparative History of Sleeping Sickness," 89. Helen Tilley offers a corrective of how the British organized their sleeping sickness research and policy around the tsetse fly. She suggests that their focus on the fly was a shorthand for the ecological complexities of the disease rather than a narrowed focus only on the insect vector. See Tilley, "Ecologies of Complexity," 21-38.

¹¹ Louise White explores the interplay between the British and African meanings of sleeping sickness as well as the way in which these ideas carried meanings beyond the most obvious. For Africans, the way she locates these meanings speaks to the general anxiety many Africans felt concerning an increasingly extractive colonial apparatus. See Louise White, "Tsetse Visions: Narratives of Blood and Bugs in Colonial Northern Rhodesia, 1931-9," *Journal of African History* 36 (1995): 219-45.

¹² John MacKenzie "Experts and Amateurs: Tsetse, Nagana and Sleeping Sickness in East and Central Africa," in *Imperialism and the Natural World*, ed. John MacKenzie (New York: Manchester University Press, 1990): 187-212, 189.

hunters and conservationists, and financial parsimony.¹³ Although the players and dynamics in Buha are different from the white settler framework of MacKenzie's study, I demonstrate the very real limitations within which colonial sleeping sickness policy makers operated. In particular, Buha's officials contended with lack of cooperation and rivalry between different departments and at different hierarchies of the colonial government. It was not a unitary, but a fractured, polyvocal administration that struggled to create and apply sleeping sickness policy. Applying Helen Tilley's careful elucidation of the methodologies and epistemologies of western colonial science to the history of Buha's sleeping sickness policy creates even more interpretive space in understanding the functioning of government medical policy. While it is undeniable that western biomedicine could, and often did, serve as a tool of empire, Tilley suggests that medicine and other sciences included elements that could impede rather than promote broader colonial priorities. Scientific methodologies and epistemologies caused field researchers to give greater respect to African knowledge systems, and to form conclusions that their colleagues in colonial administration found inconvenient but unavoidable.¹⁴ My evidence from Buha supports the notion that the reliance on scientific principles as the foundation for colonial authority in the postwar period carried with it limitations on how that science could be marshaled.¹⁵ To begin with, the complexity of factors involved in sleeping sickness – the trypanosome, the tsetse fly, its wild animal reservoir, the animal

¹³ MacKenzie, 195-199.

¹⁴ Helen Tilley, "African Environments and Environmental Science: the African Research Survey, Ecological Paradigms, and British Colonial Development," in *Social History and African Environments*, eds. William Beinart and JoAnne McGregor (Oxford: James Currey, 2003): 109-130, 111-112.

¹⁵ John Iliffe makes a related point in *East African Doctors: A History of the Modern Profession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) that colonial medical personnel were primarily medical professions and only secondarily servants of the colonial state.

and fly habitat, and human beings – insured that complete expertise could never be marshaled by one discipline, and interdepartmental rivalry hamstrung policy implementation. Even more to Tilley’s point, though, was how the combination of new chemotherapies and techniques for clearing tsetse vegetation in the mid-1950s created powerful limitations to the close control over Ha settlement patterns that pertained in the past. In combination with an interdepartmental-wide push toward economic development and democratization, they were impossible to ignore.

My study is both enhanced by valuable insights from the research of Kirk Hoppe and Heather Bell that focuses on the reasons for and enforcement of colonial sleeping sickness policy, and pushes beyond them with a careful exploration of how these policies became lived experience in Ha communities. Kirk Hoppe’s comparative study of sleeping sickness in all of British East Africa delineates colonial ideologies and policies concerning the disease, and how the unique circumstances of Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania led to their differing implementation.¹⁶ Common to all, though, were the ways in which sleeping sickness gave colonial officials rhetorical means to justify their work. On the one hand, as an emergency medical intervention, colonial officials could view their efforts and presence as “anti-conquest,” irrefutably moral and justified. On the other hand, the presence of sleeping sickness influenced colonial officials’ definition of African environments and the Africans who lived in them: diseased, wild, impermanent. Thus, sleeping sickness control was a “powerful mechanism for environmental and social engineering, defining and delineating African landscapes and reordering people’s

¹⁶ Hoppe, *Lords of the Fly*, 110.

mobility and access to resources.”¹⁷ Heather Bell’s study centered on southern Sudan adds important dimensions to Hoppe’s, including a focus on how British officials evinced a spatial conception of infection, protecting areas rather than people from the disease by attempting to control population movement and settlement. Just as crucially, though, is Bell’s understanding of colonial power as having coercive force but remaining limited in its ability to control people as closely as their policies required.¹⁸ The history of sleeping sickness policy in Buha includes examples of all of these trends: the ideological traction that the disease gave to officials, the way it reordered space and access to resources, and how coercive force to compel removal was not matched by control over how Ha people resettled.

While both Hoppe and Bell express interest in how Africans interpreted and were influenced by sleeping sickness policies, these issues are beyond the scope of both of their books.¹⁹ My study, though, does examine how Ha people folded the experience of resettlement into their lives. I demonstrate how Ha categories of thought enabled community members to analyze the problems caused by resettlement and seek their redress. Over the early decades of living in sleeping sickness concentrations, it was not colonial policy but Ha economic practices and spiritual beliefs that directed the kinds of

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁸ Heather Bell, *Frontiers of Medicine in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1899-1940* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999): 129.

¹⁹ Bell includes some tantalizing possible reactions as Zande people interacted with these policies, including increased fear of adultery, loss of privacy, strengthening of secret societies, and transformed relationships between local leaders and community members. See Bell, 152. Hoppe repeatedly writes of an interest in these dynamics but rarely explores them in any great depth. His earlier work, for instance, that focuses solely on Uganda approaches such an examination more directly than in his regional book. Nonetheless, even his more limited case studies never break out of the resistance/compliance dyad. See his “Lords of the Fly: Colonial Visions and Revisions of African Sleeping Sickness Environments on Ugandan Lake Victoria, 1906-1961,” *Africa* 67.1 (1997): 86-105, 99.

transformations that occurred in resettlements. For many elders, the major consequences of sleeping sickness removals were to imperil their relationships with nature and ancestral spirits as well as their continued access to the productive resources of their original homes. Pursuing the continuation of these spiritual relationships and economic practices shaped life in resettlements, from the organization of Ha homesteads, to the creation of new work groups, to the innovation of new community of celebrations.

This dissertation establishes a different chronology for the study of sleeping sickness, expanding examination beyond colonialism for the first time. I demonstrate the interconnections between colonial and postcolonial sleeping sickness policies, beginning with the continuation of control techniques into the mid-1960s. Like all other government departments, though, the sleeping sickness service was called on to support the central government's broader "nation building" goals, and sleeping sickness management officially became promotion of *ujamaa* villages. What this lengthier timeframe does is to lay bare, on the one hand, how sleeping sickness policies continued to reinforce broader state goals, and, on the other, how their frequent change consistently disrupted Ha peoples' lives over the course of decades. Continuing this history past colonialism thus follows a Ha-centered periodization rather than one dependent on the identity of the state.

Histories of Resettlement and *Ujamaa* Villagization

Scholars of forced removal and resettlement have created an extensive literature in sub-Saharan Africa that spans across disciplinary lines. As explicit projects of state governments, officials implement resettlement schemes in order to shape how affected

people resettle and control the resources they may leave behind. Historically in Africa, state officials pursued resettlement to draw Africans into direct political relationship with the state, whether to sedentarize mobile populations or emplace people nearer to government infrastructure; to enhance and maintain the position of white settlers by alienating African lands or maintaining racial segregation in cities; and to aid in colonial and national economic development, through infrastructure schemes like dams, irrigation projects, or large-scale agriculture.

Both theoretical and narrative scholarly work emphasize the ways in which policies forcing change in settlement patterns was a constitutive act in creating governmental administration. While some works merely tend to establish that resettlement or *regroupement* happened,²⁰ others probe into more theoretical areas. A little-emphasized dimension is its territorialist approach. To date, only two historians of Africa have investigated the spatial dimension of modern bureaucratic state structures in any depth or detail – Christopher Gray and Achim von Orren. Both draw on the work of geographer Robert David Sack who elaborated a theory of “territoriality,” that state governments delimit and define space as a way to shape political, economic, and social relationships in it.²¹ What Gray does for Gabon and von Orren does for Zambia is, first, to examine the local contexts as French and British colonial officials each planned to create bureaucratic space in their colonies. Then both of them delineate how local people interacted with and shaped these efforts. Gray emphasizes how Varama people referred

²⁰ See, for example, Philip Burnham, “‘Regroupement’ and Mobile Societies: Two Cameroon Cases,” *Journal of African History* 16.4 (1975): 577-594.

²¹ Robert David Sack, *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986): 23, 26, and 19.

to their own cognitive maps of space as defined through social relationships, particularly clan and family ties, when they confronted officials' attempts to force Varama movement and settlement along colonial roadways. Resettlement was an engine for change in Varama peoples' lives, but Gray makes clear that Varama negotiations of these different perspectives shaped realities on the ground.²² Von Orren demonstrates how, at the level of intention, late colonial efforts in Zambia to control land use and to create hierarchically-arranged territories in rural areas associated with particular rulers were also a way to remodel "the social and political relations connecting them."²³ Resettled Zambians, although adopting the new land-leadership conceptual framework in certain contexts, largely maintained older political systems in which interrelationships were more important than positions in a bureaucracy. Von Orren, too, considers how these colonial resettlement schemes related to the desire of early independence political leaders to mobilize action, communicate with villagers, and enter into political relationships in which loyalty could be rewarded through village developments.²⁴

In African spaces with European settlers, like colonial Kenya, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, forced resettlement frequently came in the form of structuring reserve areas in which evicted Africans were forced to settle after their lands were alienated for exclusive white use. In many cases, policies intended to check the tendency towards erosion and soil exhaustion that the cramped conditions of reserves produced, then

²² Christopher Gray, *Colonial Rule and Crisis in Equatorial Africa: Southern Gabon, ca. 1850-1940* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2002). See in particular, 2-5, 110-115, and 179-200.

²³ Achim von Oppen, "The Village as Territory: Enclosing Locality in Northwest Zambia, 1950s to 1990s," *Journal of African History* 47 (2006): 57-75, 58.

²⁴ von Oppen, 67-74.

exacerbated African discontent with their hemmed-in circumstances.²⁵ These “Betterment” schemes in South Africa, though, served not only the developmentalist ideology that was pervading all colonial governments, but also the apartheid state’s broader interest in racial segregation. South Africa’s relatively large urban African population and industrial sector meant that there were two kinds of Africans under construction: rural-industrial Africans who lived on reserves adjacent to manufacturing centers, and rural-peasant Africans meant to take up the ecologically-sound, intensive forms of farming needed to insure the permanency of separate rural spheres.²⁶ Unlike Ha people, these Africans were “in danger” because of the profound changes that European culture had brought; it was hoped that “social engineering could repair the ravages of social change.” At the same time, the adoption of cultural dimensions like the Christian nuclear family structure would orient African lives toward “morality, family and work.”²⁷ In the face of a Native Affairs Department that could direct settlement patterns, designate land use, and cull livestock, the impact on rural communities was profound. Anne Kelk Mager argues that such policies spurred on a reconfiguration of gender power relations in the Ciskei as men and women contended over land and livestock in a context of diminishing resources, fluid domestic units, unstable incomes, and an oscillating cycle of

²⁵ See, for example, Tabitha Kanogo, *Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1987).

²⁶ See Chris de Wet “Betterment Planning,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 15.2 (1989): 326-45, 334-5 and F.T. Hendricks, “Loose Planning and Rapid Resettlement: The Politics of Rapid Conservation and Control in Transkei, 1950-1970,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 15.2 (1989): 306-325; and de Wet, *Moving Together, Drifting Apart: Villagization in a South African Homeland* (Johannesburg: Witswatersrand University Press, 1995): 57-67. Hendricks explicitly argues, 316, though, that reserve or Bantustan policy meant to shape life in these settlements was secondary to insuring a continued labor supply to South African mining interests.

²⁷ Anne Kelk Mager, *Gender and the Making of a South African Bantustan* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1999): 42.

labor migrancy.²⁸ Nancy Jacobs' focus on the environmental history of the Kuruman area emphasizes how Betterment planning's insistence on commercial production severely hindered subsistence activities.²⁹ While she shows the large investments the state was willing to make in the region, she argues that the ultimate costs were born by black residents of Kuruman who lived with food shortages, illnesses, and increasingly coercive measures taken to impose Betterment policy. In both works, the political ideology and bureaucratic power of the modern state contended with local people seeking to reestablish productive and social relationships within resettlements.

In the late colonial and early postcolonial periods, resettlement for the sake of development projects became part of Africa's resettlement history. Some were voluntary schemes sponsored by colonial governments like Tanzania's Groundnut Scheme or Mali's Office du Niger. Others were forcible resettlement for other forms of infrastructure development like hydroelectric dam projects such as the Cahora Bassa (Mozambique) and Kariba Gorge (Zambia) dams on the Zambesi River or the Akasombo dam on the Volta River in Ghana. Elizabeth Colson and Allen Isaacman's work concerning these schemes draws focus to the arenas of dislocation that resettlement created. In particular, Colson's classic account of Tonga resettlement following the building of the Kariba Gorge dam shows how the early years of resettlement were dominated by dislocation. Tonga people went from a named and known environment where they were "easily oriented in space" to an "anonymous" one that required Tonga

²⁸ Mager, 41-49.

²⁹ Nancy Jacobs, *Environment, Power, and Injustice: A South African History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 173-205.

people to name and to implant with human markers.³⁰ Allen Isaacman's research on the Cahora Bassa highlights a related dimension of the experience of resettlement, that not only are people, property, and energy displaced in resettlement, but memory can be as well. This was heightened when the post-independence government adopted the Cahora Bassa dam as their own, crafting policies around it in ways that further silenced the experience of resettlement. Thus, both "dominant colonial and postcolonial narratives have dislodged and rendered inaudible the stories and lived experiences of the riverine people."³¹ While resettled people can humanize their new spaces, it is clear that political regimes can force other dislocations to continue.

In terms of Tanzanian history, scholars have recently opened new paths for exploration of *ujamaa* villagization, taking seriously its political content, its environmental effects, and its casting of roles for rural men and women. Leander Schneider and Paul Bjerck have each pushed for deeper understanding of the political content of *ujamaa* and villagization rather than the economic and development goals that have been emphasized in the past. Bjerck's research focuses explicitly on how President Julius Nyerere's political objectives related to his *ujamaa* villagization policy. Bjerck argues that Nyerere used the longstanding political idiom of land allocation as a tangible sign of political legitimacy in Great Lakes cultures to establish effective Tanganyika African National Union [TANU] leadership of the country. Bjerck's thesis suggests that

³⁰ Elizabeth Colson, *The Social Consequences of Resettlement: The Impact of the Kariba Resettlement on the Gwembe Tonga* (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1971): 50-54.

³¹ Allen Isaacman, "Displaced People, Displaced Energy, and Displaced Memories: The Case of Cahora Bassa, 1970-2004," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 38.2 (2005): 201-238, 206. See also Allen Isaacman and Chris Sneddon, "Towards a Social and Environmental History of the Building of the Cahora Bassa Dam," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26 (2000): 597-632.

while the Tanzanian government used organizational structures derived from colonialism, they approached the question of political legitimacy in explicitly African terms. In causing the resettlement of over 5 million rural Tanzanians, Nyerere directly laid claim to sole political power, an absolutely essential action in a new nation. Leander Schneider's more extensive work on postcolonial political practices and ideology seeks to explain seemingly contradictory tendencies in government policy and action – how Nyerere's policy of *ujamaa* villagization could be inspired by a grassroots effort to enhance economic development in Ruvuma and yet be imposed by force.³² His work argues that state officials tended to operate under the premise of a "trustee society" in which citizens had a right to a "better life" which the state was obligated to provide.³³ Their orientation carried with it particular ways that rural Tanzanians needed to "modernize".³⁴

The work of Priya Lal and Yusufu Lawi both establish how *ujamaa* villagization policy's ultimate outcomes, whether environmental relationships or its attempt to shape gender relationships, must be rooted in local processes. Priya Lal argues that an under-appreciated element of *ujamaa* thought is its representation of gender roles and family structure. Urging men to protect the nation and build villages, and women to protect the homestead and family's welfare, *ujamaa* inevitably came into conflict with local practices in Mtwara. Specifically, men and women had forged their own family strategies to deal with local instability that ran counter to villagization's valorization of

³² Leander Schneider, "Freedom and Unfreedom in Rural Development: Julius Nyerere, *Ujamaa Vijijini*, and Villagization," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 38.2 (2004): 344-90.

³³ Leander Schneider, "Colonial Legacies and Postcolonial Authoritarianism in Tanzania: Connects and Disconnects," *African Studies Review* 49.1 (2006): 93-118, 106 and 108-9.

³⁴ Leander Schneider, "The Maasai's New Clothes: A Developmentalist Modernity and its Exclusions," *Africa Today* 53.1 (2006): 101-131.

single nuclear families over extended kinship systems. Mtwara's residents, ultimately, pursued their own versions of security and self-reliance, contending with the state's expressed policies.³⁵ Yusufu Lawi's focus on how *ujamaa* villagization interfered with Iraqw peoples' environmental relationships and devalued their environmental knowledge is another way to examine how villagization caused change in particular communities. Beyond the immediate negative environmental impact of the new settlement pattern, Lawi emphasizes that resettlement also led to a profound sense of unease as people lost connection to "the forces that enhanced or jeopardized their lives and well-being in the local environmental setting."³⁶

The broad themes present in these works resonate with Buha's history of resettlement. By considering and responding to many of these studies, my dissertation provides a more balanced understanding of how unfolding resettlement policies and the experience of resettlement were interrelated phenomena. In terms of the character and power of state policies, the spatial lens used by Gray and von Orren allows me to flesh out the way in which colonial officials understood their relationship to Buha's residents. As I argue in chapter one, colonial officials' focus on the African population in Buha was secondary to their interest in Buha as part of a "territory." They were an important resource, granted, but merely one of many in need of change, much as officials

³⁵ Priya Lal, "Militants, Mothers, and National Family: *Ujamaa* Gender and Rural Development in Postcolonial Tanzania," *Journal of African History* 51 (2010): 1-20. Her forthcoming dissertation promises to push studies of villagization even further.

³⁶ Yusufu Qwaray Lawi, "Tanzania's Operation *Vijiji* and Local Ecological Consciousness: The Case of Eastern Iraqwland," *Journal of African History* 48 (2007): 69-93, 86. See also the following for environmental analyses of villagization's failure: Donna Kerner, "Land Scarcity and Rights of Control in the Development of Commercial Farming in Northeastern Tanzania," in *Land and Society in Contemporary Africa*, eds. R. E. Downs, S. P. Reyna, John Middleton, and Francis Mading Deng (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1988): 159-91 and Idris S. Kikula, *Policy Implications on Environment: The Case of Villagisation in Tanzania* (Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute, 1997).

considered that Buha's natural resources required development. Moreover, reading cases from South Africa by Mager, Jacobs, and de Wet, emphasizes how the state-based goals and coercive power in resettlement cut across even radically different political ideologies like apartheid and *ujamaa*. The scholars focused on the local effects of resettlement emphasize both the severe losses that resettlement can bring and the dynamic nature of new communities forming after resettlement. As Isaacman, Colson, and Lawi note, environmental dislocations disrupted economic and social features in resettlements. In Buha, these mainly surrounded the transformations that had to occur in the salt and honey industries, two economic practices that were deeply connected in Ha thought to the spiritual realm of nature and ancestor spirits. Isaacman and Colson further note how, with the full power of the state behind them, resettlement projects carry with them powerful narratives that dominate competing ones, thereby compounding the dislocation of resettlement by silencing alternative perspectives. Examining the history of Buha's resettlement over the course of decades creates a framework in which Ha points of view can fully emerge, emphasizing the long-term effects of living with resettlement.

In terms of the Tanzanian context, my study is the first to contextualize *ujamaa* villagization in a far deeper past history of contestation over settlement policy and resource control. While I am not the first to note that villagization was in some ways presaged by sleeping sickness concentrations, no scholar has examined this phenomenon in great depth or detail.³⁷ Clearly, there are important continuities related to government goals and methods in both sleeping sickness concentrations and *ujamaa* villagization, but

³⁷ Scholars at least mentioning the interconnection are Kjekshus, xxvi; Monson, 75-7; McHenry, "Concentrations and Ujamaa Villages," 54-9 and McHenry, *Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages*, 14-27.

my dissertation provides a decades-long history of resettlement in Buha. This approach illuminates how 40 years of frequent change in policies, all of which tended to disrupt the productive relationships Ha people built so carefully, fundamentally shaped how Ha people interpreted new resettlement initiatives. Not only do Ha histories of resettlement emphasize the unrealized plans and unintended consequences of resettlement schemes, they indicate how Ha priorities of re-forming social, spiritual, and economic relationships allowed them to incorporate the changed circumstances of resettlement into their lives.

Colonial-Postcolonial Nexus

The repeated crises of many independent African nations have led scholars to examine the institutional and ideological connections between the colonial and postcolonial state. In very different ways, Mahmood Mamdani and James C. Scott each present the way in which state governments viewed their populations and approached the task of transforming them. Mamdani draws a direct connection between colonial and postindependence practices of power by arguing that independent governments inherited a “bifurcated state,” one that distinguished between rural subjects and urban citizens by ruling rural people with “customary” and urban dwellers with “modern/civil” law. He argues that when African governments after independence sought to resolve this duality, they succeeded mainly in deracializing it. Building on a colonial foundation, though, African leaders engaged in highly uneven practices of power in which government officials viewed rural people in deeply paternalistic terms.³⁸ James C. Scott takes a different approach, analyzing the workings of what he calls the high-modernist state in

³⁸ Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996): 2-25.

which government officials approached challenges by simplifying reality into quantifiable, “legible” phenomena to which they then could apply their expertise. He argues this was a particularly visualist way of apprehending population and state projects, that it even constituted a distinct aesthetic,³⁹ but that it ultimately led to these projects’ failures because high modernism’s simplification of reality rendered it blind to very real complications. While there are serious problems with Scott’s application of these principles to *ujamaa* villagization,⁴⁰ this work nonetheless elucidates some of the attitudes which state planners and officials held.

In terms of the inner workings of colonial and postcolonial officials, Africanist historians and historians of colonial science argue for the coherence of government ideology across the era of independence, from the late 1940s through the early 1970s. These scholars argue that the late colonial to early postcolonial era forms a unified period in terms of state practices intended to “modernize” and “develop” African societies and environments.⁴¹ This postwar “development” discourse and ideology was a subtler framework than the earlier colonial focus on “civilizing,” but both assumed a cultural

³⁹ James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 18. Scott lists high modernism’s characteristics as a faith in scientific and technical progress, of expanding production, of meeting human needs, of mastering nature, and of rationally designing social order.

⁴⁰ See Leander Schneider, “High on Modernity? Explaining the Failings of Tanzanian Villagisation,” *African Studies* 66.1 (2007): 10-38. The upshot of Schneider’s critique, which he first airs in his dissertation, is that evidence does *not* exist of extensive, expert planning for villagization and so cannot illustrate Scott’s contentions.

⁴¹ Christophe Bonneuil, “Development as Experiment,” *Osiris* (2001): 258-81; Leander Schneider, “Colonial Legacies and Postcolonial Authoritarianism,” 93-118; Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) and *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Thaddeus Sunseri, “‘Every African a Nationalist’: Scientific Forestry and Forest Nationalism in Colonial Tanzania,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 49.4 (2007): 883-913. Joseph Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2007).

hierarchy in which western institutions, beliefs, and knowledge were superior to their African counterparts. This new emphasis came at a time of vulnerability for the continuation of colonialism, with new pressure from the United Nations and the United States to decolonize. Adopting a developmentalist framework therefore "...was a statement about empire: that it had a future, and it was a long one and a just one."⁴²

My work on colonial sleeping sickness resettlement indicates that one reason that these modernizing and developmentalist ideas took root in Buha was that they were already circulating and shaping policy in the 1920s and 1930s, even though they typically lacked the resource and the will to impose them strictly.⁴³ It was, however, the debut of a pattern of intervention with which Ha people would contend through the 1970s. Viewing resettlement as process also draws attention to the past experiences and current needs of the state officials involved in the schemes. The African officials implementing postcolonial development schemes, for instance, were frequently in the milieu of development projects long before independence, as African assistants who later became department heads.⁴⁴ Like their colonial predecessors, they were attracted to the ideas and paradigms embedded in development projects. As anthropologists of development argue, development ideology could convince them that their "efforts serve the welfare of the populations," especially because "the competence he or she employs in this noble

⁴² Cooper, *Decolonization*, 120.

⁴³ Monica van Beusekom makes a similar point, that efforts in the 1920s and 1930s shaped later developmentalist priorities, including "a social evolutionary model of development, a privileging of European agricultural technology and expertise, and concern over environmental degradation." See Monica van Beusekom, "Colonisation Indigène: French Rural Development Ideology at the Office du Niger, 1920-1940," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 30.2 (1997): 299-323, 301.

⁴⁴ Cooper, *Decolonization*, 3. See also Cooper, *African Since 1940*, 44. Cooper argues that the development discourse, meant to stave off independence, actually contributed to independence movements by giving leaders a metric by which they could show the failures of colonialism. Only independence, nationalists argued, would bring true development to their countries. See *Decolonization*, 113.

task...is beyond the current capacity of these populations.”⁴⁵ Nonetheless, Frederick Cooper reminds us that although African leaders adopted qualities of colonial states, “African rulers gave their own meanings to the institutions they took over, adapting them to patrimonial social structures and complex modes of representing power.”⁴⁶ In terms of *ujamaa* villagization, it is clear that control over land use – of settlement sites, economic activities, and reserved spaces – was not just a replication of colonial understandings of territoriality. Instead, drawing on Paul Bjerck’s work, I argue that state officials imbued these actions with broader political meanings that Ha people directly apprehended.

Despite this coherence in developmentalist thinking in both periods, though, scholars have opened new ground for the examination of the ways in which bureaucratic governments or organizations work in non-hegemonic fashion. Cooper argues that not “assuming coherence” in the work of officials allows us to

see beyond an omniscient colonial apparatus to one shot through with conflicts.... At the very least such a perspective should allow us to explore how limited colonial authorities may have been in putting their policies into practice, how vulnerable – and decidedly nonhegemonic – their authority was to those who subverted or pushed it aside.”⁴⁷

My own work demonstrates that colonial and postcolonial officials contended with lack of resources, interdepartmental rivalry, the competing priorities of superiors, and – most importantly – the different agendas of Ha people themselves. Anthropologists like David Mosse, however, also indicate that there are important purposes that the act of planning

⁴⁵ Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, *Anthropology and Development: Understanding Contemporary Social Change* (London: Zed Books, 2005): 70-72.

⁴⁶ Frederick Cooper, “Conflict and Connection: Rethinking African Colonial History,” *American Historical Review* 99.5 (1994): 1516-1545, 1541.

⁴⁷ Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, “Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda,” in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, eds. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997): 21.

interventions plays for the cultural and professional lives of state and project officials. He questions the assumed relationship of policy making and enacting projects by noting how policy making legitimizes action, persuades officials of their expertise and importance, and enrolls them in continued efforts.⁴⁸ Regardless of whether policy succeeded in enacting its stated goals, therefore, these other functions of policy were achieved. These ideas help to explain the complexities of planning Buha's resettlement schemes. Working within a context of disunity and contestation, planning allowed officials to envision a future in which they could act in a way that accorded with their ideas of what a modern, bureaucratic state ought to do.

Through examining the contested process of colonial and postcolonial officials working with resettlement in Buha, this dissertation not only elucidates the relationship between colonial and postcolonial governance, but also how Ha people ultimately created their lives in resettlement schemes. In both sets of resettlement projects, they were components in broader efforts by British and Tanzanian officials to establish their authority, to build particular political relationships with residents, and to bring meaningful change to their social and economic lives. Each group sought both to build up state apparatus and link Ha people to these structures in their deployment of resettlement schemes. Each, too, had to manage tensions between different governmental departments and levels of administration, embedded in the practical realities of their times and the ideological openings of early colonialism, late colonialism, and independence. And yet, colonial and postcolonial practices of power had far greater

⁴⁸ David Mosse, *Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice* (London: Pluto Press, 2005): 21. Also see David Mosse, "Is Good Policy Unimplementable?" *Development and Change* 35.4 (2004): 639-71, 648.

ability to coerce than it did to transform. As Ha narratives assert, state officials could call up overwhelming force to impose certain broad changes like shifting sites of settlement, but it could not impose all of its plans.⁴⁹ Ultimately, the realities of resettlement schemes were the result of Ha people dynamically incorporating unavoidable state impositions into their new lives.

Sources and Methodology

This dissertation draws on both oral and documentary sources to establish an unfolding history of resettlement in Buha. I treat both written and oral sources as carriers of information from the past as well as narratives rooted in the politics of the time at which they were made. When I use written materials and oral interviews, I analyze the main contours found in different governmental and Ha narratives as well as the details that neither highlight. For example, colonial and postcolonial state officials made assertions about their goals and methods in resettlement work, in particular how they employed their expertise to improve Ha lives. Ha elders gave alternate tellings of what officials did and what resettlement policies meant in their lives – how violence and coercion were central to state practices and how government control over settlement, mobility, and resource use caused loss of Ha wealth. Yet in neither set of narratives do the examples of government policies bending to Ha demands take center stage. In each telling, there are hints of other historical processes at play which are not emphasized by the author or interviewee. The challenge for oral historians, but which could apply just as

⁴⁹ Frederick Cooper's description of state power in Africa describes this well, that it "was more arterial than capillary – concentrated spatially and socially, not very nourishing beyond these domains, and in need of a pump to push it from moment to moment and place to place. See Cooper, "Conflict and Connection," 533.

much to those working with written material, is not to extract experience from narratives, but instead to “understand experience *within* narrative.”⁵⁰

Colonial officials created various writings related to resettlement meant for three particular audiences: the public eye, solely administrative use, and personal reasons. In over fifteen articles concerning the creation or management of concentrations, officials from a variety of fields published accounts in a number of local and international journals. These pieces provided officials a chance to reflect on their actions and the outcomes of resettlement, and I interpret them as narratives that include facts from the past that also did the important political work of justifying their policy choices. Reading these in conjunction with official government documents helps to unsettle the neatness of their accounts. Government documents located at the Tanzanian National Archive [TNA] in Dar es Salaam and The National Archives of the United Kingdom [PRO] provide a more contingent picture of how resettlement unfolded in Buha. To begin with, files at the PRO from the Colonial Office and from the Secretariat series at the TNA establish how supporting the work of resettlement was frequently secondary to metropolitan and Tanganyika’s central government’s major concerns. For them, supporting research on tsetse fly control and insuring that the very basics of public health order had been established were more important than supporting local officials’ efforts to bring great change to concentrations. Local officials recorded the successes and failures of these attempts in two types of files: accession numbers designated for Kigoma Region, and files from specialized branches of government like medical, agricultural, forestry, and educational files. I employ these records to establish the plans made for

⁵⁰ Monson, 11.

concentrations, the decision making process that led to changes in policies, and the lack of unified action between different branches of government. An even more candid telling of the process of resettlement over the years can be found in the private papers of colonial officials housed at Oxford University and the University of Glasgow. These serve as accounts of colonialism as a lived experience, the frequent setbacks and far from linear process through which colonial officials forced concentrations to be made and maintained. In diaries and letters home, Buha's colonial officials recorded not only minute details and daily changes that added up to creating concentrations, but also the extent to which officials took Ha reactions and opinions into account. Just as illuminating was an interview I was able to conduct with Mr. Derek Quinlan in 2007, the only former colonial official of Buha I was able to locate.⁵¹ Mr. Quinlan generously shared records from his time in Buha, as the District Commissioner of Kibondo from 1956-60, that were not present at the TNA, and imparted insight into the attitudes of colonial officials on the eve of independence. I use these more personal writings and recollections not only as repositories of information not recorded elsewhere but also as a means to more directly apprehend concerns that more 'official' records obscure.

Unfortunately, local government files at the TNA after the early 1960s are not nearly as extensive as their colonial counterparts. It is unclear whether files were never sent to the archive or whether they have not yet been catalogued and made available, and inquiries at government headquarters in Kigoma Region yielded no materials there. However, there are further sources for Buha's independence period at the Dodoma Record Center, a branch of the TNA that holds files from the prime minister's office, a

⁵¹ Mr. Quinlan passed away in October 2010. I remain grateful for his help, hospitality, and generosity.

hub of *ujamaa* villagization activity. Unfortunately, locating regional or district officials who served in Buha in the first 15 years of independence also proved impossible. This was no doubt complicated by the practice to have Tanzanian officials serve mainly outside of their home areas, and so these retirees would likely today be scattered throughout the country. Helping to fill this gap somewhat, though, are a set of academic research projects conducted by members of TANU's Kivukoni College and the University of Dar es Salaam. Records survive from five studies of Buha related to its villagization, and these writers' familiarity or association with the Tanzanian government's policies allow them to shed some light on government priorities. And so, the only available documents concerning Buha's villagization are far from complete and only represent records that were the products of or produced for the central government. The archival record of government actions must therefore be interpreted with the caveat that they are far from being fully representative of government thought and actions and wholly lack the local government's initiatives.

This dissertation's most important sources are the oral recollections of Ha elders recorded in 112 interviews in 2007 and 2009, as well as twenty-five songs collected at a meeting of thirteen elders convened to share them with me. Over the course of ten months, I visited five sites in Kigoma Region where former sleeping sickness concentrations became *ujamaa* villages: Rungwe Mpya, Kagera, Makere, Kifura, and Nyavyumbu/Kumhasha. In interviews, I worked with two different interpreters, Mussa Bugeraha in 2007 and Sarah Damian in 2009, whose knowledge of Kiha allowed elders to choose to speak in either Kiha or Kiswahili. Typically, we met with an elder for an

unrecorded discussion of relevant issues related to resettlement and then returned on another day to record a formal interview. In these sessions, we heard frequent references to songs that related to particular interview topics, but individual interviews were not an appropriate setting for songs normally sung in a group. With the invaluable help of Ladislaus Chanda Kipfumu, thirteen singers gathered in Kifura to share songs they recalled from the past that were related to issues of resettlement. With lyrics originally composed in the past, I use these songs about concentrations and *ujamaa* villages, and about activities like hunting, fishing, salt making, and honey work, to flesh out attitudes and details of livelihoods pertaining to the resettlement schemes.

I treat oral histories as oral texts as much in need of interpretation as archival documents. Like documents, they record historical facts from the past – they corroborate and are corroborated by documents, as well as by the consistency across multiple peoples' interviews. But oral interviews are also narratives that are shaped by an individual's concerns and the interview context itself. For instance, in speaking of resettlement, elders' minds inevitably turned to their former homes to the east, the current site of two forest reserves and the Moyowosi Game Reserve. Although most elders claimed they have built good working relationships with the game rangers in their area, the continuation of state management of the reserve into the present gave an immediacy and importance to their memories of past residence there or use of resources over the years. Each detail of place names, microenvironment, or economic activity staked a claim to a region where access remains limited and resources are now claimed as national property. Similarly, memories from the past also served elders as means to explain their

present state of poverty and feelings of marginalization in Tanzania. It was absolutely clear in many instances that these reflections were aimed at me, and sometimes my translators, as appeals to people these elders considered to be wealthy and potentially in contact with high government officials. Towards the end of interviews, we were frequently enjoined to take messages to the government about local plight, to request eyeglasses for some or test minerals for others. Some of these requests could even indicate how elders connected their past history of resettlement with current political claims they could make. In a few cases, when elders emphasized the losses that frequent resettlement brought, they hoped the histories they told and the advocacy we could provide might warrant an old age pension. This was especially true for elders like Ndabhateze Kagoma whose relatives could not help him in his old age: “We thought they could help us...whose strength is gone, we are nobody. We cannot move from a place and go to another place. Don’t you see now I’m cultivating while bent over [extremely old]?”⁵²

Interpreting oral histories is further complicated by the interview context itself. As Elizabeth Tonkin notes, it is impossible to fully separate “the oral representation of pastness from the relationship of teller and audience in which it was occasioned.”⁵³ Like the narrative work of documents, these interviews also communicated messages to their audiences beyond the main topic at hand. I and my translator were two potential audiences for elders, and many were eager to place both of us, me in terms of my purpose for coming and the region, family, and status of my two translators. Other elders, like

⁵² Interview of Ndabhateze Kagoma 30 October 2007 Kumhasha Village.

⁵³ Elizabeth Tonkin, *Narrating Our Pasts: The Social Construction of Oral History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995): 2.

former teacher Ladislaus Chanda Kipfumu, were eager to teach me about the past, consciously translating concepts and making comparisons he thought would have greater meaning for an American. In explaining differences between Ha people from different areas, for instance, Kipfumu said “They resemble each other, but is it not the case that there in America...a Washington state person and someone from Texas, that in American there can be small differences?”⁵⁴ Kipfumu and other elders explicitly engaged in translational work for the foreigner in their presence. But we were not the only audience present – in many cases elders’ children, grandchildren, and neighbors gathered to listen, many remarking that they had never heard stories about the colonial resettlement before. If nothing else had convinced children, grandchildren, or friends of their past hardship, recounting these stories of dislocation, lost wealth, and hard work certainly would. In the end, no interview is an unmitigated, fully authentic and representative telling of a unified “Ha perspective”; instead, each one requires careful interpretation and awareness of their complexity.

Chapter Summaries

Chapter one establishes how sleeping sickness resettlement policies in the 1930s interacted with longer-term efforts by British colonial officials and Ha residents to control wealth and territory. I argue that Buha’s colonial officials’ commitment to sleeping sickness policy was shaped by their largely unsuccessful efforts to create a working colonial administration in Buha. I note the tendency in colonial officials’ writing to emphasize the benefits of sleeping sickness concentrations beyond their

⁵⁴ Interview of Ladislaus Chanda Kipfumu 12 October 2007 Kifura Village. He chose the examples carefully: I am from Washington state and Texas was in the news quite a bit as the home state of then President George H. W. Bush.

function as disease control, and to claim this occurred consistently as each new officer came to Buha for two reasons. First, the policy opened itself to such alternate priorities because in order for concentrations to be viable areas for permanent settlement, officials envisioned that broad changes would have to occur in Ha political, social, and economic life. It was relatively simple for a public health measure to elide into a project whose first goal was social engineering. Second, sleeping sickness concentration policy appealed to local colonial officials because it provided them with a powerful mechanism to enact two early administrative priorities: taxation and territoriality. Not only had each of these efforts largely failed in the first decade of British rule in Buha, but they each held practical and symbolic power for local British officials as ways to administer Ha people and to measure their advancement in the civilizing mission.

But British efforts at taxation and territoriality had to contend with preexisting Ha conceptions of what they owed to political leaders and how that obligation related to territory. Time and again, Ha people disappointed colonial officials eager to note progress in Buha by engaging in their own form of politics, which was marked by mutually beneficial social relationships, rather than the European practice of contributing annual taxes in exchange for services. With virtually no services available, taxation and labor demanded in lieu of taxation was intimately linked in Ha minds with colonialism itself, a fact that shaped some Ha reactions to sleeping sickness policy. It was this critical context, a context of failure of previous efforts and resistance to greater state demands that sleeping sickness resettlement policies entered.

In the second chapter, I explore the messy and contested history of the creation of sleeping sickness concentrations in Buha from 1933-1941, beginning with how colonial officials and Ha elders narrate quite different accounts of this process. I argue that each narrative includes a characterization of the relationship between colonial officials and Ha people, with officials casting themselves as powerful experts and Ha people as hapless victims in need of intervention. Ha elders' memories, on the other hand, present a colonial state whose reasons for action were baffling, a ruse, or in a realm of knowledge not accessible to Ha people. They present colonialism not only as a complicated entity with which to engage, but emphasize its coercive power to enforce its will, and thus present themselves or their ancestors in a weaker, more reactive position.

The second section of the chapter unsettles both colonial and Ha accounts of creating sleeping sickness concentrations through a careful examination of the contingent process of their creation. In officials' confidential and private writings and in oral accounts of resettlement, I particularly focus on three hotly-contested sites where Ha demands trumped officials' policy priorities. These cases indicate that colonial officials were frequently forced to make or change plans rapidly, that their months of planning and combination of expert advice bore little relation to what unfolded on the ground. While exceptions were made partly as a reaction to the colonial governments' own limited resources, far more important were the demands that Ha people made to maintain connection to sites important for their productive resources as well as their spiritual and political power.

Chapter three demonstrates that, far from the colonial framing of concentrations as enhancing stability for Ha people, life in these resettlements was riddled with change and instability. Even though the first fifteen years of concentration policy were at the nadir of the colonial government's effectiveness, life in *umukutano*, the Kiha word used to describe concentrations, involved considerable transformation from that in former homes. The first part of the chapter details the ruptures that removal and resettlement brought to Ha people, the different forms of *ugwimo*, or chaos, that movement entailed. Ironically enough, concentration policy meant to emplace Ha people initiated a period of destabilized population in the lowlands, with individuals and families moving between concentrations or to areas free of the tsetse fly, and waves of newly resettled people entering concentrations for the first decade of their existence. Population fluidity created instability in *umukutano* and the more dense settlement patterns within their boundaries heightened social tensions as people were forced to live with potentially dangerous strangers. Moreover, the layout and location of *umukutano* constrained Ha productive activities by impinging on Ha agricultural techniques and making Ha men long distance rather than domestic beekeepers. Resettled Ha people met the challenges of *ugwimo* by "cooling" strained relationships between people and ancestors. Replicating homestead structure aided in this cooling through the creation of public space for socializing with neighbors as well as ritual areas for maintaining relationships with ancestral spirits.

The chapter then considers a series of policy changes that forced further change in the region. 1949-1959 was a decade of enhanced state capacity in which a reinvigorated colonial apparatus, eager to justify its continued existence, gave concentration sites the

unmitigated attention of colonial officials in every technical branch of service. Ha people experienced settlement policy enforced and expanded as never before, with mandatory tsetse bush clearings, blood testing, and mobility restrictions becoming part of everyday life. But colonial policy was constrained by its own internal forms of justification and had to change in the face of new scientific and medical breakthroughs in tsetse habitat clearing and trypanosomiasis chemotherapies. With discriminative clearing techniques and the new drug Melarsin B, the settlement restrictions on *umukutano* were drastically reduced by the late 1950s. As a testament to the attractiveness and viability of the new forms of living together in *umukutano* that Ha people created, though, many chose to continue to live together once most restrictions had been lifted.

The fourth chapter places the arrival of compulsory villagization in the early 1970s in a decades-long history of contention over settlement sites and community resources. From the late 1950s through the early 1970s, these struggles focused on the management of sleeping sickness and control over new reserve areas created in the eastern areas from which Ha people moved in the 1930s and 1940s. The context of national independence introduced compelling reasons for both state officials and Ha people to pursue their own priorities in settlement choice and resource use. State officials eagerly engaging in the newly declared war against the national enemies of “poverty, ignorance, and disease” had to respond to public health threats like sleeping sickness and hoped to use reserve areas as an engine for local and national economies. In turn, Ha men and women pushed the rhetoric of independence and freedom to their limit, founding homesteads beyond the bounds of settlement sites and staking local rather than nationalist

claims to the resources of their former home. These divergent goals continued to clash until villagization changed the region's dynamics yet again.

The chapter then turns to an examination of how different Ha groups experienced villagization in unique ways. The timing of moves into villages and the distance from which people moved were key factors in influencing how people experienced early resettlement. Those living closer to designated villages or who moved earlier could spread the labor involved in movement over a period of months rather than days and tended to lose less wealth in the short term. Those who lost greater resources, though, could include not just those who refused to move until forced or who moved great distance, but Ha people who had been at the heart of *ujamaa* activity in the region. Members of the award-winning voluntary *ujamaa* village at Kumhasha watched their group's accumulated wealth disappear as a new village government formed after massive movement into the village. In the longer term, though, the experience of resettlement became more uniform, with everyone adjusting to new settlement layouts, new neighbors, limitations to their agricultural work, and the imposition of compulsory farming.

Chapter 1 “A Revolution in Tribal Life”: Sleeping Sickness Concentration Policy’s Place in Tanganyika’s Civilizing Mission, 1921-1933

Introduction

Members of the Ha cultural and language group of western Tanzania’s Kigoma Region were the source of frustration for Kigoma’s earliest British colonial officials. In 1927, nearly seven years after the League of Nations transferred Kigoma and most of German East Africa to the British, Provincial Commissioner [PC] C.J. Bagenal identified the Ha as the only exception in the entire Region to

normal administration and progress....[T]hese people present a problem quite different to that of the inhabitants of the rest of the Province and after some seven years of experience one must confess that one finds it just as hard to prognosticate what the Ha will or will not do or what the effect of any action by the government or of any advice by the District Officer will be. The Ha goes on in his own sweet way unrepentant.¹

Inhabiting Buha,² an area mostly contained in the contemporary administrative districts of Kasulu and Kibondo, Ha people were specifically singled out as the most recalcitrant to colonial influence and resistant to colonial rule in all of Kigoma’s 80,000 square miles. Taxation in Buha, the most basic demand of a colonial regime, remained so low that 50% compliance would constitute a “successful” collection in 1931, a decade into the British administration.³ To add to Buha’s challenges in the minds of the British, Buha struck officials as being quite poor, an area able to feed itself but with little economic potential. It lacked the vast cattle herds and coffee-growing potential of Rwanda and Burundi – the

¹ Tanzania National Archive [TNA] 11678 Kigoma Annual Reports. Annual Report Kigoma Province 1927.

² See below for discussion of the place name “Buha”.

³ The Bodleian Library of Commonwealth and African Studies at Rhodes House [RH] Mss.Afr.r.180 J. E. S. Griffiths Diary, 12 October 1931.

lands in the west which the Belgians received – and it was too distant from either ports or British centers of production to be useful to the colonial economy as a supplier of food and other commodities.

The one thing that British officials largely agreed that Buha abounded in was the need for change in Ha peoples’ belief systems, political culture, agricultural production, and economic infrastructure – the classic civilizing mission aimed at members of the “child races of the world,”⁴ as Lord Lugard phrased it. This paternalistic understanding of the relationship between colonizers and the colonized coupled seamlessly with the League of Nations Mandate which directed the British to develop the territory for the indigenous population rather than for European settlers. Even though few colonial officers thought such profound changes would occur quickly,⁵ British officials, especially senior officials in the region, despaired at the lack of even incremental success in their early years in Buha, as Bagenal’s writing attests. The lack of colonial control over Ha actions, of clear resistance and disengagement on the part of Ha people towards colonial projects and concerns, maddened officials who were confronted daily by the ways in which Buha lacked the hallmarks of an area transformed by colonial rule.

The advent of sleeping sickness concentrations in Buha fundamentally altered the dynamics of the civilizing mission by providing officials with a powerful new way to bring about change in Ha lives. This chapter argues that the foundation for how both

⁴ Frederick Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (London: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1922): 72.

⁵ See E. K. Lumley, *Forgotten Mandate: A British District Officer in Tanganyika* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1976): 19 for an example. He wrote “It would have been unreasonable to expect that Africans, suppressed by the former colonizing power and in many cases not far removed from the savage background of their forbears, could straightway adapt themselves to the demands of British administrative techniques.” My thanks to Dr. Michele Wagner for making me aware of this source.

colonial officials and Ha people engaged with sleeping sickness concentration policy of the 1930s was laid in the earliest decades of British colonial rule. In particular, I argue that officials' previous attempts to impose a workable colonial administration is the critical context for elucidating how officials and Ha people understood and interacted with sleeping sickness policy. In the earlier interactions, despite the broad and ambitious series of interventions embodied in the civilizing mission, Buha's colonial officials mainly focused their efforts on creating basic administrative structures. In particular, two linked efforts had largely failed to take hold in the region: taxation and the creation of hierarchically-arranged bureaucratic spaces needed for the British governance system known as indirect rule. Widespread Ha resistance insured that effective taxation was beyond the capacity of early colonial officials. However, because taxation was the only contact between Ha communities and the administration, taxation and colonial interventions were synonymous to many and influenced how people interpreted and remember sleeping sickness concentration policy later, a topic more fully explored in the next chapter. In setting up the taxation structure, though, officials created knowledge of Buha that they used to delineate territories and African authorities to go along with them, which they hoped would pave the way for more fundamental interventions. This was an example of an attempt to impose territoriality, a process which Christopher Gray, drawing on geographer Robert David Sack, defines as "a particular kind of behavior in space" in which an individual or a group attempts to "affect, influence, or control people, phenomena and relationships by delimiting and asserting control over" a territory.⁶

⁶ Robert David Sack, *Human Territoriality* 23, 26, and 19. Quoted in Christopher Gray, *Colonial Rule and Crisis in Equatorial Africa: Southern Gabon, ca 1850-1940* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press,

While officials schematized the hierarchy of indirect rule using this information, there were few signs that they had become real on the ground: Ha rulers and Ha people refused to engage with the system in the ways that the British envisioned.

The British first diagnosed human trypanosomiasis, or sleeping sickness, in eastern, lower-lying Buha in 1929, and its spread over the next few years prodded colonial medical and administrative officials to propose radical changes, especially to residential patterns, in the lives of Ha people living in the lowlands. Briefly, in order to simultaneously reduce sleeping sickness infections and make potential patients more accessible to testing and treatment, the adopted British policy forced all of lowland Buha's residents to leave their homes and congregate in eleven designated "sleeping sickness concentrations" of at least 1,000 families each. British theory held that Ha people's agricultural clearings would remove any tsetse habitat and thus break the connection between people and the disease's insect vector. At the same time, concentrations' location near the roadway allowed for medical personnel to identify and treat any possible cases. As the next chapter delineates, in many Ha peoples' recollections, these new requirements were a different guise under which colonial officials could collect taxes and direct Ha labor. For colonial officials, though, sleeping sickness concentrations involved new spatial controls and the kinds of transformations in Ha lives that they had failed to achieve earlier. They realized that Ha people could not simply carry on as they had in their former homes, where they lived in a highly dispersed fashion and practiced shifting agriculture as fitting adaptations to the poor soils that

characterized their woodland savanna, or *miombo*, environment.⁷ Ha people would have to accept new methods of farming and marketing, and they would have to alter or abandon former economic activities like hunting, salt manufacturing, and beekeeping because they could not be conducted in concentrations. To the majority of local officials, the transformations in Ha life inherent in sleeping sickness policy had long been their object. Francis J. Bagshawe, the Provincial Commissioner at the time of concentration noted that the process of forming sleeping sickness concentrations “marks something like a revolution in [Ha] tribal life,” which not only would save lives but would also “make easier the task of changing a disease-ridden and backward horde of savages into a disciplined and prosperous community.”⁸ In simplifying residential patterns and rendering whole populations more accessible, concentration policy ignited colonial officials’ paternalistic zeal and offered a means to channel it into specific interventions into Ha peoples’ lives.

The Civilizing Mission in Mandated Buha

Colonial officials in Buha had additional motivation to pursue change in Africans’ lives because in Tanganyika Territory the civilizing mission in Buha was reinforced by the League of Nations Mandate that assigned the bulk of German East Africa to the British. Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant designated former Ottoman and German territories to Japan, France, Great Britain, Belgium, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. These nations, called mandatory powers, were to undertake the “tutelage” of these territories so that they could one day “stand by themselves under the strenuous

⁷ *Miombo* is Kiswahili for the *Brachystegia* genus of trees that predominate in this type of environment.

⁸ RH Mss.Afr.s.303 Francis J. Bagshawe Papers. Western Province Annual Report 1932-6, 1933 Annual Report Western Province, 16.

conditions of the modern world.” Article 22 divided these territories into three classes according to the degree to which they had developed economic and political institutions that accorded with a Western European-derived understanding of modern nation-states. Class A mandates in the Middle East were considered the most advanced, having already “reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized.”⁹ In contrast, Class C mandates in the Pacific and Namibia, the former German Southwest Africa, were considered so sparsely populated and remote “from the centres of civilisation” that they were allowed to be absorbed completely by their powerful neighbors – Japan, New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa.¹⁰ Class B mandates occupied a different position – their geographical locations and population densities gave them the potential to develop into independent nations, but their stage of development placed this eventuality in the unspecified future. Like Germany’s colonies in West Africa, the League placed German East Africa in this class and assigned it, shorn of Rwanda and Burundi, to the British who renamed it Tanganyika Territory.

The framers of Article 22 assigned Class B mandatory powers a specific task based in an understanding of the relative stages of development between the colonial world and the West. In this formulation, every part of the world occupied a place on a single continuum of civilization, with the West representing the greatest advance. As such, the West was positioned to promote progress in areas that were behind it. As one framer of Article 22 wrote, Class B mandatory powers were supposed to “found order

⁹ Article 22 League of Nations Covenant, clauses 1 and 2. A digital copy of the Covenant is available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp. A useful side-by-side comparison of the League of Nations Covenant and the United Nations Charter is available on-line at www.rmc.ca/academic/gradrech/UNCharter-LeagueCov.doc. Accessed 16 October 2008.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

and justice and to promote the rudiments of civilization among peoples who are in general only slightly advanced from a savage state.”¹¹ Article 22 thus characterized Class B mandates as places of savagery, chaos, and isolation that required the intervention of mandatory powers to bring justice, order, and integration into a community of nations. The Article, though, failed to outline in specific terms how this should happen, and instead directed the mandatory powers to pursue “the well-being and development” of the mandates. Such a goal was so indisputable and self-evident that the framers of Article 22 provided no other justification for its pursuit than to dub it “a sacred trust of civilization.”¹² Indeed, the League of Nations, the voice for the civilized world, did not “assign” these areas to mandatory powers, it “entrusted” them to their care.

Tanganyika’s colonial officials considered the League of Nations Mandate absolutely central to their policy of administering the territory. This was stated in unequivocal terms on the first page of the 1930 handbook that guided officers in Native Administration. Donald Cameron, the second British governor of the Territory and architect of indirect rule in Tanganyika, quoted extensively from the first two paragraphs of Article 22, noting that because the people who inhabited class B mandates were not yet able to “stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form

¹¹ George Louis Beer, *African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York: MacMillan Company, 1923): 462. Beer was an American expert on colonial Africa and participated in the Paris Peace Conference.

¹² Article 22 League of Nations Covenant, clauses 1 and 2. A digital copy of the Covenant is available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp. Accessed 16 October 2008.

a sacred trust of civilization....”¹³ British officials at all levels of the Colonial Service felt that the principles of the Mandate accorded perfectly with Britain’s colonial policy of indirect rule, by which – theoretically – local African leaders were incorporated into an administrative hierarchy and taught modern, Western techniques of administration in order to continue to rule their people.¹⁴ E. K. Lumley, who joined the Colonial Service in 1924 and became the District Commissioner [DC] of Kibondo in 1927, saw no tension between the two systems as they were both supposed to “further, before all else, the interests of the indigenous peoples of the region.”¹⁵ While some critics challenged the disinterested, humanitarian rhetoric of the mandate system, colonial officials at all levels of Tanganyika’s administration drew on it as proof of their honorable, humanitarian intentions.¹⁶ Charles Dundas, an early official in Tanganyika, sought transfer from Kenya because he thought African affairs and administration “would count for more in the mandated territory than in Kenya, where European [settler] interests predominated. I

¹³ *Tanganyika Territory Native Administration Memoranda No. 1: Principles of Native Administration and their Application* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1930), 1. My thanks to Mr. Derek Quinlan, former District Commissioner of Kibondo, for his copy of this handbook.

¹⁴ Theory and practice were not always in perfect accord, beginning with there being African leaders already present who were appropriate candidates for Indirect Rule. See below for specifics about the structure of indirect rule in Buha.

¹⁵ Lumley, 9.

¹⁶ Prominent African American intellectual Rayford W. Logan offered the most cogent challenge to this rhetoric, arguing that dividing Rwanda and Burundi from the rest of German East Africa and assigning it to the Belgians was dividing territory by right of conquest rather than through the League of Nation’s international authority. See his “The Operation of the Mandate System in Africa,” *Journal of Negro History* 13.4 (October 1928): 423-77, especially 436. When return of former colonies became a German demand in the 1930s, some British apologists went so far as to assert right of conquest as the basis for British (and Belgian) control. According to them, it was only “for humanitarian purposes” that Britain agreed to make reports to the Leagues’ Mandate Commission. For an example, see R. N. Lyne, “Germany’s Claim to the Colonies: The Mandates,” *Journal of the Royal African Society* 38.151 (April 1939): 273-80, 274.

had no faith in Kenya's policies and did not fit in well there."¹⁷ Dundas' criticism of neighboring Kenya lay in that colony's controversial adoption of land alienation policies and African labor practices to support Kenya's settler plantation economy.¹⁸ Donald Sturdy, a District Agricultural Officer in Kasulu from 1927-9 recorded similar sentiments in his diary when the Colonial Office in London was considering "Closer Union" in their East African holdings of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika. With only minimal settler populations affecting few areas in Uganda and Tanganyika, Sturdy sharply differentiated them from Kenya. He wrote "I think most of us want [Closer Union with Kenya] – but of course we refuse to be dominated by Kenya – or have any [illegible] of Kenya's policy thrust on us – Kenya's Native Policy that is. Uganda & this country you see put the native first."¹⁹

While it could be argued that, as a Class B mandate, Tanganyika Territory should have held unique status in Britain's colonial empire, British officials viewed their pre-existing colonial policies as perfectly consonant with the Mandate, and so saw no need for great change. It is therefore not surprising that colonial administrative policies in mandates did not differ substantially from those in other colonies. Governor Cameron did not invent original forms of colonial administration for Tanganyika, but instead modeled it after that of another British non-settler colony, Nigeria, where he had served

¹⁷ Charles C. F. Dundas quoted in Ralph A. Austen, "The Official Mind of Indirect Rule: British Policy in Tanganyika, 1916-1939," in *Britain and Germany in Africa*, eds. Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967): 577-606, 579.

¹⁸ Critics derided the pass law system for Africans that was in place by 1908, and brought to light forced labor scandals in 1918. See Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 27

¹⁹ RH Mss.Afr.s.1612(2) Donald Sturdy Diary, 14 March 1928.

in colonial administration for sixteen years.²⁰ In any case, mandatory powers were free to choose how they administered their mandated territories because the League of Nations' supervisory body for mandates, the Permanent Mandate Commission, had little power or desire to intervene. Despite the high-flown, if paternalistic, rhetoric of the mandate system, the League of Nations Covenant provided no means to regulate or enforce its stated ideals. Article 22 only required Class B mandatory powers to prohibit illicit trades like slavery, arms, and liquor and to guarantee free trade in mandates for all members of the League. Moreover, the Permanent Mandates Commission had only two functions: to receive annual reports from the mandatory powers and to invite officials from the mandated territories to the commission's annual meeting in Geneva. The Commission tended to support mandatory powers unstintingly, and even agreed to limit its own powers by specifically excluding the Commission's right to inspect mandates or interview petitioners.²¹ None of this was surprising given that the Commission was dominated by European colonial powers and included representatives from all three Class B mandatory powers. Lord Lugard himself, one of Britain's foremost theorists of colonial administration and author of indirect rule, served as Britain's representative on the Commission from 1923-1935. Moreover, the mandatory powers, and not the Permanent Mandates Commission, wrote the texts of the Mandates themselves, subject to approval by the Commission.²² The Mandatory system did not therefore exercise

²⁰ Mandatory powers were explicitly allowed to unify or federate mandated territories with adjacent territories already held by them. See Beer, *African Questions*, 523.

²¹ Paul Hibbeln, "'A Sacred Trust to Civilization': The B Mandates Under Britain, France, and the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission, 1919-1939" (PhD diss., The Ohio State University, 2003): 55.

²² Hibbeln, "'A Sacred Trust,'" 46-50. In each Mandate's preamble, it was stated that Germany had ceded its colonies to the Allies and not to the League of Nations. Thus mandatory powers could insist that *they*

effective control over mandatory powers, but did provide them with powerful language to justify their activities.

While work in territories like Tanganyika attracted men who wished to serve their country as well as a global mission of developing “backward” areas, Buha’s officials were also inspired by the type of authority they would have. As E. K. Lumley wrote, while a District Commissioner²³ was low in the colonial hierarchy and might only have a few years of experience in Tanganyika, “he was the effective agent of its policy, the man on whom the success or failure of that policy mainly depended.”²⁴ As Lumley’s own example shows, DCs were certainly the local lynchpins of policies emanating from Tanganyika’s capital of Dar es Salaam, but they were also able to act autonomously. John J. Tawney, a Kasulu official who joined the Colonial Service in 1929, wrote that under the system of Native Administration created by Governor Cameron, “Administrative Officers made their own decisions and bore the responsibility for them” because “there was neither the time nor the means to consult with others – indeed, that was what the District Officer was largely for.”²⁵ The fact that colonial officers could do these jobs at a young age was also an inducement. Tawney wrote that he chose Colonial Service out of patriotism and because it “offered far greater chances of responsibility and of making one’s own decisions at an early age than any other job I knew of.” This was

were the ones agreeing to allow the League of Nations to administer former Germany colonies, and not the other way around.

²³ Although titles for administrative officials changed slightly over the years, I have chosen to use, in order of precedence, “Provincial Commissioner,” “District Commissioner,” and “Assistant District Commissioner” unless in direct quotation.

²⁴ Lumley, 9.

²⁵ RH Mss.Afr.s 1333 (8) and 1758 John J. Tawney Papers, 1-2. In the 1960s, Tawney became the director of the Colonial Records Project at Oxford University. It is due to his involvement in obtaining former officials’ personal papers and in conducting interviews that the collection includes so many former Buha officials.

especially true for the period before World War II, when budgetary constraints meant that District Commissioners often administered a district with little or no support services like agriculture, veterinary, education, and public works. Thus, in addition to typical jobs like serving as magistrates and advising local African rulers, DCs devised their own, broad interventions into Ha people's lives. Buha's early British officials surveyed and implemented roads, built marketplaces, imported coffee beans, attempted to introduce new styles of beehives, wrote ethnographies, and even introduced bagpipe bands to district schools.²⁶ Cadets entering Tanganyika's service knew that they could pursue wide-ranging activities and be in charge of their own futures.

While there were ready sources of inspiration to join the Colonial Service, Buha's early British officials recognized profound challenges. In the minds of many of these officials, their difficulties in Buha were compounded by the inaction of the preceding colonial regimes. In their view, the German control of Kigoma had never established infrastructure, governing practices, or any meaningful cultural influence amongst the Ha. The local German administrative records were lost, and E. A. H. Leakey, who became the District Commissioner of Kasulu in 1921, wrote that when he first arrived in Buha "no one seemed to have any recollection of the German regime."²⁷ While this statement is certainly exaggerated, it represents the general British view that their administration in 1921 was the first, full debut of European colonialism in Buha. The writer of the entry entitled "Events Previous to Our Occupation" in the Kasulu District Book, a compendium of information written by local officials which remained as a guide at the district's

²⁶ See Lumley, 22-8 for examples.

