Implicit and Explicit Prejudice Are Related to Explicit Support for Politicians Who Are
Conservative, but Not White or Male, Mostly Because They Promote Inequality

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Abstract

Recent studies have identified that explicit prejudice is related to support for conservative politicians and opposition for liberal politicians, regardless of the politicians' demographic background. However, several questions about this line of research remain unclear. First, prior theories are still unclear on why this association exists. Second, prior studies primarily focus on these associations in explicit attitudinal domains, so it remains unclear how prejudice relates to evaluation of politicians in the implicit domain. This dissertation describes two experiments that address these two key research questions. To identify the first question about "why," two alternative (but not competing) hypotheses were tested: the inequality hypothesis and the status quo hypothesis. To investigate attitudes in multiple attitude domains, the studies use implicit as well as explicit measures of prejudice and evaluation of politicians. The results reveal a great deal of support for the inequality hypothesis and some support for the status quo hypothesis. The associations primarily occur on the explicit domain of attitudes, but the associations in the implicit domain (of racial and gender attitudes and evaluation of politicians) are less robust. The current studies also confirm past findings that politicians' demographic backgrounds do not moderate the effect of explicit prejudice, and additionally, generalize this conclusion to the domain of implicit prejudice. Together, these findings clarify the political consequences of racism and sexism and further our understanding of the psychological function of prejudice.

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Introduction

Recent studies investigated *how* racism and sexism are related to citizens' evaluation of political candidates by showing that, for example, racism is related to opposition to Barack Obama and sexism is related to opposition for Hillary Clinton (Bock, Byrd-Craven & Burkley, 2017; Dwyer, Stevens, Sullivan, & Allen, 2009; Gervais & Hillard, 2011; Tesler, 2016; Bai, 2020). Yet *why* they are related in the way they are is still not well understood. Furthermore, prior studies primarily focused on these associations in the explicit attitudinal domains, but the patterns on the implicit domain still remain underexplored. For example, though studies investigated associations between implicit prejudice and explicit evaluation of politicians (e.g., Payne et al., 2010; Finn & Glaser, 2010), no study known to the author tested the association between prejudice (implicit or explicit) and implicit evaluation of politicians. To clarify the theory on political expression of prejudice and test its utility in implicit domain, this dissertation proposes and tests two alternative, but not competing, hypotheses using explicit as well as implicit measures: whereas the “inequality hypothesis” states that people who score high on racism and sexism support conservative politicians because of their preferences for someone who maintains or leads to racial and gender inequality, the “status quo hypothesis” states that the patterns result from their preferences for a status quo where there is racial and gender inequality in the society. This dissertation first reviews relevant literature on the association between racism and sexism and political preferences. Then, it discusses the rationales for the two alternative hypotheses. Finally, it presents two studies that test these hypotheses.

The Relationship Between Racism, Sexism and Political Preferences

Racism and sexism undermine Black candidates and women candidates? In the last decade or so, Barack Obama was elected as the first Black president in the U.S., and Hillary Clinton was the first woman nominated by a major political party in the U.S. as a presidential candidate. As a result, many researchers investigated how racial and sexual prejudices are related to political preferences (e.g., Carlin & Winfrey, 2009; Tesler, 2016, Gervais & Hillard, 2011). These studies revealed that whereas racism undermined support for Barack Obama, sexism undermined support for Hillary Clinton (Bock, Byrd-

Craven & Burkley, 2017; Dwyer, Stevens, Sullivan, & Allen, 2009; Gervais & Hillard, 2011; Tesler, 2016), and they suggested that it is because citizens' prejudice undermine politicians who are racial minorities or women due to their demographic background (e.g., Dwyer et al., 2009; Gervais & Hillard, 2011). Accordingly, racism undermined support for Obama because Obama is Black, and prejudiced citizens are "prone to oppose the leadership of a president from a racial group whom they consider intellectually and socially inferior" (Tesler, 2012, pp 111) and they see "Obama's status as a presidential nominee as a result of undeserved race-based preferences that benefited him earlier in his education or political career" (Dwyer et al, 2009, pp 225). Similarly, sexism undermined support for Clinton because she is a woman, and people who score high on sexism or have a commitment to gendered roles in society believe that political leadership is inconsistent with a proper gender role for women (e.g., Gervais & Hillard, 2011). For example, Bock and colleagues (2017, pp. 189) stated that "agentic women often face discrimination and backlash when seeking positions of power." Miller and Borgida (2019) who found that Separate Spheres Ideology (a sexism measure) predicts intention to not vote for Clinton in the 2016 election months later, provided two reasons for why gender inequality may undermine support for Clinton, i.e., her candidacy as a woman and as a supporter of gender egalitarian policies (though the latter reason is consistent with the "ideology hypothesis" that will be discussed below). Ultimately, the classic interpretation of this "demographic hypothesis" is that the demographic backgrounds of a politician, such as race and gender, determines the direction of the association between racism and sexism and evaluation of the politician.

Past Studies Confound the Role of Politicians' Demographic Background and Ideology. However, these classic studies usually confound the role of politicians' demographic background and politicians' ideological orientation. For example, using data from large telephone interviews prior to the 2008 election, Dwyer and colleagues (2009) modeled participants' affective feelings toward Obama and Palin using the modern racism (or racial resentment) scale and modern sexism scale as predictors (e.g., Sears et al., 1997, Swim et al., 1995), controlling for various other predictors. The researchers found that while racism predicted negative feelings toward Obama and

positive feelings toward Palin, sexism's effect is not significant. Though the dependent variables are evaluations of a Black candidate (Obama) and a White candidate (Palin), the Black candidate was also a liberal, and the White candidate was also a conservative. Similarly, the study of Bock and colleagues (2017) asked university students questions about their gender attitudes and who they voted for after the 2016 election, and found that sexism predicted the vote choice of Trump over Clinton. Though this dependent variable is a choice between a man and a woman, it is also a choice between a conservative and a liberal.

Racism and Sexism Undermine Liberal Politicians and Benefit Conservative Politicians. Recent evidence, however, suggests an over-looked alternative “ideological explanation”—that is, racism and sexism hurt politicians who are perceived to be liberal, a political orientation that characterizes both Obama and Clinton. In fact, some prior evidence already began to cast doubt on the conventional interpretation that racial and gender prejudice specifically hurt politicians who are Black and female. For example, there is no consistent evidence that White citizens vote for Black candidates less (for example, Citrin et al. 1990, Highton, 2004, Sigelman et al. 1995, and Voss & Lublin, 2001 provide evidence that Black candidates are unlikely to be undermined by their race). In an experiment, Sigelman et al. (1995) showed White participants two hypothetical political candidates, A and B. The racial background of B is manipulated to be either White, Hispanic, or Black. The description of A remains identical across conditions, as A serves as the alternative choice to B. The researchers found that participants' assessment of how likely they will vote for B over A is not significantly different as a function of the candidate's racial background. Furthermore, using exit poll data from 1996 and 1998, Highton (2004) found that White voters are as likely to vote for House of Representative candidates who are Black as those who are White.

Many studies also revealed findings that are inconsistent with the demographic hypothesis but supportive of the ideology hypothesis. For example, although not the focus of their studies, Chambers and colleagues (2012) also showed that the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986) is correlated positively with evaluation of a hypothetical conservative individual, but negatively with a hypothetical liberal

individual, regardless of that individual's race. More recently, Gutierrez and Unzueta (2021) also found that participants' social dominance orientation, a variable that heralds racism (Kteily et al., 2011), predicts evaluation of job candidates based on the signal of the candidates' ideology, regardless of the candidates' racial background.

Using large and nationally representative interview data, Tesler (2016, p. 67) found that racism predicts intention to vote against Obama but also to vote against Clinton, a White candidate who is nevertheless liberal. Similarly, using student sample from fall 2008, Gervais and Hillard (2011) modeled participants' likelihood of voting for Palin with participants' sexism measured using the Ambivalent Sexism Scale (Glick & Fiske, 1996), and found that sexism positively predicts support for Sarah Palin, a female candidate who is nevertheless conservative. If the demographic hypothesis is true, in these two cases, we would have observed that racism predicted intention to vote for Clinton and sexism predicted opposition for Palin. To accommodate these findings, past researchers rely on explanations such as the effect of racism on Obama spilling over to Clinton and other Democratic candidates because of their close working relationship (Tesler, 2016, p. 88) and the idea that Sarah Palin conducted herself in a fashion that is congruent with traditional gender roles more so than Hillary Clinton (Gervais & Hillard, 2011). However, these observations, without the need to resort to assumptions about Clinton's working relationship with Obama and gendered behaviors of Palin, are predicted exactly the way they are by the ideology hypothesis, which states that the association between prejudice and support for politicians is conditioned by the politicians' ideology, more so than their race and gender.

To specifically test the demographic hypothesis against the ideology hypothesis of prejudice, Bai (2020) showed that people who score high on racism and sexism do not necessarily dislike Black and female candidates—instead, they just dislike liberal candidates. Using large and nationally representative datasets, Bai (2020) found that, for example, people who score high on racism and sexism tend to evaluate conservative politicians favorably, even if the politicians are Black or female (e.g., Ben Carson and Carly Fiorina), but they evaluate liberal politicians unfavorably, even if the politicians are White and male (e.g., Bernie Sanders). Furthermore, in an experiment, Bai (2020)

measured participants' racism and sexism and then randomly assigned the participants to evaluate a hypothetical politician whose race (Black versus White), gender (male versus female) and political ideology (liberal versus conservative) are manipulated. Consistent with the ideology hypothesis, participants who score high on racism and sexism consistently evaluate conservative politicians positively and liberal politicians negatively, but the gender and race of the politician were not significant moderators of racism and sexism at all. Hence, overall, evidence suggests that the relationships between racism and sexism and support for politicians is moderated by politicians' ideology more so than their race and gender.

Why Do Racism and Sexism Undermine Liberal Politicians but Benefit Conservative Politicians?

Though data from some of the studies reviewed above are more supportive of the ideology hypothesis of prejudice than the demographic hypothesis to explain the association between racism, sexism, and evaluation of politicians (Bai, 2020; Gervais & Hillard, 2011; Tesler, 2016), exactly what aspect of political ideology is responsible for the pattern is still unknown. Psychologically, there are at least two components of ideology that are usually confounded, particularly in the contemporary American political landscape, and therefore two potential aspects of ideology may explain the relationship between racism, sexism, and evaluations for politicians with varying ideological orientations. According to Jost, Federico, and Napier (2009; also see Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2009, 2018), the two inter-related components of ideology are (1) acceptance versus rejection of inequality and (2) openness versus resistance to change (or preferences for the status quo). Therefore, people may prefer, for example, a conservative politician, either because the politician is perceived to maintain existing social hierarchies or because the politician is perceived to perpetuate the social status quo—or possibly both, given that these two usually overlap in contemporary American politics. However, it is unclear whether one aspect of political ideology is *more* relevant than another. In other words, it is unclear whether people who score high on racism or sexism prefer a conservative politician because they are considering if the politician would promote inequality or if the politician would maintain the social status quo more. As discussed below, there are reasons to expect both.

The Inequality Hypothesis

On one hand, for *the inequality hypothesis*, racism and sexism can be regarded as manifestations of normative beliefs that an unequal society is intrinsically desirable. People who score high on racism and sexism may do so based on their belief that the society *should* be structured in a way that is unequal with respect to race and gender, or at least because they do not think it is problematic if such inequalities exist. They may think so because they perceive that racial equality is unfairly benefiting undeserving racial minorities (e.g., Dwyer, Stevens, Sullivan, & Allen, 2009; also see Sidanius & Pratto, 2001) or because they see that gender equality overlooks or goes against the natural differences between men and women (e.g., Miller & Borgida, 2016). Consequently, according to the inequality hypothesis, people who endorse racism and sexism prefer conservative candidates because they believe that inequality is justified, “natural,” and desirable. In other words, people who score high on racism and sexism find conservative candidates appealing because they share the beliefs that having racial and gender hierarchies is the “right” way to organize the society.