²⁷ RH Mss.Afr.s.953 E. A. Leakey Papers, "Buha 1921-1932".

headquarters, noted that the main actions that the Germans took in the Region were in the form of “pacifications,” military campaigns aimed at punishing resistant Ha leaders and replacing them with others who were more cooperative. Rather than founding hospitals, schools, and missions, the British emphasized how the Germans “suppressed” rather than “developed” the Ha people. But, as the District Book writer noted, even this German goal was incomplete: “right up to 1914 no German askari [African soldier] could go through the District without being shot at.”²⁸ The worst region of all was the focus of this dissertation, the eastern, lower-lying parts of Buha. According to a British handbook written towards the end of World War I, eastern Buha was “still very imperfectly conquered” – the problem there was less that German *askari* were attacked, but that German *askari* had never even been there.²⁹ The Belgian occupation during World War I was even less successful at founding colonial institutions. In the British evaluation, the period from August 1916 to May 1921 was nothing more than a military occupation. For local officials who were inspired by a British colonial mission and a League of Nations Mandate, Buha had long been denied the advantages of colonial rule.

Districts like Buha offered a fertile field for such interventions, but officials further subdivided ethnicities and groups within them in accordance with their own understanding of advanced social, political, and economic structures. In colonial officials’ formulations, while Ha people in general were ripe for intervention, those

²⁸ See Kasulu District Book Volume I “Events Preceding our Occupation.” No author is listed, but E. A. H. Leakey is a likely candidate. The notion of Ha suppression under German colonial rule comes from E. K. Lumley. The portrayal of German colonial cruelty and incompetence was a common British trope at the time.

²⁹ *A Handbook of German East Africa* (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969): 69. Also cited in Margot Lovett, “Elders, Migrants and Wives: Labor Migration and the Renegotiation of Intergenerational, Patronage and Gender Relations in Highland Buha, Western Tanzania, 1921-62” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1996): 17.

resident in the eastern “lowlands” were far more backward than those in the western “highlands”. Agricultural and administrative officials were impressed by the highlanders’ permanent agriculture that was made possible by the areas’ suitability for banana cultivation, indigenous irrigation practices, and the integration of cattle into the agricultural system. In contrast, despite lowlanders’ larger grain harvests, officials denigrated their agriculture for its lack of cattle and shifting nature.³⁰ Officials not only disparaged the lowlands’ unsuitability to what they viewed as improved agriculture, they also portrayed the lowlands as a difficult and dangerous environment to live in. Because parts of it were forested by *miombo* trees and related vegetation, they were thus home to wild animals and tsetse flies whose sting was painful and which served as the vector for human and cattle forms of trypanosomiasis. Officials questioned why anyone would choose to continue to live in an area where tsetse and wild animals rendered the lowlands “unattractive alike to natives and to their cattle.”³¹ They implied that only deeply irrational people would make such a choice, and colonial officials saw this characteristic revealed in lowlanders’ environmental management, especially their burning practices. For example, although Leakey acknowledges that lowlanders had good reasons to burn grass and trees – as an aid for hunting, in processing ash into potash as a fertilizer, and in

³⁰ E. A. Leakey and N. V. Rounce were impressed enough with irrigation to posit that it had been introduced by Europeans. Even in negative evaluations of lowland agriculture, though, such as Leakey and Rounce’s, they admit that lowlanders managed to grow grain far more productively than in the highlands, which formed the basis of annual trade between the two zones during harvest times. Donald Sturdy’s ability to observe positive elements of lowland agriculture is balanced by his general assessment that the lowlands were generally culturally “behind” the highlands.

³¹ E. A. Leakey and N. V. Rounce, “The Human Geography of the Kasulu District,” *Tanganyika Notes and Records* (1933): 293-305, 293.

clearing pathways – he nonetheless also attributed lowlanders’ burning as a way “more generally to satisfy their willful lust of destruction.”³²

The differences in environment and agricultural practices helped colonial officials to distinguish the two zones, but they emphasized social and cultural elements like population density, permanency of occupation, and engagement with broader Ha political communities as more important sources of differentiation. To colonial officials, lowlanders themselves were prototypical “bush natives,” fringe elements even within their own ethnic group. Unlike highlanders who remained relatively stable and lived in higher population densities, lowlanders were shiftless and anti-social: “each family group builds its own village and thus forms an entity on its own.... [T]here appears to be very little which helps to bind [a Ha person] to society or to make him a member of that society. He does not see much of his fellowmen.”³³ Lowlanders also did not see colonial officers often, as trips to the east involved difficult journeys, called “*safaris*,” that were conducted on foot with caravans of supplies carried by African porters. Their chosen environments, agricultural practices, and residency patterns made lowlanders difficult to reach and influence, but colonial officials were determined to do both.

Buha’s early administrative officials were both frustrated and inspired by the lack of resources at their disposal. They frequently complained that their area was actively

³² E. A. Leakey and N. V. Rounce “Human Geography: The Land of the Abahaa, Kasulu District” Kasulu District Book Volume 1, sheet 4. 1931.

³³ J. E. S. Griffiths, “The Aba-Ha of the Tanganyika Territory – Some Aspects of Their Tribal Organization and Sleeping Sickness Concentrations,” *Tanganyika Notes and Records* 2 (1936): 72-6, 72. Leakey grossly underestimated the population of the lowland as 10% of the overall population. He pegged Kasulu’s total population at 105,000, meaning that approximately 10,050 lived in Kasulu’s lowlands. In reality, over 30,000 were concentrated in 1933-4 alone.

neglected by the central government in Dar es Salaam.³⁴ Leakey charged that this had as much to do with central government officials' general ignorance as it did with the area's perceived poverty. In a 1966 interview, Leakey [EL] had the following exchange:

JT [John Tawney]: Do you think that anybody [i.e., senior officials] down in Dar Es Salaam, do you think anybody knew anything at all about Kasulu?

EL: Nothing at all, they did not know where it was.

JT: No, it was right off the map.

EL: We had no roads of any kind....

JT: And they [senior officials] were quite disinterested.

EL: We brought in no money.³⁵

For Leakey, central officials' lack of knowledge was a function of the area's poor tax returns, and this dynamic led to neglect of the area's infrastructure. Lumley, one of the first administrative officials in Kibondo, concurred; his first evaluation of the Ha people was that they were a poor, "neglected tribe. They were far off the beaten track, and no attempt had been made to teach them the cultivation of cash crops." Local officials often opined that Buha was neglected by Dar es Salaam officials because of its infelicitous location in the country. Lumley felt that Kibondo was too distant from colonial markets to garner much attention, the closest one being the Malagarasi station on the central railway, a good four days' walk from Kibondo town. The distance meant that profits from selling food crops would be small, besides which the colonial government

³⁴ In the case of the highland areas of Buha, Tanzanian scholars have made convincing arguments that the central government intended highland Buha to be a labor reserve for the sisal industry. This analysis does not hold for the lowland areas, however. For the labor reserve argument, see Laurent Sago's contribution in Walter Rodney, Kapepwa Tambila and Laurent Sago, eds. *Migrant Labour in Tanzania During the Colonial Period* (Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, 1983).

³⁵ RH Mss.Afr.s.953 E. A. H. Leakey Papers. Interview of E. A. H. Leakey by John J. Tawney 12 October 1966, 4 and 13.

discouraged people from selling food to raise tax money.³⁶ Although local officials often complained of the lack of support they received towards their efforts in Buha, neglect from Dar es Salaam merely reinforced to local officials their own importance – they were often the sole carriers of the civilizing mission. In Biblical language, one official compared their frustrations to those of Moses, noting how they had been called upon “to make the bricks of progress without the straw of working capital.”³⁷

Pre-Sleeping Sickness Attempts at Territoriality and Taxation

With the combined force of the civilizing mission and the League of Nations mandate, Buha’s early colonial officials had ample motivation for their work in the region, and their analysis of lowlanders made them particularly suitable targets for officials’ labors. But even in their most basic efforts, including creating meaningful territorial organization and taxation, officials spent the years leading up to sleeping sickness concentration policy in frustration. Because moving populations into concentrated centers simplified the work of tax collection and emplaced people in ways that could be easily incorporated into hierarchically-arranged territories with assigned indirect rulers, concentration policy offered Buha’s officials the means to implement the administrative structures they had failed to create earlier.

This section fleshes out these unsuccessful attempts and emphasizes a little-studied dimension of how British colonialism unfolded in Tanganyika: that the primary means by which British officials understood their responsibility was spatial rather than to specific individuals or even to groups of people. The ways that colonial officials

³⁶ Lumley, 25.

³⁷ TNA 11678 Kigoma Annual Reports. 1929 Annual Report Kigoma Province, 5.

attempted this territoriality – the control over people through controlling space – was through administrative structures like hierarchically-arranged indirect rule over territories and tax collection. These two structures were intimately linked in part because the process of collecting taxes yielded the information officials needed to identify rulers, name territories, enumerate the people therein, and define who belonged in British space. But taxation had many meanings in Buha: for officials, it was not only the funding base for their activities but also served as a metric by which they could measure the success of their efforts. To many officials, paying taxes was a tangible sign that indirect rulers and residents of lowland Buha accepted the new ideas that officials promoted.

The highest level of delimiting territory in western Tanzania was the international border between British Tanganyika and Belgian-controlled Rwanda and Burundi. The priorities of Buha’s officials in their regulation of the border, though, differs from the theoretical purposes of international borders: to demarcate spheres of authority, to channel labor, to classify people in order to govern them, and to limit the spread of human and animal pathogens.³⁸ The sum total of these purposes is an attempt to orient residents’ lives inwardly rather than beyond the boundaries of a political territory,³⁹ but as will be discussed below, Buha’s officials prioritized the ownership of resources and taxation compliance over and above all of these other issues. Like colonial powers elsewhere in Africa, they were far more liberal in regulating border crossings for the

³⁸ Paul Nugent and A. I. Asiwaju, “Introduction: the Paradox of African Boundaries,” in *African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities*, eds. Paul Nugent and A. I. Asiwaju (New York: Pinter, 1996): 1-27, 1-3.

³⁹ Thomas Wilson and Donna Hastings, “Nation, State and Identity at International Borders,” in *Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers*, eds. Thomas Wilson and Donnan Hastings (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 1-58, 48.

pragmatic reason that they lacked the resources to enforce a border that made little geographic sense and severed longstanding economic and social ties.⁴⁰ Indeed, colonial officials themselves occasionally acknowledged the ways that borders often “arbitrarily cut tribes in two, or similarly divide peoples of close cultural and social affinities,” therefore making the attempt to halt “the free movement of the African population across inter-territorial boundaries” impossible to enforce “even if desirable.”⁴¹

Even if British officials did not impose the strictest possible control over the border, they nonetheless engaged in behaviors which indicate how they understood their relationship to territory and the people who inhabited it. One of the simplest definitions of a territory used by human geographers is of a *state-oriented* concept of “a space in which sovereignty is enacted.”⁴² Border disputes indicate that British sovereignty mainly concerned insuring economic advantage over and above colonial rivals. The most important type of territory the border between British Tanganyika and Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi created, therefore, was that of wealth limited to one colonial power. As former constituent parts of German East Africa, the border between Ruanda-Urundi and

⁴⁰ Alec McEwan, “The Establishment of the Nigeria/Benin Boundary, 1889-1989,” *The Geographical Journal* 157.1 (1991): 62-70, 62. Part of the challenge of regulating colonial was the ignorance with which they were created in terms of local geographies and social ties. This is indicated by the widespread employment of astronomical and straight lines in African borders. See Ieuan Griffiths, “The Scramble for Africa: Inherited Political Boundaries,” *The Geographical Journal* 152.2 (1986): 204-16, 204 and Simon Katzenellenbogen, “It Didn’t Happen at Berlin: Politics, Economics and Ignorance in Setting Africa’s Colonial Boundaries,” in *African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities*, eds. Paul Nugent and A. I. Asiwaju (New York: Pinter, 1996): 28.

⁴¹ TNA 10218 v 2 Recruitment Outside Labour. Uganda Secretariat to Dar es Salaam and Nairobi Secretariat, 21 June 1946. A. H. Le Geyt, formerly an officer in Kigoma, used a similar understanding to argue in 1936 against Dar es Salaam’s suggestion that immigrants into Tanganyika ought to be distinguished from ‘indigenous’ inhabitants in case of future resource scarcity. He wrote “In the first place boundaries and international frontiers frequently intersect a big tribal block” and then mentions frequent border crossings amongst the Yao in the south and the Warundi “overflowing into Kasulu and Kibondo” in the west. See TNA 23274 v 1 Movement Between Tribal Areas and Rights of Immigrants. Acting District Officer A. H. Le Geyt to Chief Secretary, 4 March 1936.

⁴² R. J. Johnston, ed., *Dictionary of Human Geography* (Oxford: Blackwells, 2000): 824 “Territory”.

Tanganyika had to be set by international agreement. In his brief account of the history of these negotiations, Griffiths notes the characteristic arbitrariness of the first agreed-upon border location in 1922: it was located approximately 50 km west of the former German provincial boundary and current international border. Only after protests by Belgian missionaries in Rwanda was the line moved back to the Kagera River in 1923.⁴³ But the border was not permanently set until 1938 due to seasonal shifts in the course of the Kagera, which forms ponds and swamp in the dry season but tends to change its course substantially when it begins flowing again in the rainy season. The colonial record concerning the difficulties in using the course of the Kagera as an international border reveals colonial thinking about the purpose of the border.⁴⁴ For the British and the Belgians, cultural borders could be fluid but, because rights over a territory's wealth must be absolute, a moving political border was unacceptable. This issue came to a head when the British found tin in a stretch of the Kagera that was fully within British territory. The discovery made mineral wealth, and the rights over the water which would have to be used in order to exploit that wealth, central concerns for the internal British discussion of the subject. In response to a Belgian team surveying the river in 1928 for "purely scientific reasons," British officials worried that since the Belgians "usually got the better of us...if any mineral deposits can be put on their side of the mid-stream that has been done."⁴⁵ The final solution to this quandary was a joint Belgian-British team establishing beacons on an agreed-upon line, thus demarcating the border, their economic territory,

⁴³ Griffiths, "The Scramble," 206.

⁴⁴ Also interesting is a 9 October 1928 letter from Director of Surveys Mr. Rowe to Chief Secretary detailing the possible meanings of the ways that rivers can be divided, TNA 523/12736 Boundary Between Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi.

⁴⁵ TNA 523/12736 Boundary Between Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi. June 1928.

physically. Only with solidly anchored, visible markers could officials attempt to limit the flow of goods or resources across the border, which the British recorded the Belgians doing consistently.⁴⁶

In terms of how the border affected nearby people, British officials demonstrated a far more cavalier attitude. Officials determined that the best placement for beacons at the Kagera would be on the permanent islands in the center of the river. Although officials noted that no less than eleven of these islands were inhabited, they made no provisions for determining on which side of the border these people lived. One official wrote that “So far as land and inhabitants are concerned we can adopt any line and stick to it as we do not want natives to change their country with the river bed.”⁴⁷ In other words, the overriding concern of officials was to divide, definitively, land and the resources it might hold; where the people would be considered residents was of far less interest.

British officials treated Buha’s residents as one of that territory’s productive resources, like its environmental resources, and sought to confine this resource’s labor and tax potential to British space. When the Belgian consul Andre de Beys wrote to the Chief Secretary in Dar es Salaam in 1929 requesting that 1,000 workers from Kigoma District be allowed to labor in the Congo, the Chief Secretary firstly outlined to the Governor how this request would put stress on an already strained local and Territorial labor market:

⁴⁶ See TNA 1733/3/45 giving a brief history of the goods the Belgians refused to allow across the border.

⁴⁷ TNA 523/12736 Boundary Between Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi. F. J. D. to Chief Secretary, 30 July 1928.

The Labour position in Kigoma is becoming acute – wages are rising, many of the merchants complain of difficulty in attracting labourers & Govt for road work has to bring down Waha from the Kasulu-Kibondo border: the sudden departure of a 1000 men to the Congo would throw out the Labour Market, & seriously inconvenience plantations on the coast who are beginning to draw on Kibondo labour for their needs.⁴⁸

Even more significantly, the Chief Secretary wrote in terms identical to those usually used for the exploitation of resources like minerals and timber: “...the Congo Govt has already *denuded* Kigoma District of masons & skilled labour....”⁴⁹ Similar logic underpinned officials’ priorities when newcomers came to Buha. Provincial Commissioner Francis Bagshawe recounted conversations he had with his inferiors and Native Authorities in which he made clear that what mattered to him was not preventing movement across the border, but of insuring the tax compliance of those who lived in British space as opposed to Belgian space: “If a man wanted to live on both sides, he must expect to be taxed on both sides. If a man appeared from there, he must pay tax or go back. No one could live there & keep shambas [cultivated fields] here, & vice versa.”⁵⁰ In 1935, when a group of Rundi people moved into the border area near Kibondo and began cultivating, Provincial Commissioner Longland’s immediate concern after insuring that no violence would occur between the newcomers and locals was to have his subordinate indicate the “interterritorial boundary....to the Warundi and Waha” and explain to the newcomers that those who “elected to stay and build on this side of the

⁴⁸ TNA 10218 v 1 Recruitment of Outside Labour. Folio 39. This administrative note was made on 16 September 1929 as part of the response to the consul’s 20 April 1929 request for laborers.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* Emphasis mine.

⁵⁰ RH Mss.Afr.s.290 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 28 October 1932.

boundary would pay tax here.”⁵¹ Examples like these indicate that the colonial state in Buha had an abiding interest in maximizing taxation amongst residents rather than attempting to maximize population. In this, the colonial state did not fully accord with the modern state practices which Timothy Mitchell formulates as focused on the “containment of collective exchanges, movements, values, and identities within a territorial frame.”⁵² Rather, Tanganyika’s officials sought to contain only one element – *wealth* – within its borders.

Within the area delimited by international borders, the main British territorial conception related to Native Administration. Colonial officials’ vision of meaningful African territories in Tanganyika derived directly from their desire to identify pre-existing political structures which could be co-opted into the workings of indirect rule. This process began by identifying areas which corresponded to ethnographically separable groups, “tribes,” who were thought of as embryonic nations – having unique languages, political, social, and belief systems.⁵³ Thus, the British first placed Ha people into “Buha” or “Uha,” terms that meant literally “the land of the Ha people.”⁵⁴ This ethnographic mapping showed colonial officials where individual Africans belonged within the Territory, a dynamic made clear when individuals moved outside of their supposedly appropriate place. Colonial concerns over population movement between

⁵¹ TNA 23014. Letter from Provincial Commissioner Longland to Chief Secretary, 29 July 1935. The Chief Secretary clearly wanted to keep this issue at as low a level as possible. He instructed Longland to arrange “a friendly and informal confabulation between the two District Officers concerned” on either side of the border, rather than negotiate any issues through colonial metropolises. See letter of 20 August 1935.

⁵² Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002): 12.

⁵³ Igor Kopytoff, “The Internal African Frontier,” in *The African Frontier*, ed. Igor Kopytoff (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987): 4.

⁵⁴ “Buha” is the Kiha version, and “Uha” the Kiswahili. Trained in Kiswahili, Buha’s British officials mainly used the name “Uha.”

parts of the colony indicate the way in which so-called traditional “tribal homelands” figured as both the natural place for individuals to dwell and the only one to which they had a claim. In any given area of the territory, but most particularly in the cities, officials followed a policy of sending those individuals deemed undesirable – the unemployed, the mentally or physically ill, unattached women – to their home districts, a process tellingly entitled “repatriation.” Significantly, in order to identify where to send such undesirable people, the procedure was to locate not where the families of such undesirables lived, but under which local African official they lived, an administrative process that yielded voluminous documentation as individual cases traveled through the Native Administration hierarchy from British District Commissioner to the most local Native Authority, the headman.⁵⁵ Individuals or groups dwelling outside of their understood homeland were in danger of being moved, but, importantly, they were also in danger of receiving reduced rights to resources in their new areas. Chief Secretary D. M. Kennedy wrote in his administrative notes “...no native, simply by virtue of being a native, has a right to land which neither he nor the community to which he belongs has occupied continuously in recent times.”⁵⁶ This ethnographic mapping served to simplify ethnic diversity and created a colonial tradition of “appropriate” territories for particular people, but as will be shown below and in subsequent chapters, Ha people flatly refused these limitations through their actions.

⁵⁵ See TNA 13443 Repatriation.

⁵⁶ TNA 23274 v 1 Movement Between Tribal Areas and Rights of Immigrants. 20 November 1935. Native Authorities absolutely thwarted this desire for claims of “indigenous inhabitants” and newcomers to remain distinguishable by readily absorbing newcomers into existing communities. See *Ibid.*, Chief Secretary to Provincial Commissioners, 27 December 1935.

British officials' first imposition of territoriality on Ha people was to place them within Buha, and the second was to subdivide them into areas over which there was a paramount African ruler or "chief," the *mwami* (pl. *baami*). "Chiefdoms" – or more accurately "kingdoms" – were the next level of territory to the British, and they identified six Ha kingdoms, five of which were located in Kibondo and Kasulu.⁵⁷ Thus, District Commissioner E. K. Lumley could write that when he arrived in Kibondo, social identities and political structures were absolutely straightforward: "The Africans of Kibondo were of the Ha tribe. There were sections of the same tribe in Kasulu, but under other Watussi chiefs."⁵⁸ In the colonial imagination, chiefdoms' boundaries were fixed and could themselves be sub-divided neatly into smaller, hierarchically-arranged areas that corresponded to the *mwami*'s subordinates, the major provincial chiefs, *batware banini* (s. *mutware*), and more local authorities, *batware batoyi*. The 1926 Native Authorities Ordinance required colonial officials to establish the Native Authority in each district by listing, hierarchically, all of the territorial subdivisions of the district, followed

⁵⁷ There were two kingdoms in Kibondo, Buyungu in the northwest and Muhambwe in the southeast, and three in Kasulu District, Heru in the west, Bushingu in the northeast, and Luguru in the southeast. Matters become more complex when we discuss the sixth kingdom, Nkalinzi. Colonial officials moved the district lines around Nkalinzi, placing it either in Kigoma or Kasulu Districts. It was part of Kigoma from 1921-1947, part of Kasulu from 1947-1955, and then returned to Kigoma. The logic underlying these moves oscillated between the principle of placing members of the same ethnic group together (when it was part of Kasulu), as most of the peoples in southern Kigoma District were not Ha, and the ease of administration (when it was a part of Kigoma), as Nkalinzi was best reached via Lake Tanganyika and therefore was far easier to access from Kigoma rather than Kasulu town. See Dean McHenry, "Reorganization: An Administrative History of Kigoma District," *Tanzania Notes and Records* 84 and 85 (1980): 65-76. There are further issues about how the Germans and British identified Ha kingdoms. Wagner raises the issue that historically the Rukalanga area should be considered a separate kingdom, and the British elevated Bunganda, part of Heru, to the status of a kingdom for eight years. See footnote 60 and Michele Wagner, "Environment, Community and History: 'Nature in the Mind,' in Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Buha, Western Tanzania" in *Custodians of the Land*, eds. Gregory Maddox, James Giblin, and Isaria Kimambo (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1996), 175-196.

⁵⁸ Lumley, 25.

by the names of the African officeholders whom the regime recognized.⁵⁹ In this schema, *baami* became “chiefs,” *batware banini* became “sub-chiefs,” and minor *batware batoyi* became “headmen,”⁶⁰ each with his or her own strictly delimited territory.

These colonial understandings of territory, however, were not imposed in a vacuum in Buha. There were multiple forms of territory already existing there, all of which were based in social relations. In his work on the internal African frontier, Igor Kopytoff notes that “African space is, above all social space,” or space defined through social relationships.⁶¹ This phenomenon is just as recognized by human geographers in their definitions of “territory” as the previously cited definition of territory as state-oriented and related to sovereignty; the other core definition of territory is any bounded *social* space.⁶² Indeed, Kopytoff argues that in comparison to other world cultures, at times Africans demonstrate a “relative indifference to rootedness in physical space” because African roots were not “conceived to be in a place...but in a kin group, in ancestors, in a genealogical position,” and it is this feature that appears to explain high

⁵⁹ These lists were based on tax collection records, see below.

⁶⁰ As in other areas of Tanganyika and in other colonies, colonial officials did not just recognize local rulers, but created structures that had not previously existed. In Kasulu in 1923, colonial officials placed the *mwami* of the largest, richest, and most populous kingdom of Heru over the *baami* of the other two kingdoms in the district. In the past, these kingdoms were fully independent of Heru, and officials would later recognize this system. By 1933, Provincial Commissioner Bagshawe wrote that this situation was contrary to anything in the written record. See TNA 180/A2/23 African Administration & Affairs Ex-Chief Kanyoni of Kasulu Now Makwaya Ntale. Provincial Commissioner Bagshawe to District Officer Kigoma and Assistant District Officer Uha, 9 Sept 1933. The British also decided in 1931 to elevate the powerful *mtwale* Biessa of Bunganda, an important area of Heru, to the status of *mwami* in his own right. It appears that Provincial Commissioner Bagshawe made this decision for two reasons: because the *mwami* of Heru followed a taboo which did not allow him to enter Bunganda and because Biessa received a *mwami*'s greeting. It seems likely that Bagshawe reasoned that without the possibility of direct supervision, the *mwami* of Heru could not be seen as the superior administrator over the *mtwale* of Bunganda. See Kasulu District Book Volume 1 “Tribal Government of Uha,” 3-4. Records do not reveal that *mtwale* Biessa agitated for this change, but it certainly is possible. They reversed their decision upon Biessa's death in 1939 and returned his successor, Chobalika, to the status of *mtwale*. See RH Mss.Afr.s.503 1940 Handing Over Report Kigoma District John Rooke-Johnston, 25.

⁶¹ Kopytoff, 22.

⁶² R. J. Johnston, ed., *Dictionary of Human Geography* (Oxford: Blackwells, 2000): 824 “Territory”.

mobility as a key political and social component in many African societies, including Buha.⁶³ Mobility tied Buha into a Great Lakes regional culture area, where language, political structure, family and community concepts, and religious ideals tied together peoples currently inhabiting the contemporary nations of Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda.⁶⁴ Indeed, according to many people in Buha and Burundi, who are separated today by an international border, the ethnic labels attributed to the majority of people in either country – Ha and Rundi, respectively – are misleading because they are “the same people.”⁶⁵ Buha could be defined by colonial officials as “inhabited by Ha people over which are separate Tutsi chiefs,”⁶⁶ and therefore the home to five separate precolonial kingdoms, or it could be the home of five kingdoms just as related to the neighboring kingdoms of Burundi and Rwanda as they were to each other. The social territory of Buha’s residents stretched well beyond Buha, certainly across the borders that officials wished to implement.

Within precolonial kingdoms, however, political territories had been defined by ties of reciprocal obligation more so than any sense of a set geographical scope of power. The “personal idiom of clientship”⁶⁷ was the means by which residents described their relations to a *mwami* and his or her subordinates, a tie that indicated both different degrees of status or wealth but was also relatively easy to undo – either by residents

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁶⁴ Michele D. Wagner, “Both Sides of the Border: The Impact of the Political Milieu on Field Research in Burundi and Tanzania,” in *In Pursuit of History*, eds. Jan Vansina and Carolyn Keyes Adenaike (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1996): 18-28.

⁶⁵ Personal communication, Mwalimu Bugeraha, Kasulu, Tanzania, 8 August 2005. Important to this discussion is the fact that “Ha” and “Tutsi” was also a way to differentiate between lowlanders and highlanders within what is today called “Buha.” See Wagner, “Environment, Community,” 177.

⁶⁶ Lumley, 25.

⁶⁷ Beverly Brown, “Ujiji: The History of Lakeside Town” (PhD diss., Boston University, 1973): 32.

moving to a new area or creating new ties with a different patron. Wherever a *mwami*'s people dwelled, that was the territory over which he or she could enact authority. By extension, anywhere a *mwami* could form new ties or help to establish subordinates represented an extension of his or her power. Attracting, retaining, and expanding population was the key political goal for a *mwami* – a point shared with other precolonial leaders such as Mashoeshoe of the Basotho who lamented in 1849 that a treaty with Europeans would rob him not of particular lands but of ““thousands of my people.””⁶⁸ *Baami*'s power was far from uniform even within locations they claimed, as both major provincial chiefs, the *batware banini*, and more local authorities, *batware batoyi*, also laid claim to residents' loyalty. The scope of their power was similarly uneven as that of the *mwami*, corresponding to the people with whom they had reciprocal relations. Taken in sum, the likely outline of political territory in one of Buha's kingdom accords well with Kopytoff's description of a polity structured with “concentric ‘circles’ of diminishing control, radiating from the core,”⁶⁹ or in this case from one large core and multiple smaller ones. The contradicting tendency in this expansion and contraction of political territories were certain sacred sites which could anchor a *mwami*'s ties to particular areas, especially the grave sites of past *baami* marked with *mirumba* [figus] trees or the special location of royal drums and spears.⁷⁰ These major political territories were therefore marked by flexibility of scope and of common residents' leverage in establishing, continuing, or ending their participation.

⁶⁸ See David Coplan, “Unconquered Territory: Narrating the Caledon Valley,” *Journal of African Cultural Studies* 13.2 (2000): 185-206, 191.

⁶⁹ Kopytoff, 29.

⁷⁰ Brown, 29.

But before a *mwami* or *mutware* could establish a strong presence in Buha, they had to establish relations with earth spirit priests, *bateko* (s. *muteko*), which was accomplished mainly by requesting *bateko*'s aid in times of crisis and observing taboos associated with locations of *bateko*'s power.⁷¹ *Bateko* were the most accessible of politico-religious figures to the majority of residents of Kigoma. The spatial dimension of *bateko*'s power related to the powerful and often malevolent earth spirits, *bisigo* (s. *ibisigo*). Although some *bisigo* were transient, others preferred to dwell in a specific habitat – usually a pond, river, or fragrant tree. *Bateko* made an area inhabitable by humans by brokering relations between residents and *bisigo*, an ability derived from a *muteko* being the descendent – male or female, the position went to the descendent showing the greatest aptitude – of the first person to build rapport with the resident *bisigo*. *Bisigo* animated a given area and made certain places dangerous to non-specialists. In navigating through these landscapes, an area's residents worked to come to know the spirits and how to deal with them: “[i]n each local setting, particular spirits were identified, their characteristics were ‘discovered’ or ‘revealed’, and they developed as elements of local history.”⁷² *Bateko* accessed wealth in the form of a fee for the distribution of land and an annual tribute from residents for *ukuhoza*, “cooling” the land, making it possible for people to successfully live in an area. Because of this structure, *bateko* had a vested interest in retaining residents, and proved very generous in

⁷¹ See next paragraph for a discussion of *bateko*. Wagner, “Environment, Community,” 181 records how the *mwami* of Heru Juu ritually avoided the Bogwe River because of its *bisigo*. Brown, 34 claims that the relationship between *bateko* as owners of the land and *baami* as authorities over the land is unique in the interlacustrine region. But Kopytoff, 55 notes that Tutsi conquerors elsewhere attached themselves to priest-like *abiru* chiefs.

⁷² Wagner, “Environment, Community,” 179.

redistributing tribute.⁷³ The tie to a particular area for *buteko* families was reinforced through the establishment and reverencing of auspicious places marked with *kibira* trees or frequented by pythons. These were a “*permanent* home of his or her particular nature spirits,”⁷⁴ a tie strong enough that when a *muteko* left an area, it signaled “total evacuation.”⁷⁵ Leaving meant abandoning the spirits and, for *bateko*, their source of power and distinction.

British attempts at territoriality necessarily clashed with these Ha understandings of how territory, population, and political power interrelated. To begin with, the British attempted to impose a limitation on the rights of Africans who emigrate from their supposed tribal homeland. In a confidential circular sent out to all Provincial Commissioners in 1935, Chief Secretary D.M. Kennedy wrote of the need for colonial officials themselves to create “some measure of control” in immigration since African Native authorities were unreceptive to these measures. He wrote with some frustration that

...it is extremely difficult to make chiefs and headmen realize that there are no valid reasons why natives, who drift over from area A to area B, should become automatically and at once absorbed into the local population and should be treated as though they had always lived in B., and be regarded as being on an equal footing with the indigenous inhabitants of B.⁷⁶

⁷³ J. F. Mbwiliza, “The Hoe and the Stick: A Political Economy of the Heru, c. 1750-1900,” University of Dar es Salaam paper no. 30, 1979: 1-26, 12. Beginning in the 1830s, too, *bateko*’s positions could translate into substantial wealth as they designated land and gave crucial blessings for lake voyages to traders arriving in Kigoma as part of the central route of the ivory and slave caravan trades. See Wagner, “Environment, Community,” 190-1.

⁷⁴ Wagner, “Environment, Community,” 185. Emphasis added.

⁷⁵ Mbwiliza, 12.

⁷⁶ TNA 23274 vol 1 Movement Between Tribal Areas and Rights of Immigrants. Folio 30, Chief Secretary D. M. Kennedy to Regional Commissioners, 27 December 1935.

The Chief Secretary then directed that all immigrants should be noted as such in tax rolls, in case future developments made land a scarce commodity. In such a scenario, it was crucial that colonial administration should be able to arbitrate claims to land, and that immigrants' "rights" should be assessed at their *real* value and not be confused with those of the indigenous inhabitants."⁷⁷ The underlying premise to this policy – that Africans only have rights to areas where they can be considered indigenous – undermines one of the central means by which African rulers had enhanced their power: by attracting new followers. The rights which residents had to a specific area were not the only substantial reconfiguration in colonial thinking; officials' imagination of the power that African rulers had over territories was also a new innovation. While in the colonial schema, chiefs may have corresponded to *baami* in terms of lineage and dignity, officials thought of their power to be uniform rather than uneven or limited to where their followers lived. Their territory, therefore, could be strictly delimited. This difference was made rather clear during the sleeping sickness concentration campaigns of the early 1930s. Once moved into a new sleeping sickness settlement, even one which combined people from several different areas, "each Native authority is still responsible for the administration of its [sic] tribal country, although it may be largely depopulated."⁷⁸ The issue of depopulation makes clear the differences in British and Ha thought concerning politics and territory: for Ha people, depopulation was a clear sign of limitation to a *mwami*'s power. To the British, *baami* held uniform authority over their entire domain

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, emphasis mine.

⁷⁸ TNA 31731 Resettlement as a Preventative Measure.

whether populated or not, and their subordinate *batware* simply administered smaller districts.

In their attempts to reorganize space and politics in Buha, officials used taxation in ways far beyond its financial support of the administration. Officials used taxation as a means for imposing territoriality and as a metric for the success of colonial rule, a way to measure the progress colonial officials had made to induce Ha leaders and residents to adopt new forms of politics. In the first years of British rule, taxation was completely abandoned in face of general political unrest in 1921, but taxation remained amongst officials' earliest priorities. When asked about his first actions in Kasulu, specifically about law and order, Leakey replied, "Well, yes, law and order was a very important thing but we were trying to make a register of people that were there for tax purposes."⁷⁹ Taxation was a priority for clear reasons: money from the hut and poll tax supported local expenditures, while labor in lieu of taxation was the central means by which district officers built up colonial infrastructure. As DC Lumley recounted, tax default labor allowed him and Leakey to requisition the labor needed to lay out a new road that would connect the Kasulu and Kibondo headquarters, something that local finances could never accomplish. Because of this, "I have to confess that I did not press defaulters for their tax; their labour was of far greater value to me."⁸⁰ Just as important as funds and labor that taxation yielded, though, was the local knowledge that implementing a taxation system required. From tax numbers and their organization according to area, colonial officials came to know population figures, demographic patterns, and possible lines of

⁷⁹ RH Mss.Afr.s.953 E. A. Leakey Papers. Interview of E. A. H. Leakey by John J. Tawney, 12 October 1966, 3.

⁸⁰ Lumley, 28.

authority. It was from charts that listed names of Chiefs, Sub-chiefs, and Headmen along with their tax paying population that the structure of indirect rule was schematized.

The British viewed successful tax collection as a sign of the barest of colonial control over an area, especially in the early 1920s when colonial officials were more directly responsible for its collection. Indeed, they used the abandonment of formalized tax collection by the Germans in 1911 as proof of the Germans' lack of control over Buha – a claim which then made it all the more important for *them* to succeed.⁸¹ But the first few years of British tax collection were extremely shaky; a perfunctory tax collection first occurred for the 1921-1922 tax year in Kasulu and yielded just over 5,000 taxes paid, or about 13% compliance.⁸² As part of Territory-wide taxation reforms in 1924, Leakey and his Kibondo counterpart attempted to force greater compliance by ordering the 1923 tax defaulters to turn up at district headquarters to work in lieu of tax payments. As Provincial Commissioner Bagshawe would write a few years later, “every man who escapes tax breeds would be defaulters next year.”⁸³ Although details are lacking, Ha resistance was swift and forceful. Rioting broke out in Kibondo, and protestors in Kasulu burned the police headquarters and head clerk's house. In the end, Leakey seized the most important economic resource in the area, cattle, to gain compliance.⁸⁴ When violent resistance had been quelled, thousands of tax defaulters labored for thirty days on the

⁸¹ See Lovett, 17.

⁸² These figures are from the Kasulu District Book, Volume 2, “Hut and Poll Tax Collection 1921/22 sheet 1. This only lists the number of taxes collected, 5,093, and not the total number of taxpayers. The first list of eligible taxpayers comes in 1924 at 31,564 (thus making 1921's collection to be 16% compliant), but all evidence suggests that this taxpayer figure is too small. Unfortunately, the two volumes of the Kibondo District Books have been lost.

⁸³ TNA 13653 Hut and Poll Tax Kigoma. Provincial Commissioner Bagshawe to Chief Secretary, 16 November 1931, 2.

⁸⁴ For the rioting and cattle seizure, see TNA 1733/3/45 1924 Annual Report. See Kasulu District Book Volume 1 “Commentary on Year's Work 1924” for the arson.

roadways and at district headquarters in 1924. In the next year, nearly 5,000 worked in Kasulu alone.⁸⁵ Although precise numbers are unavailable, these early years probably represent less than 20% compliance, a sure sign to Buha's officials that they were not yet succeeding.⁸⁶

When local colonial officials established a new taxation system from 1924-1926 as part of the creation of indirect rule in Buha, they made schema of the territories they believed existed and set up a tax collection system that began to affect most Ha people. As they toured their districts and consulted with the local *mwami* of each of the five kingdoms to create tax districts, the District Commissioner of Kasulu and Kibondo recorded the names of major and minor *batware*, now known as Native Authorities, as well as the names of their areas.⁸⁷ Once officials established this basic structure, their information gathering attempted to reach into every Ha household. An African tax clerk took up residence in each district and compiled tax registers that listed each adult male eligible for taxation within that area, even noting which were eligible to pay an extra fee as part of the plural wives' tax.⁸⁸ With this information in place, British officers first visited broad areas of Buha on "tax safaris," collection trips which elders remember as the first time many encountered an European. Assistant District Commissioners [ADC]

⁸⁵ TNA 1733/7/62 1925 Annual Report Kasulu Sub-District.

⁸⁶ TNA 180 C/10 Hut and Poll Tax Collection Rates. A memo from Leakey from 22 November 1932 lists 39,448 tax payers in Kasulu District. He lists 23,507 for Kibondo District.

⁸⁷ See footnote 57 for a discussion of the British colonial priorities shown in assigning different levels of Native Authorities.

⁸⁸ From the corrections made even to basic population figures once lowlanders were concentrated, it is clear that these numbers underestimated the population by at least 10%. Documents from the time do not reveal how exactly taxpayer status was determined. By the mid-1950s, the age of sixteen was the threshold for paying tax, and it was the practice, at least in Kibondo, to determine eligibility, unless it was known, by whether a young man had underarm hair. Interviews of Derek H. J. Quinlan 16 February 2007 Felixstowe and William Ngaye 26 September 2007 Kagera Nkanda Village.

visited each of these centers on pre-appointed days where he would meet the tax clerk, local Native Authority, and tax payers. The ADC and clerk would then collect money, issue exemptions, or record individuals for future tax work.

The next set of reforms, beginning in 1925-26, brought profound changes to the basis of Ha politics and tested the limits of the colonial administration. Besides replacing the German heller with the Tanganyika shilling,⁸⁹ these reforms involved the abolishment of all forms of tribute for African leaders. In the past, tribute was the critical source of *baami*'s and *batware*'s wealth and the means by which they could form reciprocal relationships. *Batware* and *baami* could expect gifts when people approached them with requests, they could marshal agricultural or building labor in exchange for gifts of beer, salt, or meat, or *baami* would receive similar offerings when they performed regular rituals to their ancestral spirits to insure the well-being of the land. From 1925 on, though, African leaders solely depended on their state salaries for their wealth, and those salaries were tied to their success in tax collection.⁹⁰ In order to improve African leaders'

⁸⁹ Kasulu District Book Volume I "Commentary on Year's work 1925". The British could not force Ha people to use the other currency, and the German heller remained in circulation until 1940. A series of officials recorded the heller's use in local markets. See RH Afr.r.180 J. E. S. Griffiths Diary, 13 November 1931 for an example. In 1927, one heller was the equivalent of two cents, with one hundred cents equaling one shilling, and twenty shillings to the pound. The heller's use in trade with Burundi is particularly intriguing. John Rooke-Johnston, a colonial official in Buha from 1933-40, noted that up until the late 1930s Ha traders would trade shillings for hellers before crossing the Burundian border and then trade hellers for Belgian Congo francs, the currency of Burundi, in order to buy Burundian goods, see RH Mss.Afr.s.1935 (1) John Rooke Johnston, "Bits and Pieces," 19. The British attributed Ha people's preference for the bronze heller to its softer metal which blacksmiths could melt down more easily than shillings and cents. Six shillings' worth of hellers, presumably about 300 hellers, would be needed for one *mulinga*, a bracelet that was an inch thick and clamped on the arm above the wrist. Apparently, coppersmiths were highly specialized and may have formed a secret guild to preserve their skills. Another important use for copper were the royal spears of two of the Kasulu *baami*. Griffiths reported that hellers were the only source of copper in 1932. See Kasulu District Book, Volume 1, "On Copper & Brass Bracelets" by J. E. S. Griffiths 1932, 17-8.

⁹⁰ See TNA 1733/3/4 1925 Kigoma District Annual Report, 2 and Kasulu District Book "Tribute: Work Which was Done by the People" written by C. H. B. Grant in 1923. Margot Lovett argues that this reform greatly impeded *baami* and other leaders at a particularly vulnerable time. Kasulu, and presumably

salaries, the British raised tax rates by 300%, from two to six shillings, in 1925. Such a dramatic increase made the first full year of this new system in 1927 a debacle. On the one hand, the rate of actual tax collected fell drastically. But more importantly, the huge numbers of tax defaulters showed officials just how inadequate their practices and personnel were to administer Buha fully: “What ever [sic] the cause the result was disastrous and the District Officer was faced with the impossible task of employing over 14,000 tax defaulters each one of whom had to be hunted down and brought to book by most inadequate machinery [sic].”⁹¹ Even though they reduced the rate to four shillings the following year, Provincial Commissioner Bagenal lamented that “the Ha are shewing no more anxiety to pay tax than they did last year.”⁹²

To colonial officials, taxation was also an indicator of to what extent Ha leaders were adopting the colonial notions of how the government “served” the people. Taxation was a teaching tool through which Western ideas of governance were both transmitted and measured: Ha rulers were supposed to learn and demonstrate their new roles as colonial Native Authorities and how those differed from their past practices. To begin with, Ha Native Authorities needed to supervise their subordinates in the process of tax collection, chiefs monitoring sub-chiefs, headmen, and clerks. Supervision at the lowest levels was necessary because, as Provincial Commissioner Bagenal noted in 1927, “Once a [tax] clerk is appointed they are apt to consider that their responsibility is ended and

Kibondo, had suffered nearly three decades of economic difficulties, beginning with massive loss of cattle in the 1890s, continuing with German and then Belgian depredations and massive seizure of Ha resources. Following such hardships, it was common for local leaders to find any way they could, including exploiting their residents, to rebuild their wealth.

⁹¹ TNA 11678 Kigoma Annual Reports. 1927 Annual Report Kigoma Province, 19.

⁹² *Ibid.*

take little or no interest in the progress of the collection. This is especially so in the Uha Authority (Kasulu).”⁹³ Two years later, while Bagenal was reviewing Kasulu and Kibondo Native Courts, he chose to ignore irregular cases which involved chiefs punishing headmen, without any legal precedent, ““for failing to bring their people to the Tax Centre on the day appointed for Tax collection.” As he wrote in defense of his questionable actions, “Chiefs and Sub-chiefs, who are doing their utmost to collect the tax, should be supported.”⁹⁴ The British also expected that chiefs would suggest uses for the funds collected, but local officials record very little engagement. When asked what proposals Kasulu’s leaders made for change during his tenure there, DC Leakey responded “Nothing at all. They were entirely disinterested in everything.”⁹⁵ *Baami* were also supposed to understand that their role in collecting taxes was part and parcel of their larger duty to serve the people. Bagenal’s successor, Francis Bagshawe, harangued three of the area’s *baami* in a 1931 public meeting for their failure to understand and absorb the colonial vision for their leadership role. ADC John Griffiths recorded that, after threatening the *baami* with removal for not doing their work – which he specified as a lack of tax collection – Bagshawe then asked them catechism-like questions about leadership, in which he stated a principle and then expected the *baami* to give him this same principle back as an answer. He began with an exhortation that they were supposed to be the servants of the people. He then asked each *mwami* whom the chiefs served. One, *Mwami Biessa*, answered that the chiefs were the servants of “the chief” which

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 16.

⁹⁴ TNA 13634 Native Courts Ordinance 1929. Provincial Commissioner Bagenal to Chief Secretary, 18 December 1929.

⁹⁵ RH Mss.Afr.s.953 E. A. H. Leakey Papers. Interview of E. A. H. Leakey by John J. Tawney 12 October 1966, 5.

Griffiths took to mean that Biessa did not understand the question. Griffiths records that Bagshawe kept at it, and “on further questioning” Biessa answered that chiefs were the servants of “the Government.” From this account, *Mwami* Biessa missed how collecting taxes from the people was a service to them, but that was Bagshawe’s subtext. Indirect rulers’ relative involvement with tax collection was a singular way in which officials evaluated rulers’ progress in accepting British ideas of responsible government.

British officials also used payment of taxes as a means through which Ha people demonstrated their “responsibilities of citizenship,”⁹⁶ responsibility they were refusing. While on a 1931 tax safari, Griffiths wrote: “It seems I am funny – we are supposed to be running this country for the benefit of the native & we worry like [illegible] about making them pay tax when they should do the worrying, as it is for their benefit.”⁹⁷ Those refusing to comply with their Headmen by paying tax or contributing labor were shirking their responsibilities of citizenship. When tax payment improved, it signified to colonial officials that their methods of administration were working, and that Ha attitudes were changing. By 1929, tax collection had improved, reaching approximating 40% and the PC crowed: “If a better tax collection is an outward and visible signs [sic] of advance then progress may be claimed in no uncertain terms.”⁹⁸ Yet even this improvement was slow progress. In 1931, Griffiths recorded a particularly successful tax safari, one in which he collected payment or arranged for the tax default labor for half of Kasulu’s tax

⁹⁶ George Maclean, “The Relationship Between Economic Development and Rhodesian Sleeping Sickness in Tanganyika Territory,” *Annals of Tropical Medicine and Parasitology* 23.1 (April 1929): 37-46, 41.

⁹⁷ RH Mss.Afr.r.180 John E. S. Griffiths Diary, 4 October 1931.

⁹⁸ TNA 11678 Kigoma Annual Reports. 1929 Annual Report Kigoma Province.

rolls.⁹⁹ By this fundamental measure, colonial officials had little indication that Ha people were transforming rapidly.

Fifty per cent tax compliance was a hollow victory for the Province's officials, and pressures mounted to show greater progress. The worldwide economic Depression in the early 1930s forced colonial officials to become "virtually obsessed with tax collection."¹⁰⁰ Provincial Commissioner Bagshawe urged District Commissioners "to use every possible means to get the tax in, and to get it in, as far as humanly possible, during this financial year," and many resorted to withholding or lowering *baami's* salaries to do so.¹⁰¹ PC Bagshawe decided that what was needed was a consolidation of tax areas into as few as possible, four for Kasulu and six for Kibondo, so that chiefs and sub-chiefs could personally collect tax, and possibly do so while being supervised by the District Commissioner.¹⁰² He changed the workload of Kasulu-based officers in order for them to do virtually no paperwork so that they were free to do frequent touring and participate in tax collection.

Over the course of these intensifications, Ha people experienced greater demands for tax than they had in the past, especially since colonial officials made more frequent use of the improved infrastructure that Ha tax labor had built. In this way, the system of tax collection became a means to its own end: tax default labor created the infrastructure necessary to extract taxes ever more effectively. Officials wrote with satisfaction how a new generation of motorable roads could be used to teach tax defaulters that they were no

⁹⁹ RH Mss.Afr.r.180 John E. S. Griffiths Diary, 12 October 1931.

¹⁰⁰ Lovett, 156-7.

¹⁰¹ TNA 13653 Hut and Poll Tax Kigoma. 15 November 1931 Provincial Commissioner Bagshawe to Chief Secretary, 2. Also see Lovett, 156-7.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 7 September 1931 Provincial Commissioner Bagshawe to Chief Secretary, 1-3.

longer safe from compliance because of their distance from district headquarters. Provincial Commissioner Bagshawe celebrated in his diary that “a few weeks ago 20 miles represented safety, for who would walk 40 to strafe a troublesome villager. They have now found that their 20 miles is only an hour in a lorry!”¹⁰³ The tax-based infrastructure thus succeeded in transforming space by collapsing the time and distance between settlement sites and colonial headquarters. Such a change made colonialism synonymous with taxation for many Ha people, and drove home yet again how tax collection supported the interests of the colonial administration rather than “serving” tax payers. On the British side, though, their improved efforts remained far from satisfactory.

Sleeping Sickness Policy

Sleeping sickness concentration policies offered colonial officials a means by which they could pursue territoriality, taxation, and the civilizing mission in mandated Buha far more effectively. Indeed, in terms of officials’ self-identity, their portrayal of Ha people, and their attempted interventions, sleeping sickness policy reinforced officials’ long held views about their interrelationship with lowland Buha. To begin with, the understanding of the disease and the disease’s ecology harmonized perfectly with colonial officials’ conception of their purpose in the territory. As Kirk Hoppe has argued, pursuing sleeping sickness policies convinced Europeans of the unquestioned benevolence of their actions. They viewed the introduction of science in general and medicine in particular as unimpeachable, a form of “anti-conquest” that was the

¹⁰³ RH Mss.Afr.s.290 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 17 October 1931. Bagshawe commonly used the word “strafe” (presumably from the German word made popular during World War I’s use of airplanes to attack ground troops) in disciplinary contexts. He does not specify what a “strafing” would entail.

appropriate grounding for the legitimacy of the colonial state.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, officials interpreted the ecology of the disease's tsetse fly vector as proof that those suffering from the disease were the appropriate recipients for a broad range of interventions. The Director of Medical and Sanitary Services in Dar es Salaam, Dr. Davey, wrote in 1922 that the disease's vector, the tsetse fly "is as much an evidence of backward civilization and conditions of life as is the practice of witchcraft or the occurrence of typhus fever."¹⁰⁵ Tanganyika's sleeping sickness policies also gave colonial officials – administrators, doctors, agriculture and veterinary specialists – new reasons and means to intervene in Ha life. In particular, colonial doctors found in sleeping sickness policies a way for their medical work to conjoin with the development of Ha people more generally. For their part, sleeping sickness policies enabled administrators to view their work as critically important – so much so that officials commonly portrayed their activities related to sleeping sickness in particularly militaristic terms, casting themselves as commanders of Ha people in a total war effort against an efficient, deadly enemy.

Fighting sleeping sickness was integral to the civilizing mission of colonialism in general and mandates in particular, for the way in which it provided a neat test case for the West's superiority and how the disease affected colonial economies. Sleeping sickness's impact in Central Africa in the early colonial period was profound. Between 1896 and 1908, approximately 700,000 Africans died of sleeping sickness in southern Uganda and northern and eastern Congo, relatively close bordering areas to Kigoma

¹⁰⁴ See Kirk Hoppe, *Lords of the Fly: Sleeping Sickness Control in British East Africa, 1900-1960* (London: Praeger, 2003): 4 and Kirk Hoppe, "Lords of the Fly: Colonial Visions and Revisions of African Sleeping Sickness Environments on Ugandan Lake Victoria, 1906-61," *Africa* 67.1 (1997): 86-105, 88.

¹⁰⁵ D. F. Clyde, *History of the Medical Services of Tanganyika* (Dar es Salaam: Government Press, 1962): 122.

Region.¹⁰⁶ Because the disease made such an impact in colonial Africa, sleeping sickness formed part of the training at Oxford University's Colonial Service Training Course, and caught the imaginations of future officials of Buha: as John Tawney wrote, "for some reason, perhaps a particularly eloquent lecturer on the Course at Oxford, the need to wipe out Sleeping Sickness made a strong impact on me before I had even left England or had had any first-hand experience of this scourge."¹⁰⁷ As an epidemic disease, sleeping sickness forced colonial regimes to prove that their civilizing mission was effective. On the one hand, the disease gave colonial powers a concrete problem to tackle that, they felt, absolutely required Western administrative and scientific interventions. On the other hand, if colonial powers could not stem the tide of this disease, it called into question the efficacy of Western biomedicine. For these reasons, colonial powers poured unprecedented resources into all aspects of the disease's epidemiology – and thus Marynez Lyons characterizes sleeping sickness as "*the colonial disease.*"¹⁰⁸

Such devastating numbers, though, threatened the material foundations of colonialism by reducing the available work force and rendering entire areas unsuitable for economic development. It was received doctrine that the main effect of sleeping sickness in Africa was to limit areas for economic expansion because the disease prevented cattle-keeping and threatened agricultural communities. Such a potential limitation posed a

¹⁰⁶ Juhani Koponen, *Development for Exploitation: German Colonial Policies in Mainland Tanzania, 1884-1914* (Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society, 1995): 475.

¹⁰⁷ RH Mss.Afr.s. 1333(8) John J. Tawney Papers, 3.

¹⁰⁸ See Michael Worboys, "The Comparative History of Sleeping Sickness in East and Central Africa, 1900-1914," *History of Science* 32.1 (1994): 89-102; Helen Tilley, "Ecologies of Complexity: Tropical Environments, African Trypanosomiasis, and the Science of Disease Control in British Colonial Africa, 1900-1914," In *Landscapes of Exposure: Knowledge and Illness in Modern Environments* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004): 21-38; and Marynez Lyons, *The Colonial Disease: A Social History of Sleeping Sickness in Northern Zaire, 1900-1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

fundamental challenge to the mandates system in that developing mandated areas' economies in order to make them economically viable was part of the Mandate. While mandatory powers were not to profit unsuitably from mandated territories, the Permanent Mandates Commission made it clear that they "should not necessarily become a burden."¹⁰⁹ The Colonial Office in London insured that Tanganyika would not become an economic liability by offering the Territory loans, rather than grants, to cover their budgetary shortfalls in the early years, and then insisting on prompt interest payments. By 1927, the first year that Tanganyika balanced its budget, the Territory was over three million pounds in debt and sent over £450,000 to the Exchequer, 20% of its revenue, each year.¹¹⁰ This helps to explain why the British invested far more resources into the ecological dimensions of the disease, such as research on the tsetse fly, than they did into medical dimensions like developing chemotherapies. Finding ways to limit tsetse fly would not only reduce the human incidence of the disease but would open up vast new lands for economic exploitation. C. F. M. Swynnerton, the first director of Tsetse Research in Tanganyika, pursued experiments aimed at attacking the tsetse fly because he proceeded from the "the point of view of those whose direct task it was to advance the natives in civilization and prosperity and help them to develop their continent."¹¹¹ Tsetse research-related funding was forthcoming from the Colonial Development Fund [CDF], and far outstripped that earmarked for medical research. The internal discussion around tsetse versus sleeping sickness medical research is particularly revealing. When

¹⁰⁹ From a 12 April 1927 document by the Permanent Mandates Commission. Quoted in Hibbeln, 84.

¹¹⁰ See Hibbeln, 125-8. He argues that massive debt also served the purpose of making mandates' return to Germany unattractive, as the debt would have to be taken on by the Germans.

¹¹¹ Ann Beck, *A History of the British Medical Administration of East Africa 1900-1950* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970): 119.

Tanganyika Territory's budget shortfall in 1933 threatened concentration work and the Territory applied to the CDF for aid, one doctor reviewing the Territory's request wrote that they ought to support it because "[i]n any case it would be difficult to justify the present large expenditure on tsetse research in the Territory if it could be said that adequate provision was not being made for the treatment of human cases of sleeping sickness."¹¹²

Already impressed by the dangers that sleeping sickness posed, colonial officials in Buha reacted quickly when Dr. George Maclean uncovered cases of sleeping sickness in Kibondo in 1929. He and Dr. H. G. Calwell were assigned to evaluate the disease and propose public health responses in Buha. Maclean drew extensively on his experiences working against the disease in the early 1920s in the Ufipa District of Kigoma Region, south of Buha, to evaluate the prevalence of the disease and then propose solutions. What Maclean, administrative officials, and agricultural experts created in Ufipa became the blueprint for later concentrations in Buha. First identified in Ufipa in 1920-1, trypanosomiasis became epidemic by 1924 and quickly spread to part of Tabora Region, the area bordering Buha to the east.¹¹³ Unable to test and treat all residents effectively, and convinced that preventing future infections by interrupting the tsetse-human contact was key to controlling the disease, Maclean and his collaborators adopted resettlement as the most effective public health response given the colonial state's few resources. With

¹¹² The National Archives of the United Kingdom [PRO] CO 691/128/5 1933 Sleeping Sickness Control. J. Frederick N. Green, Colonial Office to Secretary of Treasury, 27 February 1933, 4. This is nearly a verbatim statement which Dr. Stanton made in his handwritten review notes, dated 27 January 1933.

¹¹³ George Maclean, "History of an Outbreak of Rhodesian Sleeping Sickness in the Ufipa District of Tanganyika Territory with Short Notes on Cases and Treatment," *Annals of Tropical Medicine and Parasitology* 20.4 (17 December 1926): 329-39

the aid of District Commissioner G. W. Hatchell, Maclean induced 18,000 people to move from their homes into seven designated areas which they were then directed to clear of vegetation. Colonial agricultural officials calculated the parameters of an ideal settlement. To create a significant enough clearing of tsetse harboring vegetation, each settlement was to hold at least 1,000 families – between 4,000 and 5,000 people – and include enough fertile land for each family eventually to have sixteen acres in use or in fallow.¹¹⁴ Maclean's 1930 investigation of the disease in the Kibondo lowlands led him to estimate roughly that the incidence in these "bush" villages was likely to be between 10 and 20%. Maclean and Calwell arranged for three dressers to be assigned to the district at the villages of Busunzu, Buyungu, and Bweru under Calwell's supervision,¹¹⁵ while Maclean began to lobby administrative officials to support concentration efforts in the lowlands. Rising infection rates supported their position and spurred officials into action: the 400 cases diagnosed in 1931 in lowland Kibondo grew to over 1,000 new cases by the end of November 1932.¹¹⁶ Assigning dressers was a stop-gap measure, the doctors argued, and only concentrations like those in Ufipa would address both current cases and reduce future ones. What was unique about Buha's concentrations compared to the earlier ones in western Tanganyika was the scale of people involved – British officials would move between 50,000 and 80,000 people into the eleven concentration sites.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ Kirk Hoppe gives a succinct summary of these requirements in *Lords*, 107.

¹¹⁵ I am unsure what is meant by "Buyungu" here, as it is the name of one of the precolonial kingdoms, in the north of Kibondo. Perhaps as in the case of Heru, there is a specific location that also carries the name of the entire kingdom.

¹¹⁶ TNA 19097 Sleeping Sickness Areas in Respect of which Warning Notices have been Issued. Sleeping Sickness Officer Maclean to Director of Medical Services, 9 August 1930 and TNA 10599 Sleeping Sickness General Correspondence. Memo by Dr. Maclean, nd, 2-3.

¹¹⁷ Colonial officials rarely estimated the total number of people involved in concentrations, although they often cite 20,000 taxpayers and their families.

The particular spatial conception of sleeping sickness that medical officials formed of Buha is a key explanation to the methods they adopted, and how it would appeal to Buha's veteran officials. Unlike other British territories afflicted with this disease, medical officials in Buha viewed the entire area, besides the western highlands, as currently or imminently infested with trypanosomiasis. Their adopted methods were not isolation of individual cases, as in southern Sudan and in the Belgian Congo, but rather a broad reordering of settlement patterns to disrupt contact between people and the disease's tsetse fly vector.¹¹⁸ Tsetse-harboring bush was the enemy, and since "the main, and almost the sole, factors that determine what is bush and what is open, is agriculture,"¹¹⁹ the British planned to insure that there was a permanent form of agriculture to create a significant clearing of land. As Dr. George Maclean outlined in July 1933,

Though the disease has not upto [sic] the present been discovered throughout the whole of this population, such areas as are not known to be infected are so situated that infection is inevitable in the near future unless steps are taken to prevent its spread. The only alternatives are the concentration of the population so as to remove them from contact with the fly or de-population... with our present resources the scope of treatment in a scattered population is limited, and in any case as long as patients are exposed to re-infection, treatment alone will not meet the emergency.¹²⁰

As in the southern Sudan "doctors...embraced a spatial conception of infection, seeking to protect a territory, rather than specific individuals, from disease..."¹²¹ To colonial

¹¹⁸ Heather Bell, *Frontiers of Medicine in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1899-1940* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): 137.

¹¹⁹ George Maclean, "Sleeping Sickness Measures in Tanganyika Territory," *The Kenya and East Africa Medical Journal* (1930): 120-6, 120.

¹²⁰ TNA 21709 Sleeping Sickness Concentrations Committee. Fairbairn, "Sleeping Sickness," recorded in 1948 that the survival rate under treatment was 48%.

¹²¹ Bell, 4.

officials, lowland Buha's disease ecology required a spatial reorganization that could directly enact territoriality.

Colonial medical officials not only recognized that increasing population density would change current Ha settlement patterns and political engagement, they saw such change as a necessary goal for containing disease. Dr. H. Fairbairn, who became Sleeping Sickness Officer in 1935, commented that the people who were concentrated were those "who desire to escape from tribal authority and from the restrictions and controls of progressive administration."¹²² Fairbairn, and Dar es Salaam-based Dr. Davey before him, posited that those most vulnerable to sleeping sickness because of their chosen environments and settlement density were necessarily the least economically and politically sophisticated people: "...by the very nature of the disease the people at risk are the most backward natives in the Territory, those who live at a bare subsistence level."¹²³ To colonial officials, this settlement pattern revealed inherent characteristics of lowlanders and accounted for the spread of sleeping sickness and its menace for the future. They posited that as soon as the *Pax Britannica* enabled people to live outside of defense-oriented settlements, lowlanders seized the opportunity to live "comparatively free both of their chief and of the new administration."¹²⁴ People with "a more modern bent" left these dispersed settlements for "more civilized conditions," leaving behind the

¹²² Harold Fairbairn, "Sleeping Sickness in Tanganyika Territory, 1922-1946," *Tropical Diseases Bulletin* 45.1 (1948): 1-17, 9. See also C. W. Hatchell, "An Early 'Sleeping Sickness Settlement' in South-Western Tanganyika," *Tanganyika Notes and Records* 27 (1949): 60-4, 62; Maclean, "Relationship Between Economic Development."

¹²³ Harold Fairbairn, "The Agricultural Problems Posed by Sleeping Sickness Settlements," *East African Agricultural Journal of Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, and Zanzibar* 9.1 (1943): 17-22, 21. For Dr. Davey, see Clyde, 122.

¹²⁴ Maclean, "Relationship Between Economic Development," 41.

least sophisticated and able.¹²⁵ Because such communities lived in a dispersed fashion, practiced shifting agriculture, and frequently entered less settled areas to do honey and salt work, they appeared to consistently refuse any form of progress or even communal cooperation. Their housing was impermanent and therefore “primitive”; there were no signs that they had improved the land or cultivated permanent tree crops; there was no collective wild animal protection; they had little intercourse with the outside world and so “little opportunity to acquire new practical knowledge” or to have marketing opportunities for their agriculture; and they could keep no cattle, which were also affected by trypanosomiasis. In such conditions, “[p]rogress...is almost impossible and it is even doubtful if a tribe, bred in the past to more communal conditions, can maintain their numerical strength living as isolated families.”¹²⁶ Worse yet, living as they did, they created the possibility of an epidemic outbreak of the disease by increasing contact between tsetse and humans and living in population densities just high enough to sustain infection. Colonial officials needed to “re-organise the mode of life of forest communities” by forcing their production to change along “more modern lines.”¹²⁷ The enactment of the civilizing mission was thus presented as a public health requirement.

Resettled Ha communities were to become havens of health, prosperity, and progress. Once moved, residents would keep sleeping sickness infections at bay through their yearly agricultural activities, household fuel and building supply needs, and compulsory annual brush clearance around the settlement. The medical department

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 42.

¹²⁶ Maclean, “Sleeping Sickness Memorandum,” 8.

¹²⁷ PRO CO 691/90/11 Report by Dr. Maclean, 31 December 1927, 4-5. Hoppe, *Lords*, 17 notes that British officials also viewed Ugandan people’s economic behaviors as a contributing factor to their vulnerability to disease.

would supply a dispensary and tribal dresser to each concentration, with medicines paid for by the Native Treasury. Christian missions, particularly the White Fathers and the Church Missionary Society, would be offered plots in the concentrations to build schools which were then subsidized by the government. Agricultural officers formulated schedules for crop rotations that involved both food and cash crops, while veterinary officials worked on plans to introduce ankole cattle owned by the Native Authority. The administration would build courthouses and market areas, complete with plots for shops run by Arabs or South Asians. Officials imagined that exposure to these facilities would breed broader cultural changes to Ha people. PC Bagshawe noted how, in the Tabora and Ufipa concentrations, women's new material desires became a motor for change:

...the women of a community soon become discontented with the rags and skins which sufficed them when buried out of sight in the bush, and their desire for competitive ornamentation stimulates them and their men to extra exertion, with excellent results.¹²⁸

The final blow to tsetse habitat would come when concentrations' population growth required that settlements expand in all directions – Buha's farmers would “reconquer” the land they relinquished. As Griffiths would write, “concentration appears to answer the purpose in that the civilizing process can be regulated.”¹²⁹

Territoriality would be fully enacted in the administration of concentrations. Dr. George Maclean, the Sleeping Sickness Officer in charge of concentrations in 1933, noted that, based purely on medical considerations, officials

should concentrate the populations of all sleeping sickness areas in one great centre situated on established lines of communication, for transport is the ruling

¹²⁸ RH Mss.Afr.s.303 Bagshawe Papers “Western Province. Annual Report for the Year, 1932,” 19.

¹²⁹ Griffiths, “The Aba-Ha,” 75.

factor in forming a self-supporting unit. From a political point of view, however, there are grave objections to evacuating large areas for economic reasons, for by so doing we would create large uncontrolled areas into which disaffected members of the community would drift, and, further the people would not willingly agree to leave their own tribal areas.¹³⁰

The political reasons appear to have been concerns that residents would move beyond the reach of administrators, as well as indirect rulers raising objections to such potential loss of population. *Baami*, apparently, were reassured:

no chief would be asked to move his people outside his own boundary. Though in some cases it was impossible to apply the latter ruling to sub-chiefs, it was possible to leave each of them with his own people within a defined boundary. What was to happen to the minor headmen was left to the chiefs to decide...¹³¹

Colonial officials' reasoning indicates that, so long as people remained within their "tribal" areas, the underlying premise was that the "exact environmental locations and political authorities were interchangeable" – a colonial logic noted by Kirk Hoppe for Uganda.¹³² In cases where there were too few people of a particular African authority to constitute their own concentration, officials would group the residents from two jurisdictions "in one area through which runs the tribal boundary, the country remains administered by the Native Authorities, who are then responsible for seeing that no one lives outside the settlement."¹³³

Far from the image of a frustrated Moses, making little progress and drawing on inadequate support, sleeping sickness policy allowed administrative officials to cast themselves as commanders of Ha troopers in the war on the tsetse, so critical was their

¹³⁰ TNA 21709 Sleeping Sickness Concentrations Committee.

¹³¹ Francis Bagshawe, "Sleeping Sickness Concentrations in Uha," Appendix VI, *Report to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Tanganyika Territory for the Year 1933* (London: Government Printers, 1934): 139.

¹³² Hoppe, *Lords*, 88.

¹³³ Fairbairn, "Agricultural Problems Posed," 18.

task. The specter of past “casualties” to the disease in Central Africa lent great urgency to the task. The framing of sleeping sickness policy as a militaristic campaign was typical of the general British colonial approach to health in Central and East Africa. As Megan Vaughan has pointed out, rather than creating a full-scale medical organization in these colonies, “the public health of these colonies was addressed piecemeal, through sporadic, militaristic ‘campaigns’ to prevent or treat one epidemic disease or another.”¹³⁴ Such a formulation of sleeping sickness policy cast Ha people as foot soldiers in a war, whose main duty was to obey orders given to them. On one end of the spectrum of obedience, refusing to comply with settlements was considered “desertion” by officials.¹³⁵ On the other end, officials viewed Ha obedience as participation in “a strategic retreat” from which they would one day move out and “reconquer” territory ceded to the tsetse fly.¹³⁶ Movement into sleeping sickness concentrations was not “a mere ignominious retreat, rather it was a tactical manoeuvre to enable him to take up a better defensive position.”¹³⁷ As in a total war effort, British commanders required obedience of a kind that was not expected in normal administration. The link between the necessity of intervention, even if using means that went against the theory of indirect rule, and sleeping sickness is not articulated but nonetheless revealed powerfully in one of John Tawney’s memoirs:

If the idea of command took priority in my mind [over less imperialistic methods], it did not diminish the consciousness of an obligation to improve the lot

¹³⁴ Megan Vaughan, *Curing Their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1991): 39.

¹³⁵ Hoppe, *Lords*, 119.

¹³⁶ J. P. Moffett “A Strategic Retreat from the Tsetse Fly,” *Tanganyika Notes and Records* 7 (1939): 35-38, 35.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

of the people to be commanded (for some reason, perhaps a particularly eloquent lecturer on the Course at Oxford, the need to wipe out Sleeping Sickness made a strong impact on me before I had even left England or had had any first-hand experience of this scourge).¹³⁸

Colonial officials felt empowered both by the urgency and details of sleeping sickness concentration policy.

The appeal of sleeping sickness concentrations to Buha's colonial officials not only derived from past years of frustration but was also rooted in how it enabled them to imagine new futures for the region. What sleeping sickness concentrations offered to colonial officials in administration and in the medical, veterinary, and agricultural departments was, by concentrating population, a more efficient means to intervene into Ha people's lives. Contact with and supervision by European officials was accepted as the most effective way to induce change, a necessity impossible to meet if people lived in a dispersed fashion. In colonial thought, simplification of Ha settlement patterns would lead to enhanced state capacities and a vision of increased social services.¹³⁹ As one veterinary official wrote to the Chief Secretary, sleeping sickness concentrations not only provided the most effective means to combat the disease and an increased ability to control these areas, but they also provided "the facility with which social services can be extended to meet the needs of the people."¹⁴⁰ A year after the bulk of Buha's concentrations were made, the Governor issued an official minute to all administrative personnel on population concentration policy. The general guideline was that

¹³⁸ RH Mss.Afr.s. 1333(8) and 1758 John J. Tawney Papers, 4.

¹³⁹ James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998): 3 outlines the simplification-increased state capacity nexus of high modernist states. See chapter 3 for a full discussion of the suitability of Scott's theories to sleeping sickness concentrations.

¹⁴⁰ TNA 31351 Compulsory Resettlement of Africans, General. Director of Veterinary Services to Chief Secretary, 31 December 1943.

compulsory resettlement was only allowable when the colonial state's capacities were tested beyond their limit. Cited examples included sanitation and hygiene in dense urban areas, endemic diseases beyond the state's control, famine conditions, pervasive lawbreaking, and "the prevalence of tsetse fly, necessitating bush clearance and concentration in fly-free areas."¹⁴¹ Resettling such populations brought developments beyond the control of the colonial state back within the orbit of colonial influence.

So attractive was such enhanced administrative control over population and disease that there were movements in the 1930s and 1940s amongst officials to create resettlement programs even when one of these issues was not a factor. In 1935, Bagshawe initiated a campaign to resettle an area he and others called "the Southern Wilderness" of Kigoma District, the Tongwe, Ubende, and Buholoholo areas to the south of Buha. In forwarding the scouting reports that District Commissioner B. W. Savory conducted in these areas, Bagshawe attempted to make public health prominent in his argument for compulsory resettlement:

Whilst [Savory] has not, apparently, found much sleeping sickness, it is only necessary to glance at the vital statistics quoted in the second section of each report to realize that to leave the people as they are, at present, is to condemn them to extinction within a comparatively short space of time. I am personally quite satisfied that it is our duty to concentrate them.... It must be understood that, as they are, normal administration cannot be applied to them. Without an increase of staff and considerable extra expense the scattered population cannot be reached, except by spasmodic and occasional efforts which have no lasting effect. Disease must spread unchecked, and the wilderness will remain a constant source of infection for other tribes.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ TNA 22494 Policy Concentration 1934-5. Folios 5 and 6 are an official Minute from the Governor, dated 10 September 1934.

¹⁴² TNA 22805 Concentration of Tribal Areas Tongwe, Ubende, etc. Provincial Commissioner Bagshawe to Chief Secretary, 13 February 1935. Bagshawe was even bold enough to cite the Governor's past enthusiasm for resettlement as a general policy, which the Governor showed at a January 1933 meeting with Bagshawe. Bagshawe implied that the Governor viewed sleeping sickness as a means to an end, and not the only justification for resettlement: "His Excellency then raised the larger questions of general policy

While whole-heartedly agreeing with Bagshawe that resettlement would benefit the people involved, the central government rejected his proposal because it was based more on “administrative and economic grounds” than that of public health. But Bagshawe was not unique in his desire to employ resettlement. At a conference of Tanganyika’s Provincial Commissioners in 1945, the PC of Southern Province wished to resettle some of his areas’ residents to more fertile soils in the Province, but was told that only persuasion, not compulsion, could be used to move residents. His brother PCs agreed wholeheartedly with the notion of forcing residents out of lands the administration deemed to be “bad” and into “more productive ones,” but Secretariat officials would not concur.¹⁴³

Conclusion

Although sleeping sickness allowed Buha’s officials to pursue their vision of improving Ha people’s “condition of life” in sleeping sickness concentration through “the introduction of schools and hospitals, instruction in better farming methods and wider outlook,”¹⁴⁴ these goals went largely unmet. For at least their first fifteen years of existence, the colonial state was unable to invest the resources necessary to enact their policies. To begin with, early colonial states were not predisposed to commit their scarce resources to major development projects. Central governments had few resources to

in relation to sleeping sickness. He pointed out that, quite apart from sleeping sickness, the concentration of population into centres throughout large areas of this Territory was a desirable aim, and its accomplishment might be accelerated by the special necessities of the sleeping sickness menace.” B. W. Savory’s three reports are available in bound book in the reading room of TNA, entitled “Report of a Tour to Investigate Conditions in the _____ Area of Kigoma District”.

¹⁴³ TNA 31351 Compulsory Resettlement of Africans General. Extract from Proceedings of Provincial Commissioners’ Conference 9 July 1945.

¹⁴⁴ Hatchell, “An Early,” 62. See also Clyde, 123 and TNA 11678 Kigoma Annual Reports. 1927 Annual Report Kigoma Province, 50.

draw on, and central government officials did not necessarily view their responsibilities as to include providing medical or educational services to African populations.¹⁴⁵ Moreover, even with defined projects like sleeping sickness concentrations, the colonial state failed to “commit resources in a comprehensive or long-term way to [sleeping sickness] settlements.”¹⁴⁶ The hope was that private investment or local market forces would provide most of the resources that they required, the colonial state providing the framework in which they could be established and prosper. Colonial-influenced agriculture would give the common people “more crops and therefore more money” to invest in further projects which officials would convince people to participate in through propaganda.¹⁴⁷ All of these projects required Ha participation for success, but officials were never able to gain compliance in any systematic way.

No longer concerned merely with collecting taxes, meting out criminal justice, distributing seeds, and building roads, Buha’s colonial officials in the 1930s had a new purpose which tapped into their deepest sense of usefulness and service. This was not merely because they were confronting a dangerous disease whose successful defeat demonstrated to officials the honor and humanitarianism of their work in Tanganyika; it was also because the means they employed to do so allowed for far more pervasive interventions. But, with policies that invested very few colonial resources and required Ha participation for success, few of the radical changes which colonial officials envisioned materialized. Far from discouraging officials, though, frequent turnover in the

¹⁴⁵ Vaughan, 39.

¹⁴⁶ Hoppe, *Lords*, 39.

¹⁴⁷ Fairbairn, “Agricultural Problems Posed,” 22. These projects were identified as better housing and improved hygiene.

region meant a constant stream of new officials entering Buha, each one newly-inspired by how concentrations enabled him to imagine how he would bring the civilizing mission to Buha.

Chapter 2

“The whole country was on fire, the whole forest”: Creating Buha’s Sleeping Sickness Concentrations, 1933-1941

Introduction

The removal and resettlement of tens of thousands of Ha people into sleeping sickness concentrations beginning in 1933 holds an important place in colonial writings and in the memories of Ha elders. Resettlement work compelled colonial officials to publish works on Buha as nothing had before. In sharp contrast to other regions where officials produced book-length ethnographies, Buha’s officials only wrote four short articles on different ethnographic topics before concentration efforts. Officials’ writings concerning sleeping sickness concentrations, though, constitute a veritable archive: there are over fifteen published accounts by colonial medical and administrative officers in which officials delineated their involvement in various dimensions of Buha’s eleven sleeping sickness concentrations. In these documents intended for public distribution, colonial officials emphasized the public health purpose of the concentrations, praised officials’ success in their creation, and highlighted how British efforts to include Ha input in planning resulted in their voluntary participation. One report included in Tanganyika Territory’s 1933 League of Nations Annual Report offers a succinct summary of these themes, calling the movement “necessary, successful, and unopposed.”¹ Ha elders narrate a very different process and offer competing narratives of the move that call into question the premises of the British policy as well as its means. Far from the colonial

¹ Francis Bagshawe, “Concentrations in Uha” Appendix VI *Report to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of the Tanganyika Territory for the Year 1933* (London: Government Printers, 1934): 138-42. Unlike many colonial reports in which prior ones were simply copied and collated, very little of the content of this appendix appears elsewhere in colonial records or Bagshawe’s personal papers.

portrayal of lowland Buha as a helplessly “disease-ridden” landscape, elders narrate a resource-rich land in which people relied on clear protocols when periodic problems, like outbreaks of disease, occurred. Although far less cohesive than colonial accounts of the creation of sleeping sickness concentrations, I argue that Ha elders’ memories of these events also offer portrayals of the relationship between Buha’s residents and the colonial state. In these memories, state officials’ reasons are in turn unknowable, baffling, or a ruse, but there is wide and significant agreement that whatever the *reason* for the concentration policy, officials enforced it with unprecedented coercive power. But the arc of these stories is not confined to their recounting of and reaction to colonial actions. The fundamental, insistent theme is of the time of trouble and chaos, *ugwimo*, that elders and their families endured during removal and resettlement; the circumstances from which they built new lives.

This chapter examines the competing narratives of the creation of sleeping sickness concentrations to examine how they diverge on the key issue of the character of colonial rule in Buha. Both present a portrait of this relationship: British writers portray their capabilities, their systems of knowledge and of administration, as a sign of their singular expertise and the reason why their motives were pure. Ha elders, on the other hand, recount how British officials never made their policy believable, but instead propagated it by irrepressible force. This ushered in communally experienced chaos, *ugwimo*, for thousands of people from an area of significant economic and spiritual resources. Yet an examination of the contingent process that created Buha’s sleeping sickness concentrations from 1933-1941 unsettles both of these accounts. Creating

concentrations was never the simple implementation of an expert plan, nor the entirely coercive exercise of overwhelming force. Instead, creating sleeping sickness concentrations was contentious, an ongoing process during which Ha people, especially local rulers, wrung concessions or fled to new areas untouched by concentration policy. Throughout the concentration process, British officials had to confront the limits of their knowledge and capacity to force Ha leaders and residents to comply with policy. Instead of fully resettling the population of eastern Buha, officials' actions instead unsettled a significant number of its residents and ushered in a series of population dispersals. To examine this process at its extremes, first I examine the formation of the two concentrations for which there are the most oral and written sources. Then I turn to the histories of three hotly contested areas in lowland Buha where Ha pressure combined with British officials' many priorities to alter their intention to forcibly remove people.

“Necessary, Successful, and Unopposed”: British Narratives of Removal and Resettlement

With the discovery of sleeping sickness in lowland Buha and its rapid increase in the early 1930s, officials in Dar es Salaam and at the regional headquarters in Tabora decided on concentration and first announced the policy publicly in Kibondo in October 1932. At this point “propaganda commenced” amongst African leaders in the affected areas.² The vast majority of the approximately 20,000 families (about 65,000 people) slated to move in 1933 were from the lowland areas of three eastern kingdoms:

² *Ibid.*, 138-9.

Muhambwe, Bushingo, and Luguru, although some people from the Heru and Buyungu areas were also involved.³




Figure 2.1 This detail from a map included in the 1936 League of Nations Annual Report shows the sites of concentrations with faint red dotted lines around them. From north to south they are Kakonko, Nyaviyumbu [sic], Kafura [sic], Heru, Makeri [sic], Muhanga, Rungwi [sic]. Kagera, Bweru and Buhoro are not shown as concentrations, for reasons that are unclear.

³A note on place names: the kingdoms of Bushingo and Buyungu have several variations: Bushingu, Ushingu, Bushingo, Ushingo, and Buyungu or Uyungu. Sites of former concentrations also have had some name changes and spelling variations. The current village of Kumhasha is in the area where the Nyavyumbu concentration was placed. Few people outside of the area know the name “Nyavyumbu” today. As to the pronunciation and spelling of place names, the village of Kifura was frequently spelled “Kafura” in colonial documents. Additionally, most Ha people pronounce “Nyavyumbu” “Nyabhuyumbu”. In an interview, Ladislaus Chanda Kipfumu explained that the contemporary spellings of many Buha place-names, and therefore their pronunciations by outsiders, represent the retention of British mispronunciations. Examples given were two of the most important bodies of water in the region: the Malagarasi River, which more properly would be “Mlagalazi”, and the Moyowosi River/Swamp, which Ha people pronounce as “Muyovosi”. There are likely some regional variations, however. Interview of Warungendanye Kagoma 22 October 2007 Kumshindwi Village.

Colonial administrators and medical officials' accounts of the move in 1933 are complicated by their intended audiences. Writings intended for public audiences, like the League of Nations Annual Report and in publications like *Tanganyika Notes and Records* and various international medical journals are the most cohesive and laudatory. Written months and sometimes years after the fact, they are crisp narratives of a series of events, starting with logical premises for the move, detailing preparation, and ending in success. In writing public documents, colonial medical and administrative officials crafted a straight-forward and cohesive narrative of the formation of concentrations. It is in these documents that Bagshawe's formulation of Buha's concentrations as "necessary, successful, and unopposed" found its clearest iteration. But these recountings are not merely summaries of events; they do the critical discursive work of justifying the creation of concentrations by the way in which they portray the interrelationship between 'average' Ha people and colonial officials. In their accounts, colonial officials place hapless, vulnerable Ha people in contrast to their own efficiency, expertise, and power to protect.

Necessary

Absolute certainty in the necessity of sleeping sickness concentrations suffused the public writings of colonial officials. So central was the necessity of concentrations, in fact, that officials rarely considered alternatives. After summarizing the threat that sleeping sickness posed in Buha, the chairman of the Sleeping Sickness Committee concluded that "There is no alternative to concentration, and preparations have been pushed forward...for the movement into fly free concentrations of all the people most

urgently in need of protection.”⁴ When writing of the necessity of concentrations, though, colonial administrative and medical officials portrayed themselves as benevolent experts bringing the best of western medicine and governmental capacities to help Ha people who were neither able to understand their danger nor to “protect” themselves.

Dr. George Maclean was the foremost architect of Tanganyika’s sleeping sickness settlement policy, and wrote of the peculiar way in which Europeans were inadvertently responsible for helping trypanosomiasis to morph from an endemic to an epidemic disease. Within three years of his arrival in 1921, Maclean was involved in sleeping sickness work to the north and south of Buha, and he was officially made the medical officer in charge of the disease, the Sleeping Sickness Officer [SSO], in 1926.⁵ It was during these activities that he created his theory of the spread of the disease as an unintended consequence of the peace and freedom that European rule brought to Tanganyika’s Africans. He believed that trypanosomiasis had been endemic in the past and became epidemic when the advent of colonial rule allowed some Africans to found new, more dispersed settlements. According to his theory – largely garnered while interviewing chiefs in Tabora, Kahama, Sumbwanga, Musoma, and Biharamulo between 1925 and 1928 – unsettled conditions in East Africa since the mid-nineteenth century had drastically changed settlement patterns and human and domestic animal densities. These

⁴ TNA 21709 Sleeping Sickness Concentration Committee. Afternoon meeting in Tabora of the Sleeping Sickness Committee, 17 July 1933, 1.

⁵ Dr. Maclean was the Sleeping Sickness Officer until 1935 when Dr. Harold Fairbairn took over. He was succeeded in 1949 by Dr. F. I. C. Apted. This position was sometimes called the Sleeping Sickness Specialist.

changes enabled the proliferation of tsetse flies and increased human contact with them.⁶ Outside influences including slave raiding, caravan trade, invasions by the Ngoni people from the south, wars with the powerful Mirambo of Unyanyembe to the southeast, and German “pacification” campaigns all motivated people who had formerly lived in small villages to form large, stockaded villages. There, residences were enclosed by fences and those fences were surrounded by agricultural clearings, with two important consequences. To begin with, dense settlement meant the abandonment of large tracts of land which returned to bush and became good tsetse habitat. But the agricultural clearings that surrounding settlements also created an effective barrier against human-fly contact by destroying the vegetation that gave tsetse flies their required shade. Once the German administration introduced law and order, however, these dense settlements began to break up and population decreased, as people were forced or chose to move to far away colonial economic centers or decided to form new, smaller communities in uninhabited areas. World War I further exacerbated these conditions as inhabitants of western Tanganyika were unsettled by both German and Belgian forces kidnapping porters and rounding up food and livestock.⁷ The stability brought by the British was the crowning event that brought increasingly smaller communities in greater contact with the tsetse fly – in fact, Maclean posited that population densities were just large enough to maintain an epidemic

⁶ University of Glasgow [UG] DC 73/18 George Maclean Diary 1924-6, UG DC 73/21 “Notes from Sleeping Sickness Diary 1926,” UG DC 73/3 George Maclean Diary, 1926-7, and UG DC 73/5 George Maclean Diary, 1928-30.

⁷ See George Maclean, “The Relationship between Economic Development and Rhodesian Sleeping Sickness in Tanganyika Territory,” *Annals of Tropical Medicine and Parasitology* 23.1 (April 1929): 37-46, 41, and UG DC 73/39 George Maclean Papers, “Health and Disease in East Africa,” nd, 6. Maclean may have been influenced by other British theorists who thought that the *Pax Britannia* had helped to cause the 1900-1905 trypanosomiasis outbreak in Uganda by allowing dense settlements to break up.

but not large enough for their agricultural clearings to act as an effective tsetse barrier. In consequence, infection rates of the disease skyrocketed.

If the *Pax Britannica* had helped to spread the disease, then surely it had the means and the obligation to check it. The answer, for Maclean, was to return populations to the dense settlements that Africans had adopted in the past. Despite diary coverage of Dr. Maclean's work in Buha in 1925 and 1933, there is no evidence that he made a similar investigation of past settlement patterns in Buha. The available evidence, however, does not bear out his theory for eastern Buha. Henry Morton Stanley passed through a part of Luguru in lowland Buha in November 1871, and he noted *the absence* of the stockaded villages that Dr. Maclean imagined had populated the countryside. Despite the absence of stockade villages, Stanley wrote that "The Wahha were evidently living in perfect security."⁸ Stanley described the average "village" as consisting of 4-20 homes, indicating that these people mainly lived in small, patrilineal family clusters, which is how elders recall settlement patterns from the 1920s and 1930s.⁹ Nevertheless, the British wrote that what they were bringing to Buha was not something new, but a revival of an African method of protection – albeit protection from human conflicts – they wrote of sleeping sickness concentrations as a "*re-establishment* of large, compact

⁸ Henry Morton Stanley, *How I Found Livingston* (New York: Arno, 1970): 386. We can identify this as Luguru because Stanley met a leader named Kimenye, who was identified as the grandfather of *Mwami* Kimenye of Luguru. See the Bodleian Library of Commonwealth and African Studies at Rhodes House [RH] Mss.Afr.s.503 John Rooke-Johnston Papers, 1940 Handing Over Report Kigoma District, 27. Baumann passed through northern Bushingo in 1892 and noted that people "lived in small villages." Cited in C. H. B. Grant, "Uha in Tanganyika Territory," *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society* (1925) 411-20, 415.

⁹ Interview of Makupi Motuta 28 May 2009, Kumhasha.

settlements.”¹⁰ Without such intervention, Maclean argued, populations would continue to decrease and 180,000 square miles of western Tanzania would eventually become uninhabited.¹¹

With Maclean’s theory as their guiding principle,¹² British medical and administrative officials viewed the threat of sleeping sickness as a public health emergency. These officials, in turn, considered public health interventions as an absolutely unquestioned duty of state officials, offering residents care and, especially, “protection.” Some medical officials used a comparison between Ha people and slum dwellers in Britain to underscore that there was nothing unusual or particularly ‘colonial’ about this campaign; it was simply what a state *must* do.¹³ Several pages of PC Bagshawe’s 1932 Annual Provincial Report serve as a manifesto for creating sleeping sickness concentrations in Buha. He wrote, “our first duties are to *protect* the sound and to heal the sick” and then noted that if people were treated with the drug Bayer 205 within eight days of the contraction of the disease, there was an almost perfect cure rate, while those whose treatment was delayed had a much higher chance of dying. But the twenty-six health centers in the Province – most of them created in the last few years – were inadequate for fulfilling these primary “duties”. With the disease spreading in the lowlands amongst people who lived in a dispersed fashion, “we cannot dream of treating successfully a fraction of the people who are liable to become infected.” Moreover,

¹⁰ Harold Fairbairn, “The Agricultural Problems Posed by Sleeping Sickness Settlements,” *East African Agricultural Journal of Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar* 9.1 (1943): 17-22, 17. Emphasis mine.

¹¹ George Maclean, “Memorandum on Sleeping Sickness” (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1934).

¹² Bagshawe recorded a meeting with Dr. Maclean in 1931 as the time when “at long last” he finally understood “why concentrations are necessary and how they work.” See RH Mss.Afr.s.260 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 26 November 1931.

¹³ TNA 31731 Resettlement as a Preventive Measure. Director of Medical Services to Chief Secretary, 20 January 1943.

medical officials like Dr. Maclean emphasized that treatment alone would not stop infections because treated patients would be re-exposed to infections in their former homes.¹⁴ Bagshawe's conclusion to these premises, agreed to without any dissent, followed swiftly: the only solution, the only way to fulfill their duty to "protect" populations under their charge was to force a radical reordering of settlement and labor patterns. "They must be extracted from the bush and made to live in concentrations where bush clearing keeps the fly at a safe distance." Bagshawe was quick to emphasize that this action had precedent following outbreaks of sleeping sickness in other districts, in Tabora, Kahama, Nzega, and Ufipa.¹⁵

Part of the necessity of sleeping sickness work was that, to the British, Ha people did not understand the threat of sleeping sickness in terms that would lead to effective responses. Because Ha people lacked a western scientific-based understanding of the disease's ecology and insect vector, Ha people could not hope to respond to the disease effectively. Dr. Maclean and PC Bagshawe were both aware that Ha and British conceptions of the disease were quite different, the difference centering on the tsetse fly. Bagshawe wrote that "...few, if any, believed that sleeping sickness was caused by fly: they had always lived amongst fly and the disease had only recently appeared." Because British justifications revolved entirely around controlling human-tsetse contact, "their disbelief, quite sincere, made our plans seem unreasonable, and many said emphatically

¹⁴ Dr. Maclean expressed this belief in a series of publications and at the 17 July 1933 meeting in Tabora of the Sleeping Sickness Committee. See TNA 21709 Sleeping Sickness Concentration Committee.

¹⁵ RH Mss.Afr.s.303 Francis Bagshawe Papers, Western Province Annual Report for the Year, 1932, 17-9. Emphasis mine.

that they would greatly prefer to take their chance in their homes.”¹⁶ To British officials, this preference was a self-imposed death sentence. Worse yet, if Ha people were not forced to resettle in a manner and in a location that made prompt detection and treatment possible, it would complicate officials’ ability to convince Ha people of the usefulness of western biomedicine. If people were not treated immediately, then the chances of a full cure were unlikely. Those dying under treatment “do not help to convince his fellows of the efficacy of our methods of treatment.”¹⁷ Such people required help for the sake of their present safety and future comprehension of the benevolence of British knowledge and methods.

Successful

Officials attributed success in the creation of concentrations as a result of their careful planning. In their descriptions of the success of creating concentrations, colonial officials emphasized their mastery not only of different technical fields such as agriculture or medicine, but their unique ability to coordinate expertise from all of these fields and apply it in a way that would be acceptable to Ha people.

District Agricultural officials began preparing plans for food crop rotations, the use of groundnuts as a cash crop, and the introduction of cattle into concentrations. But like officials in other branches of the colonial government, agriculture officials collaborated with colleagues outside of their branch and had to consider issues beyond which crops were suitable for a given area. The Director of Agriculture noted that it was

¹⁶ Bagshaw, “Concentrations in Uha,” 139, also cited in Wagner, 194. See also RH Mss.Afr.s.391 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 7 August 1933 where Ha people identified sleeping sickness as “somi ya mangu”.

¹⁷ J. P. Moffett, “A Strategic Retreat from Tsetse Fly: Uyowa and Bugomba Concentrations 1937,” *Tanganyika Notes and Records* 7 (1939): 35-8, 35.

not just his officials who were creating a plan for introducing cash crops in concentrations, but that they were in consultation with PC Bagshawe, Dr. Maclean, and the Secretary for Native Affairs while preparing them.¹⁸ Moreover, just as important as determining the suitability of groundnuts for Buha's concentrations was making arrangements so that planting could begin as soon as people moved in and that they would find workable transportation and a good price for their first year's crop. Not doing so would doom the plan before it began, and the Director of Agriculture and PC Bagshawe both worked to insure that transportation and a market would be available.¹⁹

In writing of their processes of planning, officials created mathematical formulae and timetables for the activities required to create a successful concentration. Medical officials like Dr. Maclean and Dr. Fairbairn constantly referred to the agricultural requirements of concentrations in their writings and work on concentrations, figures they derived from combining the infection rates of the disease that the medical department collected and the agricultural department's recommendations. It was the combination of these separate calculations that allowed officials to arrive at the minimal requirements for concentrations: at least 1,000 families had to live in them with an initial 4 acres of agriculture per family and enough room to expand a system of fallow that would give each family 16 acres.²⁰ Permanent, successful agriculture would spell the success of concentrations as disease prevention, and so it was medical officials rather than

¹⁸ TNA 21709 Sleeping Sickness Concentration Committee. Meeting of the Sleeping Sickness Committee, 17 July 1933.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ George Maclean, "Sleeping Sickness Measures in Tanganyika Territory," *The Kenya and East Africa Medical Journal* 7 (1930): 120-6. George Maclean, "Memorandum on Sleeping Sickness." Kirk Arden Hoppe, *Lords of the Flies: Sleeping Sickness Control in British East Africa* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 107 summarizes these.

agricultural officers who wrote and published about the agricultural aspects of sleeping sickness concentrations.²¹ So confident were medical officials in their agricultural knowledge that PC Bagshawe, the highest colonial official in Western Province, could admit in his diary to being baffled by the figures, and yet fully trust their reliability.²²

Ten years after Buha's concentration, Dr. Harold Fairbairn, Dr. Maclean's successor as the Sleeping Sickness Officer, drew on Tanganyika's experience with concentrations to schematize the process of creating successful concentrations into twelve steps. The first seven, which were concerned with their creation, and can be summarized as follows:

- 1 Determine number of people involved through tax figures, using 3.3 as multiplier per taxpayer to derive the entire population to be moved.
- 2 Ask locals to propose sites near their rulers where each taxpayer could receive sixteen acres.
- 3 Sleeping Sickness surveyor, along with elders, surveys the area to identify a suitable site with sufficient water and acreage.
- 4 Propose the site to African leaders and residents; majority vote decides.
- 5 Sleeping Sickness surveyor sites a boundary that allows each taxpayer and his family enough room for an initial eight acres of cultivation; surveyor supervises the creation of tracks in original areas to several central "collecting" points; surveyor supervises the creation of tracks in the new areas for deposit points; surveyor issues gunny sacks to residents for their harvest; surveyor supervises the trucking of household goods, elders, and children to new site.
- 6 Chief divides new area between headmen according to population.
- 7 People build homes and clear bush in their areas.²³

Relying on experts in other fields, Dr. Fairbairn could sketch out ideal plans well outside of his own area of expertise.

²¹ Also see Fairbairn, "Agricultural Problems Posed," and Harold Fairbairn, "Sleeping Sickness in Tanganyika Territory, 1922-1946," *Tropical Diseases Bulletin* 45.1 (1948): 1-17.

²² RH Mss.Afr.s.391 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 9 April 1933. Bagshawe took down Dr. Maclean's mathematical formula for calculating the area needed for some of Buha's concentrations.

²³ Fairbairn, "Agricultural Problems Posed," 18.

Unopposed

The final axis of the British public account of removing and resettling Ha people was how the officers won willing Ha participation. Of the three themes, though, this was the least emphasized in public accounts, undoubtedly in part because the local officials who had been involved in concentrations' creation were well aware that there had been Ha resistance. Nonetheless, these colonial writers used this idea of willing Ha participation to emphasize their liberal relationship to Ha people. They highlight how they incorporated Ha people into the process of choosing sites, how concentrations presented minimal disruptions to Ha peoples' lives, and finally how Ha people retained the ability to choose their future homes.

PC Bagshawe and District Officer [DO] J. E. S. Griffiths'²⁴ writings emphasized how incorporating Ha people into the process and minimizing early disruptions to "tribal" life preempted any significant dissent. Bagshawe wrote that resettlement policies were first announced nearly a year in advance, in Kibondo in October 1932, "to the chiefs and people" and then, presumably more widely because "propaganda commenced."²⁵ Later, Griffiths wrote that Ha people "were asked *through their chiefs* to choose areas in which they would like to settle."²⁶ Both writers emphasized how movement would not disrupt the territorial boundaries within kingdoms:

[e]ach chieftainship was kept distinct as indeed was each sub-chieftainship....a proposed new settlement was in each case in a chief's own country....This may

²⁴ J. E. S. "Jock" Griffiths was one of three District Officers and District Commissioners actually in charge of supervising the forced removals in Buha. The others were H. H. Armstrong and W. F. Page. Griffiths received an MBE in 1935 for his work on sleeping sickness concentrations.

²⁵ Bagshawe, "Concentrations in Uha," 138-9. Emphasis mine.

²⁶ J. E. S. Griffiths, "The Aba-Ha of Tanganyika Territory. Some Aspects of their Tribal Organization and Sleeping Sickness Concentrations," *Tanganyika Notes and Records* (1936): 72-6, 73.

have been the reason why so little difficulty was experienced in the actual moving of the natives. They nearly all agreed to move and move they did.²⁷

Once approved, an area was then “put before the Chief and the people and then decided by majority vote.”²⁸

Bagshawe and Griffiths detailed the purity of their motivations in creating sleeping sickness concentrations, which included Ha people remaining in control of their own fate. As Bagshawe wrote in the League of Nations appendix, colonial officials fully explained concentration policy to affected populations and gave them choices: “It was stated on every occasion that our object was to get the natives out of the dangerous bush. No one was obliged to enter any particular concentration or any concentration at all” so long as residents chose to move to areas that had been designated as free of tsetse flies. Officials included examples of Ha people opting for other areas than the designated concentrations: “In some cases, but not many, natives elected to leave their chief or sub-chief for another, and were allowed to do so.”²⁹ The role of colonial officials and Native Authorities in such moves was to use “patient firmness” rather than a “show of force,” to induce people finally to move. Bagshawe qualified this description a few pages later when he wrote that “...the administrative officers and the chiefs and sub-chief traveled about ‘pushing’ the people out of their homes,” which were then burnt, but burnt “by

²⁷ *Ibid.* and Fairbairn, “Agricultural Problems Posed,” 4.

²⁸ Fairbairn, “Agricultural Problems Posed,” 4.

²⁹ Bagshawe, “Concentrations in Uha,” 140.

themselves when empty.”³⁰ At all phases, planners emphasized the many forms of assistance, including transportation, that the government would provide.³¹

In public documents, officials took pains to minimize the impact of such a move on Ha people. While officials thought that lowland Ha’s proclivity for living in dispersed fashion and practicing shifting cultivation marked them as backward and as potential sleeping sickness sufferers, it also meant that the demands put on them by the colonial state were lighter than for other populations. District Officer Griffiths reminded his readers that the people involved were “the Ha of the plains” who migrate anyway, whose homes only take a few days to erect, and who had so few possessions “that a very few journeys will see all transported to a new village twenty miles away.”³² The labor involved in founding a new settlement and in preparing new fields “would be no great hardship to him; he is, in fact, accustomed to it, ‘shifting cultivation’ being one of his practices.”³³ All that such supposedly naturally migratory people needed was the good influence of indirect rulers – “where the chief exercised his influence to the good his people followed his orders and moved into concentrations” but where a chief was “weak and inefficient his people were scattered and had little cohesion and some difficulty was experienced in persuading them to obey commands.”³⁴ Moreover, officials claimed that their timetable for movement was designed to minimize disruptions, beginning with giving Ha people the entire dry season of 1933, 5-6 months, to make their decision and

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ NB: Such assistance was contingent on residents cutting the necessary tracks for vehicles, a significant labor investment.

³² Griffiths, “The Aba-Ha,” 74.

³³ Moffett, “A Strategic Retreat, 36.

³⁴ Griffiths, “The Aba-Ha,” 74.

accomplish their move.³⁵ Officials designed this period to prevent any pause in agricultural production. Residents were supposed to complete their move after harvest, with all of their food crops and goods, but in time to build new homes and commence planting. Colonial officials' presentation of their careful and inclusive planning leaves little space for the possibility of Ha resistance to the plans. If present at all, Ha resistance merely serves as an indicator of the ignorance or misguidedness of Ha communities; it is a sign of the importance of colonial officials' knowledge.

“The Only Whip was that Fire”: Ha Narratives of Forced Removal

Ha elders tell very different stories about how colonial officials compelled their families to relocate in the 1930s and 1940s. Relating colonial and Ha accounts of the move, however, is not a straightforward process. When interviewed, few Ha elders had ready-made accounts prepared for recitation, or even extended descriptions of the process that they remembered, or had been told. More often than not, I have taken sections of interviews that were mainly in question-and-answer format, and analyzed them for broad commonalities and divergences, as well as possible location-specific patterns for original locations and the concentration sites to which they moved. Taken in sum, there is far less cohesion in these different remembrances than in colonial accounts, and yet important patterns *do* emerge from them – not the least of which is how the move would affect different categories of people.

I bring Ha narratives into the same orbit as colonial accounts on three levels. To begin with, Ha accounts of the process of movement sharply contradict colonial assertions that Ha people were informed of and understood fully the reasons for forced

³⁵ *Ibid.*

removals. They therefore complicate the process portrayed by colonial accounts, and even the premises for the move – its necessity, its success, and its lack of opposition. At another level, I argue that these Ha narratives offer a portrayal of the relationship between rulers and ruled in Buha’s colonial history. For some, officials’ reasons for the move were baffling or unknowable, while for others, their stated reasons were a ruse to gain greater access to Ha wealth and labor. Above all else, though, Ha portrayals of the colonial state emphasize its capacity to call up great force to enact its policies. Finally, I view Ha narratives as speaking to issues beyond their relationship with the colonial state at this time. The state initiated these moves and used great force to enact them, but narratives of the move are also accounts of what was lost through the move, and how Ha people coped and survived it.

Elders’ different explanations of the purpose of the move are incredibly revealing. In only two of over seventy interviews I conducted related to this period, was sleeping sickness or tsetse fly the only reason given for the removals of the 1930s and 1940s; the rest involved a spectrum of reasons, or in some cases, a total inability to explain why this happened. Some portrayed the motivations of colonial officials as unknowable. When asked what officials told Ha people about the reason for the move, Ndabhateze Kagoma of Kumhasha said, “Could they tell you? Could you say anything?”³⁶ Another’s response suggested that the colonial government’s existence was itself a sufficient explanation for why the removal and resettlement happened:

JW: And then the second time Nyamaliza came to Buhoro to move people to Kifura, what reason did she give for that move?

BL: She? She was moving us because of the colonial government which was

³⁶ Interview of Ndabhateze Kagoma 25 October 2007 Kumhasha Village.

present.³⁷

By far the most common response offered was that colonial officials wanted people to “live together,” as one elder put it, they “...were saying that you have to be nearby.”³⁸

When asked, though, why anyone would desire people to live in this way, the vast majority of elders could offer no reason. Even for some of those that did recall a slightly more specific reason, they were not ultimately explanations. For instance, a few said that they wanted people to stay close together but also be in areas near colonial infrastructure, especially to be near the road. One elder suggested the reason why officials wanted people near the road and closely settled was so the government could help them. When asked in what ways, he responded

NM: Nobody knew, especially me who was still young.

JW: Did they give any other reason why?

NM: We were not informed the reason, the government just said move, that’s all.³⁹

In these accounts, there is little point to engage with the colonial state; its actions are baffling or unknowable.

Other elders had very succinct explanations of what the colonial government hoped to achieve by the move – they situated these moves alongside the earlier colonial focus on tax collection. Bagshawe himself recorded that many people surmised that concentrations were really meant to increase tax revenue, or *kodi*.⁴⁰ As the previous chapter has shown, tax collection and tax default labor were interchangeable in the 1920s

³⁷ Interview of Balikulije Lulitaliye 17 October 2007 Busunzu Village. We employed Lulitaliye’s substitution of the name “Nyamaliza” for Ruhaga, who was the *mwami* of Muhambwe at the time. Nyamaliza was the regnal name of both Ruhaga’s mother and her daughter.

³⁸ Interview of Warungendanye Kagoma 22 October 2007 Kumshindwi Village.

³⁹ Interview of Ntahokagiye Maganga 17 October 2007 Kumhasha Village.

⁴⁰ Bagshawe, “Concentrations in Uha,” 139.

and 1930s, especially as it related to the construction of colonial infrastructure. That some elders raised the suspicion that they were moved near roadways so that they would maintain them is not surprising. And still there were some elders who – I would argue correctly – were convinced that there was actually a constellation of reasons for the move. In a group interview in Rungwe Mpya, one elder at first said that there were problems with tsetse flies, but then added that people were “put on the road.... When they came, they worked on the road, without being paid.” After further discussion, another elder summed up the reasons, saying, “Therefore the transfer was due to three reasons: it was because of tsetse fly, clearing the road, and collecting tax. The other intention of transferring them to the road was for them [the officials] to reach them [the people] more easily.” The first elder, though, the one who at first attributed the move to the tsetse fly, immediately added that, out of all of these reasons, “Tax was the main factor.”⁴¹ Other elders stated this as the only reason. One in Kagera Nkanda said that “the reasons to do this [force people to move]: they needed people to stay together and so they should not have a problem with collecting tax.”⁴² These memories accord with what Kirk Hoppe found in other locations in East Africa affected by sleeping sickness policies, that “Africans consistently rejected, or never considered, concentration as disease control. They did not separate colonial science and medicine from the broader context of colonial violence and power and focused instead on British expropriation of land and labor.”⁴³

Elders’ recollections which explicitly placed forced resettlement in relationship to sleeping sickness, though, rarely did so singly. Indeed, in the many cases where sleeping

⁴¹ Group interview of nine elders 18 September 2007 Rungwe Mpya Village.

⁴² Group interview of four elders 25 September 2007 Kagera Nkanda Village.

⁴³ Hoppe, *Lords of the Fly*, 137.

sickness itself was mentioned, it came in a hodgepodge of other services that the government had a hand in providing. Sophia Bhabinga of Kumhasha responded:

JW: So why did people move, did they move because they wanted to?

SB: Yes in Bweru II [a section of the Nyavyumbu sleeping sickness concentration] they built a church and hospital, and at the original place there were tsetse fly threats, so we brought the children to be educated in schools.⁴⁴

In another case, the full palimpsest of reasons only emerged with time. Ladislaus Chanda Kipfumu of Kifura first responded that the people were moved from the forest “because the European government arrived [and] they gathered people together because they were in the forest and people were staying scattered apart.” Then, a moment later, he said that “[t]he special purpose of the government to transfer them was to put them together in order that they could give them services easily. For example, hospital services, agricultural services, and to be able to visit them easily.” His final answer came several minutes later after follow up questions. He told us “very especially at that time the big issue was tsetse fly. News of tsetse fly, [then, in English] sleeping sickness.”⁴⁵

The colonial emphasis on tax collection and road building gave elders a ready explanation for the move, but underlying at least some opinions is how the stated reason that the British gave failed to accord with Ha understandings of disease. PC Bagshawe himself recorded these ideas as an explanation of why Ha people mistakenly believed the real reason for removal was taxation. He and Dr. Maclean, as quoted above, both observed that Ha people were troubled and suspicious of British explanations of resettlement because it drew a connection between the disease and the tsetse fly, whereas the disease was considered new and tsetse flies had long been a feature of their

⁴⁴ Interview of Sophia Bhabinga 26 October 2007 Kumhasha Village.

⁴⁵ Interview of Ladislaus Chanda Kipfumu 12 October 2007 Kifura Village.

environment.⁴⁶ When asked about tsetse fly problems, several elder recalled how they only came to understand and believe the connection between the vector and the disease much later. An elder born at Buhoro, Felicita Kigina, first confirmed that there were problems with tsetse flies at Buhoro and that people were sick, and then said that “we didn’t know whether it was tsetse fly,” and that this knowledge only came about once there were hospitals to test patients.⁴⁷ It may be possible, too, that the coercive means employed, or at least condoned, by colonial officials made some Ha people doubt their intentions. We had this exchange in Kumhasha with Warugendanye Kagoma, an elder who was probably in his late 80s and likely the oldest whom we interviewed. After a pause following a discussion of why people were moved, in which there was no mention of tsetse fly, he said unprompted:

WK: Tsetse fly. Tsetse fly.

JW: Were they saying that it was because of tsetse fly?

WK: They were saying that you have to be nearby.

JW: What was the problem with tsetse fly?

WK: People were dying. Even now they [tsetse fly] are there.

JW: When they were told that it was because of tsetse fly, did they agree to move?

WK: It was not true, they even used a stick like this [making a hitting motion].⁴⁸

With different understandings of the disease and with some reason to doubt colonial officials’ intentions, Ha people had compelling reasons not to believe the reasons given for the move.

Most elders recalled that people in the past gave social explanations for the disease – they “thought maybe the sick person was poisoned.”⁴⁹ In a group interview in

⁴⁶ Bagshaw, “Concentrations in Uha,” 139. See also his diary entry of 7 August 1933 where people identify sleeping sickness as “somi ya mangu,” RH Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary.

⁴⁷ Interview of Felicita Kigina 27 September 2007 Kagera Nkanda Village.

⁴⁸ Interview of Warugendanye Kagoma 22 October 2007 Kumshindwi Village.

Kagera Nkanda, one elder recalled that people called the disease *mgoti*, a recognized disease that shared with sleeping sickness the symptom of swollen feet. *Mgoti* and swelling diseases like it were seen as a sign that the ill person had transgressed social rules. Another elder explained how sleeping sickness baffled some people as to its origins: “We didn’t understand why. When a person died or was ill, his feet, hands, or stomach swelled. People said ‘he has stolen.’”⁵⁰ With social causes of disease, people naturally turned to social means of curing it. They sought to change relationships – to learn who might have a grudge and had administered poison, or to find just what a patient had stolen, rather than to change the frequency of contact with tsetse flies.

To help in these times, Ha people turned to local healers, *bapfumu* (s. *mpfumu*), and earth spirit priests, *bateko* (s. *muteko*). The grandson of a *mpfumu* told us that while *bapfumu* tried to cure sleeping sickness patients, “[For] that illness there is not any local medicine...Other diseases are able to be cured with local medicines but the tsetse fly disease, as far as I know, there is no [local] cure.”⁵¹ *Bateko* had an even larger role to play in outbreaks of disease. *Bateko* were earth spirit priests whose descent from the first successful settler in a given area was the source of their local prominence. In being a successful settler, their ancestor was thought to have built rapport with the local earth spirits, *mashinga* (s. *ishinga*), and it was through the current *muteko*’s cultivated relationship with local spirits as well as his or her ancestors which enabled an area to be

⁴⁹ Interview of Balenge Ruhehe 30 October 2007 Kumhasha Village.

⁵⁰ Group interview of four elders 25 September 2007 Kagera Nkanda Village. The Ngindo people of the Rufiji basin called trypanosomiasis *uvimbe*, “swelling disease.” See Thaddeus Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax: State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania, 1820-2000* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2009): 106.

⁵¹ Interview of Ladislaus Chanda Kipfumu 12 October 2007 Kifura Village. Kipfumu’s family name derives from his grandfather’s profession.

settled. *Mashinga* lived in specific places such as trees, bodies of water, or rock formations, and controlled that area's resources.⁵² *Bateko* communicated with *mashinga*, performed rituals for them, and perceived the terms of the human-nature spirit relationship, described in Kiha as 'cooling' (*ukuhoza*) and as 'blessing' (*ukutelekeza* or *ukuhezaqira*).⁵³ *Bateko* acted in a preventative and curative fashion by showing "people where to live, where to plant, where to draw water, where to leave sacrifices."⁵⁴ In return for advice, ritual services, and permission to settle in an area, residents gave *bateko* small presents and yearly offerings. As Mattias Mzobha of Kagera Nkanda explained:

When chaos comes, [problems with] rain, or diseases, or fights, disorders in the country, elders appear and went to [the *muteko*]. They stay with him, talking and discussing about what has brought chaos and he tells them to bring him honey to make beer [and says] 'I will try to calm the chaos within my boundaries.'⁵⁵

In fact, the Bweru community cited above whose disbelief of the connection between tsetse fly and sleeping sickness was strong enough for them to wish to remain in their homes, were led by a *muteko* rather than a *mtware*. When Bweru's *mtware* Rukandere died in 1933 – reputedly of sleeping sickness – the local *muteko*, Njaberi, took his place. Njaberi's new role made sense in the context of a prevalent disease because *bateko* were supposed to indicate "the course of action to be taken when the human community was ailing," usually because a boundary or taboo had been transgressed in relation to the earth spirits.⁵⁶ It was these people under Rukandere who told Bagshawe in no uncertain terms

⁵² Michele Wagner, "Environment, Community and History 'Nature in the Mind' in Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Buha, Tanzania," in *Custodians of the Land*, eds. Gregory Maddox, James Giblin, and Isaria Kimambo (London: James Currey, 1996): 179 and 181.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 182.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 186.

⁵⁵ Interview of Mattias Mzobha 27 September 2007 Kagera Nkanda Village. Mzobha spoke mainly in Kiswahili in this interview and used the Kiswahili word for chaos, *fujo*, rather than the Kiha term *ugwimo*.

⁵⁶ Wagner, "Environment, Community," 186.

that they were taking the best course of action. Bagshawe records in his diary that they insisted that "...no one gets SS [sleeping sickness] here...they say that the late Rukandere got it at Kadida."⁵⁷ It was precisely these kinds of objections that led people in the Tabora District to resist concentration in 1924. As District Officer G. W. Hatchell records, people there believed that outbreaks of disease were "a punishment inflicted by the Spirits" that would not abate by moving but would "continue until the Spirits were placated." A complicating factor was that these were place-specific nature spirits and moving would cause a separation and thus was "one of their greatest objections...since they firmly believed that lacking the protection of these spirits further and worse disaster must inevitably overtake them."⁵⁸

More than any other emphasis, though, elders described in vivid detail the forms of coercion used by the colonial government. While there is no single term given to these forced removals of the 1930s, some elders called it *ugwimo*, a Kiha word usually translated as "chaos" or "war." The first to use this word said, when asked if there was a name for the forced movement: "We were met with *ugwimo*, our houses were burned and then we were taken."⁵⁹ *Ugwimo* carries the connotations of disruptions that occur outside of peoples' ability to prevent or avoid them; it is something to be endured rather than combated. The term *ugwimo* also carries the valence of a threat to an entire community rather than to an individual, a threat like famine, drought, war, or periods of lion attacks. Elders explained its use in referring to their treatment before forced removals, the

⁵⁷ RH Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 8 August 1933.

⁵⁸ C. W. Hatchell, "An Early 'Sleeping-Sickness Settlement' in South-Western Tanganyika," *Tanganyika Notes and Records* 27 (1949): 60-4, 62.

⁵⁹ Interview of Felicita Kigina 27 September 2007 Kagera Nkanda Village.

challenges they encountered en route, and the anxieties of being moved to an unknown place.

According to most elders, their families were first made aware of the movement when local leaders, not colonial officials, came to their areas and typically announced that residents must be ready to move upon their return in a few days' to a few weeks' time; the only recorded instance of such an order gave residents six days to move.⁶⁰ In most cases, elders in Muhambwe recall that *Mwami* Ruhaga herself came to announce the move or the local *mtware* did. When that period elapsed, the ruler and his or her followers returned to a given area and stayed there until everyone moved. One elder in Kagera Nkanda, who was about eight years old at the time of movement, repeated the phrase "order and date" five times in his response: "It was an order and a date. They didn't set fire themselves with matchboxes. We set fire ourselves. We were given a date and an order."⁶¹

Fire was a ubiquitous method to prod people to move, especially those who had not prepared their possessions for the move in the time that leaders had allotted. As Felicita Kigina of Kagera Nkanda put it: "We were met with *ugwimo*.... Nobody was beaten. The only whip was that fire."⁶² Residents were told to move their possessions outside, and then watched their houses burn. An elder from Bweru emphasized the lack of preparation in his recollection that there was barely enough time to get all of the things outside before the matches were struck. With the loss of their houses, many recall being

⁶⁰ RH Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 15 August 1933. This involved *Mwami* Ruhaga and the people of Kadida.

⁶¹ Group interview of four elders 25 September 2007 Kagera Nkanda Village.

⁶² Interview of Felicita Kigina 27 September 2007 Kagera Nkanda Village.

forced to sleep without any shelter the night before they left. Fire was also meant to insure that no one would return to former homes. When asked if anyone ever returned to the Ibanda area, even to visit it, Expirius Nkooko retorted, “Can you go back while they were even burning houses?”⁶³ To some, it seemed like everything was being destroyed by the methods employed in the move: “The whole country was on fire, the whole forest.”⁶⁴

Ugwimo followed people on their routes to their new houses. The journey on foot lasted from a few hours to three days before they arrived at their new locations. The only aid given for moving people came in the form of tax defaulters forced to serve as porters, and these were mainly assigned to help move the possessions of the *batware* who were in charge of moving their people. *Batware* were also given around 100 shillings for building their new houses, a very large sum at the time. If ordinary families were lucky enough to get help from porters, they were in the minority. In these situations, the only help, if any, was the organization of men from that community to serve as porters.⁶⁵ Those from farther away could only take what they could carry, and had to bring with them any supplies they needed for the journey. All elders who were old enough to be of any help recalled what they carried – grinding stones, sleeping mats, cooking pots. The longer moves, approximately those which could not be accomplished in less than two days, were completed in one go – anything that the family itself could not carry was left behind. Families simply did not have enough labor to carry both essential household

⁶³ Interview of Expirius Nkooko 17 October 2007 Kifura Village.

⁶⁴ Interview of William Ngaye 25 September 2007 Kagera Nkanda Village.

⁶⁵ For an example, see RH Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 27 November 1933 and 6 December 1933 concerning the move of Bushingo people to Makere.

goods and all of their food stores. Instead, they only brought what was needed along the way and left food in storage containers or still in the field. Elders lamented how these unharvested crops were eaten by wild animals or destroyed because of the lack of care. Their journey took many people through uninhabited and dangerous areas where people were forced to sleep in makeshift shelters. Felicita Kigina recalled being too afraid to sleep on her way from Buhoro to Kifura because of the roars of lions.⁶⁶ Even those who could reach new sites within a day spent a difficult first night, as there was rarely time to build even temporary shelters.

Ugwimo remained with the people once they completed the move and adjusted to new areas. The new environment was familiar to those who came from closer areas, but those from the Moyowosi area in far eastern Buha noted how the new area *looked* different: its soil was red or black rather than white. Its hillier appearance made some people say that the government had moved them “to Burundi.” An elder in Busunzu said “Our fathers resisted, [they said] that we cannot move to Burundi.” Another whose family moved to the Kifura concentration recalled the despair of first arrival “Those who were coming here were saying, ‘they have moved us, we are dead. There is nowhere else to go.’”⁶⁷

For many resettled people, the intensive labor to resettle lasted much longer than the travel time between old and new homes. For those who had lived within a day’s walk from the new settlement, men had to make frequent trips over the next year in order to care for and collect the remaining harvest. Many recalled that these efforts were largely

⁶⁶ Interview of Felicita Kigina 27 September 2007 Kagere Nkanda Village.

⁶⁷ Interview of Juliette Katabhe 16 October 2007 Kifura Village.

futile because crop losses due to animals, pests, and lack of care were significant.

According to elders, these trips were mainly being taken on an individual basis, but

Joakim Ruhazi who was originally from Makena and moved to Kifura recalled

differently:

We started bringing the family first and other things which you could carry. And then afterwards they said “No, we have to help each other.” We went to one person about [10 or 20] people, carrying the things of one person. And then the next day they went...bringing other things of another person. They were going in groups.

He estimated an individual man would take two weeks to move all of his goods, which is why others decided to organize cooperation. Ruhazi emphasized that the colonial government offered no help with this: “The government had already finished, that’s when we said ‘Eeh-heh [sound of sorrow], hunger will trouble us.’ That’s why we returned again to bring [the food].”⁶⁸ Those from farther away had only brought provisions to last a few days and were not allowed to return to their original fields to harvest. In the end, they were forced to trade anything they had brought of value with local people to get provisions, or sought work on their fields to receive food.

**“[I]f it was necessary...to run counter to regulation or law, they should do so”:
Unsettling British Accounts of Forced Removal**

The circuitous process of concentrating lowland Buha unsettles British and Ha accounts of removal and resettlement. Viewing the creation of sleeping sickness as a process, a plan subject to the influence of well-positioned Ha people and characterized by rapid changes with uncertain outcomes, complicates the ways in which British and Ha people wrote about and recall the beginning of concentrations. I first focus mainly on the

⁶⁸ Interview of Joakim Ruhazi 13 October 2007 Kifura Village.

formation of the two concentration sites for which there is the greatest documentary and oral evidence, Kifura and Nyavyumbu. I then examine the three areas of original settlement where negotiation between colonial officials and Ha residents created a divergent resettlement history from that the rest of the region.

Colonial official's public accounts of creating sleeping sickness concentrations streamline what was a contingent process. Internal documents, though, like minutes of meetings and reports intended for the files of superiors in Tabora, the administrative capital of Western Province, and Dar es Salaam were more prone to admit when the process of concentration diverged from the ideal. Like personal papers, these reports tended to chronicle events very soon after they happened and carry far more detail about how officials formed and revised plans. Not surprisingly, it was in personal papers that officials gave the most explicit description of practices that at times ran counter both to officials' description of events elsewhere and to general territorial policies.

In terms of announcing the move, or "propaganda" as colonial officials termed it, the thought of European officers reaching even a fraction of the population involved and explaining its purposes well was simply impossible. After all, there were never more than a dozen medical, agricultural, and administrative officials involved in sleeping sickness work and approximately 65,000 people living in hundreds of settlements. While in public accounts of the move officials make sweeping statements that imply that just this kind of widespread meeting did occur, oral interviews and their private documents reveal that the best officials could do was hold private meetings with the *baami* and group meetings with the *batware* involved. Bagshawe recorded a few of these meetings

in his diary, including the very first announcement of the policy in late 1932. In this meeting, Bagshawe himself records a reason why Ha people suspected that concentrations and taxation were connected. The meeting in Kibondo on October 28, 1932 began as a discussion about the abysmal tax collection performance that year. Bagshawe told the assembled leaders that only four of them had collected enough tax to warrant full salaries. The rest would receive half of their usual pay and would receive the rest if their tax collection performance improved – otherwise, it would become the Native Treasury's. At this point in the meeting, Bagshawe had Dr. H. G. Calwell address the group, telling them "...that we anticipated a spread of S/S [sleeping sickness] & were going to take measures: that nothing would be done this year, but that all living in danger would be concentrated next year: that the concentration year carried tax exemption for concentrates."⁶⁹ The colonial priority of tax collection was never far from other matters, explaining why Ha people inevitably connected taxation with concentration work.