Psychologically, the underlying motivation addressed by the inequality hypothesis is about creating or maintaining social hierarchy in a world characterized by competitive relations between groups (Duckitt, 2006). Furthermore, according to this perspective, racism and sexism do not speak directly or inherently to preferences for maintaining the social status quo or to the benefit of in-group. In theory, people who score high on racism and sexism would prefer to *maintain* the order of racial and gender hierarchy if the current system is hierarchical, but they would prefer to *bring changes* that will bring about racial and gender hierarchy if the current system is egalitarian (also see Brandt, 2011). In sum, the *inequality hypothesis* states that racism and sexism benefit conservative politicians because the conservative politicians are perceived to maintain or bring about racial and gender inequality. Correspondingly, this hypothesis would be supported if people who score high on racism and sexism support politicians who are described to either maintain or bring about racial and gender inequality regardless of whether such inequalities are the status quo.

The Status Quo Hypothesis

On the other hand, the *status quo hypothesis* speaks to a different psychological motivation, the motivation to preserve the status quo (e.g., Hennes et al., 2012). Racism and sexism can be thought of as narratives and systematic explanations about *why* people are where they are in the current social hierarchy--in particular, regarding why disadvantaged social groups (i.e., minorities and women) are disadvantaged. Therefore, people who score high on racism and sexism score high on them because racism and sexism can help people interpret and make sense of the *existing* social order about race and gender, and they are particularly motivated to perpetuate the status quo in order to fulfill their need for certainty and closure (e.g., van Hiel et al., 2004). That is to say, citizens who score high on racism and sexism prefer conservative political candidates because these citizens are psychologically predisposed to prefer certainty and closure, and as a result, they prefer the world to stay the same.

In contrast to the inequality hypothesis, the *status quo hypothesis* assumes that people who score high on racism and sexism prefer conservative politicians because they prefer to *maintain* an existing social order that they have already found explanations for, *regardless* if the current system is hierarchical or egalitarian. According to this perspective, those high in racism and sexism may actually want the status quo even if it is egalitarian. This is because this perspective assumes that the psychological motivation underlying racism and sexism is to maintain the status quo. As past studies have shown, psychological motivations for justifying the existing system and social order can be particularly powerful, and these motivations can lead to social phenomena that are rather counterintuitive. For example, people from low social status backgrounds are actually psychologically motivated to justify the existing social order where they are disadvantaged (Jost & Hunyady, 2003; Jost, 2020). In sum, the *status quo hypothesis* states that racism and sexism benefit conservative politicians because the conservative politicians are perceived to maintain the current status quo. Correspondingly, this hypothesis would be supported if people who score high on racism and sexism support politicians who are described to maintain the status quo, regardless if the status quo is characterized as hierarchical or egalitarian.

In short, some past studies suggest that racism and sexism benefit conservative candidates and undermine liberal candidates in the current political landscape because racism and sexism reflect underlying motivations that predispose one to conservatism as in the *preservation of extant unequal power and status quo* between different social groups (Bai, 2020; Gutierrez & Unzueta, 2021). The current dissertation extends this line of work by further unpacking different psychological motives that contribute to the effect of racism and sexism. The inequality hypothesis focuses on the motivation to maintain or bring about social hierarchy, which is fueled with the upstream belief system of competitive world beliefs (the “*unequal power and status*” part). In contrast, the status quo hypothesis focuses on the motivation related to preserving the status quo, which is theoretically heralded by the psychological needs for certainty and security (the “*preservation of extant*” part).

Implicit Attitudes

Implicit bias refers to the biases that are measured indirectly and occurs “automatically” to individuals who have them (Greenwald et al., 2019)¹. As summarized by Nosek and colleagues (2007), although implicit attitude and explicit attitudes are often correlated, these two types of attitudes are theoretically and empirically distinct. Indeed, according to Blair and colleagues (2015, p. 666), “most theoretical models consider implicit and explicit attitudes as two qualitatively different modes of psychological processing,” and studies suggest that these two types of attitudes can even diverge when the explicit attitude is reported deliberately (i.e., not spontaneous or relying on the “gut reaction”) and when the level of conceptual correspondence between the explicit and implicit measures (i.e., when they are not measuring exactly the same attitudinal object) are low (Hoffman et al., 2005)². Early evidence suggests that the two types of attitudes each have strengths in predicting behaviors in different domains. For example, they

¹ Greenwald and colleagues (2019, pp 2) distinguish two understandings of the Implicit Association Test, a popular implicit measure. One treats “implicit” as something measured indirectly, and the other treats it as a mental process that occurs unconsciously, the first of which has more support than the second. As such, a limitation of the implicit measures, including what the current studies use, is that they may not exclusively measure implicit attitudes.

² Though a lot more still remains to be known about under what conditions these two attitudes diverge. As Greenwald and Lai (2020) recently discussed, understanding what factors are responsible for the discrepancy between explicit and implicit attitude is a key area of future research.

suggest that implicit attitudes are better than explicit attitudes at predicting behaviors that are spontaneous and socially sensitive; in contrast, explicit attitudes are better at predicting behaviors that are more deliberative and propositional (Arcuri et al., 2008; Conner & Barrett; 2005; Frieze et al., 2008; Greenwald et al., 2009; Nock et al., 2010). It should be noted that, though, recent meta-analyses (Greenwald et al., 2009; Cameron et al., 2012; Kurdi et al., 2018), as summarized by Greenwald and Lai (2020), suggest that controllability does not attenuate the association between implicit attitude and behavioral criterion. However, two factors may explain the discrepancy between the theoretical expectation about controllability and the null findings on it. First, the Implicit Association Test (IAT), probably the most popular implicit attitude measure, is generally low on test-retest reliability, and as a result, this statistically limits its upper bound on the predictive validity observed for implicit attitude (Greenwald, 2019, pp. 17-18). Second, as discussed by Greenwald (2019, p. 19 and Kurdi et al, 2019), a very large amount of IAT research is under-powered, and therefore, the estimates drawn from prior studies can be statistically biased. Together, these suggest that these patterns on the associations between explicit and implicit measures still require further investigations.

Nonetheless, studies on implicit attitude revealed that even though practitioners in the field of education (Van den Bergh, 2010), health (Teachman & Brownell, 2001), and law (Morrison et al., 2016) usually hold an egalitarian attitude explicitly, they may nevertheless possess implicit prejudice, and unknowingly contribute to biased treatment of individuals from different demographic backgrounds. As such, it is particularly important to consider the attitudes on the implicit as well as explicit domain when studying the association between prejudice and evaluation of politicians.

As discussed earlier, recent data support the view that the way explicit racism and sexism are related to support for politicians based on politicians' political ideology and not politicians' race and gender (Bai, 2020; Gutierrez & Unzueta, 2021; Dwyer, Stevens, Sullivan, & Allen, 2009; Gervais & Hillard, 2011; Tesler, 2016). But what about these attitudes occurred on the implicit level? Do implicit racism and sexism relate to support for politicians based on their ideology as well or do they relate to support for them based on their demographic background, like in past studies in the domains of education, health,

and law? Furthermore, does the type of measure for the theoretical outcome play a role as well (i.e., whether evaluation of the politician is measured using explicit or implicit measures)?

There are some prior studies shedding light on this, but they also cannot rule out the confounded roles of ideology and demography discussed above. For example, studies investigated the association between implicit racial bias and support for Obama (e.g., Payne et al., 2010; Finn & Glaser, 2010) or what Obama is associated with (e.g., Knowles et al., 2010), but it is unclear if this association is due to Obama's race or ideology as this confound was not effectively addressed in the past (see below). There are several possibilities, so this aspect of the research is more exploratory. For example, past studies showed that implicit racism predicts opposition to a health reform plan when it was attributed to Barack Obama but not when it was attributed to Bill Clinton, suggesting a demographic explanation (Knowles et al., 2010). However, it is also possible that Bill Clinton was perceived to be less liberal than Barack Obama. As a result, it may have been more salient to respondents that the health reform plan reflects liberal ideology when it was attributed to Barack Obama, belying an ideological mechanism (Bai, 2020). Compounding these alternative considerations, it is also possible that whether the evaluation of the politician is measured using an explicit or implicit measure plays a role as well. For example, it is possible that whereas explicit measures of evaluations follow the predictions from the ideological hypothesis as in the past, implicit prejudice predicts evaluation of politicians based on the politicians' demographic background, given that the implicit attitudes reflect participants' response that are more automatic and subconscious, which is when demography-based biases often occur (Van den Bergh, 2010; Teachman & Brownell, 2001; Morrison et al., 2016). As such, by considering both implicit and explicit prejudice, the current studies complement earlier studies (Bai, 2020; Payne et al., 2010; Finn & Glaser, 2010; Knowles, et al., 2010) by identifying whether the ideological effect of prejudice is limited to explicit measures, and if not, whether it is more about inequality or status quo, as described above.

Politicians' Gender and Race

What about a politician's race and gender? Although racism and sexism are constructs inherently about people who belong to particular social groups, the core of racism and sexism reflects one's belief about how the social order should be arranged based on race and gender. However, as discussed above, racism and sexism in and by themselves are not about *who* should arrange the social order. The constructs of racism and sexism, therefore, cannot be reduced to a prescriptive belief that anyone with a given demographic background should or should not take a particular social role. Instead, they are about expressing the broader ideological goals of maintaining or bringing about inequality (i.e., the inequality hypothesis) and/or preserving and perpetuating the status quo (i.e., the status quo hypothesis) that fits one's psychological configurations.

The demographic background of a politician, such as their race and gender, might serve as a means of cueing citizens about the ideological preferences of the politician (after all, Black people and women are on average perceived to be more liberal while White people and men are perceived to be more conservative; see Kock, 2000; Brandt, et al., 2014; Jacobsmeiser, 2014; Fulton & Gershon, 2018). However, ultimately, it is the inferred ideological orientation of the politician, and the perception of what a politician is going to do in their capacity as a politician to the society that matters more for citizens than their race or gender (Bai, 2020; Gutierrez & Unzueta, 2021). As some past studies showed, people who score high on racism and sexism measures tend to view politicians and individuals who are perceived to be conservative favorably and politicians who are perceived to be liberal unfavorably, regardless of their race and gender (Bai, 2020; Chambers et al., 2013; Tesler, 2016 p. 67; Gervais & Hillard, 2011). Consequently, neither the inequality hypothesis nor the status quo hypothesis assumes that the gender and race of the politician will play any prominent role in determining the nature of the relationships between racism and sexism and politician evaluation, assuming the ideology of the politicians is fixed. Therefore, given their comparatively more minor roles, race and gender of the politician are not the focus of the current studies and their effects would be only investigated on an exploratory basis as the "demographic hypothesis" (i.e., politicians' race and gender moderate the effect of racism and sexism, respectively; also

see Bai, 2020), the pre-registration states that it was anticipated that the effects of race and gender are “minimal or not significant.”

Current studies

The current studies test and compare the inequality hypothesis and the status quo hypothesis about the association between prejudice and evaluation of politicians, taking into consideration attitudes that occur on the implicit level as well as the explicit level. Figure 1 on the next page provides an overview for how the current studies will investigate the role of inequality, status quo, and the use of explicit/implicit measures. The theoretical predictors are located on the left-side of the figure and the theoretical dependent variables are on the right-side of the figure. The upper two variables indicate the relationship associated with explicit attitude variables, and the lower two are about implicit variables. The theoretical moderating effects of politicians’ policy inequality implications and status quo implications are indicated by the arrows originating from the top box and the bottom box, representing corresponding variables and hypotheses. As such, paths 1 through 4 test the inequality hypothesis, and paths 5-8 test the status quo hypothesis. Paths 1, 2, 5, and 6 are related to explicit prejudice and 3, 4, 7 and 8 are about implicit prejudice. Paths 1, 3, 5 and 7 are about explicit evaluations and 2, 4, 6, and 8 are about implicit evaluation.