More detailed planning meetings were held in each affected sleeping sickness area in the coming months, where the policy was explained again and planning began. On March 31, 1933, Bagshawe and Doctors Maclean and Calwell held a large meeting with the two *baami* of Kibondo, *Mwami* Ruhaga of Muhambwe and *Mwami* Kahigi of Buyungu, and five of the major *batware* and dozens of minor *batware*. Bagshawe called this "about as good a representation of *the people* interested as we could have got." He noted that the meeting site "was excellent," since it was near the Busunzu treatment centre, and "a few yards away were some of the men women & children obviously dying of S/S [sleeping sickness]." The three officials then detailed "how large concentrations

⁶⁹ RH Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 28 October 1933.

are necessary & small ones useless” and then requested that the leaders – which Bagshawe again termed “the people” – propose possible concentration sites before the end of lunch. The *baami* and *batware* met and then “in spite of what I had said, they solemnly put up a ‘proposal’ that each major mtwale should have one or more concentrations.” Bagshawe and the doctors rejected this idea and agreed to stay for a few more hours while the *batware* decided on a location. Eventually, two of the *batware* from Muhambwe, Mudabe of Nyakabingo and Miseke of Makena, decided to settle at the confluence of the Mpemvi and Kifura Rivers, one on each side of the Kifura which had formed a boundary for their respective areas. Colonial officials were satisfied with the location, which would become known as the Kifura concentration, as it was only about nine miles from the main Kasulu-Kibondo road. The meeting then determined that two more *batware* would join Kifura, *Mtware* Lumeza of Busunzu would bring his people to the area and receive land in the Makena or Nyakabingo areas. The final *mtware*, Liambali of Mtenderi, was from Buyungu and not Muhambwe and so colonial officials were careful to plan for this settlement on the opposite bank of the Mpemvi River, as the Mpemvi was the boundary which colonial officials adopted to divide Muhambwe and Buyungu in this area.⁷⁰

It was information like this that Dr. Maclean and PC Bagshawe used as a basis to carry out a survey of all the sleeping sickness areas between March and July of 1933. In the case cited above, Maclean proceeded to the Kifura area with the *batware* involved, while Bagshawe headed to the Luguru and Bushingo areas to learn more about the sleeping sickness situation from the two *baami* there. Their purpose was “to find out

⁷⁰ RH Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 31 March 1933 entry, emphasis mine.

what people needed concentration and where it would be best to put them.”⁷¹ Normally, this consisted of Dr. Maclean going to health centers to check on incidence of the disease and Bagshawe interviewing local leaders about cases and gaining more input concerning possible relocation sites. These areas were then investigated by a doctor, an administrative official, and an agricultural surveyor from the Medical Department. The agricultural surveyor investigated the tsetse population in the area which the doctor then confirmed, the surveyor examined whether the area’s fertility and water sources could support a permanent population, and the administrative official examined how the location might affect administration through its accessibility, or by requiring an adjustment of local rulers or local boundaries. They were charged to plan for the present as well as for future expansion.⁷² But in some cases, plans had not moved forward enough to give local leaders timely information. Bagshawe had an uncomfortable meeting with *Mtware* Muhanuka whom Bagshawe told to concentrate “but – alas; Maclean’s [illegible] ‘survey’ is not finished, & we couldn’t say where!”⁷³

Arrangements for personnel occurred on 13 July 1933 at Kibondo, at a meeting attended by officials from the main branches of government involved: medical, agricultural, and local administrators. There, Doctors Maclean, Fairbairn, and Calwell met with PC Bagshawe, the three local administrative officers mainly involved, the acting Director of Agriculture, and the Secretary for Native Affairs. This meeting served to

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² There is some ambivalence as to whether these settlements were always intended to be permanent. Dr. Maclean certainly expressed the opinion that one “solution” to sleeping sickness was for concentrations to be depopulated by “progressive” inhabitants leaving in order to seek wage employment. Eventually this would reduce the concentration’s population to the extent that the inhabitants could no longer control tsetse harboring vegetation. At this point, officials would remove residents of the concentration and amalgamate them with the nearest viable concentration. See Maclean, “Sleeping Sickness Measures,” 125.

⁷³ RH Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 3 June 1933.

finalize plans and prepare the participants for a meeting a few days later in Tabora of the same personnel plus missionary representatives, the Director of Medical and Sanitation Services, and Acting Governor Jardine. The morning planning meeting of this Sleeping Sickness Committee on 17 July 1933 was the opportunity to consolidate plans that had involved personnel from the medical, agricultural, and administration, and to place them in front of the acting governor. Yet again, PC Bagshawe and Dr. Maclean sketched out the necessity for the concentrations and began to outline the process by which they would be made. They assigned the personnel who would survey the areas and supervise the movement, and designated which branches of the colonial government would be responsible for which services once the concentrations were made. While Bagshawe admitted that funds were completely lacking to set up schools in the concentrations, representatives from Protestant and Catholic missions were present and offered to set up mission schools. The medical department outlined plans to establish dispensaries in each settlement, with special emphasis on sleeping sickness detection and treatment. The agriculture department would create plans for crop rotations, cash crop adoption, and cattle introduction into new settlements. Such a pooling of expertise and resources had never been attempted in Buha before.

The afternoon meeting on July 17th, however, carried with it an awareness on the part of British officers that what they were doing was less a politically neutral implementation of a benevolent plan and more a compulsory exercise that would likely require force. The Secretary for Native Affairs recognized, if not endorsed, that coercive tactics might be required. He stated that moving such a large population quickly enough

for them to establish homes and new fields before the rains that were critical to the new crop's growth "...must proceed and be carried through without interruption. It was inevitable...that occasions might arise where action had to be taken which conflicted with existing regulations or in some cases even with the law." Officers must not act in a way that was explicitly prohibited by law, and as long as they used this discretion intelligently, the Secretary instructed the officers to

act as they thought best, and if it was necessary in doing so to run counter to regulation or law, they should do so, recording what they had done and abstaining, of course, from acting in a way which it would be clear to them that Government would prohibit if there were time to refer for authority.⁷⁴

The British forcibly uprooted Ha people from hundreds of miles away into the eleven designated sites for sleeping sickness concentrations. In two cases, Kumsenga and Makere-Ushingu, the sites of sleeping sickness concentrations were empty. In the other nine areas, forced settlement greatly increased an area that already had population: Nyavyumbu, Makere-Buyungu, Kifura, Kakonko, Kagera, Muhanga, Rungwe, Bweru, and Buhoro. These sites fulfilled most of the colonial priorities at the time: they could meet their population's subsistence requirements of land and water, they did not substantially disrupt the Native Authority structure by moving population out of rulers' "traditional" areas, and they were on established lines of communication. All but two of the eleven sites were on the all-weather roads mainly built through tax default labor.

At first, officials made progress in implementing plans for Kifura, but sticking to their timeline proved impossible. By early April 1933, Bagshawe could meet with the *batware* slated to move and examine the boundary markers that the agricultural surveyor

⁷⁴ TNA 21709 Sleeping Sickness Concentration Committee. Meeting of the Sleeping Sickness Committee, 17 July 1933.

had directed tax defaulters to create. A month later, work had to be adjusted when it was discovered that an arid plain in the center of the proposed site was several times larger than originally thought, meaning that the area no longer accorded with the calculations needed to insure that there would be an initial four acres available for every family.⁷⁵ By June, Bagshawe began to vent his frustration, as “After all this time we have exactly two concentration sites marked, Kafera & Nyanyumba [sic: Kifura and Nyavyumbu], & nothing but wind about the rest.”⁷⁶ Indeed, by mid-August, work at the Makere concentration in Kasulu would only start to begin. But despite its progress in comparison to other concentrations, Kifura in July 1933 only had a well, a temporary hospital, and a rest house built for visiting officials.⁷⁷ When Bagshawe returned again in August with District Officer Page, they discovered that tax default labor was being used to clear the roadway rather than work on the concentration.⁷⁸

While various officials were engaged in readying concentration sites, provincial superiors drafted the official legal instrument that would impel people to move. As an order under the Native Authority Ordinance, it was technically the *baami* whose areas were involved in concentration who issued the order, with colonial officials merely giving their approval of the order. Like much of Indirect Rule in these years in Buha, though, the order was entirely the work of colonial officials. The 6th rule of 1933 under the Native Authority Ordinance ordered that

All people who live in tsetse-fly country must move thence and build at the place laid out for them. Such place will be laid out by the Government, and any person

⁷⁵ RH Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 9 April 1933 and 6 May 1933.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 2 June 1933.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 12 July 1933.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 4 August 1933.

continuing thereafter to reside in tsetse-fly country will be liable to punishment. All people living in tsetse-fly country should begin moving immediately to the place allotted to them.⁷⁹

With this legislation in place, colonial officials and Native Authorities had the authorization needed to compel people to move.

It appears that it was at this juncture when concentration policy reached the residences of all those involved in the move. Sites had already been chosen and surveyed; the people were responsible merely for moving. According to PC Bagshawe's diary, he explained concentration policy to *batware* much as he did in public documents, noting both the medical necessity of it and the kinds of benefits that settling in a dense pattern could bring.⁸⁰ To what extent these reasons were understood or believed by those in the Native Administration is impossible to tell, but there are at least indications of how this announcement was then relayed to the affected Ha people. As was examined above, the vast majority of elders who could recall these incidents themselves or had a strong memory of what their relatives told them about it, explained the move as a means of getting people to settle together. Most elders employed either the word *umukutano* or its Kiswahili version, *mkutano*, to describe both this new way of settling and the area where it occurred. Judging by the long discussions in oral interviews about the meaning of this term, it appears that this word was given a new meaning in the 1930s, very different from the common meaning of *umukutano/mkutano* as "meeting".⁸¹ Ladislaus Chanda

⁷⁹ RH Mss.Afr.s.303 Francis Bagshawe Papers. 1933 Annual Report Western Province.

⁸⁰ See also RH Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 10 April 1933 discussions with *Mwami* Ruhinda and the *batware* of Bushingo.

⁸¹ I base this idea on that fact that Kiha speakers who are younger or from other areas not affected by concentration are baffled by the way *umukutano* is used to mean a place to settle. Until interviews like this one cited, my translator and I were frequently confused, thinking the elders were referring to a "meeting" held by colonial officials or Native Authorities to inform people of the move.

Kipufumu of Kifura explained how *umukutano* differs from the standard meaning in this way:

You know when he says “umukutano”, it is not the real [standard Kiswahili meaning] “mkutano” that we mean. “Umukutano” is to divide an area. At that time, it was to divide a certain area of land in a country so that now you can stay here. Yes, they were calling it “umukutano” because this place [the *umukutano*] was making people to come together, to stay here.⁸²

It appears possible, and perhaps even likely, then, that this use of *umukutano/mkutano* is a local translation of “concentration.” Elders clearly distinguished how moving to *umukutano* differed from families’ individual decisions in the past to move. Ndabhateze Kagoma of Kumhasha told us that “[i]n the past, there was no *umukutano*, *umukutano* was brought by the colonial officials. At first, in the past, they built [houses] at an unoccupied place. [At] the place which you liked, you built [a house].”⁸³ When asked what they remembered about the reasons given for the move, the British “propaganda,” the most common answer was “So we can go in the *umukutano* together.”⁸⁴

The main effort of concentrations took two months, but not the months reported by PC Bagshawe in the League of Nations Annual Report. He claimed there that the move occurred according to plan, at the end of the dry season from July to September 1933. In actuality, only the earliest preparations had happened at any of the sites by August, and the main movement occurred between September and November 1933, when heavy rains had already started. Bagshawe had important reasons for claiming that the move was accomplished by September, since it would allow people to move after harvest

⁸² Ladislaus Chanda Kipfumu, during interview with Joakim Ruhazi 13 October 2007 Kifura Village.

⁸³ Interview of Ndabhateze Kagoma 25 October 2007 Kumhasha Village.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

and before the next planting season began. As it actually occurred, the move cut into the October rains crucial for the planting of maize and beans, major staples in the area.⁸⁵

While Dr. Maclean and PC Bagshawe were personally involved in the planning phases of concentration, the actual move was entrusted to three officers. District Officer W. F. Page was in charge of the Kibondo concentrations and he had the assistance of Assistant District Officer J. E. S. Griffiths and two European agricultural surveyors who were employed by the Medical Department. The concentrations in Kasulu were under District Officer H. H. Armstrong. By the end of the year, Griffiths spent 214 days “on safari,” that is, away from the office overseeing concentration work, and Armstrong would accumulate 174 similar days.⁸⁶ Documents reveal that the total movement of communities lasted much longer than a two month period, when the bulk of the population moved to concentrations. In a different concentration involving far fewer people, Griffiths calculated that it required five months to move less than a tenth of the people involved in the move in 1933. Bagshawe himself recorded in his diary at the end of November in 1933 that three lorries had brought in several loads to Makere, but there were “over 1000 on the road ready, & that heaps more remained in the bush!”⁸⁷ In his review of 15 years’ worth of concentration efforts in Tanganyika, Dr. Fairbairn noted that “Loads averaged 40-50 per family; many had 80-100 loads, few had less than 20 loads,” numbers that would have to be multiplied by miles traveled to take on the true enormity

⁸⁵ For planting season, see Margot Lovett, “Elders, Migrants and Wives: Labor Migration and the Renegotiation of Intergenerational, Patronage and Gender Relations in Highland Buha, Western Tanzania, 1921-62” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1989): 137.

⁸⁶ TNA 21709 Sleeping Sickness Concentration Committee. 17 July 1933 meeting.

⁸⁷ RH Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 26 November 1933.

of the labor demands.⁸⁸ In later moves, officials employed the territory's famed "road train," a lorry-pulling tractor that had a 20-ton capacity, or eight lorries' worth. Its tank-like treads allowed the vehicle to go where there were no roads. District Officer Moffett wrote of its employment in the 1937 concentrations at Uyowa and Bugomba in Tabora Region that "It went anywhere and everywhere along the crudest bush tracks, through deep river beds, across miles of soft – and very corrugated – cultivated land. On the very few occasions when it 'stuck' it simply unhitched one trailer, surmounted the obstacle with the other, and then returned for the first one."⁸⁹ No such technical marvel eased the moves in Buha.

In fact, in contradistinction to all subsequent creations of concentrations, a process that was ongoing until independence in 1961, the government allocated no special funding for the 1933 concentration of Buha, except for funding to introduce new agricultural products like groundnuts.⁹⁰ Rather than the road train, it was "Co-operative head transport"⁹¹ that moved the material possessions of these tens of thousands of people. PC Bagshawe did state that "lorries were used wherever a road existed," but he should have noted that there was only one serviceable road in 1933, and any use of it would involve portering possessions to the road, the distance to which would have been nearly the same as carrying the materials directly to the concentration sites. Even when porters were available, though, they were ultimately drawn from local areas. In a

⁸⁸ Fairbairn, "Sleeping Sickness," 20 fn.

⁸⁹ Moffett, "A Strategic Retreat," 37.

⁹⁰ Bagshawe, "Concentrations in Uha," 142, see also chart in Fairbairn, "Sleeping Sickness," 20, in which no allocation is noted for 1933 Buha, despite the fact that it represented at least ten times the number of people moved in any other year.

⁹¹ Bagshawe, "Concentrations in Uha," 142.

meeting whose record was not part of the League of Nations report, Bagshawe clarified that the source of this porter labor was “provided by means of tax defaulters of whom there were many in the district.”⁹² Moreover, evidence indicates that Bagshawe was well aware of the fact that Ha people bore more of the costs of resettlement compared to other Africans in the country undergoing similar moves. Years later, Bagshawe intimated to his superiors that the Buha concentrations had been done on the cheap, that in comparison to concentrations in the Lake and Bukoba Provinces, “no native in this province has ever been paid any compensation at all.”⁹³ In 1945, the Sleeping Sickness Officer calculated that resettlement cost between Shs. 3/02 and Shs. 6/17 *per head* to resettle, which would have meant an expenditure of between Shs. 48,000 and Shs. 96,000 for Buha’s move. But the 1933 concentrations in Buha received no special funding, and Bagshawe himself described the 1934 move of 1,000 people into Nyaronga in this way: “They were visited, I think, by a cadet, and then they moved themselves at no cost or bother to anyone.”⁹⁴

Contested Sites: Mwalye, Bweru-Murungu, and Buhoro

The colonial government’s plans and sleeping sickness concentration legislation left no option for eastern Buha to remain with any population after 1933, and yet three sites remained populated, one until 1942. In response to Ha pressure, colonial officials agreed to allow people in Mwalye, Bweru-Murungu, and Buhoro to remain. The histories of these areas indicate how the colonial state could not force absolute

⁹² TNA 21709 Sleeping Sickness Concentration Committee. 17 July 1933 meeting.

⁹³ TNA 180 M/20 Sleeping Sickness Settlements: Kigoma District Native Affairs. Provincial Commissioner Western Bagshawe to Chief Secretary, 19 July 1936.

⁹⁴ RH Mss.Afr.s.303 Bagshawe Papers. 1934 Western Province Annual Report.

compliance even when they were implementing public health policies which they considered to be scientific, expert, and irrefutable. Instead, they granted concessions in ways that would support the status of Indirect Rulers in areas that produced substantial tax revenues. And yet, these concessions were ultimately the result of Ha valuing of the area. There were powerful reasons for Ha resistance to abandon these sites, a resistance that belies the image that elders paint of their parents and grandparents as fully compliant and the state as absolutely impossible to defy. For the long-term inhabitants of Mwalye, Bweru-Murungu, and Buhoro, resettlement meant more than abandoning homesteads, crops, and familiar landscapes, difficult as this was – they were also leaving sites of significant economic and spiritual power. Eastern Buha was famous for its agricultural fertility, the availability of protein sources from game animals, and its highly valued natural resources of honey, salt, and iron. These rich resources helped lowlanders to forge vibrant trading connections in all directions from the lowlands – to Tabora, Runzewe, Biharamulo, highland Buha, and Burundi. But economic resources were not merely *things* in lowland Buha – they were both the results of and the visible evidence for the maintenance of good relations between people and ancestral and nature spirits. These economic resources and powerful spiritual forces made the area valuable to residents and to political leaders alike. Although oral evidence is not definitive, there is at least a suggestion that local and regional Ha leaders attempted to manipulate sleeping sickness policy to retain population in areas advantageous to themselves.

Mwalye


Mwalye or Mwadye is the most famous ritual site in Muhambwe. It is a rock formation about 20 kilometers away from Kifura, and is known as a place of healing, of economic resources and prosperity, and of political ritual. Michele Wagner argues that the site was originally important because of the powerful *mashinga* who lived there and gave gifts of grinding stones and perennial streams through the intervention of *bateko*. Later, she suggests, Muhambwe's royal family, the *Abahumbi*, incorporated Mwalye into their own ritual uses, making it a yearly pilgrimage site because it was the place for royal burials.⁹⁵ She views the ritual specialists at Mwalye as serving different powers, some like the royal buriers were involved with perpetuating the symbols of royal power, while others were in charge of managing relations between the resident *ishinga* and those who approached the *ishinga* for help. The site, she suggests, likely "remained sacred and connected to different ideological systems at the same time," the royal family tapping into the site's ritual significance to further their own spiritual power.⁹⁶ Some evidence even suggests that local ritualists may have combined both functions, that the likely *muteko* of Mwalye, identified as Mihanga in 1923, was one of the ritual buriers of the *mwami* as well.⁹⁷ Elders' recollections of the yearly rituals in which large groups of people participated also shows a mixture of function. While residents went to Mwalye at the same time as the *mwami's ukutelekela* of his or her ancestors, their requests were

⁹⁵ Wagner, "Environment, Community," 187.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 188.

⁹⁷ Charles Bagenal, "Mwalye: A Sacred Mountain of Tanganyika," 302 in "History of Buha through the Tunze Papers," in author's possession, and Wagner, "Environment, Community," 188.

more typical of those which people made to *mashinga*: they asked for good rain, many children, abundant crops, and wealth.⁹⁸



Figures 2.2 and 2.3 Left: Scan of a photograph of Mwalye taken by Provincial Commissioner Charles Bagenal in 1923. Right: *Muteko* Mihanga of Mwalye standing in the cave where the *baami* were entombed. RH Mss.Afr.s.2351 Box 2 Charles Bagenal Papers. Used with permission.

Locals living near Mwalye were certainly aware of its spiritual and political significance, but their home also provided a series of important resources. Blacksmiths found raw ore in the vicinity for making iron for tools and weapons. Elders recall large honey harvests due to the area's forest and nectar-producing plants. But the area was also known as a place of healing, where local healers came to find effective medicines, and where some patients were directed to go for treatment. Bilangamila Mphanye of Busunzu recalled that patients were either directed to go to Mwalye to perform rituals for healing, or healers would sometimes conduct the patient to the area personally.⁹⁹ And for

⁹⁸ Interview of Johnston Timba Rugana 29 May 2009 Kasebuzi Village.

⁹⁹ Interview of Bilangamile Mphanye 17 October 2007 Busunzu Village.

problems pertaining to the entire community, disasters or wild animal attacks, people turned to the ritualists at Mwalye to intervene.¹⁰⁰

Abandoning a site as powerful as Mwalye carried with it significant consequences for the *mwami*, the local ritualists, and the residents of the Mwalye area. And yet, as Wagner notes, Mwalye's *Mtware* Ndawe was singled out as one of the most successful local leaders to move his people into concentrations. Wagner posits that Ndawe's success was due to his consultation of the *ishinga* through the local *muteko*.¹⁰¹ With the local spirit informed and perhaps able to direct Mwalye peoples' move away, it was accomplished more easily in comparison to other sites.

But the British did not require everyone to move in 1933. Although details are lacking, it is probable that they allowed five people to remain at Mwalye until 1938 so that they could continue to perform rituals.¹⁰² While the British did not necessarily recognize the area's full spiritual significance, they certainly understood it as an unique site where the *mwami* performed the rituals that buttressed his or her prestige and power. One oral interview suggests that *Mwami* Ruhaga manipulated settlement policy to avoid the complete depopulation of Mwalye. Definitive evidence is lacking, but the memory of an elder from Buhoro suggests that the *mwami* may have attempted to build up the local population. Ballikulije Lulitiliye recalled that Ruhaga forcibly moved his family three times, the first from Buhoro to Mwalye: "She moved us from Buhoro coming to Kifura, arriving [first] at Mwalye. ...I remember the move." He remembered that they remained at Mwalye for only a short time before they were told to return to Buhoro where they

¹⁰⁰ Wagner, "Environment, Community," 189.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 195.

¹⁰² RH Mss.Afr.s.503 John Rooke-Johnston Papers. 1940 Handing Over Report Kigoma District, 36.

stayed for a few years before moving to Kifura with everyone else.”¹⁰³ It is possible that this move from Buhoro to Mwalye occurred in 1933 when Ruhaga was attempting to maintain some population at Mwalye, but she was later required to empty the area and send people to other concentration sites, including Buhoro. The final forced movement – Lulitaliye recalled that compulsion and fire were involved in all of them – may have been in 1942 when Buhoro was finally depopulated. The continued presence of people at Mwalye was thus short-lived, but was nevertheless the source of negotiation between Muhambwe’s rulers anxious to maintain its ritual importance and colonial officials anxious not to damage the *mwami*’s prestige.

Bweru-Murungu

By 1931, medical officials diagnosed sleeping sickness in the portions of eastern Buha near the Moyowosi salt marshes, including the areas of Bweru and Murungu.¹⁰⁴ Because PC Bagshawe fully expected difficulties to ensue with the concentration of Bweru and its environs, he held a special meeting in May 1933 with *Mwami* Ruhaga “to talk about ‘propaganda’...especially to think out the problem of Bweru, Murungu & Buhoro.”¹⁰⁵ Although Bagshawe recorded no details from this meeting, his concerns proved to be well-founded: over the next four years, residents and administrators would contend over whether Bweru and Murungu would remain populated. This history included two exceptions to policy. The first exception, in 1933, was to allow a number of people to remain in Bweru who were too small to constitute a concentration under official policy and who were not placed near colonial infrastructure deemed necessary to detect

¹⁰³ Interview Balikulije Lulitaliye 17 October 2007 Busunzu Village.

¹⁰⁴ RH Mss.Afr.r.190 John E. S. Griffiths Diary, entries from early February 1932.

¹⁰⁵ RH Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 15 May 1933.

and treat sleeping sickness. The later exception, in 1937, was to refuse to continue a concentration incorporating Bweru and Murungu people, despite sufficient numbers of people being present.

The Bweru-Murungu area was highly valued by its residents, and those from surrounding areas, in part because of the substantial resources it provided – rich agricultural land, good hunting, honey bee habitat, and perhaps the most important resource in the lowlands, one with strong spiritual dimensions: salt. According to archeologists J. E. G. Sutton and A. D. Roberts, there are nine sites in Tanzania capable of producing salt which can serve more than a local community's needs, and at least five of them are located within Kigoma Region. While the most famous and prolific salt source is in Uvinza, there are also three sites in northern Buha which can produce surplus salt.¹⁰⁶ The most significant one, a network of salt marshes between Kimyora and Bweru, is located within the drainage area of the Moyowosi River in eastern Buha. Bweru was the home of a permanent community that mixed agriculture, honey gathering, hunting, and salt production and one of many area sites that annually welcomed thousands of Africans from Buha and the broader region to make salt.¹⁰⁷

Bweru and surrounding areas could also produce an impressive amount of grain, and a touring administrative official noted in 1932 that the Ha people in this area planted

¹⁰⁶ Besides the salt areas in the far east, which I have called the Moyowosi salt areas, there was significant salt production in the Ibanda area just east of Kifura, and in Luhama, near the northern bend of the Malagarasi. It appears that the Ibanda salt making "villages" were those seen by Bergassessor Dantz during his 1897 geological expedition, as they were "close to the eastern reaches of the Malagarassi." See Helge Kjekshus, *Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History: The Case of Tanganyika, 1850-1950* (London: James Currey, 1996): 99. For, Luhama see TNA 450 160/38/4/1 Sleeping Sickness Kigoma District Survey. Agricultural Surveyor Allinson to Dr. H. Fairbairn, 22 June 1935.

¹⁰⁷ It was recorded in 1924 that over 5,000 "alien Africans" from Burundi, Bukoba, and Tabora journeyed to Bweru to evaporate salt. See TNA 1733/3/45 1924 Annual Report Kigoma Region.

larger plots than highland Ha farmers did, estimating that one household would plant as much as an acre of crops both surrounding their homes and in more distant locations. Millet, sorghum, cassava, groundnuts, and even potatoes were planted, and seen to thrive.¹⁰⁸ From year to year, the yields were consistently good – District Agricultural Officer Donald Sturdy toured the area in 1929 and noted that “Excellent crops of mtama [sorghum] and mhundi [sic: maize] are grown.”¹⁰⁹ Elders’ recollections of Bweru’s fertility approach the vein of high tales. Dorosia Zacharia, who was born the week people left Bweru but who returned as a young girl to help with honey collection, told us that Bweru was a place where even a small area would yield so much that a farmer “could not collect all the maize grown....even if you cultivate less than an acre, if you cultivate and [even if] you don’t weed, you could harvest everything that you planted.”¹¹⁰ Women mainly focused on agriculture, while men spent much of the dry season making salt and other parts of the year hunting or collecting honey and beeswax. All in all, the region produced abundant crops and provided its residents with resources useful at home and for trading outside.

The local salt made Bweru an important node in the regional trade economy. Up to 5,000 Africans per year came to eastern Buha’s salt making sites to manufacture salt.¹¹¹ They came from the immediate surrounding area as well as from hundreds of

¹⁰⁸ RH Mss.Afr.r.180 John E. S. Griffiths Diary, 7 February 1932.

¹⁰⁹ RH Mss.Afr.s.1612 (2) Donald Sturdy Papers. Letter of 22 January 1929.

¹¹⁰ Interview of Dolothea Zacharia 29 October 2007 Kumhasha Village.

¹¹¹ Elders described a unique work culture that resulted from the demands of salt manufacturing. The two methods of salt making, from saline-rich grasses or saliferous soils, required round the clock processing as the salt was removed by boiling and filtering. Men built houses at salt-making sites and worked in small groups to tend the boiling salt. Saltmakers from nearby communities could provision themselves, but those from farther away bought or traded for supplies locally. A major dimension of the local economy was thus supplying not only food but tools to saltmakers. Interviews of Warungendanye Kagoma 22 October 2007



Figure 2.4 PC Charles Bagenal photographed what he called the “salt village” at Kimyora during a visit in 1921. The housing style shown is called *misonge*, and examination of the photograph reveals salt making implements and over 100 people in the background. RH Mss.Afr.s.2351 Box 2 Charles Bagenal Papers. Used with permission.

miles away, including Burundi, Bukoba, Tabora, Kahama, and Biharamulo. Although colonial officials only record the name Kimyora as a salt-producing spot, elders recall dozens of names for individual places, and describe a chain of salt-making sites in the Bweru area that would take several days to cross by foot.¹¹² Because the salt season lasted anywhere from two to five months, these people bought food and supplies locally,

Kumshindwi Village, Expirius Nkooko 17 October 2007 Kifura Village, and Makupi Motuta 1 June 2009 Kumhasha Village. See also Kjekshus, *Ecology Control*, 100 for a description of salt production in the area from the late 19th century.

¹¹² Warungendanye Kagoma, who himself made salt, recalled the following places: Kimyora Nyansokelwa, Kigarula, Kabhongosha, Nyamafwero, Nyamakoto, Kwihima, Nyarugaga, Kwilima, Mluhama. Interview of Warungendanye Kagoma 22 October 2007 Kumshindwi Village. Ndabhateze Kagoma, no relation, also

fuelling local crop production. But large numbers also came to the area to trade for salt, which they then transported using surrounding trade networks.¹¹³ Several colonial observers even noted how Africans from surrounding areas earned their tax money by trading in Bweru's salt. District Agriculture Officer Donald Sturdy observed people from Kasagamba and Kumsanda crossing to Bweru with "food and Karanga [groundnuts] to buy the salt and then go & peddle it."¹¹⁴

While Moyowosi salt played a significant role in regional trade networks, its most important connection was to Burundi. The markets along the Tanzanian-Burundian border like Mabamba were flooded with salt each year; a district officer wrote of the young men "up from the salt works fifty miles away [unwrapping] their 'vihiga', the long, sausage-shaped bundles of coarse, grey salt" to sell.¹¹⁵ Some of these carriers went to the salt sites to acquire salt from the salt manufacturers, while others were saltmakers themselves from all over the region. There was a vibrant trade of salt and livestock between the lowlands and Burundi, in part because Moyowosi salt apparently had greater cachet than that of Uvinza. Rundi people reportedly preferred Moyowosi salt to that of

made salt at Nyakalo, near Bweru, but remembered salt areas called Kumvubhu, Nyakifurifuri, and Nyarusese. Interview of Ndabhateze Kagoma 29 October 2007 and 15 May 2009 Kumhasha Village.

¹¹³ Warungendanye Kagoma said traders with food came from Heru, Buyungu, Muhambwe, Runzewe, Moyowosi, Malagarasi, and Buhaya to obtain salt at Bweru. Interview of Warungendanye Kagoma 22 October 2007 Kumshindwi Village. Dr. Maclean wrote that the primary trade routes from salt making sites in the Moyowosi area were to Kalumwa (Msalala Mdogo) and Uyoga. I have not been able to locate these places. See UG 73/21 George Maclean diary, 1 November 1926.

¹¹⁴ RH Mss.Afr.s.1612 (2) Donald Sturdy letters, 29 September 1928 and 30 October 1928.

¹¹⁵ Quotation from John J. Tawney, "An International Interlude" RH Mss.Afr.s.1333. Interview of Ndabhateze Kagoma 29 October 2007 Kumhasha Village. See J. E. G. Sutton and A. D. Roberts, "Uvinza and Its Salt Industry," *Azania* 3 (1968): 45-86, 68-9 and UG DC 73/3 George Maclean Diary, 1 November 1926.

Uvinza as “they fear to give the latter to their cattle,”¹¹⁶ possibly because of Uvinza salt’s lack of iodine. Local saltmakers often chose to engage in trade themselves, taking salt to cattle areas in the Buha highlands or in Burundi, and either buying cattle which they left with local partners across the border to care for them, or returning with cattle or goats to the lowlands where they sold them as meat.¹¹⁷ The trade was highly profitable: District Agricultural Officer Donald Sturdy recorded that goats purchased in Burundi for 4/- to 6/- shillings could be sold at Bweru for 6/- to 8/- shillings.

For the people of Bweru and Murungu, the local salt was the source of immense wealth in a form that helped people create and extend social relationships. Its attraction to traders meant that products of all kinds were available at Bweru. Salt “was income,” *amapato*. It fulfilled local peoples’ 2-shilling tax obligation and allowed Bweru’s people to buy luxury goods like cloth long before it appeared in other parts of Buha.¹¹⁸ It was reported in 1933 that one 5-month salt season of work there could yield as many as ten loads, or 30-40 *vihiga* or *ibhibele* (s. *ikibhele*), of salt to a skilled worker, and elders’ recollections bear this out.¹¹⁹ Each *ikibele* weighed about 20 pounds and was the equivalent of immense wealth. Elders recall that a cow could be purchased for three or

¹¹⁶ RH Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 8.9.33. The lack of iodine theory is my own based on a comment by District Commissioner John Rooke-Johnston concerning Uvinza salt’s lack of iodine, and the serious goiter problems it caused for the Africans who used it.

¹¹⁷ Interview of Ndabhateze Kagoma 29 October 2007 Kumhasha Village. Dr. George Maclean wrote of goats, foodstuffs, hoes, and cash arriving at Bweru from Burundi, with salt taken in exchange. UG DC 73/5 George Maclean Diary, 1928-30, no date for this entry. This salt trade appears to be a later chapter to that of the late nineteenth century, which is explored in Michele Wagner, “Whose History is History? A History of the Baragane people of Buragane, Southern Burundi, 1850-1932” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, 1991).

¹¹⁸ Interview of Warugendanye Kagoma 22 October 2007 Kumshindwi Village.

¹¹⁹ For a sense of how much this amount of salt was worth, see J. F. Mbwiliza, “Chunyonyu and the Nineteenth-Century Salt Trade in the Kingdom of Heru in Buha,” *Kale* (1973): 36-56, 48.



Figure 2.5 In the foreground of this scanned photograph is a pile of *vihiga* or *ibhibele*, containers of salt made from sewn leaves. Taken at Uvinza 1929. RH Mss.Afr.s.2134 Box 5 File 2, Alfred Dalton Papers. Used with permission.

four *ibhibele*, and just one *ikibhele* could be sold to pay a year's worth of tax.¹²⁰ The remaining salt was pure profit. Salt was valued not only for what it could bring in trade, but had significant local uses. Packages of salt, for instance, always formed part of a bride price locally.¹²¹ Moreover, because salt makers had ready access to cattle by trading salt, they could even contract marriages in areas where cattle was a part of bride price.¹²²

¹²⁰ Interview of Ndabhateze Kagoma 29 October 2007 Kumhasha Village.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² Interview of Warungendanye Kagoma 22 October 2007 Kumshindwi Village.

Colonial officials were more than aware that these areas could be quite profitable to the administration. By March 1930, all salt making sites in the Kibondo were taxed officially:

1. Every native extracting salt from any of the marshes in Muhambwe or obtaining salt from any natural source in Muhambwe shall pay to the authorized Native Administration a tax on the following scale: - an amount of salt equal to half the amount of salt extracted by him with a maximum of one load of 25 lbs. of salt.
2. Any native contravening this order shall be liable to a fine of Shs. 200/- or to imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding two months.¹²³

In fact, the salt itself and revenues from selling it were counted on as an important part of the budget by district and provincial officials. The District Officer in 1931 wrote that the revenue from a very good year of salt panning might make up for a shortfall in the district's budget that year. In the same year, the Provincial Commissioner counted on the salt itself to help with the potential food shortage in the district. He wrote to superiors in Dar es Salaam that Kibondo's "tribal treasury will shortly become possessed of a good deal of salt (tribute from salt collectors). This usually is purchased by Urundi natives: they will be encouraged to bring in food, sell it, and buy salt with the money."¹²⁴ This food would then be made available at a set price for any people in need of food relief – a much simpler process for officials than the usual arrangement to buy grain and truck it to distribution centers. Officials acknowledged that moving people from these areas would mean a loss of revenue for the local treasury.

¹²³ TNA 19223 Official Record of Rules Enacted by Native Authorities. There is an identical order for the other area of Kibondo, Buyungu.

¹²⁴ TNA 19859 Food Shortage Kigoma Province. See and District Officer to Provincial Commissioner 2 July 1931, and Provincial Commissioner to Chief Secretary 2 September 1931.

Beyond their economic importance, though, special resources like salt were imbued with spiritual meanings in Ha thought. Oral and written evidence related to the environmental-spiritual beliefs connected to salt making sites are limited, yet appear to accord with the broader Ha belief system in nature spirits and descriptions of Ha rituals at the Uvinza salt pans. When Provincial Commissioner Charles Bagenal visited Kimyora



Figure 2.6 “The Sanctuary of the Guardian Spirit of the Salt,” RH Mss.Afr.s.2351 Box 2 Charles Bagenal Papers. Used with permission.

in 1921, he photographed a clump of grass which he identified as “The Sanctuary of the Guardian Spirit of the Salt.”¹²⁵ These descriptions accord with the Ha ecological understanding that viewed the landscape as imbued with highly localized nature spirits

¹²⁵ RH Mss.Afr.s.2351 Box 2 Charles Bagenal Papers.

who lived in specific locations such as groves of trees or anthills. *Mashinga* were associated with special resources, but required careful handling because their power could be used either to benefit or to harm residents. The person charged with interceding with *mashinga* were *bateko*, earth spirit priests and the descendants of the reputed first settler of the area.¹²⁶ It appears that there were many *bateko* in the salt producing areas of the lowlands, although at least one *muteko* controlled more than one area. The *muteko* of the Nyakalo and Kimyora salt area was called Kanyamugina, or “the one who owns anthills”. He was the “owner” of the area, *umutelekela*, but there were other *bateko* in charge of other salt making sites in the area.¹²⁷ As in other examples of strong spiritual power, avoidance appears to have been part of the rituals at salt making sites. PC Bagshawe recorded that if the *muteko* at Bweru saw salt makers, or vice versa, “there will be no salt.”¹²⁸ This fits with what Warungendanye Kagoma remembered, that salt makers would request that the *mtware* ask the *muteko* to propitiate the spirit who lived at “the place that he [the *muteko*] owned.” The salt makers provided the *muteko* with beer, which the *muteko* used to honor the *ishinga*. Salt makers did not witness the actions performed by the *muteko*, but they may have resembled the rituals at Uvinza. At Uvinza, ritual control over the springs was in the hands of the *muteko*¹²⁹ whose role was so central to salt production that no one began work on the Uvinza springs until after *bateko* performed an annual ceremony, usually involving the sacrifice of a white chicken and

¹²⁶ Michele Wagner, “Environment, Community,” 179.

¹²⁷ Interview of Ndabhateze Kagoma 15 May 2009 Kumhasha Village.

¹²⁸ RH Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 8 August 1933.

¹²⁹ Sutton and Roberts, 65.

goat.¹³⁰ In any case, salt makers at Bweru clearly believed that the *ishinga* controlled the salt: they would ask “Mashinga, please give us salt. Now Mashinga, we want our salt to be brought.”¹³¹ Elders claimed that without the *muteko*’s *ukutelekela* at salt making sites, salt makers would wind up with “plain water” rather than salt.¹³² Once finished with their work, salt makers gave a small portion of their product to the *muteko*. If the salt season was particularly good, *bateko* could build their reputations – “This one gets a name at that place where he owned.”¹³³

The economic and spiritual power of the Bweru and salt producing sites were highly attractive to local leaders, from *batware* through the *mwami*. They each received a small percentage of each salt maker’s salt through a local collector assigned to each site. Local saltmakers paid an amount dependent on how much they had made, while foreigners, especially Burundians, had to contribute more.¹³⁴ Elders do not recall resenting the portion going to political leaders – they were viewed as a necessary part of the process: “If you didn’t have a leader, how could you know that place?”¹³⁵

In the early period of planning for the concentration of the Moyowosi area, PC Bagshawe and Dr. Maclean had no intention of allowing any population to remain at Bweru or Murungu. In May 1933, Bagshawe and Dr. Maclean conferred to discuss these

¹³⁰ Andrew Roberts, “Nyamwezi Trade,” in *Pre-Colonial African Trade*, eds. Richard Gray and David Birmingham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970): 39-74, 47 and Mbwiliza, 45 for the sacrificial offering.

¹³¹ Interview of Warungendanye Kagoma 22 October 2007 Kumshindwi Village.

¹³² Interview of Makupi Motuta 29 May 2009 Kumhasha Village.

¹³³ Interview of Warungendanye Kagoma 22 October 2007 Kumshindwi Village.

¹³⁴ Interview of Ndabhateze Kagoma 29 October 2007 Kumhasha Village and interview of Warungendanye Kagoma 22 October 2007 Kumshindwi Village. Ndabhateze said that if a person was very successful, he might give the leaders as much as a *ikibhele* of salt, roughly equivalent to a *vihiga*. A good year could yield as many as 20 *ibhibele* of salt, so the portion was about 5%. A less successful salt maker would only give a heaping handful, *akaganza*.

¹³⁵ Interview of Warungendanye Kagoma 22 October 2007 Kumshindwi Village.

eastern areas. Their thought at the time was "...that it will be best to make a concentration at or on the river side of Buhoro [south of Bweru and Murungu]: to get Murungu to join this, and to get Bweru in to Kafura [sic] all the people of the area being given the choice of each concentration."¹³⁶ Plans had not progressed much by early June when Bagshawe convened a meeting of the *batware* of Bweru, Murungu and Buhoro at the Kibondo district office. Only a few details could be worked out concerning Bweru because the major *Mtware* Magombe refused to attend the meeting and only one of her subordinates came. Two days later, she sent a messenger to the office rather than appearing herself, and resigned her post. Bagshawe continued the meeting with her four subordinates and told them that

they can't stop in Bweru & must go somewhere: that they can join Kafura, or Buhoro, or even come into Kibondo, & that the different watwale could go to different place, if they like. They had, however, obviously talked things over, and promptly decided for Kafura, which is good, as there is land available, for the 810 families involved.¹³⁷

Bagshawe showed every sign of moving ahead with this plan, arranging for District Officer Griffiths and Dr. Maclean to meet with the Bweru *batware* at Kifura to begin planning for the move.

The written record does not detail why Bagshawe reversed course and allowed people to remain at the Bweru-Murungu area. By August 1933, Bagshawe and DO Page had decided to allow people to form concentrated settlements in fly free areas of Bweru and Murungu, and to allow 38 people to remain at Kimyora which was not free of tsetse fly. Technically, because there were fly-free areas in Bweru and Murungu, the decision

¹³⁶ RH Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 17 May 1933.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 17 May 1933, 3 June 1933 and 5 June 1933.

concerning Bweru-Murungu did not contravene official sleeping sickness policy. In practice, though, residents of other parts of eastern Buha were not given the option of remaining in their home areas if there were fly free portions – officials moved all other people into areas that were more accessible to medical authorities. It appears that officials were under pressure from the area’s residents and political leaders. Bagshawe records numerous meetings with *Mwami* Ruhaga during which she could have made her case for Bweru-Murungu to remain populated – the area was discussed frequently, even if Bagshawe does not note any details. Years later, once Bweru and Murungu were evacuated, District Officer John Rooke-Johnston wrote that it was for “political reasons” that people were allowed to remain in eastern Buha.¹³⁸ The decision concerning Kimyora was even more surprising as it was clearly *against* sleeping sickness policy. Here officials may have eventually acceded to rhetoric of “tribal assets” that Buha’s leaders might have supported. Bagshawe recorded that the 38 people at Kimyora were under the leadership of *muteko* Njaberi, and were there to “protect the tribal salt” under the leadership of *muteko* Njaberi.¹³⁹

Despite its importance for taxation, though, Provincial Commissioner Bagshawe saw salt and other resources as an impediment for accomplishing important changes in the lowlands. While a resource, in Bagshawe’s eyes Bweru’s salt was just a locally-used product and could not contribute to the broader colonial economy. Because of this, he referred to Bweru and the surrounding area as “economically hopeless.”¹⁴⁰ Bagshawe

¹³⁸ TNA 23892 Sleeping Sickness Settlements: Kigoma District. Provincial Commissioner Bagshawe to Chief Secretary, 22 July 1936.

¹³⁹ RH Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 8 August 1933.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 9 August 1933.

even schemed to undermine the value of Moyowosi salt by replacing it with other salt that accorded better with local preferences than Uvinza salt did. He encouraged a European trader named Reid to open a shop at the Kakonko and Makere concentrations in Buha since “his principal aim is to sell salt & I discussed the suggestion of selling cheap ‘brown’ salt in order to undercut the Bweru...native salt makers: we want to keep them out of fly & danger, but just can’t as long as they have a market, as they have at present in Urundi.”¹⁴¹ But to Ha people, Moyowosi’s economic importance was indivisible from the belief system connected to salt production.

In his diary, Bagshawe recorded that he intended these exceptions would last for a short period only when the residents would be forced to move when – not if – they became ill. But in the mean time, Bagshawe was determined that this move would fulfill administrative goals and bring a peripheral area into a closer form of control. He demanded that all people move into fly free areas, that every resident must be documented – “there were to be no ‘refugees’ here: everyone would be written down at once, and only those on the list could live here: if they let refugees squat I would move them” – that all tax must be collected during one month at one location, and that a court would be built to try cases.¹⁴² Even if people were not moved, eastern Buha was to be transformed by sleeping sickness policy.

PC Bagshawe’s intention of eventually depopulating Bweru and Murungu was complicated by its attractiveness to locals. Agricultural Surveyor E. Allinson visited Bweru in September 1934 and saw good crops and a burgeoning population: “this area is

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 9 November 1933.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 9 August 1933.

becoming quite popular, as far as I can ascertain at the moment some 60 families have moved in during the last few months.”¹⁴³ By 1936, there were over 1,100 families in the area.¹⁴⁴ Murungu grew even faster. The *mtware* of Murungu in 1933, Mukuze Miseke or Maseke, a relative of *Mwami Ruhaga*’s, had been the *mtware* of Kadida/Makena when it was forced to concentrate in 1933 into the Kifura concentration. She resisted this move, and was likely among those who defied Bagshawe directly: “The people of Kadida proved troublesome. They started out by saying that nothing would induce them to go anywhere at all: they would sooner die at Kadida.” They argued that they could not grow crops at Kifura and suggested that if they must move, they should go to the east, which Bagshawe rejected: he told them that “no one could go to Bweru or Murungu, or stop in the bush.”¹⁴⁵ Miseke must have had long standing family connections to the Kimyora and the Bweru-Murungu area; she “pleaded to be allowed to send a party to Kimyora to arrange for her [ancestral] sacrifices.”¹⁴⁶ A few months later, after being moved by force to Kifura, she resigned her post at Kadida. Sometime thereafter she became the *mtware* of Murungu because it was “as far away as possible” from the concentrations in the west.¹⁴⁷ About 1,200 of her followers chose to go with her to the fly free parts of Murungu.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴³ TNA 450 160/38/4/1 Sleeping Sickness Kigoma District Survey. E. Allinson to Sleeping Sickness Officer, 8 September 1934.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.* E. Allinson to Sleeping Sickness Officer, 19 February 1937. It was a promising enough settlement to prompt the Church Mission Society to request plots at Bweru in 1934. See TNA 21711 Sleeping Sickness Concentrations: Educational Arrangements Concerning. Provincial Commissioner Bagshawe to District Officer Kigoma, 19 February 1934.

¹⁴⁵ RH Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 7 August 1933.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 11 August 1933.

¹⁴⁷ RH Mss.Afr.s.295 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 23 November 1936.

¹⁴⁸ RH Mss.Afr.s.503 John Rooke-Johnston Papers. 1940 Handing Over Report Kigoma District, 34. It is not clear if this was 1,200 people total, or 1,200 taxpayers (and their families), although I suspect the latter.

Residents of Bweru and Murungu had manifold reasons to wish to remain in their homes, the sources of economic prosperity and spiritual power, but local and regional leaders were also intent on maintaining the settlement at Bweru and Murungu. There is suggestive evidence that besides groups of people willingly moving to Bweru, local leaders again manipulated sleeping sickness policy and the coercive powers that the government gave to them to insure that population remained in their areas. One of the oldest informants we met, who was likely born around 1920, described a move from the area between Bweru and Runzewe called Kangatale. He recalled being moved into an *umukutano* called Mlulemela, a part of the Bweru concentration. This move was obviously by force: “they took us to Mlulemela....You see, to leave the grassland was difficult, they were coming there unwillingly. There was one person from Murungu, they brought him in handcuffs.”¹⁴⁹ Some families left their homes in the night time to go to other places; his own family traveled the morning after their house was burned. But bolstering Bweru’s population was counterproductive for colonial officials; local Ha leaders, though, stood to gain from it.

But growth in population in an area that was not closely connected to colonial infrastructure was worrisome to officials, especially since both leaders and residents showed signs of opposition to the administration. Many officials came to refer to these people as “renegades,” and noted that a large part of the population were people who had come from other areas that had been concentrated because they refused to be a part of the new settlement pattern.¹⁵⁰ Worse yet was the overt opposition to concentration that

¹⁴⁹ Interview of Ndabhateze Kagoma 25 October 2007 Kumhasha Village.

¹⁵⁰ TNA 967/821/1 1935 Annual Report on Native Affairs: Western Province.

leaders like Miseke had demonstrated. Officials congratulated themselves when the areas were finally evacuated, as it broke up “a band of renegades...who have opposed Anti Sleeping Sickness Concentrations from the beginning and included Mwami Ruhaga’s Aunt, Mtwale Miseke, who was at the head of them.”¹⁵¹

Despite good crops, improved tax collection, and interest shown in the area by missionary groups like the Church Missionary Society, officials claimed that “there is no progress” in Bweru or Murungu, and that the two areas gave the largest number of sleeping sickness cases for 1935.¹⁵² The reason for the increased infections was not, apparently, where Bweru and Murungu people were living, but that their salt and beekeeping activities forced them to remain in tsetse fly habitat for extended periods of time. Officials decided in May 1936 that the only solution was to completely close any trade in salt and move the entire population of Bweru-Murungu into either the Kifura or the Nyavyumbu concentrations.¹⁵³ Even a significant drop in the number of cases in the district between 1935 and 1936, down to just 92 cases for the year, did not motivate a change in plan. Officials instead pointed out that most of these cases came from Bweru and Murungu.¹⁵⁴ Bagshawe worried that this move would be very difficult “as the people are wild and have a huge area of uninhabited bush and swamp behind them into which they can bolt,”¹⁵⁵ but Bagshawe instructed Ruhaga to tell her people that “if they run into

¹⁵¹ TNA 967/821/1 1937 Kigoma District Annual Report, 2.

¹⁵² TNA 967/821/1 1935 Annual Report Kigoma District, 5.

¹⁵³ RH Mss.Afr.s.503 John Rooke-Johnston Papers, 5.

¹⁵⁴ RH Mss.Afr.s.303 Francis Bagshawe Papers, Annual Report Upon Native Affairs 1936, 4.

¹⁵⁵ TNA 63/934 vol 1 Sleeping Sickness Concentration Measures. Provincial Commissioner Bagshawe to Chief Secretary, 24 February 1937.

Tabora District – Silambo – or Kahama District – Bugomba – they will find that both are being concentrated, so there is no escape.”¹⁵⁶

Plans to concentrate Bweru and Murungu during the dry season, June-August, of 1936 were complicated by a lack of funds and the presence of a bumper crop of food that would take time to harvest and provided palpable evidence of the area’s fertility.

Bagshawe requested over £1,500 of funding to aid in trucking the people and possessions from eastern Buha to concentrations in the west. But the central government did not have the funds and refused to agree to local officials’ plan to take a loan out of Muhambwe’s Native Treasury fund to support the move.¹⁵⁷ The good harvest of 1936 meant that not only was there more food to move, but that people would be all the more loath to leave good farmland: “The Muhambwe country is just full of food & she [Ruhaga] says that Bweru & Murungu have most [sic] which is, in a way, a d— nuisance.”¹⁵⁸

But Bagshawe and his subordinates had not waited to secure funding before making preparations at Kifura and Nyavyumbu for the new influx of population. In August 1936 District Officer John Rooke-Johnston, who is popularly remembered as *Muhogo Mchungu*, or “Bitter Cassava” took *Mtware* Miseke, the local *muteko* and another *mtware* and “dumped them at Nyaovyumbe [sic].” He then made boundaries for all of the *batware* of Bweru and Murungu at Nyavyumbu and instructed them to bring their people and clear land for next season’s cultivation.¹⁵⁹ Three months later, only

¹⁵⁶ RH Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 16 May 1936. Emphasis in the original.

¹⁵⁷ RH Mss.Afr.s.295 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 2 August 1936 and 21 August 1936.

¹⁵⁸ RH Mss.Afr.s.294 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 4 July 1936.

¹⁵⁹ RH Mss.Afr.s.295 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 25 August 1936. Both John J. Tawney and Dean McHenry identify Rook-Johnston as *Muhogo Mchungu*. See Dean McHenry, “Tanzania: the struggle for development: a study of attempts to establish a fishermen’s cooperative and to introduce cotton growing in Kigoma region of Western Tanzania” (PhD diss., Indiana University, 1971): 93.

these leaders and about 60 of their followers were at Nyavyumbu, and even then thousands of pounds of their possessions remained to be moved.

By February 1937, officials secured £1500 worth of funding, which they earmarked for transportation, especially for the Territory's road train. In order to use the road train effectively, officials planned to build a new 35-mile road from Nyavyumbu to a collection point roughly halfway between Bweru and Murungu at Lubumba. Officials planned to use lorries to bring in some of the crops to Lubumba, which would be coming from as far as 25 miles away, but people were expected to do some of the carrying themselves. Officials estimated that it would take the road train 125 days to move all of the people – over 2,000 families.¹⁶⁰ All of these plans came to a screeching halt by the end of February 1937 when *Mtware* Miseke returned from a month-long visit to Murungu and reported that over two thirds of the Murungu people had left their homes. She learned that nearly 500 families had left the area, fleeing to Runzewe and Bugomba in Kahama District and to the Silambo area of Tabora.¹⁶¹ Officials scrambled to locate these families, sending out hut counters to the districts to which they were said to have gone.¹⁶² John Rooke-Johnston surmised that many had moved to Buhoro, while others likely returned to their homes from the past, between Murungu and Buhoro. He suggested that patrols needed to be sent to comb this area before and after they forced people out.¹⁶³ Officials learned that many of the Murungu people had moved with

¹⁶⁰ RH Mss.Afr.s.296 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 19 February 1937.

¹⁶¹ TNA 63/934 vol 1 Sleeping Sickness Concentration Measures. Agricultural Surveyor E. Allinson to Sleeping Sickness Officer, 21 February 1937.

¹⁶² RH Mss.Afr.s.296 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 3 March 1937.

¹⁶³ TNA 63/934 vol 1 Sleeping Sickness Concentration Measures. District Officer John Rooke-Johnston to Provincial Commissioner Western Province, 4 March 1937.

minimal possessions, making officials suspect that these refugees did not intend to stay in the new area but only went there “to get out of the way” until concentration efforts were over.¹⁶⁴

Those from the Bweru area initially went through a process of concentration much as those did in the 1933 movement. But for many Bweru people, 1937 was the second time leaders forced them to move, once into the Bweru concentration area in 1933 and the second into Kifura and Nyavyumbu.

NK: ...all the moves were by force.

JW: So in this second move did they burn houses?

NK: Twice [i.e., twice in his life].¹⁶⁵

Only a fraction of the Bweru and Murungu residents moved to concentration sites. The slow bleed of population beginning in 1936 turned into a hemorrhage, with each month’s visit to the areas revealing fewer and fewer residents. When the final move to Nyavyumbu and Kifura was made in March 1937 for Bweru, 400 families went to Nyavyumbu and 100 to Kifura from an original 1,400 families. When Murungu’s move was complete in September 1937, 165 families were traced at Nyavyumbu and 50 at Kifura, from an original 800.¹⁶⁶ Hundreds were said to have gone to other parts of Buha, to Tabora, Runzewe, and Kahama.¹⁶⁷ Officials gave different explanation for this scattering of population. In one version, one of the local agricultural surveyors, Mr. White, told residents not to plant any crops as they were going to move the next season.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, Provincial Commissioner Bagshawe to Chief Secretary, 7 April 1937.

¹⁶⁵ Interview of Ndabhateze Kagoma 25 October 2007 Kumhasha Village.

¹⁶⁶ For Bweru, see TNA 967/821/1 Kigoma District Annual Report 1938, 12. For Murungu, see TNA 63/934 vol 1 Sleeping Sickness Concentration Measures. Agricultural Surveyor E. Allinson to Sleeping Sickness Officer, 2 November 1937.

¹⁶⁷ TNA 63/934 vol 1 Sleeping Sickness Concentration Measures. Assistant District Officer J. P. Moffett to Provincial Commissioner Western Province, 28 July 1937.

A year later, when people still remained in Bweru and Murungu, they were living off of the 1936 bumper crop. In his diary, Bagshawe surmised that the lack of food had caused “the wide and troublesome scattering of the Murungu population all over the country.”¹⁶⁸ But in official annual reports written to superiors in Dar es Salaam, officials attributed the scattering of population to the fact that they were “leaderless,” seeming to forget that it was a district officer who forced the Murungu *mtware* to move before there were preparations to move the people.¹⁶⁹

After so much effort to accomplish the move, officials hailed it as a major achievement. With the evacuation of Bweru and Murungu, they claimed sleeping sickness was brought “into controllable areas” and represented “the last rounds of the fight with sleeping sickness which has gone on since 1933... the campaign in the Province [is] over.”¹⁷⁰ No one would be tempted to return to the area to live as all the houses had been burned. Moreover, with fewer people to move in the end, officials spent only £400 rather than the originally planned £1,400.¹⁷¹

Buhoro

Buhoro was an unlikely location to receive a concentration site as an exception. It was the most remote concentration site, far to the southeast of the other concentrations, but even more to the point, it had a small population. Documents concerning the settlement never estimated more than 350 families at the site, and several of these reports

¹⁶⁸ RH Mss.Afr.s.297 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 14 August 1937.

¹⁶⁹ RH Mss.Afr.s.295 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 23 November 1936.

¹⁷⁰ RH 754.12.r.25 Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners on Native Administration for the Year 1937, 83 and TNA 63/934 vol 1 Sleeping Sickness Concentration Measures. Provincial Commissioner Bagshawe to Chief Secretary, 24 February 1937.

¹⁷¹ TNA 967/821/1 1937 Kigoma District Annual Report, 2.

include the mitigating factor that a number of these families were never living in the concentration at all, but were Tussi cattle herders who stayed far to the east of Buhoro, near the border with Tabora. There they lived “quite surrounded by fly & their cattle are useless.”¹⁷² When the major *mtware* of Buhoro, Kipyoka, asked for a concentration site at Buhoro, Bagshawe was not encouraging. He told Kipyoka that he would look into it, but also said that Buhoro “is too far away, and there are not enough” people there.¹⁷³ Despite this, a few weeks later following a series of discussions with *Mwami* Ruhaga and Dr. Maclean, Bagshawe and Dr. Maclean decided that Buhoro would be the only spot in the eastern lowlands to have a concentration.¹⁷⁴

Buhoro was another resource-rich area. It was a place that had significant resources of meat from nearby forest that teemed with wild animals and no restrictions on how people used them, and abundant honey bees. It was also one of the few places in the lowlands that could support cattle,¹⁷⁵ a practice that people combined with an unique local agriculture largely dependent on areas that remained swampy throughout the year. An elder born at Buhoro explained that Buhoro’s resources made locals and *Mwami*

¹⁷² Population estimates varied wildly for Buhoro, the highest numbers being 1,700 people or 350 families. For comparisons, see RH Mss.Afr.s.503 John Rooke-Johnston Papers. 1940 Handing Over Report Kigoma District, 35; J. P. Moffett, “A Raft on the Malagarasi,” *Tanganyika Notes and Records* 16 (1943): 54-75; and TNA 63/934 vol 1 Sleeping Sickness Concentration Measures. Provincial Commissioner Bagshawe to Chief Secretary, 19 April 1937. For the quotation concerning the Tussi, see RH Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 10 May 1933.

¹⁷³ RH Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 9 May 1933.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 17 May 1933. Officials later changed their thinking and allowed settlements to continue at Bweru and Murungu.

¹⁷⁵ RH Mss.Afr.s.1331 Donald Sturdy Papers. Interview of Donald Sturdy by John J. Tawney, 26 August 1969, 13; TNA 10898 1928 Half Yearly Report for Kigoma Province, 10; RH Mss.Afr.s.1612 (8) Donald Sturdy Diary, 2 February 1929.

Ruhaga value it highly “...at that time, they were even eating meat. They were collecting honey. That’s what they loved, and this is what she [the *mwami*] loved also.”¹⁷⁶

Buhoro rivaled Mwalye for its ritual significance to the *Abahumbi* rulers of Muhambwe. While Mwalye remained the premier place for entombing *baami*, Buhoro was also the site of dynastic graves which the *mwami* would visit in order to propitiate and ask blessing from his or her ancestors. During his 1923 visit to Mwalye, Provincial Commissioner Charles Bagenal learned that other former *baami* and important members of the royal family were buried at Buhoro, including *Mwami* Ruhaga, the father of the current *Mwami*, Nyamaliza. At the time of his death, *Mwami* Ruhaga had been involved in a dispute with the rulers of Buyungu, who had seized Mwalye, and so complicated his burial.¹⁷⁷ But Buhoro was not chosen at random to serve as a substitute burial spot. Two elders explained the importance of Buhoro with accounts they heard as children, a tradition told many times by elderly relatives about how Buyungu and Muhambwe became separate polities in the early German period.¹⁷⁸ In this tradition, after the death of the first *mwami* of Buyungu and Muhambwe, Nkanza I, his son Nkanza II succeeded him as *mwami*. He held power from the Kakonko area of Buyungu as his father had

¹⁷⁶ Interview of Balikulije Lulitiliye 17 October 2007 Busunzu Village.

¹⁷⁷ Charles Bagenal, “Mwalye: A Sacred Mountain of Tanganyika,” *Journal of the Royal African Society* 24.96 (1925): 299-305.

¹⁷⁸ Beverly Brown, “Ujiji: The History of a Lakeside Town, c. 1800-1914” (PhD diss., Boston University, 1967): 11-2, gives a late 18th century split for Muhambwe and Buyungu, following a succession dispute after the reign of *Mwami* Kahigi I. In this account, his heir Nkanza initially ruled both until his *brother* Nyamaliza broke off and ruled Muhambwe separately. This account is still likely the first separation of the two kingdoms, but the elders’ stories are not mistaken. Either the two kingdoms came together again in the late 19th/early 20th century or the two *baami* merely fought each other for control over the entire area of *Abahumbi* rule. Brown, 225 collected an account in the 1960s of several attempts by *Mwami* Kihumbi of Buyungu to take over Muhambwe from Nyamaliza, who was the *mwami* of Muhambwe until her death in 1924. The British officials recorded that there were succession disputes between cousins during the reign of *Mwami* Ruhaga, who was the father of *Mwami* Nyamaliza, the protagonist of both elders’ traditions. Apparently it was this dispute between relatives which motivated Nyamaliza’s daughter *Mwami* Ruhaga to repeatedly claim rulership over the Buyungu area in the 1930s and 1940s.

done, at a place called Muganza. But Nkanza II's sister, Nyamaliza was the sub-chief of Buhoro, where her mother had lived while married to Nkanza I. After a few years of accepting her brother's rule, she began ruling in her own stead at Buhoro and refused to show signs of deference such as attending the annual gathering of *batware* at Muganza *ukushangera*, "to greet," the *mwami*. Nkanza II then fought his sister and while he could defeat her militarily, she used mystical powers to escape from her own execution. She then sought the intervention of German soldiers who removed Nkanza and split the two kingdoms.¹⁷⁹

Due to Buhoro's importance for the *mwami* of Muhambwe, it was the spot where the *mwami*'s insignia "lived". Ruhaga told PC Bagshawe that they "must always live" there.¹⁸⁰ These consisted of drums, a shield, pieces of elephant tusk, a bamboo basket, and several spears which were given to the *mwami* when he or she entered office and which remained under the guardianship of ritualists at Buhoro. The *mwami* visited Buhoro regularly to conduct ceremonies, which mainly appear to have been connected to propitiating the *mwami*'s ancestors who were buried there. Colonial officials reported that there were up to twelve sacred graves in special groves of trees where the *mwami* would come and conduct ceremonies and make offerings.¹⁸¹ *Mwami* Ruhaga's 1937 visit lasted for over a month and involved rituals and celebrations involving a special kind of

¹⁷⁹ This account follows the details given by Ladislaus Chanda Kipfumu, interview of Ladislaus Chanda Kipfumu 20 October 2007 Kifura Village. The other version was from Johnston Timba Ruganza, collected on 29 May 2009 at Kasebuzi Village. There are minor differences in the two recountings. In Mzee Ruganza's version, the heir was Kihumbi, who actually sent his sister Nyamaliza to Buhoro where the people demanded that she become their *mwami*. In this version, she is not caught by her brother before magically escaping and seeking help from the Germans, instead she flees before capture to seek help at Kigoma (rather than Tabora, in Kipfumu's version).

¹⁸⁰ RH Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 15 August 1933.

¹⁸¹ RH Mss.Afr.s.503 John Rooke-Johnston Papers. 1940 Handing Over Report Kigoma District.

beer.¹⁸² She was accompanied by a retinue of 150 people that included members of the secret *baswezi* healing society.

Colonial officials appear to have allowed a concentration to take place at Buhoro for two reasons: they were seeking an accessible site to consolidate other easterners who were unwilling to move to the concentrations in the west, and they were particularly likely to accept arguments based on maintaining the *mwami*'s prestige. In Bagshawe's diary summary of the meeting he held with the *batware* of Bweru, Murungu, and Buhoro, he noted that he agreed to the Buhoro concentration because "it is well on the way to the railway." At this same meeting, he rejected the same request from the Murungu *batware* to have their own concentration. They were told to join Buhoro or the concentrations in the west.¹⁸³ Over time, when officials became more determined to close Buhoro, they began to write of the settlement as existing only for "local sacerdotal insignia"¹⁸⁴ there. When District Officer J. P. Moffett visited in 1942 to begin preparations for moving the people, he wrote that "It was because of its spiritual importance to the tribe that Buhoro had been left thus completely isolated in the bush."¹⁸⁵

Buhoro was one of the sites that consistently received people who were avoiding movement into concentrations further to the west. In the 1933 concentrations, some residents of Luguru opted to move to Buhoro rather than to the much closer Muhanga and Makere concentrations.¹⁸⁶ A year later, people from the Makere and Kagera areas were

¹⁸² TNA 967/821/1 1937 Annual Report Kigoma District. District Commissioner Johnston mentions *pombe ya ajabu*, "wondrous beer", in the report.

¹⁸³ Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 3 June 1933.

¹⁸⁴ TNA 19452 vol 1 Food Shortage Western Province. Provincial Commissioner Bagshawe to Chief Secretary, 6 October 1937.

¹⁸⁵ J. P. Moffett, "A Raft on the Malagarasi," 66.

¹⁸⁶ Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 27 November 1933.

known to be moving in throughout the year.¹⁸⁷ When the Bweru concentration was broken up in 1937, several hundred of the Bweru and Murungu residents were said to have fled to Buhoro.¹⁸⁸ In fact, in his cost calculations for the resettlement in 1937, PC Bagshawe counted on hundreds of Murungu people to “move without assistance” to Buhoro, over 35 miles away.¹⁸⁹ It appears that while the larger Buhoro region’s population underwent an increase, the concentration site itself remained at a much lower figure than sleeping sickness policy required.

Despite their reasons for permitting an exception to be made at Buhoro, from the beginning of the concentration’s existence, officials wrote of wanting to end it. PC Bagshawe was heartened when he learned that some people slated to move to Buhoro had decided to move to Kifura because “It will reduce Buhoro, but it is too small already & the smaller it gets the easier it will be to kill it out eventually.”¹⁹⁰ A year later, he despaired of the Church Missionary Society’s success in setting up a school at Buhoro because it was difficult to access in the rains – the Malagarasi River had to be crossed by canoe near Kagera to reach it.¹⁹¹ Excessive rains in 1937 flooded the swampy areas where Buhoro people usually grew their crops, and officials wrote of the difficulty of reaching it to assess the situation and to bring aid in August. The Assistant District Officer followed in September and “found that though the population were without food,

¹⁸⁷ See Mss.Afr.s.292 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 30 January 1934 and TNA 450/160/38/4/1 Sleeping Sickness Kigoma District Survey. E. Allinson Agricultural Surveyor Uha to Sleeping Sickness Officer, 8 September 1934.

¹⁸⁸ TNA 11515 vol 2 Outbreak. Memo from Provincial Commissioner Bagshawe, 4 July 1937.

¹⁸⁹ TNA 63/934 vol 1 Sleeping Sickness Concentration Measures. Provincial Commissioner Bagshawe to Chief Secretary, 24 February 1937.

¹⁹⁰ Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 4 August 1933.

¹⁹¹ TNA 21711 Sleeping Sickness Concentrations: Educational Arrangements Concerning. Provincial Commissioner Bagshawe to District Officer Kigoma, 19 February 1934.

they were providing for themselves by working for, or buying food in other areas. The Bohoro [sic] people are honey hunters and are accustomed to living on the bush in cases of emergency. They eat the honey and use the wax for the purchase of other food.” The people gladly accepted seeds that the ADO brought with him and had planted them a month later when he returned in November 1937. Buhoro’s farmers also began clearing a higher-lying area in case of future floods.¹⁹²

Despite Buhoro residents’ ability to face and overcome their food shortage without any need for significant aid,¹⁹³ officials ramped up pressure on *Mwami* Ruhaga in the late 1930s to move the Buhoro people. They saw the problem as being one of convincing Ruhaga to move her royal insignia, which she agreed to do in 1941. While the Provincial Commissioner claimed that the move was accomplished during this year, in September 1942 District Officer Moffett journeyed to Buhoro to make final preparations to move the insignia and the people to the Kifura concentration. The move meant that settlement ceased in Buhoro, which brought with it a simplification of administration. Colonial administrators wrote with relief at the end of the “small and remote area at Buhoro which had always been a source of worry to the Sleeping Sickness Department and Administration.”¹⁹⁴

Conclusion

¹⁹² TNA 19452 vol 1 Food Shortage Western Province. Acting Provincial Commissioner Western Province to Chief Secretary, 10 December 1937.

¹⁹³ In comparison, British officials provided three months of free food aid to Uyowa concentration in Tabora during 1937-8. See TNA 19452 vol 1 Food Shortage Western Province. Provincial Commissioner O. Guise Williams to Chief Secretary, 17 September 1938.

¹⁹⁴ RH 754.12.r.25 Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioner for the Year 1941 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1942): 104.

Colonial and Ha retellings of the creation of sleeping sickness concentrations, in their own ways, present divergent portraits of the relationship between residents and state officials. In colonial narratives, officials drastically streamlined the contingent process of creating concentrations until it appeared as nothing more than the efficient implementation of an expert plan. In doing so, they simultaneously cast Ha people as hapless residents in need of intervention, and British officials as powerful experts in their given fields. Ha recollections of resettlement, though, offer a different view, presenting a colonial project that was at times unknowable, baffling, or a ruse. They insist, however, that the fundamental theme of resettlement was the violence and chaos that it produced. Examining the contested process of creating sleeping sickness concentrations unsettles these accounts and indicates the ways in which colonial expertise failed to be the sole shaper of Buha's resettlement history. Instead, planning was subject to material limitations and insistent pressure from Ha people to remain outside of concentrations. Compelled to compromise, colonial officials granted concessions strategically in order to insure continued tax revenues and create colonial infrastructure in the conceded sites. Nevertheless, it was Ha demands that ultimately forced their hand.

Chapter 3

Building *Umukutano*: Shaping Buha's Sleeping Sickness Concentrations, 1933-1956

Introduction

According to official plans, sleeping sickness concentrations were to bring radical change to eastern, lowland Ha people. They would form effective disease control for sleeping sickness and other health problems, while at the same time facilitate broader transformations to Ha political, social, and economic life by changing residential patterns into a more concentrated form, thus rendering people more accessible to colonial officials. As I argued in chapter one, these changes formed the moral vision, the values-laden frame of reference, that inspired colonial officials' plans for concentrations. Examination of the interior histories of sleeping sickness concentrations during the first decades of their existence, though, indicates that realities were far different from a straightforward execution of colonial plans. While concentrating population did create the basis for a later transformation of governance in the region, there were two essential factors that limited the full implementation of colonial plans for concentrations. The first was that the colonial administration's ability to impose change was limited by financial, technical, and ideological reasons. These included the financial predicament of the colony until after World War II, changing techniques of tsetse fly control and chemotherapies for sleeping sickness, and the new focus on economic development and more democratic governing institutions from the mid-1940s onward. The second and more important complication to the implementation of colonial plans was that Ha people had their own, competing moral visions for how to restructure their lives in concentrations. Responding to the real change that concentration brought, Ha men and

women sought to recreate right relationships with ancestral and nature spirits, relatives, and neighbors. They did this in a context of impeded access to important natural resources, increased labor demands, and unprecedented population instability – the ironic results of colonial policy.

This chapter explores how these two factors shaped the development of sleeping sickness concentrations until the late 1950s when the renamed sleeping sickness “settlements” had lost nearly every parameter that colonial officials originally set for them. I begin with an examination of the material limitations of the colonial administration, made all the more complicated by frequent disagreement between different branches and level of the government. At its most remarkable, Provincial Commissioner [PC] Bagshawe recorded with shock how the Governor of Tanganyika was uninterested in the local plans for concentrations: he “took the position that if we could keep the Waha well fed & happy in their concentrations & the rest of their country, we could look on them as ‘in cold storage.’”¹ My next section roots itself in an examination of how life in concentrations unfolded in Ha peoples’ daily struggle to re-establish their social and economic lives in the changed circumstances of concentrations. I focus in particular on how their reformed homesteads, particularly their planting of *mirumba* ficus trees and building of *ndalo* ancestor houses, both enabled reconnection with ancestral spirits, their original homes, new neighbors, and extended family and facilitated the new kinds of relationships necessary to keep the local honey industry viable. This chapter argues that, while some of these transformations were the result of

¹ The Bodleian Library of Commonwealth and African Studies at Rhodes House [RH] Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 14 October 1933.

specific colonial actions, the weight of change was far more the result of Ha priorities to remake viable family and community life in the wake of immense disruptions. The *ugwimo*, the chaos, which elders described as being a significant feature in their experience of being removed from their original homes remained a challenge in concentrations. I then move to an examination of the decade when administrative capacity was at its height, the late 1940s to the late 1950s, to delineate the way in which colonial and Ha priorities interacted. Colonial officials had succeeded in creating a form of territoriality in Buha and had transformed the meaning of local level offices, while at the same time could provide funding and personnel to fully staff concentrations. But these changes came just when colonial ideology was shifting significantly and local officials focused on building new leadership institutions for an independent Tanganyika, a shift toward local control that was reinforced by far less restrictive tsetse fly control measures. In consequence, colonial institutions were more open than ever before to be shaped by Ha people, and many Ha people, especially the small minority who were involved in these institutions, sought to use them to enact their own vision for the future of Buha.

The Disappointing Years of “Cold Storage,” 1933-1949

Planning documents for sleeping sickness concentrations were powerful statements of intentions, but bore little direct relationship to what materialized in concentrations themselves: the services which colonial officials claimed, and some elders noted, as reason for concentrations’ creation were not realistically within reach of the colonial government until after World War II. Officials envisioned that concentrations

would contain all of the hallmarks of an area transformed by colonial rule, through the colonial provision of schools, courts, missionary churches, dispensaries, and expert advice to concentrations. Concentrations were to become cash crop-producing and cattle-keeping areas, with a new European officer, the Agricultural Surveyor, monitoring their viability in each administrative district. He would be supported by a team of African sleeping sickness scouts and a specially trained African sleeping sickness dresser, making concentrations the most highly administered rural areas in the colony. They would monitor sleeping sickness, organize communal bush clearings to remove tsetse habitat, and coordinate concentrations' economic development. I will explore below how Ha peoples' actions interacted with these efforts, but there were also internal tensions and limitations that significantly reduced the impact of these plans. In particular, limitations of funding and personnel combined with a lack of agreement between departments and levels of government to severely limit what colonial officials could attempt, much less achieve.

Colonial officials implemented Buha's sleeping sickness concentrations in the midst of the financial crisis of the worldwide economic Depression and the resulting retrenchment programs meant to reduce the cost of colonial administration. Annual reports from the region are replete with unfilled staff positions, especially at the lowest district level. Ideally, district headquarters were supposed to have a series of permanent European staff positions. There was the main administrative officer, either a district commissioner or a district officer, who could be supported by several subordinates. Specialized branches of the government including medical, agriculture, veterinary, and

public works were each supposed to be represented with permanent staff at district headquarters.² In turn, each of these officers were supposed to have one or several trained Africans in instructional or support capacity. The necessary financial retrenchment of the Depression years involved the reduction and consolidation of African and European staff positions, and each department was responsible to stay within their smaller budgets. This meant that the years of the Depression and World War II were ones of extremely high personnel turnover in Buha, as each department frequently moved staff as they reorganized to reduce staff positions. In most cases, this meant that specialized staff were assigned to touring and supervision work across larger areas, rather than personally running programming. Thus, District Commissioners, Medical Officers, and technical department staff could only pay sporadic visits to concentrations, while African support staff was cut to a minimum. Worst of all for bringing change to concentrations, the new Agricultural Surveyor position was consolidated in Buha and frequently went unfilled.³

Financial retrenchment coupled with conflict between the different government departments involved in the maintenance of concentrations. While concentrations could be the concern of every department in the colonial government, medical and administrative officers were the most involved. To begin with, medical officers' involvement with sleeping sickness concentrations pushed their personnel to engage in

² The Medical Department could typically only provide a European officer at the higher Regional level. These officers would tour their subordinate districts regularly, inspecting local dispensaries and district hospitals. Hospitals and district headquarters typically had permanent Sub-Assistant Surgeons who had longer medical training than dressers and tended to be of South Asian heritage.

³ Tanzania National Archive [TNA] 22065 vol 2 Sleeping Sickness Staff. Acting Director Department of Medical and Sanitary Services Owen to Chief Secretary, 12 March 1934; TNA 35167 Establishment of Buha as a District Separate from Kigoma. Memorandum by John J. Tawney, 27 June 1946; TNA 450/1266/27 1945 Annual Report Western Province.

areas beyond medicine. As chapter two showed, doctors like Maclean, Calwell, and Fairbairn were directly involved in choosing concentration settlement sites and keenly promoted agricultural plans for concentrations. Their understanding was that agriculture and the choice of appropriate sites was key to concentrations' viability and retention of population, which in turn was fundamental to their usefulness as a disease control measure. But administrative officers frequently saw some of this involvement as an impingement on administrative prerogatives. Tensions mounted in 1933-4 when an administrative officer, Mr. Page, was removed from his typical duties and assigned to focus solely on sleeping sickness work. In this position, he worked closely with medical officers and was assigned to supervise the Agricultural Surveyors, who were Medical Department personnel. Page was in a liminal position between the administration and Medical Department, and acted as a point person in Buha by dealing "with various aspects of tsetse and organizing services." His reassignment to normal duties in 1934 removed this key link, and the Medical Department requested that the administration create a permanent position. While the Director of Medical and Sanitary Services was careful to detail that this administrative officer would not be under medical department supervision, he also made it clear that if the administration failed to employ someone permanently, the overworked Sleeping Sickness Officer, Dr. Maclean, would have to add close supervision to his other manifold duties and thus "the old concentrations will have to be neglected."⁴ Without the budget to fill eleven vacant administrative positions, the administration refused to create a new position to placate the Medical Department.

⁴ TNA 22065 vol 2 Sleeping Sickness Staff. Dr. A. D. Owen Director of Medical and Sanitary Services to Chief Secretary, 3 March 1934, 2.

Added to this problem, the African sleeping sickness dressers practicing in concentrations were employees of the Medical Department, rather than of the Native Administration as all other dressers in the territory were.⁵ Administrators were perfectly content that the Medical Department arranged funding for these positions, but balked at the way in which dressers were only allowed to treat sleeping sickness. They viewed such a limitation as a lost opportunity to provide broader biomedical services to concentration residents, but Medical Department officials stood their ground on professional qualifications, arguing that dressers' limited training only qualified them for sleeping sickness work.

Because sleeping sickness work failed to fall neatly within departmental borders, it was relatively simple for members of various departments to feel that some officials were acting outside of their areas of expertise. PC Bagshawe recorded several complaints in his diary about the conduct of Dr. Maclean, particularly concerning his unwillingness to keep the administration informed of his activities and his overreaching of authority. Bagshawe wrote that Dr. Maclean "...persists in looking on the whole of concentration, including agriculture & administration, as entirely his personal job....He is quite anxious to use us, transport & everything, but doesn't want to lose control!"⁶ Bagshawe bristled at the presence of Agricultural Surveyors working in his region, receiving instructions directly from Maclean, sometimes almost secretly.⁷ Medical and administrative officers, though, were far from the only personnel interested in sleeping sickness concentration

⁵ For more on the Native Authority dressers structure, see John Iliffe, *East African Doctors: A History of the Modern Profession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 41-45.

⁶ RH Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 5 June 1933.

⁷ Bagshawe continued to complain about Maclean's chariness in sharing his plans with administration, including giving orders to Agricultural Surveyors while they were both in England on leave. See RH Mss.Afr.s.294 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 17 February 1936.

work. While the Department of Tsetse Research mainly focused on methods of controlling tsetse flies, many of their experiments pertained to effective methods of clearing tsetse-harboring vegetation, an activity that Agricultural Surveyors were supposed to conduct regularly around concentration sites. The director of Tsetse Research noted how the Medical Department failed to draw on their expertise, highlighting this work by Agricultural Surveyors “that might as well be ours.”⁸ Sleeping sickness concentrations’ many facets played on the colonial government’s division of expertise to produce tense interdepartmental relationships.

Buha’s administrative officers who were charged with overseeing the development of sleeping sickness concentrations were placed in an even weaker position when great change came to the area’s administrative structure in the early 1930s. In 1932, as part of an effort to consolidate the provincial administrative structure, Kigoma Province was incorporated with Tabora Province to form Western Province, with headquarters at Tabora town. This change meant that the provincial commissioner, the highest local official, had to split his focus between two areas that were large enough in the past to require individual attention. Even more significantly, regional officials decided to demote the two northern administrative districts that mainly comprise Buha, Kasulu and Kibondo, from full districts to sub-areas beneath Kigoma District: the annual provincial report of 1932 termed them “a ‘tribal unit’ called Uha.”⁹ Officially, this meant that the few administration-run institutions like the two schools and two prisons were shuttered, and all European personnel were assigned to Kigoma district and would remain

⁸ The National Archives of the United Kingdom [PRO] CO 691/182/1 1942 Sleeping Sickness Control Research. E. E. Hornby memorandum, 2.

⁹ RH Mss.Afr.s.303 Francis J. Bagshawe Papers. Western Province 1932 Annual Report, 10.

at those district headquarters, only paying “flying visits” to Kasulu and Kibondo at varying intervals. In reality, one and occasionally two administrative officers lived and worked permanently at Kasulu district headquarters even if they were considered as “on safari” from Kigoma. The acting Provincial Commissioner acknowledged that this represented a demotion for Kibondo district: “Kibondo is to be treated even more scantily and it is to be regarded as merely a rest-house with a caretaker who will normally be a station-hand.”¹⁰ The administrative officer assigned to Kasulu was enjoined to produce as little official paperwork as possible, to avoid the need to keep a filing system and clerical staff at Kasulu. Much to the historian’s chagrin, they were instructed to write all that they could in pencil rather than typing information on official letterhead, and to keep local files on current issues until they had been resolved, at which point they were to destroy the documentation. Senior officials emphasized that Kasulu should retain no appearance of being an independent district: “There is only one District Office and that is at Kigoma.”¹¹ Thus, for the fifteen years after concentrations’ creation, one or two administrative officers were in charge of an area including 250,000 people and in this “Ha section of the Kigoma District,” these officers were to limit their focus to “the collection of the Hut and Poll Tax in that area as well as...the touring which that task and the supervision of the Native Courts entails.”¹² One officer assigned to this duty complained that over a quarter of his time was spent doing accounting work alone,

¹⁰ TNA 35167 Establishment of Buha as a District Separate from Kigoma. District Commissioner John J. Tawney’s memorandum of 27 June 1946 quotes from a 28 July 1932 letter from Acting Provincial Commissioner Longland.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

leaving little opportunity for the “closer personal attention” that Provincial Commissioner Bagshawe hoped would remain possible since officers were doing little paperwork.¹³

With such limitation in personnel, it was impossible to implement the ambitious schemes laid out for concentrations. The plan by Agricultural officers to introduce groundnuts as the premier cash crop in concentrations was a notable failure. Trained African Agricultural Instructors were assigned to the Makere and Muhanga concentrations in Kasulu, to promote groundnuts and other crops, but their efforts in the early years were largely futile. Dry weather and unexpected plant diseases harmed the harvest and were even more devastating to their intention of using the groundnut project as a means “to educate the people as to the value of a cash crop.”¹⁴ Agricultural officers tried eighteen other crops at demonstration plots located throughout the region, but all either grew poorly or required so much effort that officers concluded they would never be able to persuade Ha farmers to adopt them.¹⁵ Donald Sturdy, who was the District Agricultural Officer before concentration and who paid return visits after the resettlement campaign had ended, reflected in 1969 that his department was never fully prepared to provide a workable agricultural regime in concentrations, as they had never “strictly mastered the agriculture of the miombo bush country.” Without far more research, especially into what “was [already] in existence” in Ha lowland agriculture, they could never *have* been ready. His final analysis was quite candid: “I don’t see we were in a

¹³ John Moffett mentioned the demands of accounting in his Handing Over report from 7 July 1944. See TNA 180/P4/4 Provincial Administrative, Handing Over Correspondence. See RH Mss.Afr.s.303 Francis J. Bagshawe Papers. Western Province Annual Report 1932, 13 for Bagshawe’s hope.

¹⁴ TNA 450 160/38/4/1 Sleeping Sickness Kigoma District Survey. Agricultural Survey of Kasulu Lowland and Concentrations, 19 September 1935.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

position to move people as we did – agriculturally, leaving out the medical necessity of it – and to have re-settled them in the manner we did.”¹⁶ Planners indefinitely postponed experiments to introduce cattle into concentrations, which did not materialize until the early 1950s, twenty years after the creation of concentrations.

In the context of staff and funding shortages, colonial efforts were further stymied by internal disagreements, beginning with disputes between local administrative officers and officers of specialized branches about where priorities should be placed. Local administrators argued that their forced removal of Ha people into concentrations formed a compact on their part, and that they must honor it by carrying through with their promised transformations in resettlements. Agricultural officers’ mandate, though, was to improve agriculture equally *throughout* the province, and they lamented the overemphasis of concentrations over other promising areas. One official complained that of the three instructors stationed in Kasulu, two were in concentrations and the third was at the district headquarters, leaving many other areas entirely without instruction.¹⁷ Agricultural officials especially lamented at how the focus on concentrations impacted their work in the highland areas to the west of concentrations, areas that were declared fly free and were not subject to concentration. These were considered by many to be the most advanced areas of Buha with the highest potential for improved agriculture, as they already incorporated cattle into their agriculture and had innovated a complex system of irrigation. Donald Sturdy, the former District Agricultural Officer in Buha, recalled that

¹⁶ RH Mss.Afr.s.1331 Donald Sturdy Papers. Interview with John J. Tawney 26 August 1969, 7.

¹⁷ TNA 450 160/38/4/1 Sleeping Sickness Kigoma District Survey. Kasulu Lowlands and Concentrations 19 September 1935 District Agricultural Officer Kigoma, 8-10.

“all interest in the Highlands ceased when Sleeping Sickness and its work made it necessary to concentrate everything on the Lowland position.”¹⁸

Agriculture officials also became frustrated by the resistance that their plans for agriculture in the concentrations elicited. These mainly concerned anti-erosion measures, such as planting in ridges or ties, and the cultivation of drought resistant crops like cassava and potatoes as an anti-famine measure. Agricultural and administrative officers combined efforts on this score, and elders in concentrations remember these requirements in detail. The focus that officials gave to these activities can be seen in an undated Kiha-English primer that was compiled for administrative officials “who do not intend to learn the entire language.” Officials found the following dialogue mapped out for them in

Kiha:

uri imigombe	= you must make ridges
ugir’utubundi twa hagati	= you must make ties
ugirentya	= do it like this
zan’insuka	= bring your hoe
ntiyikwiyentya	= these (ridges) are not good enough
turagombi ukuking’ amazi	= we want to stop run off
amazi yaronona	= the water will cause damage
ivuva dyanyu iratwagwa	= your soil will be carried away

As will be explored below, the requirement to plant certain crops and to do so using these techniques were met with Ha resistance, a resistance that is implicit in another Kiha phrase in the primer meant to convince skeptical people: “imimoati s’ibiribwa = is muhogo [cassava] not food?”¹⁹

¹⁸ RH Mss.Afr.s.1331 Donald Sturdy Papers. Interview of Donald Sturdy by John J. Tawney, 26 August 1969, 7.

¹⁹ “A Short Kiha Vocabulary for Those Who do not Intend to Learn the Entire Language.” I am grateful to Mr. Derek Quinlan, a former District Commissioner of Kibondo, for giving me his copy of this fascinating

Other colonial concerns challenged the future of Buha as a cash crop producer, most notably the need for cheap laborers on coffee, sisal, and cotton plantations as well as in area mines. In forming concentrations, the Medical Department arranged for a ban on labor recruitment within concentrations, much to the annoyance of mine owners, labor agencies, and some administrative officials. Those eager to gain cheap labor and to promote wage earning in Buha used the Agriculture Department's own dictum for which areas ought to receive expert advice concerning cash crops. In order to maximize its impact, the Agriculture Department determined that only Africans who lived within a 40 mile radius of the colony's major transportation infrastructure of railways, lake transport, and high quality roadways ought to receive their attention. Beyond that limit, agricultural officials advised that Africans ought to be encouraged to earn their cash by engaging as laborers. Because Buha was well beyond this 40-mile limit, administrators could argue that Ha highlanders and lowlanders should be encouraged or compelled to serve as laborers. Provincial Commissioner Longland's 1935 Report of Native Labour in Gold Mining Areas offered the most extreme form of this view by suggesting the full depopulation of Buha, moving them east to the neighboring gold mining districts in Uzinza. Medical Department officials argued vigorously against this suggestion, but pointedly could not object on medical grounds. Instead, they cited "African objections," a phrase frequently employed when discussing rights that Africans collectively held to their homelands and the resistance they might put forth when forced to leave them. The other objection was the problem of leaving the area abandoned "completely

document. Internal evidence suggests that this document must have been produced in Kasulu sometime between 1933 and 1945. I suspect that District Commissioner John J. Tawney was the author.

unadministered” and thus an area to which Africans wishing to live outside of colonial structures could flee.²⁰

Efforts to promote western education in concentrations met with even less direct support by the administration than the promotion of cash crops. Administrative and educational officials recognized from the planning stages of concentrations that they would lack the resources to provide schools. Their solution was to abdicate this service to missionary societies whose interest was aroused by how concentrated population could simplify their efforts and increase their influence. Both the Roman Catholic Missionaries of Africa, better known as the White Fathers [WF] for the long white *kanzu* robes they wore, and the Protestant Church Missionary Society [CMS] sought rights to land in concentrations, “the local religious plums.”²¹ PC Francis Bagshawe was an enthusiastic proponent of how missionaries could exert broad influence on Ha people: “The people are very backward, and I regard Christianity and some sort of education as the only antidotes to witchcraft: there have been five ‘witchcraft’ murders in Uha this month.”²² Both the White Fathers and the CMS viewed concentrations as a real opportunity to reach a large number of Ha people, and hoped that they would serve as an entry point into Buha more broadly. They quickly claimed plots in all of the concentrations and built basic “bush schools” wherever possible in which they taught rudimentary literacy and Christian catechism. By 1938, the CMS ran 20 “bush schools” in Kibondo, and the White Fathers

²⁰ TNA 23047 Labour for the Mines. Director of Medical Services to Chief Secretary, 15 January 1936.

²¹ TNA 21711 Sleeping Sickness Concentrations: Educational Arrangements Concerning. For quotation, see 8 December 1933 letter of Provincial Commissioner Bagshawe to Chief Secretary. The file is full of letters about the Education department’s lack of funds for the 5,000 children who might desire education. See the letters of Director of Education A. A. Isherwood to Chief Secretary 7 July 1933 and 11 August 1933 for examples.

²² TNA 21711 Sleeping Sickness Concentrations: Educational Arrangements Concerning. Provincial Commissioner Bagshawe to Chief Secretary, 8 December 1933.

held even more as well as 22 full mission plots by 1941.²³ Despite these establishments, conversion and the spread of literacy were both hampered by Ha disinterest and rivalry between missionaries. District officials frequently refereed disputes between missionary groups, typically involving rivalry over school and mission plots or particular pupils. In part because of these disputes, District Officer Tawney later wrote that the CMS missionaries at Kibondo “did not conceal that they regarded Roman Catholic priests as emissaries of the Devil.”²⁴ And at the time, Tawney recorded that Ha people were uninterested in missionary activity: “there is no enthusiasm amongst any of the local population for the establishment of mission educational centres of any denomination; educational and religious influences have, as yet, barely impinged upon the consciousness of the average Muha, a fact which is frankly admitted by certain local missionaries.”²⁵ It was not until the late 1950s that these missions and schools produced a significant number of converts and made more common the opportunity for the basic education at mission-run bush schools. In the mean time, most Ha elders recall that missions held very little influence in their lives.

The plans of colonial officers to insure “the economic development of the [Ha] natives in their own country”²⁶ depended not only on the full cooperation of all specialized departments and missionaries but also on support from highest level of colonial government in Dar es Salaam. Differing views and rivalries at the local level

²³ Church Missionary Society Archive, University of Birmingham [CMS] Annual Letters Elsie Jean Veal 19 August 1938 and Reverend Charles Bakewell 1938. TNA 523/L20/18 Land White Fathers Mission. 11 June 1941 renewal request.

²⁴ RH Mss.Afr.s.1758 John J. Tawney Papers, 30. See also Elsie Jane Veal’s annual letter of 19 August 1938 in CMS Archive.

²⁵ TNA 180/L2/241 Land CMS Mission. J. J. Tawney to Provincial Commissioner Western Province, 1 October 1943.

²⁶ TNA 23047 Labour for the Mines. Director of Medical Services to Chief Secretary, 15 January 1936.

were compounded by a distinct lack of interest in supporting the future of concentrations, coming directly from the colony's governor. After all the work within the region to plan for the Ha concentrations' future, PC Bagshawe found that not only had the Governor not read through these proposals, but had a very different vision for what ought to be accomplished. As previously quoted, Bagshawe recorded in his diary that the Governor was focused on averting a widespread epidemic and was content to wait for a more opportune time to do anything further in concentrations. In the mean time, Ha people were "in cold storage."²⁷ Nothing could irk Bagshawe and Dr. Maclean, to whom he related the incident immediately, like this idea. In their view, concentrations were to be dynamic areas in which expert planning would lead to fundamental change, but the governor was advocating that a state of stasis was perfectly acceptable. So long as Ha people were safe from epidemic sleeping sickness, preserved "in cold storage", nothing more would be expected of or for them. The governor communicated this in another way immediately understandable to the Buha's officials, in his suggestions for the area's tax rate: he "was prepared to recognize that they wouldn't be able to pay tax."²⁸ As argued in chapter one, taxation was a measure for how far Ha people had advanced under colonial tutelage, and so the governor's suggestion to remove taxation altogether was a tacit admission that concentrations were no longer an object for transformation. Despite this lack of support from Dar es Salaam, or perhaps in part because of it, Bagshawe immediately redoubled his efforts to get the Agriculture Department fully on board, insisting to the Director of Agriculture and his regional counterpart that "not only that

²⁷ RH Mss.Afr.s.291 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 14 October 1933.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 14 October 1933.

Uha ought to be developed but that it can be!”²⁹ The governor’s differing view, though, was a clear example of the lack of interdepartmental and hierarchical unity that hampered the implementation of colonial plans for concentrations.

Locating sleeping sickness infections and treating current cases was the one element of concentration planning that held over the years. In the initial emergency years of the early 1930s, British doctors visited concentrations and their sleeping sickness dispensaries regularly. Between their visits and after 1937 when the initial concern of a wider epidemic had passed,³⁰ the vast majority of sleeping sickness treatment and detection fell to the African sleeping sickness dressers. Their capabilities shocked PC Bagshawe: “The whole thing is extraordinary to me. An uneducated native – he can [only] read & write – uses a microscope to diagnose blood diseases like S/S [sleeping sickness] & injects the necessary medicine – and saves lives in scores & hundreds!”³¹ Besides low salaries and rough living conditions, dressers in sleeping sickness concentrations experienced some trouble in convincing patients to remain for full treatment, mainly because patients had to provide their own food.³² Yet most elders recall dressers’ work with gratitude for the way in which they helped to cure the sick free of charge.³³ Moreover, the Ha and other surrounding ethnic groups were singled out as

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 22 October 1933. The following year, the Agriculture Department doubted they could fund a European position in Buha, much to Bagshawe’s chagrin. See RH Mss.Afr.s.292 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 7 February 1934.

³⁰ TNA 29181 Application to the Colonial & Welfare Fund for the Appointment of Medical Officer for Sleeping Sickness Control. 5 December 1940, 1.

³¹ RH Mss.Afr.s.290 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 2 February 1932.

³² RH Mss.Afri.s.292 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 30 January 1934 and 6 May 1933.

³³ Interview of Mokupi Motuta 28 May 2009 Kumhasha Village. Many elders emphasized the free provision of medical care in this period, limited though it was, as a means to contrast the situation after independence. The point of those who made this comparison was that at various times after independence

those who were the most enthusiastic about injections, mainly those distributed in 1930 to treat yaws. Their enthusiasm, one observer noted, was in their evaluation that injected medicine was superior to herbal medicine for specific diseases like yaws, syphilis, gonorrhea, and various sores.³⁴ At the time, everyone was aware of the dangers that sleeping sickness posed. They knew of no local medicine that could be used, and there were always sleeping sickness cases in concentrations, with particular flare ups in Buha in 1942-1944, and 1948-9.³⁵ These factors might explain why no elders recall any fear or anxiety attached to the collection of blood samples that immediately preceded treatment, even though such physical extractions caused widespread rumors of blood sucking and *mumiani* accusations of dressers, the fear of cannibalism or sorcery.³⁶ Although detailed evidence is lacking as to why infections of the disease dropped steadily after

medical examination and treatment was either fee-based, or that a gift or bribe was necessary to insure that care was efficient.

³⁴ Alonsi Gonzago, *Mambo Leo* June 1928, cited in Iliffe, *East African Doctors*, 40.

³⁵ TNA 450/1266/28 1945 Sleeping Sickness Annual Report , 2; RH 754.12.r.25 Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners for the Year 1949 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1950), 159; and TNA 11515 vol 3 Outbreak Western Province. 30 September 1949, 65, RH 754.12.r.25 Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners for the Year 1948, 141-2.

³⁶ Though asked, no elder recalled any fear attached to the taking of samples. David Clyde, *History of the Medical Services of Tanganyika* (Dar es Salaam: Government Press, 1962): 185, however, reported two intriguing incidents from Kasulu. The first, from Kabanga hospital, involved a doctor declining to perform an autopsy because “medical investigations, particularly those involving the collection of blood samples, were not always regarded with favor.” The second was a recollection by the District Commissioner that concerns were raised in 1954 when three women researchers were seen in their rest house drinking red wine after a day of collecting blood films “from a reluctant population.” For a detailed analysis of these rumors in central and eastern Africa, see the following works of Louise White: “Tsetse Visions: Narratives of Blood and Bugs in Colonial Northern Rhodesia, 1931-9,” *Journal of African History* 36 (1995): 219-245; “Cars out of Place: Vampires, Technology, and Labor in East and Central Africa,” in *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, eds Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997): 436-460; and *Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and History in Colonial Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

concentration, there was significant early improvement, from a high of 1,215 cases in 1932 to just 92 in 1936.³⁷

Rebuilding Viable Communities in *Umukutano*: 1933-1949

While colonial officials struggled to realize any substantial change in concentrations, resettled Ha people remade their lives in *umukutano*, the Kiha word used to describe these new settlements. Far from an area defined by failed attempts and lack of transformation, *umukutano* were dynamic areas where Ha men and women replicated, adjusted, or revolutionized their lives and livelihoods in the midst of drastically changed circumstances. As chapter two noted, Ha elders emphasized the *ugwimo*, the chaos, of the process of leaving their original homes to the east, and this *ugwimo* remained with families as they attempted to recreate spatial, spiritual, and social relationships in *umukutano*. Even though colonial officials could not enact their ambitious plans for concentrations, *umukutano* presented substantial differences from peoples' original homes. First, the boundedness of concentrations and colonial crop requirements impinged on Ha agricultural systems and created an unsettled population and increased social tensions. Second, removal from environmentally-specific special resources like salt and honey not only forced labor patterns to change but also required adjustment to

³⁷ TNA 967/821/1 1935 Annual Report Kigoma District, 5 and TNA 69/934 vol 1 Sleeping Sickness Concentration Measures. Provincial Commissioner Bagshawe to Chief Secretary, 24 February 1937. John Ford argued that clearing techniques were frequently successful in reducing infection, but it was more for the effect on the wild animal vector's habitat than for the tsetse. John Ford, *The Role of the Trypanosomiases in African Ecology: A Study of the Tsetse Problem* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 53. Marynez Lyons notes that the rate of infection has to do with factors beyond disease ecology, including individuals' nutrition and stress levels. See Marynez Lyons, *The Colonial Disease: A Social History of Sleeping Sickness in Northern Zaire, 1900-1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): 195-216. Sunseri uses the low rate of infection and limited numbers of death – 11,500 in 24 years – to argue that sleeping sickness did not constitute a serious epidemic in Tanganyika. See Thaddeus Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax: State Forestry and Social Conflict in Tanzania 1820-2000* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2009): 107.

Ha spiritual beliefs connected with them. Ha people drew on pre-existing spatial and social practices to meet these challenges in the early years of *umukutano*, and at times combined these with the new opportunities that *umukutano* offered.

Insuring that spiritual and social relationships were on good footing was of paramount importance in the early years of life in *umukutano* because of the instability and change that *umukatno*'s structure brought to Ha people. From their inception, *umukutano* were unstable entities that were marked as much by loss of population as by its concentration of people. Ironically, colonial policies pursued to emplace and settle Ha people actually created a far higher degree of mobility. Elders recall how the original compulsory removals motivated some of their relatives and neighbors to opt for other areas rather than the sites of concentrations. Added to this, a portion of the population who moved to concentrations made no efforts to clear new land or build new homes, and left concentrations within a season or two for areas where friends or kin would insure a warm welcome and aid.³⁸ Meant to emplace population permanently, some concentrations lost as much as 15% of their population.³⁹

Concentrations brought *ugwimo* in part because of the increased social tensions that resulted from requiring Ha people to live with neighbors not of their own choosing, and to live with them in far higher densities. *Umukutano* themselves were bounded spaces, areas that were chosen because they offered the means to make a settlement permanent: enough fertile land and water to support the present and future needs of its

³⁸ Interviews of Mokupi Motuta 1 June 2009 Kumhasha Village, Warungendanye Kagoma 11 June 2009 Kumshindwi Village, and Meshaki Bakuba 23 June 2009 Kifura Village.

³⁹ TNA 450 160/38/4/1 Sleeping Sickness Kigoma District Survey. Agricultural Surveyor Uha E. Allinson to Sleeping Sickness Officer, 16 August 1934, and 8 September 1934.

people, and close enough to colonial infrastructure so that any tsetse infestation could be monitored and any sleeping sickness infections treated. Buha's eleven concentrations originally ranged between two and thirty square miles, around which Sleeping Sickness Scouts and Agricultural Surveyors directed residents to place a border through a process called *kukata malaini*, "cutting lines," clear-cutting swaths of several feet around the entire area.⁴⁰ Ha people went from living in areas where each patrilineal homestead and their surrounding fields were separated by miles of uninhabited land to being in concentrations where one field met the next. At Nyavyumbu concentration, for instance, there were over 3,000 people in five square miles.⁴¹ Many coming from the easternmost parts of the lowlands called the new area "Burundi," a place known as much for its mountains as its population density. In this unusual living condition, several elders recall fearing that new neighbors might attack or steal from them. Their character was unknown and it was possible that someone might use powerful medicine to harm another. One elder recalled consulting *banyamuragula*, diviners, to know if a new neighbor was a witch.⁴² No elder recalled an actual witch being found in this period, but it is clear that the possibility of this happening could cause great damage, and lay people open to accusations of witchcraft. A song from the period claims that *umukutano* had thus destroyed the unity of communities:

Umukutano ee numulabhe, umukutano gwatumaliye abhantu
 Uwanka mutulanye
 Ntabhura kwagila
 Umukutano ee, umukutano gwatumaliye abhantu

⁴⁰ See TNA 270/40E vol 2 1955 Annual Report of the Forest Department, 11.

⁴¹ TNA 11771 vol 2 Permanent Settlement of Tsetse Clearings by Migration & Afforestation. Folio 16E.

⁴² Interview of Severina Ngurubhe 12 November 2007 Makere Village.

Umukutano, see the *umukutano* you have finished the people
My neighbor
Can bring an accusation [of witchcraft]
Umukutano you have finished the people.⁴³

Such tensions, too, were not necessarily limited to just the earliest years: between 1934 and 1942, at least another 15,000 people were concentrated in Buha alone, driving new groups of unwilling people into concentrations to start again cycles of distrust.⁴⁴

Constraints to the Ha system of agriculture was an irrefutable sign of *ugwimo*, especially because it violated Ha principles of access to land. To begin with, Ha people were required to grow cassava as an anti-famine crop, originally ½ acre but this was doubled by 1941, and noncompliance carried with it a sentence of 1 month in prison and a 50-shilling fine. The need to keep concentrations clear of bush where tsetse flies could live led some officials to fear that concentrations would become eroded. *Muhogo Mchungu* again played the lead role in forcing the planting of banana trees beginning in 1936, which had the added benefit, in Rooke-Johston's mind, "to anchor the people to their land inside the concentration."⁴⁵ These requirements were monitored haphazardly in the years of low supervision, but, much like *Muhogo Mchungu*, it was never clear when European officials or African government workers would turn up and inspect.

Elders recall that noncompliance was met with great brutality, usually including beatings

⁴³ "Umukutano" collected on 4 July 2009 Kifura Village.

⁴⁴ This figure is taken from several places, including Bagshawe, "Concentrations," 141 in which he reports a further 5,000 families in Buha moved in 1934 and 1,000 families in 1937 from Bweru and Murungu; J. P. Moffett, "A Raft on the Malagarasi," *Tanganyika Notes and Records* 16 (1943): 54-75 reports 350 families moved in 1942 from Buhoro-Muhambwe; and the 1939 Annual Report that reports 20% of the Kavumu area left for Burundi.

⁴⁵ TNA 967/82/1 1937 Annual Report Kigoma District, 3.

and descriptions of jail time and fines well beyond what officials record.⁴⁶ One called this system under *Muhogo Mchungu* “agriculture of the whip.”⁴⁷ The impact of colonial agricultural requirements also involved an increase in crop pests, an ongoing problem made more intractable because of other colonial policies that limited how Ha people could respond. Ha people consistently complained that root crops like cassava and potatoes attracted rats, porcupines, baboons, and wild pigs to their fields, where they did even more damage to their staple grain crops. The colonial response to these complaints placed the blame squarely on Ha shoulders: they had to keep planting the unwanted crops “particularly as those who have the most to say on the subject have made the least efforts to plant or to protect their crops.”⁴⁸ Because of these policies, resettled Ha farmers were particularly hostile to continued efforts by the Agriculture Department, which officers duly noted. In 1935, the District Agricultural Officer wrote that residents of concentrations appeared not to understand his purpose. Their reaction was even more extreme to African Instructors, who “complain bitterly of lack of support and threats of violence, and several have been assaulted in the performance of their duties.”⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Interviews of Leonia Kifwoka 23 October 2007 Kifura Village and Felicita Kigina 27 September 2007 Kagera Nkanda Village.

⁴⁷ Interview of Petro Magorwa 6 November 2007 Makere Village. Part of Margot Lovett’s dissertation deals with how these requirements drastically increased Ha women’s workloads in the highlands. Because required cassava cultivation interacted with widespread male migrant labor systems, women were left to bear the brunt of this crop that required substantial work to make edible. As I indicate below, the lowlands’ low involvement with migrant labor created a very different scenario. See Margot Lovett, “Elders, Migrants and Wives: Labor Migration and the Renegotiation of Intergenerational, Patronage and Gender Relations in Highland Buha, Western Tanzania, 1921-1962” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1989): 194-331.

⁴⁸ TNA 450 160/38/4/1 Sleeping Sickness Kigoma District Survey. District Agricultural Officer to Senior Agricultural Officer i/c NW Circle Mwanza, 7 December 1935, 3.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, District Agricultural Officer to Senior Agricultural Officer i/c NW Circle, 7 December 1935. Appendix VII “Attitude of Natives Towards Agriculture,” 2.

Moreover, patterns of settlement in concentrations disrupted Ha agricultural practices. Before concentration, Ha farmers had extensive farmlands and practiced a sophisticated form of fallow agriculture. The landscape was dotted with homesteads in which families lived patrilocally and were surrounded by fields, fallow land, and unbroken soil. More often than not, many miles separated each homestead. Within their area, Ha farmers would start fields in different years, leaving one to fallow and beginning another when they saw signs of declining fertility, especially the appearance of the *ngonga* flower.⁵⁰ No one would rely on the harvest from a plot's first year of planting, as good soil was the result of a two-year rotation of specific crops.⁵¹ A family's area was normally large enough that areas under fallow or virgin soil were extensive enough to meet their needs for decades, but there was always the option to pioneer new areas. Nowhere in eastern Buha was land scarce or movement into new lands controlled. Sleeping sickness policy violated these practices, not only creating hunger conditions in the first years of concentrations, but also leading to a general state of noticeably deteriorated agriculture.⁵² After resettlement, too, there were few options for opening new areas. As an elder explained, in the past, "...you moved saying that 'let me go to a new place,'" but "*Umukutano* was a [predetermined] place for everyone."⁵³ This meant that Ha people had limited options of where they could open new fields, as they had to "...stay very near," within *umukutano*'s boundaries. This meant that residents who

⁵⁰ Interviews of Nyamweru Maseke 28 May 2009 Kumhasha Village and Ladislaus Chanda Kipfumu 12 October 2007 Kifura Village.

⁵¹ These practices were even noted by colonial officers, in RH Mss.Afr.s.290 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 4 October 1931 and Mss.Afr.s.1612 (17) Donald Sturdy Papers, letter of 7 February 1938.

⁵² RH Mss.Afr.S.1331 Donald Sturdy Papers, 20.

⁵³ Interview of Julietta Katabhe 16 October 2007 Kifura Village.

needed to expand frequently ran into others' areas: "when you cultivate and you arrive there, he says "no! You have now reached my boundary, don't cultivate. Don't go on.""⁵⁴

Because of colonial personnel shortages, the lack of maintenance of *umukutano* stymied Ha efforts to insure their own agricultural production. Ha people requested land extensions and wider borders throughout the 1930s and 1940s, but official responses were delayed, often by years. Even when a new Agricultural Surveyor, Mr. Ollendorff, was specifically assigned to Buha in 1945 to work on concentration borders and supervise bush clearing, his ability to do his job was hampered because he had no vehicle with which to visit the concentrations.⁵⁵ Over the years, many Ha people shifted within *umukutano*, attempting to find viable soil. This resulted in the most dispersed living arrangement possible within a bounded space, with homestead built at the very edge of the boundaries and cultivation done in the vast center inside.⁵⁶ In other cases, Ha people took the initiative and often went ahead and began cultivation, sometimes fully settling outside of concentration lines. Officials could not prevent this from happening, but met each offense with the same response: they burned homes, destroyed crops, and told people to go to fly free areas.⁵⁷ The administrative staff had the following dialogue mapped out for them in the Kiha primer:

Aha harih' ibibugu?	= Are there tsetse here?
Harihe vyinshi?	= Are there many?

⁵⁴ Interview of Ladislaus Chanda Kipfumu 12 October 2007 Kifura Village.

⁵⁵ TNA 450/1266/28 1945 Sleeping Sickness Annual Report and RH Mss.Afr.s.1333 John J. Tawney Papers, 15 January 1945.

⁵⁶ TNA 232/F/HO Handing Over. P. S. Hogg 1954, 3-4.

⁵⁷ TNA 450 160/38/4/1 Sleeping Sickness Kigoma District Survey. District Agricultural Officer to Senior Agricultural Officer, 6 September 1935 and interview of Nyamana Ndikumwami 17 June 2009 Kumshindwi Village.

Uvuyehe?	= Where have you come from?
Ho wageruts' ino hahez' imyak' ingahe?	= How many years ago did you move here?
Urubibe ruri hehe?	= Where is the boundary?
Ntushobor' ukugenda hanze.	= You cannot go outside
Wagway' amalale?	= Have you got (had) S, [sic] Sickness?
Uwumensi ni wa kangahe?	= How many days ago?
Waragiwe ihospitali?	= Did you go to the dispensary?
Ko utagiye ni kuvi?	= Why not?
Abagenzi wawe bakutware.	= Your friends should carry you. ⁵⁸

Destruction of such labor-intensive property even elicited the “hidden sympathy” of Kasulu’s District Commissioner John J. Tawney. He wrote of how Ha peoples’ search for better soil involved back-breaking work, all of which was destroyed with a match.⁵⁹ According to elders, many people who were burned out chose to move to other regions entirely rather than return to concentrations.

Moving people to *umukutano* also made them more subject to tax collection.

Within two years of concentration, full taxes in Buha’s concentrations were paid within three months of the start of collection, rather than requiring the full twelve months as was typical throughout the colony. By the 1940s, administrative officials bragged that there was now “a tradition of quick payment of tax.”⁶⁰ As chapter one argued, colonial officials looked on tax collection as a sign of acceptance of and engagement with the colonial state. For people in concentrations, though, where avoiding tax collection was rendered virtually impossible, quickly paying taxes could be a strategy to avoid repeated visits by officials and delay their next return to the following tax year. The issue of taxation in concentrations caused elders to discuss the brutality of some colonial officials,

⁵⁸ “Short Kiha Vocabulary.”

⁵⁹ RH Mss.Afr.s.1333 John J. Tawney Papers. Letter to Supu, 23 August 1945.

⁶⁰ RH Mss.Afr.s.1333 (8) John J. Tawney Papers, 26.

recalling a particularly lurid story in which *Muhogo Mchungu* whipped a dead body he came across on the road. He demanded to know whether the corpse had paid his tax for that year, and then lamented: “He has died without paying my tax!”⁶¹ Just what such taxes were used for was not forthcoming from those telling these stories: “We just paid without knowing where it would be spent.”⁶²

Life in concentrations brought a series of examples of *ugwimo* to Ha people, but there were ways of seeking the resolution to chaos in Ha thought, a process known as *ukuhoza* or “cooling.”⁶³ In concert with many other sub-Saharan African cultures, Ha people believed that troubled relationships with ancestral and nature spirits or with other people were manifested in deteriorating health, stability, peace, and prosperity of individuals and the community. But these relationships could be made right again through “cooling,” and Ha elders’ accounts of how they built viable communities from a state of *ugwimo* in concentrations give pride of place to Ha people “cooling” a series of troubled relationships. In recreating homesteads that included *ndalo* ancestor houses and *mirumba* ficus trees, Ha people restored relationships with the spiritual realm while at the same time recreated public space for socializing, maintaining, and repairing relationships with family and neighbors. These sites and new work relationships that centered on the honey industry facilitated significant cooperation that overcame the forms of chaos and enhanced challenges of living within the boundaries of *umukutano*.

⁶¹ Interview of four elders 25 September 2007 Kagera Nkanda Village. This story was clearly a crowd favorite.

⁶² Interview of Bilangamila Mfanye 17 October 2007 Busunzu Village.

⁶³ Michele Wagner, “Environment, Community, and History ‘Nature in the Mind’ in Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Buha, Tanzania,” in *Custodians of the Land: Ecology and Culture in the History of Tanzania*, eds. Gregory Maddox, James Giblin, and Isaria Kimambo (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1996): 182 and interview of Mattias Mzobha 27 September 2007 Kagera Nkanda Village.

Re-forming and maintaining relationships with ancestor spirits was an early priority of resettled Ha people, and was done through creating a physical presence for ancestor spirits, *imizimu* (s. *umuzimu*) in the homestead. Good relations with ancestors insured prosperity and health to a family, while disrespected ancestors could bring disease, death, and hunger.⁶⁴ In *umukutano*, Ha people recreated familiar spiritual and social spaces. Soon after building permanent homes, Ha elders recall building *ndalo*, small ancestor houses where family members, primarily a patriarch, would go to propitiate his father's, grandfather's, or other ancestor spirits to bring the family health and prosperity.⁶⁵ Well into the late 1940s, CMS missionaries in Kibondo noted the presence of *ndalo* as a sign of their continuing lack of influence: "It is almost impossible to visit even the nearby houses without passing a sacred grove or a series of spirit-houses for ancestor-worship."⁶⁶ Ancestor spirits were thought to visit the *ndalo* from time to time, to observe their descendents and their ceremonies.⁶⁷ In these ceremonies, a man might approach the *ndalo* with a gourd of beer only used for this purpose, drink some, share it with the spirits by spitting it with a straw into the *ndalo* and make a request: an elder told me "...if a person [in the family] is ill, [the father] goes to his father [the *ndalo*] and says 'you should help me, so that my child can be able to recover.'" Sometimes the


⁶⁴ Johan Scherer, "The Ha of Tanganyika," *Anthropos* 54 (1960): 889.

⁶⁵ Some male Ha elders included his mother, grandmother, or some of his wife's ancestors when speaking of the possible spirits propitiated, although this was not universal. None of the female elders to whom I spoke said her ancestors were involved. Johan Herman Scherer, *Marriage and Bridewealth in the Highlands of Buha* (Groningen: VRB Kleine, 1965), 36, mentions that the *ndalo* of women's ancestral spirits were propitiated just outside of the compound fence of their married homestead. Lowland homesteads tended not to be fenced.

⁶⁶ CMS Annual Letter, Deaconess Doris Jean Crawford, 11 August 1949.

⁶⁷ Scherer, *Marriage and Bridewealth*, 35. In a 30 September 1929 letter home, W. B. Tripe recounts coming across "miniature huts scattered here & there and peoples' reluctance to explain them. Leakey explained they were for departed ancestors who returned at night to protect their descendents. RH Mss.Afr.s.868 Tripe Papers.

request would come with the offer of a specific gift, such as a roasted goat, if the request were fulfilled. In the face of success, it was not only the immediate family but close neighbors who would be invited to partake of the roasted goat.



Figures 3.1 and 3.2 Left: building a new house in the lowlands, with *ndalo* to the left, c. 1927. RH Mss.Afr.s.1612 Donald Sturdy Papers, used with permission. Right: a rare present-day *ndalo* of Warungendanye Kagoma, Kumshindwi Village. The rope used in the construction in both pictures is made from the *mirumba* tree. Photographed by author, 11 June 2009.

Ancestor spirit veneration took place in the part of the homestead marked out for socializing, in the shade of specially planted ficus trees. These ficus trees, called *mirumba*, created the public social spaces of Ha homes. *Mirumba* were nearly universally planted before and after concentration; one elder reported that they were the sign of a humanized landscape, a tree that had to be planted and so it was a clear indicator of past settlement sites.⁶⁸ Most Ha homes had several *mirumba* planted: at least one in the middle of an area meticulously cleared and swept directly outside of the house, and another group just beyond the homesteads' buildings. This latter group was in an area of the homestead with its own place designation, the *umuvumu* (pl. *mivumu*), where they would build *ndalo*. There were a series of reasons for *mirumba*'s universality, beginning with the usefulness of the tree. Its bark could be processed into a textile called bark

⁶⁸ Interview of Ladislaus Chanda Kipfumu 12 October 2007 Kifura Village.

cloth, which Ha men made into clothing or blankets for home use or trade. *Mirumba* bark was also the source of rope, an essential building material, and the tree's sticky sap could be used in trapping birds. Ha people used the tree itself, though, to create a space for socializing: the *mirumba*'s shade was where people gathered to work, eat, and welcome visitors. It was the place where people negotiated and maintained a series of relationships with family members and other people, where good interactions guaranteed that cooling would either be simple or unnecessary. *Mirumba* also literally connected resettled Ha people to their original homes. *Umukutano* were not placed in areas where *mirumba* were found, and so on subsequent trips back to their original homes, Ha men made cuttings from their former trees and returned with them to concentrations to plant in their new homes.

As chapter two noted, there were a series of specialists in Ha society to help maintain right relationships. *Bateko*, earth spirit priests, played a maintenance role by conducting ceremonies particularly at sites of known and powerful nature spirits, meant to insure that local resources would be bountiful. They also played a curative role when environmental disasters like wild animal attacks increased.⁶⁹ Although clear oral evidence is lacking, it seems highly likely that *bateko* continued to play important roles in concentrations on both scores. But, because *bateko*'s activities were a secret body of knowledge, and because today's elders were quite young when concentrations began, there was little detail shared in oral interviews. There is also evidence that in the first few decades of concentrations, the system of Native Administration that colonial officials created served to marginalize *bateko* from formal channels of power and authority.

⁶⁹ Michele Wagner, "Environment, Community," 182.

Although early colonial officials toyed with the idea of incorporating *bateko* formally into the Native Authority system, in the end there were only a few *bateko* who took on such roles, usually as minor headmen of local sites. While many *bateko* undoubtedly remained important local figures, there is evidence that *batwale* increasingly took on powerful roles in concentrations that had once been the realm of the *bateko*. In particular, officials recorded that minor *batwale* allocated land in concentrations far more commonly in the 1950s than *bateko*, and received a one-time, rather than annual, gift paid in cash as “a fee” of 40 shillings, a substantial sum.⁷⁰

New Social and Spatial Ties in *Umukutano*

The changed circumstances of *umukutano* influenced Ha people to form new ties in concentrations, most importantly connected through the local honey industry. Before concentration, lowland Ha families typically combined farming with salt boiling, hunting, and beekeeping to meet their own needs and to take part in a vibrant regional trade where salt and honey were high value commodities. Officials placed an immediate moratorium on salt producing, citing salt making sites’ high tsetse fly density to justify this restriction,⁷¹ and thus made the honey industry all the more important. Solely men’s work, honey could only be obtained in certain parts of the lowlands that had nectar-producing flowers, and Ha people tended to cluster in these areas. But resettlement had

⁷⁰ TNA 232/F/HO Handing Over PS Hogg 1954, 4. By the late 1950s, this critical power was the prerogative of the new district councils. See TNA 180/A3/22 v 3 Agriculture Reports. J. F. Hall Buha Division, 4 December 1959 Monthly Letter for October and November, 3.

⁷¹ Elders note that people broke this ban in the early years, but it became increasingly hard to continue to make salt as it was difficult to hide the large bundles produced. It is interesting that there was a continued need to outlaw the practice of making salt in former lowlanders’ homes up until 1950, such as in TNA 202/L60/87 Local Government Buha Council Federation Minutes. Minutes from 2 November 1950. Many elders proposed an intriguing thesis that the purpose of the moratorium was to support the partially government-owned salt factory at Uvinza. For an example, see interview of Ladislaus Chanda Kipfumu 12 October 2007 Kifura Village.

moved them between 20 and 80 miles away from honey areas, distances that could take one to four days to cover on foot.⁷² This reality reconfigured both men's and women's productive activities in ways that stimulated new social ties in *umukutano*.

Once a landscape inhabited by people, honey areas were now *pori*, “wilderness,” an area fraught with a series of dangers. Because of honey sites' distance from concentrations and the work necessary to prepare beehives and attract bees to them, honey-related trips required that men stay in the *pori* for weeks at a time. Before concentration, men tended their beehives alone or with the help of junior male relatives, but beekeepers now chose to travel and work in groups of neighbors, family, or friends in order to confront the dangers of traveling through and staying in wilderness.⁷³ Hanging hives and collecting honey could involve dangerous tree climbing, and more than one elder recalls serious injury from falls that could have been worse if they had been alone.⁷⁴ Beekeeping groups became close-knit, and the activity took on a heightened sense of prestige. These processes can both be seen in a series of work songs from this period that I collected, the largest number of which related to the honey industry. As Frank Gunderson has written, work songs perform a number of functions: they can express social commentary or protest, they can transform difficult work into something more playful, but they also create “a dynamic and heightened group consciousness” – after all, only beekeepers knew these songs.⁷⁵ Men sang as they tended their beehives, while

⁷² Interview of Balikulije Lulitaliye 6 June 2009 Busunzu Village.

⁷³ Interviews of Nyamweru Maseke 28 May 2009 Kumhasha Village and Warungendanye Kagoma 11 June 2009 Kumshindwi Village.

⁷⁴ Interviews of Rukumbila Gota 19 June 2009 Kumshindwi Village and Kafizi Kabahazi 18 June 2009 Kumshindwi Village.

⁷⁵ Cited in Stephen Rockel, *Carriers of Culture: Labor on the Road in Nineteenth Century East Africa* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2006): 114.

women sang of their absence. In one song, women acknowledged the dangers of the forest and the importance of the spiritual realm in their success:

Umugabho akaja kuhiga
Mawe kabhayonga
...Ulobhona Imana igaluye

My husband has gone to hunt [honey]
He is sacrificed
... You will see if God returns him.⁷⁶

Movement to concentrations transformed the labor that went into beekeeping and increased the areas of expertise beekeepers had to master. Before concentration, beekeeping was an activity requiring expertise in hive building, hive placement, attracting bee colonies, and removing honey without injury. After concentration, beekeepers had to do all of these things without a nearby home base, and had to do so in a changed landscape bereft of familiar landmarks. Without the option to return to hives often to check on their progress, beekeepers' activities were vulnerable in several ways. To begin with, honey could be stolen, and so beekeepers used new medicines in hives to prevent theft.⁷⁷ And without the option to move an unproductive hive easily to a new location, beekeepers were even more dependent on their ability to place hives in productive areas. Locating these areas was made all the more difficult by changes in the landscape, and so beekeepers used trees located in formerly inhabited areas to orient themselves. Palm trees, mango trees, and, especially *mirumba* indicated former homesteads, and beekeepers added marks to these to indicate their routes.⁷⁸ In part

⁷⁶ "Umugabho Akaja Kuhiga" collected on 4 July 2009 Kifura Village.

⁷⁷ J. E. S. Griffiths observed this in 1932: RH Mss.Afr.r.179 John E. S. Griffiths Diary, 10 March 1932.

⁷⁸ Interviews of Expiriusi Nkooko 24 June 2009 Kifura Village, Ladislaus Chanda Kipfumu 20 October 2007 Kifura Village, and Felicita Kigina 27 September 2007 Kagera Nkanda Village. Barbara Gunn's

because of the increased difficulty of beekeeping, when they returned home with a great deal of honey from an area so rich in bees that their buzzing sounded like “shouting,” it was cause for celebration, and for bragging:

Sanganila bhavumbi, nawe mukonde
Zilantuma kuyaga, zilimulwabhila
Ngereye Mulisondo. Ndwava zilahiga mpingwe
Nterekere zilimulwabhila
Ngereye Mulisamase. Ndunva zilahiga mpingwe
Nterekere zilimulwabhila
Sanganila bhavumbi, nawe mukonde
Zilantuma kuyaga, zilimulwabhila.