Figure 1. Study Overview and Hypotheses

Whereas Study 1 focuses on prejudice in the domain of racism or racial attitudes, Study 2 focuses on prejudice in the domain of sexism or gender attitudes. On the predictor side, the type of prejudice examined in the studies are explicit and implicit racism (Study 1) and explicit and implicit sexism (Study 2), and on the dependent variables side, the evaluation variable is examined on the explicit level and implicit level. The *explicit* evaluation of the politician is further examined in two different ways: one is about support for the politician, and one is about emotional feeling toward the politician. Support for the politician is measured with feelings toward the politicians and voting likelihood measures, similar to some prior studies on similar topics (e.g., Bai, 2020; Major et al., 2018). Emotional experiences examined in the studies are anger and disgust. According to Rozin et al. (1999), in the context of inter-group relations and political opinion, people can experience anger and disgust when they perceive someone violating moral principles; in particular, things that are in violation of rights (in which case anger is triggered) and something deeply venerated (in which case, disgust is elicited). People who disagree with a politician on racial and gender issues may experience these emotions because these issues are intrinsically normative and moral questions that are about what is the “right” way of dealing with the social relationship between people from different demographic backgrounds. For implicit evaluation of political candidates, it is examined in just one way, using the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The evaluation of political candidates is examined implicitly because, as mentioned above, past studies suggest that implicit attitude toward political candidates can play an often-overlooked role. For example, among undecided voters, implicit attitude toward political candidates measured a month in advance can predict who they eventually vote for (Arcuri et al., 2008), and some recent studies also suggest that implicit candidate evaluations are uniquely predictive of vote choice (Ksiazkiewicz et al., 2017). Therefore, by examining the variables on the predictor side as well as the dependent variable side both explicitly and implicitly, the current studies are designed to identify the role of implicit attitudes more fully than prior studies that only examined implicit attitudes on the predictor side (e.g., Payne et al., 2010; Finn & Glaser, 2010; Knowles et al., 2010).

Method

For simplicity, the shared method of the two studies will be presented and then each of the methods for the two studies will be presented separately. The same approach is adopted for the report of results. The two studies (N=403 for Study 1 and N=404 for Study 2) were collected online together concurrently using Prolific from May 17, 2021 to May 18, 2021. To increase the samples' political representativeness, the recruitment has a party affiliation quota, benchmarked against Gallup's national partisan distribution as of April 1, 2021, i.e., 27% Republicans, 41% Independents/Moderates, and 32% Democrats (see <https://news.gallup.com/poll/15370/party-affiliation.aspx>). The full text of all items and stimuli used in all studies can be found in Appendix A. Both studies were pre-registered (Study 1: <https://osf.io/6hxqp> and Study 2: <https://osf.io/6sj3y>). All analyses were executed using R. The Implicit Association tests were generated using the IATgen R package (Carpenter et al., 2019; see <https://osf.io/g529h/> for the code). All measures, manipulations, exclusions, as well as the method of determining the final sample size in all studies are reported. No additional data collection was continued after data analysis in any study.

The manipulation procedures were pre-tested for effectiveness before the data collection of these studies (see Appendix B). In short, all four manipulated factors have intended effects on the corresponding manipulation check. Though the inequality manipulation and status quo manipulation each have some “spill-over” effect on each other (i.e., participants perceived “unequal” politicians as more likely to endorse status quo, and “status quo” politicians as more likely to promote inequality), these spill-over effects are much smaller than that of the effects from the corresponding manipulation. Furthermore, the main models that will be discussed below (Models S1.3s and S2.3s) include interactions from both inequality and status quo factors. This specification, therefore, statistically controls for the effects of both factors relative to the other (e.g., any effect of the inequality manipulation spilling over to the status quo factor is controlled for once the inequality variable itself is entered in the model, and vice versa for the reverse). Together, the limitation of these spill-overs is unlikely to affect the conclusions that will be discussed below.

Study 1 Method

Explicit and implicit prejudice. In Study 1, participants first responded to the recently validated four-item FIRE scale ($\alpha=.70$) as a measure of explicit racism (e.g., rating statements such as “I am fearful of people of other races” from 1=Disagree strongly to 5= Agree strongly; DeSante & Smith, 2020). Though researchers in the past have often relied on racial resentment as a measure of racism (e.g., Dwyer et al, 2009 Payne et al., 2009), racial resentment is not used in the current study because many researchers in the past have questioned whether it is truly a measure of racial prejudice or political ideology (e.g., see Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986; Feldman & Huddy, 2005). As such, the FIRE scale was used as a measure of racism instead. After that, participants completed a race Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), which uses facial images of White and Black individuals on a grayscale as race stimuli, and the affective stimuli are the words “Joy”, “Happy”, “Laughter”, “Love”, “Glorious”, “Pleasure”, “Peace”, “Wonderful” for positive stimuli and "Evil", "Agony", "Awful", "Nasty", "Terrible", "Horrible", "Failure", "Hurt" for negative stimuli. These stimuli are sourced from the race IAT of Project Implicit (<https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/selectatest.html>).

Politician experiment. After responding to the prejudice measures mentioned above, participants read about a hypothetical politician, “Jackie Maher.” Critically, four aspects of descriptions about the politician are manipulated, and the politician’s gender (male versus female), race (White versus Black), and their policy implications for inequality (policies bringing more racial inequality versus bringing more racial equality) and status quo (policies perpetuating racial status quo versus challenging the racial status quo) are manipulated independently in a $2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2$ design. The gender and race of the politician are manipulated using a profile picture attributed to the politician, and the latter two factors are manipulated by describing the politicians’ policy implications for racial inequality and status quo. As part of the manipulation, participants were asked to type in the name of the politician in a text box, and they needed to respond to two comprehension check questions (“Based on the article, if this politician is re-elected, the existing social order will be more likely ____.” 1=to be kept the same; to be changed, and

“Based on the article, if this politician is re-elected, there will be_____.” 1= more inequality between different racial groups; 2= more equality between different racial groups). Participants were not allowed to proceed unless their responses were consistent with the materials presented in their condition. Participants may correct their responses in order to proceed if their first responses were incorrect, and it is unknown how many individuals entered a wrong response wrong first and then corrected it.

Explicit and implicit evaluation of the politician. As mentioned earlier, the dependent variables about the evaluation of politicians comprise three domains: support for the politician, emotional feelings toward the politician, and implicit attitude toward the politician, the first two of which are explicit, and the third of which is implicit. After reading the politician’s profile, participants indicated their support with a “voting likelihood” item (i.e., how likely that they think they would vote for the politician from 0% to 100% where 100 indicates 100% of chance of voting for the politician) and a “feeling thermometer” (from 0 to 100 where 100 indicated the most favorable feeling). The support variable was computed by averaging participants’ responses for the two items ($\alpha=.93$ in Study 1 and $\alpha=.94$ in Study 2). In the second domain, participants rated how much they experienced the emotions of anger and disgust with the instruction “when you are thinking about this candidate, how much do you experience each of the following emotions? 0=not at all, 5=a great deal.” Finally, participants completed an IAT measuring their implicit attitudes toward the candidate. In this IAT, participants were asked to pair the word string “Jackie Maher” and “NOT Jackie Maher” with the words that have positive (i.e., "Ethical", "Moral", "Good", "Love", "Glorious", "Virtuous", "Kind", "Wonderful") and negative (i.e., "Evil", "Bad", "Awful", "Nasty", "Terrible", "Horrible", "Unethical", "Vile") connotations. The stimuli of this IAT was designed by the author.

Study 2 Method

The design of Study 2 is very similar to that of Study 1. Instead of the FIRE scale, participants responded to the fifteen-item Separate Spheres Ideology (SSI) scale ($\alpha=.92$) as a measure of explicit sexism (e.g., rating statements such as “Women can learn technical skills, but it doesn’t come as naturally as it does for most men” from 1= Disagree strongly to 7= Agree strongly; Miller & Borgida, 2016), and a gender IAT as a

measure of implicit sexism. It should be noted that though the role of ambivalent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996) has been examined more thoroughly in the literature, it is not used as a measure of sexism in the current study because ambivalent sexism primarily focuses on beliefs about the proper interpersonal relationship between men and women, and in contrast, SSI addresses the normative roles of men and women in the society (Miller & Borgida, 2016). Additionally, though some past studies demonstrate that ambivalent sexism predicts voting preferences for Trump over Clinton (Ratliff et al, 2019), recent evidence (Bai, 2020) found that the significant relationship between ambivalent sexism and politician evaluations is no longer significant after accounting for the role of SSI. These findings suggest that the effect of ambivalent sexism found by Ratliff and colleagues (2019) may be driven by the variances that it shares with SSI, or the variances that SSI specifically addresses. On the basis of these considerations, this study uses SSI as the measure for sexism as opposed to ambivalent sexism.

After completing the SSI, participants completed a gender IAT. The gender stimuli are stereotypical men's name and women's name, and they are "Ben", "Paul", "Daniel", "John", "Jeffrey" for the men's name, and "Rebecca", "Michelle", "Emily", "Julia", "Anna" for women's name. The paired concepts are career versus family, and for the career concepts, they are "Career", "Corporation", "Salary", "Office", "Professional", "Management", "Business", and for family concepts, they are "Wedding", "Marriage", "Parents", "Relatives", "Family", "Home", "Children". These stimuli are sourced from the gender-career IAT from Project Implicit (<https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/selectatest.html>).

Participants then reviewed a hypothetical politician's profile and completed the same measures about evaluation of the politician as in Study 1. The description is very similar to Study 1 except that the descriptions that manipulate the inequality factor and the status quo factor focus on the politician's policy implications for *gender* (as opposed to racial) inequality and status quo. The questions used as part of the manipulation are similar—participants still had to respond to the questions about the politicians' policy implications correctly before proceeding.

Results

For the analyses, each factor of the manipulation was coded to be -1 or 1, where 1 represents a politician who is male, White, whose policies bring about more inequality or perpetuate the status quo, and -1 otherwise. This coding allows the main effect of the prejudice measures in the models to be interpreted actually as the main effect. In contrast, if the condition variables were indicator-coded as 0 vs 1, an additional set of models that only contain main effects without interaction terms would be needed to allow this interpretation. All other variables other than IAT scores and age were recoded to run from 0 to 1 such that a higher score represents a higher level of that construct.

Bivariate relationships. The correlational and descriptive statistics are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. Accordingly, on average, across studies, participants explicitly support the politician described as promoting inequality and status quo less compared to the politician described as otherwise. They also feel more angered and disgusted by the “inequality politician” and the “status quo politician” in both studies, though their implicit evaluation of the former is significantly worse only in Study 2. Participants do not evaluate the politician described as Black or female any less than if the politician is White or male in both studies, across all three domains of evaluation measures—in fact, in Study 1, participants experience less anger and disgust if the politician is described as Black compared to White.

Explicit and implicit racism are correlated but explicit and implicit sexism are not correlated. Interestingly, implicit racism is correlated with ideology more than explicit racism. This suggests that its effect is likely more ideologically-driven (contra Jost et al., 2009). However, this pattern is not observed for the implicit sexism measure. In fact, implicit sexism is not correlated with any other variables other than higher age and, counterintuitively, female gender. Finally, the four variables in the three domains of evaluation are all correlated in the expected direction in both studies: participants are angered and disgusted more by politicians they oppose, explicitly and implicitly, though the three explicit measures are correlated with each other more highly, thus demonstrating that these measures are indeed measuring related constructs. This suggests

that the null effects related to the implicit evaluation models (see below) are unlikely to be caused by issues in the measurement of implicit evaluation of politicians.

Testing the Inequality Hypothesis and the Status Quo Hypothesis in Study 1

In order to test the hypotheses, linear regression analyses were conducted to predict support for the politician, experience of the two emotions, and implicit attitudes toward the politician in four sets of parallel models. These models use the four condition variables that represent each of the factors manipulated in the experiment. Critically, the variables for the inequality condition and its interaction with racism were included in the model to test the inequality hypothesis—if the term is significant and positive, then it provides evidence for the inequality hypothesis. Similarly, the variables for the status quo condition and its interactions with racism were included in the model to test the status quo hypothesis—its positive significance in the model can provide evidence for the status quo hypothesis. These results are summarized as Models S1.3 in Table 3, and from left to right, the models are for predicting explicit support, anger, disgust, and implicit support. The tables were generated using the regtable package (Bai, 2021) that can generate regression tables automatically from linear regression syntax in R. The significant interaction terms are plotted in Figure 2.

Table 1. Study 1 Correlation Table.