To receive the honey gatherers, you the receivers.
I can talk because there are a lot of bees there.
I was near Mulisondo. I listened, the bees are shouting.
Going there where there are a lot of bees.
I was near Mulisamase. I listened, the bees are shouting.
Going there where there are a lot of bees.
To receive the honey gatherers, you the receivers.
I can talk because there are a lot of bees there.⁷⁹

Beekeeping enabled many resettled Ha men to maintain regular ties with their original homes on their biannual honey trips. Some beekeepers chose to hang their hives in trees in the immediate vicinity of where their beekeeping group chose to camp. But many of these elders recall that their route would take them through their original homesteads, which elicited conversation and even boasts of the land’s fertility: “I was telling them... ‘here we used to be, this was our area.’ And another person said, ‘here was our area.’ We showed them to others who had not gone [before]. ‘Friends, this is

guides in 1958 looked for beekeepers’ signs on trees to find the route from Murungu to Ibolero. They remained lost, however, until a group of Ha beekeepers told them where they could pick up their route, over two kilometers away. See Barbara Gunn, “Malagarasi Journey,” *Tanganyika Notes and Records* 58 & 59 (1962): 153-62, 155 and 158.

⁷⁹ “Sangila Bhavumbi” collected on 4 July 2009 Kifura Village.

our area. This here now is our past home.”⁸⁰ For other elders, these visits simply reinforced their worsened condition in *umukutano*: “I started from having many things. There were many crops, every type of crop was found there [at the original home]. The land was very fertile compared to [*umukutano*].”⁸¹ In other cases, Ha men returned to the same areas, and at times the same trees, where their fathers and grandfathers had hung their beehives in the past. Because many of these were located near their former homes, many beekeepers camped at their former homestead sites, reinforcing connections with these areas on each trip into the forest.⁸²

Women changed their labor patterns as much as men did in the early years of resettlement: the song that worried about men’s safety continues “Cook for him so he can go,” and elders recall how preparing provisions to last this length of time could take two grown women a full week to complete. Once the beekeepers left, women continued to pound more flour in case a beekeeping group member returned for more. Women’s labor burdens also increased because honey work coincided with periods of weeding and sorghum harvesting. In this context of increased work, women also turned to neighbors, relatives, and friends to form work parties in fields and in pounding provisions for beekeepers. Some even recalled shifting their fields together onto slopes, where households could cooperate in driving away birds that were serious crop pests.⁸³ The

⁸⁰ Interview of Expiriusi Nkooko 24 June 2009 Kifura Village.

⁸¹ Interview of Joakim Ruhazi 13 October 2007 Kifura Village.

⁸² Interviews of Warungendanye Kagoma 11 June 2009 Kumshindwi Village, Leonia Kifwoka 23 October 2007 Kifura Village, and Balikulije Lulitiliye 17 October 2007 Busunzu Village.

⁸³ TNA 63/L5/101 District Administration – Kibondo District – General. Settlement Officer to District Commissioner Kasulu, 21 April 1948.

nexus between honey and increased labor continued when women saved part of the honey harvest to pay people for helping with cultivation the following season.⁸⁴

Cooperating in work was only the beginning of the ties that honey work formed. In elderly men's and women's memories of this early period, the danger of going to the forest was balanced by the joy of beekeepers' return and the communal celebration that ensued. Women began brewing beer long before men's actual return, preparing to host crowds "like at a market."⁸⁵ Nothing elated elders like recounting these celebrations, and the greatest number of songs about honey were drinking songs referencing both work and return.⁸⁶ Truly communal celebrations, neighbors and friends traveled from house to house, sitting under *mirumba* and drinking, until each beekeeper's family had hosted:

Yes, it was a holiday. Because if you left that forest, you met them making beer at every house. You were drinking with that one, and with that one, like this. It was like a holiday if you came from the forest. Many people came because there was beer, and it was free beer! He invited those who were close by to him. On that day, you were going to another's and they were drinking. You were going even to yet another person's [and] you were drinking the whole day, you were just drinking."⁸⁷

Close neighbors and friends might even be referred to as *abaryango*, clansmen, regardless of their actual clan affiliations.⁸⁸ These celebrations were also a forum for conspicuous generosity during which a beekeeper demonstrated his skill and his family's largesse:

Mkumbule bhadyosha bhashima bhantu.
Akonakalyoti ndimulele winzuki bhoze bhalamenya.

⁸⁴ TNA 450 160/38/4/1 Sleeping Sickness Kigoma District Survey. District Agricultural Officer to Senior Agricultural Officer and interview of Nyamana Ndikumwami 17 June 2009 Kumshindwi Village.

⁸⁵ Interviews of Nyamana Ndikumwami 17 June 2009 Kumshindwi Village and Warungendanye Kagoma 11 June 2009 Kumshindwi Village.

⁸⁶ "Sangila Bhavumbi" collected on 4 July 2009 Kifura Village.

⁸⁷ Interview of Paolo Kigaraba 18 June 2009 Kumshindwi Village.

⁸⁸ Scherer, "The Ha," 868.

Bwilwa wunve kanyamtete

To remember people who are good, not greedy.
We are thankful for the champion of keeping beehives
and everyone knows him.
Champion, you listen to what we are saying.⁸⁹

Hosts sent out invitations widely, but women made sure that the most honored guests were those who worked with them at the times of men's absence. As one elder said, "we made beer and we called the people to come and drink, the ones who could help us to grind."⁹⁰

Like the use of alcohol at *ndalo*, these beer parties were not merely celebrations. Returning safely and with an appreciable quantity of honey was a tangible sign that relationships with ancestral and nature spirits were cool. Indeed, before most productive activities, Ha men would propitiate their ancestral spirits and local nature spirits with beer and offer even greater gifts if the spirits helped them prosper. A beekeepers' worksong stated, "If God returns me safely I will drink *intarano* [honey beer]" with the implication that this bounty would be shared with other people and with the spirits.⁹¹ No British official ever wrote of Ha alcohol consumption with an appreciation of its many meanings. Instead, officials continually noted how the drunkenness of Ha people wasted their grain crops and was a sign of lack of industriousness and rational planning.⁹² In one song, Ha

⁸⁹ "Walimusoga Muna Bhabha" collected on 4 July 2009 Kifura Village.

⁹⁰ Interview of Nyamana Ndikumwami 17 June 2009 Kumshindwi Village.

⁹¹ "Bhavumbi Bhalamenya" collected on 4 July 2009 Kifura Village. Interviews of Mokupi Motuta 1 June 2009 Kumhasha Village and Meshaki Bakunda 23 June 2009 Kifura Village.

⁹² See RH Mss.Afr.s.1516 J. A. K. Leslie Papers. Interview of J. A. K. Leslie by John J. Tawney, May 1969, 19; RH Mss.Afr.s.1333 (8) John J. Tawney Papers, 23; and RH Mss.Afr.s.292 Francis J. Bagshawe Diary, 4 May 1934 for samples. In the last example, Bagshawe goes so far as to suggest an enhanced crop campaign to give Ha people less time to spend drinking at gatherings.

singers countered colonial disapprobation and countered with their own indignation at the disrespectful treatment of elders by officials:

Mulamenya munywe neza
Ntimumene imihange za bhatama
Umugereza yiyankiye
Na Muhogo yiyankiye
Umugereza yiyankiye

You just know that you drink well
You don't break the [beer] pots of the elders
The British don't like it
And *Muhogo* doesn't like it
The British don't like it.⁹³

Drinking well, an indicator that spirit relations were peaceful, seems to counter any critique colonial officials like *Muhogo Mchungu* might lay at Ha feet.

The early years of *umukutano* were ones of profound adjustment to closer settlement patterns, limitations on agriculture, new neighbors, and disrupted access to forest resources. The case study of beekeeping in Buha encapsulates the ways in which Ha people remade their lives: they continued relationships with the spiritual world, adjusted their economic practices, formed new cooperative groups along gendered and neighborhood lines, and cemented all of these relationships with new social events.

“Accent on Development”: Resurgent Policies for Concentrations, 1947-1959

During these early years of dynamic change in concentrations, Buha's local colonial officials grew exceedingly frustrated by their lack of influence in the region. The demands of World War II on personnel and funding compounded the problem to such an extent that, in the view of District Officer of Kasulu John J. Tawney, the British colonial mission was a failure:

⁹³ “Mulamenya Munywe Neza” collected on 4 July 2009 Kifura Village.

A foreigner visiting this country of a quarter of a million inhabitants, knowing that it has been under British rule for twenty five years, would be justified in asking 'What have you been doing all this time'? Practically nothing has been done to advance the welfare of the Waha.⁹⁴

While the British had failed to develop the regional in general, Tawney was especially critical of the neglect of the sleeping sickness concentrations:

Those Sleeping Sickness Settlements which at the start had no cattle in them, even to-day have not a single head, no Government or N.T. [Native Treasury] Schools, no fixed policy. They are a monument to apathy and indifference and already are tending to break up.⁹⁵

Tawney's evaluation was not unique; when Donald Sturdy returned to Buha in 1937 after having been gone since 1929, his evaluation of the change that had occurred was that "all the Lowland people had been moved into concentrations – settlements. Roads were all over the place, but basically there were no changes whatsoever."⁹⁶

The colonial government's crippled capacity during World War II transformed radically from the late 1940s through the late 1950s. Underwritten by new funding, the colonial apparatus expanded dramatically, adding new personnel in all departments who proposed and implemented a series of transformative projects. To begin with, Kibondo and Kasulu were restored to full administrative units in 1947, and could draw on a series of technical officers and their African assistants to push projects through. The postwar period was a time when colonial governments invested unprecedented resources into their colonies, pursuing "development" as a new justification and purpose for colonial rule.

As Frederick Cooper has analyzed, both France and Great Britain "sought new visions of

⁹⁴ TNA 35167 Establishment of Buha as a District Separate from Kigoma. Memorandum of District Commissioner John J. Tawney, 27 June 1946, 6.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁹⁶ RH Mss.Afr.S.1331 Donald Sturdy Papers. Interview of Donald Sturdy by John J. Tawney 26 August 1969, 3.

empire” at the end of the World War II “to make their colonies more productive and orderly and to find a stable basis for imperial ideology in an era when self-determination was being proclaimed a basic principle of international relations.”⁹⁷ The practical measure by which the Colonial Office in London supported such efforts was through the Colonial Development and Welfare Act [CDW]. Its drafting in 1940 promised to drastically increase and critically expand areas of investment in Britain’s colonies after the war. The CDW replaced the 1929 Colonial Development Act, in which only £5 million had been spent between 1929-1939, versus £5 million available per year from the late 1940s on. Moreover, the addition of “welfare” to the act’s title expanded the CDW’s mandate. The old act focused on improving colonies’ ability to trade with Great Britain, and officials justified the expenditure in a time of financial crisis because this increased trade was to ease unemployment in the metropole. The 1940 act, however, could focus on the reduction of colonial people’s poverty and could promote welfare dimensions like public health, education, and water supplies. Officials in London assumed that their economic development initiatives would eventually lead to each colony’s ability to pay for these services. But, in great contrast to the Colonial Office’s earlier insistence that colonies fund their efforts from their own revenues or from loans, now London was prepared to fund these initiatives in their early phases.⁹⁸ These funds were supplemented

⁹⁷ Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: the Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 18.

⁹⁸ Cooper, *Decolonization*, 67. See also Cooper’s “Possibility and Constraint: African Independence in Historical Perspective,” *Journal of African History* 49.2 (2008): 167-96.

from the local treasuries in Buha, which had been building throughout the war years because there were no materials available to buy and no staff available to pay.⁹⁹

With full financial support and a new, unifying ideology, colonial officials pursued broad-based change in Buha. Officers from every department planned their work to enhance local economic and social development. Specifically, they sought to integrate Ha farmers into the colonial crop marketing apparatus, modernize the honey industry, reestablish the effectiveness of concentrations as sleeping sickness deterrents, and democratize the African leadership structure. This was “colonialism at its most reformist, its most interventionist, its most arrogantly assertive.”¹⁰⁰ As such, officials focused their efforts on concentrations as particularly apt sites for such interventions. As Kasulu District Commissioner John Leslie recalled years later, “Because it was so easy to administer a compact group, you could afford to put a school where everybody was concentrated in one area where you perhaps would have left them for another ten years [before trying to do so], and the same with the baraza [court] and the other so-called amenities.”¹⁰¹ Yet, none of these initiatives were pursued in a vacuum: all had to contend with competing Ha priorities as well as technical and scientific breakthroughs which forced colonial policy to change rapidly.

Crop Marketing

Buha’s agricultural officers wrote of their re-articulated goals of enhancing development with enthusiasm borne of their enhanced capacity. When Kasulu’s

⁹⁹ RH Mss.Afr.s.1516 J. A. K. Leslie Papers. Interview of J.A.K. Leslie by John J. Tawney, 19 May 1969, 8.

¹⁰⁰ Cooper, *Decolonization*, 451.

¹⁰¹ RH Mss.Afr.s.1516 J.A.K. Leslie Papers. Interview of J. A. K. Leslie by John J. Tawney, 19 May 1969, 40.

Agricultural Officer wrote to his regional superior, he began with the general principle that his purpose in Buha was to increase production through advice to administrative officers and Ha farmers, as well as to channel agricultural goods into the colonial marketing structure. All of this was aimed at linking Ha farmers to the outside world. In the Agricultural Officer's view, he and his colleagues were the holders of scientific knowledge which "at present are not in the minds of Africans" but which "have been proved by History in other countries and districts" to be undeniably accurate.¹⁰² These included identifying the most suitable food and cash crop for each environment, and finding timber or pasturage usage for land less suitable for agriculture. Some of his views, he suggested, were already being proven correct in two concentration areas, where he credited the market incentive for bringing vast changes to some Ha farmers: "the provision of markets has meant that in new settlement areas, e.g. Makere and Nyavyumbu where there is plenty of room, africans [sic] now cultivate big shambas of 20 acres or more."¹⁰³ In every area, agricultural officers established demonstration plots and seed nurseries. They used them both to conduct research on potential crops and to model different forms of crop rotation and plant care. They also established Native Authority markets where special days were set aside for commerce in the main local crops like beans, maize, sorghum, cassava, castor, and pigeon peas.¹⁰⁴

The most ambitious agricultural project in Buha in the late 1940s was to transform the limited local tobacco cultivation into a viable industry in Kibondo. A

¹⁰² TNA 198/A3/3 vol 1 Kasulu Agriculture Monthly Reports. Agricultural Officer Kasulu to Provincial Agricultural Officer, Report for February 1955 Kasulu, Kibondo, and Kigoma Districts, 1.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁰⁴ TNA 232/F/HO Handing Over. P. S. Hogg, Kasulu 1954, 8. Hogg lists produce markets at Nyavyumbu, Kakonko, Kifura, Kasanda, Mabamba, Mugunzu, and Nyaruonga.

newly-designated Tobacco Officer toured the region, distributing free seeds and attempting to create enthusiasm among Ha farmers to plant tobacco more extensively and sell it to the Nyamirembe Native Tobacco Board. This move would directly connect Ha farmers to the international tobacco market. Based in Biharamulo District to the north, Nyamirembe sold their tobacco in four graded classes to the East Africa Tobacco Company based in Kampala, which sent their processed tobacco to Britain and beyond. Kibondo's Tobacco Officer and his team of nine African Tobacco Instructors offered advice on the best practices of growing and fire-curing tobacco leaves, as well as monitoring the marketing process. They organized labor to build buying sheds in all major locations and scheduled the visits of Nyamirembe representatives for direct purchasing from Ha producers. From an initial group of 200 farmers, over 3,000 were growing tobacco in Kibondo 1949.¹⁰⁵

Despite the Agriculture Department's attempts to integrate Ha farmers into the colonial marketing system, only a small percentage of Ha products ever sold in these arenas. The standardized prices offered by colonial marketing boards could never compete with the strongest local market for food and cash crops: Burundi. Colonial officials worked hard to build marketing infrastructure, but longstanding trading practices and cross-border relationships already facilitated a far more profitable trade. Agricultural officials bemoaned how their export numbers belied the very real agricultural output of Buha. Not only did Ha harvests feed at least 250,000 people locally, but they also met the needs of Burundians who "do not produce enough food for their own needs, but have

¹⁰⁵ RH 754.12.r.25 Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners for the Year 1949 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1950), 153.

plenty of money available to pay high prices.”¹⁰⁶ Estimates ranged from 1,000-1,500 tons of goods crossing the border annually. In terms of tobacco, Agricultural Officers were baffled that greater numbers of growers and more extensive fields could yield the same amount of tobacco sold to Nyamirembe. From the early 1950s on, however, higher prices paid in Burundi meant that more and more tobacco crossed the border privately to be sold.¹⁰⁷ Added to this, the preference in Burundi for the coil variety also meant that tobacco processing for this market involved far less labor than the fire-cured varieties required by Nyamirembe.¹⁰⁸

Ha farmers found much of this agricultural advice to be a form of interference that attempted to add to their labor demands. The presence of Agricultural Officers and a total of 61 African subordinates in various roles, for instance, meant that compulsory cassava cultivation became stringently enforced from the late 1940s on. In 1951 alone, over 6,000 Ha farmers were fined for not planting cassava, and later administrative officials made these compulsory crops one of their main focuses.¹⁰⁹ Some of the requirements for tobacco conflicted with the priority that many Ha men gave to the honey industry. Both the need to destroy residual tobacco plants in order to prevent the spread of tobacco diseases, and the timing of watering seedbeds interfered with the October-November main honey gathering season.¹¹⁰ The upshot of all of these interventions was to make Ha farmers less than ever interested in changing their practices, which

¹⁰⁶ TNA 232/F/HO Handing Over Report. P. S. Hogg Kibondo 1954, 7 and 8.

¹⁰⁷ RH 754.12.r.25 Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners for the Year 1951 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1952): 184.

¹⁰⁸ Interview of Charles Kikwaba 25 May 2009 Kumhasha Village. He and other elders recalled the labor involved in collecting and hauling firewood to their drying sheds, especially because they could not use typical firewood but needed young trees because they produced more smoke.

¹⁰⁹ TNA 232/F/HO Handing Over. Handing Over Notes Kasulu P. S. Hogg 1954, 3 and 13.

¹¹⁰ TNA 232 I.STS.TOUR.Kib Safari Diaries Kibondo. Safari Diary 31 October 1960.

Agricultural Officer duly noted: “Any advice or help you try to give them has the effect of making them appear as if you were trying to increase the load or [sic] already overloaded porter.”¹¹¹

Modernizing the Honey Industry

With economic development uppermost in officials’ minds after the war, the lucrative honey industry received new focus for control and “rationalization”. The territory’s Beeswax Officer, Dr. F. G. Smith, was assigned to the Agricultural Department and sought to transform beekeeping practices into “live, progressive, and profitable industry.”¹¹² He worked to end what he viewed as destructive practices to bee swarms and bee environments, and sought to induce Africans to produce standardized qualities of honey and beeswax that could enter the international market. Especially since the war years, bee products were in high demand – honey was desired as a sweetener and beeswax had a series of industrial applications as a lubricant, molding material, and insulator.¹¹³ The Beeswax Officer felt that changed African beekeeping practices would have to involve a transformation of what he termed “honey hunters” into “beekeepers”. This distinction defined honey hunters as Africans who sought “the wild nests of bees in hollow trees, under rocks and in holes in the ground,” who set large fires, destroyed the trees in which honey was found, and tended to destroy the brood in the collection process. A beekeeper, though, “collects beeswax and honey from beehives

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, Safari Diary November 1959.

¹¹² TNA 270/A20/BW Annual Reports Beeswax Division. Beeswax Officer Dr. F. G. Smith to Chief Conservator of Forests, 7 March 1955.

¹¹³ TNA 270/40/III Beeswax and Beekeeping. See Entomological Leaflet No. 10 1931 and Memorandum on Beeswax Production, 17 March 1942. Apparently in war time, beeswax was also incorporated into incendiary bombs and artillery pieces.

which he himself has made,” insures the longevity of the bee colony, and builds and brings hives into the forest.¹¹⁴ Smith’s vision went beyond transforming individuals’ practices. He hoped to practically industrialize beekeeping in Tanganyika by creating a permanent infrastructure of piped water for apiaries, permanent beekeeper housing in forest camps, a network of transport centers, and willing traders to pay a good price for all the product beekeepers were willing to sell.¹¹⁵ He used explicitly developmentalist language to argue that his goal to turn all honey hunters into beekeepers was “for their own benefit and that of the Territory and Empire as well.”¹¹⁶

To achieve this aim, the Beeswax Officer created a cadre of trained Beekeeping Instructors and utilized the services of Settlement Officers and Scouts. Each Beekeeping Instructor was recruited locally and sent to Tabora for a two-week course in “modern” beekeeping and honey and wax processing. Instructors were supposed to be older, respected and accomplished beekeepers who not only could provide instruction to others, but whose real value was in serving as a model of advanced methods and the presumed wealth it could bring. They were specifically required to keep a minimal number of beehives and to submit to monthly blood tests to monitor sleeping sickness, the latter a requirement before they were paid.¹¹⁷ While these measures made beekeeping instruction available to Ha beekeepers, the department never succeeded in closely monitoring beekeepers’ practices. However, because honey work took beekeepers into areas infested

¹¹⁴ TNA 270/40/H vol 1 Beekeeping in Game Reserves. Beeswax Officer Dr. F. G. Smith to Game Warden G. H. Swynnerton, 4 November 1952.

¹¹⁵ TNA 336/A/14 Monthly Reports Beeswax Officer. Report for January and February 1956, 4.

¹¹⁶ TNA 270/40/H vol 1 Beekeeping in Game Reserves. Beeswax Officer Dr. F. G. Smith to Game Warden G. H. Swynnerton, 21 August 1951.

¹¹⁷ TNA 180/A3/16 vol 1 Beeswax. Provincial Commissioner Western Province to all District Commissioners, 16 February 1951; Beeswax Officer to District Commissioners Western Province, 5 September 1951; and TNA/180/A3/16 vol 2 Beeswax. April 1955 “Duties of Beekeeping Instructors”.

with tsetse and sleeping sickness, Settlements Scouts and Officers became more involved in monitoring the industry. From the early 1950s on, beekeepers had to receive a 30-day permit from Scouts, creating a record of who entered infested territory and requiring them to return to dispensaries to be tested at the end of the 30-day period.¹¹⁸ The Settlement Officer also became involved in constructing collection centers and residential camps in the bee habitats directly east of the concentrations, building a skeletal beekeeping infrastructure. The Settlement Officer in Kibondo at the same time was called an “unofficial Assistant Beeswax Officer” for his work in making new beekeeper camps in the forest.¹¹⁹

According to the Beeswax Officer, part of his difficulty in proceeding with his plans was that his work seemed to fall in the interstices of several departments. The Agricultural Department never quite viewed apiculture as a high priority, and most beekeeping occurred in forested areas, many of which were included in the expansion of forest and game reserves after the war. The Game Warden was unequivocal in his objection to allowing beekeeping in Game Reserves, arguing that the 200,000 square miles of beekeeping country outside of reserve areas ought to be used before beekeepers would be allowed in Game Reserves. Besides the general policy to exclude Africans from Game Reserves, the Warden raised concerns about how beekeepers’ use of fire in their work could disturb animal habitat, as well as his suspicion that many would engage

¹¹⁸ TNA 35533 Settlement Officers Postings. Provincial Commissioner R. W. Varian to Chief Secretary, 28 April 1950.

¹¹⁹ TNA 336/A/14 Monthly Reports Beeswax Officer. Report for December 1956, 2.

in hunting while there for honey work.¹²⁰ While the Game Warden expressed suspicion of how ill-conceived economic development plans could ruin the long-term benefits of preserving wildlife, forestry officials pointed out how widespread beekeeping in their reserves could destroy forest resources needed for development, if beekeepers' fires ran out of control.¹²¹ This clash of departmental priority was ameliorated somewhat when the Beeswax Officer was transferred to the Forestry Department in 1954, the same year that the Chief Conservator of Forests agreed to allow beekeeping in reserves. The Game Warden was later mollified by the control methods that the 30-day permit system provided and capitulated to beekeeping in Game Reserves in 1959.¹²²

Ha beekeepers were not so easy to convert to new methods for two important reasons. Firstly, they followed longstanding practices that straddled the categories "honey hunter" and "beekeeper," and secondly, they sought a rational compromise between the greatest monetary profit and greatest reduction of labor in processing and selling honey and beeswax. It was all well and good for the Beeswax Officer to write of how honey hunters sought out bees in the forest whereas beekeepers attracted them to their hives, but elders' descriptions of honey work makes it clear that these distinctions meant little in relation to Ha beekeeping practices. Balikuliye Lulitaliye made an analogy

¹²⁰ Beekeepers used fire to "stupefy" bees, allowing them to collect honey without being stung much. For Game Warden's reservations, see TNA 599/GD/17/37 Beekeeping in Game Reserve. Game Warden G. H. Swynnerton to Chief Secretary, 24 November 1952. One of the Beeswax Officer's more pointed replies occurred when he argued for the value of preserving invertebrate fauna as well as the vertebrate. See TNA 270/40/H vol 1 Beekeeping in Game Reserve. Beeswax Officer Dr. F. G. Smith to Game Warden G. H. Swynnerton, 21 August 1951.

¹²¹ TNA 270/40/III Beeswax and Beekeeping. 17 July 1934 Memorandum on Beeswax Industry in Tanganyika Territory. See letter from Chief Conservator of Forests 10 November 1934 on the "intolerable menace" that beekeepers posed to vegetation.

¹²² TNA 599/GD/18/5 7 Game Reserve General. Game Warden G. H. Swynnerton to Beeswax Officer Dr. F. G. Smith, April 1959.

to agriculture that “if you know that in this place [a crop] will not flourish, you go to another area. . . . Now at that [new] place, if you see crops flourishing, you continue [using] that area.” To be a successful beekeeper, “you began by entering the forest going all around and met bees in a tree. You cut it down to get the honey. You continue like this and you say ‘here is a good place, I should come here now to place [beehives] here.’”¹²³ Thus, the Ha method of locating a suitable area to practice a kind of beekeeping that the Beeswax Officer would recognize as legitimate (placing hives) involved using a method he would have labeled “honey hunting.”

Moreover, beekeepers had few inducements either to sell their honey and beeswax in colonial economic channels or to make the effort to manufacture them to the standards that metropolitan industries required. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, Buha’s officials recorded the high prices paid by Africans for honey in both Buha and across the border in Burundi. Even more importantly, these were prices paid for raw honey without any processing, as opposed to the cycles of cooking and straining needed to meet the official standards for different grades of honey. In consequence, the Beeswax Officer noted with dismay that less than 10% of Ha honey was sold through colonial markets.¹²⁴ Selling in markets was also unappealing to Ha beekeepers because its structure rarely served the needs of the beekeepers: marketing rounds were often held too early in the season for beekeepers to return from their work in the forest, there was little competition amongst traders who instead colluded and bought honey in turns, there were market fees

¹²³ Interview of Balikulije Lulitiliye 6 June 2009 Busunzu Village.

¹²⁴ None of the elders, many of whom were beekeepers in this period, recall selling their honey in colonial markets. RH 754.12.4.25 Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners for the Year 1944 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer): 117; TNA/180/A3/16 vol 2 Beeswax. Beeswax Officer to District Commissioner Kibondo, 4 November 1955 and Beeswax Officer to Forest Department, 7 February 1957.

deducted from honey profits, and many traders forced beekeepers to take part of their profit in goods rather than in cash.¹²⁵ With strong local markets paying higher prices in a more convenient fashion involving less processing, Ha beekeepers had no compelling reason to change their practices.¹²⁶

Continued attempts to intervene in Ha beekeeping practices could actually counteract the possibility for change by raising suspicion of the department's hidden motives. Rumors abounded that hives would soon be taxed: "[t]he beekeepers point out that some years ago cattle were counted and soon afterwards they were taxed. It was strongly recommended that all beekeeping staff refrain from asking anyone how many hives he has." Even more to the point, African Beekeeping Instructors were charged to build as many hives as they could as a sign that there was nothing to fear.¹²⁷

Sleeping Sickness Control

Concentrations were a logical object for colonial officers' attention in an era of enhanced capacity and focus on development: their creation and maintenance, many officials wrote, created an obligation to see that they prospered, and their spatial arrangement could facilitate interventions. Changes in the mid-1940s sought to simplify the roles of different departments in the management of concentrations by reducing the Medical Department's role from directly managing dimensions of concentrations to acting only in an advisory capacity. The Agricultural Surveyor, now called the Settlement Officer, became part of the administration, and the local Native Authorities

¹²⁵ TNA 336/A/14 Monthly Reports Beeswax Officer. March 1955 Conference of Senior Beekeeping Instructors, 2-3.

¹²⁶ TNA 270/A20/BW Annual Reports Beeswax Division. Annual Report of the Beeswax Officer 1954, 4.

¹²⁷ TNA 336/A/14 Monthly Reports Beeswax Officer. 15 December 1955 Second Beekeeping Division Conference.

began to fund sleeping sickness dispensaries through taxation rather than receiving funds from the Medical Department. Sleeping Sickness Officer Dr. Calwell wrote that this change was in response to the “many non-medical factors [that] are involved” in concentrations that made them not entirely a public health measure. The administration was therefore a better fit to supervise them.¹²⁸ Increased funding guaranteed that Settlement Officer positions would be filled in all but unusual circumstances, with one officer assigned to each district with a major tsetse fly presence. Settlement Officers worked closely with Sleeping Sickness dressers in disease treatment, but the far greater job of disease prevention required a new subordinate position, the Sleeping Sickness or Settlement Scout. By 1951, there were 20 Scouts in Kasulu, Kibondo, and Kigoma Districts, enough for at least one scout in every concentration, living and working with the residents. Their ranks continued to swell until there were 40 Scouts in these districts and a new position called the Settlement Assistant was created to supervise them.¹²⁹

Moving the Settlement Officer to the administration was not just a question of where he fit in the bureaucratic structure, but influenced what his work entailed. He was now thought of as the local District Commissioner’s “executive for ensuring the satisfactory running of the resettled area,” adding another European officer to supervise every dimension of concentrations.¹³⁰ In a time when there was a particular “accent on development and production, his interests should...[embrace] not only agriculture and veterinary pursuits, but, also, forestry, tsetse, water, social and co-operative

¹²⁸ TNA 450/1401/1 1946 Sleeping Sickness Annual Report, 4.

¹²⁹ Article written by Mrs. M. Quinlan describing *mafyeke*, in author’s possession. My thanks to Mr. Derek Quinlan for a copy of this article.

¹³⁰ TNA 37788 Settlement Officers. R. de Z. Hall Member for Local Government to all Provincial Commissioners and Director of Medical Services, August 1951.

development.”¹³¹ This meant that the Settlement Officer did not have to have expert knowledge in agriculture and stock keeping, as Agricultural Surveyors did, because the Settlement Officer could draw on the advice of the district representatives from each of these specialized departments. Medical officials still raised concerns from time to time when they felt that the use of Settlement Officers for non-concentration work like census, taxation, and elections rendered their sleeping sickness measures inadequate.¹³² They were always careful, however, to couch their criticisms in terms that resonated with the broader focus on development:

Balanced development within the settlement is essential to the successful control of sleeping sickness and there can, of course, be no justification for restrictive medical measures tending to hinder the progress of development. The purpose of this memorandum is...to draw attention to the necessity for constant vigilance against the introduction of the disease in sleeping sickness settlements, even when the risk appear remote, for if this aspect of settlement management breaks down, all development must be seriously retarded.¹³³

Increasingly, officials in most departments came to see sleeping sickness work as requiring a “team” approach, in which each technical field offered advice and the Settlement Officer offered his “intimate knowledge of the people.” Officials in Dar es Salaam made clear, however, that even though a Settlement Officer might supervise personnel from other departments, all departments could still act independently in concentrations as well.¹³⁴ Making plans for change to settlement sites, for instance, drew on expertise from a series of fields and so officials sought to set out a clear protocol for

¹³¹ TNA 180/M1/13 Medical Sleeping Sickness General. Sleeping Sickness Specialist Dr. F. I. C. Apted to Settlement Officer, 20 September 1957.

¹³² TNA 450/1563/12 1954 Annual Report of the Sleeping Sickness Specialist, 9.

¹³³ TNA 37788 Settlement Officers. Director of Medical Services to Member for Social Services, 2 June 1952.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, R. de Z. Hall Member for Local Government to all Provincial Commissioners and Director of Medical Services, August 1951.

the different department's responsibilities. 1) Settlement Officer determines the need to move people or to clear a site of tsetse habitat; 2) the Sleeping Sickness Specialist researches the incidence of disease; 3) the Settlement Officer chooses a new site; 4) the Provincial Tsetse Officer examines the site and recommends clearing techniques; 5) agricultural and veterinary officials then consult on the suitability of the site as a permanent residence; 6) the District Commissioner and Provincial Commissioner petition the central government for permission and funds.¹³⁵ In practice, the proliferation of bureaucracy delayed settlement change, but what excited officials was how this kind of coordination led to the full deployment of colonial expertise. The Sleeping Sickness Officer celebrated this protocol as clear progress because until recently "...such a joint scheme has been well nigh impossible because all the departments concerned have tended to work in water-tight compartments and no one department had a full idea of what the others were doing."¹³⁶

For residents of concentrations, contact with Scouts was the most common interaction with the sleeping sickness apparatus, and Scouts' duties caused frequent interaction. Their main job, to locate possible sleeping sickness cases and to insure they undertook appropriate testing and treatment, was just the beginning of their duties. In 1950, Sleeping Sickness Officer Dr. Smartt suggested that all Scouts follow the system put in place in Kahama District, in which Scouts would tour a given area each morning, collect a quota of blood, and analyze it in the afternoon. He also suggested that all Scouts

¹³⁵ TNA 83/12/17 Sleeping Sickness North Mara. 23 September 1950 meeting regarding trypanosomiasis in Western Province.

¹³⁶ TNA 37788 Settlement Officers. Memorandum Tsetse and Sleeping Sickness Western Province by Sleeping Sickness Officer Dr. C. G. F. Smartt, 6 November 1950, 2.

wear the coat, hat, and “SS” badge that Kahama’s scouts wore.¹³⁷ Scouts were also charged to work with local dressers to keep good records, notifying the Regional Medical Officer of any new cases or relapses and sending him monthly accounts of sleeping sickness patients. They also had to maintain contact with possible relapsed cases by regularly visiting people who had gone through the initial stages of treatment.¹³⁸ If there were outbreaks, Scouts assisted Medical Department Officials and Settlement Officers in conducting blood slide surveys – by entering people’s homes in a given area and bringing out every ill person to have blood drawn and tested.¹³⁹ In reality, Scouts did even more than this – when administrative or department officials required action but lacked the European personnel to carry them out, Scouts took care of them. At various times, Scouts collected taxes, conducted censuses, measured out compulsory cassava fields, and even inspected the sanitation of individual homesteads, right down to the presence of pit latrines and cleanliness of cooking utensils.¹⁴⁰

The Sleeping Sickness Dresser position had the longest history of work in concentrations, with their focus on testing and treating cases of the disease. Established as an innovative emergency measure, sleeping sickness dispensaries were not intended to be a permanent fixture in concentrations; their creator, Dr. Maclean, fully expected that the central government or the local Native Authority would build better buildings and pay for the services of a government-trained dispenser whose 2-3 years of study qualified him

¹³⁷ TNA 83/12/17 Sleeping Sickness North Mara. Meeting 29 November 1950 and memorandum by Dr. Smartt, 8 November 1950.

¹³⁸ TNA 37788 Settlement Officers. Sleeping Sickness Officer to Secretary of Native Affairs, 2 September 1949.

¹³⁹ TNA 523/P/4/63 Sleeping Sickness – Kigoma Southern. March 1949 Report, 3.

¹⁴⁰ Interviews of Dorothea Zacharia 20 May 2009 Kumhasha Village, Makulilo Kalita 16 June 2009 Kumshindwi Village, and Nyamana Ndikumwami 17 June 2009 Kumshindwi Village.

to deal with a host of medical issues. Instead, the Sleeping Sickness Dressers' few weeks of training focused solely on sleeping sickness, which was reflected in their 25/- shilling salaries, half that of government dispensers.¹⁴¹ Regional medical officers toured these dispensaries when they could, consistently deploring their sanitation, the state of record keeping, and the Dressers' skill. The Director of Medical Services Dr. P. A. T. Sneath called them "a medicine racket...a substitute to the witch-doctor."¹⁴² An in-depth study of Buha's sleeping sickness dispensaries yielded this scathing report:

the concentrations are not at all well served medically and the standard of work done there is deplorably below what Government ought to provide for people who have been moved, more or less forcibly, from their homes and are so well placed for proper medical service to be really effective.¹⁴³

The shifting of responsibility for dispensaries from the Medical Department to the local Native Authority in 1947 entailed the replacement of Sleeping Sickness Dressers with government-trained Dressers. Together with Scouts, they were the "rural eyes and ears" that prevented local flare ups from becoming serious epidemics.¹⁴⁴

With a new, expanded sleeping sickness bureaucracy in place, the group's first task was to insure that all concentration sites were bounded and free from tsetse flies. Some concentrations in Buha were so overgrown that "the Administration [did] not know the defined boundaries of the settlements" as their maps were out of date and one of the last Agricultural Surveyors kept these in his head rather than recording them.¹⁴⁵

Settlement Officers and Scouts organized and supervised gangs of taxpaying men to re-

¹⁴¹ TNA 450/1401/6 1946 Annual Report Western Province, 18.

¹⁴² Cited in Iliffe, *East African Doctors*, 44-45.

¹⁴³ TNA 450/160/41 Sleeping Sickness Dressers General. Sleeping Sickness Officer Dr. Fairbairn to Director of Medical Service, 16 March 1944, 2-3.

¹⁴⁴ TNA 21710 Sleeping Sickness Concentrations: Medical Arrangements Concerning. Senior Medical Officer to Provincial Commissioner Western Province, 16 June 1947.

¹⁴⁵ TNA 11515 vol 3 Outbreak. Meeting of 30 March 1949, folio 56.

cut borders around concentrations and clear any regenerated vegetation within them.

Where sleeping sickness cases were highest in Kibondo, they also carried out a blood slide survey of over 6,000 people.

The making of clear areas within and around concentrations, *mafyeke*, became an increasingly onerous task from the late 1940s onwards.¹⁴⁶ Before this era, Agricultural Surveyors or District Officers in Buha occasionally required men from a particular community to clear areas, but these *mafyeke* were in order to extend concentration boundaries: one elder described it as “they were clearing that place and later the people themselves went to live there.”¹⁴⁷ From the late 1940s, though, *mafyeke* work became a yearly requirement of all taxpaying men of about 10 days of work. Their task was not just to expand boundaries, but also to clear common pathways and create space for new agricultural and veterinary projects within concentrations. The Settlement Officer worked through the Native Authority structure to muster labor each year, trying to inform them of the location and timing of clearing work by May in order for the local leaders to organize the men in their area. Before this system was in place, however, one Settlement Officer admitted that poor planning could produce inefficient results, with “each man [nibbling] at the piece of bush nearest to his homestead” or being forced to walk “12 miles each way to do the work.”¹⁴⁸ Sensitive to any appearance of forced labor in the

¹⁴⁶ Most elder used the Swahili word for clearing, *mafyeke*, to describe this work, although a few used the Kiha, *amafyeke*.

¹⁴⁷ Interview of Pius Muliliye 10 June 2009 Busunzu Village.

¹⁴⁸ TNA 523/AR/10/4 Regional Administration – Handing Over Reports Kibondo. R. C. H. Risley 1950 Handing Over Report Kibondo, 1.

post-war world, the Provincial Commissioner demanded that all clearing work be paid or at least compensated by substantial gifts of beer, beef, or salt.¹⁴⁹

Mafyeko work was arduous and borne by unwilling Ha laborers. They provided their own clearing tools and rations, and either made overnight camp and cooked their own provisions from home or, if they were close enough, returned home to eat and sleep. Elders recall the best possible circumstance involved working near enough home to return easily, having work organized as a task system so they could return home for the day as soon as they cleared a set area.¹⁵⁰ Despite the notice given to Native Authorities, Ha elders recall very little warning given for the start of *mafyeko*. When travel was involved, this meant that Ha women had to devote great energy to prepare provisions for men to take. One elder recalled that his wife stayed up all night preparing his food, she “slept while she was grinding.”¹⁵¹ Besides the physical exhaustion of cutting down trees and grasses for hours on end, *mafyeko* work was also dangerous: “it was horrible! People were hit by some falling trees in some cases, and they died.”¹⁵² Aware of the danger, colonial officials determined to give such victims an equivalent sum of money as that set out by the Workman’s Compensation Ordinance, but officials were clear that “any such payment is entirely *ex gratia* and in no way implies an admission of liability in respect of

¹⁴⁹ TNA 202/L60/17 Communal Turnouts. See District Commissioner Kibondo to Provincial Commissioner Western Province, 28 June 1954 and Provincial Commissioner Western Province to all District Commissioners, 14 June 1954.

¹⁵⁰ Interview of Maganga Mtabwilwa 29 October 2007 Kumhasha Village.

¹⁵¹ Interview of Ndabhateze Kagoma 30 October 2007 Kumhasha Village.

¹⁵² Interview of Nzigonimbi Kikwaba 30 October 2007 Kumhasha Village.

the injury...”¹⁵³ This was enacted in at least one case in Buha, following the July 1954 death of Ndika Biguila.¹⁵⁴

As Scouts engaged in more varied activities over the years, how colonial officers and Ha residents valued and understood their role changed. With expanded work and responsibilities, the Scout system became more hierarchically arranged and more lucrative. Every district had a senior Scout called a Settlement Assistant¹⁵⁵ who took on some of the duties of the Settlement Officer, particularly the closer management of Scouts in each concentration. Scouts also received a significant pay increase in 1956, with a starting salary of 79/50 shillings per year rather than the 38/- to 67/- range of the late 1940s.¹⁵⁶ Ha elders recall Scouts, *maskauti*, as being ambiguous figures, like most with power over their lives. On the one hand, they appreciated how *maskauti* tended to marry and settle locally and how their work led to sick people recovering from sleeping sickness. One elder said people appreciated Scouts because “he removed danger,” arranging treatment for some who were so ill they “were in the state of [not being able to eat *ugali*].”¹⁵⁷ But some of the Scout’s duties, especially enforcing settlement restrictions, elicited more negative response. More often than not, complaints of *maskauti*’s actions were attributed to a particular Settlement Assistant named Juma Rugina. He was the local *maskauti*’s boss, their *umukuru*, the one who could order that settlement lines be

¹⁵³ TNA 202/L60/17 Communal Turnouts. Member for Local Government to all Provincial Commissioners, 3 August 1954.

¹⁵⁴ TNA 202/L60/17 Communal Turnouts. Communiqué regarding the death of Ndika Biguila, 24 July 1954.

¹⁵⁵ TNA 180/M1/13 Medical Sleeping Sickness General. “Settlement Policy,” Sleeping Sickness Specialist to all District Commissioners Western Province, 3 October 1959.

¹⁵⁶ TNA 450/160/41 Sleeping Sickness Service Staff. 4 October 1956.

¹⁵⁷ Interview of Kafizi Kabahazi 18 June 2009 Kumshindwi Village. *Ugali* is an easily digestible staple food made from maize, sorghum, or cassava flour.

expanded or who could force people within a particular boundary. The greatest tension with local *maskauti* could come if people thought that their reports resulted in swift action from Juma Rugina. The widow of one Scout at Nyavyumbu, George Muntu, recalled that when people who had moved outside of the settlement lines into the Nyakibondo river valley were brought back in by Rugina, it created animosity towards Muntu: “They hated him, the one who returned [them]. All the people who were returned were very sad. Even George Muntu, they wanted to kill him because they thought he was the one who brought the news secretly to Juma Rugina.”¹⁵⁸ Nevertheless, some elders clearly appreciated that Scouts’ actions were driven by their job’s responsibilities rather than any kind of animosity towards individuals: “he was given responsibilities [*madaraka*]. Now if a person crosses [the line] and builds there, can he agree?”¹⁵⁹

Changes in Leadership Structure

Buha’s administrative officials also sought to reform the leadership structure in the region, moving away from the system of indirect rule to what they thought of as more democratic and progressive forms of government. First, they sought to replace local leaders, who were recognized by the colonial officials as having some form of local legitimacy, with western educated Africans schooled in the workings of colonial bureaucracy. Their second objective was to establish local councils from which new laws and initiatives could come and at least some of whom were popularly elected.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸ Interview of Dorothea Zacharia 20 May 2009 Kumhasha Village.

¹⁵⁹ TNA 450 160/38/4/1 Sleeping Sickness Kigoma District Survey. District Agricultural Officer to Senior Agricultural Officer, 6 September 1935 and Interview of Nyamana Ndikumwami 17 June 2009 Kumshindwi Village.

¹⁶⁰ McHenry, 92 and Frederick Cooper *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 49. Cooper notes that the push to incorporate western educated Africans was a

Tanganyika officials called for putting “the political house in order so that the new class of literates now being created by modern education may find a satisfactory place in it,” while singling Buha out as one of the most challenging areas for imposing this kind of change:

...if abysmal ignorance, with concomitant apathy, is to be found in such people as the Ha of the Western Province, at the other end of the scale are found their near neighbours the Bahaya of Bukoba, or the Chagga of Kilimnjaru, who show the liveliest interest in politics. The Ha are a primitive people living in a remote and poor country, still in great part in the stage of wearing skins and bark cloth, poor in physique, mental equipment and economic resources, preyed on by witchcraft and prone to violence.¹⁶¹

The march toward democratization began with the establishment of tribal councils in which Native Authority leaders served but could be replaced over time, in whole or in part, with elected representatives.

The most dramatic change in personnel was the removal of four of the seven Ha monarchs, *baami*, between 1947 and 1951, including both the *baami* of Kibondo.¹⁶²

While each of them was removed for specific convictions of crimes committed in recent times, it is clear that they all had earned the antipathy of a series of administrative officials who had lacked both workable personnel and ideological alternatives for replacing these leaders. *Mwami* Ruhaga of Muhambwe in Kibondo offers a good example of this. Officially, her offense was possessing ivory and dealing in government trophies, but the District Commissioners’ letters explaining her case to his superiors spent

general desire in British colonies. Officials in the Colonial Office determined in 1957 that Tanganyika should be on a 10-year plan for achieving independence. See Cooper, *Decolonization*, 212.

¹⁶¹ F. A. Montague and F. H. Page-Jones, “Some Difficulties in Democratisation of Native Authorities in Tanganyika,” *Journal of African Administration* 3.1 (January 1951): 21-27, 21-22.

¹⁶² *Mwami* Ruhaga of Muhambwe was deposed in 1947; *Mwami* Nkanza of Buyungu was deposed in 1947; *Mwami* Batega of Nkalinzi was deposed in 1951 and replaced by his son George, *Mwami* Issa Ruhinda of Bushingu was deposed sometime before 1955.

just as much time on the other areas of conduct that he and his predecessors disliked: there were incidents of subordinates being beaten, women being kidnapped, and even allowing people to return “to their old villages in the sleeping sickness areas provided that they first gave her a bribe.”¹⁶³ Ruhaga claimed that there was a conspiracy of the witnesses against her, especially by Katamguru whose job was to crown the *mwami* and who would be regent if she were deposed and her minor son made *mwami*. The cause of his and the other witnesses’ antipathy towards her, Ruhaga claimed, stemmed from an argument in August 1946 over her inability for the past two years to give him and her other subchiefs presents.¹⁶⁴ Because Ruhaga’s 14-year-old son had a poor record at the government school at Tabora and the officer admitted that some of the sub-chiefs were at least involved in ivory smuggling, the DC decided to appoint Paolo Mkoa, an outsider, as *wakili*.¹⁶⁵ In all but one of the areas with a deposed *mwami*, he or she was replaced by an alien *wakili*, an administrative title which the Germans took from the coast and had used throughout German East Africa.

Popular reaction to these changes is difficult to gauge, but there are some tantalizing suggestions in what elders remember and in the written record. Two letters reached the Chief Secretary in July and September 1949 sent from “all the citizens of Buyungu” demanding that *Mwami* Nkanza return, that his crimes be made known, and that his son Isa should replace him if he could not return.¹⁶⁶ The desire to retain someone

¹⁶³ TNA 21425 vol 3 Native Chiefs Western Province. Provincial Commissioner Western Province to Chief Secretary, 19 February 1947.

¹⁶⁴ TNA 21425 vol 3 Native Chiefs Western Province. 12 February 1947 Appeal of *Mwami* Ruhaga.

¹⁶⁵ Interestingly enough, the British had explicitly moved away from this system and its titles when they established Indirect Rule in the 1920s.

¹⁶⁶ TNA 21425 vol 3 Native Chiefs Western Province. Letters to Chief Secretary, 18 July 1949 and 11 September 1949.

from the *mwami*'s family in a position of leadership was even more forcefully apparent in Muhambwe. Ladislaus Chanda Kipfumu expressed the unease of people when Ruhaga was removed and *wakili* Paolo replaced her:

LK: People were very sad. After Ruhaga, there was no *mwami* but a *wakili* came...he was from that Kahama area, a Sumbwa person... People liked him. They had to like him, it was necessary to like him. But later, people asked very much that their *mwami* should return, they asked a lot, asked completely with all their power.

J: What was wrong with Paolo?

LK: They just saw that he was not a local person, not their local. [They asked themselves] why should they continue to be ruled by a person who comes from far away [when] at the same time there was [an eligible] person within themselves? They started to request, you know it began at the District Council, which had already been started. They requested.... they said Paolo should return to his home and they should get their *mwami* whom they wanted.¹⁶⁷

The widespread popularity of this view was evident in 1957 when Kibondo's DC Derek Quinlan decided to hold an election to replace *wakili* Paolo Mkoa. While Quinlan meant to replace the executive of the area, he used the term *mwami* for the new candidate, which caused a debate to unfold in the council. In Quinlan's view, they ought to be able to make any criteria they wished for the new *mwami*. This included considering candidates outside of the *Abahumbi* royal family and limiting his or her term to three years with the possibility of renewal. But council members argued that if any member of the *Abahumbi* were elected, his or her term would have to be for life. When it came time to nominate candidates, Quinlan was troubled that only Ruhaga's children or members of the clan were named. After the two-day election, in which every adult was allowed to vote by

¹⁶⁷ Interview of Ladislaus Chanda Kipfumu 12 October 2007 Kifura Village.

checking a box marked with an image that served as a symbol for each candidate, Ruhaga's daughter Margaret Msuni won in a landslide.¹⁶⁸

Ha people also made use of the new local and District Councils to send formal requests up through the colonial bureaucracy, including requesting new areas or extensions into areas.¹⁶⁹ Throughout the years, wild animal crop raiders plagued farmers in concentrations, but they managed crop pests on their own and the government placed no restrictions on hunting within a 15-mile radius of concentrations until the early 1950s.¹⁷⁰ When this changed, Ha people used the newly established councils to voice their concerns about the new policy and request help. The petitioners included a pointed criticism in their request for the government to intervene: "...these animals damage their plots a great deal, in the past they would have used arrows to hunt them or trapped them...but now they are not allowed."¹⁷¹

Ha people also used councils with the hope that they could reverse or ameliorate some of the most onerous colonial measures imposed after concentration. Elders recall that some individuals continued to "sneak back" to salt-producing sites, a continued practice reflected in some explanations for sleeping sickness infections in the 1940s and the continued need to include the salt making prohibition in local law.¹⁷² But hiding

¹⁶⁸ TNA 202/L60/73 Local Government Muhambwe. 19 June 1957 and 17 July 1957 meetings of the Itsindiro. The details of the election were described in interviews of Ladislaus Chanda Kipfumu 12 October 2007 Kifura Village and of Derek H. J. Quinlan 16 February 2007 Felixstowe.

¹⁶⁹ TNA 202/L60/73 Muhambwe Chiefdom Minutes. See requests made at 29 May 1952 meeting and 18 September 1957 meeting at which *Mtwale* Nyamweru requested a new area for the residents of Murungu.

¹⁷⁰ TNA 19931 vol 2 Game Reserve in Connection with Tsetse Research and Anti-Sleeping Sickness Measures. Acting Director of Medical Services to Chief Secretary, 1 July 1941.

¹⁷¹ TNA 202/L60/73 Muhambwe Chiefdom Minutes. 18 August 1951. Translation mine.

¹⁷² See RH 754.12.4.25 Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners for the Year 1943 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1944), 107 and TNA 202/L60/87 Local Government Buha Council

large quantities of salt during transportation and marketing was a great enough challenge that most salt makers simply abandoned the practice and focused their energies on honey work. In 1951, a group of people from the Nyavyumbu concentration brought a petition “to cook salt in the area where they cooked it in the past.” In their reasoning, they framed their argument to address possible sleeping sickness concerns, noting that the reason for the prohibition was the need to pass through potentially tsetse fly infested bush en route. The salt areas themselves, though, were “open grassland” and the petitioners offered to clear a route of four hundred paces to protect travelers.¹⁷³ There was no reply, but it is likely that the presence of tsetse throughout the route to Kimyora and other salt making sites rendered this petition unsuccessful.

Changed Policy, New Challenges

By the mid-1950s, though, two scientific breakthroughs forced the British to re-evaluate settlement policy. The first was the successful use, from around 1952 on, of the drug Melarsoprol B [Mel B] for late-stage cases of sleeping sickness that had usually resulted in death. The second was the adoption of a practice called discriminative clearing, where clearing efforts were confined to locations and vegetation associated with tsetse breeding grounds. Rather than clear-cutting all vegetation, officials claimed that discriminative clearing could reduce tsetse numbers by removing as little as 5 or 10% of vegetation. Taken together, these breakthroughs meant that tsetse presence near human habitats could be controlled with far less labor and time, and now virtually all early sleeping sickness cases and the vast majority of late stage cases were curable. These two

Federation Minutes. 11 February 1950, 14 “o. To go to find salt at Kimyora, Nyankoko, Muruhama or any other place outside of the line is prohibited.” Translation mine.

¹⁷³ TNA 202/L60/73 Muhambwe Chiefdom Minutes. Minutes from 1 November 1951. Translation mine.

developments led to a radical shift in sleeping sickness control policies that created far greater flexibility in Ha settlement patterns. While many officials expressed anxiety at abandoning techniques that proved effective in the past, the demands of their own methodologies forced this shift. Staking their claims to authority on their technical expertise, colonial officers could not back away from the implications of their new developments.¹⁷⁴

With the introduction of Mel B and its proven effectiveness in 90% of late stage cases, the Medical Department reoriented the sleeping sickness policies that had been in place for over three decades. The Sleeping Sickness Specialist wrote in his annual report in 1955 that

our policy in [sleeping sickness] areas is, in fact, not so much to reduce the number of infections, except so far as we can do so by ensuring that the homes are protected, as to concentrate on and endeavour to improve continually our case finding and to give advice to the people on reporting to their local dispensary as soon or even before they fall ill.¹⁷⁵

This shift fell in line with the larger developmentalist mentality of the postwar period because their abandonment of the “preventative attitude” could allow for broader “development within a sleeping sickness area.” Medical Department officers were explicit in their praise of the concentration system’s effectiveness as disease control, but noted how demarcated settlements led to loss of soil fertility, yielding areas where “[t]here is...little or no sleeping sickness...but there is also little or no future.”¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁴ This accords with Helen Tilley’s provocative suggestion that there were times during which colonial epistemologies alleviated rather than reinforced social and environmental “hegemonies.” See Helen Tilley, “African Environments and Environmental Science: The African Research Survey, Ecological Paradigms, and British Colonial Development, 1920-1940,” in *Social History and African Environments*, eds. William Beinart and JoAnn McGregor (Oxford: James Currey, 2003): 112.

¹⁷⁵ TNA 450/1563/14 1955 Annual Report of the Sleeping Sickness Specialist, 2.

¹⁷⁶ TNA 450/HE/1636/19 1959 Annual Report of the Sleeping Sickness Specialist, 2.

The labor-intensive system of clear-cutting all vegetation near concentrations in which tsetse fly was found gave way in the mid-1950s to discriminative clearing. By targeting areas essential to the tsetse life cycle such as ecological interzones and irrigation canals, experts claimed that discriminative clearing could achieve the same results as clear-cutting with as little removal as 5% of vegetation. The new technique was the brainchild of years of tsetse research, now under the aegis of the Tsetse Survey and Reclamation Department [TSRD]. In order to insure that discriminative clearing be conducted properly, they took steps to be involved personally in any such operations. The director of TSRD, H.M. Lloyd, pointedly declined to publish any guidelines on discriminative clearing in order to insure that his department's expertise would be consulted whenever clearance was needed.¹⁷⁷

Discriminative clearing not only meant that far less labor would be needed to create and maintain *mafyeke*, but that radically different settlement patterns were also possible in Buha's lowlands. Rather than having contained settlements surrounded by tsetse-infested vegetation, former concentrations could now be located in "large continuous areas of settlement" that stretched from district border to district border, from a line connecting the concentrations westward to the tsetse fly-free highlands.¹⁷⁸ Following great clearing campaigns conducted with Ha labor, this had been achieved in both Kasulu and Kibondo Districts by 1958, allowing Ha people to live without restriction within this vastly expanded area. The Nyavyumbu concentration, for instance,

¹⁷⁷ TNA 270/N/1 Forestry Tsetse Control. H. M. Lloyd to Chief Conservator of Forests, 28 May 1955.

¹⁷⁸ TNA 450/1623/17 1958 Annual Sleeping Sickness Report, 2.

began as a five square mile area, but was eleven times as large by the late 1950s.¹⁷⁹ Ha people in Kibondo also successfully petitioned the government to make further clearing work a paid activity, willingly agreeing to an increase in their taxes to cover the added cost.¹⁸⁰ As the District Commissioner of Kibondo wrote in 1959, Kibondo was “the textbook answer to tsetse,”¹⁸¹ and the completion of these clearings in the district marked the culmination of enhancing development opportunities in the area. As his wife wrote in a newspaper article describing *mafyeke*, they had succeeded in “[opening] up and [making] safe” a large area “for occupation, bringing increased capital investment and agriculture, more land for expansion and a higher standard of living for the people.”¹⁸²

From colonial records it is clear that Ha people noted these changes in settlement policy with great attention and pushed officials to their limits. Settlement Officer Ronald West reported a constant stream of verbal requests from people “to return to their homes from which they were evacuated” so they could be near ancestors and access better land.¹⁸³ When the District Team as a whole met in 1959 to consider proposals to make 100 families a new minimum in order for new settlement sites to be approved, these details somehow leaked out. Officials were bombarded with requests: “...some members

¹⁷⁹ TNA 523/AM/11/1 Medical Sleeping Sickness Uha Kibondo. Settlement Officer Kibondo to Administrative Secretary Western Region, 12 February 1963.

¹⁸⁰ See also TNA 450/1623/17 1958 Annual Report of the Sleeping Sickness Specialist, 2. This had the support of the Tsetse Department, which viewed paid laborers as far more efficient workers. See RH Mss.Afr.s.1376 Turner Papers, 2.

¹⁸¹ 1959 Handing Over Notes Kibondo District by D. H. J. Quinlan. My thanks to Mr. Quinlan for providing a copy of this document. Interview of Derek H. J. Quinlan 16 February 2007 Felixstowe.

¹⁸² Article written by Mrs. M. Quinlan, in author’s possession.

¹⁸³ TNA 180/M1/13 Medical Sleeping Sickness General. R. E. West to all Provincial Commissioners, 23 July 1959.

of the public appear to think that they have only to produce a list of one hundred names and permission will automatically then be given for a new settlement to be formed.”¹⁸⁴

Conclusion

The first thirty-five years of sleeping sickness concentrations’ existence involved a sea change in Ha peoples’ lives and in public health policy. With severe financial constraints and points of tension between departments and levels of government, concentrations never achieved the many goals their founders set for them. While officials therefore viewed the early years of concentrations as a disappointment, as a “monument to apathy and indifference,”¹⁸⁵ Ha men and women struggled to recreate new homes and lives for themselves in *umukutano*. With the salt industry curtailed, they adjusted work patterns and innovated new social relationships to insure that the honey industry would remain viable. Even more importantly, they structured their homes in familiar ways that aided in keeping relationships with ancestors healthy. The reinvigoration of colonial control with an explicit developmentalist mentality and greatly expanded capacity provoked changes in Ha peoples’ lives that they had to manage. While colonial officials in all departments pursued their goals for changing Ha lives, Ha dynamics were critical in determining whether they would succeed or fail.

Colonial settlement policy continued its ability to change the contours of Ha people’s lives by radically changing settlement policy in the wake of technical advancements related to sleeping sickness. By the end of the 1950s, Ha men and women

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, “Settlement Policy,” Sleeping Sickness Specialist to all District Commissioners Western Province, 3 October 1959.

¹⁸⁵ TNA 35167 Establishment of Buha as a District Separate from Kigoma. Memorandum by John J. Tawney, 27 June 1946, 7.

had unprecedented choice in where to live. While some took the opportunity to test the boundaries of settlement sites or return to former homes, others remained interested in the new options they had created in concentrations. An Agricultural Officer described this new situation, that there tended to be a “center with people who like community life and a perimeter of genuine shifting cultivators.”¹⁸⁶ Ha efforts over the years had created a totally new social formation in Buha, living in *umukutano*, and it was viable enough to retain most people. And yet, this was not an era of unfettered settlement or governmental abdication of control over land. Officials continued to limit settlement in extremely tsetse infested areas,¹⁸⁷ and strongly delineated where settlement could and could not be by creating forest and game reserves in eastern Buha. These were the contradicting policies that the independent Tanzanian government inherited in the 1960s, and fashioned to their own efforts to create and claim political authority and legitimacy.

¹⁸⁶ TNA 198/A3/3 volume 1 Kasulu Agriculture Monthly Reports. Report for February 1955, Kasulu Agricultural Officer to Provincial Agricultural Officer, 4.

¹⁸⁷ RH 754.12.r.25 Annual Reports of the Provincial Commissioners for the Year 1958 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1959): 181. Provincial Commissioner B. J. Dudbridge records an outbreak in Kasulu’s Muyama valley, where Ha people were allowed to move several years previously, despite the presence of tsetse flies. He worried that the “major epidemics of the thirties have been forgotten.” There is no evidence to support the characterization of the uptake in disease in Buha in the early 1930s as “major epidemics”. See also TNA 450/1623/17 1958 Annual Report of the Sleeping Sickness Specialist, 2 and TNA 180/M1/13 Medical, Sleeping Sickness General. Sleeping Sickness Specialist Dr. F. I. C. Apted to Provincial Commissioners, 28 September 1959.