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1. Inequality Condition	2. Status Quo Condition	3. Race Condition	4. Gender Condition	5. Gender	6. Age	7. Edu.	8. Income	9. Ideology	10. PID	11. Exp. Racism	12. Imp. Racism	13. Support	14. Anger	15. Disgust
5. Gender (1=female)	0.44	0.50	-0.07	-0.02	0.03	-0.05											
6. Age	36.1	13.1	0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.05										
7. Education	0.51	0.24	0.04	-0.05	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	.24***									
8. Income	0.55	0.30	-0.03	0.00	-0.05	0.03	-0.02	0.06	.29***								
9. Ideology	0.41	0.32	0.07	-0.01	0.03	0.01	-0.04	.34***	.16**	0.09†							
10. Party Identity	0.45	0.29	0.08†	0.01	0.02	0.06	-0.07	.30***	.11*	.13**	.82***						
11. Explicit Racism	0.26	0.20	0.06	0.01	0.04	0.06	-.10*	.11*	0.08	0.02	.49***	.44***					
12. Implicit Racism	0.45	0.44	-0.02	0.00	0.01	0.05	0.05	.14**	0.03	-0.02	.18***	.14**	.12*				
13. Support	0.49	0.28	-0.47***	-.21***	-0.05	-0.03	-0.01	0.06	.10*	0.05	.11*	0.00	0.05	.11*			
14. Anger	4.89	1.14	.39***	.14**	.14**	-0.01	0.02	-.14**	0.02	0.02	-.14**	-0.07	-0.03	-0.09†	-.60***		
15. Disgust	4.98	1.26	.38***	.14**	.14**	0.00	0.02	-.14**	0.01	-0.03	-.15**	-0.09†	-0.05	-0.08	-.63***	.86***	
16. Implicit Evaluation	0.53	0.37	-0.09†	-0.04	-0.08	0.04	-0.08	0.09†	-0.05	-0.04	0.00	-0.01	-0.04	.15**	.15**	-.14**	-.12*

Note. S.D. represents standard deviation. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.10$. Rows 1 through 4 are omitted intentionally because they are correlation between conditions assignment, which are theoretically irrelevant.

Table 2. Study 2 Correlation Table.

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1. Inequality Condition	2. Status Quo Condition	3. Race Condition	4. Gender Condition	5. Gender	6. Age	7. Edu.	8. Income	9. Ideology	10. PID	11. Exp. Sexism	12. Imp. Sexism	13. Support	14. Anger	15. Disgust
5. Gender (1=female)	0.56	0.50	0.05	-0.06	0.03	-0.08											
6. Age	37	14.3	-0.09†	0.04	-0.04	-0.07	0.05										
7. Education	0.50	0.22	-0.04	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.01	0.22***									
8. Income	0.51	0.30	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.08	-0.05	.23***								
9. Ideology	0.43	0.31	-0.04	0.08	0.04	-0.03	-.13*	.27***	0.04	.12*							
10. Party Identity	0.45	0.29	-0.05	0.04	0.01	-0.01	-.17***	.22***	-0.02	.10*	.86***						
11. Explicit Sexism	0.31	0.20	0.02	-0.03	0.06	0.04	-.26***	.14**	-0.03	0.03	.59***	.55***					
12. Implicit Sexism	0.42	0.40	0.03	-0.08	0.01	0.01	.11*	.13**	0.05	-0.04	0.08	0.06	0.07				
13. Support	0.48	0.28	-.44***	-.21***	-0.03	-0.05	-0.01†	0.06	0.09†	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.03	-0.07			
14. Anger	4.90	1.14	.41***	.16**	0.02	0.03	.16**	-0.09†	0.01	-0.01	-.11*	-.14**	-0.08	0.07	-.59***		
15. Disgust	4.98	1.24	.37***	.17***	0.01	0.04	.18***	-0.05	0.01	-0.06	-0.08†	-.11*	-0.03	0.08	-.64***	.83***	
16. Implicit Evaluation	0.52	0.38	-.24***	-.18***	-0.01	-0.05	-.13*	0.07	-0.02	-0.05	0.09†	0.08	0.05	0.00	.26***	-.23***	-.26***

Note. S.D. represents standard deviation. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.10$. Rows 1 through 4 are omitted intentionally because they are correlation between conditions assignment, which are theoretically irrelevant.

Reviewing the results of Models 1.3 in Table 3, the significant term for “FIRE scale×Inequality condition” term ($ps<.001$) in the model for explicit support, anger, and disgust suggests that participants who score high on the explicit racism measure tend to have more explicit support for “inequality politicians,” and feel less angered and disgusted by them, and vice versa for “equality politicians.” These patterns are visualized in panels A (explicit support), D (anger), and E (disgust) of Figure 2. The significant term for “FIRE scale×Status quo condition” term ($p<.05$) in the explicit support model suggests that they only have more explicit support for a “status quo politician” and vice versa for “changing politicians” (see panel B). Independent of the effects of explicit racism, the significant term for “Inequality condition×Implicit racism” in the explicit support model ($p<.01$) and its marginal significance ($p<.10$) suggest that participants who score high on *implicit* racism have more explicit support (panel C) and potentially feel disgusted (not graphed due to its marginal significance) by an inequality politician. The lack of significance for the “Status quo condition×Implicit racism” term throughout the models suggests that the status quo factor does not play a role in moderating implicit racism. No interaction term is significant for the implicit support model, suggesting that participants’ implicit evaluation of the politician is not moderated by either factor. The only significant term is implicit racism—it is possible that this term’s significance reflects the shared methodological variance between the implicit measures.

Testing the Inequality Hypothesis and the Status Quo Hypothesis in Study 2

Like in Study 1, a parallel set of models were estimated for Study 2, and the key difference is that the racism measures were replaced with sexism measures (i.e., Separate Spheres Ideology and implicit sexism) in these models. As such, the results can be interpreted in a similar way as in Study 1. The results are summarized in Models S2.3 in Table 4, and its layout mirrors that of Table 3. The significant interaction terms are plotted in Figure 3.

The Separate Spheres×Inequality condition and Separate Spheres×Status quo condition terms are significant ($ps<.05$) in all models other than the one for implicit support, suggesting that participants who score higher on explicit sexism tend to have explicit support for the “inequality politicians” (panel A) and “status quo politicians”

(panel B), feel less angry at them (panels C and D) and less disgusted by them (panels E and F), and the opposite is true for “equality politicians” and “changing politicians.” Different from Study 1, there is an interaction that is marginally significant for the implicit support model (not graphed): the Inequality condition×Implicit sexism term is marginally significant, albeit the term has a negative value, opposite to the expectation, so it is very possible that this reflects random noise as opposed to a true pattern (also not graphed due to its marginal significance).

Testing the Effect of Politician’s Gender and Race

In order to test whether politicians’ gender and race provide any additional predictive effect (the “demographic hypothesis” mentioned above), a set of models, Models S1.4 and S2.4, were estimated with the following additional terms: the variables for the gender condition and race condition and their interactions with racism and sexism. The significance of the interaction terms can provide evidence whether the politician’s demographic background (i.e., politician’s gender and race) play any role above and beyond their policies’ effect on inequality and status quo. In order to formally test if gender and race play any role, Bayes factors (BF) were computed to compare the main model mentioned above (comparing Models 1.3 and 2.3) and the alternative models (Models 1.4 and 2.4). In all comparisons, Bayes factors are less than 1 in 5,000, which greatly favor the simpler model over the more complex model, suggesting that the politician’s race and gender are unlikely to play any role in moderating the effect of racism or sexism, confirming recent studies on this topic (Bai, 2020; Citrin et al. 1990, Highton, 2004, Sigelman et al. 1995, and Voss & Lublin, 2001). However, more importantly, the results from these additional models are very similar to that of the main models (S1.3s and S2.3s), suggesting robustness of the patterns described above, a topic which will be further discussed in the next section.

Robustness checks

Three additional sets of models were estimated for robustness. Two sets of them are simpler models: one set only involves the explicit prejudice measures (Models S1.1 and S2.1), and the other set only involves the implicit prejudice measures (Models S1.2 and S2.2). These simpler models serve the purpose of ensuring that the above models

were not over-specified. Specifically, these models can help identify if any potential lack of effect from either explicit or implicit prejudice measures is due to potential suppression or mediated effect of the other, given that sometimes researchers regard explicit prejudice as a mediator for the effect of implicit prejudice (e.g., Payne et al., 2009). Furthermore, a set of more fully specified models was also estimated to include participants' gender, age, education, income, and party identification (though not ideology) as control variables (Models S1.5 and S2.5). This set of models were estimated to ensure that the models were also not under-specified. Ideology is not included as a control in these models because the effect of prejudice is ideological in the first place-- participants who score high on prejudice measures support conservative candidates because participants themselves support conservatism. Therefore, in theory, participants' own ideology is a mediator, not a control variable. This is also an assumption of the inequality and status quo hypothesis and this general idea was also more elaborated in detail in the footnote 18 of Bai (2020) and empirically tested in Bai (2021, under review).

Comparing all interaction terms across specifications by reviewing Tables 3 and 4, the results are relatively similar--no significant interaction (at the threshold of $p < .05$) in any model becomes not significant in any other model (at the threshold of $p > .10$). The reverse is true too, as no interaction that is not significant in any model becomes significant in any other model (though there are some results that cross from marginal significance to significant, such as the Inequality condition $\times$ Implicit sexism term which is significant in Model S2.5 but marginally significant elsewhere), so the results are robust across model specifications.

Table 3. Study 1 Regression Results

		Explicit support		Anger		Disgust		Implicit support	
		Estimate	S.E.	Estimate	S.E.	Estimate	S.E.	Estimate	S.E.
Model S1.1	(Intercept)	0.46 ***	0.02	4.98 ***	0.08	5.11 ***	0.09	0.55 ***	0.03
	FIRE scale	0.09 ns	0.05	-0.22 ns	0.25	-0.38 ns	0.27	-0.06 ns	0.10
	Inequality condition	-0.25 ***	0.02	0.83 ***	0.08	0.94 ***	0.09	-0.06 †	0.03
	Status quo condition	-0.10 ***	0.02	0.27 **	0.08	0.31 ***	0.09	-0.01 ns	0.03
	Male condition	0.00 ns	0.01	-0.04 ns	0.05	-0.03 ns	0.05	0.01 ns	0.02
	White condition	-0.02 ns	0.01	0.16 **	0.05	0.19 ***	0.05	-0.03 ns	0.02
	FIRE scale×Inequality condition	0.45 ***	0.05	-1.38 ***	0.25	-1.65 ***	0.28	0.12 ns	0.10
	FIRE scale×Status quo condition	0.14 *	0.05	-0.29 ns	0.25	-0.38 ns	0.27	-0.04 ns	0.10
Model S1.2	(Intercept)	0.46 ***	0.02	4.99 ***	0.07	5.06 ***	0.08	0.48 ***	0.03
	Implicit racism	0.07 *	0.03	-0.21 †	0.12	-0.21 ns	0.13	0.13 **	0.04
	Inequality condition	-0.17 ***	0.02	0.55 ***	0.08	0.61 ***	0.08	-0.02 ns	0.03
	Status quo condition	-0.08 ***	0.02	0.23 **	0.08	0.27 **	0.08	0.00 ns	0.03
	Male condition	0.00 ns	0.01	-0.01 ns	0.05	0.00 ns	0.06	0.01 ns	0.02
	White condition	-0.02 ns	0.01	0.16 **	0.05	0.18 **	0.06	-0.03 ns	0.02
	Implicit racism×Inequality condition	0.09 ***	0.03	-0.24 *	0.12	-0.29 *	0.13	-0.02 ns	0.04
	Implicit racism×Status quo condition	0.04 ns	0.03	-0.14 ns	0.12	-0.19 ns	0.13	-0.03 ns	0.04
Model S1.3	(Intercept)	0.43 ***	0.02	5.08 ***	0.09	5.20 ***	0.10	0.50 ***	0.04
	FIRE scale	0.07 ns	0.06	-0.23 ns	0.26	-0.39 ns	0.28	-0.09 ns	0.10
	Inequality condition	-0.28 ***	0.02	0.90 ***	0.09	1.03 ***	0.10	-0.05 ns	0.04
	Status quo condition	-0.12 ***	0.02	0.30 **	0.09	0.35 ***	0.10	0.01 ns	0.04
	Implicit racism	0.07 **	0.02	-0.24 *	0.11	-0.23 †	0.13	0.14 **	0.04
	Male condition	0.00 ns	0.01	-0.02 ns	0.05	-0.01 ns	0.06	0.01 ns	0.02
	White condition	-0.02 †	0.01	0.16 **	0.05	0.18 **	0.06	-0.03 ns	0.02
	FIRE scale×Inequality condition	0.43 ***	0.06	-1.43 ***	0.26	-1.72 ***	0.28	0.14 ns	0.10
	FIRE scale×Status quo condition	0.14 *	0.06	-0.17 ns	0.26	-0.20 ns	0.28	-0.05 ns	0.10
	Inequality condition×Implicit racism	0.07 **	0.02	-0.18 ns	0.12	-0.22 †	0.13	-0.03 ns	0.04
Model S1.4	Status quo condition×Implicit racism	0.03 ns	0.02	-0.12 ns	0.12	-0.16 ns	0.13	-0.03 ns	0.04
	(Intercept)	0.43 ***	0.02	5.08 ***	0.09	5.19 ***	0.10	0.49 ***	0.04
	FIRE scale	0.06 ns	0.06	-0.26 ns	0.26	-0.33 ns	0.29	-0.08 ns	0.10
	Inequality condition	-0.27 ***	0.02	0.90 ***	0.10	1.02 ***	0.11	-0.05 ns	0.04
	Status quo condition	-0.11 ***	0.02	0.31 **	0.10	0.34 **	0.11	0.01 ns	0.04
	Male condition	-0.02 ns	0.02	0.00 ns	0.10	-0.03 ns	0.11	0.01 ns	0.04
	White condition	-0.04 *	0.02	0.08 ns	0.10	0.26 *	0.10	-0.03 ns	0.04
	Implicit racism	0.07 **	0.03	-0.23 *	0.12	-0.23 †	0.13	0.14 **	0.04
	FIRE scale×Inequality condition	0.43 ***	0.06	-1.43 ***	0.26	-1.71 ***	0.29	0.14 ns	0.10
	FIRE scale×Status quo condition	0.12 *	0.06	-0.20 ns	0.26	-0.14 ns	0.29	-0.04 ns	0.10
	FIRE scale×Male condition	0.04 ns	0.06	-0.12 ns	0.26	0.08 ns	0.28	-0.04 ns	0.10
	FIRE scale×White condition	0.06 ns	0.06	0.14 ns	0.27	-0.37 ns	0.29	-0.07 ns	0.10
	Inequality condition×Implicit racism	0.07 **	0.03	-0.18 ns	0.12	-0.22 †	0.13	-0.03 ns	0.04
	Status quo condition×Implicit racism	0.03 ns	0.03	-0.13 ns	0.12	-0.16 ns	0.13	-0.03 ns	0.04
	Male condition×Implicit racism	0.02 ns	0.03	0.02 ns	0.12	0.01 ns	0.13	0.02 ns	0.04
	White condition×Implicit racism	0.02 ns	0.02	0.12 ns	0.11	0.03 ns	0.13	0.04 ns	0.04

Model S1.5	(Intercept)	0.38 ***	0.04	5.26 ***	0.19	5.51 ***	0.21	0.52 ***	0.07
	FIRE scale	0.00 ns	0.07	0.08 ns	0.31	0.08 ns	0.34	-0.13 ns	0.12
	Inequality condition	-0.28 ***	0.02	0.91 ***	0.10	1.04 ***	0.11	-0.04 ns	0.04
	Status quo condition	-0.12 ***	0.02	0.34 ***	0.10	0.36 ***	0.11	0.00 ns	0.04
	Implicit racism	0.08 **	0.03	-0.21 †	0.12	-0.20 ns	0.13	0.14 **	0.04
	Male condition	-0.01 ns	0.02	-0.01 ns	0.09	-0.04 ns	0.09	0.03 ns	0.03
	White condition	-0.04 †	0.02	0.09 ns	0.09	0.25 **	0.10	0.00 ns	0.03
	Sex	-0.01 ns	0.02	0.07 ns	0.10	0.06 ns	0.12	-0.08 *	0.04
	Age	0.00 ns	0.00	-0.01 *	0.00	-0.01 *	0.00	0.00 ns	0.00
	Education	0.13 **	0.05	0.08 ns	0.23	0.14 ns	0.25	-0.08 ns	0.09
	Income	-0.03 ns	0.04	0.28 ns	0.18	0.04 ns	0.20	-0.03 ns	0.07
	Republican identification	0.03 ns	0.05	-0.28 ns	0.21	-0.40 †	0.24	-0.02 ns	0.08
	FIRE scale×Inequality condition	0.44 ***	0.06	-1.46 ***	0.27	-1.74 ***	0.29	0.10 ns	0.10
	FIRE scale×Status quo condition	0.15 **	0.06	-0.31 ns	0.27	-0.23 ns	0.29	0.01 ns	0.10
	Inequality condition×Implicit racism	0.07 **	0.03	-0.17 ns	0.12	-0.21 ns	0.13	-0.02 ns	0.04
	Status quo condition×Implicit racism	0.03 ns	0.03	-0.13 ns	0.12	-0.17 ns	0.13	-0.04 ns	0.04
	FIRE scale×Male condition	0.03 ns	0.06	-0.08 ns	0.26	0.12 ns	0.29	-0.07 ns	0.10
	FIRE scale×White condition	0.06 ns	0.06	0.27 ns	0.27	-0.32 ns	0.30	-0.09 ns	0.10

Note. S.E. represents standard error. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.10$.

Table 4. Study 2 Regression Results

		Explicit support		Anger		Disgust		Implicit support	
		Estimate	S.E.	Estimate	S.E.	Estimate	S.E.	Estimate	S.E.
Model S2.1	(Intercept)	0.46 ***	0.02	5.04 ***	0.09	5.03 ***	0.10	0.49 ***	0.03
	Separate spheres	0.05 ns	0.06	-0.47 †	0.25	-0.19 ns	0.27	0.10 ns	0.09
	Inequality condition	-0.29 ***	0.02	0.9 ***	0.09	0.98 ***	0.10	-0.13 ***	0.03
	Status quo condition	-0.15 ***	0.02	0.35 ***	0.09	0.44 ***	0.10	-0.07 *	0.03
	Male condition	-0.02 †	0.01	0.05 ns	0.05	0.07 ns	0.05	-0.02 ns	0.02
	White condition	-0.01 ns	0.01	0.03 ns	0.05	0.02 ns	0.05	0.00 ns	0.02
	Separate spheres×Inequality condition	0.52 ***	0.06	-1.34 ***	0.25	-1.59 ***	0.27	0.13 ns	0.09
	Separate spheres×Status quo condition	0.27 ***	0.06	-0.47 †	0.25	-0.71 **	0.27	0.00 ns	0.09
Model S2.2	(Intercept)	0.5 ***	0.02	4.84 ***	0.08	4.89 ***	0.08	0.52 ***	0.03
	Implicit sexism	-0.05 †	0.03	0.18 ns	0.13	0.24 †	0.14	-0.01 ns	0.05
	Inequality condition	-0.13 ***	0.02	0.49 ***	0.08	0.47 ***	0.08	-0.06 *	0.03
	Status quo condition	-0.08 ***	0.02	0.17 *	0.08	0.25 **	0.08	-0.07 *	0.03
	Male condition	-0.02 ns	0.01	0.04 ns	0.05	0.05 ns	0.06	-0.02 ns	0.02
	White condition	-0.01 ns	0.01	0.02 ns	0.05	0.01 ns	0.06	-0.01 ns	0.02
	Implicit sexism×Inequality condition	0.01 ns	0.03	-0.02 ns	0.13	-0.01 ns	0.14	-0.09 †	0.05
	Implicit sexism×Status quo condition	0.05 ns	0.03	0.04 ns	0.13	-0.11 ns	0.14	0.01 ns	0.05
Model S2.3	(Intercept)	0.48 ***	0.02	4.98 ***	0.10	4.96 ***	0.11	0.50 ***	0.04
	Separate spheres	0.07 ns	0.06	-0.45 †	0.25	-0.22 ns	0.28	0.10 ns	0.10
	Inequality condition	-0.28 ***	0.02	0.86 ***	0.10	0.94 ***	0.11	-0.10 *	0.04
	Status quo condition	-0.16 ***	0.02	0.33 **	0.10	0.47 ***	0.11	-0.07 †	0.04
	Implicit sexism	-0.05 ns	0.03	0.16 ns	0.13	0.17 ns	0.14	-0.01 ns	0.05
	Male condition	-0.02 †	0.01	0.05 ns	0.05	0.06 ns	0.05	-0.02 ns	0.02
	White condition	-0.01 ns	0.01	0.03 ns	0.05	0.02 ns	0.05	0.00 ns	0.02
	Separate spheres×Inequality condition	0.52 ***	0.06	-1.28 ***	0.26	-1.56 ***	0.28	0.15 ns	0.10
	Separate spheres×Status quo condition	0.25 ***	0.06	-0.52 *	0.26	-0.73 **	0.28	0.00 ns	0.10
Model S2.4	Inequality condition×Implicit sexism	-0.01 ns	0.03	0.03 ns	0.13	0.07 ns	0.14	-0.09 †	0.05
	Status quo condition×Implicit sexism	0.04 ns	0.03	0.08 ns	0.13	-0.06 ns	0.14	0.02 ns	0.05
	(Intercept)	0.48 ***	0.02	4.98 ***	0.10	4.96 ***	0.11	0.49 ***	0.04
	Separate spheres	0.06 ns	0.06	-0.44 †	0.26	-0.22 ns	0.28	0.10 ns	0.10
	Inequality condition	-0.29 ***	0.02	0.88 ***	0.10	0.95 ***	0.11	-0.09 *	0.04
	Status quo condition	-0.16 ***	0.02	0.31 **	0.10	0.44 ***	0.11	-0.08 *	0.04
	Male condition	-0.03 ns	0.02	0.18 †	0.10	0.17 ns	0.11	-0.01 ns	0.04
	White condition	-0.03 ns	0.02	0.14 ns	0.10	0.04 ns	0.11	0.01 ns	0.04
	Implicit sexism	-0.05 †	0.03	0.17 ns	0.13	0.19 ns	0.14	0.00 ns	0.05
Model S2.4	Separate spheres×Inequality condition	0.52 ***	0.06	-1.32 ***	0.26	-1.59 ***	0.28	0.14 ns	0.10
	Separate spheres×Status quo condition	0.24 ***	0.06	-0.47 †	0.26	-0.67 *	0.28	0.02 ns	0.10
	Separate spheres×Male condition	-0.01 ns	0.06	-0.38 ns	0.26	-0.18 ns	0.28	0.03 ns	0.10
	Separate spheres×White condition	0.06 ns	0.06	-0.46 †	0.26	-0.22 ns	0.28	-0.09 ns	0.10
	Inequality condition×Implicit sexism	-0.01 ns	0.03	0.04 ns	0.13	0.07 ns	0.14	-0.09 †	0.05
	Status quo condition×Implicit sexism	0.03 ns	0.03	0.10 ns	0.13	-0.04 ns	0.14	0.02 ns	0.05
	Male condition×Implicit sexism	0.03 ns	0.03	-0.06 ns	0.13	-0.14 ns	0.14	-0.05 ns	0.05
	White condition×Implicit sexism	-0.01 ns	0.03	0.06 ns	0.13	0.11 ns	0.14	0.03 ns	0.05

Model S2.5	(Intercept)	0.48 ***	0.05	4.77 ***	0.21	4.71 ***	0.23	0.59 ***	0.08
	Separate spheres	0.01 ns	0.07	0.33 ns	0.32	0.6 †	0.34	-0.07 ns	0.12
	Inequality condition	-0.28 ***	0.03	0.87 ***	0.11	0.92 ***	0.12	-0.09 *	0.04
	Status quo condition	-0.16 ***	0.03	0.31 **	0.11	0.42 ***	0.12	-0.09 *	0.04
	Implicit sexism	-0.03 ns	0.03	0.03 ns	0.13	0.05 ns	0.14	0.01 ns	0.05
	Male condition	-0.03 ns	0.02	0.25 **	0.09	0.23 *	0.10	-0.04 ns	0.04
	White condition	-0.03 ns	0.02	0.14 ns	0.09	0.05 ns	0.10	0.03 ns	0.04
	Sex	-0.05 *	0.03	0.40 ***	0.11	0.45 ***	0.12	-0.11 **	0.04
	Age	0 ns	0	0.00 ns	0.00	0 ns	0.00	0.00 ns	0.00
	Education	0.04 ns	0.06	0.29 ns	0.24	0.49 †	0.26	-0.07 ns	0.09
	Income	0.02 ns	0.04	0.01 ns	0.17	-0.24 ns	0.19	-0.08 ns	0.07
	Republican identification	0 ns	0.05	-0.39 †	0.21	-0.37 ns	0.23	0.11 ns	0.08
	Separate spheres×Inequality condition	0.51 ***	0.06	-1.32 ***	0.26	-1.64 ***	0.28	0.15 ns	0.10
	Separate spheres×Status quo condition	0.26 ***	0.06	-0.42 ns	0.26	-0.59 *	0.28	-0.01 ns	0.10
	Inequality condition×Implicit sexism	-0.01 ns	0.03	0.01 ns	0.13	0.08 ns	0.14	-0.11 *	0.05
	Status quo condition×Implicit sexism	0.04 ns	0.03	0.07 ns	0.13	-0.02 ns	0.14	0.04 ns	0.05
	Separate spheres×Male condition	0.02 ns	0.06	-0.60 *	0.26	-0.44 ns	0.28	0.07 ns	0.10
	Separate spheres×White condition	0.06 ns	0.06	-0.47 †	0.26	-0.24 ns	0.28	-0.10 ns	0.10

Note. S.E. represents standard error. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.10$.