Chapter 4

“It is difficult to move people forward without moving them”: Villagizing Buha’s Sleeping Sickness Areas, 1958-1975

Introduction

The coming of independence in 1961 injected new dynamics into the resettlement history of Buha. While there were strong continuities between the late colonial and early postcolonial period, the unique circumstances of independence gave both Ha people and government officials new and compelling reasons to seek change in how Ha people settled and used resources. Since the late 1950s, lowland Ha people pushed settlement policies to their limit in their attempts to assert sole control over their personal and economic lives, and these efforts were heightened by the rhetoric of independence and freedom. At the same time, post independence officials combined the developmentalist ideas present in the late colonial era with broader nationalist goals to build a unified people who recognized their strong, legitimate government. These separate trajectories clashed most dramatically in lowland Buha beginning in 1972 with compulsory “villagization,” the resettlement of all rural Tanzanians into centralized villages through which the government intended to direct their social and economic development.

But this clash could be seen in earlier controversies, like one involving wire anklets worn by women called *inyerere*, that many elderly women like Kubhitisha Masekesha recall experiencing. In the mid-1960s she frequently walked to the weekly market outside of Rungwe Mpya to sell beer or to buy and sell food, using the income to buy herself and her children clothes, and met many other women doing the same. But one day was different: some unnamed government officials “saw us and rushed over.

They cut off our *inyerere*.”¹ Most women explained that removing them was necessary because of the similarity of the name with that of the president: “They said, ‘Nyerere is alive so he doesn’t like to see you wearing *inyerere*.’”² And yet their stories indicate there were other possible reasons for the removal that relate to other government-sanctioned campaigns to transform what people wore. In the early years of independence, political leaders interpreted dress as a tangible sign of whether or not Tanzanians ascribed to the central government’s major principles of non-capitalist, progressive development. As Leander Schneider argues, there were “political stakes in postcolonial dress” in Tanzania.³ In the case of Buha, setting aside *inyerere* was likely tantamount to the central government inducing people to leave behind “dirty” practices and join the national war to eradicate “ignorance, disease, and poverty.”⁴ Indeed, elderly women talking of *inyerere* connected its removal to broader state development goals, claiming that the government’s wish for the end of *inyerere* related to changes they wished to see take place. Masekesha explained that they had to remove *inyerere* because officials “wanted us to wear shoes,” which she then elaborated to explain were an article only affordable by the very wealthy.⁵ Ha men and women should use their resources to make more important investments than in wire anklets and aspire to more hygienic

¹ Interview of Kubhitisha Masekesha 13 November 2007 Rungwe Mpya Village.

² Interview of Laurensia and Sophia Bhabinga 20 May 2009 Kumhasha Village.

³ Leander Schneider, “The Maasai’s New Clothes: A Developmentalist Modernity and its Exclusions,” *Africa Today* 53.1 (2006): 100-131, 103. Schneider analyzes the campaign to change Maasai dress in the 1960s and 1970s in contrast to Operation *Vijana*, the campaign against urban youths wearing supposedly western fashions like tight trousers or short skirts. Detractors believed such fashions bought into western decadence and thus belied the sobriety of socialism. Unlike those targeted by Operation *Vijana*, Schneider argues, Maasai people had less ability to argue against the campaign on its own terms because urban youths could at least claim their styles were “modern” and “progressive”.

⁴ Schneider, “The Maasai’s New Clothes,” 107 includes this quotation from *The Nationalist*, 26 February 1968.

⁵ Interview of Kubhitisha Masekesha 13 November 2007 Rungwe Mpya Village. Over 40 years later, she had still never been able to buy a pair of shoes.

footwear. Elders also emphasized the coercion used to end the practice of wearing *inyerere*, that officials told them to “[j]ust cut it [off] and go to the [*ujamaa*] village....They told us, ‘if you don’t cut them off, we will arrest you.’”⁶ Tanzanian officials would employ the full force of the state to impose change.

The controversy over *inyerere* encapsulates some of the main tensions between lowland Ha people and state authorities from the late-1950s through the era of villagization in the mid-1970s. This chapter demonstrates that these fifteen years of conflict provide the crucial context for understanding how resettled Ha people and state officials interpreted and used villagization. At an elemental level, villagization was about controlling settlement, resource use, and labor. Each of these dimensions were the cause of controversy during this period as Ha people and state officials pursued competing agendas. People like Masekesha who had lived under sleeping sickness settlement regulations since the 1930s eagerly exploited the more permissive policies that began in the late 1950s. She and her family moved outside of the old settlement boundary, establishing agricultural fields in former “bush” areas and turning their bumper crops into profit at the market.⁷ Meanwhile, independence era officials increasingly “claimed for itself a broad-ranging and indisputable leading role in development: indeed, it conceived of the promotion of development as its primary *raison d’etre*.”⁸ In this framework, government officials and Ha people each had distinct arenas. The government directed development, modernization, and progress, but needed Tanzanians to follow their

⁶ Interview of Laurensia and Sophia Bhabinga 20 May 2009 Kumhasha Village.

⁷ Interview of Kubhitisha Masekesha 13 November 2007 Rungwe Mpya Village.

⁸ Leander Schneider, “Developmentalism and Its Failings: Why Rural Development Went Wrong in 1960s and 1970s Tanzania” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2003): 6.

directives, and even something like changing what they wore was a sign they had “[started] doing their share towards reaching Tanzania’s goals.”⁹ In particular, lowland Ha people and state officials struggled over ongoing efforts to control sleeping sickness and to expand management of newly-designated ‘reserve’ areas in the east. These were unstable times in Buha because – in part as a result of Ha actions – settlement and resource use policies shifted frequently over time. Thus, many lowlanders interpreted villagization in a context of loss of control over resources and government seizure of community wealth.

The experience of villagization and life in early villages, though, was formed at the confluence of government directives and how Ha people engaged with them. While loss of wealth and control over labor was universal in elders’ memories of the early years of villagization, Ha peoples’ reactions to compulsory villagization, specifically the relative timing of their compliance with orders to move, fundamentally determined the severity of such losses. Once moved, though, the experiences were more universal, particularly in terms of villages’ new labor regime and the spatial layout of villages. Village policies for collective production made great demands on time and forced villagers to seek out extra land with which they could meet their families’ needs. At the same time, they came to terms with an unprecedented arrangement of houses and fields with a dense and regulated core for living surrounded by regulated fields. In this new, foreign environment, Ha villagers encountered dress and language that were central to a new Tanzanian identity.

⁹ *The Nationalist* 17 February 1970. Quoted in Schneider, “The Maasai’s New Clothes,” 105.

“You Should Not Interfere with Us: This is Our Independence”: Settlement Sites and Reserve Areas, 1957-1962

The late 1950s initiated a period of struggle over managing settlement and controlling natural resources in Buha that lasted until villagization became compulsory in the early 1970s. While important differences exist between the motivations and ideology of late colonial and early independence officials in Buha, both groups shaped settlement policy in accordance with two key concerns: managing sleeping sickness and promoting economic development. Both goals were served when colonial officials established game and forest reserves covering the eastern portion of Buha, the area from which Ha people had been removed in the 1930s and 1940s. In turn, Ha people eagerly seized upon the more permissive settlement policies of this period, pushing beyond former sleeping sickness boundaries and resettling evacuated areas. Just as importantly, they maintained their cyclical presence in and use of the new game and forest reserves, and challenged the state's claims over the resources therein. The trajectories of government policies and Ha priorities, though, were on a collision course, culminating in a series of controversial changes to policy in the mid-1960s, contests which progressed concomitantly with the central government's increasing promotion of *ujamaa* policies. For the vast majority of lowland Buha's residents, these processes were the critical context through which they interpreted and experienced villagization.

Settlement and Sleeping Sickness Policy

The sleeping sickness control strategies of the mid-1950s, described in the last chapter, focused on disease management rather than prevention, a shift that depended on sleeping sickness staff balancing a series of unstable factors. Settlement sites in Kasulu

and Kibondo consisted of two huge swathes of land that were considered fly-free and that were bordered to the east by cleared “lines” or roads maintained by the Settlement Officer and his staff of Settlement Scouts. So extensive was this work that it is likely at this point that the Settlement Officer became known as “Bwana Malaini,” the “Lines Officer.” Although Ha people could settle anywhere within these areas, they were supposed to comply with state monitoring of activities that took them into reserve areas, cooperate with blood slide surveys, refrain from settling outside of the boundary, and engage in yearly clearing work to remove vegetation that could support tsetse flies. Each of these were points of tension and were the responsibility of different government workers. Kibondo’s fourteen and Kasulu’s eleven Settlement Scouts conducted most of these activities. They lived in sites throughout the districts and managed a surrounding territory, focusing mainly on monitoring men going into endemic areas and testing any suspicious illnesses in the broader local area.¹⁰ Scouts then sent or accompanied any positive cases to district hospitals where medical personnel treated them. Members of the Tsetse Fly Department focused their efforts on controlling tsetse populations near settlements and in commonly used sites outside of them by conducting fly surveys and planning discriminative clearing projects. Managing sleeping sickness therefore required not only the full integration and cooperation of government officials from a variety of departments, but also the compliance of Ha people.

Ha people seized upon the change in sleeping sickness settlement policies of the late 1950s to settle beyond the boundaries of former sleeping sickness concentrations, or

¹⁰ See Tanzania National Archives [TNA] 198/A3/3 vol 2 Kasulu Agriculture Monthly Reports 1964-5. July 1964 Monthly Report Tsetse Control.

to resettle areas that had been prohibited. The most common response to greater choice in settlement sites was for Ha people to push just outside of former concentrations' boundaries. In both Kasulu and Kibondo, Ha people pioneering new settlement sites followed their own logic rather than that of the administration. Settlement Officers wrote worried reports when new settlements failed to have the required number of people "to maintain safety" in new settlements. The problem was a "constant tendency for the people to demand land elsewhere in spite [sic] of the fact that they themselves pressed for the release of the present unfilled areas."¹¹ As Mokupi Motuta explained, people were eager to leave the confines of the Nyavyumbu concentration and move into the surrounding hills: "Living there at that time, you could just live in any area that you went to. If you had family or there were relatives in a certain area [you said] 'let's go there.' He [head scout Juma Rugina] was not forbidding it. People were living beyond that hill over there."¹²

Even new settlement sites that began extralegally could become recognized by the government. No site created as much controversy as Buhoro, in southeast Muhambwe, where Ha people's insistence forced unwilling government officials to open it to settlement. As chapter two demonstrated, Buhoro was one of the sites that Ha people most tenaciously refused to leave, not evacuating until colonial officials forced the issue in 1942. As soon as changes in colonial settlement policy created the possibility that it could be reopened, *Mwami* Ruhaga and other political leaders of Muhambwe consistently requested that the Settlement Officer re-open it. They argued for the site's ritual

¹¹ TNA 523/AM/11/1 Medical Sleeping Sickness Uha Kibondo. November Report Kibondo 1960.

¹² Interview of Mukopi Motuta 28 May 2009 Kumhasha Village.

importance for the royal family as well as its likely economic success: its well-known soil fertility would attract many people, especially those who were forcibly moved – they would “pour back in.”¹³ It is clear, though, that it was not just the *mwami* of Muhambwe who wished to reopen Buhoro, and its resettlement eventually became a reality when people forced the issue by settling there extralegally. A group from Kagera moved there in September 1959, and the officer sent to reconnoiter the area found that it accorded with the key requirements for new settlement sites. Not only was it nearly tsetse fly-free, it also offered rich soil and “wonderful opportunities of honey and hunting.”¹⁴ Faced with a fait accompli, Kibondo’s District Commissioner wrote to provincial authorities that “I believe that the settlement will have to be legalized at some time.”¹⁵ Kifura people, many of whom had been evacuated in the 1940s, quickly joined the Kagera pioneers, and the settlement grew rapidly over the years.

While officials had no reason rooted in policy to deny resettlement at Buhoro, they were determined to fully manage it as a settlement site. Before finally agreeing to recognize the resettlement, officials struck a deal with the Kibondo District Council that forced Buhoro residents to show signs that they would comply with sleeping sickness and tsetse fly policies. To insure initial safety from tsetse fly infestation, every male taxpayer who wished to live at Buhoro had to perform fifteen days of clearing work, *mafyeke*, each month until the Field Officer was satisfied the area was completely safe from tsetse.

Even more telling in terms of the intention of district officials to maintain some control

¹³ TNA 523 A M/11 Medical Sleeping Sickness Uha Kibondo. District Commissioner Kibondo to Provincial Commissioner Western, 31 October, 1959.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Report on Survey in the Buhoro Area, 14 October 1959, 2.

¹⁵ TNA 180 M1/13 vol 2 Medical Sleeping Sickness General. District Commissioner Kibondo to Provincial Commissioner Western Province, 31 October 1959.

over Buhoro was the requirement that Buhoro's residents had to build three structures there: a dispensary, a house for the tsetse field officer, and one for the settlement scout.¹⁶ Over the next few months, the Settlement Officer and other officials made use of the structures and dispensed their directions and advice. Ultimately, then, it was the combination of Ha desire to resettle Buhoro and the settlers' willingness to work within government protocols that allowed the site to reopen.

Other areas, though, proved far less willing to create the strategic clearings that were so critical for sleeping sickness control. By the late 1950s, the first option for clearing labor was voluntary "tribal" turnouts of local areas, but officials were willing to be creative with the funds available to them. The July 1959 *mafyeke* work involved clearing over 500 acres, and officials made the usual gift of salt once it was done, about five kilograms each.¹⁷ Elders, though, recall the salt as a paltry gift rather than true compensation for difficult work. They were far happier when officials instead opted to use the funds designated to buy salt as wages. While this reduced the work force by 90%, the Provincial Tsetse Officer was confident that this would not reduce the amount of work done, as these wage earners could be employed nearly ten times as efficiently.¹⁸ The groundswell of support to use tax revenue to pay men for bush clearing work increased in the late 1950s and early 1960s. So disliked was the old system of yearly "tribal clearings" that residents attended Kibondo council meetings to lobby for a five shilling increase in taxes to pay for *mafyeke* work, indicating that they were far more

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, District Commissioner Kibondo to Provincial Commissioner Western Province, 22 January 1960.

¹⁷ TNA 523/AM/11/1 Medical Sleeping Sickness Uha Kibondo. Settlement Assistant Kasulu to District Commissioner Kasulu, 29 July 1959.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Provincial Tsetse Officer Monthly Progress Report February 1959, 2.

willing to give money rather than lose control over their time and labor.¹⁹ Throughout February of 1959 over 2,000 man-days of *mafyeke* work were financed through taxation.²⁰ In Kasulu District where the taxation option had not been adopted, Tsetse Department officials could be faced with all-out refusal on the part of communities like Muyama to do *mafyeke*.²¹ The District Commissioner told an officer from the Tsetse Department that even if full plans were created for making clearings there, he was doubtful of “his ability to persuade even the people directly concerned to turn out this year [to clear vegetation].”²²

Beyond willing Ha participation, managing sleeping sickness also depended on strong interdepartmental cooperation and the regular implementation of several technical control methods. The last chapter demonstrated that interdepartmental and hierarchical tensions within the colonial bureaucracy were themselves difficult to manage, and in conjunction with new pressures from Ha representatives in councils, their task was nearly impossible. The addition of a new policy of sleeping sickness management versus disease reduction greatly expanded the work of the Settlement Officers and Settlement Scouts. Government officials inherited similar dynamics in the post-independence period but their challenge was compounded by greater financial difficulty.

At the most local level, Settlement Scouts struggled as much with the enormity of their task as with Ha non-compliance. Scouts had to test those who returned from the

¹⁹ TNA 202/L60/73 Muhambwe Chiefdom Minutes. Minutes from 5 September 1958 meeting.

²⁰ TNA 336/9/042 Tsetse Survey Monthly Letter 1957-9. Monthly Newsletter for January 1959 Tsetse Survey and Reclamation Department, 2 and Newsletter for February 1959.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Monthly Newsletter for April 1959 Tsetse Survey and Reclamation Department, 2.

²² TNA 523/AM/11/1 Sleeping Sickness Uha Kibondo. Provincial Tsetse Officer Monthly Progress Report February 1959, 2.

forest and track down those who did not report back to them after their period had expired. This job was immense, with district-wide numbers averaging about 3,000 permits per year²³ and times of even more extreme demand: in Kasulu district, for instance, there were over 500 permits issued in March 1959 alone.²⁴ But even when they were able to check every case, effective sleeping sickness control was complicated by the fact that Scouts did not have the ultimate power to enforce penalties. Earlier, that had been the province of local headmen and *batware*, but with the greater emphasis on democratic governing institutions from the 1950s on, enforcement of sleeping sickness regulations fell to the local councils, known as *baraza* in Swahili or *itsindiro* in Kiha. Rising nationalist feeling in the early 1960s influenced their lackluster implementation. Settlement Officer Alushula complained in April 1961 that “[r]ecently cases have occurred where scouts have brought people before the barazas for having gone to the bush without permits and no action has been taken by the baraza.”²⁵

At times of increased cases, the settlement staff was tested beyond its manpower and funding. The 1960s brought a consistent rise in sleeping sickness cases, forcing the Scouts to conduct broad bloodslide surveys. Kibondo District had fourteen Scouts working, but Settlement Officer Makalanga estimated he needed at least two more to manage the task. In the sleeping sickness crisis year of 1963-4, there were 45 new cases and two deaths within a few months, forcing Makalanga’s staff to conduct over 3,000 bloodslides to learn the extent of the problem. Having identified thirteen further

²³ DRC Loc 420 Box 173/CCM R/80/1/G 1964 Annual Report Kigoma Region, 14.

²⁴ TNA 523/AM/11/1 Sleeping Sickness Uha Kibondo. Report from the Settlement Assistant Kasulu, 31 March 1959.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, For the quotation see Settlement Officer’s report for April 1961. For the fines, see Settlement Officer’s report for May 1961, January 1962 and 1962 Annual Report for Kibondo District.

infections this way, the survey ended before completion when it ran out of money.²⁶

When Makalanga requested emergency travel funds, the local accountant suggested that this touring should be done on foot if they had outpaced their funding.²⁷ Its inadequacy was driven home by an analysis by the Kibondo Area Commissioner, who estimated that sleeping sickness personnel required at least four times the funding they were currently getting.²⁸

The increase in sleeping sickness infections also caused increased tension between medical personnel and the settlement staff. Not all medical personnel were enthusiastic about the new thinking of the late 1950s, that improved chemotherapies made infection rates less significant. The District Medical Officer who ran the Kibondo hospital resented the way in which trypanosomiasis cases dominated his work. Despite that fact that the death rate there was still the lowest in the country, the fact that they had the highest infection rate was unacceptable. He wrote to all of the dispensers and dressers working in the district that they should

remind Watwales concerned that this not a Sleeping Sickness Hospital, but one in which people who become ill, through no fault of their own, should be treated. At present it is people who deliberately flout the regulations and the law who are filling the majority of beds....It should be impressed that Sleeping Sickness can readily be controlled if the regulations are obeyed; otherwise it may cost this District thousands of shillings in future years, due to the lack of thought and selfishness of those who don't obey the rules which they know only too well.²⁹

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Kibondo Settlement Officer Makalanga to Kibondo Area Commissioner Kiboya, 19 February 1963.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Kibondo Settlement Officer to Kibondo Area Commissioner 12 July 1963.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, He wrote this to the Vice President's office on 11 September 1963, but no reply was in the file. The title "Area Commissioner" replaced "District Commissioner" in the early 1960s.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Kibondo District Medical Officer to all dressers, Regional Medical Assistants, and dispensaries, 24 August 1961.

After the 1963 outbreak, the Medical officers of Kigoma and Tabora launched an investigation into the management of sleeping sickness in Kibondo, which Settlement Officer Makalanga took personally. Although details of the outcome of the investigation are lacking, Makalanga complained to Kibondo's Area Commissioner that they ignored the settlement staff's inadequate funding and instead decided the cause was that "my 14 Scouts and myself were not doing our work properly."³⁰

Part of the financing for the settlement staff came from funds from the ruling party, Tanganyika African National Union [TANU], adding a further layer of bureaucracy to the efficient running of the service. Settlement Officer Makalanga clearly took umbrage at the written questions a new TANU Area Secretary sent to him regarding his Scouts' qualifications. In his reply, Makalanga took him to task: "You are only a new man to the District and you [sic] knowledge on the Sleeping Sickness at present is very minute."³¹ Their tense correspondence escalated, when the Area Secretary required Makalanga to justify his request for more positions. Makalanga responded with chilling facts: his fourteen Scouts covered 37,500 square miles of area with trypanosomiasis, an area he felt was growing due to "shortage of staff and sufficient funds." He had need of four more Scouts and a Settlement Assistant, and summed up their exchange that it had "shown quite clearly" that the Area Secretary did "not have the faintest idea of what this District has in connection with Sleeping Sickness."³² The system's inability to manage sleeping sickness would wind up forcing a radical change in settlement policy in Buha.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, Kibondo Settlement Officer to Kibondo Area Commissioner, 12 July 1963.

³¹ *Ibid.*, Settlement Officer Makalanga to Kibondo Area Commissioner, 17 April 1964.

³² *Ibid.*, Kibondo Settlement Officer to Kibondo Area Secretary, 21 May 1964.

Settlement and Reserve Areas

Ha peoples' enthusiastic exploitation of more permissive settlement policy clashed with far more restrictive government control over the eastern forests from which many Ha people had moved in the 1930s and 1940s. Part of the increasingly developmentalist focus of late colonial practices was a desire to maximize the colony's natural resources by designating and managing all uninhabited areas as game or forestry reserve areas. Colonial officials had envisioned that game reserves would only be placed in areas with little population, infertile soils or the presence of trypanosomiasis, as all are places "unsuitable for any other purposes."³³ Because of the presence of tsetse flies, the areas in Buha to the east of the roadway had been under stricter control than most areas, but they were not officially designated as reserves until the 1950s. In January 1957 officials declared the Mwayle Forest Reserve, covering over 1,550 square miles of Kibondo, and then added another 600 square miles in July in the form of the Buyungu Forest Reserve.³⁴ Buha's reserve areas tripled in size two years later with the creation of the Moyowosi and Njingwe Game Controlled Areas in March 1959, over 4,200 square miles.³⁵

Reserve areas came with different restrictions, depending on their management by the Forestry Department or the Game Department. The Provincial Conservator of Forests of Western Province, for instance, noted in 1953 that hunting could continue in forest reserves without any special license, and was one of many arenas in which officers

³³ TNA 11234 Game Reserves vol 3. For this expansion, see also Thaddeus Sunseri, *Wielding the Ax: State Forestry and Social Conflict, 1820-2000* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2009): 97-116.

³⁴ TNA 336/9/011 Monthly Report West Circle. January 1957 Report and July 1957 Report.

³⁵ TNA 273/MLSW/555/III Game Hunting Areas. 9 March 1959 notice. For the size, see TNA 599/GD/19/CA/54 II Moyowosi Controlled Area & Project 1976-1980. Letter of 26 June 1978, 4.

should “convince people that reserves are created to be used for their benefit...we must get away from the notion that every act is prohibited in a reserve unless it is authorised by a piece of paper issued by a forest officer.”³⁶ The Game Warden of Tanganyika set a very different trajectory for his department, writing that the fundamental principle of the department was “to allow the fauna and flora to have an undisturbed existence,” a goal which required the absolute exclusion of humans.³⁷ But the Game Department had different levels of protection, from Game Reserves that prohibited all entry without the approval of the Director of Game, to Game Controlled Areas like the Moyowosi. Game Controlled Areas were supposed to have no restrictions on entry but would not allow the hunting of certain species.³⁸

Following independence, officials pursued policies in Buha’s reserves that were also development-oriented. In particular, they sought to use the Moyowosi to attract desperately-needed foreign currency. During the first decade of independence, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism doubled game reserves from six to twelve and increased game control areas from 26 to 33. Doing so doubled proceeds from tourist hunting, to the tune of four million Tanzanian shillings.³⁹ In the case of the Moyowosi, the government contracted with privately-owned hunting safari companies that paid a premium price to reserve “blocks” of the region solely for their clients’ use, a practice that remains in place today.⁴⁰ Annual revenue averaged between £2,250 and £4,000 from

³⁶ TNA 270/CI WC Forest Reserves Western Circle. 18 December 1953

³⁷ TNA 270/40/H vol 1 Beekeeping in Game Reserves. Game Warden G. H. Synnerton to Director of Agriculture, 17 January 1951.

³⁸ TNA 599/GD/18/5 Game Reserves General. R. M. Swahele, 25 September 1971.

³⁹ TNA 599/GD/25/55 Part A Sehemu za Mwaka wa 10 Tangu Uhuru.

⁴⁰ TNA 599/GD/21/5 1971 Annual Report Game Division Kigoma Region. Between 1969 and 1971, the companies were Uganda Wildlife Development, Tanzania Wildlife Safaris, and Afriventures (T) Limited.

the Moyowosi, and the government worked to build infrastructure to suit the needs of tourist hunters, including five airports, three rest houses, and the first well-maintained roads throughout the reserve. Just as important as facilitating the transportation of tourist hunters was excluding locals from hunting in the reserve. Of the thirty-seven personnel employed to monitor the reserve, fifteen were game scouts charged with reducing the number of locals who continued to hunt in the reserve.⁴¹ But even those foreigners interested in merely watching animals could be important for national development. Photosafari goers in Kigoma were also a boon to the region bringing in “a lot of foreign currency which the nation badly needs for its development.”⁴²

The creation and management of reserve lands in the east also allowed Tanzanian officials to pursue broader goals related to the challenges of establishing a strong government and building a unified nation. All newly-independent colonies struggled to establish political legitimacy with their citizens, a workable relationship even more challenging to create with a largely rural population. Paul Bjerck has argued that President Julius Nyerere’s land laws were an active means by which Nyerere communicated distinct political messages to Tanzania’s citizens about the new government’s sole claim to authority. He begins by establishing the existence of what he terms a “political idiom” by which political authority was enacted historically in eastern and central Africa through land division and allocation. Drawing on a series of other scholars’ work, he demonstrates the varied expressions of this political idiom in several

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, F. Bwire, Director of Wildlife Kigoma 9 May 1974 Report on the work of the Ministry of Mashirika wa Uma [sic] 1954-1974, 2-3.

⁴² *Ibid.*, Report for the Year 1974, 3.

cultures around the region, with some reaching back at least 1,000 years.⁴³ With this context in mind, Bjerk argues that changes in land law had direct political significance, such as the 1962 act that converted all freehold property into 99-year leases and declared all other land to be the property of the president. This represented “a declaration of sovereign authority that intended to bind all landholders directly to the bureaucracy of the independent state, making the President the chief patron and eliminating rival ideologies of patronage.”⁴⁴ Thus, this law connects to the 1963 abolition of chiefship throughout the country, removing other contenders to whom rural people might give their loyalty. There could be no intervening layers of authority and so chiefship was completely abolished.⁴⁵

Managing reserve areas and shaping their use was thus not only economic policy, but sent political messages to surrounding residents. In particular, Nyerere’s own vision for the flora and fauna in reserve areas throughout the nation helped not only to stake a claim to state authority; it also sought to create a Tanzanian group identity, a collective body with shared resources and goals. In 1967s’ Arusha Declaration, Nyerere declared that “[b]ecause the land belongs to the nation, the Government has to see to it that it is used for the benefit of the whole nation and not for the benefit of one individual or just a few people.” And so, the forest and game reserve areas of Buha were no longer *local*

⁴³ Paul Bjerk, “‘The Soil is Mine’: Tanzanian Citizenship in Local Political Idiom” (MA thesis, University of Wisconsin, 2005). Bjerk draws on the work of David Schoenbrun, *A Green Place, A Good Place: Agrarian Change, Gender, and Social Identity in the Great Lakes Region to the 15th Century* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1998), Steven Feierman, *Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), Holly Hanson, *Landed Obligation: the Practice of Power in Buganda* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2003), and James Giblin, *The Politics of Environmental Control in Northeast Tanzania, 1840-1940* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992).

⁴⁴ Bjerk, 55.

⁴⁵ Former *batware* in Buha, headmen or sub-chiefs, were banned from serving on government committees in 1963. See TNA 523/C5/40A Kibondo District Council Minutes of Meetings. Meeting of 5 February 1963, 4.

resources preserved by official designation, they were the resources of the nation as a whole. This message was clearly communicated to residents in terms of control over forest resources. As an elder explained, reserves were not like undesignated areas “where a citizen can conduct activities such as farming, searching for firewood and so on, a Reserve is a reserved area for the government.”⁴⁶ As Pius Mulilliye almost paradoxically explained, firewood and building materials in the forest reserve “is all ours” but the authorities would not allow “one person who claims it for himself to go and get it by himself, they cannot agree, the law cannot agree.”⁴⁷ Former residents of reserves could claim rights to reserve area’s resources, but these were not exclusive rights for their community, they were rights which they shared in common with all other Tanzanians, and which were governed by Tanzanian policies.⁴⁸

The context of independence heightened state control over reserves, but it also emboldened Ha people to test the limits of reserve policy. In November of 1960, over 65 people from Nyavyumbu entered the forest reserve and created a new settlement “without known or traceable permission.” This circumstance called for all the relevant colonial personnel, the Forest Ranger, the Settlement Officer, and even Kibondo’s District Commissioner to travel to the site to explain that they had illegally settled. At that point, the settlers made clear the connection between their choice of settlement site and national independence when they “attempted to involve Tanu [sic] District Officials and the local authority into the matter in their favour,” hoping that new circumstances would give them

⁴⁶ Interview of Naftari Barnuba 15 June 2009 Kumshindwi Village.

⁴⁷ Interview of Pius Muliliye 10 June 2009 Busunzu Village.

⁴⁸ See also Jan Bender Shetler’s discussion of the post-independence management of Serengeti National Park in *Imagining Serengeti: A History of Landscape Memory in Tanzania from Earliest Times to the Present* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2007): 212-39.

a successful claim on the land.⁴⁹ Neither TANU nor the local council could contravene the standing regulations and eventually the group agreed to move when they were convinced that even “at that stage [of impending independence] the forest reserve ordinance was to rule.”⁵⁰ The arrival of independence only heightened Ha interest in reserve policy. Less than 10 days after independence, Kasulu’s local council re-examined forest reserve laws because they “...were created during the time of the colonial government, and now in Tanganyika there is independence.”⁵¹ While the results of this scrutiny were not recorded, Ha people continued to establish settlements within reserve boundaries well into 1969, in part because reserve land control techniques were an immense attraction.⁵² In a 1962 incident, the road inspector M. Nyamalize found that when he widened roadways within reserves through clearing work, people in Kasulu took it upon themselves to use the areas as already-cleared agricultural fields. They “planted roads” and built houses nearby and, when asked, they told him “you should not interfere with us, this is our independence.”⁵³ It even appears possible that the 65 settlers forced out of the Forest Reserve in 1960 returned again in 1962, as the Forest Officer made a complaint to the Natural Resources Committee that 60 people who had been removed in the past “have returned again” to the forest reserve to farm.⁵⁴ For many, independence

⁴⁹ TNA 523 AM 11/1 Medical Sleeping Sickness Uha Kibondo, “Kibondo November Report,” 9 December 1960.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ TNA 198/L5/ 31 Native Administration Kasulu Council General Correspondence. Committee Meeting 20 December 1961-22 December 1961. Translation mine.

⁵² See TNA 523/D30/47 vol 1 Development Vijiji Vya Ujamaa. Director of Agriculture Kigoma Region to Regional Commissioner, 26 November 1969.

⁵³ TNA 523 A/21/3 Three Year Development Plant Kasulu District. District Development Committee Meeting, 5 October 1962, 3. Translation mine.

⁵⁴ TNA 198/L5/ 31 Native Administration Kasulu Council General Correspondence. Natural Resources Committee Meeting 23 February 1962.

meant that all land was open to settlement: an angry settler told the Kasulu District Council that “We Tanganyikans can receive land in any area in our country, Tanganyika.”⁵⁵

Shifting Settlement Policies, 1963-1969

Ha people eagerly exploited the newly expansive forms of settlement in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but a major shift in settlement policy cut short their investments of time and labor pioneering new areas. By the mid-1960s, officials called for greater control measures because of three main factors: Ha people frequently disengaged from settlement restrictions, the number of sleeping sickness cases in Buha rose steadily throughout the 1960s, and there was insufficient funding and manpower to reign in the disease to a controllable level. In particular, the sleeping sickness service was concerned that Kibondo’ community funding for *mafyeke* would not suffice and that they would be unable to induce people to do it voluntarily.⁵⁶ The need to enact greater control over settlements sites and to elicit greater cooperation from Ha people set the stage for how government officials and Ha people reacted to the new policy to adopt *ujamaa* villages after 1967.

The resettlement of Buhoro, officially sanctioned in 1959, came under fire within three years of its re-establishment, and government officials’ objections were wide-ranging. Non-compliance or recalcitrance was a major problem. An agricultural Senior Field Officer reported to the Kasulu District Development Committee that Buhoro people “were not prepared to cultivate the proposed 3 acres of cash and food crops unless they

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, Meeting of the Chiefdom Council, 7 June 1962. Translation mine.

⁵⁶ TNA 523/AM/11/1 Medical Sleeping Sickness Uha Kibondo.

were told what kind of imposition of punishment could be given to them as a result of their negligence.”⁵⁷ With independence’s renewed accent on development, regional officials worried that the distance of Buhoro from other areas would mean that the “pace of development” there would “always be hindered by communication difficulties.”⁵⁸ Kibondo’s Settlement Officer B. S. Makalanga neatly summarized the conflict by writing in 1963 about how Buhoro was “flourishing,” but also that his last three attempts to visit it over the past thirteen months had each been defeated when he got stuck in the swamps.⁵⁹ The challenge of travel and communication to Buhoro continued to hinder officials who wished to visit the settlement over the next two years, and they emphasized in their reports that such isolation was potentially dangerous: “If the people of Buhoro...receive an epidemic sickness, it will be difficult to help them by any method during the west season or at any date before August or after October.”⁶⁰ Living where they chose, it was not possible for the Tanzanian government to provide government services to Buhoro’s residents, leaving them outside of the nation-wide goals of wide-ranging social and economic development.

Overall, Buhoro’s location and the attitudes of its residents toward government initiatives presented a challenge that officials were unwilling to accept. Buhoro’s officials analyzed its viability in terms of how well the government could meet the

⁵⁷ TNA 523/A/21/3 Three Year Development Plan Kasulu District. Kasulu District Development Meeting, 7 September 1962.

⁵⁸ TNA 523 A/21/21 Development Plan – Kibondo District [Agriculture]. District Commissioner Kibondo to Administrative Secretary Western Region, 29 May 1962. Buhoro’s cash crops were an acre each of tobacco and groundnuts and 1 acre of millet and .5 of cassava.

⁵⁹ TNA 523A M/11 Medical Sleeping Sickness Kibondo Uha. Settlement Officer to Regional Development Officer, 3 July 1963.

⁶⁰ TNA 523D30/3 Development: Reports on Irunde and Buhoro. Area Commissioner and Executive Officer Kibondo to Regional Commissioner, 30 August 1965. Translation mine.

mahitaji ya wananchi, the needs of citizens. In his analysis of postcolonial authoritarianism in Tanzania, Leander Schneider argues that what drove officials' paternalistic attitude towards citizens was their dedication to a "trustee society" in which citizens had a right to a "better life" which the state was obligated to provide.⁶¹ Buhoro's location proved an insurmountable stumbling block to providing the kinds of advice that government officials deemed necessary. Improved inputs like tractors could not be used in the wet and heavy soils in any case, and so poverty would be an abiding factor. The settlement lacked a school, and so ignorance would remain. And despite the absence of sleeping sickness, disease was a true danger because the hospital could not receive medicines outside of a two month window. Staying as they were, they would be "sunk in ignorance, poverty, disease," precisely the elements that Nyerere had identified as national enemies. As to where they should go, the report writers left the choice up to those who were moving so long as they chose a place where they could "work totally to develop the Tanzanian nation," a place "where their children could study and receive [medical] treatment when they are ill."⁶² Even when they attempted to provide state services at great expense, they were "insufficient." Non-delivery of what officials deemed to be "essential" services to Buhoro challenged the basis of the relationship between government and governed. As one official wrote about Buhoro, "The government of Kibondo cannot be needed by people who are not able to receive full

⁶¹ Leander Schneider, "Colonial Legacies and Postcolonial Authoritarianism in Tanzania: Connects and Disconnects," *African Studies Review* 49.1 (2006): 93-118. See 106 and 108-9.

⁶² TNA 523D30/3 Development: Reports on Irunde and Buhoro. Area Commissioner and Executive Officer Kibondo to Regional Commissioner, 30 August 1965.

support.”⁶³ Buhoro peoples’ goals and that of the state were most clearly seen in conflict when it came to the different ways they valued the soil: the rich, dark soil could produce “a large harvest from a small area,” producing local staples like maize, sorghum, pigeon peas, and cassava as well as newly-introduced fruits like papaya. These fed households, while the surplus found ready uses like beer brewing and sale to the Watussi herders at nearby Irunde. But to market-oriented state officials, “the distance from the road...makes the value of [Buhoro’s] soil to be nothing” when long-term development was the goal.⁶⁴

To Buhoro’s residents, though, their need to move had less to do with the government services they would gain as the desire on the part of the government to make a more successful reserve. Former game scout Gabriel Nyakamwe recalled the reasons for the evacuation of Buhoro:

[M]any people were living at Buhoro, but they were making a boundary and the plan they should be moved from there so the Game Reserve would remain....it was planned by the government because they were increasingly poaching, stealing the animals.⁶⁵

The writers of the 1965 report betrayed the existence of this other purpose in the forced movement when they noted that Buhoro’s “road should be left behind [for] tourists, elephant and other animal hunters.”⁶⁶ In October three Buhoro leaders, Kwezi Mwinyimugumi, Mwitila Ruhasha, and Kitumba Mwenejohn agreed with the Area Commissioner to move to areas of Kifura in September of 1966, with the proviso that the

⁶³ *Ibid.* Translation mine.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ Interview of Gabriel Nyakamwe 6 June 2009 Busunzu Village.

⁶⁶ TNA 523D30/3 Development: Reports on Irunde and Buhoro. Area Commissioner and Executive Officer Kibondo to Regional Commissioner, 30 August 1965.

Buhoro migrants could start their farms before they moved,⁶⁷ and yet there were settlers at Buhoro well into 1970.⁶⁸ By then, the answer for resettlement was unequivocally *ujamaa* villagization and Buhoro's residents were encouraged to join the Busunzu *ujamaa* village.⁶⁹

People living in areas without Buhoro's communication and accessibility problems experienced far greater settlement controls in the same period. The sleeping sickness crisis of 1963-4 served as a clarion call for changed policy. An important sign of the seriousness of the outbreak was the number of women infected the following year. Because few of their activities took them far from residential or farming areas that were supposed to be mostly fly-free, a high number of female patients indicated that sleeping sickness control measures had largely broken down. In April of 1964, 12 of the 40 diagnosed cases were women.⁷⁰ The area around Nyavyumbu, one of the original sleeping sickness concentrations from the 1930s, was especially worrying to officials because 80% of the cases in Kibondo District were from the area. Residents of this "re-settled Settlement" had moved out beyond the old boundaries and pushed out tsetse flies as they went, but left evacuated land between homesteads. So, not only were these people in danger of the flies in the nearby forest, but tsetse flies also began to move into the settlement itself.⁷¹ Six months later, Settlement Officer B. S. Makalanga sent out a warning to all government officials in the Kibondo District that the Nyavyumbu area was

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, Area Commissioner Kibondo to Regional Commissioner, 8 October 1965.

⁶⁸ TNA 523A/M11/5 Medical, Sleeping Sickness Returns. Field Officer Tsetse to Director of Agriculture, 17 August 1970.

⁶⁹ DRC 298 PM/UV/U25 Proposed Ujamaa Villages Kibondo, no date or author.

⁷⁰ TNA 523 AM/11/1 Medical Sleeping Sickness Uha Kibondo. Tabora Settlement Officer J. F. Arrosmith to Kibondo Settlement Officer, 5 May 1964.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, Settlement Officer Kibondo to Administrative Secretary Kigoma Region, 12 February 1963.

fully infected and that all government employees should attempt to stop any travel to the forests where most of the infections were found.⁷² These measures were apparently not effective because two months later, in October of 1963, the Settlement Officer, with members of the District Council, and the Division Executive Officer held meetings trying to persuade those living beyond the old concentration's borders to return to the "regenerated land" in the settlement. The pervasive focus on national development even influenced how officials dealt with the tsetse problem at Nyavyumbu. They placed an area-wide call for all residents to clear the regenerated land in the old Nyavyumbu settlement as a "nation building," *kujenga taifa*, project. This included closing all Kibondo government offices so that the "[s]taff [could give] a hand with pangas [machetes] at Nyavyumbu Bush clearing."⁷³ Nearly 200 people cleared 400 acres, with a continuation one day every week from then until the work was done. Without greater financial support, though, labor alone could not salvage the situation. The Regional Development Officer in Tabora wrote to Makalanga that because neither local nor central government funds were forthcoming, they would have to implement the "defensive strategy" they had discussed: "withdraw all people who are living in close contact with tsetse at Nyavyumbu."⁷⁴ It was the first time in ten years that a retraction rather than an expansion of settlement area was necessary.

Ultimately, officials changed settlement policy for interrelated reasons: the upsurge in sleeping sickness cases, Ha non-compliance with settlement policy, and the

⁷² *Ibid.*, Settlement Officer B.S. Makalanga to Divisional Assistants, Divisional Officers, and all Executive Officers of Kibondo 8 August 1963. Translation mine.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, Kibondo Settlement Officer's Report, October 1963.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, Regional Development Officer Tabora to Settlement Office Kibondo, 20 September 1963.

national government's new promotion of *ujamaa* villagization. As one official wrote in terms of Buhoro, resettlement was the lynchpin of their new policy priorities: "it is difficult to move people forward without moving them."⁷⁵ The ultimate goals of sleeping sickness prevention integrated seamlessly into the nation-wide push for social and economic development. Only "proper development of the reclaimed land" could insure that settlements were safe from sleeping sickness because development eliminated "the ecological requirements of the tsetse." President Nyerere's call for *ujamaa* villages following the 1967 Arusha Declaration and his requirement in 1969 that all branches of government support villagization⁷⁶ influenced the proceedings of a 1969 sleeping sickness meeting in Tabora. The chair of the meeting, M. K. Gao addressed the group, arguing that sleeping sickness prevention and *ujamaa* villages were natural partners. He told the group that the permanent solution to sleeping sickness was

EDUCATION. As soon as the people realize the importance of the disease, they will very quickly appreciate the importance of preventive measures, they will guard themselves against the disease by living together in UJAMAA VILLAGES and utilize the land usefully for their own needs.⁷⁷

That same year, settlement officials replaced the terminology "sleeping sickness settlement" with "*ujamaa* village". In a stunning invocation of colonial ideas concerning sleeping sickness concentrations' usefulness as disease control, Gao noted how centralized settlements like villages would create cleared areas, as well as the fact that they were "easily accessible and therefore easy to render health services [sic]. The

⁷⁵ TNA 523 D30/3 Development: Reports on Irunde and Buhoro. Area Commissioner and Executive Officer Kibondo to Regional Commissioner, 30 August 1965.

⁷⁶ Leander Schneider, "Developmentalism and Its Failings: Why Rural Development Went Wrong in 1960s and 1970s Tanzania" (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2003): 178.

⁷⁷ TNA 523/A/M11/5 Sleeping Sickness Returns 1963-1972. 28-29 July 1969 Tsetse and Sleeping Sickness Control Seminar for Tabora, Kigoma, and Mbeya Regions.

service is therefore seriously encouraging their establishment on [sic] all endemic districts.”⁷⁸ Over the next few years, settlement workers wholeheartedly adopted villagization as disease control. People living in different settlements near Makere were “continually advised and persuaded” to regroup together preferably in *ujamaa* villages: “without which no guarantee of protection against tsetse and sleeping sickness can be made.”⁷⁹

Villagization in Buha: 1967-1976

Ha peoples’ responses to the promotion of villagization largely resulted from the combination of their experiences with recent state settlement and development policies and their analysis of the specific content of *ujamaa* ideology. In the years when villagization was fully voluntary, a minority of Ha people enthusiastically and creatively engaged with *ujamaa* principles, adapting them to their own needs and priorities. Most, though, remained unconvinced and demonstrated a fundamental suspicion of how government actions were veiled efforts to seize peoples’ wealth. The most common fear was that Nyerere “wanted to make them slaves, you see, they suspected that Nyerere wanted to nationalize their property. You know it came from the Arusha Declaration, it came from that, they suspected that now he can...if they arrive [in the villages] he will nationalize their property.”⁸⁰ Even after villagization became compulsory, though, the ultimate consequences of forced removal remained largely a function of Ha actions, in this case the timing of their compliance with the order.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare Tanzania Sleeping Sickness Service Annual Report 1969, 12.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, April-June 1970 Quarterly Summary, Sleeping Sickness Service Tabora, 3.

⁸⁰ Interview of Emanuel Ruswaga 1 July 2009 Kifura Village.

Government programs to promote social and economic development had been a major focus of the Tanzanian government since independence in 1961, but this endeavor took new shape after 1967 when President Nyerere announced *ujamaa* villagization as the nation's ultimate development policy in the Arusha Declaration. Although there was no detailed description of *ujamaa* villages in the Arusha Declaration, President Nyerere did express some key concepts that would continue to inform village policies. National development, Nyerere said, must come from developing the nation's own resources, and so he lionized the term *kujitegemea*, "self-reliance." Using only the nation's resources would also advance the anti-exploitation focus of the government. As Leander Schneider has definitively established, Nyerere's more detailed description of *ujamaa* villages after 1967 drew largely upon the example of the Ruvuma Development Association [RDA], a fully voluntary group that formed in 1960. Over the course of time and through trial and error, the group organized their labor through committees planning activities and adopted communal agricultural production, with all members working on central fields. Part of the harvest went to RDA initiatives like building projects, establishing a local store, and buying a grinding machine for the group to use, but members subdivided the rest as individual shares.⁸¹ Nyerere fixed on these features as key organizing concepts for *ujamaa* villages, taking what had been the result of years of experimentation and transforming them into a blueprint of what ought to happen in villages throughout the nation. He wrote and spoke lyrically about the exciting possibilities that collective work for the common good could create, terming such care and communal effort *ujamaa*,

⁸¹ Schneider, "Developmentalism and its Failings," 125-140 and Schneider, "Freedom and Unfreedom in Rural Development: Julius Nyerere, *Ujamaa Vijijini*, and Villagization," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 38.2 (2004): 344-90. See 348-352.

“familyhood.” Each *ujamaa* village would set its own course, adapting the general model to specific environments and individual group’s goals. While Nyerere charged government officials to promote, aid, and incentivize the formation of *ujamaa* villages, he believed that their voluntary nature was essential to their success. Using mainly their own resources and innovating their own plans for the future, the RDA served as the model which Nyerere promoted as the nation’s solution to its overarching problems of poverty, ignorance, and disease.

The call to villagize met with such a lackluster response across the nation that in 1969 Nyerere called on every government agency to support the policy. Most of lowland Buha reflected the general lack of enthusiasm to establish *ujamaa* villages, but the most promising development was a group of young Catholics at Kumhasha, an area within the former Nyavyumbu sleeping sickness concentration. With the help of Fr. Francisco, a missionary priest, they founded an enterprise in 1968 that would develop into an award winning *ujamaa* village two years later. At the urging of Fr. Francisco, seven members of the Young Christian Tanzanians [VIWAWA] decided to focus their cooperative efforts to produce groundnuts and raise pigs.⁸² Besides the group’s initial investment of livestock from Fr. Francisco, they planned to plant groundnuts as a cash crop and maize and beans as food crops, which were used in communal mid-day meals and the rest shared out for member’s home use or to sell.

As in Nyerere’s vision, the Kumhasha group created their own means to organize their efforts. When the group consisted of only a few dozen members, it was relatively

⁸² Interview of Cypriani Bishakara Kumhasha Village. See also DRC 298/PM/UV/U25 Kigoma Ujamaa Villages. Report of Building Better Housing in Ujamaa Villages of Kasulu and Kibondo Districts. E. N. Mwakabonga, 14 October 1970, 11.

simple to hold weekly meetings during which they planned the next series of activities. Having access to missionary education, some members brought their literacy and math skills to create a working bureaucracy. Founding member Pius Kavura was appointed the secretary and charged to record work plans and verify their completion. Members of the group, *wajamaa*, formed smaller committees for different group activities like livestock raising, maize farming, and groundnut farming, but membership was so small that all individuals involved essentially *were* the committee. As Kavura recalled, “there were few people, they used to supervise themselves. For instance, if there are three who are taking care of animals, they had a committee amongst them.”⁸³ In the first few years, the *wajamaa* shifted into different roles according to their wishes, but as membership grew, members tended to specialize. The involvement of the local and central government reinforced this tendency, particularly by providing the group with expert advisers. The agricultural officer tutored certain members in the use of the plow while others became the permanent livestock keepers of the group. All members of the group, though, worked: “It was necessary that I go [to work in the fields] because at that time they said “a leader is an *ujamaa* member.... He had to be an example, not a boss.”⁸⁴

Because promoting *ujamaa* was a directive from the president himself, local political officials were eager to lay claim to activities in the Nyavyumbu-Kumhasha area. The Area Commissioner and the local Executive Officer reported that the group originated when local officials “wanted to restore the old settlement of Nyavyumbu” and so used persuasion to “bring back the people who are living in the tsetse infested areas to

⁸³ Interview of Pius Kavura 21 May 2009 Kumhasha Village.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

come to settle together and lead communal life.”⁸⁵ When government reports included information about Fr. Francisco, they placed more emphasis on the greater role played by local officials. While the priest provided the initial livestock investment and helped organize the group’s government, “in doing these things, the priest cooperated with the district leaders a great deal and recognized that the village will become self reliant. Now the priest is gone and the villagers are conducting their matters themselves.”⁸⁶ Having laid claim to the village, officials remained interested in its development and were particularly concerned by how its organization diverged from the *ujamaa* model. An officer from the Department of Ujamaa Villages worried that the chairman of the Kumhasha group in 1970 was the reason for the group’s failure to progress more quickly. The writer explained that he was popular “because he promotes individual economic work rather than collective. He even gave out a seed distribution to be used on individual plots.”⁸⁷ With over fifty members in 1971, officials were concerned that the group was not invested enough in their group activities because they only had a total of fifteen acres of crops planted.⁸⁸

Officials had some cause for concern in terms of where members’ priorities lay. In interviews, elders who were early *wajamaa* in Kumhasha tend to emphasize how working together provided a series of lucrative economic opportunities for them as individuals. Pius Kavura opted to join the *ujamaa* group in 1969 only after he had to

⁸⁵ DRC 298/PM/UV/U25 Kigoma Ujamaa Villages. “Proposed Ujamaa Villages” no author or date given, but likely from 1969.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, J. B. Obzut and L. M. Mongi, Report of a Visit to Kigoma and Tabora Regions, 14-30 September 1971, 10.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, Trip to Kigoma Region by Officer A. S. Kaduri Mwandamizi of the Department of Ujamaa Villages, 11-18 December 1970, 5.

⁸⁸ DRC 210 CDR 9/1 Kigoma Rural Development 1969 Annual Report, Appendix I, 2.

leave school when his family could no longer pay his school fees: “I came home and I thought it wise to join *ujamaa*, because school had failed me because of financial reasons.”⁸⁹ Elders recalled that their involvement yielded them higher returns than they could get engaging in individual agriculture, because the group marketed with an Indian trader who gave a higher price than what was available at the local market. Original members recall dividing the revenue from the *ujamaa* harvest according to the number of days they had worked. All recalled the exciting uses to which they could put their profits, buying clothes for themselves and family members, even contracting marriages. Kavura, for instance, used his profits as bridewealth for two marriages, and he was one of many *wajamaa* who married in these years. Women had an additional option for revenue production if they turned their profits or their share of grain into beer. The larger Nyavyumbu area included enough people that there was a weekly beer sale, called Nyavyumbu Club. Member Melania Rusudiye recalls making double the amount of beer that she had before she joined the group.⁹⁰

While government planners urged *ujamaa* village groups to invest in communal development, Kumhasha’s *wajamaa* expanded the functions of their group to take on roles similar to those of Ha patrilineages – a far more literal take on “familyhood” than Nyerere intended. Melania Rusudiye recalled that “when the men wanted to get married they got a kind of help. We contributed from the village money, buying some clothes to give to the lady, and other things like cooking pots, building him a small house etc.” These gifts acted as a portion of bridewealth, something to which patrilineal relatives at

⁸⁹ Interview of Pius Kavura 21 May 2009 Kumhasha Village.

⁹⁰ Interview of Melania Rusudiye 27 May 2009 Kumhasha Village.

the time would contribute to aid their family member, expand the lineage, and ultimately return to them in forms of aid the bridegroom might provide. Key to this system was the understanding that the possessions given for the marriage would stay within the group's orbit as marriages were patrilocal. How female *wajamaa* fared proves the point: following the advocacy of Rusidiye and the other member women, the group conceded that they would give gifts to female members upon their marriage, but only if they married a fellow member. The wealth thus stayed within the collective.⁹¹



Figure 4.1 The cattle shed built by the original Kumhasha *Ujamaa* group. Photographed by author in 2007.

The way the Kumhasha *wajamaa* structured their lives in the group better followed their own preferences than the state's proscriptions for *ujamaa* planning, and regional and national officials accepted this variation. In particular, Kumhasha was marked by a pattern in which most members did not build homes within the village site but instead chose to live at their parents' or their own homesteads in the surrounding area and commute for work. In 1970, only nine out of the forty members lived in the village.⁹² One government commentator thought of this as a "stage," that they were

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² DRC 298/PM/UV/U25 Kigoma Ujamaa Villages, 7.

“working together” but not “living together communally as envisaged in the Ujamaa villages pattern of living.”⁹³ Despite this divergence from full adherence to *ujamaa* policy, the central government recognized the Kumhasha group in 1970. As a means to promote *ujamaa* villages, each region held a contest for the area’s best *ujamaa* village and Kumhasha won the competition in Kigoma Region. Not only did the group receive President Nyerere at Kumhasha, he also gave them a series of valuable presents including cattle, a grinding machine, a diesel powered water pump, and plows. These were all communal gifts, but he also made a pledge that those members who built modern houses in the village would receive a corrugated iron roof. One original member recalls him promising “make bricks and you will be brought roofs and nails.”⁹⁴



Figure 4.2 Robert Kavura, one of the original *wajamaa* in Kifura, standing in front of the roof he received as a prize from the Tanzanian government. Photographed by author in 2007.

Beyond Kumhasha, though, there were only a handful of other *ujamaa* village success stories in Kigoma Region. Development planners met with disheartening reactions from Ha people, and came to characterize Buha as more “backwards compared

⁹³ Cuthbert K. Omari, “Kigoma Operation: Kibondo District, a Preliminary Appraisal Report,” November, 1973, 6. East Africana Collection, University of Dar es Salaam Library. EAF PAM HT 431 T3 045.

⁹⁴ Interview of Cypriani Bishakara 19 May 2009 Kumhasha Village.

to other regions.” Despite extensive efforts to “awaken the revolutionary hearts for development” there with projects ranging from educational campaigns concerning unsanitary foods, malnutrition, “better housing,” cash crops, and the politics of *ujamaa*, regional officials had little to show for it.⁹⁵ Officials sent to reconnoiter sites in lowland Buha for *ujamaa* villages met with people who expressed a series of reservations about them. Some feared witchcraft, that “staying together will increase the chances of harming each other.” Others expressed concerns that sorghum, their preferred crop, would not do well within a village’s “artificial grouping” because it flourishes using shifting cultivation. Some disliked the promotion of “improved housing” in villages, preferring to build the type of home to which they were used. Above all, locals told the report writer that “instead of being forced to have communal farms they are ready to cultivate his/her plot helping each other voluntarily and freely.”⁹⁶

Buha’s slow progress in villagizing and reputation for “backwardness” made it a target for compulsory villagization. Nyerere began to relent on the use of force starting in 1970, finally announcing in 1973 that all Tanzanians would have to be in villages within three years.⁹⁷ Buha and Kigoma Region as a whole was one of a handful of regions which Nyerere himself selected to undergo earlier forced villagization with a military-style operation to move an estimated 99,190 families. Known as “operations,” they involved marshaling resources from all ministries and surrounding regions to prepare village sites and move people and property. A delegation of Kigoma’s planners

⁹⁵ DRC 210/CDR/9/1 Kigoma Rural Development. Regional Rural Development Officer Kigoma A. H. S. Mwakapesa, Report of the Development Work in the Villages in Kigoma Region from November 1969 to February 1970, 1.

⁹⁶ DRC 298 PM/UV/U25 “Ujamaa Villages in Kigoma” nd but likely 1969.

⁹⁷ Schneider, “Developmentalism and its Failings,” 210.

even visited Dodoma Region as Operation Dodoma was going on, in order to avoid some of their mistakes.⁹⁸ Planners organized Operation Kigoma, as it was known, into five phases, each with a target number of villages to make, families to move, and date by which both were to be accomplished.⁹⁹ Phase I was set to begin on 1 July 1972, with Phase V completed by 1977.¹⁰⁰ But Nyerere himself sped up the timeline based on a November 1973 visit to the region and determined that the project should be completed within eight months, by July 1974. At that time, there were 58 villages in Kibondo and 70 in Kasulu.¹⁰¹

Although its impetus came from the central government, Operation Kigoma was always planned to be run locally. In 1970, central government officials ran training programs for all regional members of “advisory” services, including week-long seminars taught by TANU members and experts from various ministries about the Arusha Declaration, African Socialism, and various dimensions of *ujamaa* villages.¹⁰² More local leaders also received training and between July and November 1971, government and party leaders at the regional, district, and divisional levels attended seminars.

Local government employees came to play an increasingly large role in preparing people to move and planning village sites. This apparently happened in part because Operation Kigoma went on at a time of great reorganization of the central government’s bureaucracy, known as decentralization, when many of the most important regional

⁹⁸ TANU College Kivukoni Main Report on Movement into Villages in Kigoma, West Lake, Mwanza and Mara Regions, 15 September-8 October 1974, 1. My thanks to Jim Giblin for a copy of this document.

⁹⁹ CCM Archive, Accession #3 File 111. My thanks to Leander Schneider for a copy of this document.

¹⁰⁰ TANU College Kivukoni Main Report, 12.

¹⁰¹ TNA 599/GD/8/ Vermin Control. Game Officer Kibondo to Director of Wildlife 9 May 1975 and Game Officer Kasulu to Director of Wildlife 13 May 1975

¹⁰² TNA 523 A/20/10 Agriculture Monthly Reports. Agricultural Advisory Services Kigoma Region, July 1970 Monthly Report.

planners left the region before movement began.¹⁰³ With their replacements not necessarily conversant with the new plans, locally-based employees became far more prominent. Their mediation between local realities and central plans, though, was hampered by communication challenges and lack of expertise. Some of these local leaders, for instance, raised concerns about available resources, but a number could not participate well because “some of the leaders, especially TANU cell leaders, were not conversant with Kiswahil but [spoke] Kiha.”¹⁰⁴ At the lower levels, all party and government officials were charged with informing local people of villagization and urging their compliance. But the logistical challenges of surveying so many villages, demarcating residential sites, garden plots, and agriculture fields, proved too much for survey teams themselves to handle. Instead, village officials were told to survey the areas themselves. Naftari Barnuba was the Ward Educational officer in his area, and yet he was one of a group who were “sitting as officials and planned that when the vehicles came, we would arrange that this one will go to a certain place to take people.”¹⁰⁵ When desperate, some officials even suggested that villagers do the surveys themselves. Above all, villagers were not supposed to rely on the government to accomplish all the work: “[t]he people themselves should do whatever they are able to do: survey an area, cut poles and grasses, make the village roads.”¹⁰⁶ As Barnuba put it, their role was to “stay here... now it becomes their responsibility to work hard building their houses.”¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ DRC 298/PM/UV/U25 Kigoma Ujamaa Villages, 7.

¹⁰⁴ Omari, 14.

¹⁰⁵ Interview of Naftari Banruba 15 June 2009 Kumshindwi Village.

¹⁰⁶ DRC 298/PM/UV/U25 Kigoma Ujamaa Villages. H. M. Makwaia, Commissioner of Ujamaa Villages, R. S. Juma, and M. Ndikwege Ujamaa Villages Officer, Travel Report, 11 April-23 April 1972, 4.

¹⁰⁷ Interview of Naftari Banruba 15 June 2009 Kumshindwi Village.

How quickly Ha people agreed to cooperate in the formation of villages was a key predictor for the hardships that elders associate with villagization. In general those who moved early or already lived within village' boundaries made the transition far better than those who were forcibly transported. How people understood and how quickly they reacted to the call to villagization in turn depended on what forms of information they had access to. People who were connected to government circles or who accessed mass media received far more urgent messages to move. Cypriani Bishakara already lived in Kumhasha but he advised all of his relatives to move in when he learned about Operation Dodoma from his brother, who was serving in the national service group there. Bishakara recalls his brother telling him: "if we heard an announcement to move, we should just build [i.e., move into a village]. We shouldn't have other ideas because there we were moving people by whip and gun, we beat the Wagogo [main ethnic group in Dodoma] with whips, by force."¹⁰⁸ Many who heard the announcement on the radio or read it in newspapers gave more detailed accounts about the reasons for the move and the possible benefits it could bring. Emanuel Konrad remembered hearing the radio announcement when he was a teenager: "[Nyerere] said that he learnt something on his trip to China, he saw that they have started socialist villages and he thought to do the same so that the government could be able to deliver services to its citizens."¹⁰⁹ In most cases, they were more likely to see government services as an advantage worth moving for. For elders like the two former teachers whom I interviewed, moving into villages

¹⁰⁸ Interview of Cypriani Bishakara 19 May 2009 Kumhasha Village.

¹⁰⁹ Interviews of Emanuel Konrad 1 July 2009 Kifura Village and Ladislaus Chanda Kipfumu 12 October 2007 Kifura Village.

with their own schools was a boon for them and their children.¹¹⁰ Not surprisingly, the former Member of Parliament Pius Muliliye had the most detailed explanation of the purposes of villagization:

We were teaching each other that if people stay in one place together...we will help each other in various activities which will move forward our development....[t]hat of agriculture and the development of reading because we also consulted [that] if we come together, there will be schools and our people and children will study and we ourselves can study in adult education classes.¹¹¹

Adults who had experienced the forced move to sleeping sickness concentrations in the 1930s and 1940s formed another group disproportionately willing to move into villages. They were not, for instance, among the people in Buha who ignored the order because they doubted that the government had the power to enforce such a radical move: “For about a whole year...we ignored it, saying ‘who can afford to move and put people together?’ We did not know that for the government this is a small task.”¹¹² Besa Makampu’s father had been a teenager when he was forced to leave Bweru in the 1930s. As a young teenager in the 1970s, Makampu had joined other youths who learned political and patriotic songs meant to encourage their elders to join *ujamaa* villages and was excited by the announcement that all would move. She recalled asking her father what he thought of the news:

I asked my father, ‘Now father these *ujamaa* villages, what will they be like?’ Now my father said, ‘these *ujamaa* villages are the same as that *umukutano* which we were in there at Bweru. We were at Bweru, then *Muhogo Mchungu* came and he broke it up. They burned the crops, they burned the maize, they burned

¹¹⁰ Interviews of Ladislaus Chanda Kipfumu 12 October 2007 Kifura Village and Naftari Barnuba 15 June 2009 Kumshindwi Village. Other elders cited their education, sometimes quite limited, as a reason why they welcomed what villages might provide, such as Charles Kikwaba 25 May 2009 Kumhasha Village, Emanuel Konrad 1 July 2009 Kifura Village, and Balikulije Lulitaliye 17 October 2007 Busunzu Village.