Figure 2. Study 1 Effect of Explicit and Implicit Racism on Explicit Evaluation by Inequality and Status Quo Conditions

Figure 3. Study 2 Effect of Explicit Sexism on Explicit Evaluation by Inequality and Status Quo Conditions

General Discussion

Though a few studies suggest that the way citizens' racism and sexism relate to their evaluation of politicians is primarily determined by politicians' political ideology, more so than politicians' gender and race, the reasons for this remain to be clarified. The current studies test two alternative hypotheses: the inequality hypothesis predicts that the association between prejudice and evaluation of politicians is determined by perceptions of the politicians' intention to maintain or bring about inequality. The status quo hypothesis predicts that the association is determined by perceptions of their intention to maintain and preserve the status quo, as opposed to inequality for its own sake. Two experiments were conducted to test these hypotheses.

Overall, the results provide strong support for the inequality hypothesis and some support for the status quo hypothesis, as more terms involving inequality are significant than terms involving status quo. The support for these hypotheses primarily occurs on the explicit domain of attitudes, whereas support in the implicit prejudice domain is less robust, as there are 1. more terms involving explicit prejudice are significant than terms involving implicit prejudice, and 2. only explicit (but not implicit) evaluations are predicted by terms related to any hypotheses. The results also confirm earlier findings that politicians' demographic backgrounds do not moderate the effect of explicit prejudice, which generalizes to the domain of implicit prejudice. To assist the elaboration and interpretation of the findings, the overall pattern of Tables 3 and 4 is further summarized in Table 5, given that Tables 3 and 4 contain a very large amount of results that have many layers of complexity--there are two factors of conservatism (inequality and status quo), each tested with two types of prejudice (racism and sexism), each measured explicitly and implicitly, and each tested on explicit and implicit evaluation of politician (see Figure 1), the former of which is measured with three different outcome measures (i.e., support, anger and disgust).

Table 5 tabulates the number of significant terms that support each hypothesis out of the total number of terms that test each hypothesis based on the results from Tables 3 and 4. Table 5 is organized by hypothesis (inequality and status quo), then by the type of prejudice (i.e., racism vs sexism), and then by measurement type (i.e., explicit vs implicit

measure). This organization thus can help provide an easier interpretation of the large amount of results presented in Tables 3 and 4. These proportions only count significant terms that are consistent with the hypothesis at $p < .05$, so marginal significance (such as the Inequality condition $\times$ Implicit racism term in Models S1.3 and S1.4 for predicting disgust, despite their support for the hypothesis) are not counted. The significance of the Inequality condition $\times$ Implicit sexism term in Model S2.5 for predicting implicit evaluation (see Table 4) is also not counted because this term's effect is in the opposite direction to what is hypothesized. Given this term's small and unstable effect (its significance is marginal in Models S2.2 through S2.4), its significance in Model S2.5 is likely a false positive.

It may be seen in Table 5 that support for the inequality hypothesis about explicit prejudice's association with explicit evaluation is the strongest among all types of relationships, as all 12 terms for the racism models and all 12 terms for the sexism models are significant. Their corresponding terms for the status quo hypothesis are less robust, as only 3 out of 12 are significant in Study 1 and 9 out of 12 significant in Study 2. The effects related to implicit prejudice only occurred in Study 1 when predicting explicit evaluation-- this term is significant in 6 out of 12 cases, and its corresponding models in the gender domain are not significant. Therefore, implicit prejudice's effect, if any, is likely moderated by concerns for inequality. All remaining cells in Table 5 are zeros with a pattern that is relatively easy to describe: first, no term related to implicit evaluation of the politician is significant (which is unlikely to be due to issues in measurement, as discussed earlier). This suggests that a politician's demographic background and ideological orientation are unlikely to moderate the association between citizens' own racial and gender attitudes and implicit evaluation of politicians, regardless of which component of ideology examined in the current studies. Second, no term related to the demographic hypothesis is significant, which is consistent with the most recent theoretical expectations of Bai (2020). Third, other than predicting explicit evaluation in using implicit racial prejudice, no implicit prejudice term is significant. As mentioned above, it suggests that implicit prejudice's effect, if any, is moderated by concerns of inequality, but furthermore, these findings clarify that its effect is unlikely to be

moderated by the politicians' demographic background, as some prior literature assumed (e.g., Knowles et al., 2010), generalizing the ideological hypothesis of prejudice (Bai, 2020) to the domain of implicit racial bias, though not implicit gender bias. Future research should examine why the pattern is not generalized to gender bias.

Theoretical Contribution and Practical Implications

Together, these patterns have two main contributions. One is on the political expression of prejudice and one is on the understanding of implicit prejudice and implicit political attitudes.

Political expression of prejudice. The first main contribution of the current studies is in the theories about the political expression of prejudice. Although some studies revealed *how* racism and sexism are related to citizens' evaluation of political candidates (Bock, Byrd-Craven & Burkley, 2017; Dwyer, Stevens, Sullivan, & Allen, 2009; Gervais & Hillard, 2011; Tesler, 2016) by identifying that prejudice benefits conservative and undermines liberal politicians (Bai, 2020), *why* they are related in the way they are is still not well understood. The current dissertation identifies and tests two alternative hypotheses, each addressing a different component of ideological orientation (Jost et al., 2009): whereas the "inequality hypothesis" states that it is because prejudiced individuals support inequality, the "status quo hypothesis" states that it is because they prefer the status quo.

Table 5. Summary of results of support for each hypothesis by prejudice type and measurement type

Hypothesis	Study	Type of outcome measure	Tabulation (by predictor measure type)	
			Explicit prejudice	Implicit prejudice
Inequality hypothesis	Study 1 (racism)	Explicit evaluation	Path 1. 12/12 (100%)	Path 3. 6/12 (50%)
		Implicit evaluation	Path 2. 0/4 (0%)	Path 4. 0/4 (0%)
	Study 2 (sexism)	Explicit evaluation	Path 1. 12/12 (100%)	Path 3. 0/12 (0%)
		Implicit evaluation	Path 2. 0/4 (0%)	Path 4. 0/4 (0%)
Status quo hypothesis	Study 1 (racism)	Explicit evaluation	Path 5. 3/12 (25%)	Path 7. 0/12 (0%)
		Implicit evaluation	Path 6. 0/4 (0%)	Path 8. 0/4 (0%)
	Study 2 (sexism)	Explicit evaluation	Path 5. 9/12 (75%)	Path 7. 0/12 (0%)
		Implicit evaluation	Path 6. 0/4 (0%)	Path 8. 0/4 (0%)
Demographic hypothesis	Study 1 (racism)	Explicit evaluation	0/6 (0%)	0/6 (0%)
		Implicit evaluation	0/2 (0%)	0/2 (0%)
	Study 2 (sexism)	Explicit evaluation	0/6 (0%)	0/6 (0%)
		Implicit evaluation	0/2 (0%)	0/2 (0%)

Note. This table summarizes the number of significant terms that support each hypothesis out of the total number of terms that test each hypothesis based on the results from Tables 2 and 3. These are organized by hypothesis, then by the type of prejudice (i.e., racism vs sexism), and then by measurement type (i.e., explicit vs implicit measure of evaluations). These proportions only count significant terms that are consistent with the hypothesis at $p < .05$, so marginal significance and significance at the opposite direction to what is hypothesized are not counted.

The current studies provide robust support for the inequality hypothesis, and some support for the status quo hypothesis. Therefore, these results suggest that the way that prejudice is related to political preferences is mostly explained by citizens' tolerance of inequality, as they see the world as a "competitive jungle" and consider racial equality unfairly benefiting undeserving racial minorities (e.g., Dwyer, Stevens, Sullivan, & Allen, 2009; also see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and gender equality goes against the natural differences between men and women (e.g., Miller & Borgida, 2016). Compared to the inequality hypothesis, the support for the status quo hypothesis is far less robust, but in the big picture, it is remarkable that it still received *any* support. While on the surface, it is intuitive that citizens who score high on prejudice have a resistance to changing the existing social order, it is far less intuitive that this pattern emerges *regardless* if the change is to promote more or less inequality. This finding nonetheless corroborates the assumption of system justification theory (Jost, et al., 2004), as citizens' political expression of prejudice is not just an instrumental process that translates their (in)egalitarian value system into policy preferences, but also reflects people's psychological need for order and security (van Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004), *independent from* the motivations behind preferences for inequality. In other words, prejudice is not just about realistic concerns for group interest and symbolic considerations of values in egalitarianism, but very often, the political expression of our prejudice is motivated by nuanced psychological needs for order and security *that are entirely separate from the first two factors*.

As such, the predominant support for the inequality hypothesis suggests that we may anticipate that a rise of racism and sexism in a society is accompanied by a greater tolerance for inequality between different social groups, and we may witness a growing popularity of political figures whose agenda maintains or exacerbates social inequality. Conversely, we may anticipate that decreased levels of racism and sexism are associated with support for egalitarian politicians. Similarly, the support for the status quo hypothesis (albeit less robust than the inequality hypothesis) suggests that we may anticipate that a rise of racism and sexism is associated with a more stagnant political sentiment where citizens are unwilling to make social changes. Conversely, revolutionary

politicians who would like to make social changes may be more popular at a time when racism and sexism are unpopular ideas.

Understanding of implicit prejudice and implicit political attitudes. The second main contribution is that the current studies expand our understanding of implicit prejudice and implicit political attitudes. Though many researchers investigated the association between citizens' prejudice and evaluation of political candidates, most of them rely on explicit measures (Bock, Byrd-Craven & Burkley, 2017; Dwyer, Stevens, Sullivan, & Allen, 2009; Gervais & Hillard, 2011; Tesler, 2016; Miller & Borgida, 2016; Bai, 2020). Studies that venture into the domain of implicit attitudes typically face two shortcomings; (1) inability to effectively disentangle the role of politicians' ideology and demographic background, and (2) not considering the implicit attitude on both independent variable side and dependent variable side (Payne et al., 2010; Finn & Glaser, 2010; Ksiazkiewicz et al., 2018). The current studies identified that the association between implicit racial (though not gender) prejudice and explicit (though not implicit) evaluation of politicians is moderated by politicians' ideological orientation as opposed to their demographic background such as race and gender. Given that implicit racism is often thought to predict people's attitude toward specific target individuals from a group based on their demographic background (Van den Bergh, 2010; Teachman & Brownell, 2001; Morrison et al., 2016; Payne et al., 2010; Finn & Glaser, 2010; Knowles, et al., 2010), these results provide the most stringent test of the ideology hypothesis against the demographic hypothesis of prejudice so far, and clarify that implicit prejudice, like explicit prejudice, also predicts citizens' evaluation of politicians based on *what the politicians (presumably) ideologically believe* not *who they demographically are* (Bai, 2020). Additionally, by considering the inequality and the status quo components of ideology separately, these results also reveal that the association between implicit attitude and evaluation of politicians is primarily explained by participants' own preferences for politicians whose agenda is perceived as promoting inequality. Therefore, these results further our understanding of the political function of implicit prejudice by suggesting that its expression and theoretical consequences may not be "associative" in the sense that people who implicitly associate Black people with negativities do not also automatically

associate Black politicians with negativities, explicitly or implicitly; but instead, they consider the syntactic connotations related to Black politicians (that is, the social implications they infer and derived from descriptions of the politicians' ideological standing), at least in the domain of explicit evaluation of politicians.

There are some other (null) findings that should be discussed. Most notably, none of the prejudice measures is related to implicit evaluation of politicians across the studies. This suggests that, despite its potential influence on explicit evaluations and voting behaviors (Ksiazkiewicz et al., 2017), how political candidates are evaluated implicitly seems unlikely to be a function of citizens' prejudice, explicit or implicit. Reviewing Tables 1 and 2 again, implicit evaluation is not correlated with any variables other than explicit evaluations. As such, it may be an interesting question for future researchers to identify exactly what factors may herald and shape citizens' implicit evaluation of political candidates.

Limitations and Future Directions

There are several limitations associated with the two dissertation studies. First, like prior studies in this area, the samples are predominantly White, and primarily American. It still remains unclear how well the ideological hypothesis of prejudice may generalize beyond the American context, and it is still unclear what the boundary conditions of the ideological hypothesis of prejudice are (Bai, 2020). Future research should prioritize the identification of the features of political and cultural contexts that may be the boundary conditions of the ideological hypothesis. For example, in societies with high levels of inequality, it may be more normatively proscriptive for minorities or women to run for political office, so the ideological hypothesis may have less explanatory power than the demographic hypothesis there. Furthermore, like similar studies in the past (Bai, 2020), the current studies, though experimental, still cannot provide definitive causal identification, as these studies do not manipulate prejudice, the theoretical causal variable. Experimental methods that manipulate prejudice will be helpful to derive stronger causal inference, albeit the development of such a manipulation is likely challenging, given that interventions that aim to reduce prejudice rarely have large effects, and their effects on implicit prejudice tend to be even more transient (e.g., Lai et

al., 2016; Paluck, 2020). Another limitation is that the experimental stimulus is relatively simple and somewhat artificial. In the “real world,” citizens’ interaction with news media platforms can be a lot more complex and richer in content as well as format. Therefore, it is possible that the conclusions derived from the current studies are not generalizable to the “real world.” Nonetheless, with all its constraints and limitations, overall, this dissertation still contributes to the literature by clarifying the psychological motivations behind the effect of prejudice (i.e., racism and sexism) on political preferences, broadening our understanding of the interplay between prejudice and the ever-changing political landscape.

There are several other future directions for research. In the literature of social psychology and political psychology, researchers have studied the association between evaluation of political figures and several other psychological variables related to racial attitudes, such as racial identity and perceived racial threat (e.g., Jardina, 2019; Major et al., 2018). Similar to the studies on the association between evaluation of political figures and prejudice, it also remains largely unclear if the nature of these associations is primarily determined by the political figures’ race or ideology. Specifically, past findings revealed that White Americans’ racial identity centrality and perception of status threat predicted support for Trump and opposition for Obama (Jardina, 2019; Major et al., 2018). However, as discussed above, Trump is a White conservative while Obama is a Black liberal, so these collections of variables’ positive association with support for Trump and opposition for Obama cannot effectively disentangle the role of politicians’ race and ideology. Future research should consider disentangling the role of politicians’ race and ideology using experimental methods that consider both.

Conclusion

In conclusion, two experiments reveal predominant support for the inequality hypothesis and some support for the status quo hypothesis. The support for these hypotheses primarily occurs on the explicit domain of attitudes, whereas support in the implicit domain is less robust. Together, these findings clarify the political consequences of racism and sexism and further our understanding of the psychological function of prejudice.

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Appendix A

Items noted with “R” are reverse coded. All implicit association test stimuli can be found in the R code file posted on the osf folder.

Racism is measured using the following FIRE scale (DeSante & Smith, 2020) items. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each of the statements below from 1=Disagree strongly to 5=Agree strongly.

1. I am fearful of people of other races.
2. White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin. R
3. Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations.
4. I am angry that racism exists. R

Sexism is measured using the following Separate Spheres Ideology (Miller & Borgida, 2016) items from 1=Strongly disagree to 7= Strongly agree

1. Women can learn technical skills, but it doesn't come as naturally as it does for most men.
2. If one person in a heterosexual marriage needs to quit working, it usually makes more sense for the husband to keep his job.
3. Children with single parents can be just as well off as children with both a mom and a dad. R
4. When it comes to voting for president, I'm more comfortable trusting a man to make tough political decisions than a woman.
5. When a married couple divorces, judges shouldn't assume that the mother is the more “natural” parent. R
6. Most men naturally enjoy a tough and competitive career more than women do.
7. I would feel more comfortable if my auto mechanic was a man, rather than a woman.
8. If we got rid of stereotyping and discrimination, differences between men and women would mostly disappear. R

9. Women can learn how to be good leaders in the workplace, but it doesn't come as naturally as it does for most men.
10. It's natural for a woman to be fulfilled by taking care of her children, but most men feel better when they have a good career, too.
11. There are certain care-giving jobs, like nursing, that just naturally fit with women's skills better than men's skills.
12. Most kids are better off if their dad is the primary provider for the whole family.
13. I would feel equally comfortable with a repair-man or a repair-woman to fix something in my house.
14. It's just as important to most women as it is to men to have a successful career. R
15. When it comes to making tough business decisions, men tend to have special abilities that most women don't have.

The **evaluation of the hypothetical candidate** is measured using the following procedure. Participants read a hypothetical profile of a political candidate. The profile includes several pieces of information that are manipulated.

Instruction

Please carefully read the following article about a hypothetical city mayor, Jackie Maher. You will be asked some questions related to the the [sic.] mayor the next several pages, and please respond to the questions as truthfully as you can as if everything is real.

Race and gender are manipulated by including one of the following four pictures as the profile picture:

Black female condition

White female condition

Black male condition

White male condition

The ideology of the politician is manipulated using the following hypothetical press release. Key differences between conditions are bolded in the manipulation to increase participants' attention to them.

Study 1

Condition 1 (bringing inequality and preserving Status quo)

Jackie Maher: Taking Stock

After three and half years in office, Jackie Maher, mayor of Lakeview, a city with a population of 80,000, has implemented several plans in the city. However, what the citizens of the city may not have realized is that Jackie's plans and policies are **bringing racial inequality and perpetuating the status quo in the city.**

In the most recent year, Mayor Maher supported two policies, both of which were shown to have **brought more racial inequality and blocked change in the city.** In one of the plans, Mayor Maher backed a program that pays for the loans on education-related expenses from anyone who completes technical college, college, graduate degree and work to provide public services in the city, which includes working in the government, school, and charities. A comprehensive analysis of the impact of this program showed that although it benefits all students who received tuition loans, **this law predominantly benefits Whites, and is thus perpetuating racial inequality in the city.** Moreover, during the mayor's tenure, **many social institutions and laws in the city that were otherwise going to change were instead frozen in place.**

In an interview, the mayor said that "there will always be some domains where one racial group is doing better than other racial groups. **Eliminating racial inequality is a moving target. We should not try to achieve that.**" In a different interview the mayor also said that "there is a reason that the existing laws and social order are the way they are. As a mayor, **I do not think I should change any of them.**"

Condition 2 (bringing inequality and changing status quo)**Jackie Maher: Taking Stock**

After three and half years in office, Jackie Maher, mayor of Lakeview, a city with a population of 80,000, has implemented several plans in the city. However, what the citizens of the city may not have realized is that Jackie's plans and policies are **bringing racial inequality and changing the status quo in the city.**

In the most recent year, Mayor Maher supported two policies, both of which were shown to have **brought more racial inequality, changing the city.** In one of the plans, Mayor Maher backed a program that pays for the loans on education-related expenses from anyone who completes technical college, college, graduate degree and work to provide public services in the city, which includes working in the government, school, and charities. A comprehensive analysis of the impact of this program showed that although it benefits all students who received tuition loans, **this law predominantly benefits Whites, and is thus bringing more racial inequality to the city.** Moreover, during the mayor's tenure, **many social institutions and laws were changed.**

In an interview, the mayor said that "there will always be some domains where one racial group is doing better than other racial groups. **Eliminating racial inequality is a moving target.**" In a different interview the mayor also said that "we should not try to keep existing laws and social order that we always have. As a mayor, **I should change them.**"

Condition 3 (bringing equality and preserving status quo)

Jackie Maher: Taking Stock

After three and half years in office, Jackie Maher, mayor of Lakeview, a city with a population of 80,000, has implemented several plans in the city. However, what the citizens of the city may not have realized is that Jackie's plans and policies are **bringing racial equality but perpetuating the status quo in the city.**

In the most recent year, Mayor Maher supported two policies, both of which were shown to have **brought more racial equality but blocked change in the city.** In one of the plans, Mayor Maher backed a program that pays for the loans on education-related expenses from anyone who completes technical college, college, graduate degree and work to provide public services in the city, which includes working in the government, school, and charities. A comprehensive analysis of the impact of this program showed that although it benefits all students who received tuition loans, **this law predominantly benefits Blacks, and is thus bringing more racial equality to the city.** Moreover, during the mayor's tenure, **many social institutions and laws in the city that were otherwise going to change were instead frozen in place.**

In an interview, the mayor said that “there are some domains where one racial group is doing better than other racial groups. **Eliminating racial inequality is an important target. We should try to achieve that.**” In a different interview the mayor also said that “there is a reason that the existing laws and social order are the way they are. As a mayor, **I do not think I should change any of them.**”

Condition 4 (bringing equality and changing status quo)

Jackie Maher: Taking Stock

After three and half years in office, Jackie Maher, mayor of Lakeview, a city with a population of 80,000, has implemented several plans in the city. However, what the citizens of the city may not have realized is that Jackie's plans and policies are **bringing racial equality and changing the racial status quo to the city.**

In the most recent year, Mayor Maher supported two policies, both of which were shown to have **brought more racial equality and changing the status quo.** In one of the plans, Mayor Maher backed a program that pays for the loans on education-related expenses from anyone who completes technical college, college, graduate degree and work to provide public services in the city of Lakeview, which includes working in the government, school, and charities. A comprehensive analysis of the impact of this program showed that although it benefits all students who received tuition loans, this law **predominantly benefits Blacks, and is thus bringing more racial equality to the city.** Moreover, during the mayor's tenure, **many social institutions and laws in the city were changed.**

In an interview, the mayor said that “there are some domains where one racial group is doing better than other racial groups. **Eliminating racial inequality is an important target. We should try to achieve that.**” In a different interview the mayor also said that “we should not try to keep existing laws and social order that we always have. As a mayor, **I should change them.**”

Study 2

Condition 1 (bringing inequality and preserving Status quo)

Jackie Maher: Taking Stock

After three and half years in office, Jackie Maher, mayor of Lakeview, a city with a population of 80,000, has implemented several plans in the city. However, what the citizens of the city may not have realized is that Jackie's plans and policies are **bringing gender inequality and perpetuating the status quo in the city**.

In the most recent year, Mayor Maher supported two policies, both of which were shown to have **brought more gender inequality and blocked change in the city**. In one of the plans, Mayor Maher backed a program that pays for the loans on education-related expenses from anyone who completes technical college, college, graduate degree and work to provide public services in the city, which includes working in the government, school, and charities. A comprehensive analysis of the impact of this program showed that although it benefits all students who received tuition loans, this law **predominantly benefits men, and is thus perpetuating gender inequality in the city**. Moreover, during the mayor's tenure, **many social institutions and laws in the city that were otherwise going to change were instead frozen in place**.