¹¹¹ Interview of Pius Muliliye 10 June 2009 Busunzu Village.

¹¹² Interview of Charles Kikwaba 25 May 2009 Kumhasha Village.

everything. They brought us to Kifura.... Now I see, my child, that it will be that way.

Makampu's father insisted that the family move before the government employed any similar forms of destruction, but did so with the full knowledge that this kind of massive resettlement tended to strain resources to a breaking point. He continued,

The way I understand it, my child, is that to be broken up you will find a person removed from a certain area, you are sent to a certain area, you meet its problems, it brings hunger.' He said, 'and right now the government wants to do that, hunger will come.' I said, 'father, no, hunger cannot come.' My father said, 'my child, you will just see.'¹¹³

Other veterans of the colonial movement used their past experience to gauge the extent to which villagization was a problem. In the case of Joakim Ruhazi, villagization was far less impactful because "people were coming from Busagara coming here, and Busagara is about two miles only. It is very different compared to very distant places from which people were moved."¹¹⁴

Those who moved willingly over the next few years experienced a far easier transition than those who came by force. Even luckier were those who happened to live in areas that were designated as *ujamaa* sites. For them, the surveyors marking out housing and farm plots "found us here because we were from here" and did not need to make a major move.¹¹⁵ Sometimes, though, individuals were frustratingly close to the village boundary, being forced to rebuild their houses just yards away from where they were currently living.¹¹⁶ When people agreed to move before deadlines, they were able

¹¹³ Interview of Besa Makampu 29 June 2009 Kifura Village.

¹¹⁴ Interview of Joakim Ruhazi 13 October 2007 Kifura Village.

¹¹⁵ Interviews of Regina Migarambo 2 July 2009 Kifura Village and Naftari Barnuba 15 June 2009 Busunzu Village.

¹¹⁶ Interview of Dolosea Zacharia 29 October 2007 Kumhasha Village.

to do so gradually, building as they went. They were far more likely, too, to be able to choose their plots and garden sites, possibly planning for a future arrangement in which married sons could live near their father's family: "We just arrived in an area and said, 'I will be here.' And if you have three children, you took three plots."¹¹⁷ Typically, men worked on the new site while women and children kept their original homestead in order. Only after all was ready would families move, in some cases returning to former sites to tend to any remaining crops until they were harvested. Emanuel Konrad described that his father "came first to [Kifura to] prepare a plot, then he built and after he finished packing the mud, he thatched with grass, then he moved in the other household items. We and the cattle also moved and came in the village."¹¹⁸ These people took a calculated risk, investing scarce resources into a move that might not, in the end, be required. For instance, some interviewees recalled that their parents used money or goods to hire porters to move their possessions.¹¹⁹ Even relatively short moves like that of Emanuel Konrad's family from Kanyonza to Kifura represented an enormous amount of labor. Although the journey took an hour by foot, the family was not fully moved in four month's time. Although not universal, for some early settlers in villages the government sometimes provided help in the form of building supplies, bringing truckloads of building poles to aid in construction.¹²⁰ Some early movers were even able to arrange to settle near people who had been neighbors in their former home. When this was possible, typically neighbors from former settlements moved together and chose housing plots near

¹¹⁷ Interview of Paulo Kigaraba 18 June 2009 Kumshindwi Village.

¹¹⁸ Interview of Emanuel Konrad 1 July 2009 Kifura Village.

¹¹⁹ Interview of Emanuel Ruswaga 30 June 2009 Kifura Village.

¹²⁰ Interviews of Pius Muliliye 10 June 2009 Busunzu Village, Emanuel Konrad 1 July 2009 Kifura Village, and Rukumbila Gota 19 June 2009 Kumshindwi Village.

to each other, or lined the length of an entire street.¹²¹ This not only allowed for the retention of social ties from their original site, but also facilitated help in the challenging work of building shelters and preparing gardens or fields.¹²²

Most lowland Ha people, though, were unable to attend mass meetings or listen to politicians' radio addresses in Swahili. These elders gave only vague or general explanations for why the government required them to move, and tended to be among the nearly half of the population who were unconvinced at the time and did not move until the government used force.¹²³ The most common explanation for the purpose of villagization was that the government or Nyerere himself wanted the people "to live together" or "to live nearby," although many also mentioned that government services (usually unspecified) were another reason.¹²⁴ Much like testimony about earlier movements, many elders' responses indicated disengagement with the central government. Nyarovuno Matabhalo denied that she was even supposed to know the reason because "[t]hose who moved us are the ones who know."¹²⁵ Ndabhateze Kagoma agreed, saying "Could we know? They just told us to come in the village."¹²⁶ As Ladislaus Chanda Kipfumu explained when his friend seemed unable to answer why everyone was supposed to move, "An ordinary villager cannot answer that question

¹²¹ Interview of Paolo Rutozi 15 October 2007 Kifura Village.

¹²² Interview of Emanuel Ruswaga 30 June 2009 Kifura Village.

¹²³ DRC 298/PM/UV/U25 Kigoma Ujamaa Villages. Report of a Trip to Kigoma Region by M. S. Ndikwege, 7-24 January 1973, 2.

¹²⁴ Interviews of Leonia Kifwoka 23 October 2007 Kifura Village, Laurensia Bhabinga 26 October 2007 Kumhasha Village, Balikulije Lulitaliye 17 October 2007 Busunzu Village, Bilangamila Mphanye 17 October 2007 Busunzu Village, Ntahokagiye Muganga 18 October 2007 Busunzu Village, and Rukumbila Gota 19 June 2009 Kumshindwi Village.

¹²⁵ Interview of Nyarovuno Matabhalo 19 October 2007 Busunzu Village.

¹²⁶ Interview of Ndabhateze Kagoma 25 October 2007 Kumhasha Village.

exhaustively...I think he might not have even attended the meeting where the decision to move was announced.”¹²⁷

Making many pause before moving to villages was a widespread rumor that villagization would mean the collectivization of all wealth, including livestock, wives, and children. People feared that all of their

property will be owned by the village...it was like my wife will be collected by many people that is how they were [thinking]. Some moved and other agreed after they understood [that this wouldn't happen]...others agreed to come to the villages. [Many worried that their] possessions will be owned by the whole village...even livestock, that you cannot slaughter a chicken and eat with your family unless you distributed the meat to the whole village, that is how they understood, that is why they were afraid.¹²⁸

This was the primary reason given in both government documents and in interviews why a significant number of people opted to move to areas in the region rather than to the villages.¹²⁹ They scattered to Burundi, Biharamulo, or Geita. A song of the time records some of these possible destinations:

Holela bhande we, vijiji vilaje	Hey hey the villages are coming
Funga miligo tugende Kigoma, vijiji vilaje	Pack your things we should go to Kigoma, the villages are coming

Holela bhande we, vijiji vilaje	Hey hey the villages are coming
Funga miligo tugende Tabora, vijiji vilaje	Pack your things we should go to Tabora, the villages are coming

Ndakuse	I passed
Kuka?	Where?
Malagarasi	Malagarasi
Kuka?	Where?

¹²⁷ Interview of Joakim Ruhazi 13 October 2007 Kifura Village.

¹²⁸ Interview of Elizabert Kajoro 1 July 2009 Kifura Village. Other elders told similar stories, including Pius Muliliye 10 June 2009 Busunzu Village, Emanuel Ruswaga 30 June 2009 Kifura Village, Charles Kikwaba 25 May 2009 Kumhasha Village, and Paolo Rutozi 15 October 2007 Kifura Village.

¹²⁹ TANU College Kivukoni Main Report, 10. Interviews of Mariamu Bandi 12 June 2009 Busunzu Village, Bilangamile Mpfanye 17 October 2007 Busunzu Village, and Ndabhateze Kagoma 25 October 2007 Kumhasha Village.

In many cases, elders recall these sites were chosen carefully not only because individuals might have helpful connections there but also because they were areas (especially Burundi) where they hoped forced villagization would not reach.¹³¹

The elders who experienced compelled movement into villages emphasized the chaotic nature of the move. Most elders recall that compulsion to move began in August 1973 and continued through December, depending on location.¹³² While original plans were to last from 1972-1977, between regional officials' zeal at founding villages and Nyerere's orders to move faster, nearly half of Buha's residents were "moved in 4 months rather than 4 years."¹³³ Whether elders had been moved by force or had come willingly to *ujamaa* villages, they all contrasted the difference between the "planned way" of coming gradually, with the violent uprooting that compulsory movement included.¹³⁴ The National Guard and TANU Youth wing were both employed in forcing people to move, typically only giving them time to pack before they began the journey to the new village that same day:

They went to every household and they tell people to carry their belongings. They told them, 'you have a plot in the village....' They came to them, like they visited three or four villages and they induced all of them to carry loads of belongings. [Even] their goats came with them like that.¹³⁵

Most recalled that, much as their colonial counterparts had done decades earlier, the government agents involved in forced villagization destroyed old homesteads to

¹³⁰ "Holela Bhande" collected on 4 July 2009 Kifura Village.

¹³¹ TANU College Kivukoni Main Report on Movement, 10. Interviews of Bilangamile Mpfanye 17 October 2007 Busunzu Village and Ndabateze Kagoma 25 October 2007 Kumhasha Village.

¹³² Interview of Rameck Mtareha 10 June 2009 Busunzu Village.

¹³³ TANU College Kivukoni Main Report, 1.

¹³⁴ Interview of Protasi Chobhahalaye 22 November 2007 Makere Village.

¹³⁵ Interview of Paolo Kigaraba 28 June 2009 Kumshindwi Village.

discourage people from returning: “Some people went as far as Burundi and some just refused until the government decided to go and burn their houses, taking possessions out, [including] the goats plus other things. Then they burned the crops.”¹³⁶

Without the chance even to prepare new shelters in their designated villages, those forced out of their former homes experienced difficult days and weeks. As Paolo Kigaraba recalled, “[a]n individual would arrive at a clear area without any kind of previously built shelter. He might receive shelter from a neighbor, [but] if he didn’t have someone whom they knew, he will sleep outside until he finished building.”¹³⁷ In at least one case, though, an entire area of Kanyonza managed to move together into Kifura village and worked together to better weather the sudden demands on their labor:

...almost the whole hamlet from where we lived earlier, we all built along one line [street] because they had an understanding with each other, they had cooperation so they thought it is better that they hold...three roads...They especially helped each other in cutting trees and later on loading and unloading them from the car. Each person did his part because they were moving within a time given that was insufficient because the traditional army and the ‘sungusungu’ should go there to chase them and bring them in the village.¹³⁸

Building New Lives in Villages 1972-1976

However people arrived in villages, all confronted a series of short- and long-term challenges they had to negotiate before life in villages could stabilize. For many, arrival in villages involved exposure to new, foreign circumstances, food shortages, and the abandonment of wealth. Villagers then struggled to cope with different strains of living under village organization, including greater constraints on agriculture, worsening public

¹³⁶ Interviews of Naftari Barnuba 15 June 2009 Busunzu Village and Emanuel Konrad 1 July 2009 Kifura Village.

¹³⁷ Interview of Paolo Kigaraba 28 June 2009 Kumshindwi Village. Other interviewees explained arrival in similar terms, including Emanuel Konrad 1 July 2009 Kifura Village.

¹³⁸ Interview of Emanuel Konrad 1 July 2009 Kifura Village.

health conditions, enhanced government control over reserve areas, and state campaigns meant to modernize and unify Ha people with the rest of the nation.

In recalling their first arrival in villages, many elders emphasized the foreignness of their new homes. Most commented on the unusual spatial arrangement of the village itself with houses tightly grouped in a center along streets or “lines.”¹³⁹ Many even remembered how many paces each housing plot measured, usually 70 by 70 paces. But the greater concern was in how the close proximity brought them in daily contact with strangers about whom they knew little:

...we had concerns and our parents especially had them because they were accustomed [to this area] and then they were bringing them [making] a mixture of various kinds of people. There were some with thieving tendencies, others who were sorcerers, just every kind of character. They were afraid; they lived with fear; they did not feel comfortable.¹⁴⁰

Violence, theft, witchcraft, immoral behavior were all characteristics that made strangers frightening, and many interviewees who were children at the time recall being warned by their parents to avoid contact with strangers in villages.¹⁴¹ The loss of privacy could even harm the careers of specialists, as in the case of a local doctor who moved away from Kibondo “because Ujamaa living would deprive him of his privacy. For his professional privacy was one of the secrets of his success.”¹⁴²

New and unusual objects first encountered in the villages figure prominently in the memories of those who were children at the time: “[a]t that time our clothes consisted

¹³⁹ Interview of Elizabert Kajoro 1 July 2009 Kifura Village.

¹⁴⁰ Interviews of Regina Migarambo 2 July 2009 Kifura Village, Emanuel Konrad 1 July 2009 Kifura Village, Emanuel Ruswaga 30 June 2009 Kifura Village, and Laurensia Bhabinga 26 October 2007 Kumhasha Village.

¹⁴¹ Interview of Charles Kikwaba 25 May 2009 Kumhasha Village.

¹⁴² Omari, 20.

of wrapping old material [around and tying it behind the neck], but now we saw people wearing shirts, shoes, shorts, trousers...we really were astonished.”¹⁴³ Some commented on the oddity of metal cooking pots compared to clay ones, and how differently they cooked typical foods like *ugali* and influenced their flavor. While some of the newness of the area could be frightening to children, they were also alluring. Children tried to figure out how tennis balls bounced and were drawn to inspect them closely. Cars passing by on the roadway were objects of wonder “because we saw people sitting in the cars and then it moves, then stops and people get out and some get in, we really were amazed by that.”¹⁴⁴ Many of these younger interviewees emphasized that the new elements in villages were more difficult for their parents and grandparents to accept at first. Over time, many of these elders changed their thinking and adopted different styles: “the more we continued living in the village, our parents now opened their minds and they bought us shoes, shorts and shirts. We stopped wearing the wrapping clothes.”¹⁴⁵

Both individuals and village authorities sought out familiarity to re-ground themselves in villages. At least in the case of Kifura, the village chairman created a path to ease tensions of so many people coming together by allowing relatives and clan members to live together in large numbers if they chose.¹⁴⁶ Groups of neighbors settling together militated against an overwhelming sense of foreignness, but so did recreating space in ways that Ha people had employed decades before in their move to sleeping sickness concentrations. Ntahokagiye Mugunga remembered his thought process in

¹⁴³ Interview of Emanuel Konrad 1 July 2009 Kifura Village.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.* In our interview with Emanuel Konrad, he remembered wondering how a tennis balls “does the jumping.”

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ Interview of Regina Migarambo 2 July 2009 Kifura Village.

choosing to plant a *mirumba* tree in Busunzu *ujamaa* village: “I was thinking that *mirumba* would make it like the first place....they told you to go and plant the *mirumba* there at the place where you built the *ndalo* of the ancestors.”¹⁴⁷

Besides dealing with foreign elements, the early years in villages were marked by deprivations and hunger. Although the 1972-1976 seasons were all difficult ones in lowland Buha’s *ujamaa* villages, 1974 holds a special place in memory. Whenever elders were asked if they remembered songs composed about villagization and *ujamaa*, the one that was universal concerned the hardship of 1974:

Inzala ya 74 nikasubhile	The hunger of ‘74 shouldn’t return.
Inzala ya 74 nikasubhile	The hunger of ‘74 shouldn’t return.
Isubhiye abhantu bhohona nzanila kalamba	If it returns, people will die, give me a drink.
Isubhiye abhantu bhohona nzanila kalamba	If it returns, people will die, give me a drink. ¹⁴⁸

Regina Migarambo was a teenager at the time of villagization and recalled that the term for the hunger in the Kifura village derived from the fact that locals were so desperate for food, they took to eating unripe crops and fruits:

[T]hey were calling it the hunger of mangoes. They were eating mangoes, they were grabbing unripe mangoes. They were boiling them and eating them.... they found unripe mangoes, unripe maize, unripe cassava, roots. Children went to sleep hungry, people became very weak.¹⁴⁹

While ripened maize and cassava were considered normal foods, roots and mangoes were the foods of desperation, or ones that only children would typically choose to eat.

Mariam Bandi evocatively described the strain that hunger placed on newly-moved

¹⁴⁷ Interview of Ntahokagiye Muganga 5 June 2009 Busunzu Village.

¹⁴⁸ “Nzaa ya 74 Ntikasubile” collected on 4 July 2009 Kifura Village.

¹⁴⁹ Interview of Regina Migarambo 2 July 2009 Kifura Village.

people, saying they felt like processed grain: “hunger ground us all.”¹⁵⁰

The 1974 crisis resulted from a series of factors, many of which were the direct result of the strains of resettlement and the specific way it was carried out during Operation Kigoma. Newly-cleared and planted fields in the lowlands took at least two years of work to make fully productive, which structured agriculture practices in the area. As described in chapter two, shifting cultivators began preparation of new fields well before their main ones lost fertility. Those who refused to move before force was used in 1974 had no opportunity to begin readying new fields years in advance. Worse yet, many moved at a critical time in the agricultural calendar, during the November-December rains when major cultivation occurred.¹⁵¹ Those who moved early, in 1972 or 1973, had relied on their surplus food from their former homes as their new fields were not yet productive.¹⁵² By 1974, though, this cushion had run out, and the growing conditions in 1974 were abysmal. The rains were insufficient everywhere, some places experienced near-drought conditions, and the sun “blazed” all year long.¹⁵³ For early arrivals, the village agricultural requirements in *ujamaa* villages further exacerbated the problem by constraining the time they could spend on their own food crops. Planning for future economic development and attempting to insure food security, officials required that everyone plant an acre of cotton and an acre of cassava. Part of villagers’ precious agricultural time had not been devoted to maximizing food crops on immature fields, but had instead been spent on an inedible cash crop and, ironically, an anti-famine crop. The

¹⁵⁰ Interview of Mariamu Bandi 12 June 2009 Busunzu Village.

¹⁵¹ Interview of Kadudungwa Kibogi 12 June 2009 Busunzu Village.

¹⁵² Interview of Elizabert Kajoro 1 July 2009 Kifura Village.

¹⁵³ Interviews of Regina Migarambo 2 July 2009 Kifura Village and Cypriani Bishakara 19 May 2009 Kumhasha Village.

trouble with cassava was that it took two to three years before it was useable and the famine struck before it was ready: an elder asked rhetorically, “That cassava which you planted in that year, in the next year could you eat it?”¹⁵⁴

The crisis that the hunger of mangoes represented tested the rhetoric of the Tanzanian government that villagization would improve government services. Some elders recalled being comforted that the Tanzanian government sent food aid:

We were surprised they brought us food. Yellow flour, yellow corn, and beans....We were given quart-sized shares. We did not buy it, it was shared out because Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere, our president, loved us greatly. So in 1974, 1975 it was the year of being served by the government.¹⁵⁵

But most elders told of how they were forced to scramble together a means of survival, “creating strategies of craftiness,” as Regina Migarambo put it.¹⁵⁶ Those in need might call upon luckier relatives and friends for help, especially possible when they were people who had planted mainly sorghum, a grain that can withstand drought, which had done well in 1972 or 1973.¹⁵⁷ A much more common necessity was for men to walk long distances, typically thirty to fifty miles, to areas that were either not affected by villagization or had better growing conditions. Popular destinations were places like Kitagata because farmers there specialized in sorghum, which weathered the drought better, or most commonly Burundi. For both areas, men reported traveling to either

¹⁵⁴ Interview of Besa Makampu 29 June 2009 Kifura Village.

¹⁵⁵ Interviews of Besa Makampu 29 June 2009 Kifura Village and Sophia Bhabinga 26 October 2007 Kifura Village. The term “yellow corn” likely means that the Tanzanian government distributed food aid that they received from abroad.

¹⁵⁶ Interview of Regina Migarambo 2 July 2009 Kifura Village.

¹⁵⁷ Interviews of Regina Migarambo 2 July 2009 Kifura Village and Elizabert Kajoro 1 July 2009 Kifura Village.

purchase food or to find work in exchange for food.¹⁵⁸

An immediate consequence of forced movement was the abandonment of personal wealth. Even though most banana and coffee cultivation occurred in the highlands, some lowlanders also cultivated them and lost them in the move.¹⁵⁹ Elders frequently referred to these crops as a way to explain their feelings at the time of moving: “How would you feel to be told to move to another place leaving growing banana trees behind? [There was] nothing good at all [about the move]!”¹⁶⁰ Vehicles were insufficient to move all people and possessions, and one of the most dramatic financial losses was the fact that many livestock owners had to sell their animals. Ernest Maganya found during his 1976 study of Kibondo that this necessity especially rankled because it meant the enrichment of local elites who had the wherewithal to buy and transport the stock, and sometimes this included local government officials and party bureaucrats, the very people who arranged transportation.¹⁶¹ While these issues mainly pertained to the highlands where livestock keeping was more widespread, lowlanders also lost stock that had taken years if not generations to build up. Areas around Kifura like Mtala and Kanyonza were especially good for livestock keeping. In the case of Jacobo Kachira’s father from Mtala, though, his cows died at Kifura “because of the weather or the environment itself.” Emanuel Konrad’s father from Kanyonza decided to sell his goats

¹⁵⁸ Interviews of Kadudungwa Kibogi 12 June 2009 Busunzu Village, Besa Makampu 29 June 2009 Kifura Village, and Charles Kikwaba 25 May 2009 Kumhasha Village.

¹⁵⁹ Ernest Maganya, “Kigoma: From a Labour Reserve to a Cash Crop Growing Area; A Case Study of the Process of the Internationalization of Capitalist Relations in Peasant Societies,” Department of Sociology, University of Dar es Salaam 1977, 44. Interview of Expirusi Nkooko 17 October 2007 Kifura Village. The losses recorded in government examinations of villagization provide a case in point, only mentioning loss of wealth in terms of the highlands. See TANU College Kivukoni Main Report, 19.

¹⁶⁰ Interview of Nyarovuna Matabhalo 19 October 2007 Busunzu Village. Other elders agree, such as Ndabhateze Kagoma 30 October 2007 Kumhasha Village.

¹⁶¹ Maganya, 44.

instead of bringing them to the Kifura *ujamaa* village. He determined to sell in part because all village goats were supposed to be gathered and kept at Kisogwe, several miles from Kifura, and he wished to avoid the trouble and potential confiscation such an arrangement could pose. But Konrad called this a “clever” move on his father’s part because he also avoided losing stock due to “natural” causes.¹⁶²

One of the most ironic examples of how Buha’s villagization caused the loss of wealth was that of the Kumhasha *ujamaa* group. The Kumhasha location was an obvious choice to remain an *ujamaa* village, but planners did not necessarily follow the way the *wajamaa* had organized the place. While they used the groups’ buildings, they designated the groups’ main groundnut fields as residential areas. A member of the original *ujamaa* village recalled that officials framed the coming of area people into the village as benefiting both groups:

there were no dispensaries, so the governments said this: “we are building a school, and provide clean water, and every good thing compared to when you were just a few people. Now we are building them for everyone.” Now it seemed that those people [*ujamaa* members] should join with them [newcomers], they should enter the government’s area. The *ujamaa* people and the Operation people.¹⁶³

The original *wajamaa* welcomed the newcomers and urged their families to come, but they also recall feeling outraged by what happened to their *ujamaa* activities once the newcomers arrived. Soon after each village’s formation, villagers held local elections to choose village leaders to set the collective agenda, but in Kumhasha this happened without any acknowledgment of the accomplishments or potential special rights of the

¹⁶² Interviews of Jacobo Kachira 2 July 2009 Kifura Village and Emanuel Konrad 1 July 2009 Kifura Village.

¹⁶³ Interview of Pius Kavura 2009 Kumhasha Village.

original *wajamaa*. *Wajamaa* like Bishakara argued that this shift spelled the end to *ujamaa* activity at Kumhasha, destroyed their collective and individual wealth, and failed to provide the kind of long-term development they had worked for. Before Nyerere gave them a grinding machine, he noted that the group had already been able to buy one. But villagization changed all that:

...the politicians of that time were bringing bad things, they said that because those others came from there and you who are here already, your property which is here will be owned by everyone. After hearing this, the property which was around was destroyed....For example we decided to slaughter the pigs. The [grinding] machine which remained, the leaders who were there sold it and the leaders ate the money. So things went bad. But if it was not like that we would have development because there was profit.¹⁶⁴

In the longer term, everyone who moved to *ujamaa* villages faced similar experiences in villages. Elders frequently spoke of the challenges that village life posed for agricultural work. Limiting peoples' acreage was meant to promote more supposedly stable forms of agriculture with the planting of permanent crops and the use of inputs like fertilizers and pesticides that could work against poor soil health and crop disease. But these inputs were not provided free and their prices actually increased substantially in the 1970s, so the option was only available to wealthier people. As Ernest Maganya found in his 1976 undergraduate study of the region, because assigned acreage removed shifting cultivation as a viable option, most people had to locate other fields to supplement those assigned to them in the village.¹⁶⁵ When villagers found that the designated areas for farming, called *bega kwa bega*, "shoulder to shoulder" were insufficient, their first preference was to use the fields at their former homes: "...that *bega kwa bega* was one

¹⁶⁴ Interview of Cypriani Bishakara 2009 Kumhasha Village.

¹⁶⁵ Maganya, 59.

acre, and there at their homes they had had two acres, now should he cease [to cultivate at the first]?”¹⁶⁶ While this saved the labor of clearing new fields and could take advantage of their knowledge of microenvironments, the travel involved constrained the amount of time people could devote to their crops, and disrupted household workloads.¹⁶⁷ To date, this remains the pattern throughout lowland Buha, with many people choosing to farm in areas from where they or their parents moved, the luckier ones having access to far more convenient, fertile areas:

JW: Today do people live in the same places where they lived before they were moved to the roadway? Have they gone back to those areas?

LK: No, they just go to cultivate there and come back...they go to find some food, here the land is no longer fertile, crops don't grow well here. In some places it is far away, two hours to go and two hours coming back. In other places it is not far, like those who go to Kumsange.¹⁶⁸

Those who lived too far away to engage in this strategy tended to focus on the plots assigned to them by the village, but eventually sought more land locally. To avoid disputes, village officials assigned or oversaw the distribution of further lands in the area: “If you told someone that ‘I will go and farm there,’ chaos would ensue.”¹⁶⁹ Some even claimed that those who moved some distance had to compensate more local people if they wanted to take over part of nearer plots that family had worked.¹⁷⁰ The new need to cover large distances contrasted sharply with how people had farmed in the past. Because they had lived far enough apart that it was possible for households to farm in the intervening areas between homesteads, in the past

¹⁶⁶ Interview of Pius Kavura 21 May 2009 Kumhasha Village.

¹⁶⁷ Interview of Besa Makampu 29 June 2009 Kifura Village.

¹⁶⁸ Interviews of Leonia Kifwoka 23 October 2007 Kifura Village, Matiasi Mzobha 27 September 2007 Kagera Nkanda Village, Sophia Bhabinga 26 October 2007 Kumhasha Village, Emanuel Ruswaga 30 June 2009 Kifura Village, and Expiriusi Nkooko 17 October 2007 Kifura Village.

¹⁶⁹ Interview of Pius Kavura 21 May 2009 Kumhasha Village.

¹⁷⁰ Interview of Emanuel Konrad 1 July 2009 Kifura Village.

people did not think of going to farm far away. It was just like farming close to home, even when you leave something on the pot boiling then you can go to farm and later on you come and see if it is dry already. It was not like how it is now that we go about five to six miles.¹⁷¹

An essential change to life in *ujamaa* villages, then, was in the expanded time needed to produce household crops.

Besides hindering access to sufficient farmland, *ujamaa* villages also required both famine food crops, typically cassava, maize, or potatoes, and revenue-producing cash crops like cotton, sisal, or tobacco. Forced cultivation in *ujamaa* villages were distinctive in that at least part of the crop became the village's property, and that crops were all grown in one large area separate from individuals' crops. None of these required crops were grown collectively but were instead *bega kwa bega*, a system of block farming. In that system, officials subdivided a large agricultural area into demarcated acres, with each family typically receiving one acre for cash crops and one for food.¹⁷² In theory, no one would work the same areas for more than a year, to discourage them from considering the land as personal property.¹⁷³ Organizing labor on these fields also varied from village to village. In some, village officials created village-wide plans for their cultivation, typically 2-3 days per week when families had to work the area. In others, village officials merely assigned a date by which key activities like planting, weeding, or harvesting had to be completed.¹⁷⁴ The far more hated form of forced cultivation were crops meant to provide development funds for the village as a

¹⁷¹ Interview of Melania Rusudiye 27 May 2009 Kumhasha Village.

¹⁷² The size of the plots could vary, but this seems most typical. See DRC 298/PM/UV/U25 Kigoma Ujamaa Villages. Regional Development Director R. J. Walwa "The Progress of Operation Kigoma Phase I and II up to 31 July 1973 and Ujamaa Villages Plans for the year 1973/74," 17-18.

¹⁷³ TANU College Kivukoni Main Report, 24.

¹⁷⁴ Interview of Emanuel Ruswaga 30 June 2009 Kifura Village.

whole, better known by the acronym *mfumaki*.¹⁷⁵ The actual structure of *mfumaki* varied in the *ujamaa* villages in which we conducted research, some elders recalling that some of their *bega kwa bega* harvest would go to this use, others stating that there were *bega kwa bega* plots specifically for the village in addition to the ones assigned to individuals. Village officials organized *bega kwa bega* and *mfumaki* plots, and monitored them for violations which could result in fines. Matiasi Mzobha explained his role in monitoring required cash crops as a 10-cell leader, an elected position from each group of 10 houses, like this:

MM: Matters of cotton, we cultivated, those who were rude, those elder ones, were fined.

JW: Were they not able to defend themselves, claiming that “I didn’t get cotton this year”?

MM: They defended themselves, but if the 10-cell leader saw them, they reported to the village chairman and then to village executive officer, and they saw him. They were also watching; we were watching every acre of every person. I watched my area of my people. If one is lazy, I observe it and we write it in the book.¹⁷⁶

Villagers had powerful reasons for disliking both these forms of forced agriculture. Elders recall that they rarely knew what happened to *mfumaki* crops after they had been deposited in the village storehouse, and none recalled ever benefiting from them. For many, either the purpose of *mfumaki* was unconvincing or was never explained well to those who had to carry it out: “They were being forced, therefore they did not feel good – they did not see a bright future. They felt like they were being oppressed, but they were being shown ‘development’.”¹⁷⁷ In some areas, elders claim

¹⁷⁵ *Mfumaki* stands for “mfuko kwa maendeleo ya kijiji,” “fund for village development.”

¹⁷⁶ Interviews of Matiasi Mzobha 27 September 2007 Kagera Nkanda Village and Mariamu Bandi 12 June 2009 Busunzu Village.

¹⁷⁷ Interview of Regina Migarambo 2 July 2009 Kifura Village;

that *all* of the required cash crop was *mfumaki*: “It was not our money; it belonged to the village office. We got nothing!”¹⁷⁸ The former members of the Kumhasha *ujamaa* village had their own reasons to react negatively to *bega kwa bega* farming. Cypriani Bishakara compared *bega kwa bega* to work on a prison farm, and then distinguished *bega kwa bega* from the work they had done in the original *ujamaa* village:

The [village] farm was different from the *ujamaa* farm because they were cultivating, and after cultivating crops they were sent to the storeroom and three people used the crops, the chairman, the ward secretary, and the divisional secretary...they were going to steal it at night. Or the money which [it] was sold [for], they ate it themselves so that work was the work of suffering a lot.¹⁷⁹

Cultivation requirements disrupted household economies in part because they came in combination with a new regulation that all children must attend school. Since so many families opted to continue to plant sometimes hours away in their former home areas, there were not always enough people to care for the major household crops as well as *bega kwa bega*:

...they were told Tuesday and Wednesday you should go to the *bega kwa bega* farm, we big kids by then were at school, there was no one to watch at the [family] farm, the destructive animals came and destroyed the crops. In this way they are discouraged because you find that [my father] goes to *bega kwa bega* and my mother goes to watch for the animals, so it becomes hard to finish cultivating our own farm. My father didn't like it.¹⁸⁰

Children's attendance at school during the day limited their help to the work around the house, never the major focus of household subsistence.

While some recall receiving a share of the *mfumaki* food crops back,¹⁸¹ all claimed that *mfumaki* cash crops never yielded any advantage. To begin with, their

¹⁷⁸ Interview of Angelina Kivakule 19 October 2007 Busunzu Village.

¹⁷⁹ Interview of Cypriani Bishakara 19 May 2009 Kumhasha Village.

¹⁸⁰ Interview of Emanuel Konrad 1 July 2009 Kifura Village.

¹⁸¹ Interview of Balikulije Lulitaliye 17 October 2007 Busunzu Village.

growing requirements could severely compromise a household's food security. Matias

Mzobha explained that:

We were forced to cultivate cotton and the time of cultivating maize was lost, so when we came to cultivate maize, its time was gone. It was late and therefore hunger came..... For maize, it was perhaps done during the evening. When you left there you were very tired, still you needed to go to cultivate [maize], even to place three ridges for the maize plot.¹⁸²

Besides the loss over control of their own labor and ability to create their own subsistence strategies, forced cultivation of cash crops elicited negative responses because they never turned a profit. Had Ha families received even a modest income from them, they would have regarded the project with more respect. But sisal prices dropped throughout the 1970s, the cigarette-quality tobacco market had already failed to take hold in the 1960s, and cotton was plagued by a series of problems. In some areas, particularly in Kibondo, it never even grew well, and villagers were frustrated when all of their cotton was returned as unusable.¹⁸³ But the overriding problem was that the Tanzania Cotton Authority was unable to market local cotton and never made any payments to producers.¹⁸⁴ The failure to sell the forced cash crop especially rankled; after all, if there was no market for maize or cassava, at least the household could use it. But cash crops without a local or broader market were different. Felicita Kigina asked rhetorically, “how can you be happy, to grow sisal or cotton which you cannot eat?!”¹⁸⁵

The food crop portion of *mfumaki* appear to have been intended for two possible

¹⁸² Interview Matiasi Mzobha 27 September 2007 Kagera Nkanda Village.

¹⁸³ Interview of Besa Makampu 29 June 2009 Kifura Village.

¹⁸⁴ Interviews of Balikulije Lulitaliye 17 October 2007 Busunzu Village, Nyarovuno Matabhalo 19 October 2007 Busunzu Village, and Matiasi Mzobha 27 September 2007 Kagera Nkanda Village. For the problems with the tobacco industry in Kibondo, see TNA 232/A/BOA/NNT Nyamirembe Tobacco Board; TNA 232 I/STS/TOUR/Kib Safari Diaries Kibondo; TNA 180/A3/22 v 3 Agriculture Reports. TNA 198/A3/3 vol 2 Kasulu Agriculture Monthly Reports; and TNA 523 A/20/10 Agriculture Monthly Report.

¹⁸⁵ Interview of Felicita Kigina 27 September 2007 Kagera Nkanda Village.

purposes: to serve as a village food reserve in times of need, and to be sold to net revenue for village projects that required a significant capital investment like a store, grinding machine, water pump, or vehicles. Except for the few elders who recall receiving a share of the crops back from the village, no elders remember any profit or communal use of these crops. Instead, they recall that they were involved in political corruption in the villages:

people were cultivating a lot and the crops were abundant, much maize but its profit was nowhere to be seen because the leaders who were the secretaries at that time, they made the decisions of how to use the profit. There was not any citizen who prospered from *mfumaki*, none!¹⁸⁶

Because people could not see the benefit of their work, since, as Mariamu Bandi put it, they “didn’t know where it was going, [they] didn’t know what work it was doing, [they] saw it as cultivating for free.”¹⁸⁷

It took a change of crop and, more importantly, agricultural policies before people reported improvements to early village life. Even when officials in Kibondo proposed adopting groundnuts as a cash crop, a far more suitable crop for the area, cynicism and dissatisfaction remained until *bega kwa bega* and *mfumaki* ended. It was only after assurances that the government would take no part of the groundnut harvest that Ha people planted them enthusiastically:

After saying that, ‘now people, every person should cultivate in his/her area,’ people cultivated even 5 or 10 acres, according to the ability of the person. And it truly lifted up the people, those groundnuts. You could even see people building with corrugated iron roofs. The groundnuts even bought them motorcycles.¹⁸⁸

While evidence is lacking concerning government officials’ acceptance of this change, it

¹⁸⁶ Interview of Emanuel Ruswaga 30 June 2009 Kifura Village.

¹⁸⁷ Interview of Mariamu Bandi 12 June 2009 Busunzu Village.

¹⁸⁸ Interview of Besa Mkampu 29 June 2009 Kifura Village.

appears that they remained involved in village agriculture. As former MP Muliliye explained, “*Mfumaki* continued and then later it weakened and every person had his/her own area but that area should not be far from the areas where they could get agricultural officers’ services, agricultural officers had to visit them.”¹⁸⁹

Beyond its negative effects on agriculture, villagization could also contribute to declining standards of public health. Despite the insistence of officials that closer settlement in *ujamaa* villages would necessarily improve both by bringing people closer to dispensaries, villagization could intensify health problems. Villagers who had lived in areas where they had fresh spring water were upset when their children began to contract bilharzias from the Pasanda River near Kifura.¹⁹⁰ More ironically, villagization sometimes guaranteed contact with tsetse flies. Planners recognized from the beginning that the location of most *ujamaa* villages along the roadway were “either inside of or the verge of the fly belt.”¹⁹¹ In many cases, elders recall that their nearby former homes, places like Kumsenga or Mtala had been tsetse fly-free and residents lived without fear of the disease.¹⁹² In some cases, moving to *ujamaa* villages meant moving closer to the Moyowosi reserve’s boundary, which brought people into contact with the wild animals which provided blood meals for the tsetse flies. Emanuel Konrad recalled an exciting day when the national symbol, the “Freedom Torch” that had been lit at the top of Mt. Kilimanjaro on Tanganyika’s independence day, visited the Kifura *ujamaa* village:

¹⁸⁹ Interview of Pius Muliliye 10 June 2009 Busunzu Village.

¹⁹⁰ Interview of Emanuel Konrad 1 July 2009 Kifura Village.

¹⁹¹ TNA 523/A/M11/5 Medical Sleeping Sickness Returns. Sleeping Sickness Service Tabora Quarterly Summary April-June 1970, 4.

¹⁹² Interviews of Kadudungwa Kibogi 12 June 2009 Busunzu Village and Jacobo Kachira 2 July 2009 Kifura Village.

At the time when the national torch paused here, these animals came drinking water near that oak tree. It was easy for tsetse flies to come with them because they were sucking into their skin. When the buffalo went back the tsetse flies remained behind and started attacking people.¹⁹³

A special medical team began working in Busunzu Village, one of the worst hit, testing all sick residents and sending those found to be infected immediately to the district hospital at Kibondo. There were so many cases of sleeping sickness patients in the district hospital at Kibondo, that they created their own ward.¹⁹⁴ But ultimate control was impossible with local economies depending on the honey industry and the close location of some villages to the reserve border. As former game scout Gabriel Nyakamwe explained, “They couldn’t clear to get ahead of [sleeping sickness]. Are you able to clear the entire Reserve? [Tsetse flies] came from the Reserve.”¹⁹⁵ Many residents felt quite bitter that their health had been sacrificed due to villagization: “...some people said ‘the government has created a crisis for us, we have come into the village, now we have received many harmful things’¹⁹⁶ and many chose to move away ‘just fleeing from the tsetse flies.’¹⁹⁷ Many people even lost productive work hours waiting in long lines because the entire village could be forced to undergo testing.¹⁹⁸ And while medical care was free, locals soon realized that they would receive better treatment if they gave gifts or bribes to those treating them: “if you went there without money, you would not be tested until you brought money first. For that one who was doing medical

¹⁹³ Interview of Emanuel Konrad 1 July 2009 Kifura Village.

¹⁹⁴ DRC 298/PM/UV/U25 Kigoma Ujamaa Villages. Muhtasari wa kamati ya maendeleo ya mkoa wa Kigoma, 17-18 July 1972. Translation mine.

¹⁹⁵ Interview of Gabriel Nyakamwe 6 June 2009 Busunzu Village.

¹⁹⁶ Interview of Jacobo Kachira 2 July 2009 Kifura Village.

¹⁹⁷ Interview of Emanuel Konrad 1 July 2009 Kifura Village.

¹⁹⁸ Interview of Rameck Mtareha 10 June 2009 Busunzu Village. Mtareha contracted sleeping sickness once along with a neighbor woman, who later died at Kibondo.

work, you gave him tea that you should receive medical treatment quickly.”¹⁹⁹

Beyond Busunzu’s problem with sleeping sickness infections, the area was plagued by animal crop raiders which residents were not allowed to control. When Kadungwa Kibogi moved into Busunzu he experienced frequent raids by elephants which he was helpless to prevent: “you cannot protect crops from elephants, they are the property of [the Ministry of] Natural Resources, you cannot drive them off.”²⁰⁰ Game Scouts spent significant amounts of time trying to control elephants, water buffalo, hartebeest, topi, and wild pigs, all intent on “coming to eat the maize” of nearby villages. They eventually worked out a permit system to kill crop raiders but farmers had to contact Game Scouts immediately and have them verify the license before they could use the meat.²⁰¹

Villagization facilitated control of reserve areas, outlawing or restricting the forest industries that Ha people conducted within them. State officials made plans to transform local industries dependent on Moyowosi resources as a part of the economic plans for area *ujamaa* villages and the national economy as a whole. Officials at the ministerial level created the “Master Plan for the Moyowosi Project” in 1972 with two main goals: “to protect and increase the condition of the national economy from the wildlife living in the reserve” and “to reform the beekeepers who were spreading out in the reserve to hang their hives.”²⁰² Throughout the 1970s there was debate amongst local Moyowosi

¹⁹⁹ Interview of Mariamu Bandi 12 June 2009 Busunzu Village. Requesting/giving tea is an idiom for gift-giving or bribing. Bandi contracted sleeping sickness twice.

²⁰⁰ Interview of Kadungwa Kibogi 12 June 2009 Busunzu Village.

²⁰¹ Interview of Gabriel Nyakamwe 6 June 2009 Busunzu Village.

²⁰² TNA 599/GD/19/CA/54 II Moyowosi Controlled Area & Project 1976-1980. E. Kamagi, Beekeeping Officer, described the origins in a report dated 28 February 1979, 1.

government employees concerning how they ought to transform beekeeping in the area. Several felt that they could better manage the reserve if they excluded locals, and the best way to do this would be to promote cash crops in nearby villages to replace honey. After all, since honey was “like a cash crop,” beekeepers could instead take up agricultural cash crops like cotton or tobacco.²⁰³ More typically, development officers advocated that beekeeping be amalgamated into *ujamaa* village planning, some arguing for the collective keeping of bees in *ujamaa* villages themselves,²⁰⁴ and others more realistically proposing that beekeeping in the more appropriate environment of the Moyowosi continue as a cooperative endeavor. This view won out and Moyowosi officers engaged in a project titled “Honey and Beeswax Means Money” and worked with cooperative groups in Kifura, Busunzu, and Kumshindwi. Elders recall that groups of fishermen or beekeepers would band together and apply for permission to enter the reserve, stating the length of their stay and which designated camp they would live at. In return, they received identity cards and were required to report for blood slide examinations for sleeping sickness at the end of a stated term.²⁰⁵ Game officials agreed to these measures in part because they could pursue several priorities: to reduce poaching; to track bee numbers and honey revenue; to direct marketing; to manage beekeepers’ camps; and to be involved in *ujamaa* villages’ plans.²⁰⁶

Elders recall this shift in policy quite clearly: officials told them that ““there is no

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, Three Year Report from H. Nkussa, 10 July 1978, 3.

²⁰⁴ DRC 298/PM/UV/U25 Kigoma Ujamaa Villages. Trip to Kigoma Region by Officer A. S. Kaduri Mwandamizi of the Department of Ujamaa Villages, 11-18 December 1970, 3.

²⁰⁵ Interview of Kadudungwa Kibogi 12 June 2009 Busunzu Village.

²⁰⁶ TNA 599/GD/19/CA/54 II Moyowosi Controlled Area & Project 1976-1980. E. Kamagi, Beekeeping Officer, 28 February 1979, 2. Interview of Balikulije Lulitaliye 6 June 2009 Busunzu Village.

entering the forest. You should not go into the forest. You are going and exterminating the animals. You are going and destroying the trees, you are cutting them down everywhere.”²⁰⁷ Worse yet was the claim to *national* ownership over the Moyowosi’s resources that local people considered their birthright:

They said that, ‘this is a government reserve, now everything which is inside of it is the government’s property. Everything inside of it is the government’s property, you should not touch even a small thing until you have permission....I was very angry because I saw that they were forbidding the things which we were using, our property. For the people who came from there, what will we do?’²⁰⁸

Moreover, some nearby residents of the Moyowosi interpreted the emphasis on foreign tourism as a sign that their government had given the area over to foreigners. As Ndabhateze Kagoma recalled “*Umutali* purchased” the areas to the east of Nyavyumbu from where Ha people moved in the 1930s. Kagoma said that *Umutali* “owned all the things, all the animals came to be his/her possessions [*mali*]” and then identified *Umutali* as a foreigner, a European or people “from America, outside of the country” whom he saw “passing by” Nyavyumbu “going into the forest.”²⁰⁹ When asked, Kagoma could not identify this new owner with any greater specificity, but the term *umutali* appears to be a Kiha version of *mtaali*, “tourist”. It may be that Kagoma’s understanding comes from the fact that the Game Division was re-assigned to the Ministry of Natural Resources and

²⁰⁷ Interview of Balikuliye Lulitaliye 6 June 2009 Busunzu Village.

²⁰⁸ Interview of Expiriusi Nkooko 24 June 2009 Kifura Village.

²⁰⁹ Interview of Ndabhateze Kagoma 30 October 2007 Kumhasha Village. Kagoma indicated that salt making was cut off when the area became *mali ya bibi*, “the lady’s/queen’s property” before independence. This terminology appears to relate to the use of the phrase *shamba la bibi* “lady’s/queen’s farm” for forest reserves. See TNA 232/P/FOR Forest Reserves. Provincial Forestry Officer Western Province to All Political Officers, 13 August 1959.

Tourism in 1970,²¹⁰ but his insistence on foreigners controlling the reserve area speaks to the objections that many locals felt over access to the Moyowosi.

Once in *ujamaa* villages, villagers experienced a series of attempts to direct their social development as much as their economic development. In particular, they confronted policies focused on creating unity, uniformity, and a sense of progress, especially in terms of language and housing styles. As previous studies on fashion in Dar es Salaam and Arusha have shown, the modernizing goals of *ujamaa* were never limited to economic development but considered what people wore and what they lived in as signs of backwardness or affinity to ethnic rather than national allegiance.²¹¹ In the case of Buha, it was not dress but housing style that government officials focused their attention on. From the mid-1960s, the government promoted the adoption of what it termed “better housing,” rectangular structures that could be built with windows and with iron roofs if the homeowner could afford them. These *mabanda* or *mgongo wa tembo* were supposed to replace the distinctive housing styles that most regions of Tanzania was known for. Even the creation of Dar es Salaam’s Village Museum in the early 1970s was connected to this project: it was as much about celebrating Tanzanian culture as it was about preserving what museum designers hoped would become “the past” that Tanzanians had moved beyond.²¹²

These attempts to change clothing and housing fashion came in the form of operations, and Operation Ngondano, was a region-wide push to replace *ngondano*, or

²¹⁰ TNA 599/GD/21/5 Annual Reports 1973-4. F. Bwire Report on the work of Ministry of mashirika ya uma [sic], 9 May 1974.

²¹¹ Schneider, “The Maasai’s New Clothes.”

²¹² *Ibid.*, 114.

muyore and *misonge*, as they were known in Kiha, with the *mabanda* favored by the government. Although there were regional variations, typical Ha *misonge* were conical-shaped buildings that were made with a wooden skeleton over which thatch was laid in ascending rows.²¹³ In the colonial period, British officials described some local variations as “beehive” shaped, describing the undulations that the layers could make. *Mabanda* or *mgongo wa tembo* were apparently improvements over *misonge* because they could include windows and thus enhance ventilation from cooking fires. They were also supposed to be made of materials less prone to fire than the thatched *misonge*. A 1970 report on Kumhasha *ujamaa* village calls them “very small and dangerous to human life.”²¹⁴ *Misonge* were unhygienic, dirty, and backward in the eyes of state planners, a fact made clear in a 1974 study by Kivukoni College scholars. In this, the presence of *ngondano* is one distinguishing characteristic of the underdeveloped lowlands versus the more advanced highlands. The report highlighted that the highlands have permanent crops like bananas and build *mabanda* with iron roofs, and the lowlands had no permanent crops, lived spread out, and lived in *ngondano*.²¹⁵

Some recalled that Operation Ngondano was mainly conducted by persuasion and providing models, with every 10-cell leader and village chairman having a *banda* built for him or her.²¹⁶ Most, though, recall that destruction or its threat were the most common strategies. Members of TANU Youth again conducted the operation in some villages, and elders were particularly common victims. Rameck Mtareha recalled the

²¹³ This style was also known as (using the English words) “full suit,” referring to the fact they were thatched from top to bottom rather than thatch serving only as a roof.

²¹⁴ DRC 298/PM/UV/U25 Kigoma Ujamaa Villages A report by E. N. Mwakabonga, 10.

²¹⁵ TANU College Kivukoni Main Report, 18. My thanks to Jim Giblin for a copy of this document.

²¹⁶ Interview of Regina Migarambo 2 July 2009 Kifura Village.

following incident with a deep sense of disapproval:

I witnessed one of the old men whom we lived close to, they burnt his house. He was a person who didn't want to engage in building [new houses], so he ignored [the order]. Well they completely burnt his house. It was like three *ngondano* structures, but they burnt them.... He was very much hurt but he had no choice because it was an official order from the president.²¹⁷

For most lowlanders, their first exposure to Swahili, the national language, came in villages. Even those who lived along the roadway in service centres like Kifura-Kasanda were not conversant in the language.²¹⁸ Informants who were children at the time of villagization tell how they learned their earliest Swahili from other children at places of common interest. In particular, the gatherings of children waiting for passing cars served as places where newcomers could pick up language skills: "Later on when we moved, we were coming here at the road just to look at cars and learn from our friends, and we managed to arrange the sentences."²¹⁹ Learning Swahili informally was less fraught than learning it at school, which frequently could bring embarrassment or abuse. Teachers required students to speak Swahili exclusively during school, and the punishment was for any offender to wear the *kikonokono*, a wooden board worn around the neck, until another student also spoke Kiha.²²⁰ Although many adults never learned Swahili, some opted to attend the adult education classes that taught literacy and Swahili. Some even recall that their mothers, who had never had the opportunity to study before, eagerly sought out this opportunity.²²¹

²¹⁷ Interview of Rameck Mtareha 10 June 2009 Busunzu Village. See also interviews of Jacobo Kachira 2 July 2009 Kifura Village and Mariamu Bandi 12 June 2009 Busunzu Village.

²¹⁸ Interview of Regina Migarambo 2 July 2009 Kifura Village.

²¹⁹ Interview of Emanuel Konrad 1 July 2009 Kifura Village.

²²⁰ Interview of Regina Migarambo 2 July 2009 Kifura Village.

²²¹ Interview of Jacobo Kachira 2 July 2009 Kifura Village.

Conclusion

The new context of independence heightened Ha peoples' and government officials' desire to control settlement, natural resources, and labor. Independent government policy makers sought to improve health, and enhance individual and national prosperity by changing sleeping sickness control policies and staking claims to reserve areas in the east. In turn, Ha people took advantage of new openings in these policies, at times pushing well beyond the bounds that officials intended to set. Conflict and breaking points were inevitable, and the 1960s were a time of rapid policy change and instability. Elders described feeling as though they were "wandering around again and again" in this period, losing investments with each new policy change.²²² This was the charged context into which forced villagization came in 1972, a situation in which Ha people feared growing state intrusion into their lives. Villagization's promoters then attempted to direct change in Buha, but their actions frequently led to unintended or ironic consequences. A project meant to enhance prosperity and health led to palpable declines in both arenas. And yet, villagization did transform lowland Buha's countryside, introducing changes that made its spatial layout and some social features far more uniform. State actions during villagization were thus an example of what Frederick Cooper terms a "developmentalist state," an entity that "...exercised initiative, yet it suppressed initiative too...above all [it] encouraged citizens to *think* of the state as the prime mover for raising the standard of living."²²³ What is clear from Buha's history of

²²² Interview of Ndabhateze Kagoma 30 October 2007 Kifura Village.

²²³ Frederick Cooper, *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 89.

villagization, though, is that while state policies tried to direct Ha action, Ha people eventually became the primary agents of their own futures.

Conclusion

President Julius Nyerere spent much of his energies in the late 1960s convincing Tanzanians of the revolutionary potential of regrouping in collective villages. What Nyerere presented as innovative and new, though, struck people in western Tanzania as all too familiar. For Ha people, *ujamaa* villagization reinforced the kinds of state interventions that had been in force in the region since the 1930s – it was a government-sponsored project claiming to bring social and economic development which ignored the kinds of losses they would suffer when forced to move. While some Ha people saw in villagization opportunities to improve their own economic circumstances or access to government services, others found cause for concern in the project's novel elements as well, alarmed by the idea of communal control over their individual property. These fears, though, were not merely a function of the specific content of *ujamaa* ideology, but were instead born of decades of experience with government settlement, sleeping sickness, and natural resources policies. In considering this much longer-term history in Buha, this dissertation understands resettlement not as a linear, limited event, but rather as a decades-long unfolding process for both government officials and Ha people. In particular, this study examines the material realities, ideological commitments, and social practices of both sets of these actors as they engaged with resettlement policies.

Colonial and postcolonial officials in Buha were attracted to resettlement as a tool for bringing change to Ha lives and enacting their professional responsibility. The clearest commonalities between concentrations and *ujamaa* villages were in how officials justified the moves: in each case, officials forced Ha people to live in high densities

because effectively directing Ha labor enabled officials to, in their minds, improve Ha lives. In the 1930s, colonial officials wanted to insure that Ha agriculture and occasional organized bush clearing would remove tsetse habitat. Post-independent Tanzanian officials were even more ambitious in the 1970s, and sought to establish collective farming in villages and cooperatives for marketing each village's required cash crops. But living in higher densities, which radically simplified residential patterns, also meant that the state could intervene in Ha lives in other ways. Both British colonial officials and Tanzanian officials wrote of how they could provide necessary social services to the people through creating concentrated populations: piped water, schools, medical care. Additionally, government experts could just as easily offer expert advice to Ha residents: agricultural officers could direct crop choices, farming practices, and improved inputs like fertilizers and pesticides; veterinary officers could improve stock keeping and control animal disease; medical officials could launch programs to combat particular diseases as well as improve sanitation and public health. Working with resettlement and the control over land and resources it entailed also allowed post-independence officials a means to stake a powerful claim to sole political legitimacy in the region. In a country with over 120 cultural and language groups, building a national identity and controlling the flow of loyalty from Tanzanians was a paramount task. Resettlement thus allowed colonial officials to envision an area transformed by colonial rule in accordance with a European civilizing mission, and Tanzanian officials to envision villages filled with new socialist citizens working towards the development of themselves and an independent, self-reliant nation.

As this dissertation demonstrates, while colonial and postcolonial officials had both ideological reasons for insisting on resettlement and the coercive power to enforce its effectiveness, government agencies involved in resettlement were hampered on a number of levels. To begin with, government bureaucracies were riddled with disunity and internal rivalry. Because managing settlement policy in an area affected by sleeping sickness fell at the interstices of different departments' expertise, medical, agricultural, and administrative personnel had differing ideas of how they should shape the future of resettled sites. Officials were also not free to pursue their highest priorities when the forms of knowledge on which they staked their legitimacy required changes in policies. For example, when research yielded more advanced environmental control practices and chemotherapies, colonial officials dedicated to the idea of the absolute expertise of western science were forced to change settlement policies in ways that ran counter to their wish to control settlement in Buha more closely. Officials thus had to manage internal disagreements, the practical complexities of providing services, unfolding scientific and technical advancements, and, most importantly, the competing initiatives of the people whom they governed.

While compulsion could force removal and compel people to settle in certain areas, force could not impel how Ha people structured their lives in resettlement sites. They had their own priorities and competing moral visions for how their lives in these new homes should be structured. Memories of resettlement tend to focus partially on the ruptures that these projects brought to Ha lives and livelihoods. In particular, the recollections of frequent forced removals in between the major pushes of the 1930s and

1970s bears witness to one of the greatest ironies of resettlement projects in Buha: they were meant to improve circumstances by emplacing and settling Ha people permanently, but instead initiated decades of extremely costly instability. This instability was the reason Ha people experienced and interpreted *ujamaa* policies and *ujamaa* villagization in terms of ongoing conflict over control of residential sites and their former homes to the east.

However, the upshot of Ha memories of resettlement is an emphasis on reforming communities and restructuring important relationships. Ha elders place a particular emphasis in memories of resettlement on preserving right relationships with the spiritual world, maintaining ongoing access to important forest resources like honey, and insuring their own food security. Ha men and women adapted their work lives to meet these needs, innovating new social ties and work structures. The communities formed in the wake of removal were neither monuments to apathy nor to the transformative power of state planning, but rather to the adaptive abilities of Ha men in women working with the government priorities that were beyond their control. Within the unique circumstances of living in *umukutano* and in villages – especially in terms of their dense settlement, their combination of people who did not choose to be neighbors, and the impediments they posed to resource use – Ha people innovated new ways of living together.

People in Buha today continue to live with the legacy of resettlement. For example, the placement of villages along roadways and the arrangement of houses along lines or roads within villages are both quite evident today. But even this village

framework remains a negotiated affair. Many Ha people have managed to return to former homes by banding with others to form *vitongoji*, “sub villages,” in the areas from which they were moved in the 1970s. In every case, this original settlement site had to be relatively close to the village site of the 1970s, and in all cases they were areas which people had used as supplemental farmland. Buha’s beekeepers, too, continue to return to the Moyowosi to hang their beehives and collect their honey, but the honey industry remains one of dynamic change. To begin with, women began to engage in honey work in the 1980s, a distinct break from the past when it was considered male work. The female beekeeping pioneers of the 1980s overcame worries about their safety and made it possible for today’s women to gain access to the steady revenue that honey provides. Even more indicative of Ha innovativeness are the variety of honey collection methods now employed. Many, like Warungendanye Kagoma continue to use the bark beehive that his father taught him to make as a boy. Quite a few members of the Kifura Beekeepers’ Cooperative, though, attended government-run seminars in Arusha to learn the latest beehive designs and rarer forms of honey that command high prices. Most, though, find their goals met best by mixing the two styles together, placing bark and “box” hives at various points in the forest. These beekeepers demonstrate how access to new ideas and methods does bring about change in the honey industry, but in ways that mix older practices with innovations.¹

None of these forms of greater mobility and resource use, though, would be possible without effective control of sleeping sickness. The widespread use of tsetse fly traps – squares of blue and black cloth impregnated with acetone (a scent to attract flies)

¹ Interview of Leonardi Paolo Dyuwundi 13 October 2007 Kifura Village.

and insecticides like Glossinex to kill them – has allowed the areas most used by Ha people to become virtually fly-free.² Placed near homes, at the edges of the Moyowosi Game Reserve, and along beekeeper’s routes in the forest, these traps have transformed how Ha people live in their villages and can use the Moyowosi. The two explanations for



Figure 5.1 An impregnated tsetse fly trap outside of the Kumhasha Village grade school. Photographed by author, 2007.

the origin of this technology indicate how very much Buha’s public health depended on interventions beyond the capacity of the Tanzanian government. The Tsetse Fly Officer, who works for the Veterinary Department and thus mainly focuses on livestock victims of trypanosomiasis, explained in 2007 that the impregnated traps were originally a project funded by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees to make refugee camps housing Burundians safe from sleeping sickness.³ Former Game Scout Gabriel Nyakamwe recalls it differently, noting that these new effective forms of management were connected to the use of the Moyowosi as an arena for tourist hunting:

Yes, there was a European who came to hunt lions and tsetse flies bit him. After

² Interview of Charles Gwamagobe, Kibondo Tsetse Fly Officer, 30 October 2007 Kibondo Town.

³ *Ibid.* He said this began around 1997.

the biting, he was ill and they tested him and found sleeping sickness and they sent him to England to be treated. He came [back] with medicine and he set up cloth [traps]. He placed chemicals in the bottles [below the traps]. Everyone was bitten [in the past, but] today it is happiness, comfort. There is no more sleeping sickness...he has killed them all [tsetse flies].⁴

According to interview subjects, village life has been almost entirely domesticated and accepted. Indeed, an entire generation has grown up knowing no other way of siting settlements and arranging houses. In recent years, roads, educational facilities, and health facilities have all improved substantially. While they do not fulfill all of villagers' expectations, there is a palpable pride that many evince in being Tanzanian today. In some cases, the specific compulsory campaigns to change local practices are no longer controversial. For instance, it is extraordinarily rare to see a *muyore* style house, in part because elders say that over time they came to appreciate the features of *mabanda*. With greater space came the ability to organize possessions and provide more privacy within the homes. Giving these as examples, Rameck Mtareha demonstrated that he adopted the link between possessions and modernity: he ended his description of the advantages of having more room and greater organization with "We really came from a long way back."⁵

While this dissertation has striven to encapsulate the contours of resettlement history in Buha, inevitably there are dimensions ignored or not fully explored. Studying large state projects tends to create binary categories of "government" vs. "people," and this study has not completely escaped this problem. In trying to illustrate the sub-categories and complexities of "the government," I examined the tensions among

⁴ Interview of Gabriel Nyakamwe 6 June 2009 Busunzu Village.

⁵ Interview of Rameck Mtareha 10 June 2009 Busunzu Village.

different state actors. Ha communities, too, were far from homogenous. A particularly dynamic arena was how the gendered division of labor transformed after resettlement of the 1930s, when both men and women had to adjust their work lives in the changed circumstances of resettlement. The forced movement in the 1970s also affected community members differently, and here generation was a key determinant for divergent experiences. A further differentiation within Ha communities was how past experiences with resettlement policies affected the relative impact of forced villagization. To begin with, elders who experienced colonial-era forced resettlement tended to live nearer to the main district roadway where Tanzanian officials sited *ujamaa* villages, making the disruptions caused by moving to these village sites less extreme. Furthermore, some elders were also quicker to comply with orders to move because of their previous resettlement history, and thus had greater flexibility in choosing a village and moving gradually, unlike those who delayed until government workers arrived. And yet, there is more room for further investigation of these dimensions and others that remain unexplored. In focusing on documenting the broad outlines of resettlement history, my interviews did not explore issues, such as gender, in depth. For example, it would be potentially quite revealing to consider how frequent changes to settlement affected reliance on extended family, and how that might fall along gender lines. Even more illuminating, though, would be a study focused on the Ha people who straddled between membership in their families, communities, and state policies. In particular, the social lives and professional understandings of Sleeping Sickness Scouts, Forest Guards, and Game Scouts could delineate the possibilities that existed in the intermediate space

between state directives and local practices. Such possibilities certainly form a future research agenda; they also demonstrate the rich complexity of Buha's resettlement history.

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