In an interview, the mayor said that "there will always be some domains where one gender group is doing better than others. **Eliminating gender inequality is a moving target. We should not try to achieve that.**" In a different interview the mayor also said that "there is a reason that the existing laws and social order are the way they are. As a mayor, **I do not think I should change any of them.**"

Condition 2 (bringing inequality and changing status quo)**Jackie Maher: Taking Stock**

After three and half years in office, Jackie Maher, mayor of Lakeview, a city with a population of 80,000, has implemented several plans in the city. However, what the citizens of the city may not have realized is that Jackie's plans and policies are **bringing gender inequality and changing the status quo in the city**.

In the most recent year, Mayor Maher supported two policies, both of which were shown to have **brought more gender inequality, changing the city**. In one of the plans, Mayor Maher backed a program that pays for the loans on education-related expenses from anyone who completes technical college, college, graduate degree and work to provide public services in the city, which includes working in the government, school, and charities. A comprehensive analysis of the impact of this program showed that although it benefits all students who received tuition loans, this law **predominantly benefits men, and is thus bringing more gender inequality to the city**. Moreover, during the mayor's tenure, **many social institutions and laws were changed**.

In an interview, the mayor said that "there will always be some domains where one gender group is doing better than others. **Eliminating gender inequality is a moving target**." In a different interview the mayor also said that "we should not try to keep existing laws and social order that we always have. As a mayor, **I should change them**."

Condition 3 (bringing equality and preserving status quo)**Jackie Maher: Taking Stock**

After three and half years in office, Jackie Maher, mayor of Lakeview, a city with a population of 80,000, has implemented several plans in the city. However, what the citizens of the city may not have realized is that Jackie's plans and policies are **bringing gender equality but perpetuating the status quo in the city.**

In the most recent year, Mayor Maher supported two policies, both of which were shown to have **brought more gender equality but blocked change in the city.** In one of the plans, Mayor Maher backed a program that pays for the loans on education-related expenses from anyone who completes technical college, college, graduate degree and work to provide public services in the city, which includes working in the government, school, and charities. A comprehensive analysis of the impact of this program showed that although it benefits all students who received tuition loans, this law **predominantly benefits women, and is thus bringing more gender equality to the city.** Moreover, during the mayor's tenure, **many social institutions and laws in the city that were otherwise going to change were instead frozen in place.**

In an interview, the mayor said that "there are some domains where one gender group is doing better than others. **Eliminating gender inequality is an important target.** We should try to achieve that." In a different interview the mayor also said that "there is a reason that the existing laws and social order are the way they are. As a mayor, **I do not think I should change any of them.**"

Condition 4 (bringing equality and changing status quo)

Jackie Maher: Taking Stock

After three and half years in office, Jackie Maher, mayor of Lakeview, a city with a population of 80,000, has implemented several plans in the city. However, what the citizens of the city may not have realized is that Jackie's plans and policies are **bringing gender equality and changing the gender status quo to the city.**

In the most recent year, Mayor Maher supported two policies, both of which were shown to have **brought more gender equality and changing the status quo.** In one of the plans, Mayor Maher backed a program that pays for the loans on education-related expenses from anyone who completes technical college, college, graduate degree and work to provide public services in the city, which includes working in the government, school, and charities. A comprehensive analysis of the impact of this program showed that although it benefits all students who received tuition loans, **this law predominantly benefits women, and is thus bringing more gender equality to the city.** Moreover, during the mayor's tenure, **many social institutions and laws in the city were changed.**

In an interview, the mayor said that "there are some domains where one gender group is doing better than others. **Eliminating gender inequality is an important target.** We should try to achieve that." In a different interview the mayor also said that "we should not try to keep existing laws and social order that we always have. As a mayor, **I should change them.**"

How likely do you think you will vote for this politician? Rating of 0 means that there is a 0% of chance you will do so. Rating of 100 mean that you there is a 100% of chance, and rating of 50% means that you there is a half chance you will vote for this politician.

We would like to get your feelings toward this politician. Please rate that person using something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the politician. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the politician and that you don't care too much for the politician. You would rate the politician at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the politician. There is no right or wrong answer.

When you are thinking about this politician, how much do you experience each of the following emotions?

	Not at all				A great deal
Anger	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Disgust	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Appendix B: Pilot Study

In total, three pilot studies were conducted to test and refine the manipulation. The following will describe the last pilot study, which tested the manipulation that was ultimately used in the actual studies. The key difference over the iterations is that in the first pilot study, there was no bolded text in the material, and participants were also not given the two comprehension check questions. In the second pilot study, the bolded text was added, and in the third or the last pilot study, the two comprehension check questions (which require participants to answer correctly in order to proceed) were added. All these changes were made in order to reduce the unintended “spill-over” effects or violations of the stable unit treatment value assumption (see below). Though these unintended effects are reduced over the iterations, they are not completely eliminated (see below).

Method

In the last pilot study, a total of 404 participants were recruited from Prolific (Mean age= 33.77, SD age= 12.60; 181 identified as females, and 217 as males, and the remaining cases identified as neither or were missing). Participants in this pilot study used exactly the same procedure as what was later used in the actual study. Given the similarity of the manipulations, the pilot studies for Studies 1 and 2 were collected together and analyzed together.

For the manipulation check questions, on a separate page after the manipulation, all participants were asked “What is the racial background of the candidate?” (0=Black, 1=White), “What is the sex of the candidate?” (0=male, 1=female), and “If this politician is re-elected, do you think the existing social order will be more likely to be **kept the same or to be changed**?” (1=Stay the same, 7= Will be changed). “If this politician is re-elected, do you think there will be more inequality or equality **between different racial groups**?” (1= More inequality, 7= More equality) and “If this politician is re-elected, do you think there will be more inequality or equality **between men and women**?” (1= More inequality, 7= More equality). These questions are manipulation check items for the manipulated factors of the politician's race, gender, status quo, racial inequality, and gender inequality, respectively.

Results and Discussion

To test the effectiveness of the manipulation, two logistic regressions (Models 1 and 2) and three linear regressions (Models 3-5) were estimated using the four condition variables that represent each of the factors manipulated in the experiment. The regressions for predicting recalled race and gender are logistic regression models, given that the dependent variables are binary outcomes, and the remaining ones are linear regressions. All models other than the two for predicting inequality (i.e., Models 3 and 4) also include a term for “Study” which is coded as 0 if the manipulation materials are what would be used for Study 1, and 1 if they are what would be used for Study 2. This term is included to account for potential differences in intercept across the manipulation used in the two studies. This term is not needed for the models for inequality measures because only the subsample that received the Study 1 materials were used for the model for the racial inequality item (i.e., Model 3), and only the subsample that received the Study 2 materials were used for the model for the gender inequality item (i.e., Model 4).

The results from the five regression models are summarized in Tables A1 and A2. According to Model 1, the race condition variable is the only significant predictor, suggesting this manipulated factor is effectively manipulated. No other predictor is significant, so there is unlikely any other manipulated factor “spilled over” to the race factor. In other words, there is unlikely any violation of the stable unit treatment value assumption. The same can be said for the gender manipulation (Model 2) and the racial inequality manipulation (Model 3).

The results are somewhat different for the gender inequality manipulation and status quo manipulation as shown in Models 4 and 5—though the condition variables for the corresponding factors are significant in the expected direction as intended, there are other unintended “spill-over” effects as other terms that are independently manipulated are also significant. Specifically, in Model 4, status quo and gender condition variables are both significant, suggesting that the politician described as male and as preserving status quo are also more likely to be perceived as undermining gender equality. In Model 5, the inequality condition variable is also significant, suggesting that the politician described as undermining equality is also perceived to promote the status quo. Therefore,

there are some violations of the stable unit treatment value assumption related to the gender equality and status quo aspect of the politician.

In the “real world,” these spill-over effects are difficult to avoid because citizens sometimes do infer a politician’s ideology from their gender (Koch, 2000), and status quo and inequality are deeply related in American politics (Jost, Federico, Napier, 2009). Nonetheless, reviewing the effect size of the terms related to the unintended effects, they are much smaller than that of the intended manipulations. Furthermore, the main models that will be discussed below (Models S1.3s and S2.3s) include interactions from both inequality and status quo factors. This specification, therefore, statistically controls for the effects of both factors relative to the other. Together, these suggest that these violations of the stable unit treatment value assumption are unlikely to be of a great concern.

Table A 1. Pilot Study Results for Race and Gender Manipulations

		Estimate	S.E.	p	95% CI	Odds ratio
Model 1. Perceived race (Studies 1 and 2)	(Intercept)	-3.82 ***	0.79	0	[-5.56 -2.4]	0.02
	Inequality condition	0.59 ns	0.64	0.35	[-0.63 1.95]	1.81
	Status quo condition	0.55 ns	0.64	0.39	[-0.66 1.91]	1.74
	Gender condition	-0.58 ns	0.64	0.36	[-1.94 0.64]	0.56
	Race condition	7.47 ***	0.71	0	[6.24 9.06]	1751.55
	Study	0.18 ns	0.62	0.77	[-1.04 1.44]	1.2
	Family: binomial, McFadden Pseudo R-squared=0.83, AIC=109.47, BIC=133.45					
Model 2. Perceived gender (Studies 1 and 2)	(Intercept)	-2.85 ***	0.71	0	[-4.46 -1.6]	0.06
	Inequality condition	-0.61 ns	0.65	0.34	[-1.99 0.62]	0.54
	Status quo condition	-0.49 ns	0.65	0.45	[-1.86 0.75]	0.61
	Gender condition	8.76 ***	1.15	0	[6.94 11.8]	6391.38
	Race condition	1.08 ns	0.69	0.12	[-0.19 2.63]	2.96
	Study	-0.62 ns	0.65	0.34	[-1.99 0.62]	0.54
	Family: binomial, McFadden Pseudo R-squared=0.84, AIC=98.77, BIC=122.77					

Note. S.E. refers to standard error of the estimates. *** $p < 0.001$. All 0 refers to values between -.01 and .01

Table A 2. Pilot Study Results for Racial and Gender Inequality and Status Quo Manipulations

		Estimate	S.E.	p	95% CI	Partial eta square (in %)	Standardized estimate
Model 3. Perceived Racial equality (Study 1)	(Intercept)	5.72 ***	0.22	0	[5.28 6.15]		0
	Racial inequality condition	-3.45 ***	0.2	0	[-3.85 -3.1]	60.44	-0.77
	Status quo condition	-0.28 ns	0.2	0.18	[-0.68 0.12]	0.96	-0.06
	Gender condition	0.21 ns	0.2	0.31	[-0.19 0.61]	0.54	0.05
	Race condition	-0.12 ns	0.2	0.54	[-0.52 0.27]	0.2	-0.03
	F(4,191)=73.87, R-squared=0.61, adjusted R-squared=0.6						
Model 4. Perceived Gender equality (Study 2)	(Intercept)	6.42 ***	0.19	0	[6.06 6.79]		0
	Gender Inequality condition	-3.61 ***	0.16	0	[-3.93 -3.3]	70.65	-0.82
	Status quo condition	-0.78 ***	0.16	0	[-1.11 -0.5]	10.16	-0.18
	Gender condition	-0.35 *	0.16	0.04	[-0.67 -0]	2.18	-0.08
	Race condition	-0.04 ns	0.16	0.8	[-0.37 0.28]	0.03	-0.01
	F(4,200)=127.44, R-squared=0.72, adjusted R-squared=0.71						
Model 5. Perceived status quo (Studies 1 and 2)	(Intercept)	5.5 ***	0.17	0	[5.16 5.84]		0
	Inequality condition	-0.63 ***	0.14	0	[-0.92 -0.4]	4.74	-0.14
	Status quo condition	-3.3 ***	0.14	0	[-3.58 -3]	57.38	-0.75
	Gender condition	0.03 ns	0.14	0.83	[-0.25 0.31]	0.01	0.01
	Race condition	0.22 ns	0.14	0.13	[-0.06 0.5]	0.59	0.05
	Study	0.18 ns	0.14	0.22	[-0.1 0.46]	0.39	0.04
	F(5,395)=111.08, R-squared=0.58, adjusted R-squared=0.58						

Note. S.E. refers to standard error of the estimates. *** $p < 0.001$. All 0 refers to values between -.01 and .01

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